Topic: Local Government

Tax Breaks, Transparency, and Accountability: A Conversation with Greg LeRoy

January 28, 2016 | 12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.

Cambridge, MA United States

Free, offered in English

Watch the Recording


The “economic war among the states (and suburbs)” is on steroids, says Greg LeRoy, founder of Good Jobs First. Large companies such as, General Electric, Tesla, or Boeing have great power to play states and cities against each other for nine- and ten-figure subsidy packages. There is no leadership for restraint from the federal government or the National Governors Association, and no success has been found in state or federal litigation strategies, he says. So activists have demanded greater transparency to win accountability. They have won a great deal of progress: every state now discloses at least some of its deal-making online, which Good Jobs First captures in Subsidy Tracker</a>; money-back clawbacks and job quality standards are commonplace; and some communities have agreed to attach various community benefits to deals. Now with the adoption of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board GASB Statement No. 77 on Tax Abatement Disclosures, a new era of transparency is unfolding: for 2016 and beyond, states and most localities will have to account for the revenue they lose to corporate tax breaks. Even school districts that lose revenue passively will have to report such expenditures. Property taxes, whose records are so extremely dispersed, will be the most affected, gaining the most in transparency. This is significant because property tax abatements often comprise the single largest tax breaks in development deals. Join Greg LeRoy for a brief presentation followed by a conversation with Lincoln Institute President George W. “Mac” McCarthy. This event is the second in a yearlong series that is part of the Lincoln Institute’s campaign to promote municipal fiscal health.

Dubbed “the leading national watchdog of state and local economic development subsidies” and “God’s witness to corporate welfare,” Greg LeRoy @GregLeRoy4 founded and directs Good Jobs First, a national resource center promoting accountability in the >$70 billion spent annually by states and cities for economic development, and smart growth for working families. Good Jobs First is home to Subsidy Tracker, the only national database of subsidy awards (480,000 state, local and federal deals). He is the author of The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax Dodging and the Myth of Job Creation (2005) and No More Candy Store: States and Cities Making Job Subsidies Accountable (1994). Good Jobs First was recently honored by State Tax Notes magazine as one of two organizations of the year in 2015 for its victory winning a new accounting rule from the Governmental Accounting Standards Board. He earned a BSJ from the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University and an M.A. in U.S. history from Northern Illinois University.


Details

Date
January 28, 2016
Time
12:00 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.
Registration Period
January 15, 2016 - January 28, 2016
Location
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
113 Brattle Street
Cambridge, MA United States
Language
English
Cost
Free

Keywords

Economic Development, Local Government, Municipal Fiscal Health, Property Taxation, Public Finance, Taxation

Cities on the Brink: The Dynamics of Fiscal Retrenchment

November 20, 2015 | 12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Cambridge, MA United States

Free, offered in English

Watch the Recording


Research on fiscal retrenchment at the local government level has been severely hampered by limited data on city finances after the Great Recession of 2007-09. This research will present the results of the Municipal Fiscal Retrenchment and Recovery (MFRR) survey, which targeted municipal governments with a population of 50,000 or more, and was implemented from March to June 2015. The MFFR survey targeted appointed managers and budget or finance directors, and had a response rate of approximately 40%. The survey gathered information about different aspects of the fiscal retrenchment and recovery process in city governments. The results show that most cities faced a serious budget crisis in 2009 and 2010. The most frequently cited cause of the crisis was the Great Recession, followed by structural issues such as rapidly increasing expenditures, reliance on a few revenue sources, and tax and expenditure limits, among others. In responding to the budget crisis, cities relied more on expenditure cutting strategies in comparison with revenue-raising approaches. Have cities fully recovered their fiscal health? More than five years after the end of the Great Recession, a large majority–seven out of ten cities–reports that they are on the precipice of another budget crisis. This lecture is the first in a yearlong series that is part of the campaign to promote municipal fiscal health.

Benedict S. Jimenez (PhD, University of Illinois) is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Northeastern University. He is the recipient of the Clarence N. Stone Scholar Award and the Paul A. Volcker Junior Scholar Award from the American Political Science Association, and the 2009 Donald C. Stone Junior Scholar Award from the American Society for Public Administration. Formerly a faculty member at Rutgers University, his research examines how sub-national governments finance, manage and provide local public goods. Benedict is currently directing a research project that examines how fiscal, institutional, and organizational variables influence the process and outcomes of fiscal retrenchment in cities after the 2007-09 Great Recession. His research has been published in top public administration, public policy, and public budgeting and finance journals such as the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, and Urban Affairs Review, among others.


Details

Date
November 20, 2015
Time
12:30 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.
Registration Period
November 10, 2015 - November 20, 2015
Location
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
113 Brattle Street
Cambridge, MA United States
Language
English
Cost
Free

Keywords

Economic Development, Local Government, Municipal Fiscal Health, Public Finance, Public Policy

Course

Urban Land Policy for Latin American Journalists

March 17, 2016 - March 19, 2016

Lima, Peru

Free, offered in Spanish


This course is especially designed to provide an understanding about current urban issues in Latin American cities and their roots in land and urban policies to a journalism audience. Mass media and journalism professionals have great potential to inform the public regarding cities and their problems as well as influence urban and land policy. The course will cover the fundamentals of land markets (land use and price determination), the nature and limits of property rights in Latin American legislation, and alternative land-based tools for financing urban (re)development. Special attention will be given to new urban planning instruments currently being applied in the region, including value capture, inclusionary zoning, and regularization of informal settlements.


Details

Date
March 17, 2016 - March 19, 2016
Application Period
January 28, 2016 - February 15, 2016
Location
Lima, Peru
Language
Spanish
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Infrastructure, Land Market Monitoring, Land Use Planning, Planning, Property Taxation, Public Finance, Public Policy, Valuation

Course

Reviewing the Basics of Planning for Land Management

April 10, 2015 - May 17, 2015

Online

Free, offered in Spanish


The course, offered in Spanish, provides a space to discuss new theoretical perspectives and practical experiences that seek to challenge and overcome some weaknesses of traditional technocratic planning, and the need to make visible the state’s role in building the city and the impact that planning decisions have on land markets.


Details

Date
April 10, 2015 - May 17, 2015
Application Period
March 16, 2015 - March 30, 2015
Location
Online
Language
Spanish
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Housing, Land Market Monitoring, Land Use, Land Use Planning, Legal Issues, Local Government, Planning, Urban Development, Zoning

Course

Municipal Fiscal Health and Urban Planning

July 4, 2016 - July 8, 2016

Beijing, China

Offered in English


Each year, the Program on the People’s Republic of China offers a week-long capacity-building “Training the Trainers” course to young faculty members, researchers, and practitioners from universities, government agencies, and institutions across China. The subject of the course varies each year, often targeting to the specific need for knowledge relevant to the current policy reform. The course is taught by internationally-reputed scholars in relevant fields. This year the course topics are Municipal Fiscal Health and Urban Planning.


Details

Date
July 4, 2016 - July 8, 2016
Location
Peking University
Beijing, China
Language
English
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Infrastructure, Municipal Fiscal Health, Planning, Public Finance, Urban, Urban Design, Urban Development, Value Capture

Course

Planning Basics for Land Management

February 27, 2016 - April 5, 2016

Online

Free, offered in Spanish


In this course, offered in Spanish, students discuss and debate new perspectives and practical experiences regarding land management planning while identifying weaknesses of more traditional systems. Topics covered also include the role of the State during urban construction and the impact that planning has on land markets.


Details

Date
February 27, 2016 - April 5, 2016
Application Period
February 1, 2016 - February 14, 2016
Selection Notification Date
February 22, 2016 at 6:00 PM
Location
Online
Language
Spanish
Cost
Free
Educational Credit Type
Lincoln Institute certificate

Keywords

Housing, Land Market Monitoring, Land Use, Land Use Planning, Legal Issues, Local Government, Planning, Urban Development, Zoning

Buy-In for Buyouts

Three Flood-Prone Communities Opt for Managed Retreat
By Robert Freudenberg, Ellis Calvin, Laura Tolkoff, and Dare Brawley, July 29, 2016

This article is adapted from Buy-in for Buyouts: The Case for Managed Retreat from Flood Zones, a Policy Focus Report to be published in September 2016 by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in conjunction with Regional Plan Association.

 

Hurricane Irene and Superstorm Sandy cost the New York metropolitan area an unprecedented number of lives and properties. In the span of 14 months, between August 2011 and October 2012, the storms killed 83 residents and caused $80 billion of damage in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. More than $60 billion in recovery funding was allocated to local governments, home owners, and facilitators to repair roads and seawalls; elevate, secure, or acquire buildings; restore dunes and wetlands; and reconstruct communities. 

The hurricanes generated a regional dialogue about how to prepare for and respond to extreme weather events. These conversations led to state-of-the-art, government-sponsored design competitions such as Rebuild by Design. And at the federal level, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted the two-year, $19.5 million North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study, which focused on how to protect Northeast residents from hurricanes. 

Yet nearly five years later—after recovery efforts have been completed and appropriate programs implemented—many communities in the region still could not withstand the surge levels of another Sandy or the riverine flooding of another Irene. And by 2050, the number of residents vulnerable to flooding in the region will likely double to 2 million people, due to rising sea levels, the increasing frequency and magnitude of storms, and steady population growth. One third of the victims will be socially vulnerable. 

The Case for Buyouts

Rebuilding and restoring are the most common and popular adaptation tools for strengthening community resilience in the face of climate change, but the strategy that most effectively eliminates risk is managed retreat through the use of buyout programs. Yet, because of the social and political complexity of managed retreat, governments and communities across the United States have largely dismissed it as an adaptation strategy. 

Typically funded by federal or state dollars and managed at the state or county levels, buyout programs are designed to provide a mechanism for residents to sell their homes and move to safer locations if they no longer want to live in high-risk flood zones. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut all employed buyout programs on a limited scale following Hurricane Irene and Superstorm Sandy, but too often this approach was considered controversial even for the hardest hit areas.

Indeed, managed retreat poses considerable challenges. For home owners, the decision to leave a community can be traumatic, especially if adequate and affordable housing is hard to find nearby. For municipalities, the loss of tax revenue from bought-out properties can have a serious impact on the local budget. On a higher level, urban planning’s dubious history of relocating low-income communities, ostensibly for the greater good, stands as a reminder of how well-intentioned, even necessary measures such as managed retreat can have disproportionate negative impacts if they are not carefully considered in close consultation with residents. 

But if these problems are carefully considered during the design and implementation process, the benefits of buyouts can outweigh the risks. Unlike other adaptation measures, retreat is a one-time investment that requires no further action beyond providing relocation assistance to participants and protecting the natural landscape left behind. Managed retreat also has the potential to create synergies with other resilience and adaptation strategies. Since development is not permitted on acquired land, buyouts can be used to implement projects such as sea wall construction, wetlands restoration, and many other engineered and nature-based resilience measures. Residents can forge new beginnings on safer ground and help create public amenities by allowing for the acquisition of homes in flood-prone areas and restoration of the land to natural floodplain functions.

While the promise of buyouts is great—yielding 100 percent risk reduction, a greater return on public investment, and other benefits to communities and habitats—they have attracted only $750 million of the billions in federal aid allocated for resilience and recovery in the New York metropolitan region. The vast majority of recovery efforts have focused on more popular adaptation measures.

Buyouts in the New York Metropolitan Region

This article highlights the experience of three cities in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey that adopted buyout programs after suffering major property loss from Hurricane Irene or Superstorm Sandy. The case studies demonstrate that buyout programs are a useful tool for moving residents in flood zones out of harm’s way, but they also illustrate the limitations of current programs. 

 


 

Buyout Programs in the New York Region

NY Rising
New York State established the New York Rising Buyout and Acquisition Programs (NY Rising) in order to address the damage caused by hurricanes Irene and Sandy as well as Tropical Storm Lee between 2011 and 2013. In a handful of designated “enhanced buyout areas,” including Oakwood Beach on Staten Island, home owners were offered the pre-storm value of their homes, plus incentives for group participation to prevent the so-called “checkerboarding” of bought-out properties. 

Blue Acres
The Blue Acres program, run by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, predates hurricanes Irene and Sandy, but it has benefited from the funding made available after those storms. In recent years, the program has mainly targeted neighborhoods in Sayreville and Woodbridge, and identified individual properties or clusters of properties that experienced repetitive or severe repetitive losses.

Other Federally Funded Programs
In many cases, buyout programs are administered on the local level and funded largely through federal grant programs such as FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and the USDA’s Emergency Watershed Protection Floodplain Easement Program (EWP-FPE). Typically, federal grants for buyouts require a local funding match of 25 percent.

 


 

Oakwood Beach, New York

Oakwood Beach is located on the central part of Staten Island’s South Shore. The lowest-lying portion of the neighborhood is situated next to the marshes of Great Kills Park. The most serious flood risks come from storm surge off the Raritan Bay and Lower New York Harbor. Additionally, sections of the neighborhood experience nuisance flooding following even modest rainfall. Along with the neighboring upland community of Oakwood, Oakwood Beach has a population of 22,000, and nearly 3,000 residents live in current FEMA Special Flood Hazard Zones. The number of people within high-risk flood zones is expected to increase nearly 150 percent, to 7,300 by 2050. 

Oakwood Beach is a middle-class community with a median annual household income of $89,000. The neighborhood is 31 percent low-to-moderate income, 16 percent nonwhite, and 69 percent owner-occupied. The neighborhood was largely developed in the 1960s and 1970s; nearly half its residents have lived in the community for more than 25 years. In general, the homes built closer to the water are smaller and cheaper than those located farther upland. Single-family homes dominate the neighborhood, but there are a handful of apartment buildings inland.

Hurricane Sandy severely impacted Oakwood Beach. The storm surge overtopped the boulevard that runs along the coast and damaged the berm between the neighborhood and the Atlantic Ocean. The surge inundation was exacerbated by the floodwaters trapped within the “bowl” topography of the South Shore (SIRR 2013). In Oakwood Beach, some homes were swept off their foundations; others were flattened. Staten Island as a whole was among the hardest hit areas, with 23 storm-related deaths in the borough (SIRR 2013; Koslov 2014). Prior to Sandy, Oakwood Beach withstood several other historic floods, including intense inundation from a nor’easter in 1992 and flooding from Hurricane Irene in 2011 (Oakwood Beach Buyout Committee 2015; Koslov 2014). After the 1992 storm, residents organized a Flood Victims’ Committee to petition for better flood protection from the state and federal government. Although the USACE somewhat addressed their concerns by constructing a berm, it was not completed until ten years after the nor’easter (Koslov 2014).

Building on their experience organizing for flood protection in the 1990s, Oakwood Beach residents moved quickly to plan their recovery after Hurricane Sandy. At an early community meeting devoted to immediate disaster response and aid, one organizer asked if residents would support a buyout program. Nearly all community members in attendance said yes. Residents then formed the Oakwood Beach Buyout Committee, which began to draft an application for a state buyout. The committee conducted outreach to gauge interest and provided information to residents about what a buyout program might entail. The committee collected signatures from nearly all the neighborhood’s residents to indicate their interest (Lavey 2014). Additionally, committee members surveyed residents about where they felt safe living within the neighborhood, in order to generate maps of priority acquisition areas. 

This mapping effort is a powerful tool for communities organizing to receive buyouts. However, some populations that are considering buyouts are settling in marginal flood-prone areas because they have suffered government-imposed relocations and disinvestments in the past. If buyout program plans are not community-driven, they risk continuing this pattern of marginalization. As we observed in post-Katrina New Orleans, residents understandably opposed buyout programs proposed by outside planners who hadn’t consulted with the local population. By contrast, Oakwood Beach residents collaboratively created their own “green dot” maps to convey their goals for a buyout program and to confirm that they did not want redevelopment in their flood-prone area. 

The NY Rising Program heeded residents’ requests and launched a buyout program for Oakwood Beach. As of June 2015, nearly 99 percent of the neighborhood’s residents have participated. The state plans to purchase 326 properties, an acquisition process that will be completed in 2016. As of February 2015, the state owned 296 properties and had demolished 60 (Rush 2015; Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery 2015). 

The relative success of Oakwood Beach’s buyout program is not surprising considering the fiscal context. Factoring in the projected sea level rise by 2050, a single 100-year flood event could cause $216 million of damage across 1,837 properties, and 830 would have to be demolished. As summarized in table 1 (p. 32), a buyout of only those 830 properties would save community residents $817,000 per year in flood insurance premiums and an annualized average of $5.7 million in damages and dislocation costs. In terms of the potential costs to communities, Oakwood Beach benefits from being only one neighborhood in a very large city. The loss in tax revenue is quite negligible in the context of New York City’s $75 billion budget.

Wayne, New Jersey

Wayne is a township of 55,000 people in the outer ring of northern New Jersey suburbs. Twenty percent of households are low-to-moderate income, 20 percent of residents are nonwhite, and 80 percent are home owners. The town is landlocked but lies within the Passaic River Basin. Approximately 12 miles of Wayne’s western border is formed by the Pompton River, which has a history of flooding. Additionally, the township has several lakes and streams with development encroaching on flood zones. Approximately 5,400 people (nearly 10 percent of the total population) currently live in Special Flood Hazard Areas. Wayne is the wealthiest of the case studies, but the town has experienced the slowest property value growth since 2000. FEMA has provided $6.9 million in individual assistance to Wayne home owners since 2007, and 15 percent of registrants occupy repetitive-loss properties.

Wayne has experienced severe flooding since colonial times. The most severe flood to impact the entire Passaic River Basin occurred in 1903. Since then, several major floods have occurred each decade. Although the USACE began plans to reduce flooding in the Passaic River Basin in 1936, a comprehensive plan for the area has yet to be implemented.

The first buyouts in the Passaic River Basin began in 1995, after the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) formed its Blue Acres Program. They have continued through various funding sources, including NJDEP, FEMA, and open space taxes, in the case of municipalities in Morris County. However, Wayne was not included in the first round of buyouts through the Blue Acres Program in the late 1990s. As a result, municipal officials approached the state about funding the town, which led to several other programs. In 2005, the NJDEP and USACE identified the Hoffman Grove neighborhood in Wayne as a priority area for buyout funding (USACE 2005). A series of allocations since 2005, including additional funding after hurricanes Irene and Sandy, allowed for the purchase and removal of 96 homes in the Hoffman Grove neighborhood. FEMA was the primary source of funding for these purchases; the Blue Acres Program provided the nonfederal match. Despite these significant subsidies, news sources reported that “there is no immediate funding to buy and raze the houses that are left standing” (McGrath 2011). Nevertheless, all but 29 homes in this neighborhood have now been purchased and removed.

In May 2015, the USACE, together with NJDEP, released a follow-up to that 2005 study and identified 27 additional properties within Hoffman Grove as priorities for acquisition. Municipal officials in Wayne are now working to identify willing residents in order to move the program forward. Once these buyouts are complete, the entirety of the Hoffman Grove neighborhood will return to a floodplain.

The buyout programs in Wayne more closely resemble the FEMA buyout programs that began in the 1990s in response to the Great Flood of 1993, given Wayne’s vulnerability to seasonal and storm-related riverine flooding. Buyouts have undergone greater testing in riverine settings, leading to simpler program designs. Additionally, lower property values in inland riverine areas make it possible for buyout programs to purchase a greater number of homes. (Following disasters, property values of riverine flood properties are less resilient than coastal property values.)

The fiscal impact analysis for Wayne reveals that, after the acquisition of 96 Hoffman Grove properties, the township has a relatively small number of properties vulnerable to severe flooding compared to the other case studies. Even so, a 100-year flood event could still severely damage 127 homes, costing $25 million, as shown in table 1 (p. 32). It is worth noting that applying Wayne’s buyout program to the remaining most vulnerable properties may lead to an average of $840,000 in lost tax revenues per year. 

Milford, Connecticut

Milford is a coastal city of 52,000 people, midway between Bridgeport and New Haven on Long Island Sound. Milford has the longest coastline of any town in Connecticut (14 miles) plus two significant rivers, the Wepawaug and Housatonic, leaving residents vulnerable to both coastal and riparian flooding. Oceanfront property is one of Milford’s most prized amenities, and the town has more waterfront homes than any other case study in this article. Currently, there are 8,100 Milford residents in the 100-year flood zone, with a 26 percent increase projected by 2050. Milford also has the most repetitive-loss properties of any municipality in Connecticut. Since 2007, Milford residents have made up 20 percent of registrants in FEMA’s individual assistance program; FEMA awarded them $3.5 million. The town is 25 percent low-to-moderate income, 15 percent nonwhite, and overwhelmingly owner-occupied.

Milford’s own analysis confirmed the city’s extreme vulnerability. A Category 2 hurricane has the potential to inundate more than 2,000 properties, including 35 city facilities. More than 1,500 homes were damaged by Irene and Sandy, over 200 severely (Daley 2014). An excess of $60 million in flood insurance claims were paid to Milford residents in 2011 and 2012 (City of Milford 2015). A year after Sandy, entire streets and dozens of homes remained empty, while many others were elevated on piles and rebuilt. As in many areas damaged by Sandy, government funding came slowly, which retarded recovery (Zaretsky 2013). An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 homes in the city may still need to be elevated to satisfy building code requirements (Buffa 2013).

The primary strategies for combating flood risk in Milford have included beach nourishment projects, building retrofits and elevations, revetments, jetties, and groins. The city’s 2013 Hazard Mitigation Plan outlined over $14.4 million in flood mitigation projects, including elevating structures, protecting or upgrading critical infrastructure such as the wastewater treatment plant, and replenishing dunes (City of Milford 2013). The highest-priority projects were neighborhood drainage systems and catch basins. Due to lack of funding, however, many proposed projects either stalled or have not begun. 

The USACE evaluated the coastline of Milford for the North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study and found that the implementation of structural measures, like beach fill or dune projects, may be limited due to space constraints even in areas where these approaches might normally be most cost effective. If these measures are not applicable, flood proofing, and even acquisition and relocation, might be the most economical long-term strategies (USACE 2015). These challenges are shared by many highly developed areas along the eastern Atlantic coast. Buyouts can be difficult to secure in the short term, and structural solutions do not effectively reduce risk. 

Yet buyouts have received some attention from the city’s residents. FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant funds were used to buy several properties. Additionally, Milford has received $1.4 million from the USDA Floodplain Easement Program to buy at-risk properties (USDA n.d.). Despite available funding, however, the programs received only seven applicants in 2013. Furthermore, the city’s official position was “unenthusiastic” (Spiegel 2013). Milford stakeholders interviewed for this report cited concerns over the loss of the municipal tax base as the primary cause of resistance to buyouts, as coastal property owners pay the highest property taxes.

From the state’s perspective, Milford presented a promising case for a buyout program since many of the repetitive-loss properties were adjacent to the Silver Sands State Park, and acquired parcels could be incorporated into the park. Stakeholders indicated that positive alternative models for development are needed to encourage participation in buyout programs. The fiscal analysis performed for this study reveals that, while buyouts would impact property taxes, the effects would not be as severe as perceived by municipal officials. As a percentage of the most recent budget, buyouts of the most vulnerable properties would result in only a 1.36 percent loss in revenue, as indicated in table 1 (p. 32). 

Milford’s vulnerable properties have the highest average value among the case studies. Factoring in 2050 sea level rise projections, Milford’s most vulnerable homes—those that could suffer over 50 percent damage—could face $204 million in damage and dislocation costs over the next 100 years. Relocating home owners from just these properties that are most at risk could save $435,000 in annual flood insurance premiums. 

Conclusion

Buyout programs have long been avoided in public dialogue. Yet when weighed against the magnitude of risk faced by some U.S. coastal and riverine communities, they can be a viable and effective way to enable retreat from flood zones. As tools to preserve communities and strengthen resilience, they deserve serious consideration.

The three case studies highlight both the potential value of buyout programs and the political, social, and economic challenges of implementing them. Many factors contributed to the relative success of buyout participation in Oakwood Beach and Wayne and to the failure in Milford. The timing of the program, the level of program engagement with residents, the attachment to place, and the availability or lack of alternatives all played a role. In order to meet the needs of residents and municipalities, we must rethink the goals, strategies, and time frame of buyout programs, improve the administration of funding, reform the planning process, and design minimally disruptive programs. 

For an in-depth exploration of managed retreat in the New York metropolitan region, see the forthcoming Policy Focus Report, Buy-in for Buyouts: The Case for Managed Retreat from Flood Zones, to be published in September 2016 by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in conjunction with Regional Plan Association.

 

Robert Freudenberg is director of Energy and Environment at Regional Plan Association (RPA), where Ellis Calvin is an associate planner in the same department. Laura Tolkoff is a former senior planner for Energy and Environment, and Dare Brawley is a former research analyst at RPA.

Photograph: Tom Pioppo/FEMA (2011)

 


 

References

Buffa, Denise. 2013. “Storm-Battered Shoreline Gets a Lift, One House at a Time.” Hartford Courant. August 3. http://articles.courant.com/2013-08-03/news/hc-houselifter-20130803_1_houses-milford-contractor-coastline.

City of Milford. 2015. “Flood Insurance Claims Paid to Milford Residents by Year.”

Daley, Beth. 2014. “Milford, East Haven Top Connecticut in Costly Flood-Prone Homes.” New Haven Register. March 21. http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20140321/milfordeast-haven-top-connecticut-in-costly-flood-prone-homes.

Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery. 2015. “Notice of Change of Use of Acquisition Properties by NY Rising.” New York.

Koslov, Liz. 2014. “Fighting for Retreat after Sandy: The Ocean Breeze Buyout Tent on Staten Island.” Metropolitics. April 23. http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Fighting-for-Retreat-afterSandy.html.

Lavey, Nate. 2014. “Retreat from the Water’s Edge.” The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hurricane-sandy-retreat-waters-edge.

McGrath, Matthew. 2011. “Hoffman Grove is More Wilderness than Neighborhood.” NorthJersey.com. December 30. http://www.northjersey.com/news/wayne-neighborhood-surrendering-to-the-river-1.276454.

Oakwood Beach Buyout Committee. 2015. “About Us.” http://foxbeach165.com/about-us/.

Rush, Elizabeth. 2015. “Leaving the Sea: Staten Islanders Experiment with Managed Retreat.” Urban Omnibus. http://urbanomnibus.net/2015/02/leaving-the-sea-staten-islanders-experiment-with-managed-retreat/.

Special Initiative for Rebuilding and Resiliency (SIRR). 2013. “A Stronger, More Resilient New York.” City of New York. http://www.nyc.gov/html/sirr/html/report/report.shtml.

Spiegel, Jan Ellen. 2013. “Despite Storms, Few Coastal Homeowners are Open to Buyouts.” Connecticut Mirror. September 16. http://ctmirror.org/2013/09/16/despite-storms-few-coastalhomeowners-are-open-buyouts/.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 2005. “Passaic River Floodway Buyout Study Limited Update: Final Report and Environmental Assessment.”

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 2015b. “North Atlantic Coast Comprehensive Study: Main Report.”

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). n.d. “Emergency Watershed Protection Program — Floodplain Easement Option.” http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/detail//?cid=nrcs143_008225.

Zaretsky, Mark. 2013. “1 Year After Superstorm Sandy, Recovery Moves Slowly on Connecticut Shore.” New Haven Register. October 26. http://www.nhregister.com/generalnews/20131026/1-year-after-super-storm-sandy-recovery-moves-slowly-on-connecticut-shore.

School Finance and Property Taxes

By Joan Youngman, February 1, 2016

This feature is excerpted from A Good Tax: Legal and Policy Issues for the Property Tax in the United States, by Joan Youngman, scheduled for publication in April 2016.

 

Some of the most significant policy discussions concerning the property tax do not deal with the tax itself but rather with the use of its revenue to support local public schools. This vigorous and long-running controversy highlights the role of the property tax, but the tax itself is of secondary importance to the substantive points at issue, such as the amount of total education spending, its distribution across school districts, and the levels of government that are to provide these funds. If income taxes constituted the primary local revenue source and property taxes were imposed at the state level, the school finance debate could continue as it stands, merely substituting the term “income” tax for “property” tax.

School funding challenges generally begin with one basic problem: how best to expand the revenue available to schools in impoverished districts whose own resources cannot support adequate public education, even at tax rates far higher than those imposed by more affluent jurisdictions. This is not a property tax problem, but a local tax problem. A needy area restricted to its own income tax or sales tax revenues would find it equally difficult to support a successful school system, no matter how high its tax rates. Some transfer of external resources is essential for districts that cannot fund their vital services independently. This statement may seem self-evident, but it sometimes represents the limit of consensus in this extremely heated debate.

By itself, this consensus only establishes that no local tax can serve as the sole support for basic services when the local tax base is inadequate for that purpose. This is a far cry from demonstrating the unfairness of the property tax or any other local tax. But the traditional use of the property tax as a primary support for local schools has sometimes given rise to that implication.

Although the property tax generally functions as a local tax in this country and provides the largest share of independent local revenue, this has not always been the case. Before widespread adoption of state sales and income taxes in the twentieth century, property taxes were a major source of revenue at the state level. At the same time, many local jurisdictions also impose other taxes, such as sales or income taxes. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of U.S. property tax collections fund local government operations, and the property tax remains the main source of autonomous revenue for most local jurisdictions, including school districts. Therefore, debate over reliance on local resources to fund education generally questions the fairness of using property taxes as the primary means to finance local schools. It is important to clarify the extent to which the property tax itself is at issue in this debate, and the extent to which it is simply the most commonly used instrument for raising the revenue whose distribution and use is in question.

The Property Tax and Equalization of School Funding

Property taxes were most dramatically linked to the equalization of school funding in the 1971 California Serrano decision, which ushered in a new era of state constitutional challenges to education finance. In that case, the California Supreme Court found that divergent local property tax bases led to constitutionally unacceptable variations in school budgets: “The source of these disparities is unmistakable: in Baldwin Park the assessed valuation per child totaled only $3,706; in Pasadena, assessed valuation was $13,706; while in Beverly Hills, the corresponding figure was $50,885—a ratio of 1 to 4 to 13. Thus, the state grants are inadequate to offset the inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases.”[1] Within a decade, California had pioneered a new system of centralized school finance. Instead of districts setting their budgets on the basis of local revenues, budget decisions were made for each district at the state level.[2] The initial phase of school finance reform in California focused strongly on equalization of basic funding, with the very first judicial decisions seeking to limit variations in per-pupil spending across the state to no more than $100.[3]

The same decade saw California voters lead a wave of property tax limitations with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. In the wake of this initiative, the state legislature changed the system for distributing property tax revenue as well. As a result of these measures, state law now governs the property tax rate, the budgets of local school districts, and the distribution of property tax collections. Approximately one-third of property tax revenue is allocated to K–14 school districts.[4] The California experience demonstrates that the property tax can be a tool for centralization and equalization of school finance as well as for decentralization and local variation.

Complexities of Centralized School Finance

Although Proposition 13 closely followed school finance reform in California, the causal connection between the two remains controversial. One perspective considers centralized, standardized school finance and administration to erode homeowners’ support for the property tax.[5] “Homeowners were willing to pay higher property taxes if they were convinced this led to quality schools. The school finance litigation movement essentially breaks this tie—local property tax revenues tend now to be redistributed statewide and not directed, on the margin, to local schools.”[6] At the same time, other scholars vigorously contest this hypothesis on statistical and historical grounds: “[T]he evidence does not support the claim that Serrano caused Proposition 13.”[7]

Whatever their connection, these two elements—constitutional challenges and property tax limitations—reinforced one another in shifting authority and responsibility for school funding from localities to the state government. This process also exposed school budgets to new political pressures. At the local level, school spending is often the single most important element of the budget, but wider state needs include public health and safety, transportation, corrections, and higher education. Centralization also carries the challenge of maintaining parental contact and involvement if crucial educational decisions are perceived to be the province of state or other higher-level officials.

The California experience has demonstrated that these concerns should be taken seriously. In 1969–1970, before centralization of its school finance and the introduction of Proposition 13, California ranked 11th among all states and the District of Columbia in per-pupil K–12 spending. By 2013, it had fallen to 36th.[8] Its shortfall in spending is even greater than per-pupil figures indicate, because California teacher salaries, to be competitive, are above the national average. Eric Brunner and Jon Sonstelie observe, “California students performed considerably better in the period before the transformation from local to state finance. . . . This apparent decline in average performance would be less troubling if it were accompanied by equalization across districts and income groups. There is little evidence of equalization across school districts, however.” They note that the decline in performance cannot be attributed to resources alone. “The dismal performance of California students on achievement tests is a disappointment, but that performance is due more to the inefficiency with which funds are deployed than to the paucity of those funds.”[9] This situation is the result of many complex factors, but it is clear that state support for local education in California has not fulfilled the high expectations of early proponents of school finance reform.

Michigan undertook a major centralization of its school finance system in 1994, but the state’s continuing economic difficulties have diminished its ability to maintain funding levels. As in California, changes in school funding were part of a set of sometimes contradictory goals, including educational improvement, enhanced equity, and tax relief. Michigan’s 1994 “Proposal A” reduced property taxes dramatically and substituted a number of other sources, such as portions of state income tax collections and revenue from state sales tax increases, for school purposes.

Ten years later, two analysts who judged the results of Michigan’s centralization to be “decidedly positive” nonetheless expressed concern that the state’s revenue base for its school aid fund was “dangerously vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations.”[10] In 2010, the Citizens Research Council of Michigan reported:

Given the practical realities of the current financing system, state-controlled revenues (directly or indirectly) comprise nearly 85 percent of the total operating funding for local schools. As a result, state, not local, policy makers control the purse strings of Michigan’s local schools. . . . In addition to the fiscal challenges posed by Michigan’s near-decade-long economic malaise, which have been exacerbated by the Great Recession, public education finances also face another serious long-term problem. Since the early 2000s, the state has failed to come to grips with the dual structural deficits affecting its major operating funds, General Fund and School Aid Fund.[11]

In a little-noticed provision of Michigan’s 1994 legislation, typical of the intricacies of such enactments, the state government’s former annual payments to the school retirement fund became a local responsibility.[12]

A shift to centralized school finance does not in itself address the issues of adequacy and efficiency crucial to education reform, no matter what tax is utilized as the source of education revenue. The substantive challenges of education reform are larger than the choice of a tax instrument.

Property Taxes and Local Supplementary Spending

Local taxes can also be controversial when they are used to supplement centrally set spending levels. No state is likely to fund all schools at the level the wealthiest districts might set for themselves if they made these budgetary decisions independently. This presents a choice when a state intervenes to ensure that less wealthy districts receive necessary funding. The state may direct resources to needy districts without guaranteeing them a per-pupil budget equal to that of the highest-spending jurisdictions. Alternatively, it may impose spending restrictions that limit the ability of affluent districts to supplement their budget from their own resources. Under the former approach, use of the property tax to increase the local school budget would be acceptable; under the latter, it would not. For example, Michigan does not permit local districts to seek additional tax revenue for school operations. High-spending districts that have seen their funding decline brought a new dimension to school finance litigation by considering legal action against the state.[13]

One of the attorneys who filed the original challenge to California education funding argued that it is unfair to permit parents to raise funds for local schools: “If we have a lousy education system, then the parents of the rich have to be just as concerned as the parents of the poor.”[14] The opposing position considers some variations in spending a reflection of legitimate local choice, particularly if parents who cannot supplement baseline budgets may withdraw from the public school system altogether and instead send their children to private schools.

Vermont experimented with a unique approach to the issue of above-average spending after the state’s Supreme Court overturned its method of school funding.[15] The legislature responded with Act 60, which from 1999 to 2004 provided a uniform statewide allowance for all elementary and secondary students. At the time, 90 percent of Vermont’s school districts were already spending more than that standard amount per pupil. However, under Act 60, districts that chose to spend more had varying amounts of these additional local funds allocated to a state pool to benefit poorer areas. The wealthier a district, the greater the amount that was allocated to this “sharing pool.” The state could reallocate more than two-thirds of the funds raised from the wealthiest districts to support schools in poorer districts. As reported in 2004, “Roughly 91 percent of Vermont’s school districts receive more funding under the new scheme, and the residents of property-poor districts have actually experienced tax reductions. Taxes have more than doubled in the wealthiest districts, though, and per pupil spending in those districts has decreased. These results engendered an intense response from Vermont’s wealthier districts, sparking civil disobedience, local withholding from the state education fund, circumvention of the ‘sharing pool’ through the use of tax deductions, and an unsuccessful lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Act 60.”[16]

This controversy was a major reason for later legislative change. In Vermont, as in other states, limitations on school budgets also led to extensive private fundraising and the use of charitable foundation grants to replace tax revenues lost to local schools. In California, for example, private voluntary nontax contributions to public schools accounted for $547 million in 2011 alone.[17]

To some observers, the ability of affluent parents to purchase extra educational resources for their children’s schools signals a return to the situation that gave rise to education finance court challenges in the first place. A New York teacher expressed the view that the very concept of public education “suppresses all distinctions between groups of individuals as inherently unjust.”[18] On the other hand, the opportunity for local support can help foster a broad-based commitment to the public schools.

From Equalization to Adequacy

A 1986 California decision in the long line of related Serrano cases offered another perspective on the problems faced by spending equalization. “The adverse consequences of years of effective leveling down have been particularly severe in high spending districts with large concentrations of poor and minority students. Some of the state’s most urban districts, with high concentrations of poor and minority students, are high-revenue districts.”[19] As this opinion noted, “high wealth” jurisdictions with large amounts of commercial or industrial property can be home to low-income urban residents who could actually lose funding under a strict equalization approach. Many large cities with poor students need to spend more, not less, than the statewide average per student on public education.[20]

Efforts to address the needs of underserved students have shifted the focus of school finance reform from equalization to provision of sufficient funds for adequate achievement. “In 1989, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared the entire state system of public elementary and secondary education unconstitutional and held that all Kentucky schoolchildren had a constitutional right to an adequate education. The decision resulted in a dramatic overhaul of the state’s entire public school system, and sparked what many scholars have called the ‘adequacy movement.’”[21] Yet it is far easier to calculate differences in funding than to provide an operational definition of an adequate education. This influential decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the state’s constitutional requirement of “an efficient system of common schools” in terms of seven fairly abstract goals, including “sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization” and “sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness.”[22]

In the absence of a federal constitutional claim to equality in school finance[23], these cases are left to state courts. However, challenges to state systems cannot address the most important source of nonuniformity in education spending: differences in spending across states. These are far more significant than differences among districts in any individual state. “[R]oughly two-thirds of nationwide inequality in spending is between states and only one-third is within states, and thus school-reform litigation is able to attack only a small part of the inequality.”[24]

Complexities of Per-Pupil Spending

The shift in focus from strict equalization in spending to directing adequate resources to needy districts can weaken the argument against allowing localities to choose to tax themselves to supplement state-mandated revenues. If many disadvantaged and low-performing urban districts need to spend far more than the average per-pupil budget, uniformity will not be an optimal outcome.

Nevertheless, uniform spending will always have an intuitive appeal. In California, decades of centralized school finance have effectively broken the connection between education spending and local property wealth. However, a 2011 report by the Center for Investigative Reporting’s “California Watch” illustrated the ways in which per-pupil spending continued to vary widely across districts. The report quoted the president of the Alameda Education Association: “For us not to receive the same amount as other districts near us is like saying, ‘We are going to value one child more than another.’” This report went on to describe California’s post-Serrano funding system:

In the landmark 1971 Serrano v. Priest ruling, the court found that using local property taxes to fund schools resulted in vast differences between a wealthy district like Beverly Hills and Baldwin Park, a low-income community east of Los Angeles.

The Supreme Court ruled that differences in the basic amount spent per student—so-called “revenue limit” funding—had to be within $100 across all districts. Taking inflation into account, the permissible difference is now $350 per student. Although larger differences remain among some districts, disparities in the basic amount districts receive from the state have been substantially reduced.

But that reduction has been wiped out by local, state, and federal funds for close to a hundred different programs. A large part of the money is based on formulas established in the 1970s for meals, transportation, and other services that often have little connection to current student needs.

The inequities the court sought to alleviate with its Serrano ruling persist. About two-thirds of districts now spend at least $500 above or below the state average, according to California Watch’s analysis.

“What happened since the Serrano case is that we tried to equalize base funding for students across the state,” said [Julia] Brownley, the Santa Monica assemblywoman. “But since then, we have instituted hundreds of different categorical funds that added to the base. That has taken it to another level and skewed spending again.”[25]

Several aspects of this report are noteworthy.From a property tax perspective, perhaps the most significant conclusion is that continuing disparities in district budgets are not the result of differences in local property tax collections, since the allocation of property tax revenue is determined by the legislature and the governor.

Moreover, the goal of equalizing spending to within a few hundred dollars per student across a state as vast and varied as California is inappropriate. Costs of goods and services differ dramatically across regions, and between urban and rural centers. One of the major criticisms of Michigan’s centralization of school finance concerned its failure to account adequately for cost differentials faced by school districts in different areas serving different populations.[26] The same criticism was applicable to California.

Many shortcomings of the post-Serrano funding system in California were addressed in landmark legislation signed by Governor Jerry Brown in 2013, “the most sweeping changes to the way California funds its public schools in 25 years.”[27] This legislation seeks to direct more funds to needy districts, such as those serving low-income students and nonnative English speakers, rather than to equalize spending among districts.

As a numerical measure, per-pupil spending can sometimes offer a misleading suggestion of exactness. The calculations vary according to a multitude of choices about the figures to be included, such as capital expenditures, debt service, adult education, after-school programs, retirement contributions, and state administrative expenses, to say nothing of the many ways in which enrollment may be measured.[28] Appropriations may differ from budgeted amounts, and both may differ from actual spending. Thus, it is possible for the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate New York City’s 2011 per-pupil spending as $19,770 and for the City’s Independent Budget Office to find that figure to be under $8,000.[29] Comparisons of individual school district budgets can also be distorted if a few very small or remote districts necessarily incur very high per-pupil costs. And of course it goes without saying that the use of school funds, and not the amount of spending alone, is critical to improving instructional results.

All of these crucial issues are far removed from property tax policy, yet property taxes are still used as a convenient target in seeking blame for poor school performance. A 2013 New York Times editorial considering the reasons for this country’s low ranking in international math and science tests took this position:

American school districts rely far too heavily on property taxes, which means districts in wealthy areas bring in more money than those in poor ones. State tax money to make up the gap usually falls far short of the need in districts where poverty and other challenges are the greatest. . . .

. . . Ontario [Canada], for example, strives to eliminate or at least minimize the funding inequality that would otherwise exist between poor and wealthy districts. In most American states, however, the wealthiest, highest-spending districts spend about twice as much per pupil as the lowest-spending districts, according to a federal advisory commission report. In some states, including California, the ratio is more than three to one.[30]

After more than four decades of extremely ambitious school finance reform, centralization, and equalization, the deficiencies of California’s educational system are not the fault of the property tax. An easy resort to criticism of the tax evades the enormously challenging and far more complicated problems of improving educational outcomes.

Statewide Property Taxes

The fairness of the property tax is an issue in this debate only to the extent that local funding is deemed unfair—and then only when the property tax serves as the local tax source. Therefore, a statewide property tax would not be judged unfair in the same way. Some states impose a small surtax on local property taxes and use the proceeds to fund education. But statewide property taxes can encounter serious problems when they are imposed on property values computed through nonuniform local assessment practices.

This was the situation faced by New Hampshire when its school funding system, which relied primarily on the local property tax, was ruled unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court in 1997.[31] New Hampshire is the only state in the nation without either a statewide sales tax or a general income tax, leaving the property tax as an essential mainstay of public services. In response, the state imposed a tax on real property at a rate of .66 percent, based on locally assessed values equalized by the New Hampshire Department of Revenue Administration. A superior court ruled that a statewide tax could not be based on nonuniform local assessments.[32] However, a sharply divided state Supreme Court quickly reversed this decision, finding that a violation of the state’s uniformity clause could only be established by “specific facts showing a ‘widespread scheme of intentional discrimination.’”[33]

Other states have also made use of local property taxes to fund centralized school budgets. In Michigan, a property tax on nonhomestead property, such as vacation residences and second homes, is dedicated to the state school aid fund. This is not formally a statewide property tax, but districts that do not impose the tax do not obtain full state funding of their education grant. As in New Hampshire, a locally administered tax has become in substance a state levy.

In California, property tax assessments and collections remain a local responsibility, but the state legislature determines the use of the funds. With regard to education, the state determines funding according to a formula known as the revenue limit. As the state Department of Education explains, “A district’s total revenue limit is funded through a combination of local property taxes and state General Fund aid. In effect, the State makes up the difference between property tax revenues and the total revenue limit funding for each district.”[34] In 2009–2010, the average per-pupil revenue of California school districts was $8,801, and the average property tax received per pupil was $2,210, with state aid accounting for the difference. An increase in property tax revenue would cause a corresponding decrease in state aid. The property tax functions as an instrument of centralized state school finance. As noted, this has by no means eliminated objections to funding disparities between school districts. A report found that, among small elementary districts, the highest revenue limit funding per pupil in 2005–2006 was $31,237, and the lowest was $4,727.[35]

Impacts of Capitalization

School finance sometimes stands in a unique relationship to the property tax through the process of capitalization. The benefits of superior local public services clearly can have a positive influence on the value of real property within a jurisdiction. It is intuitively clear that if two houses are comparable in other respects, including their tax liabilities, the one in a municipality that enjoys a higher level of public services will command a higher price. At the same time, equivalent houses in different municipalities that receive similar services but bear unequal tax liabilities will command prices that reflect this difference in tax payments.

These two aspects of capitalization—the enhancement in price caused by superior services and the diminution in price caused by increased taxes—affect the school finance debate.[36] Excellent school systems can be expected to increase local property values, providing an incentive even for homeowners without children in local schools to support effective education spending. This also offers a reason to oppose wasteful or ineffective spending that may reduce the value of local property. There is no similar financial incentive for homeowners to support state-funded school spending, because their state tax payments do not affect their local property values. This is one potential advantage to local participation in school funding and operation decisions, and one reason for the hypothesis that centralized school finance helped gain support for Proposition 13 in California.

Clarifying the Debate

School finance reform is an immense challenge involving questions ranging from fundamental definitions of adequacy to legal interpretations of state mandates and measurement of costs. Public officials must balance sometimes competing concerns for equalization, adequacy of funding, centralization, and local autonomy. Moreover, school finance reform is only one part of the much larger challenge of improving educational outcomes. In many cases, the role of the property tax is only incidental to these overriding issues. The operation of the tax and the use of its revenues can be structured to support any of a number of desired financing outcomes, and a focus on the property tax as the cause of educational deficiencies can be a distraction from the essential and daunting task of improving school quality. Efforts to reduce schools’ reliance on property tax revenue may draw as much or more support from anti-tax activists as from those motivated by a belief that these steps can foster greater equity or educational effectiveness. Debate on the property tax should proceed on its own merits and clearly distinguish between issues concerning its operation and the use of its proceeds.

 

Joan Youngman is a senior fellow and chair of the Department of Taxation and Valuation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Photograph: Alamy

 


 

References

[1] Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594; 487 P.2d 1241, 1248; 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 (1971) (citation omitted).

[2] Brunner, Eric J., and Jon Sonstelie. 2006. “California’s School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism.” In The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

[3] Fischel, William A. 1989. “Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?” National Tax Journal 42(4): 465–473.

[4] California Legislative Analyst’s Office. 2012. Understanding California’s Property Taxes, 19. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst’s Office.

[5] Fischel, William A. 1996. “How Serrano Caused Proposition 13.” Journal of Law and Politics 12(Fall): 607–636.”

[6] Brunori, David. 1999. “Interview: Steven M. Sheffrin on the ‘Worst Tax,’ Local Options, and Prop 13.” State Tax Notes (December 27): 1721–1723.

[7] Stark, Kirk, and Jonathan Zasloff. 2003. “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?” UCLA Law Review 50(February): 853. Also: See also Martin (2006).

[8] U.S. Census Bureau, Education Finance Branch. 2015. Public Education Finances: 2013.

[9] Brunner and Sonstelie (2006), 73, 88.

[10] Arsen, David, and David N. Plank. 2004. “Michigan School Finance under Proposal A: State Control, Local Consequences.” State Tax Notes (March 15): 903–922.

[11] Citizens Research Council of Michigan. 2010. State and Local Revenues for Public Education in Michigan, Report 363 (September), vii, 50. Livonia, MI: Citizens Research Council of Michigan.

[12] Thiel, Craig. 2012. “Rising School Retirement Contribution.”

[13] Coffman, Jennifer. 2012. “AAPS Mulls Suing State Over School Aid Fund.” Ann Arbor Chronicle, January 22.

[14] Seligman, Katherine. 1988. “Creative Fund-Raisers for Schools Keep Affluent Districts Humming.” San Diego Union-Tribune, November 18.

[15] Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 692 A.2d 384 (1997).

[16] Obhof, Larry J. 2004. “Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Litigation.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 27: 569–607. 593 (citations omitted).

[17] Weston, Margaret. 2015. Voluntary Contributions to California’s Public Schools. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

[18] Becker, Sidney. 1997. Letter to the Editor. New York Newsday, Queens Edition, October 14: A39.

[19] Serrano v. Priest, 200 Cal. App. 3d 897, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 619 (1986).
Shelby County Assessor v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 350 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2013).
Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 105 Neb. 843, 182 N.W. 485 (1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 441 (1923).

[20] Minorini and Sugarman. 1999b. “School Finance Litigation in the Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future,” 38. In Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, and Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[21] Minorini, Paul A., and Stephen D. Sugarman. 1999a. “Educational Adequacy and the Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm.” 175. In Equity and Adequacy in Education Finance, ed. Helen F. Ladd, Rosemary Chalk, and Janet S. Hansen. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

[22] Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).

[23] San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

[24] Murray, Sheila E., William N. Evans, and Robert M. Schwab. 1998. “Education-finance Reform and the Distribution of Education Resources.” 808. American Economic Review 88(4): 789–812.

[26] Freedberg, Louis, and Stephen K. Doig. 2011. “Spending Far from Equal Among State’s School Districts, Analysis Finds.” California Watch, June 2.

[26] Arsen and Plank (2004).

[27] York, Anthony. 2013. “Jerry Brown Signs School Funding Overhaul.” Los Angeles Times, July 1.

[28] California Department of Education (2013). Comparison of Per-Pupil Spending Calculations. Sacramento, CA: California Department of Education.

[29] U.S. Census Bureau (2013); New York City Independent Budget Office (2014). U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. “Per Student Public Education Spending Decreases in 2011 for First Time in Nearly Four Decades, Census Bureau Reports.” Press Release. May 21.

[30] New York Times. 2013. “Why Other Countries Teach Better.” Editorial, December 18: A22.

[31] Claremont School District. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997).

[32] Sirrell v. New Hampshire (Rockingham Superior Court, January 17, 2001).

[33] Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 373, 780 A.2d 494, 501 (2001).
Sirrell v. New Hampshire, 146 N.H. 364, 780 A.2d 494 (2001).

[34] California Department of Education. 2008. “School District Revenue Limit.” http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/fo/profile.asp?id=1296.

[35] Weston, Margaret. 2010. Funding California Schools: The Revenue Limit System. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.

[36] Oates, Wallace E. 1969. “The Effect of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis.” Journal of Political Economy 77: 957–971.

———. 2006. “The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model.” In The Tiebout Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates, ed. William A. Fischel. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Mensaje del presidente

¿Quién pagará nuestro futuro urbano?
By George W. McCarthy, April 1, 2016

Los seres humanos han tenido una relación de amor y odio con la urbanización desde hace cientos de años. A mediados del siglo XVIII, en los albores de la Revolución Industrial, los campos y las tierras de pastoreo de uso común estaban cercados con el fin de obligar a los campesinos a realizar trabajo asalariado y vivir en los asentamientos informales de las ciudades industriales europeas. Estas personas, arrastradas en contra de su voluntad a la vida urbana, vivían en pésimas condiciones, hacinadas en viviendas de mala calidad y ahogadas por el humo que emanaba de las fábricas que utilizaban el carbón para funcionar. En el verano, las familias con recursos económicos se retiraban al campo para evitar los ineludibles brotes de peste, cólera, y otras enfermedades. Afortunadamente, al mismo tiempo, muchas de las características negativas de la urbanización comenzaron a tratarse por parte de un nuevo invento: el sector público o gobierno municipal. Las obras públicas se crearon para construir caminos y sistemas de alcantarillado, encontrar y proporcionar agua potable y segregar los usos del suelo para que las viviendas estuvieran separadas de las fábricas contaminantes.

Este progreso desembocó en una época, a mediados del siglo XIX, en la que las ciudades del mundo se vieron pobladas con una creciente ola de residentes voluntarios que eran atraídos por las comodidades y el entusiasmo de la vida urbana. Las obras públicas proporcionaban agua y energía directamente a las viviendas. Los nuevos sistemas de transporte trasladaban alimentos y materiales desde las granjas y minas, además de llevar a los trabajadores desde sus hogares al trabajo. Las ciudades florecieron y se convirtieron en la fuerza motriz de las economías nacionales; sin embargo, este nuevo modelo urbano se vio debilitado por dos contradicciones básicas. A medida que reorganizamos nuestro espacio con el fin de alimentar y brindar combustible a las ciudades, también ejercimos una creciente presión sobre nuestros sistemas naturales. Además, como países urbanizados, redujimos la miseria pero aumentamos la desigualdad. Asimismo encontramos nuevas formas de aislar a los ricos de los aspectos negativos de la vida urbana, creando barrios o suburbios urbanos exclusivos.

Durante la primera etapa de la urbanización, innovamos con el fin de resolver el problema de las pestes y enfermedades que eran resultado del hacinamiento de las personas en espacios mal organizados. Durante la segunda etapa, convertimos a nuestras ciudades en lugares brillantes que atraían a nuevos residentes, pero agotamos nuestros sistemas naturales. Redujimos la pobreza, pero aumentamos la desigualdad y la distancia social entre las personas que habitaban el mismo espacio. Tal vez, en el siglo XXI podamos ser lo suficientemente inteligentes para marcar el inicio de una tercera etapa de urbanización, en la que las ciudades brinden respuestas al estrés mundial por el medio ambiente y los países continúen experimentando una reducción de la pobreza, y también un menor nivel de desigualdad. No obstante, para lograr esto, necesitaremos recalibrar nuestra comprensión de la importante función que cumplimos como individuos a la hora de financiar esta evolución: debemos reafirmar el contrato social mediante el cual pagamos nuestros impuestos al gobierno municipal, quien, a su vez, nos recompensa con bienes y servicios públicos que definen una calidad de vida excepcional.

Fue un reconocimiento a la enorme reputación del Instituto Lincoln y un honor personal que me invitaran a liderar, junto con el Banco Mundial, una de las diez unidades de gestión de políticas dedicadas a la creación de un Nuevo Programa Urbano, que se anunciará en la segunda mitad de este año en Hábitat III, la Tercera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Asentamientos Humanos. Con la ayuda de más de una docena de expertos en políticas a nivel mundial designados por sus respectivos Estados miembro, elaboramos el Documento de Políticas sobre Finanzas y Sistemas Fiscales Municipales, que contiene recomendaciones sobre la forma en que el mundo puede financiar el Nuevo Programa Urbano.

Si usted nunca ha oído hablar de las reuniones de ONU-Hábitat, no se sorprenda: se realizan muy esporádicamente. Estas reuniones tienen lugar cada 20 años y su objetivo es brindar asesoramiento para elaborar políticas nacionales que den como resultado ciudades más seguras, más saludables y más habitables. En 1976, la Primera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Asentamientos Humanos, realizada en Vancouver, tuvo como oradores a ilustres pensadores a nivel mundial, como Margaret Mead, Buckminster Fuller y la Madre Teresa. El resultado de la conferencia fue el Plan de Acción de Vancouver, que brindó 64 recomendaciones de políticas para que los gobiernos nacionales “adoptaran políticas relativas a los asentamientos humanos y estrategias de planificación espacial que fueran audaces, significativas y efectivas”, con el fin de facilitar un desarrollo urbano de calidad.

En 1996, la conferencia Hábitat II se celebró en Estambul y siguió los pasos de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (Cumbre para la Tierra) de 1992. Hábitat II se centró en conectar el programa de urbanización con las medidas a nivel mundial dirigidas a promover el desarrollo sostenible. En aquel entonces, los urbanistas se encontraban desilusionados debido a que la Agenda 21 (el plan de acción de políticas elaborado por la Cumbre para la Tierra) casi ni mencionaba a las ciudades y, cuando sí lo hacía, estas se consideraban como parte del problema, no de la solución, para la sostenibilidad mundial. La Agenda de Hábitat que surgió de la conferencia de 1996 propuso un marco de políticas para orientar las medidas nacionales en las próximas dos décadas, con el fin de promover asentamientos urbanos sostenibles. Un avance significativo de Hábitat II consistió en la creación de un marco de compromiso de información, para que los gobiernos nacionales se responsabilizaran de dar cuenta sobre los avances de los objetivos establecidos en la Agenda de Hábitat, un aspecto que se había omitido en el Plan de Acción de Vancouver.

Aunque las anteriores conferencias de Hábitat fueron muy importantes, no generaron el impacto o la divisa cultural a la que aspiraban. Este año, existen varios motivos para creer que Hábitat III, que se realizará en octubre en Quito, Ecuador, será diferente. En primer lugar, hoy en día el planeta es predominantemente urbano: alrededor del año 2007, más de la mitad del mundo ya estaba urbanizada, y las tendencias actuales señalan que el planeta estará urbanizado en un 70 por ciento para el año 2050. La totalidad del crecimiento de la población mundial durante las próximas tres décadas tendrá lugar en las ciudades, lo que añadirá unos dos mil millones y medio de personas. Además, a menos que escojamos otro enfoque, se duplicará la cantidad estimada de 850 millones a 1.000 millones de personas que viven en todo tipo de asentamientos informales en las ciudades de todo el mundo.

En segundo lugar, los gestores de políticas internacionales están comenzando a tomar en serio la urbanización. Este cambio puede verse claramente en los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (SDG, por su sigla en inglés) recientemente elaborados por los Estados miembro de la ONU, con el fin de actualizar los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (MDG) adoptados en el año 2000 para regir las políticas mundiales de desarrollo económico hasta el año 2015. Los SDG establecerán un marco a nivel mundial con la finalidad de promover un desarrollo más efectivo y responsable para 2030. A diferencia de los MDG, los SDG contienen objetivos e indicadores específicos referidos a la urbanización.

En tercer lugar (y más importante), debido a que las naciones miembro tendrá la obligación de informar anualmente el progreso que han alcanzado para lograr los SDG, se tomará muy en serio el proceso de urbanización. Este acuerdo incluye la admisión tácita de que entender la urbanización de forma correcta es un factor clave para lograr un futuro humano sostenible en el planeta. Entender la urbanización de forma correcta requiere el compromiso de proporcionar servicios básicos a todos los residentes, tanto antiguos como nuevos, de utilizar los recursos naturales de manera más eficiente, y de reducir nuestra huella de carbono. Por último, aunque no menos importante, entender la urbanización de forma correcta significa encontrar formas de financiarla. Tal como se establece en el Documento de Políticas: “La salud fiscal de las ciudades es una condición necesaria para gestionar nuestro futuro urbano mundial. La salud fiscal permite a los gobiernos municipales invertir en la infraestructura social y económica que promueve una mayor calidad de vida, sostiene el crecimiento económico y ayuda a los municipios a prepararse ante cualquier crisis natural o financiera y mitigar sus efectos”.

Con el fin de lograr esto, necesitamos incrementar las fuentes de recaudación existentes y encontrar otras nuevas. Y la mayor fuente —antigua y nueva— de generación de ingresos municipales para financiar la urbanización puede encontrarse en el suelo.

Cuando invertimos en infraestructura urbana, posibilitamos los asentamientos urbanos densos y multiplicamos exponencialmente el valor de dicho suelo. La base fiscal que genera este suelo con más valor, así como las mejoras realizadas en el mismo, es la mayor y más antigua fuente de recaudación municipal que tienen las ciudades, instrumentada mediante el impuesto sobre la propiedad. No obstante, una nueva fuente de ingresos casi no explotada es la recuperación del incremento del valor del suelo que la infraestructura pública genera a favor de los propietarios privados, lo que se conoce como “recuperación de plusvalías”. Como hemos observado en América Latina, el incremento del valor del suelo generado por la inversión pública casi siempre multiplica la inversión en sí. La recuperación de una parte del incremento del valor del suelo puede ser muy útil a la hora de financiar la infraestructura que necesitaremos para recibir en nuestras ciudades a otros dos mil millones y medio de residentes hacia mediados del siglo.

Paradójicamente, nos resistimos mucho más a los impuestos basados en el suelo que a otras fuentes inferiores de ingresos. Aunque el impuesto sobre la propiedad es la fuente de ingresos municipales más estable, continúa representando una parte relativamente pequeña de los presupuestos municipales; además, debido a que este impuesto generalmente es el mayor tributo directo que pagan los propietarios, sufre constantemente el ataque del público. Los electores captan el apoyo de los gobiernos estatales, provinciales y nacionales para limitar la capacidad que tienen los municipios de recaudar el impuesto sobre la propiedad, imponiendo límites a las tasas, jugando con las valuaciones del suelo, o ambas cosas. Y cuando lo logran, socavan el avance del que puede decirse que es el más importante para alejarnos de nuestro pasado salvaje: el gobierno municipal.

El desafío del financiamiento municipal puede resumirse en una simple pregunta: ¿Quién pagará nuestras futuras ciudades y pueblos? Y la respuesta es bastante simple: nosotros, tal como siempre lo hemos hecho. Podríamos pedir prestados billones de dólares para invertir en nueva infraestructura, desarrollar nuevas asociaciones entre entidades públicas y privadas, mejorar las transferencias intergubernamentales u obtener los fondos del suelo (como creo que deberíamos hacerlo). Sin embargo, a la larga, todo gasto que realicemos se pagará con fondos que recaudamos de nosotros mismos de una u otra forma. Presumiblemente, estaremos felices con la calidad de la vida urbana que paguemos. Pero esto requerirá nuestro compromiso colectivo para pagar lo que cuesten los servicios que deseamos y necesitamos, y esto será posible cuando comencemos a recordar la función esencial que cumple el gobierno municipal para proporcionar estos beneficios.