Antonio Azuela, a fellow of the Institute for Social Research at Mexico’s National University, holds law degrees from the Universidad Iberoamericana (Mexico) and the University of Warwick (England), as well as a Ph.D. in sociology from Mexico’s National University (UNAM). Since the late 1970s, he has been engaged in research and teaching on urban and environmental law from a sociolegal perspective. His book Visionarios y pragmáticos: Una aproximación sociológica al derecho ambiental (Visionaries and Pragmatists: A Sociological Approach to Environmental Law), Mexico: UNAM, 2006, is a sociological reconstruction of his experience as General Attorney for the Environment in the Mexican Federal Government, from 1994 to 2000. He has recently edited the book Expropiación y conflicto social en cinco metrópolis latinoamericanas (Expropriations and Social Conflict in Five Latin American Metropolises), published by UNAM and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in 2013.
Land Lines: How did you get involved with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Antonio Azuela: In 1991, I met several of the Institute’s officers while they were on an exploratory trip to Mexico. I stayed in touch, because I was interested in the Institute’s approach to urban policy. My relationship grew stronger in 1998 through a meeting in Cairo organized by the International Research Group on Law and Urban Space (IRGLUS), where the Institute expressed interest in a sociolegal approach to urban land problems. In 2000, I was honored with an invitation to join the Institute’s Board of Directors. Since then, I have been in permanent contact with the Lincoln Institute staff and programs.
Land Lines: Why has the public acquisition of land become such a critical issue, particularly in Latin America?
Antonio Azuela: Expropriation, also known as eminent domain (i.e., the compulsory acquisition of land by the state) is an important subject all over the world, because it is a way of procuring land for public urban projects. But in Latin America it is even more critical, due to the weak nature of the state regarding urban matters. Before the democratic transition in the region, it was easier for governments to procure land using mechanisms that would be questionable in a democracy. But the transition has strengthened the judicial branch, which is generally unsympathetic to government interventions in the marketplace. Now, it’s increasingly possible for private owners to interfere with the public acquisition of land in the region (with the notable exception of Colombia, where a wide-ranging coalition of professionals, judges, and social organizations supports the doctrine of the social function of property). This trend can be seen, for example, in the exorbitant compensation that some courts have granted for land expropriations in Mexico City and São Paulo.
Land Lines: What are the main watershed issues?
Antonio Azuela: The first is the adoption of economic policies that advocate a lesser role for the state. The second pertains to the legal status of property rights. When constitutional reforms empower judges to limit the power of eminent domain, this restriction is not necessarily bad, because it can lead to higher quality public administration, but in the short term it has interfered with government power to purchase urban land for public projects. There are two notable exceptions: In Brazil and Colombia, constitutional reforms have established urban policies inspired by ideas of social justice—though only in Colombia do we find a new generation of judges who act in accordance with these principles. In Brazil, the courts are dominated by the classic liberal view of private property, which interferes with the ability to implement the social function of property—an idea that has been circulating in Latin America for almost a century.
Land Lines: Many jurisdictions prefer to acquire land in the open market instead of using instruments such as eminent domain.
Antonio Azuela: Eminent domain should not be the first option for acquiring land. The challenge is for governments to regulate a variety of instruments in order to achieve a general goal, which is to reduce the land component of the total cost of urban development. The use of eminent domain must be guaranteed by a strong legal framework that can establish an adequate balance between the power of the state and the power of the landowners, and it should be the last option when acquiring land for public urban projects.
The big problem is the cost of land, but the mechanisms of government intervention can inflate prices. For example, if the use of eminent domain is not expected to increase land value, and the judges determine it’s the right approach, it can have a positive impact on land markets. At the very least, we can expect from governments that their acquisition of land does not raise prices.
Land Lines: What are the main outcomes of your research on the use of eminent domain for urban development in the region?
Antonio Azuela: While there is a general trend to strengthen property rights, which interferes with the power of eminent domain, this trend shows several variations, depending on the relationship between the judicial and executive branches in the post-authoritarian governments of the region. The process of institutional change depends less on global trends than on domestic and even local forces, as certain cities follow different paths from others in the same country. Even if all local governments were to adopt the same strategy, the courts in one region will protect landowners more than the courts in other regions. The metropolitan area of Buenos Aires, for example, illustrates how the institutional system of eminent domain is not homogeneous, even within the same metropolitan area. In the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, for example, people who live in informal settlements (villas miseria) have gone to court and prevented evictions. In the Province of Buenos Aires, however, the political climate is such that there is no threat of eviction; eminent domain is used to ensure that settlers can remain where they are.
Another important lesson is that there is no authentic dialog in Latin America on the significance of eminent domain or on the various ways the courts have tackled the dilemmas it presents. While the constitutional thinking in the region is very rich in ideas about certain legal issues, such as the rights of indigenous people and the elderly, urban policies—in particular, eminent domain—have not triggered deep discussions among legal scholars. Unfortunately, these issues seem to be viewed as exceptions, despite the enormous number of people who live (suffering or enjoying) in large urban centers.
Land Lines: Are eminent domain compensations arbitrary or unfair? If so, for whom?
Antonio Azuela: Inadequate compensation is, no doubt, one of the great challenges for the future development of eminent domain as a land policy instrument. In some cases, governments may take advantage of the powerlessness of certain social groups and offer them ridiculously low compensation for their land or homes. In other cases, however, the landowner’s economic power and influence can result in exorbitant compensations. Beyond these two extremes, in which the affected landowner is either very vulnerable or very powerful, it is difficult to discern a dominant trend.
A precise answer to your question would require a market study of a large number of eminent domain cases in order to determine if the compensation is high or low when compared to preestablished criteria. The existing research has shown, however, that in general the courts do not possess clear and widely shared criteria for determining whether compensations are fair. Moreover, courts lack the capacity to understand what is at stake during the process of urban transformation in which eminent domain is used. Consider, for instance, the case of a prominent family from Ecuador that received a very high compensation for the expropriation of agricultural land on the periphery of Quito. What is remarkable is that this case was decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and it was obvious that the court did not establish clear criteria to determine the amount of compensation; it simply averaged the assessments submitted by the different parties. The compensation was the highest ever awarded by this high court, which was created to address violations of human rights committed by dictatorships yet ended up benefiting private property owners at the expense of the public interest. The fact that this case did not create a scandal among constitutionalists in the region indicates how marginalized urban legal issues are in Latin America.
Land Lines: What are some changing trends you have observed?
Antonio Azuela: I observe, with some optimism, that many courts and local governments in the region are undergoing a learning process, trying not to repeat prior judicial mistakes. Unfortunately, these lessons rarely transcend the affected local area and become incorporated into the common regional juridical knowledge.
Land Lines: What sort of education or training would you recommend?
Antonio Azuela: Logically, we need to intensify exchanges among different disciplines and countries, placing the courts at the center of the discussion, as they will make the final decisions. These decisions should express the best possible synthesis of a body of knowledge that we need to build around the urban dynamics of the region. In the contact we have had with the courts, with the support of the Lincoln Institute, we have found that once a dialog is established, judges understand the need to learn more in order to grasp the effects of their decisions. In other words, while the courts do not seem to show a great interest in urban problems, as evidenced by the routine attitude shown in their day-to-day decisions, they can see new perspectives for their own professional development in the context of a critical analysis of urban issues.
Land Lines: What are the critical issues that need to be investigated more deeply? What is it that we do not yet know?
Antonio Azuela: We should try to understand the logic of court decisions in the region. We frequently make a simplistic interpretation of the actions taken by the courts, because the media tend to amplify the worst cases. However, many judges make an effort to find the best possible solution to each case. Under what conditions do they operate? One of the challenges of investigating these issues in Latin America is to understand the real world in which these decisions are made, apart from the common but always relevant themes of corruption and incompetence. We need to analyze statistical information to observe general trends, combined with an ethnographic approach to the functioning of the courts. Only then will we be able to understand what needs to be reformed in order to improve the court performance in urban conflicts. While it is important to ascertain who is being favored by the court decisions—which can be done by analyzing the contents of judicial decisions—we need better understanding of the conditions under which these decisions are made. In order to do that, we need to get closer to the courts themselves.
Vivienda inclusiva: La creación y el mantenimiento de comunidades equitativas
Por Rick Jacobus
En diferentes ciudades, como Seattle, San Francisco, Chicago, y Portland, Maine, se ha desatado un debate sobre la vivienda inclusiva, es decir, el requisito de que los desarrolladores reserven un porcentaje de los nuevos desarrollos residenciales para viviendas asequibles. Algunos sostienen que esta política desalienta el desarrollo o, con alegación más polémica que podría llegar a la Corte Suprema, que constituye una amenaza a los derechos de propiedad. Mientras tanto, el alcalde de la ciudad de Nueva York, Bill de Blasio, se enfrenta a críticas desde ambas partes: que su propuesta de vivienda inclusiva va demasiado lejos, o que no es suficiente.
En este nuevo informe titulado “Vivienda inclusiva: Creación y mantenimiento de comunidades equitativas”, Rick Jacobus separa la realidad de los mitos y traza el camino a los gestores de políticas, mostrando cómo la vivienda inclusiva puede usarse de manera eficaz para reducir la segregación económica.
“En las ciudades con mercados inmobiliarios muy activos, el aumento de los precios de la vivienda, obliga a los residentes de clase media y de bajos ingresos a alejarse de los empleos mejor remunerados, del transporte confiable, de las buenas escuelas y de los barrios seguros”, sostiene George W. McCarthy, presidente y director ejecutivo del Instituto Lincoln. “La vivienda inclusiva por sí sola no solucionará nuestra crisis de la vivienda, pero es uno de los pocos baluartes que tenemos para contrarrestar los efectos del aburguesamiento, y únicamente si preservamos las unidades que tanto nos cuesta construir”.
Mediante un análisis de la bibliografía sobre el tema y casos de estudio, Rick Jacobus, de Street Level Urban Impact Advisors, ofrece soluciones para superar las principales barreras políticas, técnicas, legales y prácticas que enfrenta todo programa de vivienda inclusiva para tener éxito.
“Más de 500 comunidades han utilizado las políticas de vivienda inclusiva con el fin de mantener la vitalidad y diversidad de los barrios en transición, y hasta ahora hemos aprendido mucho”, señala Jacobus. “Según investigaciones realizadas, si los programas se diseñan e implementan concienzudamente, pueden llegar a ser una herramienta valiosa en tiempos en que la vivienda inclusiva se necesita desesperadamente”.
En particular, el autor se refiere en este informe a la preocupación de que la vivienda inclusiva podría impedir nuevas construcciones debido a que el desarrollo tendría un rendimiento económico menor. Según el informe, muchas ciudades han evitado dicho impacto otorgando flexibilidad a los desarrolladores para cumplir con las normas y ofreciendo incentivos, como la posibilidad de construir unidades con mayor densidad.
Otras conclusiones y recomendaciones clave que surgen del informe son las siguientes:
Durante muchos años, el Instituto Lincoln ha desarrollado estrategias para apoyar la vivienda permanentemente asequible, mediante, por ejemplo, el establecimiento de fideicomisos de suelo comunitarios y otros acuerdos de capital compartido. Estas medidas se han tomado teniendo en cuenta la actual crisis de acceso a la vivienda existente en muchas ciudades. Los precios estratosféricos de los precios de alquiler y compra de viviendas en los mercados inmobiliarios muy activos han ido desplazando a los antiguos residentes y cambiando el carácter de ciudades y barrios.
Para encargar ejemplares: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/3583_Inclusionary-Housing.
Rick Jacobus, es experto nacional en vivienda inclusiva y en acceso a la propiedad de viviendas asequibles. Es director principal de Street Level Urban Impact Advisors (StreetLevelAdvisors.com). Fundó Cornerstone Partnership y actualmente es asesor estratégico en Cornerstone.
In a report titled A Rise in Downtown Living, the Brookings Institution and the Fannie Mae Foundation (1998) highlighted an emerging land use movement in 24 U.S. cities. The release of the 2000 U.S. Census data verified the progress in those cities in another brief, Downtown Rebound (Sohmer and Lang 2001). While these publications alerted the nation to a possible trend, they did have some limitations, which inspired Eugenie Birch’s follow-up study, A Rise in Downtown Living: A Deeper Look, funded by Lincoln Institute, the University of Pennsylvania and the Fannie Mae Foundation.
This study, initiated in summer 1999, employs census data analysis, survey research, personal interviews and field visits to the sample cities. Birch draws on a larger and more representative sample of 45 cities, including 37 percent of the nation’s 100 most populous cities selected for balanced regional distribution, and of these 100 percent of the top 10 and 62 percent of the top 50. The sample includes 19 percent of the 243 cities having a population of 100,000 or more. Birch defined each city’s downtown by census tracts to create a baseline for mapping and collected data on nine population and housing factors for the downtowns and their cities and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) over three decades. Birch administered two mail surveys, in 1999 and 2001, of city officials and business improvement district leaders to identify their respective roles in encouraging downtown housing, and she is currently making site visits to all 45 cities to verify the census data and survey results.
In this article, Birch summarizes seven key findings of her research, which were also presented at a Lincoln Institute lecture in March 2002 and reported in the APA Journal (Birch 2002).
The Definition of Downtown
Although most people think they understand what downtown is, there is no single socioeconomic meaning or geographical definition for the term. While U.S. downtowns share several common characteristics (a central business district at the core, access to substantial transportation networks, a supply of high-density buildings, expensive land), they differ dramatically in their age, size, functions, contents and character. Furthermore, downtowns are in a state of flux as their boundaries and contents are changing. Tracking downtown boundaries over time reveals that in almost all the cities in the sample, the downtowns of today are remarkably different in size (measured in the number of census tracts included) than they were 20 years ago. Downtowns that are incorporating residences are also attracting more community-serving facilities, such as supermarkets or cineplexes that used to be in neighborhoods. Maps of the several downtowns, created as part of this study, illustrate the size variations.
Residential Populations by the Numbers
The rates of increase in downtown residential populations vary enormously among cities. While downtown growth rates are impressive, numerical counts for MSAs still overshadow those of downtowns. Measuring the growth against basic benchmarks (1970 population levels for the defined downtowns and comparative growth rates with city and MSA) reveals just how fragile this movement is. For example, only 38 percent of the sample cities had more downtown residents in 2000 than in 1970. Only one-third had a downtown population growth rate between 1970 and 2000 that was greater than that of their cities. For the same period, 42 percent of the sample showed a negative downtown growth rate even when their cities had positive numbers. Finally, only seven cities (Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, New York, Norfolk, San Francisco and Seattle) had downtown growth rates that exceeded those of their MSAs in the entire 30-year period.
Looking at the data decade-by-decade tells a different story. Not surprisingly, downtown population declined most severely in the 1970s, when 89 percent of the sample showed losses that ranged from 2.4 percent (Des Moines) to 60 percent (Orlando). In contrast, by the 1990s more than three-quarters (78 percent) of the sample posted increases. However, only four cities (Los Angeles, New York, San Diego and Seattle) had gains in all three decades. Comparing city and MSA data shows similar nuances.
Downtowns also vary in the amount and level of residential development. In 2000 for example, 24 percent of the sample cities had 20,000 or more downtown residents, while 20 percent had fewer than 5,000, and a great deal of diversity exists within the categories. Denver’s downtowners number just over 4,200, but most observers perceive the city’s record in attracting residents as a stand-out success, while Cincinnati, with about 3,200 downtown residents, is struggling to maintain a critical mass. At the other end of the scale, Chicago’s 73,000 and Philadelphia’s 78,000 downtowners are integrated into their larger metropolises.
Differences in the proportion of a city’s population that lives downtown are also striking. For example, Boston and Philadelphia have roughly equal downtown populations, but Boston’s comprises 14 percent of the total while Philadelphia’s is only 5 percent. Finally, a simple numerical listing of the sample downtowns is misleading. Downtown population growth has occurred at varying rates with some cities experiencing the phenomenon for a longer time than others. This may account for the greater success of some cities. Also, given the varying geographical size of the different downtowns, density measures as well as demographic analysis should be added to any assessment in order to gauge the potential impact (economic, political, social) of new residents.
Approaches to Creating Downtown Housing
Over the past decade, policy makers and investors have relied on six types of approaches to create downtown housing, and they often blend more than one of these:
To accomplish these ends, cities have engaged in creative financing, leveraging public funds, tax credits, gap financing pools and other tools at their disposal. Philadelphia, Boston and Lower Manhattan present examples of the office conversion trend, while Atlanta, Minneapolis, Cincinnati and Cleveland have employed warehouse store adaptive reuse. Charlotte represents a combination of HOPE VI, new construction and historic preservation. The found-land approach is seen in Milwaukee with its riverfront redevelopment (including brownfields remediation), Cincinnati with its expressway diversion/riverfront development, Des Moines with its construction of a new downtown neighborhood, and New York at Battery Park City. Chicago is the king of mixed-use new construction. Columbus (Georgia), Lexington and Chattanooga have fostered historic districting as a means to protect older, downtown residential neighborhoods.
Deep Roots of Success
Today’s growth in downtown living is the fruit of more than five decades of sustained attention to downtown revitalization. It has come about because cities have steadily improved their environments through downtown planning and additions of new elements to reinvent their old central business districts. In so doing, they have transformed their downtowns into new, hip places, thus making them competitive and attractive for housing. Although specific municipal policies such as favorable tax treatment, zoning amendments and infrastructure investments have, without doubt, flamed the private market activities in downtown housing, public investment in large-scale projects dating from the mid-1950s to the present have helped create a sympathetic climate for this investment. Preliminary evidence shows a strong relationship between investor choices and the presence of new downtown amenities. For example, developers in Los Angeles, Denver, Baltimore, Detroit and Memphis cite the presence of stadiums or sports arenas as important factors in their location decisions.
Demographic Characteristics of Downtowners
Downtowners are more affluent, more highly educated and more white than the city dwellers overall, but more diverse than those in the MSA. Singles, empty-nesters, gays, and childless or small households are more highly represented in downtowns than in MSAs. Families with children are present but not dominant. Other submarkets are students and the elderly. In some cities where the housing market is tight, notably Boston, New York, Chicago and San Francisco, low- and moderate-income groups are reporting difficulty in finding space for affordable housing. In other cities like Charlotte that have an excess of downtown land, much of it devoted to parking lots, the issue is not space but cost. In these contexts, questions arise as to what resources should be devoted to high-rent downtown units.
Private Development Efforts
Promoting downtown housing has emerged as a central strategy of private downtown groups, mainly business improvement district (BIDs), working with municipal government, often city planning and/or economic development departments. In 59 percent of the sample, BIDS or other privately sponsored organizations have engaged in pro-housing campaigns. As membership organizations their internal needs drive the agenda, so the amount and nature of their efforts vary widely.
Contribution to Citywide Growth
Downtown growth has contributed to the numeric changes in citywide populations in many cities. While the percentage contribution to overall municipal growth is often quite small, in 53 percent of the sample cities the downtown numerical contribution is a significant portion of the total, and in another 22 percent of the sample cities the downtown portion has offset losses in other parts of the city. In other words, without the downtown population growth, 60 percent of the sample would be worse off. In Boston, for example, downtowners constituted 25 percent of the increased number of people living in the city, while in Pittsburgh the additional downtowners reduced the city’s population loss by only one percentage point.
Conclusions
Reviewing these seven findings reveals a few themes. Downtowns are ever-changing places. Their functions, their boundaries and their very characters have been evolving in the postwar period. They are like complicated jigsaw puzzles with players (urban leaders) fitting the pieces together slowly. Just as assemblers first frame a puzzle and then fill in the center, city leaders have provided infrastructure outlines—streets or street improvements, schools, redeveloped river edges, improved open space—and now are adding other parts. Downtown living is one of these. In many places it has fit very well, especially in the past ten years. In a few cases, new downtown residents contribute significantly to the numerical growth of their city’s population. Just as certainly, many downtowns have not really kept up with their MSAs, and a majority of cities have yet to recover their 1970 populations. Nonetheless, having formerly vacant and/or abandoned buildings occupied (and eventually paying taxes) and having more (and more diverse) people on the streets night and day, weekday and weekend, are positive factors for urban life.
Making sense of this housing phenomenon requires not only placing it in the context of contemporary metropolitan development but also making it part of an evaluation of past urban redevelopment programs. Downtown living is not a silver bullet for curing urban ills but one element of an ongoing planning and investment effort for a part of the city.
Public/private partnerships have been essential in achieving changes in downtown living. The existence of productive interplay between focused interest groups, especially the growing number of business improvement district leaders, and public planning and economic development units has resulted in bold, imaginative, creative and thoughtful approaches to creating housing opportunities.
The findings and themes in this research give rise to other questions related to individual downtowns. These include an evaluation of the costs and benefits of attracting different types of downtowners and an assessment of the reasons why some places have been more successful than others in gaining the populations. This information that would be useful, for example, for policy makers in cities having less developed downtowns who first must decide whether a downtown living approach is appropriate for their cities and, second, must determine whether supportive incentives or complementary activities are needed. Other questions revolve around how to spread downtown progress to nearby neighborhoods without provoking displacement or unwanted gentrification and how to resolve the inevitable political disputes that will arise with the newcomers.
All in all, the rise in downtown living is as complex and layered as any urban issue. While widely reported in the popular press, it deserves a balanced, scholarly appraisal. This study raises important planning and development issues that still need attention: for example, information on the critical mass of residents required to make a difference in downtown life, the relationship between downtown housing units and employment, and the number of households needed to support community-serving functions. All of these issues lead to questions of balancing appropriate density for new development and quantity for adaptive reuse with other downtown functions like office, parking, retail and entertainment. No one really knows the proper composition of a balanced downtown.
Eugenie Ladner Birch is professor and chair of the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of Pennsylvania.
References
Birch, Eugenie Ladner. 2002. Having a Longer View on Downtown Living. Journal of the American Planning Association 68 (1):5-21.
Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy and Fannie Mae Foundation. 1998. A Rise in Downtown Living. Washington, DC.
Sohmer, R.R., and Lang, R.E. 2001. Downtown Rebound (FMF Census Note 03, May). Washington, DC: Fannie Mae Foundation and Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy.
Few places in Latin America, or in the rest of the world, have dared to implement such radical urban land policy reforms as Chile has over the last 20 years. In 1979, the government began initiating deregulation policies by releasing a document that stated that the scarcity of land was artificially produced by excessive regulation, which resulted in the virtual elimination of urban growth boundaries.
Since then much has changed in the morphology and internal structure of Chilean cities, but the assessment of these changes varies greatly according to one’s ideological position. Explicit socially oriented urban policies have allowed for significant improvements in access to housing by the poor, but some argue that the spatial segregation impacts of such policies have imposed a high toll on society by indirectly lowering quality of life, impeding access to jobs and aggravating social alienation.
Even before the 1973-1990 period of military government, Chile was recognized as a unitarian and centralist political system, characterized by the strong presence of the state in economics and politics. It is a society with a relatively homogenous culture and is unique among Latin American countries in its strong legalist tradition. Chilean cities also present a sharp contrast to their counterparts in Latin America. There are virtually no informal land markets; land tenure has been almost completely regularized by strong public programs; and the majority of the urban poor live in areas where the main streets are paved and sanitary services are provided. Urban violence, in spite of growing trends, is still minimal compared to the rest of the continent.
Deregulation Policies and Problems
Among the most innovative aspects of Chilean urban policy are the following:
Although some of the achievements of these deregulation policies are widely recognized as positive-particularly in regard to legal and physical or urbanistic regularization and the quantity of social housing provided-many Chileans believe that the policies of the past 20 years have only caused new problems. Some of them are:
It is unclear whether these urban changes can be attributed directly to the effectiveness of market-oriented land policies or to the strong overall performance of the Chilean economy. The steady growth in gross domestic product (GDP), averaging about seven percent a year since 1985, was interrupted only recently due to the Asian economic crisis.
Expanding the Debate
The liberalization of urban land markets in Chile represents an intriguing and innovative experience from an international perspective, yet internal public debate has been limited. Recently, the achievements and problems of liberalization have reached a point of such undeniable importance that they have stimulated broad concerns. Furthermore, the government has proposed modifying the current “Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones” (Law of Urban Planning and Construction), which would result in a number of significant changes. Among the most important are:
To facilitate a focused discussion of these issues, Carlos Montes, President of the Chilean House of Representatives, invited the Lincoln Institute to participate in a seminar coordinated with the Institute of Urban Studies of the Catholic University of Chile. Titled “20 Years of Liberalization of Land Markets in Chile: Impacts on Social Housing Policy, Urban Growth and Land Prices,” the seminar was held in October 1999 in Santiago. It brought together members of the Chilean Congress, the business community (developers, financial leaders, etc.), officials of public agencies (ministries, municipalities, etc.), academics and representatives of NGOs to engage in a lively public debate. The discussion highlighted a clear ideological polarization between “liberal” and “progressive” approaches to understanding and solving deregulation issues (i.e., “more market” versus “more state”).
From a liberal point of view, these problems emerge and persist because land markets have never been sufficiently deregulated. Some liberals, in fact, insist that public intervention never disappeared; they believe that regulation actually increased after Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. For example, liberals cite various means, often indirect, by which the state restricts the free growth of cities, such as when it attempts to expand environmentally protected areas that are closed to urban uses or to impose an official and almost homogenous criterion of densification to all urban space. They also assert that citizens should be free to choose different lifestyles and that the authorities should limit themselves to informing citizens of the private and social costs of their options, with the implicit understanding that such costs are reflected in market prices when urban land markets are functioning efficiently (i.e., when they are fully liberalized).
The principal explanation offered by the liberals for the problems of equity and efficiency facing Chilean urban development today are insufficient advances in the application of criteria to “internalize the externalities,” particularly negative externalities, by those responsible for them. As passionately argued by some representatives of this group, private agents should be allowed to act freely, as long as they are willing to compensate society for the implied social costs incurred.
On the other hand, the progressives believe that liberalization has gone too far in its market approach and has left many problems unsolved: the increase in land prices; problems in the quality and durability of housing; the conditions under which land is serviced; social problems associated with urban poverty; and problems of efficiency and equity derived from the growth patterns of cities, such as the mismatch between areas where services are provided and the locations chosen for private developments.
These criticisms recognize the imperfect nature of urban markets and the need for greater levels of control and intervention. Among the forms of intervention recommended by many progressives are value capture instruments, which have rarely been used or even contemplated in financing programs for the public provision of new urban infrastructure and services. The creation of such mechanisms would be consistent with the idea of internalizing the externalities, a point of relative consensus between the progressives and the liberals. The main difference is that the liberals would restrict value capture to the public recovery of specific costs, whereas the progressives would consider the right to capture the full land value increment resulting from any public action, whether resulting from investment or regulation.
In more general terms, the progressives argue that not everything can be considered in strictly monetary terms. There are urban values and objectives related to public policy that cannot be achieved through the market, or for that matter by law, such as the sense of community. Although largely disregarded in the new housing options provided by private developers to low-income families, such as the voucher system, community solidarity is of tremendous importance to counteract the social problems that spatial segregation tends to exacerbate. Environmental conservation is another example of an urban policy objective for which “price tags” are seen to be of questionable effectiveness.
With regard to the free growth of cities and the idea of respecting the options of their citizens, the progressives react by noting that steep social and environmental costs tend to go hand-in-hand with sprawl. They also point out that the only group that can truly choose its way of life through the marketplace is the wealthy minority. While seeing benefits in concentration, progressives also voice concerns about extreme density. Some Chileans have expressed an interest in a metropolitan authority to deal with regional issues, and in the use of public infrastructure investment as a means of guiding growth.
Adequate responses to these issues and perspectives involve more than technical or fiscal solutions, such as the extent to which developers actually pay for the full cost of the changes they impose on society (let alone the problem of accurately assessing the costs) or the sustainability of the demand-driven voucher system which constitutes the core of Chile’s housing policy. The solutions also involve broader and more value-related concerns, such as the environmental costs of sprawl and the importance of maintaining local community identities and initiatives. Discussion in the Congress and other settings is still expanding, but is expected to take some time before the opposing perspectives reach consensus.
Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and the director of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program. Francisco Sabatini is assistant professor of the Institute of Urban Studies at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago. Laura Mullahy, research assistant, and Armando Carbonell, senior fellow, both of the Lincoln Institute, also contributed to this article.
Notes:
In contrast to the rest of the continent, drugs were not a major problem in Chile until recently.
2 Metropolitan Santiago is comprised of 35 independent political-administrative jurisdictions called comunas.
3 See Gareth A. Jones, “Comparative Policy Perspectives on Urban Land Market Reform,” Land Lines, November 1998.
4 Our use of the term “liberal” corresponds to its connotation in Chile, which refers to the strong influence of the economic principle of freeing market forces to their limits, as espoused by the “Chicago School.”
Sources: Francisco Sabatini, et.al., “Social Segregation in Santiago, Chile: Concepts, Methods and Urban Effects” (monograph, 1999) and Executive Secretariat of the Planning Commission for Investments in Transportation Infrastructure (SECTRA), “Survey of Origin and Destination of Trips in Santiago”(1991).
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Brasilia, la capital de Brasil, fue inaugurada a principios de los años 1960 como una “nueva ciudad” que daría comienzo a una era distinta para las metrópolis en América Latina y que demostraría cómo el gobierno hacía un uso eficaz de la tierra en aras de un crecimiento urbano planificado. Tal propósito se servía de dos instrumentos básicos: un control normativo del uso de la tierra basado en un plan general diseñado por Lucio Costa y el gobierno como propietario de las tierras de la capital federal, lo que permitiría que ésta fuera planificada sin los tipos de restricciones y conflictos que normalmente surgen cuando la tierra está en manos privadas. Sin embargo, tres décadas y media más tarde, los problemas asociados con el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia no se diferencian sustancialmente de los que padecen otras ciudades grandes de América Latina.
Falta de visión para la tenencia de la tierra y padrinazgo administrativo
Brasilia se presenta como un ejemplo único de la gestión de tierras urbanas en América Latina porque la responsabilidad de administrar las tierras públicas siempre ha recaído sobre el gobierno local. Sin embargo, la periferia de la ciudad ha sufrido un índice explosivo de crecimiento con un patrón concomitante de ocupación irregular de la tierra, subdivisiones ilegales y carencia de infraestructura. En Brasilia la posibilidad de dirigir el proceso de crecimiento urbano a través de una política explícita de acceso a las tierras públicas se ha visto comprometida de forma lenta e irremediable por la ocupación espontánea (e ilegal) de la tierra. Esta falta de visión en el uso de las tierras públicas suele ser disfuncional tanto para la densidad urbana como para las finanzas públicas, por lo que obstruye los esfuerzos que hace el gobierno local para proveer infraestructura a esos asentamientos irregulares.
Más aún, las influencias políticas que intervienen en el proceso de desarrollo han menoscabado en gran medida las posibilidades de manejar con eficacia la oferta de tierras públicas en Brasilia. A principios de los años 1990 el gobierno distribuyó unas 65.000 parcelas en áreas que carecían de infraestructura básica. Además de reducir las reservas de tierras públicas, este “padrinazgo de la tenencia de la tierra” generó la necesidad de encontrar otras fuentes para financiar nueva infraestructura. Dado que el principal recurso que tiene disponible la entidad de desarrollo urbano del Distrito Federal (Terracap) es la tierra misma, esta política de padrinazgo trajo como resultado la venta de otras tierras públicas para financiar la construcción de infraestructura en los asentamientos irregulares. Este círculo vicioso ha provocado graves distorsiones que la administración local actual pretende resolver usando tierras públicas como “capital” para crear una política efectiva que permita controlar los ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y los costos urbanos.
La experiencia de Brasilia parece confirmar los argumentos de Henry George y otros de que la propiedad de tierras públicas no conduce por sí sola a un crecimiento urbano más equilibrado y equitativo socialmente. La estrategia del gobierno local actual de definir maneras de manejar el ingreso proveniente de tierras públicas para así controlar el uso de tierra urbana indica una nueva modalidad de interacción gubernamental con el mercado inmobiliario. En tal sentido, el gobierno cambia su función y deja de ser el propietario principal para convertirse en el administrador de los beneficios de la tierra.
Tierras públicas como capital de tenencia de la tierra
El principio medular de la nueva estrategia de Brasilia para administrar la equidad de la tierra es la definición de tierra pública como “capital de tenencia de la tierra”. El uso de esta tierra se somete a una serie de acciones estratégicas que transforman el capital de las tierras públicas en un factor que propicia la consolidación del complejo tecnológico del Distrito Federal. Se trata de la contraparte pública en el proceso de reconvertir el uso de la tierra en el centro de la ciudad en un instrumento de promoción social en el programa de regulación de la tenencia de la tierra: las tierras públicas se usan como activos mediante ventas, arrendamientos y asociaciones en proyectos urbanos.
La aplicación de estrategias diferenciadas para la tenencia de la tierra confiere mayor flexibilidad al gobierno para coordinar sus acciones. La búsqueda del equilibrio entre las iniciativas de índole social y otras en las que el gobierno intenta maximizar sus ingresos está cobrando la apariencia de una verdadera política de administración de tierras públicas que rompe con las anteriores prácticas de padrinazgo.
En este contexto de exploración de nuevos enfoques para el uso de tierras públicas con la finalidad de controlar el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia, el Instituto Lincoln, el Instituto de Planificación del Distrito Federal y Terracap organizaron un seminario internacional sobre gestión de ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y costos urbanos en junio de 1998.
El programa reunió a expertos internacionales, ministros gubernamentales y administradores locales con miras a evaluar las experiencias internacionales en el uso de tierras públicas para financiar el crecimiento urbano en Europa, los Estados Unidos y América Latina. Martim Smolka del Instituto Lincoln describió las relaciones entre las operaciones del mercado inmobiliario, las regulaciones sobre el uso de la tierra y la recuperación pública de plusvalías. Alfredo Garay, arquitecto y exdirector de planificación de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, expuso las experiencias en el desarrollo de terrenos públicos en los alrededores del puerto de esa ciudad.
Bernard Frieden del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts describió cómo se usan las actividades comerciales realizadas en tierras públicas en el oeste de los Estados Unidos para recaudar fondos para la educación y otros fines locales. Henk Verbrugge, director del organismo fiscal de Rotterdam y representante de Holanda ante la Asociación Internacional de Peritos, describió el sistema que tiene el país para la tenencia hereditaria, una regulación legal con la cual la tierra puede tener uso y beneficios completamente privados al tiempo que permanecen bajo control y propiedad económica de la municipalidad.
Los participantes discutieron la medida en que estas experiencias eran comparables a la situación en Brasilia y concluyeron que el éxito de varias estrategias para el uso de tierras públicas depende de la idoneidad de los proyectos específicos para la cultura empresarial del país en cuestión y las prácticas institucionales vigentes en la administración local.
Increasing socio-economic and spatial disparities in Latin American cities have prompted a revival of interest in equity-oriented government policies to reduce those disparities. However, solutions to the major urban problems being faced today must go far beyond the implementation of inconsistent and narrowly defined actions. The solutions must ensure equity for all sectors of society. In too many places, entire neighborhoods are forced to exist under deplorable living conditions while government agencies seek to evict residents in the name of environmental protection. It is evident that urban legislation can no longer ignore the rights of people to have a place in which to live in security and dignity.
The critical impact of land inequity on the urban environment requires that the urban poor gain access to the technical information necessary to better negotiate their concerns with public officials. My research explores the role of environmental education in low-income communities in developing countries. Taking a perspective based on self-help capacity building, my goal is to develop programs to train community leaders at the grassroots level to deal more effectively with local land use conflicts and environmental risks.
Impacts of Land Inequity
Like many Latin American cities, Rio de Janeiro is strongly affected by prevailing poverty and environmental degradation. Complex factors are involved: economic instability, inequitable land ownership, short-sighted development policies, and a lack of a democratic system that provides for human rights and freedoms. In my view, the problems experienced by Rio de Janeiro during the last few decades are mainly a result of existing “apartheid” urban planning assumptions and a lack of political will to incorporate the popular sectors in land use policy making.
In the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá-at the heart of the core expansion area of Rio de Janeiro-the extraordinary process of urban growth since the 1970s has provoked dramatic changes in the landscape, as well as a variety of environmental problems. Amidst the spectacular natural beauty of lagoon ecosystems, mangrove forests and wetlands, the region remains home to a large population of urban poor who live in favelas-shanty communities resulting from largely uncontrolled urbanization of public land.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the region enjoyed an unprecedented development boom that has fostered unsustainable patterns of land use. Discrimination against the poor inhabitants and inequalities in landownership allowed landowners and speculators to capitalize on the boom by formally obtaining titles and subdividing the land. In addition, a select group of private builders injected themselves into the local scene with multiple court permits to develop the region for high-income residential condominiums, commercial establishments and industrial enterprises.
Increasing pressures on the land snowballed into a wide range of protests between the popular sectors and the powerful land developers, posing the threat of forced eviction of the poor inhabitants. The accumulated discontent against the government for failing to control land speculation and ensure protective legislation created an extremely dangerous situation. Violence and persecution claimed the lives of 30 community leaders, presidents of local community associations, their family members and relatives. The murders were carried out by what are known in the region as “extermination squads,” and no criminal investigation has taken place.
The Vicious Cycle of Poverty and Environmental Degradation
Since poverty and environmental degradation are interdependent, it is appropriate to think of environmental concerns in terms of social justice. My research revolves around the problems of inequality and the environmental risks faced by the residents of the Via Park village-an informal settlement located in the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá. A basic question arising from this research is to what extent can improved access to land equity actually contribute to mitigate the factors that encourage environmental degradation. By connecting land use issues to the learning process of environmental education, the research demonstrates that environmental degradation is a recurring phenomenon manifested in the inequitable ways land has been used and distributed in the region.
Via Park village has been caught in a serious land use struggle since the 1970s, when urban development began to impact many traditional fishing communities in the area. Builders were eager to lobby the government to break the fishermen’s land tenure system, which was enforced by law, and thereby turn the land over to market forces. In the 1980s, the area was designated a public reserve for environmental preservation, enshrined in Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). Since the village was located on protected land, the city’s planning authorities then argued that the Via Park residents had no legitimate claims of ownership.
Living in an atmosphere of fear and at mercy of the land developers and speculators who continued to flourish, the Via Park residents started illegally subdividing and selling small parcels of land to new settlers. The growth of the poor population and the concentration of land ownership and speculation contributed to the expansion of informal land markets into nearby low-income communities.
Underlying these practices was a more complex system of commercial transactions and civil relations governing the invasion of vacant lands, as well as the division and sale of plots. Throughout Rio de Janeiro, land development through informal channels is the predominant “territorial pact” by which disadvantaged local groups have been able to gain access to land and housing. At the same time, agents from the “formal world” have developed political arrangements to support and take advantage of existing informal land markets.
It was in this context that a program for grassroots environmental improvement was conceived and eventually implemented in Via Park village. However, given the residents’ long history of exclusion-including threats of forced eviction-they remained suspicious. It became clear that successful program implementation would depend on managerial strategies based on an integrated vision of the geographic/ecological and social/cultural environment.
If the dilemma of poverty and environmental degradation is to be overcome, then the task of improving the environment must be shown to be compatible with the struggle for land equity. This innovative approach toward environmental education differs from traditional methodology, which is generally more concerned with simply introducing physical changes to the environment. The key here is to focus on the conditions that are favorable for the development and exercise of a sense of “community belonging”-a tangible expression of shared sentiments, values and identities where land is understood not only as a component of wealth, but as a common settled place invested with symbolic meanings.
Lessons of Via Park Village
While there is no single solution to the social and environmental vulnerability of the urban poor living in the Via Park village, their experience does offer some insights. One alternative suggests creating “urban natural reserves” integrated into the community where those threatened with forced eviction are encouraged to maintain their traditional lifestyles. In exchange, government authorities at all levels would accept the obligation to promote land equity, giving security of tenure and protection to those forced by circumstances to live in informal settlements.
Aspects of the environmental education program initiated in the Via Park village are applicable to other Latin American cities. The fundamental principle is based on insuring respect for the inherent identity of the community. The experience of the Via Park residents demonstrates that local action can contribute to consolidating a socio-political struggle for land equity with protection of the environment. This is in line with current thinking about land use and environmental management, which suggests an integrated approach that acknowledges the leadership role of the local residents.
The Via Park case reveals that a routine excuse being used to justify evictions is “protecting the environment.” In other words, the urban poor most often accused of being the primary protagonists of environmental degradation are in reality the greatest victims. For the 450 residents of the Via Park village, the trauma of being forcibly evicted from their homes will never be overcome. Five people, including two children and one woman, lost their lives in the confrontation. The Via Park village, now destroyed by bulldozers, still reminds us that hope for land equity lies in community solidarity, effective governance and democracy.
Sonia Pereira is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute. She is also completing her Ph.D. thesis from the Institute of Earth Sciences of the Federal University in Rio de Janeiro, with support from a Fulbright scholarship. An environmental lawyer, biologist, social psychologist and activist on behalf of human rights, she has been widely recognized for her work on environmental protection for low-income communities in Brazil. She is a Citizen of the World Laureate (World Peace University, 1992) and a Global 500 Laureate (United Nations Environment Programme-UNEP, 1996).
Driven by an awareness of population expansion and the difficulties that follow growth, Oregon’s Departments of Transportation and of Land Conservation and Development created the “Smart Development” program. The state retained Leland Consulting Group and Livable Oregon to define the goals of Smart Development, to identify obstacles to its execution and to enjoin the development community in discussions about how to implement its goals.
Smart Development is land use that:
In examining over 60 projects across the country that attempt comprehensive solutions to problems of urban growth, the consultant team looked at examples of “new urbanism,” as well as infill development, subdivisions, affordable housing, adaptive re-use and neighborhood revitalization. While common factors exist among all projects, none of the ones that are successful for their developers satisfy all Smart Development goals at once. The good news is that careful attention to local market conditions and demographics can result in successful projects that do satisfy many of these goals.
Why Smart Development Raises Financing Questions
Projects that satisfy some goals are unlikely to satisfy others because the goals may have different land use solutions which—when built in current markets—are in conflict. Proponents of neotraditional, transit-oriented, small-lot, pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use and grid-platted development have bundled these styles as a single concept. Developers and lenders do not understand the markets, values and risks for these hybrid products.
When we surveyed lenders about the factors that affect their decision to finance Smart Development projects, they explained unequivocally that financing of innovation required clear limits on the risk the lender could accept. While factors such as preleasing and on-site management were considered important, lenders strongly preferred working with a developer who had a track record, financial capacity and experience in the product type.
Lenders also expressed doubts about the willingness of the secondary market to lend on innovative projects. The problem is not innovation in physical design itself, but lenders’ anxieties about FannieMae’s “pass-through” requirement: the bank is financially responsible for the project through foreclosure of the asset. FannieMae support does not insulate the bank from the risk of default. Since banks do not want to own real estate, innovative project types that cannot show strong track records cause anxiety that is not allayed by securitization.
Overcoming the Obstacles
There are three technical obstacles to financing Smart Development:
A fourth obstacle is financial, relating to the first phase provision of new infrastructure.
Appraisal and Comparables: Standard appraisals usually focus on the housing product without accounting for the economic value produced by higher quality infrastructure, adjacent services, pedestrian amenities, and access to transit. By comparing only housing units, appraisals allot them the value that they would have in adjoining subdivisions that contain none of the amenities. Yet, new projects that we reviewed were often higher in price than the surrounding market. The quality of new designs may justify pricing, but appraisals based on the local area did not support the same percentage of purchase price as for nearby units. Smart Development projects also required proportionately higher cash down-payments, making the units harder to buy (and harder for the developer to sell).
It must be emphasized that Smart Development features are positive attributes that have long-term effects on value. Appraisal is regularly performed involving regression equations to model the economic value of positive externalities and could be applied to this area to produce new standards for evaluation of Smart Development. This process needs research but is well within the professional purview of the appraisal community.
New Market Studies: Smart Development, with its sophisticated land use and concepts such as inclusion of retail into subdivision development, attracts different demographic groups than standard development. Income levels per capita are higher, household sizes are smaller, and the use of transit and other services per person is often greater.
To overcome feasibility and appraisal obstacles, it is useful to consider Smart Development not as a single market concept but as a series of land use solutions that incorporate traditional real estate products in innovative ways. The market for the products can then be assessed in the same way as existing similar land uses that have attracted the demographic groups noted above—older neighborhoods with the sort of land use proposed in these projects. Through this method it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of “trend” studies that are unable to assess the market for new products.
Presentation of Smart Development to Lenders: The business plan for new products describes how products were arrived at in response to market niches and supporting demographics and sales potential. Every aspect of the business is revealed: project principals and roles; financial structure; applied start-up capital; reserves for operational deficits; and projections of revenues, cash flows and profits. The plan illustrates potential risks and suggests mitigations for risk should conditions not meet expectations.
Presentation of real estate development is typically done through market trend studies and architectural drawings. Neither of these modes addresses the issues raised in a business plan. It may be worthwhile for proactive lenders to consider offering assistance with business planning and presentation of innovative projects to alleviate the anxieties of capital investors and loan boards.
First Phase Financial Feasibility: In many western U.S. cities, grid street plans were built by the city and then builders provided the houses. After World War II, American cities stopped creating streets and the developers began providing the local infrastructure. The major public infrastructure dollars were funneled through federal agencies into regional infrastructure improvements (freeways) which sped private development into fringe areas.
It is now understood that highways and major arterials do not eliminate congestion but rather act as a subsidy for congestion-producing development. New requirements for grid streets, pedestrian amenities, sidewalks and parking strips with trees can make development either unaffordable to median buyers or financially infeasible, and there are no local support mechanisms equal to the magnitude of highway funding.
If the goals of Smart Development are serious social goals, then some level of first phase credit enhancement in exchange for fulfillment of social goals is appropriate. Such credit enhancement would serve to produce land use with the long-term benefits of lowered social cost through reduction of congestion and auto use and a better quality of life.
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Edward H. Starkie, principal, and Bonnie Gee Yosick, associate, conduct economic analysis and research on downtown redevelopment for Leland Consulting Group, 325 Northwest 22nd Street, Portland, OR 97210; 503/222-1600.
I am pleased to report that the Lincoln Institute has signed an agreement of understanding with the Ministry of Land and Resources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to work together on researching and teaching about land and tax policies. Many places in the world face fundamental problems in land allocation and land taxation, but it is difficult to imagine a place and time where the resources of the Lincoln Institute could be more influential and could help more people than in China during the early twenty-first century.
Land and tax policy makers in China are faced with enormous challenges as a result of the extraordinary urbanization of the past two decades. The number of established cities in China grew from 182 in 1982 to 324 in 1985, and reached 666 by 1996, and the average urban population grew by 227 percent between 1957 and 1995. Some cities grew by 200 percent from 1985 to 1995, and the urbanized area of Beijing doubled from 1985 to 1992. However, the extent of urbanization in the future will dwarf that of the recent past. Based on forecasts of population growth and migration, China must provide enough urban land and infrastructure to accommodate more than 450 million persons over the next 20 years. If all of the additional urban population were put in new cities of 10 million persons each, China would need to develop and finance 45 such cities.
China initiated fundamental and revolutionary land use reforms during the mid-1980s. The first reforms established privately held land use rights. The second set of reforms included multiple elements, such as land banking, land trusts, land readjustments, and development of land markets in both urban and rural areas. We believe that the Institute can make a real difference in assisting these reform measures by sponsoring education and training for government officials, supporting research and publications by U.S. and Chinese scholars, and facilitating more in-depth interactions through workshops and conferences.
Over the past two years the Institute has led two training programs in Beijing and participated in meetings between Chinese officials and scholars and Institute board members, faculty and staff. The Institute also sponsored several sessions on land and housing markets in the PRC at the First World Planning Congress in Shanghai in 2001. We anticipate several more training and exchange programs this year, but we believe this is still just the beginning of an expanded effort by the Institute to have a positive impact on land and tax policy in the world’s most populous country. In this issue, Institute faculty associates Chengri Ding and Gerrit Knaap examine some of the recent reforms and current trends in urban land policy in China.
Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.
To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).
1. The Process of Favelización
The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.
2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality
Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.
The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.
3. A World of Diversity
Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.
In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.
There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.
4. Tolerance of Informality
Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).
This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.
5. Expectations and Land Values
Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.
6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies
Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.
At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.
7. Lack of Financial Resources
As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.
8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization
Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.
Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.
9.The Importance of Titling
Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.
There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.
In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.
10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation
The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.
11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights
Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.
12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs
After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.
13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions
In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.
The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.
Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.
Conclusion
Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.
It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.
Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Related Land Lines Articles
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in global perspective. April: 8–11.
Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.
———. 2002. Faculty profile. July: 12–13.
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.
Figure 1:
Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs
Dos
Don’ts