Topic: Urbanization

Fue ciudad y ciudad será

Detroit
John Gallagher, April 1, 2015

Los viejos residentes de Detroit recuerdan las décadas de 1950 y 1960 como una era dorada de la planificación urbana. Bajo Charles Blessing, el carismático jefe de planificación de la ciudad entre 1953 y 1977, Detroit llevó a cabo una serie de intentos ambiciosos para rediseñar su paisaje urbano. Dejando de lado un siglo de conventillos y estructuras comerciales pequeñas, se creó el emprendimiento residencial de Lafayette Park, diseñado por Mies van der Rohe, adosado al este del centro, un parque para industrias ligeras, al oeste del centro y manzana tras manzana de viviendas de baja altura para residentes de ingresos moderados, en el norte. Edward Hustoles, un veterano planificador jubilado de aquellos años, recuerda que Blessing era tan reconocido como visionario en Detroit que bosquejaba sus planes sobre el mantel mientras almorzaba en un buen restaurante; si el mesero se quejaba, Blessing enrollaba el mantel y le decía que lo agregara a su cuenta.

Pero los tiempos cambian. Blessing se jubiló en la década de 1970, y para entonces Detroit estaba sumiéndose en su larga y agonizante pendiente hacia la ruina del cordón industrial. El doble flagelo de la desindustrialización y el crecimiento suburbano desordenado, que lastimó a tantas ciudades del corazón de los Estados Unidos, afectó a Detroit de manera particularmente intensa. Muchas fábricas, tan modernas cuando se construyeron a comienzos del siglo XX, parecían obsoletas en las décadas de 1950 y 1960, y en su mayoría fueron abandonadas a fines de la década de 1980. La nueva cultura suburbana del automóvil, facilitada por la construcción de la red federal de carreteras y otras medidas, alentó a cientos de miles de residentes a abandonar la ciudad para asentarse en Birmingham, Troy y otras comunidades periféricas. El éxodo se aceleró por las tensas relaciones raciales, que se hicieron particularmente tóxicas después de los disturbios civiles de 1967. Sin habitantes, el vasto inventario de pequeñas viviendas de madera para trabajadores se fue deteriorando; los incendios provocados, la droga, el hurto de metales, el deterioro y otros males corroyeron barrios enteros, forzando a la ciudad a demoler manzana tras manzana de casas en las décadas de 1990 y 2000, una tendencia acelerada por la crisis inmobiliaria de 2007–2008, que creó un círculo vicioso de mora en el pago de impuestos sobre la propiedad y ejecuciones hipotecarias, diezmando lo que quedaba del mercado inmobiliario de Detroit. Hoy, las mejores estimaciones sugieren que por lo menos 62 de los 360 km2 de Detroit están vacíos, y otros 15 a 23 km2 tienen viviendas desocupadas que se tienen que demoler. Agréguense los parques municipales que la ciudad ya no mantiene y los derechos de paso abandonados, como las viejas líneas de ferrocarril, y un 25 por ciento de Detroit (un área mayor que Manhattan) está vacante.

Para la década de 1990, la planificación urbana se había quedado obsoleta como foco y guía. Una serie de alcaldes trataron de engancharse en cualquier proyecto vistoso que surgiera: el tan difamado Renaissance Center en la década de 1970, o la apertura de casinos a finales de los noventa. El departamento de planificación municipal de Detroit encontró una nueva función administrando subvenciones federales en bloque para el desarrollo comunitario y, en años recientes, el departamento ha tenido más contadores que planificadores. Pero en 2010, el entonces alcalde David Bing lanzó una iniciativa estratégica para abordar el problema generalizado de suelos vacantes y la carga que ejercía sobre los servicios y presupuestos municipales. Dicho esfuerzo culminó en 2013 con la publicación de Detroit Future City, un marco de referencia integral de 354 páginas para fortalecer y volver a expandir los barrios deteriorados de Detroit y dar un nuevo destino a sus lotes y edificios vacíos en las décadas futuras. Detroit Future City, con sus estrategias de “reverdecimiento” extendido –incluyendo “paisajes productivos” que reutilizarían suelos vacantes mediante reforestación, lagunas de retención de agua de lluvia, instalación de paneles solares y producción de alimentos– recibió elogios como una nueva manera visionaria de pensar sobre las viejas ciudades industriales y de incluir a ciudadanos comunes y corrientes en la conversación sobre su futuro. “En los anales de participación cívica y planificación comunitaria, Detroit Future City es probablemente el ejercicio de planificación y extensión comunitaria más amplio que he visto”, dijo George W. McCarthy, presidente y Director Ejecutivo del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo.

Orígenes y esencia

En 2010, tres años antes de que Detroit declarara la bancarrota municipal más grande de la historia de los EE.UU., la población se había reducido a 700.000 habitantes, de su pico de 1,85 millones en 1950. El alcalde de entonces, David Bing, se vio obligado a reajustar los servicios municipales a la reducción de la base imponible y del paisaje urbano. Su sugerencia inicial a los medios, de que iba a mudar a los pocos habitantes que quedaban fuera de los barrios “fantasma” más abandonados de Detroit, generó comparaciones despiadadas con los proyectos de renovación urbana del pasado e incluso abucheos acusatorios de “limpieza étnica”; su idea fue rápidamente guardada en un cajón. Ese mismo año, el alcalde y sus principales funcionarios organizaron una serie de reuniones comunitarias llamadas Detroit Works para iniciar un diálogo con la ciudadanía sobre la necesidad de repensar cómo debería operar la ciudad en el futuro. Pero los residentes tenían otras ideas. Las reuniones enseguida derivaron en sesiones caóticas de quejas, en las que cientos de residentes demandaban mejor alumbrado en las calles, protección policial y otros servicios municipales con urgencia.

McCarthy, que en ese entonces trabajaba en la Fundación Ford y respaldaba los esfuerzos de revitalización de Detroit, dijo que los líderes deberían haber pensado antes de actuar. “Cuando se incorpora a ciudadanos normales al proceso de planificación, lo consideran como si fuera una reunión pública y la manera de hacerse notar es gritar más fuerte”, dijo. “Si uno es sincero sobre la participación ciudadana, tiene que tomarse el tiempo para capacitar a los ciudadanos para ser planificadores. Hay que dedicar una cantidad importes de tiempo y atención para que la gente pueda comprender que la planificación consiste en tomar decisiones difíciles en un entorno constreñido”.

Con financiamiento de la Fundación Kresge y otras fuentes, la ciudad se reagrupó y contrató a equipos de consultores, algunos respetados a nivel nacional, como la Directora de Proyecto Toni L. Griffin, profesora y directora del Centro J. Max Bond de Diseño para la Ciudad Justa en la Facultad Spitzer de Arquitectura de City College en Nueva York. Con el liderazgo de Griffin, comenzaron a delinear el documento que se convertiría en Detroit Future City.

El grupo tuvo cuidado en evitar la palabra “plan” cuando se lo presentaron al público. A diferencia de un plan de ordenamiento convencional, que básicamente crea un mapa de qué usos se permitirá en los distintos lugares antes de que el sector privado llegue para desarrollarlos, Detroit Future City es un marco de referencia estratégico para pensar en los distintos tipos de barrio y cómo podría evolucionar cada uno, dadas las tendencias existentes.

“No queríamos dejar a la ciudad imágenes estáticas ilustrativas de cómo podría ser”, dice Griffin. “Ya había montones de ellas. Queríamos dejar a la ciudad una herramienta para que la gente pudiera manejar el cambio, porque, como ya se sabe, Detroit todavía tiene mucho por definir en términos de gobierno, estructuras fiscales, servicios municipales, pérdida de población y la composición siempre cambiante de suelos vacantes”.

El marco de referencia tenía que permitir a los dirigentes tomar decisiones mientras se producía el cambio a lo largo del tiempo. “Ofrece distintas estructuras para tomar decisiones que permiten, por ejemplo, decir: si esta es la condición actual, estos son los distintos tipos de opciones que se pueden considerar para pasar de A a B”, dice Griffin. Para simplificar: Si un barrio está mostrando un nivel significativo y creciente de vacancia, pero sigue teniendo un inventario utilizable de viviendas y comercios, el suelo vacante en esa zona se podría convertir en área de producción de alimentos o en un campo de paneles solares para alimentar a las empresas locales. Pero un barrio con poca vacancia y niveles mucho más altos de densidad podría planificar emprendimientos internos para sus pocos lotes vacantes. En vez de sugerir que la esquina de Woodward Avenue y 7 Mile Road debería tener un centro comercial, el marco de referencia ofrece una serie de ejemplos de lo que podría ocurrir dadas ciertas tipologías de barrios.

El lema fue: “Cada barrio tiene un futuro, pero no necesariamente el mismo futuro”.

Las estrategias de reverdecimiento de Detroit Future City fueron particularmente importantes y llamaron la mayor atención debido a la gran cantidad de suelos vacantes en los que la opción de desarrollo inmobiliario no era realista, y probablemente no lo fuera por muchos años más; quizá un tercio de la ciudad reclama un nuevo propósito y uso. Los puntos con más lotes vacantes del mapa se podrían hacer productivos con la instalación de campos de paneles solares productores de energía, reforestación, agricultura o “infraestructura azul”, como lagunas de retención de agua de lluvia, biocanales de drenaje y canales que proporcionan agua para riego agrícola y que desvían el agua de lluvia y la nieve derretida del sistema de alcantarillado combinado de Detroit, ya de por sí sobrecargado. Casi todos estos usos serían presuntamente esfuerzos privados, pero requerían de permisos municipales y quizá otro tipo de asistencia, como cambios de zonificación o sociedades con varios grupos filantrópicos o sin fines de lucro. “Hay que contar con una estrategia de reverdecimiento para poder usar el suelo de manera que, como mínimo, no presente una carga para las áreas pobladas existentes y, como máximo, aumente la calidad de vida, la productividad económica y la calidad medioambiental de la población de Detroit”, dice Alan Mallach, un consultor de Detroit Future City, fellow no residente del Brookings Institution, y autor de Regenerating America’s Legacy Cities (Cómo regenerar las ciudades tradicionales de los EE.UU.), publicado por el Instituto Lincoln.

Pero el plan contempla también densidades de población significativamente mayores en aquellas zonas de Detroit que ya se están regenerando, como el área extendida del centro, donde profesionales jóvenes han provocado un resurgimiento residencial recientemente, y donde empresas pioneras como Quicken Loans, que se mudó al centro en 2010, han llenado torres de oficinas previamente vacantes. Ello sugiere que los hospitales y corredores industriales existentes en Detroit podrían y deberían ver concentradas en ellos nuevas inversiones para aumentar las oportunidades de capacitación laboral y nuevos emprendimientos residenciales y minoristas en esos nodos. Los distritos de empleo claves se podrían interconectar con nuevas opciones de transporte público, como la línea de tranvía M-1 que se está construyendo a lo largo de Woodward Avenue, la calle principal de la ciudad, con financiamiento público-privado. La construcción de esta línea de 5 kilómetros de largo a un costo de US$140 millones comenzó a mediados de 2014, y conectará el centro desde Jefferson Avenue hasta el área de New Center, otro centro de actividad, a lo largo del distrito de Midtown, que se está revitalizando rápidamente. Se espera que la línea comience a operar a fines de 2016. Si los votantes aprueban un nuevo amillaramiento del impuesto sobre la propiedad que se presentará a su consideración presuntamente en 2016, la línea M-1 podría ser suplementada por un sistema regional de tránsito rápido por autobús que se construiría en los próximos años.

Mallach describe Detroit Future City “como un análisis realista de lo que está ocurriendo, para sugerir cómo gastar el dinero, dónde realizar las inversiones, a qué dar prioridad, etc.”.

Detroit Future City ofrece un menú”, agrega. “No dice: este sitio deberá convertirse en una granja urbana; sólo sugiere opciones”.

Participación ciudadana

Las decisiones sobre qué ocurriría y dónde quedarían a criterio del proceso político, con la participación de los vecinos, dirigentes municipales y otras partes interesadas. De esa manera, la opinión pública sería crucial para el éxito del programa.

En 2012, el equipo de Detroit Future City contrató a Dan Pitera, profesor de la Facultad de Arquitectura de la Universidad de Detroit Mercy (UDM), para diseñar una nueva y mejor estrategia de participación que recogiera y orientara el deseo de cambio de los residentes. Los esfuerzos abarcaron desde sesiones de charla informales en torno a una “mesa itinerante” diseñada por los estudiantes de arquitectura de UDM, que se ubicó en varios lugares de la ciudad, hasta una serie de reuniones en centros comunitarios, donde 100.000 residentes participaron en debates sobre la rehabilitación urbana.

Durante la etapa de planificación de 2012 y principios de 2013, se abrió una nueva oficina al público en el distrito de Eastern Market para que los residentes pudieran conocer al personal, ver planes, responder a encuestas, etc. El personal de la oficina incluía a miembros del Centro de Diseño Colaborativo de UDM, dirigido por Pitera, y de la organización sin fines de lucro Recursos Legales Comunitarios. El grupo de Pitera también creó una aplicación de teléfono móvil para fomentar la participación comunitaria. Y el equipo creó 25 carteles de colores para identificar los distintos temas, como suelos vacantes o jardines comunitarios, y los distribuyó a millares por toda la ciudad.

En una reunión de sábado por la mañana en 2012 en la Misión de Rescate de Detroit, unos 50 residentes tuvieron una vista previa de lo que pasaría con distintos barrios, dependiendo de las condiciones existentes y los deseos de los residentes. Algunos de los asistentes expresaron una opinión positiva. “El diálogo es justo lo que necesitamos para volver a considerar los problemas reales”, dijo Phillis Judkins, de 65 años de edad, proveniente del distrito de North End. Y Larry Roberts, de 70 años de edad, quien vive en el barrio Indian Village de Detroit, dijo que las reuniones públicas de 2012 fueron más productivas que las reuniones masivas más bien caóticas de Detroit Works en el otoño de 2010. “Hoy parece que hay gente con ideas que nos pueden hacer progresar”, dijo.

Por supuesto, todavía había un poco de escepticismo sobre cuántas de estas buenas ideas se convertirían en políticas reales en una ciudad con un presupuesto tan restringido, y cuántas se concretarían alguna vez. “Si el gobierno municipal adopta este plan y nos comunica lo que va a hacer, creo que las cosas van a salir bien”, dijo Roberts.

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La controversia de la agricultura urbana

Un uso controvertido del suelo que la oficina ha fomentado proviene de una tendencia ya conocida en Detroit: la agricultura urbana. En los últimos 15 años, Detroit ha presenciado el nacimiento de más de 1.000 pequeños jardines comunitarios, incluidos entre ellos proyectos reconocidos a nivel nacional como Earthworks y D-Town Farm, cada uno de los cuales abarca unas pocas hectáreas. Pero en la actualidad la mayor parte de la actividad agrícola la realizan voluntarios, y la producción la consumen los vecinos, se dona a bancos de alimentos o, en algunos casos, se vende en mercados de agricultores locales. En años recientes Detroit se ha visto sumido en un intenso debate sobre la posibilidad de ampliar esta actividad a escala de agricultura comercial. Algunos proyectos, como Hantz Farms y RecoveryPark, han elaborado planes ambiciosos para convertir cientos de hectáreas para la producción de alimentos. Pero por el momento cada uno de estos esfuerzos tiene una escala relativamente pequeña mientras el debate sobre la oportunidad de la agricultura comercial continúa.

De todas maneras, el equipo de DFC sigue comprometido a producir muchos más alimentos dentro de la ciudad, tanto en terrenos vacantes como en fábricas abandonadas, donde se podrían realizar cultivos hidropónicos. El equipo de DFC, por ejemplo, está trabajando con RecoveryPark para diseñar un sistema de retención hídrica para regar los cultivos.

Como mínimo, la agricultura urbana podría ayudar a algunos emprendedores de alimentación locales a hacer crecer sus empresas, generar puestos de empleo y ampliar la base imponible, aunque sea en una escala modesta. La producción de alimentos también ayuda a generar un propósito comunitario alrededor de una actividad, eleva la conciencia sobre la nutrición y crea un nuevo uso productivo para lotes vacantes y fábricas en ruinas. “Detroit tiene la oportunidad de ser la primera ciudad del mundo con alimento asegurado”, dijo Kinkead.

Pero los funcionarios municipales no han aprobado aún estos proyectos agrícolas comerciales en gran escala, por temor a que los problemas secundarios, como polvo, ruido y olores, se les vayan fuera de control. Otros cuestionan si los bajos márgenes de las economías agrícolas (que dependen del trabajo pesado realizado en su mayoría por migrantes que ganan el salario mínimo) pudieran producir ingresos y trabajos suficientes como para justificar esta estrategia. McCarthy sigue siendo uno de los escépticos. “Creía que no era una buena idea cultivar productos alimenticios”, dijo. “La ecuación económica no lo justifica; los costos son prohibitivos, ya que no hace falta ir demasiado lejos para llegar a suelos agrícolas excelentes fuera de Detroit a un décimo del precio”. Así que el debate continúa, mientras el equipo de implementación de DFC sigue trabajando para producir más alimentos en los suelos vacantes de Detroit.

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En el ejercicio del actual alcalde, Mike Duggan, quien se hizo cargo del gobierno en 2014, se ha abierto una serie de oficinas en los barrios para comunicarse con los ciudadanos más de cerca que las administraciones anteriores, y recoger sus inquietudes. El nivel de participación comunitaria a la fecha ha puesto en evidencia que los habitantes de Detroit no se han dado por vencidos, incluso en los barrios más perjudicados.

La hora de la verdad

Felizmente, la preocupación de que Detroit Future City languidezca en algún cajón acumulando polvo, como tantos otros documentos lo hicieron antes en Detroit, parece infundada. Con el respaldo financiero y el liderazgo de Kresge, se estableció la Oficina de Implementación de Detroit Future City (DFC) como una organización sin fines de lucro encargada de implementar las visiones y sugerencias del plan. Dan Kinkead, un arquitecto que ayudó a escribir Detroit Future City, fue nombrado director de proyectos. El grupo tiene una sede permanente en el distrito New Center de Detroit y una plantilla de 12 miembros, incluyendo el personal disponible a través de varios programas de becarios se ha puesto en marcha en la ciudad. Kenneth Cockrel, un expresidente del Concejo Municipal de Detroit que ejerció brevemente como alcalde interino después de que el entonces alcalde Kwame Kilpatrick dimitiera por un escándalo en 2008, fue contratado a finales de 2013 para ser el director de la oficina de implementación.

A comienzos de 2015, la oficina de implementación había puesto en marcha múltiples proyectos piloto en alianza con otras organizaciones. Estos incluyen:

Campos solares. En colaboración con Focus: HOPE, organización sin fines de lucro para la capacitación laboral de la ciudad, y una pequeña empresa emergente, el equipo de DFC tiene pensado cubrir alrededor de 6 hectáreas de suelos vacantes con paneles solares. Kinkead estima que el campo podría producir cinco megavatios de energía, suficiente para alimentar varios cientos de casas. Los planificadores esperan comenzar el proyecto este año o el que viene, pero no se sabe bien a cuántas personas va a dar empleo.

Lagunas de retención de agua de lluvia. En el lado este de Detroit, el personal de DFC está considerando crear una serie de lagunas de retención de agua de lluvia en un barrio residencial, para evitar que drene en el sistema de alcantarillado. El barrio, conocido como Jefferson Village, había sido destinado a viviendas unifamiliares 15 años antes, pero ese proyecto quedó paralizado por falta de financiamiento, dejando docenas de lotes vacantes y muy poca demanda por ellos. Pero, con el financiamiento de la Fundación Erb local y con el asesoramiento del Departamento de Aguas y Alcantarillado de Detroit, el equipo de DFC ha identificado varias docenas de lotes vacantes para las lagunas de retención. Prevén que los propietarios cercanos podrían recibir una reducción en sus facturas de agua, puesto que el departamento ya no tendría que construir y mantener la infraestructura de grandes tuberías necesaria para recolectar el agua de lluvia que se mezcla con las aguas residuales. Si el esfuerzo resulta exitoso, se ampliará al resto de la ciudad.

Amortiguadores de carbono en los bordes de las carreteras. Una de las recomendaciones de DFC, la plantación de árboles como amortiguadores de carbono junto a las calles y carreteras principales, dio lugar, junto con la organización sin fines de lucro Greening of Detroit, a la mayor campaña de plantación de árboles de la ciudad a finales de 2014 en el lado oeste de Detroit, cerca de la carretera Southfield, uno de los conectores principales de norte a sur. Alrededor de 300 árboles fueron plantados por voluntarios en un solo día a lo largo de varias cuadras. Cuando maduren, estos árboles absorberán por lo menos algunas de las emisiones de carbono de la carretera.

Trish Hubbell, vocera de Greening of Detroit, dijo que la alianza con el equipo de implementación de DFC para este tipo de iniciativas eleva la visibilidad de cada proyecto, lo cual a su vez contribuye a la recaudación de fondos. Y el equipo de DFC aporta una gran cantidad de conocimientos sobre temas de uso del suelo en cada uno de estos empeños.

“Su valor más importante es que tienen un marco de referencia, de manera que pueden ayudar a determinar dónde se tienen que hacer las cosas”, dijo Hubbell. “El marco de referencia agrega valor a todas las oportunidades que se presenten”.

Construcción de consenso

En vez de ignorar Detroit Future City como un producto de una administración previa, el alcalde Duggan ha apoyado públicamente esta iniciativa como guía propia. Su asesor principal para temas laborales y económicos se refiere a su ejemplar ya desgastado de Detroit Future City como su “Biblia” para reorganizar la ciudad.

Jean Redfield, Directora Ejecutiva de Next-Energy, una organización sin fines de lucro de Detroit que trabaja por un futuro de energía sostenible para la ciudad, tiene otro ejemplar de Detroit Future City sobre su escritorio. “Lo uso mucho para encontrar el lenguaje específico necesario para hablar de opciones específicas”, dijo. “Uso algunos de los mapas y estadísticas con regularidad”. Y el equipo de NextEnergy colabora con el equipo de implementación de DFC para planificar una variedad de proyectos de infraestructura verdes y azules. “Nuestros caminos se cruzan con frecuencia”, declaró. “Allá donde surja una pregunta o un problema sobre el Departamento de Energía o la ciudad de Detroit relacionado con el uso del suelo, la infraestructura de energía, el alumbrado de calles o proyectos solares, frecuentemente trabajamos codo a codo con ellos”.

Como mencionamos, el equipo de implementación actúa más como asesor principal de otras agencias, como Greening of Detroit o el Departamento de Aguas y Alcantarillado de Detroit, que como protagonista. El Director de Implementación de DFC, Kenneth Cockrel, denomina al equipo una “agencia de planificación no gubernamental”. Explica: “Brindamos información para poder tomar decisiones, pero no tomamos las decisiones nosotros mismos. En última instancia, las recomendaciones del marco de referencia serán implementadas por el alcalde y el Concejo Municipal, si es que deciden ejecutarlas. Ellos son los que las pondrán en práctica”.

Cockrel también compara la implementación de Detroit Future City “con lo que ocurre cuando un libro se convierte en una película. No se filma el libro palabra por palabra y página por página. Algunas cosas se dejan de lado, y otras aparecen en la película. Me imagino que en última instancia esta será la estrategia utilizada por la administración Duggan”.

Como cualquier organización nueva, el equipo de DFC sigue afinando su papel a la búsqueda de dónde puede contribuir más. Kinkead concuerda que su papel se puede describir mejor con una paráfrasis del viejo lema corporativo de BASF: El equipo de DFC no implementa muchos proyectos innovadores en Detroit; simplemente hace que esos proyectos sean mejores.

“Vivimos en un mundo escurridizo”, dice Kinkead. “Es un tipo de juego distinto, pero nuestra misión se basa en brindar ayuda a los demás”.

A comienzos de 2015, quedó claro que muchas de las ideas innovadoras del corazón de Detroit Future City, como las estrategias de reverdecimiento, la producción de energía, los árboles como amortiguadores de carbono, los nuevos emprendimientos dedicados a distritos que ya son densos, que parecían ideas traídas por los pelos en 2010, cuando el entonces alcalde Bing lanzó su campaña Detroit Works, se han convertido en ideas normales.

“Ya no son sólo los ecologistas o activistas del cambio climático los que hablan sobre bosques de carbono; son los residentes y directores ejecutivos de las corporaciones de desarrollo comunitario”, dice Griffin. “Los líderes empresariales y los filántropos ahora reconocen su importancia. Un resultado importante de este trabajo es que hay un espectro más amplio de la ciudadanía que habla de estos temas, aunque no sean necesariamente una cuestión fundamental para sus actividades cotidianas.

Quizá sea igualmente importante la conciencia generalizada de que Detroit tiene que proporcionar servicios municipales de manera distinta, dada la realidad de los problemas económicos y la pérdida de población de la ciudad. La ciudad emergió con éxito de la bancarrota a finales de 2014, pero en el mejor de los casos esto le ha dado a Detroit un respiro para comenzar a crecer de nuevo. Si este crecimiento vuelve a producirse, la ciudad tiene que conducirlo de manera más inteligente que como lo hizo en los periodos de expansión del pasado, cuando el desarrollo se produjo en forma desordenada en toda la ciudad.

El camino por delante

Una de las razones por las que la ciudad y sus habitantes estaban listos para un documento como Detroit Future City fue la comprensión profunda de que los problemas de Detroit se debieron a la desindustrialización y el crecimiento suburbano desordenado. “Los residentes comenzaron a comprender que en realidad estaban subsidiando el crecimiento desordenado y la desinversión. Comenzaron a pensar en maneras de cambiar estos sistemas para que fueran más eficientes”, dijo Griffin.

Mientras este artículo se estaba preparando para su publicación, Detroit dio otro paso gigante para revitalizar sus actividades de planificación, que se encontraban en hibernación desde hace tiempo. El alcalde Duggan anunció que había contratado a Maurice Cox, el sumamente considerado director de Tulane City Center, un centro de recursos de diseño comunitario para Nueva Orleáns, y vicedecano de Community Engagement (Participación comunitaria) en la Facultad de Arquitectura de la Universidad de Tulane, como nuevo director de planificación de Detroit. En Nueva Orleáns, Cox facilita una amplia gama de alianzas entre la Universidad de Tulane, la Autoridad de Revitalización de Nueva Orleáns y la Ciudad de Nueva Orleáns. En Detroit, entre otras actividades, ayudará a convertir algunos de los marcos de referencia generales de Detroit Future City en recomendaciones de planificación específicas.

Si la planificación innovadora está otra vez de moda, como parece ser, es más descentralizada, menos enfocada en grandes proyectos y más en sintonía con las condiciones reales, que podrían demandar soluciones distintas en cada barrio. Y la cantidad de voces que se escuchan en los debates de planificación es mayor que nunca. Quizá la contribución final y más importante de Detroit Future City ha sido la de incorporar a los barrios y ciudadanos al mismo nivel que a los planificadores profesionales de gran prestigio para decidir la dirección futura de la ciudad.

En efecto, Detroit Future City ha inaugurado una nueva era de planificación, y no se parecerá casi o nada a la de la era de Blessing. “La planificación ciertamente ha resurgido, pero es fundamentalmente distinta de lo que fue hace 50 años”, dice Kinkead. “En las décadas de 1950 y 1960, los objetivos de planificación amplios de la ciudad eran frecuentemente la manifestación de una elite municipal gubernamental”.

“Para que la ciudad avance, hacen falta todos”, dice Kinkead. “No se trata sólo de Detroit Future City. No se trata sólo del gobierno. No se trata sólo del sector empresarial. Se trata de todos ellos trabajando juntos”.

John Gallagher cubre temas de desarrollo urbano para el Detroit Free Press. Sus libros Reimagining Detroit: Opportunities for Redefining an American City (Imaginando un Detroit nuevo: Oportunidades para redefinir una ciudad norteamericana) y Revolution Detroit: Strategies for Urban Reinvention (Revolución en Detroit: Estrategias para una reinvención urbana) se pueden obtener de Wayne State University Press.

Referencias

Detroit Future City. 2012. Detroit Future City: 2012 Detroit Strategic Framework Plan. Detroit, MI: Inland Press.

Mallach, Alan and Lavea Brachman. 2013. Regenerating America’s Legacy Cities. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Skidmore, Mark. 2014. “Will a Greenbelt Help to Shrink Detroit’s Wasteland?” Land Lines 26 (4): 8–17.

Law and the Production of Urban Illegality

Edésio Fernandes, May 1, 2001

The creation of economic and institutional conditions for efficient urban environmental management, which are also committed to the consolidation of democracy, the promotion of social justice and the eradication of urban poverty, constitutes one of the major challenges for leading political and social agents in this century. This challenge to promote sociospatial inclusion is even more significant in developing and transitional countries, given the complexity of problems resulting from intensive urbanization, environmental degradation, increasing socioeconomic inequalities and spatial segregation. The debate on the legal-political conditions of urban environmental development and management deserves special attention.

The discussion on law and illegality in the context of urban development has gathered momentum in recent years, especially since the Habitat Agenda1 stressed the central importance of urban law. At workshops promoted by the International Research Group on Law and Urban Space (IRGLUS) over the last eight years, researchers have argued for the need to undertake a critical analysis of the role played by legal provisions and institutions in the process of urbanization. The UNCHS2 Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance suggests that the promotion of law reform has been viewed by national and international organizations as one of the main conditions for changing the exclusionary nature of urban development in developing and transitional countries, and for the effective confrontation of growing urban illegality.

Illegal practices have taken many different forms, especially in the expanding informal economy. An increasing number of people have had to step outside the law to gain access to urban land and housing, and they have to live without proper security of tenure in very precarious conditions, usually in peripheral areas. This process has many serious implications-social, political, economic and environmental-and needs to be confronted by both governments and society. It is widely acknowledged that urban illegality has to be understood not only in terms of the dynamics of political systems and land markets, but also the nature of the legal order, particularly the definition of urban real property rights. The promotion of urban reform depends largely on a comprehensive reform of the legal order affecting the regulation of land property rights and the overall process of urban land development, policy-making and management. Special emphasis has been placed on land tenure regularization policies aimed at promoting the sociospatial integration of the urban poor, such as those proposed by the UNCHS Global Campaign for Secure Tenure.

Conservative versus Innovative Approaches

This complex legal-political debate has serious socioeconomic implications at the global level, and it has to be viewed against three conservative though influential and intertwined political-ideological approaches to law and legal regulation.

First, discussion of the role of law in urban development cannot be reduced to the simplistic terms proposed by those who suggest, despite historical evidence, that capitalism per se can distribute wealth widely and who defend a “hands-off” approach to state regulation aimed to control urban development. Whereas globalization is undoubtedly irreversible and in some ways independent of government action, there is no historical justification for the neoliberal ideology which assumes that by maximizing growth and wealth the free market also optimizes the distribution of that increment. (Hobsbawn 2000).

Several indicators of growing social poverty, especially those closely related to the precarious conditions of access to land and housing in urban areas, demonstrate that, even if the world has become wealthier as a result of global economic and financial growth, the regional and social distribution of this newly acquired wealth has been far from optimal. Moreover, the successful industrial development of many countries (e.g., the U.S., Germany, or even Brazil and Mexico) was achieved by adopting regulation measures and by not accepting unreservedly the logic of the free market. Perhaps more than ever, there is a fundamental role for redefined state action and economic regulation in developing and transitional countries, especially regarding the promotion of urban development, land reform, land use control and city management. The central role of law in this process cannot be dismissed.

Second, the impact of economic and financial globalization on the development of land markets has put pressure on developing and transitional countries to reform their national land laws and homogenize their legal systems to facilitate the operation of land markets internationally. This emphasis on a globalized, market-oriented land law reform, with the resulting “‘Americanization’ of commercial laws and the growth of global Anglo-American law firms,” is based on an approach to land “purely as an economic asset which should be made available to anyone who can use it to its highest and best economic use.” This view aims to facilitate foreign investment in land rather than recognize that there is “a social role for land in society” and that land is a “part of the social patrimony of the state” (McAuslan 2000).

A third and increasingly influential approach has been largely, and sometime loosely, based on the work of the economist Hernando de Soto. He defends the notion that global poverty can be solved by linking the growing informal “extra-legal” economy to the formal economy, particularly in urban areas. In this view, small informal businesses and precarious shanty homes are essentially economic assets, “dead capital” which should be revived by the official legal system so people could have access to formal credit, invest in their homes and businesses, and thus reinvigorate the urban economy as a whole. Rather than questioning the nature of the legal system that generated urban illegality in the first place, the full (and frequently unqualified) legalization of informal businesses and the recognition of individual freehold property titles for urban dwellers in informal settlements have been proposed in several countries as the “radical” way to transform urban economies.

Contrary to these conservative approaches, several recent studies have argued that, in the absence of a coherent, well-structured and progressive urban agenda, the approach of legal (neo)liberalism will only aggravate the already serious problem of sociospatial exclusion. However, policy makers and public agencies should become aware of the wide, and often perverse, implications of their proposals, especially those concerning the legalization of informal settlements. The long claimed recognition of the state’s responsibility for the provision of social housing rights cannot be reduced to simply the recognition of property rights. The legalization of informal activities, particularly through the attribution of individual property titles, does not necessarily entail sociospatial integration.

Unless tenure legalization policies are formulated within the scope of comprehensive socioeconomic policies and are assimilated into a broader strategy of urban management, they can have negative effects (Alfonsin 2001). These consequences can include bringing unintended financial burdens to the urban poor; having little impact on alleviating urban poverty; and, most important, directly reinforcing the overall disposition of political and economic power that has traditionally caused sociospatial exclusion. New policies need to reconcile four major factors:

  • adequate legal instruments creating effective rights;
  • socially oriented urban planning laws;
  • political-institutional agencies for democratic urban management; and
  • socioeconomic policies aimed at creating job opportunities and increasing income levels.

The search for innovative legal-political approaches to tenure for the urban poor includes reconciling the promotion of individual tenure with the recognition of social housing rights; incorporating a long-neglected gender dimension; and attempting to minimize impacts on the land market so the benefits of public investment are “captured” by the poor rather than by private land subdividers. Pursuit of these goals is of utmost importance within the context of a broader, inclusionary urban reform strategy (Payne forthcoming). Several cities, such as Porto Alegre, Mexico City and Caracas, have attempted to operationalize this progressive urban agenda by reforming their traditional legal system. Significant developments to democratize access to land and property have included less exclusive urban norms and regulations, special residential zoning for the urban poor, and changes in the nature of fiscal land value capture mechanisms to make them less regressive.

Widening the Debate

In the context of this lively debate on urban law, the Lincoln Institute supported three recent international conferences:

  • 7th Law and Urban Space Conference on Law in Urban Governance, promoted by IRGLUS, Cairo, Egypt, June 2000;
  • UNCHS/ECLAC Latin American and Caribbean Regional Preparatory Conference in Santiago, Chile, October 2000;
  • 1st Brazilian Urban Law Conference in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, December 2000.

Law in Urban Governance

Given the relatively new emphasis on reconciling urban studies and legal studies, the legal dimension of the urban development process still needs to be made more explicitly the focus of research. This requires a more consistent approach to language so key concepts, such as property rights, can be adequately discussed in both political and legal terms. Most of the papers presented at this IRGLUS conference focused on land regularization. While regularization has become the most frequent policy response to the general problem of illegal settlement, the term is used in a variety of ways, each with different meanings, by different agencies and researchers. The implementation of the physical dimension of regularization policies entails upgrading infrastructure and introducing services. It also highlights the need to be culturally sensitive. For example, regularization policies to provide security of tenure require greater attention to the gender implications of the process.

Participants also discussed the impacts of regularization policies on both formal and informal land market. Regularization was seen by some as the “marketization” of processes operating in erstwhile illegal settlements. One area of concern was the possibility of “gentrification,” which in this case means not the rehabilitation and changed use of buildings but the process of middle-income groups “raiding” newly regularized settlements for residential or other purposes and displacing the original inhabitants. Clearly, a broad range of economic and political issues needs to be addressed when defining regularization policies. In particular, the residents of illegal settlements need to be included in the economic and political life of the city to avoid the dangers of increased socioeconomic segregation.

Responding successfully to the complex problems of illegal settlement is difficult, and particular solutions cannot always be replicated in other places. Ultimately successful regularization is dependent on government and requires costly programs and legal reform. However, the gap between the questions raised and actual practice in the field is significant. Because of the pressing need to “get ahead” of the process of illegal settlement, public agencies are concentrating on cure not prevention.

How do local governments halt the process of illegal settlement? By working on more effective housing and land delivery systems. Conference participants defended the legitimacy of tenure programs, pragmatically in some cases, or as a fundamental right in others. Given the “top-down” approach frequently given to this issue, the discussion on empowerment needs to be widened so the voice of the urban poor can emerge.

The UNCHS/ECLAC Conference

Latin America was the only region to draw up a plan of action for Habitat II-an indication that, despite the existence of fundamental linguistic, historical and cultural differences in the region, there is a common agenda that should mobilize collaboration. The region’s urban structure is undergoing significant transformation as a result of several combined processes:

  • new economic frontiers;
  • growing social poverty and spatial segregation;
  • environmental degradation;
  • the impact of natural disasters on the precarious urban infrastructure;
  • changes in family size and relations;
  • generalized unemployment and growing informal employment; and
  • escalating urban violence, frequently related to drug trafficking.

All such problems have worsened because of expanding economic globalization, inappropriate liberalization policies and largely unregulated privatization schemes. Despite its rapid integration into the growing global market, Latin America has seen social poverty escalate in the last decade. World Bank projections suggest that if this picture remains unchallenged 55 million Latin Americans may be living on less than US$1 a day in the next decade.

The Santiago Declaration resulting from this conference clarified the goal of an urban environmental agenda for political-institutional dialogue and joint action. The focus is to create the conditions needed to overcome political governance obstacles that still challenge the efforts made over the last two decades to promote economic reforms and democratization in the region. To develop a more competitive and efficient urban structure, such a regional action plan should:

  • require broad political reforms to facilitate the adoption of decentralization policies to favor the action of local government;
  • redefine intergovernmental relations and financial cooperation at national, regional and international levels;
  • modernize the institutional apparatus;
  • combat endemic and widespread corruption; and
  • create mechanisms for effective democratic participation in urban governance.

An urgent need is to provide better and more accessible housing conditions for the urban poor, as part of a broader urban reform strategy. Since public investment in housing in much of Latin America has decreased recently, the provision of new housing units, improvements to the existing housing stock and the regularization of informal settlements cannot be postponed any longer.

The Santiago Declaration also advanced a number of proposals, including new regulation frameworks for urban and housing policies; territorial organization policies and land use control mechanisms; and public policies for social integration and gender equity. However, it failed to confront the fact that many of the region’s social, urban and environmental problems have been caused by the conservative, elitist and largely obsolete national legal systems still in force in many countries. Any proposed new balance between states, markets and citizens to support the process of urban reform requires not only economic and political-institutional changes but a comprehensive legal reform as well, especially the legal-political approach to property rights.

Brazilian Urban Law Conference

Brazil’s 1988 Constitution introduced a ground-breaking chapter on urban policy by consolidating the notion of the “social function of property and of the city” as the main framework for Brazilian urban law. Although previous Brazilian constitutions since 1934 nominally stated that the recognition of individual property rights was conditioned to the fulfillment of a “social function,” until 1988 this principle was not clearly defined or made operational with enforcement mechanisms. In short, the 1988 Constitution recognizes individual property rights in urban areas only if the use and development of land and property meets the socially oriented and environmentally sound provisions of urban legislation, especially master plans formulated at the local level. As a result, countless urban and environmental laws have been enacted at the municipal level to support a wide range of progressive urban policies and management strategies.

Some of the most interesting international experiences in urban management are taking place in Brazil, such as the participatory budgeting process which has been adopted in several cities (Goldsmith and Vainer 2001). The imminent approval of National Urban Development Law (the so-called “City Statute”) should help consolidate the new constitutional paradigm for urban planning and management, especially by regulating constitutional enforcement mechanisms such as mandatory edification, transfer of development rights, expropriation through progressive taxation and special usucapiao (adverse possession) rights.

This change in the legal paradigm is of utmost importance. The incipient tradition of urban legal studies in Brazil tends to be essentially legalistic, but it reinforces traditional notions of individual property rights found in the long-standing 1916 Civil Code. This obsolete Code views land and property rights almost exclusively in terms of the economic possibilities granted to individual owners, allowing little room for socially oriented state intervention aimed at reconciling different interests over the use of land and property. Just as important as enacting new laws is the need to consolidate the conceptual framework proposed by the 1988 Constitution, and thus replace the individualistic provisions of the Civil Code, which still provide the basis for conservative judicial interpretations on land development. Much of the ideological resistance to progressive urban policies held by large conservative sectors of Brazilian society stems from the Code, which does not address the role of law and illegality in the process of urban development and management.

The papers presented at this conference explored the legal, political and institutional possibilities created by the new constitutional framework for state and social action in the process of urban development and land use control. Participants emphasized that the discussion of laws, legal institutions and judicial decisions has to be supported by an understanding of the nature of the law-making process, the conditions for law enforcement, and the dynamics of the process of social production of urban illegality.

Participants also remarked that if the legal treatment of property rights is to be taken out of the narrow context of civil law so it can be interpreted from the more progressive criteria of redefined public urban law, then the possibilities offered by administrative law in Brazil are not satisfactory either. The limited and formalistic administrative provisions now in force do not have enough flexibility and scope to deal with and provide legal security to the complex and rapidly changing political-institutional relations at various levels-inside the state, among governmental levels, between state and society, and inside society. New urban management strategies are based on ideas such as planning gains, public-private partnerships, so-called “urban” and “linkage” operations, privatization and public service subcontracting, and participatory budgeting, but they lack full support in the legal system. Furthermore, the new constitutional basis of Brazilian urban law still needs to be consolidated as the main legal framework for urban management.

Conclusion

Many important questions about law and urban illegality remain unanswered, and much more work, research and discussion needs to be undertaken before they can be properly answered. However, sometimes formulating the right questions is as important as providing the right answers. Thus, the discussion of the legal dimension of the urban development and management process will continue to explore questions and answers in the regional context of Latin America and internationally.

Notes

1) Habitat Agenda – the global plan of action adopted by the international community at the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul, Turkey, in June 1996

2) UNCHS: United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). See www.unchs.org/govern for information on the UNCHS Global Campaign on Good Urban Governance and www.unchs.org/tenure for information on the UNCHS Global Campaign for Secure Tenure.

References

Alfonsin, Betania de Moraes. 2001. “Politicas de regularizacao fundiaria: justificacao, impactos e sustentabilidade”, in Fernandes, Edesio (org) Direito Urbanistico e Politica Urbana no Brasil. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey.

de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.

1989. The Other Path. London: I.B.Tauris & Co.

Fernandes, Edesio. 1999. “Redefining property rights in the age of liberalization and privatization,” Land Lines (November) 11(6):4-5.

Goldsmith, William W., and Carlos B. Vainer. 2001. “Participatory budgeting and power politics in Porto Alegre.” Land Lines (January) 13(1):7-9.

Hobsbawn, Eric. 2000. The New Century. London: Abacus.

McAuslan, Patrick. 2000. “From Greenland’s icy mountains, from India’s coral strand: the globalisation of land markets and its impact on national land law.” Paper presented at the 1st Brazilian Urban Law Conference.

Payne, Geoffrey. Forthcoming. “Innovative approaches to tenure for the urban poor.” United Kingdom Department for International Development.

Edésio Fernandes is a Brazilian jurist and lecturer at DPU-Development Planning Unit of University College London. He is also the coordinator of IRGLUS-International Research Group on Law and Urban Space. He thanks the participants in the IRGLUS Cairo workshop who shared their notes, especially Ann Varley, Gareth A. Jones and Peter Marcuse.

Mobilizing Land Value Increments to Provide Serviced Land for the Poor

Martim O. Smolka and Alfonso Iracheta Cenecorta, July 1, 1999

The lack of affordable serviced land for the urban poor is one of the most important issues on the Latin American land policy agenda.1 This shortage of serviced land and the subsequent illegal occupation of unserviced land are characteristic features of Latin American cities, especially in the urban peripheries and in areas unsuited to or restricted from the formal property market by topographic and environmental conditions.

An immediate consequence of this shortage is the overvaluation of land that is serviced. In effect, the provision of services usually increases the price of land by more than the cost of the services. Typically, raw land at the fringe, when designated as urban, is valued at US$5-10 per square meter. The provision of all services costs about US$20-30 per square meter, but the market price may be as much as US$50-100 per square meter. At this price, a 150-square-meter lot of serviced land is equivalent to at least three times the annual income of the majority of poor urban families. In most Latin American cities at least 25 percent of the population falling below the poverty line can barely survive, let alone pay for overpriced land.

Poor people in illegal settlements thus pay a higher price for land than residents in other parts of the city, and they pay more for services such as water, which they have to acquire from private vendors, as well as food, building materials and other consumer goods. Furthermore, their risk for disease is higher due to poor sanitation and limited access to medical facilities.

The Problem of Irregular Occupancy

It should be no surprise that 60 to 70 percent of land in Latin American cities is occupied irregularly, illegally or even clandestinely, with most housing stock being self-built incrementally over decades. In Mexico, the phenomenon of irregularity in land tenure can be seen as a way of life, given its important political and even cultural context. Low-income families find that the only way they can settle in the cities is by acquiring or invading illegal or irregular land.

The message transmitted to younger generations and others who seek housing has been clear: settle wherever you can, and don’t worry because some day the state will regularize your lot.2 This cultural attitude reinforces the perversity of the vicious cycle: the higher the expectation regarding the eventual regularization of irregular settlements, the higher the price that land sub-dividers may charge to sell unserviced or partially serviced land. The mere act of parceling the land raises the price two or three times, so again the poor pay more for land than buyers in the formal market.

Two important policy corollaries relate to this anticipation of land appreciation resulting from future regularization. First, public actions to regularize land have not solved the problem of access to land for the urban poor; rather, regularization is part of the problem because it feeds into the “industry of irregularization.” We must consider a serious restructuring or even the termination of this perverse policy and create other ways to offer serviced land to those who need it.

Second, this process also exposes a fallacy regarding the (in)capacity of the poor to pay for some urban services. They are already paying for at least part of their services, albeit to the landowner/sub-divider as a private “land tax” that could otherwise be collected publicly. The focus of the discussion is therefore misplaced. The issue is not so much whether the poor should pay or not, but rather how they should pay and the limits of such payments. For example, should low-income families benefiting from regularization programs pay for services directly, or should the land value increment generated by the improvements be captured from the landowners through taxation and other fiscal policies? The latter point sheds new light on the problems with some conventional subsidy schemes.

Challenging Current Regularization Programs

The traditional frameworks for studying the phenomenon of irregularity-regularization of land tenure in low-income urban colonies in Mexico (as for the rest of Latin America) need to be reevaluated. This was the motivation behind the March 1999 Lincoln Institute seminar cosponsored with the Colegio Mexiquense AC in Toluca, State of Mexico. Although the seminar could not resolve the conundrum indicated above, or even provide the means to break the vicious cycle, it generated some important conclusions.

First, it is important to recognize that the problem of how to supply land to the poor in Latin American countries cannot be resolved within the prevailing regularization programs. Besides the perverse feedback effects of these programs, there are serious questions regarding their financial sustainability. Regularization programs tend to be more curative than preventive, and they often depend on extra-budgetary government allocations unless the funds are provided by multilateral agencies, NGOs or other organizations.

In Mexico, CORETT, a federal commission for land tenure regularization of “ejidal” land, and CRESEM, a state commission for land tenure regulation and regularization of private land, have worked mainly on the legal side of the problem. Neither commission has achieved its program objectives of providing serviced land for the poor or creating land reserves. They have not focused on the basic problem of land irregularity but rather on one of its manifestations or consequences: illegal tenure.

Second, the problem with current regularization programs exposes the weakness of dissociating such programs from a broad-based fiscal policy, particularly property taxation, with its obvious implications for a healthier land market. As noted in the seminar, successful urban land management cannot be achieved solely through regulatory means. Greater fiscal discipline of land markets is needed, principally at the local level. This should be a pre-condition for an effective mobilization of land value increments to generate urbanized land, rather than a surrogate for the absence of a more comprehensive tax on land values. The same difficulties in obtaining adequate land value assessments, updated land records and other information usually attributed to the implementation of land value taxes also apply, sometimes even more dramatically, to most value capture instruments.

Third, existing fiscal instruments governing land in Mexico, although quite diverse and rigorous, are quite sensitive politically and thus, in reality, very weak. For example, land property taxes (mainly “impuesto predial”) face serious practical limitations in being able to capture land value increments because they were not designed for that purpose. However, fiscal reform may not be as insurmountable an obstacle as once thought when one considers that changes in other sensitive areas, such as privatization of state-owned assets or of ejido lands, have been accomplished.

Over and above these technical and political constraints, one should not neglect the importance of cultural and managerial obstacles. Planners must work with the fiscal administrators to overcome the lack of communication that has long characterized these two groups. Some promising steps have already been taken, and many public employees are aware of the urgent need to integrate fiscal policies and urban planning within the framework of a global strategy.

Finally, there is the broader context in which the issue must be placed. The government and the private sector have to understand that land has become the strategic issue in the dynamic process of urbanization. The main concern is the need to regulate land markets to meet the huge demand for serviced land in new ways and to make significant changes in the priority of this issue within Mexican politics and urban policy.

In sum, the seminar exposed the multifaceted need for a more effective policy to provide serviced land for the poor, including better coordination of existing policies relating to finance, territorial reserves, regularization and land market dynamics. We have also learned that many fiscal and regulatory instruments are sufficient in theory but not in practice. The problem is not so much a lack of resources as the capacity to mobilize the resources that do exist into a comprehensive program that links regularization with fiscal policy, including the exploration of value capture mechanisms.

While we studied various proposals and offered alternatives for future working agendas on the topic, several issues must be addressed before we can begin to understand the phenomenon in a different way. One key question is, If servicing the land adds so much value, why is it so hard to find private agents or developers in the formal market who are willing to invest in the informal market? Why is it deemed unprofitable in spite of such handsome mark-ups?

There is no easy answer, other than imprecise indications regarding risks due to complicated judicial and legal problems, unclear rules of the game, the high cost of approval licenses, lack of information about procedures, and concerns about low profitability over time. Because of the complex institutional issues involved in this dilemma, it will continue to be the focus of attention in collaborative efforts by the Lincoln Institute and its cosponsors in Mexico and other countries of Latin America.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Latin American Program at the Lincoln Institute.

Alfonso Iracheta Cenecorta is president of El Colegio Mexiquense AC, an institution of research and postgraduate education in social sciences and the humanities, in the State of Mexico.

Notes

1. Serviced land is land designated for urban use and provided with basic public services (water, sewerage, paved roads, electric and telephone utilities, and the like), and with access to municipal functions such as employment, education and public transport.

2. Regularization means not only the provision of legal title but, more importantly, the provision of the urban infrastructure, services and other changes needed to integrate the “informal/illegal yet real” settlement into the fabric of the “legal” city.

Some Definitions

Illegal – land occupation that expressly contradicts existing norms, civil codes and public authorization

Informal – economic activity that does not adhere to and is not protected by institutional rules, as opposed to formal activity that operates within established procedures

Irregular – subdivisions that are officially approved but are not executed in accordance with the law

Clandestine – subdivisions that are established without any official recognition

La recuperación de plusvalías ‘socialmente creadas’ en Colombia

William A. Doebele, July 1, 1998

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

El 18 de julio de 1997 el Congreso de la República de Colombia aprobó una innovadora Ley de Desarrollo Territorial con objetivos ambiciosos que permiten que los municipios y distritos recuperen el valor de la tierra creado socialmente, es decir, las plusvalías. Específicamente, la Ley 388 establece que los ciudadanos tienen derecho a “participar” en el aumento del valor de la tierra cuando el marco legal que regula su uso aumenta el potencial de desarrollo. Se distinguen tres categorías de acción urbanística:

  1. cambio en la clasificación, de tierra rural (en la que el desarrollo está sumamente limitado) a tierra para expansión urbana o suburbana;
  2. modificación de la zonificación u otras regulaciones del uso de la tierra;
  3. modificación de las regulaciones que permiten un mayor aprovechamiento de la tierra.

Para expresarlo de forma breve, la legislación estipula que el precio del metro cuadrado de tierra se calculará antes y después de cualquier acción urbanística. Cualquier municipio, por iniciativa del alcalde, podrá exigir su “participación” y así podrá recuperar entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento (según lo decida el mismo municipio) de la plusvalía generada. El precio se determina multiplicando los dos precios en metros cuadrados por el área de cada predio individual en cuestión y restando el precio antes de la acción urbanística del nuevo precio de referencia. Se fijó una tasa máxima del 50 por ciento para garantizar que siguiera habiendo motivación financiera para los promotores inmobiliarios.

Con esta legislación, Colombia ha dado fuerza de ley nacional a la premisa fundamental de los postulados de Henry George, quien sostenía que los ciudadanos tienen el derecho moral de recuperar el valor creado socialmente, como se evidencia en este caso con el aumento del precio de la tierra generado por las tres categorías de acción urbanística mencionadas anteriormente. Tal vez con la única excepción de Taiwán, pocos países, por no decir ningún otro, han intentado incorporar de manera tan directa los principios de George en una ley verdadera de carácter nacional.

Procedimientos para la aplicación

La legislación actual es apenas el primer paso. Según las prácticas colombianas, el Congreso actúa para trazar las políticas generales, pero su aplicación depende del seguimiento que se haga en el nivel ejecutivo nacional y en el nivel municipal. Para hacer el peritazgo crítico por metro cuadrado anterior y posterior a la acción urbanística con la mayor objetividad posible, una entidad independiente llamada Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi llevará a cabo los avalúos de acuerdo a las directrices establecidas en la ley para cada una de las tres categorías.

Las tasas (denominadas participaciones en la ley) deben pagarse cuando el propietario solicita una licencia de urbanización o construcción, cuando cambia el uso del inmueble, cuando hay transferencia del dominio sobre el inmueble o cuando se adquieren títulos valores (representativos de los derechos adicionales de desarrollo y construcción). Estas tasas deben quedar asentadas en el registro de escrituras de propiedades para garantizar el cumplimiento del pago, y el dominio del inmueble no podrá ser transferido en dicho registro hasta que se paguen las tasas mediante alguna de estas modalidades de pago:

  1. en dinero efectivo;
  2. por transferencia a una entidad pública de una porción del predio con valor equivalente al monto de la participación;
  3. por canje de predios de valor equivalente localizados en otras zonas urbanas;
  4. haciendo socia a una entidad pública en la ejecución del proyecto con un interés social equivalente a la participación;
  5. mediante la ejecución de obras de infraestructura o áreas de recreación de valor equivalente; o
  6. mediante la cesión de una parte, de valor equivalente, de los derechos de desarrollo derivados de la acción urbanística.

Es de esperar que la mayoría de los promotores privados preferirá asociarse con los municipios en lugar de pagar dinero efectivo. De hecho, la legislación prevé a manera de incentivo un descuento del 10 por ciento sobre el monto de la participación al utilizar la modalidad (6) y un descuento del 5 por ciento al utilizar las modalidades (2) y (4).

Los municipios y distritos deben destinar los recursos provenientes de las participaciones en las plusvalías para fines específicos:

  • compra de predios o inmuebles para viviendas de “interés social”;
  • obras de infraestructura en las áreas donde el desarrollo sea inadecuado;
  • ampliación de la red de espacio público urbano;
  • financiamiento del sistema de transporte masivo;
  • ejecución de macroproyectos urbanos o programas de renovación urbana;
  • pago de los costos de expropiación de inmuebles para programas de renovación urbana; o
  • fomento de la conservación del patrimonio histórico.

Posibles repercusiones de la ley

Esta legislación aborda muchos aspectos de las políticas de la tierra que por mucho tiempo han sido de interés para el Instituto Lincoln. Martim Smolka, director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto y otras instituciones asociadas realizan seminarios y programas de capacitación con el propósito de compartir las experiencias adquiridas durante los procedimientos de implementación, posiblemente brindar asistencia en los proyectos piloto y seguir la evolución del experimento colombiano.

Uno de estos programas fue un taller de tres días impartido en marzo y copatrocinado por la Universidad Nacional de Colombia y la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública de Bogotá. El taller comprendía las observaciones formales e informales de un amplio espectro de partes interesadas en el tema, tanto de Colombia como de otros países. Puesto que es obvio que Colombia ha dado un paso atrevido y existen pocos precedentes que sirvan de orientación, los funcionarios públicos responsables de la implementación deben actuar de manera innovadora. En el taller se identificaba un número de posibles complicaciones que pueden presentarse a medida que avanza la implementación.

Aspectos constitucionales: La nueva ley se fundamenta inequívocamente en el artículo 82 de la Constitución de Colombia de 1991, que en sí mismo es un documento sumamente novedoso en muchos aspectos de la reforma de políticas de tierra urbanas. Para expresarlo de forma sencilla, el artículo 82 establece que cuando las acciones urbanísticas aumentan el potencial de desarrollo de la tierra, los ciudadanos tienen el derecho de participar en la plusvalía generada por tales acciones, de manera que se sufrague y distribuya equitativamente el costo del desarrollo urbano.

El debate legal y constitucional tiene dos facetas: 1) ¿Pueden los municipios actuar con base únicamente en la ley o deben esperar hasta que el gobierno nacional decrete “regulaciones” para luego ceñirse a ellas por completo? y 2) ¿debe la ley limitarse a establecer los principios generales comunes, dado que la Constitución de 1991 confiere la responsabilidad de los impuestos territoriales exclusivamente a los municipios?

Efectos prácticos de la sindéresis municipal: En el taller también se señaló que la naturaleza voluntaria de la ley puede tener consecuencias negativas y posiblemente imprevistas. Puesto que es el alcalde de cada municipio quien da inicio a la tasación de la “participación”, puede verse sometido a una presión considerable, tanto financiera como de otra índole. En áreas de rápido desarrollo, una tasa entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento del incremento en el valor de la propiedad puede ser una suma altísima. Un vocero, por ejemplo, aseguró que en Cali el 60 por ciento de las plusvalías generadas por las decisiones de planificación equivalían al monto total del presupuesto municipal. Por otra parte, la ley puede facilitar negociaciones y asociaciones de beneficio mutuo entre los municipios y los promotores inmobiliarios, las cuales no ocurren en este momento.

Cuidado del electorado: El ambiente político que produjo esta valiente legislación abarcaba casos escandalosos de fortunas repentinas que surgieron a raíz del cambio de zonificación en Bogotá y de la decisión de extender el perímetro urbano de Cali. En este último caso, se dijo que el precio de la tierra llegó a multiplicarse, ¡más de mil veces!

Además de la implementación inicial, se plantea la cuestión sempiterna de mantener un electorado que permita la efectiva implementación de dicha ley de cara a la resistencia poderosa y bien financiada que oponen los terratenientes y promotores inmobiliarios privados. Por otra parte, la habilidad de cualquier gobierno nacional que haya aprobado una ley de este tipo es de por sí un logro que despierta interés especial en aquellos que consideran la “recuperación de plusvalías” como un elemento esencial de la política de desarrollo urbano.

Objetividad de los avalúos: A pesar de los procedimientos tan específicos estipulados en la ley con la finalidad de lograr la mayor objetividad y transparencia posibles, no será fácil para el Instituto Codazzi cumplir a cabalidad con el avalúo previo y posterior a la acción urbanística dadas las limitaciones de tiempo que establece la ley. Más aún, las distintas alternativas de transferencia para el pago de las tasas con dinero efectivo, que seguramente gozarán de mayor popularidad, dependen de la apreciación local que se haga de lo que se considera “valor equivalente”. Varios oradores señalaron que este proceso podría ser una invitación a la corrupción.

Aspectos técnicos: Los oradores también hicieron mención a un número de problemas de avalúo técnico con las directrices establecidas en la ley. Por ejemplo, si la zonificación restrictiva hace que un propietario pierda valor de su propiedad, y esto a su vez aumenta el valor de un propietario adyacente, ¿qué disposición puede estipularse para proteger al primer propietario sin dejar de recuperar la plusvalía del segundo? Es más, puesto que el mercado anticipa la acción urbanística, ¿se reflejará ya en el avalúo “previo” el aumento de valor que provoca la probabilidad de la acción? O, si las regulaciones del uso de la tierra o de la construcción aumentan el valor de los propietarios de bajos ingresos con predios o inmuebles pequeños, es posible que éstos no cuenten con el dinero efectivo necesario para pagar las tasas por desarrollo, y a pequeña escala tampoco serían viables las otras modalidades de pago. Esto podría traer como resultado ventas forzadas o el desplazamiento de los habitantes pobres. Estos asuntos plantean un reto para la viabilidad de la política: ¿Es mejor seguir adelante y resolver las dificultades a medida que se presenten o intentar una modificación legislativa de los problemas técnicos antes de proseguir?

Efectos económicos: Aunque legalmente se describe como participación pública en el aumento del valor que generan las acciones urbanísticas, la legislación también puede ser considerada como una forma de impuesto a las ganancias de capital. ¿Con qué frecuencia se aplicará? ¿La implementación tenderá a bajar los precios de las tierras afectadas o será el consumidor final el que absorba los cambios en el valor? Si ocurre esto último, la ley podría tener un efecto negativo sobre las viviendas de precio asequible. Por esta razón el artículo 83 (4) exonera del cobro de la participación a los inmuebles destinados a “viviendas de interés social”, según la definición que de esto hace el gobierno nacional. ¿Se convertirá esto en una ruta de escape para la evasión masiva? Existe poca experiencia internacional para responder estas interrogantes.

Planes de ordenamiento territorial: La Ley 388 de 1997 también estipula que todos los municipios y distritos deben elaborar planes de ordenamiento y proporciona descripciones bastante detalladas de dichos planes en los artículos 9 al 35. Sin duda la planificación altera las expectativas de los propietarios y, por ende, el valor de los inmuebles. La interacción administrativa y económica del proceso de planificación de la ciudad y la recuperación de las plusvalías seguramente será un asunto complejo.

Conflictos en los objetivos: Como suele suceder con los instrumentos fiscales, los nuevos cambios buscan alcanzar varios objetivos que no siempre son compatibles: financiar un mejor desarrollo urbano, reducir la especulación inmobiliaria, darle mayor equidad y carácter progresivo a la tributación y cerrar algunas de las vías predilectas para la corrupción de los funcionarios municipales.

Aprendizaje mediante la innovación

Pese a estas inquietudes, Colombia continúa la tradición de ser una de las naciones más innovadoras del mundo en el campo de la planificación de desarrollo urbano, legislación y finanzas. Bogotá fue la primera ciudad importante del mundo en crear un distrito de zonificación especial que reconocía las realidades de las prácticas de vivienda para sectores de ingresos menores. Con el estímulo producido por las ideas y la influencia del fallecido Lachlin Currie, asesor económico del gobierno nacional durante aproximadamente 30 años, la ciudad utilizó distritos de avalúo especial (llamados contribuciones de valoración) para llevar a cabo una transformación física de envergadura en los años 1960. Las leyes colombianas sobre el desarrollo territorial de 1989 y 1991, modificadas y ampliadas por esta ley de 1997, se encuentran entre los enfoques más integrales de la planificación urbana desde la ley británica para el control del desarrollo urbano promulgada en 1947 (British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947). Asimismo, la constitución colombiana prácticamente es única en mencionar el derecho moral que tienen los ciudadanos a las plusvalías generadas por las acciones urbanísticas.

Como cabría esperarse, algunas de estas innovaciones a la larga no llenarán las expectativas iniciales. De hecho, algunos participantes del taller sostenían que los esfuerzos invertidos en la recuperación de la plusvalía podrían ser de mayor utilidad en el mejoramiento de la eficacia de los impuestos a la propiedad convencionales. Por otra parte, la nueva ley está abordando y resolviendo algunos problemas causados por legislaciones y políticas anteriores, y el país está aprendiendo de esta experiencia. La conclusión de los participantes en el taller fue que el proceso bien ha valido la pena y que la nueva ley debe entenderse y evaluarse comparándola con otros instrumentos para la recuperación de plusvalías establecidos anteriormente y la política fiscal en general.

William A. Doebele es profesor emérito de planificación urbana y diseño en la Escuela de Postrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard y miembro asociado del cuerpo docente del Instituto Lincoln. La preparación de este artículo contó con las valiosas colaboraciones de Martim Smolka, miembro superior de los programas para América Latina, Fernando Rojas, docente invitado del Instituto, y Fernanda Furtado, asociada del cuerpo docente y de investigación del Instituto.

Planificación y preservación participativas en La Habana

Ann LeRoyer and Mario Coyula, July 1, 1997

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 6 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Preguntas y respuestas con Mario Coyula

P: ¿A qué se debe la reputación que tiene La Habana por sus hermosos edificios y barrios antiguos?

R: Hace más de doscientos años La Habana era la ciudad más destacada del Golfo de México y la cuenca del Caribe. Establecida como un asentamiento de servicios de la colonia española, la ciudad fue extendiéndose hacia el oeste y el suroeste desde su emplazamiento inicial próximo al puerto, y fue dejando tras de sí un valioso legado en edificaciones que han representado numerosos y variados estilos arquitectónicos durante más de cuatro siglos.

El talante histórico de La Habana perdura tanto por accidente como por diseño: Por accidente porque la revolución de 1959 súbitamente detuvo la marcha de un proceso de substitución de hermosos edificios antiguos por condominios de gran altura; por diseño porque una meta inicial del nuevo gobierno era reducir la pobreza rural y mejorar las condiciones de vida en el campo y en las ciudades pequeñas y los pueblos. Como consecuencia de esto, La Habana se deterioró más, pero la meta de población quedó interrumpida y la ciudad escapó al destino de una dramática renovación urbana y de un desarrollo especulativo de los bienes raíces.

P: ¿Cuáles son las dos caras de La Habana a las que hace referencia el título de su próximo libro, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis?

R: Cada ciudad tiene como mínimo dos caras, según el sesgo social, cultural y político del observador. En La Habana vivía mucha gente bastante adinerada y también mucha gente pobre. Algunas personas dirán que La Habana prerrevolucionaria era una ciudad maravillosa y llena de encanto, un lugar ideal para vivir hasta que llegó el comunismo. Otros la recordarán como un sitio agobiado por la pobreza, la discriminación y la injusticia social; creen que la revolución brindó las mismas oportunidades para todos.

Algunos dirán que La Habana actual está a punto de derrumbarse debido a la falta de mantenimiento y que se ve apagada debido a la carencia de servicios y opciones. Otros señalarán que por esta causa la arquitectura única de La Habana no sufrió los efectos del redesarrollo. Es posible que haya hacinamiento en los centros urbanos, pero la gente no ha sido desplazada a causa de la regeneración urbana. En cada caso, ambos fenómenos suceden simultáneamente. Tal vez es esto lo que hace que La Habana sea tan fascinante.

P: ¿Cuál es la misión del Grupo para el Desarrollo de la Capital?

R: El Grupo se creó en 1987 como un equipo interdisciplinario de expertos con la finalidad de asesorar al gobierno municipal en materia de políticas urbanas. Nuestra misión es darle el mismo peso al desarrollo económico y al desarrollo social de la ciudad, con énfasis en la participación activa de sus habitantes. La preservación del vasto patrimonio arquitectónico de La Habana representa una fuga impensable de fondos públicos en un momento en que la economía cubana atraviesa graves dificultades. No obstante, la inversión es un factor crítico para reafirmar el papel principal de La Habana en la región y para crear un entorno urbano capaz de estimular el crecimiento económico y mejorar la calidad de vida de la población.

Las nuevas inversiones deberían alentar a los habitantes a identificar y resolver sus propios problemas, y es indispensable supervisar el avance logrado para evitar los efectos negativos sobre el medio ambiente natural, así como en la estructura social y arquitectónica. La planificación del cambio en La Habana exige un patrón de desarrollo que sea económicamente factible, ambientalmente estable, socialmente justo y políticamente participativo. Queremos trabajar con inversionistas que entiendan y respeten la comunidad, para ayudar a crear una identidad social y una participación comunitaria mediante la mejora de los aspectos materiales, tales como vivienda, transporte, educación y salud.

P: ¿Cuál es la función de los talleres integrales de transformación del barrio organizados por el Grupo?

R: Son organizaciones de residentes de los barrios, asesorados y estimulados por arquitectos, trabajadores sociales, planificadores e ingenieros. Para cada grupo tratamos de encontrar profesionales que realmente vivan de forma permanente en el mismo barrio. Los grupos escogen y dirigen la recuperación, construcción de viviendas, recreación y otros proyectos económicos y sociales, según la visión y prioridades que tengan para el desarrollo comunitario en sus barrios específicos.

Algunos talleres han escogido dedicarse a la fabricación de materiales de construcción, incluso el reciclaje de escombros (¡materia prima abundante en La Habana!); utilizan estos materiales en sus propios proyectos y también los venden a otros grupos. Otros talleres de los barrios han decidido enfocarse en los jardines urbanos populares o el reciclaje de desechos. Lo que es más importante, estos talleres fomentan la independencia y el compromiso de los habitantes, lo cual despierta un sentimiento local de orgullo que ayuda a combatir la marginalidad.

P: ¿Qué funciones respectivas cumplen el gobierno central y los barrios en la recuperación de La Habana?

R: El gobierno central ha tenido dificultad para satisfacer las necesidades de los barrios, especialmente desde el desplome de la Unión Soviética. En una época el combustible, los alimentos y el transporte eran suministrados y controlados centralmente, o incluso eran importados. Los ciudadanos se acostumbraron a esperar que un gobierno bondadoso se ocupara de ellos, desde arriba hacia abajo. Ahora uno de los desafíos más grandes que tenemos es impulsar y habilitar a los ciudadanos para que ellos mismos obtengan esas cosas localmente, desde abajo hacia arriba. Por ejemplo, el gobierno ha autorizado la creación de decenas de miles de huertos comunitarios pequeños en terrenos baldíos, y el excedente se vende en los mercados municipales.

P: ¿Cuáles son las ventajas y desventajas del desarrollo del turismo en La Habana?

R: Por un lado, el turismo puede atraer nuevas inversiones e ingresos que ayudarán a mejorar las condiciones de vida de los habitantes de la ciudad. Por el otro, la construcción a gran escala destinada sólo a los turistas puede trastornar el conjunto de edificaciones locales y hacer que los cubanos miren a los turistas no como seres humanos semejantes, sino como un mero recurso económico, casi de la misma manera en que el hombre hambriento de la vieja película de Charlie Chaplin veía a cada persona a su alrededor como un pollo asado o un delicioso postre.

Sería preferible atraer muchos inversionistas pequeños en vez de unos pocos grandes y encontrar formas de reutilizar las antiguas quintas de la ciudad como hoteles pequeños. De esa manera podremos manejar con más eficacia las ventajas y los riesgos del turismo y distribuir los beneficios y los costos con mayor uniformidad entre los barrios.

Este patrón debería ser más sostenible y menos vulnerable en un entorno exterior desfavorable, incluso con el bloqueo de los Estados Unidos.

P: El Grupo ha diseñado una maqueta a gran escala de La Habana. ¿Cómo la usan?

R: Utilizamos la maqueta como una herramienta educativa para ayudar a la gente a ver la ciudad como un solo conjunto y a situar el barrio dentro de ese conjunto. Dado que los edificios están clasificados por colores según el período en que fueron construidos, la maqueta también ayuda a la gente a ver cómo ha crecido la ciudad y cómo las edificaciones más recientes han sustituido o arrollado las más antiguas. La maqueta se construyó en una escala 1:1000 y actualmente cubre 112 metros cuadrados. Está en exhibición en un pabellón construido específicamente para ese propósito y que sirve de centro de información para los habitantes y visitantes de la ciudad.

Asimismo usamos la maqueta para evaluar el impacto visual de nuevos proyectos. Al colocar los edificios nuevos en los emplazamientos propuestos, ayudamos a la gente a obtener más información sobre las distintas opciones y oportunidades. Tan es así que este proceso ha puesto freno a ciertos proyectos inapropiados y disruptivos porque todos los participantes –planificadores, urbanistas, residentes del barrio- pudieron ver con claridad la forma cómo una nueva estructura afectaría la comunidad.

Nota del editor: En abril, el arquitecto y planificador Mario Coyula visitó el Instituto Lincoln, la Escuela de Posgrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard y la Escuela de Administración Pública Kennedy para dar charlas sobre la historia y arquitectura de La Habana, su ciudad natal. Se ha desempeñado como profesor de tiempo completo en la Facultad de Arquitectura de La Habana desde 1964 y es el subdirector del Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC). El Dr. Coyula además es integrante de varias comisiones, consejos científicos y consejos consultivos. Es coautor del libro de próxima circulación titulado Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis (Nueva York y Londres: John Wiley and Sons, 1997) junto con Roberto Segre y Joseph L. Scarpaci Jr.

Fortress Communities

The Walling and Gating of American Suburbs
Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder, September 1, 1995

Gated communities are residential areas with restricted access designed to privatize normally public spaces. These developments occur in both new suburban developments and older inner city areas retrofitted to provide security. We estimate that at least three or four million and potentially many more Americans are seeking this new form of refuge from the problems of urbanization.

This rapidly growing phenomenon has become ubiquitous in many areas of the country since the late 1980s. While early gated communities were restricted to retirement villages and the compounds of the super rich, the majority found today are middle to upper-middle class. Along with the trend toward “forting up” in new developments, existing neighborhoods of both rich and poor are using barricades and gates with increasing frequency to isolate themselves.

Gated communities can be classified in three main categories based on the primary motivation of their residents. Two types of “lifestyle” communities provide security and separation for the leisure activities and amenities within. These include retirement communities and golf or country club leisure developments as one subgroup and suburban new towns as another.

In “elite” communities the gates symbolize distinction and prestige. Through both creating and protecting a secure place on the social ladder, these communities become enclaves of the rich and famous, developments for the very affluent, and executive home developments for the middle class.

The third type is the “security zone,” where fear of crime and outsiders is the key motivation for defensive fortifications. This category includes middle-class areas where residents attempt to protect property and property values; working-class neighborhoods, often in deteriorating sections of the city; and low-income areas, including public housing complexes, where crime is acute.

Urban Problems Stimulate Trend to Gating

High levels of foreign immigration, a growing underclass and a restructured economy are changing the face of many metropolitan areas and fueling the drive for separation, distinction, exclusion and protection. Gated communities are themselves a microcosm of America’s larger spatial pattern of segmentation and separation by income, race and economic opportunity. Suburbanization has not meant a lessening of segregation, but only a redistribution of the old urban patterns. Minority and immigrant suburbanization is concentrated in the inner ring and old manufacturing suburbs. At the same time, poverty is no longer concentrated in the central city, but is suburbanizing rapidly.

Gated communities are not yet the normal pattern in the nation. They are primarily a metropolitan and coastal phenomenon, with the largest aggregations being in California, Texas and Florida. However, gates are being erected in almost every state. Real estate developers suggest that the demand for homes in gated communities is increasing, and there is evidence that housing appreciation in such developments is higher than outside the gates.

Fear of crime is the strongest rationale for this new form of community. According to recent reports in Miami and other areas where gates and barricades have become the norm, some forms of crime, such as car theft, are reduced. On the other hand, some data indicate that the crime rate inside the gates is only marginally altered by barricades. Nevertheless, residents report less fear of crime in such settings. This reduction in fear is important in itself, since it can lead to increased neighborly contact, which can reduce crime in the long run.

Policy Issues for Community Life

The development of gated areas is related to the uncoupling of industry from cities and of professionals from the industrial core. Geography compounds current trends toward fragmentation and privatization by undercutting the old foundation of community and providing a new rationale for the lifestyle enclave or gated community based on shared socioeconomic status. This narrowing of social contact is likewise narrowing the social contract.

Privatization- the replacement of public government and its functions by private organizations which purchase services from the market- is promoted as a “benefit” of gated communities, but it may have serious impacts on the broader community. Private communities provide their own security, street maintenance, parks, recreation, garbage collection and other services, thus relieving taxpayers of additional burdens. However, they may also have the unintended consequence of reducing voter interest in participating in tax programs or voluntary efforts to deal with community problems or additional public services such as schools, streets, police or other city and county government programs.

The resulting loss of connection between citizens in privatized and traditional communities loosens social contact and weakens the bonds of mutual responsibility that are a normal part of community living. As a result, there is less and less talk of citizenship. The new lexicon of civic responsibility is that of the taxpayers who take no active role in governance but merely exchange money for services. Residents of privatized gated communities say they are taking care of themselves and lessening the public burden, but this perspective has the potential for redistributing public costs and benefits.

Walled and gated communities are a dramatic manifestation of the fortress mentality growing in America. As citizens divide themselves into homogenous, independent cells, their place in the greater polity and society becomes attenuated, increasing resistance to efforts to resolve municipal, let alone regional, problems.

The forting-up phenomenon has enormous policy consequences.What is the measure of nationhood when neighborhoods require armed patrols and electric fencing to keep out other citizens? When public services and even local governments are privatized and when the community of responsibility stops at the subdivision gates, what happens to the function and the very idea of democracy? In short, can this nation fulfill its social contract in the absence of social contact?

Edward J. Blakely, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is dean and Lusk Professor of Planning and Development for the School of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Southern California. Mary Gail Snyder is a doctoral student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley.

Additional information in printed newsletter:

1. Map of the United States showing concentrations of Gated Communities.

2. Table showing Social Dimensions of Gated Communities.

The Changing Politics of Urban Mega-Projects

Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff, October 1, 2003

From the earliest days of the Republic, civic boosters have prodded American governments to develop large-scale physical facilities—mega-projects, we label them—ranging from canals and railroads in the nineteenth century to rail transit systems and convention centers today. Until the mid-twentieth century, such projects tended to involve modest public expenditures by contemporary standards and they rarely caused significant disruption of the existing urban fabric.

This pattern altered abruptly in the 1950s and early 1960s. Central city economies had, with rare exceptions, stagnated through the Great Depression and World War II, and they continued to do so in the early postwar years. Local business and political leaders concluded that if central cities—particularly those developed prior to the auto age—were ever to thrive again, they would require major surgery. Specifically, they needed to clear slums to provide large downtown sites for redeveloped office districts; to facilitate high-speed automotive movement between suburban and central city locations; and to provide larger airfields with attractive terminals for the nascent commercial aviation industry.

Recognizing that they could not finance these expensive projects with locally generated funds, urban leaders campaigned aggressively for federal assistance, and they were successful in obtaining considerable amounts of funding. We attribute their success mainly to the following factors: (1) public confidence in government was unusually high in the postwar period; (2) business leaders generally accepted the need for government activism to sustain prosperity; and (3) although cities lacked the political clout to secure expensive programs on their own, they were able to participate in much broader coalitions—most notably, those focused on housing (which expanded to include urban renewal) and highways. Urban aviation advocates were less successful, but as aviation traffic boomed they were able to fund new airports and expand old ones by relying primarily on revenues from landing fees and terminal leases.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s these efforts combined to produce an unprecedented wave of urban public investment. While often successful on their own terms, these projects tended to be highly disruptive as well, destroying in particular vast amounts of low-income housing and urban parkland. Project advocates maintained that the public should accept such impacts to advance the greater good. Robert Moses, New York’s famed master builder, never tired of citing a French proverb: “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” (Caro 1974).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, neighborhood activists allied with those involved in the emerging environmental movement against the full panoply of mega-project programs that had come into being during the 1950s. They succeeded not just in blocking large numbers of planned expressways, renewal schemes and airport projects, but also in securing the adoption of numerous statutes, regulations and judicial doctrines, thus strengthening the hands of critics in urban development controversies. For a time it seemed to most observers that the era of mega-project investment in cities was over.

“Do No Harm” Planning

The forces committed to mega-projects have proven highly resilient and adaptive, however. While the character of such investment has changed dramatically since the 1970s, its volume has remained high. Nevertheless, mega-project advocates have had to work within new constraints; they have had to learn the art of making omelets without leaving a residue of broken eggs. We label this art, as exercised in the domain of urban land use, “do no harm” planning. Its essential components are the selection, siting and design of projects to minimize disruptive side effects, and the aggressive mitigation of any harmful impacts that cannot be avoided entirely. Most obviously, governments have ceased clearing slums and building expressways through developed neighborhoods, and only one major new passenger airport—in Denver—has been constructed since the early 1970s.

Public investment in facilities such as rail transit systems, festival retail markets, sports stadiums and arenas, and convention centers has surged. Within the transportation sector, moreover, investment priorities have shifted toward the reconstruction of existing highways, new construction on suburban fringes and airport terminals rather than runway improvements. The great advantage of such projects is that they are relatively easy to site either at some distance from existing development or in older commercial districts that have few preservationist defenders.

Where cities and states have gone forward with major highway and airport projects, they have taken extraordinary steps to minimize social and environmental impacts. The new Denver airport, for example, is on a previously rural 53-square-mile site 25 miles east of downtown. Its location and scale were determined primarily by two considerations: land assembly without the disruption of existing residential enclaves; and future airport operation without significant noise impacts overflowing the airport boundary. Boston’s $14.6 billion Central Artery/Tunnel project, known colloquially as “The Big Dig,” appears very different, in that it is located in the heart of downtown, but it is virtually identical in its do no harm planning orientation. It is almost entirely underground as it passes close to built-up areas (replacing a previous elevated roadway); it has been threaded into the urban fabric without the taking of a single home; and it will add significantly to the city’s parkland.

Common Themes

In addition to do no harm planning, our review of mega-projects built over the past two decades identified the following themes as particularly salient.

Business Support

While insufficient by itself, strong business support has generally been an indispensable condition for mega-project development. Within the business community, leadership has almost invariably come from enterprises with deep local roots, particularly in real estate ownership, development and finance. The strongest supporters of Denver’s new airport, for example, were those who owned property with commercial development potential near the new site; downtown businesses concerned that the city’s existing airport was too small to allow for the region’s continued development; and the banks and financial service firms that had lent money to many of the city’s property owners and developers. Similarly, the most active and effective support group for Boston’s Big Dig has been the Artery Business Committee, a coalition of those who own major buildings adjacent to the artery’s corridor and several major employers with historic roots in downtown Boston.

Public Entrepreneurs

In addition to well-mobilized constituencies, aggressive, deft government officials have been indispensable to the success of recent mega-project proposals. Indeed, it was frequently they who originated project ideas and first sparked the formation of supportive coalitions. Even when others initiated, they commonly took the lead in crafting strategies, tactics and plans; in lobbying for state and federal aid; in securing other types of needed legislation and regulatory approvals; and in dealing with project critics.

Though business groups initiated some projects, they seemed more frequently to “invest” in proposals originated by public entrepreneurs. The business constituents were by no means easy marks, of course. Like venture capitalists in the private sector, they considered a great many ideas brought to them by public entrepreneurs (and others), but invested only in those few that looked particularly good for their enterprises, were to be carried out mainly or entirely at public expense, and had a reasonable chance of securing the myriad approvals required.

Illustratively, Boston’s Big Dig was conceived by Fred Salvucci, a transportation engineer who had become active in battles against planned highway and airport projects during the 1960s and then served as transportation secretary for twelve years under Governor Michael Dukakis. During the first Dukakis administration (1975–1979) the main constituencies for a new harbor tunnel (business) and for depressing the central artery (neighborhood and environmental groups) were at loggerheads. While temporarily out of office from 1979 to 1983, however, Salvucci concluded that the politically feasible strategy might be to marry these projects, while also relocating the tunnel to an alignment far from a neighborhood that it had historically threatened. This strategy in fact resolved the local controversy, and prepared the way for a successful campaign for massive federal aid, led again by Salvucci with critical business support.

Denver Mayor Federico Peña broke a similar type of logjam that had persisted for years over whether to expand Denver’s existing Stapleton Airport or build a new facility on a large site outside the city’s borders. Concluding that the obstacles, both political and environmental, to expanding Stapleton were insuperable, but that city ownership and operation of any new airport remained a critical objective, he negotiated successfully with adjacent Adams County for a massive land annexation. To achieve this objective, he accepted conditions protecting county residents from significant airport noise and guaranteeing Adams County most of the tax benefits that would flow from economic development around the new airport. With local agreements in hand he, like Salvucci, then led a successful campaign for special federal assistance.

Mitigation

Do no harm plans avoid substantial neighborhood and environmental disruption but it is impossible to build a mega-project with no negative side effects. The commitment of do no harm planning is to ameliorate such impacts as much as possible, and to offset them with compensatory benefits when full direct mitigation cannot be achieved. The boundary between mitigating harm and providing net benefits to protesting groups is often indistinct, however, so the norm of mitigation provides leverage as well for skilled activists whose demands are at times tangential to the mega-projects whose budgets they seek to tap. Mega-project champions in turn reflected on the fate of such projects as New York City’s proposed Westway, which failed because of what seemed at first a minor legal challenge. They were deathly afraid of litigation and were frequently willing to make very expensive concessions in return for agreements by critics not to sue.

During permitting for the Big Dig, for example, Boston’s Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a group whose signature strategy was litigation for environmental purposes, threatened to sue unless the state committed to accompany the highway project with a multi-billion dollar set of rail transit investments, mainly for expansion. CLF’s rationale was that the transit projects would prevent the new road from filling up with traffic, which in turn would generate more air pollution. Modeling done for the project (as well as data from other regions) showed that the Big Dig would not in fact have significant air pollution effects, and that investing in rail transit extensions would be a particularly inefficient way to offset pollution effects if they did occur. Nonetheless, both Democratic and Republican state administrations acquiesced to CLF’s demands because they did not want to risk litigation, which at the very least threatened project delays and might also have imperiled the breadth of local consensus in support of the Big Dig.

Bottom-up Federalism

A naïve observer of American politics might assume that the federal government distributes grants to achieve national goals. In fact, however, the grantor-grantee relationship is usually much more complicated than that. Recipient jurisdictions are typically active participants in the coalitions that bring new programs into being and provide them with critical support each budget season. The programs of aid for mega-project investment that we examined were all distinguished more by their openness to local initiative than their sharp definition of national purpose. If grantee jurisdictions had a great deal of influence collectively on program structure, moreover, they had even more when it came to projects, and they were able to exercise it individually.

Every project we studied was initiated by subnational officials and interest groups, and it was they who took the lead at every stage in the decision process. While limited in their discretion by federal program rules, they were alert as well to opportunities for securing waivers, statutory amendments and add-on funds, with the assistance of their congressional delegations. Stated another way, when federal aims are diffuse and weakly defended, principal-agent theory (as applied to the intergovernmental system) needs to be read bottom-up rather than top-down.

High and Rising Costs

Do no harm designs and related mitigation agreements have tended to produce projects that are vastly more expensive than their historic predecessors. According to Brian Taylor (1995), the average cost per centerline mile of urban freeways rose by more than 600 percent in real terms from the 1960s to the 1980s, and costs were even more extreme in some of the mega-projects we examined. Whereas Taylor found that urban freeways cost on average about $54 million per centerline mile (in 2002 dollars) in the 1980s, for example, the Big Dig cost $1.9 billion per centerline mile. Judith Grant Long (2002) reports in a similar vein that the average cost of new stadiums and arenas more than quadrupled in real terms from the 1950s to the 1990s, and we have calculated that light rail development costs increased by nearly two-fifths from the 1980s to the 1990s.

Both older and more recent projects have been marked by a consistent pattern of substantial cost increases between authorization and completion. The projected cost of Boston’s Big Dig, for example, has roughly tripled in real terms since its approval by Congress as an interstate highway project in 1987. The cost of Denver International Airport more than doubled from the late 1980s, when it received voter approval and its federal funding commitments, to its completion six years later.

While a full study of this issue was beyond the scope of our work, we judge that the consistent pattern of underestimation has two primary causes. First, project advocates have very strong incentives to estimate optimistically as they seek political commitments of support. Second, mega-projects are often so complex—both technically and in terms of the mitigation agreements that will often prove necessary to keep them on track—that early cost estimates are typically little more than guesses within very broad ranges.

Locally Painless Project Funding

The hallmark of successful mega-project financing is that projects should appear costless, or nearly so, to the great majority of local voters. The easiest way to achieve this result is to rely on funding from higher-level governments. Where such aid is unavailable or insufficient, the challenge is to identify other sources of revenue to which local voters are generally insensitive—which means, above all, avoiding local property and income taxes and spreading the burden beyond host city residents.

This challenge became increasingly salient after 1970 with rising antitax sentiment, the end of federal renewal aid, and the surge in capital spending for such facilities as stadiums, arenas and convention centers, for which federal aid was only rarely available. In the growing domain of mass transit, moreover, federal matching ratios have tended to decline since 1980.

The revenue strategies adopted to deal with these challenges have been varied and ingenious. New terminals and runways at major airports have been funded largely by increased landing fees, lease payments, and (since the early 1990s) ticket surcharges authorized by the federal government but imposed locally. Stadiums, arenas and convention centers are commonly funded by taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents, such as taxes on hotel rooms, car rentals and restaurant bills. Where broad-based taxes have been unavoidable, the preferred method has been incremental add-ons to sales taxes, which typically require voter approval. Voters have often said no, but sales tax increases provide large amounts of revenue when they are adopted—and when they are not, project advocates routinely come back with revised plans. In Los Angeles and Seattle, for example, transit advocates responded to referendum defeats by scaling back their rail plans and allocating some of the projected revenue to bus service and local road improvements.

Looking to the Future

Almost two decades ago, when New York City’s ambitious Westway project died even though its backers had helped pioneer the do no harm planning and design paradigm, then-Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wondered whether it had become so difficult to build public projects that “Central Park could not conceivably be built today” (Finder 1985). Recent history suggests, however, that the mega-project impulse remains strong. The pertinent question is not whether the U.S. political system can still generate mega-projects but whether the projects that go forward are typically worth their costs to taxpayers.

In general, economists are skeptical about the cost-effectiveness of the most prominent mega-projects, from the Big Dig to the scores of rail transit systems, professional sports facilities and convention centers, built over the past 25 years. Project advocates invariably retort that the economists miss intangible project benefits such as fostering community pride and (in the case of transit, particularly) strengthening the likelihood of smart growth practices in new development. The national coalitions in support of highway and airport improvements, which economists tend to rate more favorably than other types of projects, have argued vociferously that current environmental rules and opportunities for critics to litigate are too onerous and should be relaxed.

There is no easy resolution of these issues because they involve tradeoffs between important, deeply held values. However, our review of a half-century of public works projects in urban areas has left us with three clear impressions. First, states and localities should be required to bear half or more of the cost of projects they undertake, because great windfalls of earmarked money from higher levels of government tend to overwhelm serious local deliberation. Second, strong environmental regulation helps ensure that local pro-growth coalitions do not leave fouled environments or devastated neighborhoods in their wake. Finally, while referenda are in general a flawed instrument of policy making, the evidence seems to suggest that the requirement of voter approval for major local projects tends to have a salutary effect on the bargaining between business groups that stand to benefit financially from the proposed investments and the more general interests of local taxpayers and residents.

_____________________

Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff are the coauthors of Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment. Altshuler is the Stanton Professor of Urban Policy at the Kennedy School of Government and the Graduate School of Design (GSD) at Harvard University, and director of the Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Luberoff is the Taubman Center’s associate director and an adjunct lecturer at GSD.

References

Caro, Robert A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Finder, Alan. 1985. Westway: A road that was paved with mixed intentions, losing confidence and opportunities. New York Times, September 22, sec. 4, 6.

Long, Judith Grant. 2002. Full count: The real cost of pubic funding for major league sports facilities and why some cities pay more to play. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.

Taylor, Brian. 1995. Public perceptions, fiscal realities, and freeway planning: The California case. Journal of the American Planning Association 61 (1): 43–56.

The Social Urbanizer

Porto Alegre's Land Policy Experiment
Martim O. Smolka and Cláudia P. Damasio, April 1, 2005

The Lincoln Institute has been cosponsoring research and training programs with public officials in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for several years. The land policy experiment described in this article represents an innovation with much pedagogical potential because it brings attention to the importance of procedural factors (e.g., management, negotiation, transparency, public legitimacy) in the provision of serviced land for the poor, over and above the conventional attention given to funding and other resources.

Approximately one billion people around the world currently live in slums with precarious infrastructure and without basic services or secure land title, and this situation is expected to worsen in the future (UN-HABITAT 2003). From the perspectives of both the urban order and the environment, irregular land occupations often cause irreversible damage and impose high urbanization costs for the local government and the society as a whole.

Irregularity is a multidimensional phenomenon involving tenure issues (e.g., legal rights of occupation, title registration); compliance with urban norms and regulations (e.g., lot sizes, allowance for public spaces, street layouts); the number and quality of services provided; the type of area where settlement occurs (e.g., ecologically risky areas, hillsides, contaminated brownfields); and above all the occupation process itself, which is usually the opposite of formal development, whereby occupation is the culmination of a legal and regulated sequence from titling to planning to servicing.

Basic infrastructure is frequently available in irregular areas, but it is installed either by unregulated subdividers or after occupation by public agencies, often as an emergency measure. For example, sometimes the main trunk networks for water and sewer systems exist close to areas where irregular settlements are forming, so the subdivider or occupants simply improvise clandestine connections to tap into the main line. For small settlements this kind of intervention is not disastrous, yet it implies that services may be extended into areas that are unsuitable for occupation. Private or public utility companies also extend their services to new settlements irrespective of their legal status and often without consulting the local authorities.

Typical Occupation Processes

The most common current practice for creating irregular settlements involves the occupation of a parcel of land through a complex series of commercial transactions involving the landowner, the developer or land subdivider, and often the future occupants. Landowners seek a way to extract profits from the land; subdividers ignore the need to comply with municipal codes and produce a low-cost, high-profit subdivision; and the poor occupants purchase these illegal plots because they have no other option and may be unaware of the legal status. They usually lack a regular income source and savings to apply for credit and meet the stringent building codes and other conditions required for formal purchase and occupation.

Prospective occupants buy the “right to occupy” through a plot acquisition contract and proceed to organize plot boundaries, street layouts and the construction of simple houses. When an official inspection is made it’s already too late; houses have been built and the community is organized to resist. Public authorities cannot keep up with this cycle of complicity, and thus restrict their role to minimal inspection activities that both conceal a management model tolerant of informality and expose the absence of other housing options for that segment of the population.

High-cost curative actions to introduce urban improvements and title regularization programs are being established in many cities, but their effectiveness to date has been limited (Smolka 2003). More seriously and paradoxically, the expectation created by these programs has tended to increase the number of people resorting to irregularity. In sum, the typical process by which the urban poor access serviced land is inefficient and unfair, and ultimately feeds into a vicious cycle of irregularity by contributing to poverty rather than mitigating it. The problem is not so much what services are provided, by whom and at what scale, but how, when and where the process operates to provide those services in the first place.

The Case of Porto Alegre

Porto Alegre (population 1,360,590 in 2000) is the capital of the southernmost state in Brazil and the center of a metropolitan area of 31 municipalities (see Figure 1, page 12). The city’s quality of life improvements have gained worldwide recognition, largely as a result of its poverty reduction and social inclusion programs and its widely acclaimed participatory administration processes (Getúlio Vargas Foundation 2004; Jones Lang Lasalle 2003; UNDP 2003; UN/UMP 2003). For example, the level of infrastructure services is very high: 84 percent of the city’s houses are connected to the sewerage system; 99.5 percent receive treated water; 98 percent receive electricity; and 100 percent of suburbs are serviced by selective waste collection (Municipality of Porto Alegre 2003).

In spite of these impressive figures, 25.5 percent of the population lives in the city’s 727 irregular settlements (Green 2004). It is estimated that the annual population growth in these areas is 4 percent compared to 1.35 percent for the city as a whole. These facts present an apparent paradox and conundrum: How to reconcile widespread provision of basic services with the increase of irregularity in a period of successful, popular and participatory administration?

Since the introduction of decentralized participatory budgeting in 1989, public investment decision making in Porto Alegre has improved, but the process remains economically ineffective, technically inappropriate, environmentally disastrous, fiscally unfair (because land subdividers pocket monies that should benefit the public) and politically unsustainable. Many areas still have serious problems: poor quality streets without drainage or paving; geological instability and susceptibility to flooding; and a lack of legal titling, which means, for example, no address for postal delivery. Nevertheless, the Porto Alegre case is interesting because it vividly demonstrates that the problem of confronting irregularity is less one of providing services than of changing the process by which the services are provided. It’s a procedural process, a change in the rules of the game.

An Innovative Urban Policy Instrument

The Social Urbanizer concept was developed in Porto Alegre as an instrument, and more generally a program, to overcome the existing unsustainable process of providing urban services in spite of a long history of regulatory legislation (see Figure 2). Enacted in July 2003 shortly after approval of Brazil’s innovative City Statute Act, the Social Urbanizer Act was the result of significant dialogue involving the building industry unions, small land subdividers, housing cooperatives, financial agents and the City Council.

A Social Urbanizer is a real estate developer registered with the municipality who is interested in developing in areas identified by the government as suitable for low-income housing, and who agrees to operate according to certain negotiated terms, including the affordability of the serviced plots. The process contemplates a public-private partnership through which the municipality commits to make certain urban norms and regulations more flexible, to speed up the licensing process, reduce the legal requirements, and recognize progressive, step-by-step urbanization. It also anticipates using the transfer of development rights as a stimulating mechanism for private developers. Other incentives may take the form of access to specific lines of credit or certain direct public investments in urban infrastructure so the costs are not passed on to the final buyer. Eligible Social Urbanizer applicants include duly registered real estate developers, contractors already working in the informal market, landowners and self-managed cooperatives.

Porto Alegre’s Social Urbanizer program incorporates lessons learned from both real challenges and untapped opportunities for public action, and it is inspired by several specific ideas. First, land subdividers operating to provide access to urban land by the low-income sector (albeit through illegal activities) have an expertise and familiarity with that sector that public authorities do not have. Thus, rather than demonize or punish these agents, the Social Urbanizer approach takes a new attitude toward attracting them with appropriate incentives (and sanctions) so they can operate legally. Furthermore, while it is common knowledge that a subdivider can usually operate more profitably at the margin of the law, because of lower overhead costs, avoidance of legal approvals, and so forth, it is less well known that, given the option, many of these subdividers would rather operate legally, even if it means a lower profit margin.

Second, the land value increments generated by land transactions could be converted into a source of revenue for the development. In practice this share of value should be distributed both directly by the landowner (as an in-kind contribution of land beyond what is legally required in land subdivisions for low-income occupations) and indirectly by the subdivider through negotiated lower land prices for the low-income buyers. In most cases of irregular development the public is not able to capture and benefit from this increase in land value.

Third, by giving public transparency to the terms of direct negotiations and the resulting win-win agreement among all the interested parties (i.e., landowners, developers, public authorities, prospective buyers), the Social Urbanizer process creates adequate sanctions for compliance with the norms established for the development. Another component of the negotiation process has to do with the agreed investment schedule and its effect in diffusing speculative pricing.

Fourth, to have any chance of success this new mode of urbanization should be able to provide an adequate supply of serviced plots to meet social needs under competitive market conditions (i.e., more affordable than the conditions of otherwise informal subdividers). In effect an essential ingredient of the program’s rationale is that it establishes new rules for social urbanization in general. The signal should be clear to private agents that the Social Urbanizer process is the only way for the government to participate in the development of socially approved and affordable settlements.

The Social Urbanizer as a Third Path

For the public interest, the primary goal of this strategy is to establish the basis for development before occupation takes place, or at least according to a schedule allowing for significant reduction or control of urbanization costs (see Figure 3).

Public administrations in third-world cities typically respond to the inability of the poor to access formal land markets through two models or paradigms. Under the subsidy model the public intervenes to provide serviced land either directly through publicly developed settlements on an emergency basis, or indirectly through below-market interest for developers operating in that segment of the market. At the other extreme, the 100-percent tolerance model recognizes that the government does not have the capacity to provide all the serviced land needed, and thus tolerates irregular and informal arrangements that may eventually be improved with various regularization programs.

Both approaches keep land market conditions untouched and feed into the vicious cycle of informality. In the first case the subsidies are capitalized into higher land prices, and in the second case they allow land subdividers to charge a premium based on the expectation of future regularization: the higher the expectation, the higher the premium.

The Social Urbanizer represents a third path that recognizes both the role and expertise of informal land subdividers who operate in the low-income segment of the market and the indispensable role of public agents in supporting the poor to participate in otherwise inaccessible market conditions. In other words, this program represents an effort to “formalize the informal” and “informalize the formal” by facilitating and providing incentives for developers to operate with more flexibility in the normally unprofitable low-income market. It is an instrument designed to encourage both entrepreneurs operating in the clandestine real estate market and those operating in the formal, higher-income market segment to develop land under the existing regular standards.

The Social Urbanizer Act represents an attempt to change the rules on how low-income housing needs are to be addressed. It gives a clear signal to the private agents operating in the land market and protects the public from arbitrariness in private development actions. The Social Urbanizer has proven to be an indispensable tool for public management. As a break with current practices, however, the program still faces many challenges in implementation.

  1. From an institutional point of view, it must overcome the city’s traditional model of urban development, which has been limited to regulation and inspection. This tradition can interfere with the public authorities’ roles as a manager, a leader of urbanization processes and a regulator of relations normally left to the market.
  2. From the municipal administration’s view, the goal is to coordinate its many agencies, branches and entities to encourage activities that are economically viable and attractive for developers, but that goal may be at odds with typical public-sector concerns.
  3. To attract large development companies that will be better partners for the public authorities, the instrument will have to be highly attractive, since this type of developer already has sufficiently profitable opportunities at the top end of the market.
  4. The program also must be able to increase the viability of partnerships with small developers, which usually do not possess the internal infrastructure and financial resources to operate in this kind of market.
  5. The Social Urbanizer must ensure its stability and role as a structural element of urban policy in accordance with the principle of democratic access to land. Porto Alegre is currently experiencing political changes that are generating uncertainty and caution after 16 years with the same progressive political group in power. Ultimately the Social Urbanizer will not create significant results unless the municipal government incorporates its principles in a strategic manner over the long term.

Early Stages of Implementation

Porto Alegre has five Social Urbanizer pilot projects at different stages of development. They involve different types of developers so they can function as true experiments: small developers, developers already established in the market, and housing cooperatives. One of these pilot areas has demonstrated that 125 square metres (m2) of fully serviced land can be produced at a price ranging from US$25 to US$28 per m2 in contrast with the formal market price of US$42 to US$57 per m2 for the same amount of land. The first price range represents how much a developer is actually willing to contract with the local administration to operate under the Social Urbanizer framework.

The municipality also attempted to gain financial support for social urbanization activities from Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), the federal organization responsible for financing housing and urban development. The agency is creating a new financial line within its partnership program in which credit is given to the buyer, who will knowingly use it to purchase a plot of land. Until now this financial option was only available for the acquisition of a housing unit before construction. Thus the idea of a credit line to ultimately finance the development of serviced land is a novelty. Another related improvement is the willingness of the local administration to void requirements on developers’ risk analysis, an essential ingredient to open the field to small developers.

The innovation of the Social Urbanizer instrument, as compared to traditional public methods of dealing with urban irregularity, has attracted the attention of many organizations and other municipalities. At a federal level the Social Urbanizer is considered fully integrated with the principles of the City Statute, which has brought support from Brazil’s Ministry for Cities. Another federal law that deals with the subdivision of urban land is now being discussed in the Brazilian National Congress, and the Social Urbanizer is part of that debate as well. If adopted, this subdivision legislation will be an important step toward changing the traditional and perverse process of providing access to land for the urban poor in other Brazilian cities.

Chronology of Urban Policies in Porto Alegre

1979 – Approval of the Federal Subdivision Law (6766/1979) and the First Development Master Plan for Porto Alegre

1990 – Establishment of the Urban Regularization Program

1996 – Creation of the Urban Regularization Center

1998 – Announcement of Land Title Regularization Year

1999 – Approval of the Environmental Development Master Plan

2001 – Implementation of a pilot plan of a differentiated taxation model, based on preventive action, operating in the region of the city that suffers the highest number of irregular settlements

2001 – Enactment of Brazil’s City Statute Act on Urban Development (Law 10.257/2001)

2003 – Enactment of the Social Urbanizer Act (Law 9162/2003)

2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects

2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute, director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, and co-chairman of the Department of International Studies. Cláudia Damasio is an architect and former under-secretary of planning for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She now serves as coordinator of the Social Urbanizer project. .

References

Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 2004. Revista Você S/A. Editora Abril. August 10. São Paulo, Brazil

Green, Eliane D’Arrigo, ed. 2004. Irregularidade fundiária em Porto Alegre por região de planejamento (Land irregularity in Porto Alegre by planning regions) Municipality of Porto Alegre, Secretary of Municipal Planning, http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/spm/

Jones Lang Lasalle. 2003. World Winning Cities II, http://www.joneslanglasalle.com/research/index.asp

Municipality of Porto Alegre. 2003. Informaçöes a cidade: Títulos e Conquistas (Information about the city: Titles and achievements), http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br

Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Land Lines 15(1): 4–7.

UN-HABITAT. 2003. The Challenge Of Slums: Global Report On Human Settlements. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/register/item.asp?ID=1156

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. Human Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press, http://www.undp.org/

United Nations Urban Management Program (UN/UMP). 2003. Report of the Urban Management Program of UN-HABITAT 2003. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/programmes/ump/publications.asp

Taking Land Around the World

International Trends in the Use of Eminent Domain
Antonio Azuela, July 1, 2007

Compulsory purchase, expropriation, eminent domain, or simply “taking” are different names for the legal institution that allows governments to acquire property against the will of its owner in order to fulfill some public purpose. This tool has been used for a long time as a major instrument of land policy, but now it is subject to a number of criticisms and mounting social resistance in many parts of the world. Campaigns for housing rights, movements for the defense of property rights, and legislative and judiciary activism are among the factors changing the conditions under which governments exercise their power of eminent domain.

Land Policy Issues in China

Joyce Yanyun Man, January 1, 2010

As the world’s most populous country and its third largest economy, China and its rapid urbanization and development will represent one of the defining trends of the twenty-first century. Over the past 30 years, China has made remarkable economic and social progress, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and catapulting China onto the international stage.

This economic transformation has also involved an institutional transformation as China’s centrally planned economy has moved pragmatically to a broad reliance on market mechanisms. This movement has been especially challenging in the case of land, which for decades was owned by the state or peasant collectives. Progress has been made in urban areas, where the leasehold term of land ownership is now normally 70 years, but in rural areas collective land ownership continues.

Despite its noteworthy accomplishments, China is facing critical land policy issues that will determine the direction of its future economic development and urbanization.

  • Property rights. The rapid growth of cities has led to government transfers of rural land to urban and industrial uses. Inadequate compensation to farmers whose property rights have been poorly defined has fueled growing civil unrest, while urban leaseholders seek to strengthen their new property rights.
  • Property tax implementation. Recent tax reform has reduced local government revenues and prompted local officials to rely on land sales receipts, fees, and off-budget revenues to finance government expenditures. China’s government is seeking to implement a property tax as a local revenue source to take advantage of the rapid growth of the real estate market.
  • Farmland preservation. The large amount of land removed from agricultural production by the complex forces of urbanization has exacerbated concerns about farmland preservation, especially related to food security.
  • Urban planning and development. Rapid urbanization has also resulted in increased urban poverty, housing affordability problems, inequality between urban and rural population groups, regional disparities, and other social and economic challenges. China’s urban planning practices are in need of reform to better reflect market forces and economic behavior.
  • Environmental sustainability. China’s economic and demographic changes over the past 30 years have been associated with severe environmental degradation. With rapid urbanization forecast over the next decade, there is growing consensus that China must find a more sustainable development model. More sustainable cities are integral to any low-carbon development trajectory.

With these diverse issues in mind, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s China Program was inaugurated in 2003 and continues to focus on improving the quality of public debate and decisions concerning land policy and urban development in China through sound research and the leveraging of international experience and expertise.

The China Program has grown considerably in capacity, scope, and geographic footprint, highlighted by the establishment of the joint Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy in October 2007. The Center’s mission is to study land, urban, and fiscal policies and to facilitate education, training, policy analysis, and research. Having this joint facility in Beijing provides the China Program with an ongoing domestic presence that expands the Institute’s networks and resources and brings together government officials, practitioners, and foreign and domestic scholars to engage in dialogue and to share experiences to promote a better understanding of land policy, urbanization, and property taxation in China and around the world.

The China Program has identified six key research areas that are highly relevant to China’s future development and also offer the best opportunities to utilize the Lincoln Institute’s expertise and resources.

Adoption of a Property Tax

China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) elevated the issue of a property tax onto the official agenda, and pilot property tax projects are currently under way in more than 10 provinces. However, the issue’s sensitive political nature, lingering technical difficulties concerning data and valuation, and continued debate about the exact form of any proposed property tax have slowed implementation and made it unlikely that a broader property tax and related tax policy reforms will be implemented before the 12th Five-Year Plan begins in 2011.

Through close working relationships with the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Development Research Center for the State Council (DRC), the China Program has offered a number of educational programs and provided significant intellectual and capacity building support for China’s adoption of a property tax.

For example, in October 2009 representatives of the British Columbia Assessment Office, the Altus Group, and ESRI Canada led a China Program training workshop on property tax implementation and design of computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) systems. More than 50 SAT officials participated, including representatives from each of the property tax pilot cities.

Delegates from the SAT and the Lincoln Institute attended a three-day conference on valuation and mass appraisal at the University of Pretoria, South Africa, in March 2009, before traveling to Johannesburg’s valuation office to discuss the challenges of implementing a property tax in that country.

In November 2008, training on technical aspects of property valuation was provided in Beijing by property tax experts from Canada, the United States, South Africa, and Hong Kong for more than 40 administrators and assessors from China’s property tax pilot cities.

Local Public Finance

Fiscal policy reform is a key component in addressing many of the social and economic problems China faces. Restructuring the current tax system and promoting balanced tax and expenditure responsibilities at the local government level is one of the main policy objectives of the Chinese government. The underlying efforts are closely related to the future development of any property tax, a necessary and critical solution to local public finance challenges.

The China Program is focused on issues of fiscal decentralization, public service financing, land-related taxes and fees, regional inequity, intergovernmental finance, and the role of property taxation in a modern public sector finance system. Representative activities have included a January 2009 workshop in Beijing on fiscal policy and economic growth in China with leading fiscal policy scholars and experts, including officials from the MOF, DRC, and SAT.

An international conference held at the Lincoln Institute’s headquarters in Cambridge, Massachusetts in May 2008 focused on local public finance and property taxation. Those proceedings will be edited and published in a Lincoln Institute book in 2010, and the volume will be translated and published in China as well.

Land Policy and Land Management

The revision of China’s Land Management Law has been a sensitive issue over the past several years, as the country struggles to define rural land rights, land expropriation, and the public good. With a new land law revision on the horizon, land-related issues remain at the forefront of China’s policy agenda, particularly issues concerning urban and rural property rights, land expropriation, land use efficiency, land use planning, land conservation, and urban expansion and sprawl.

In June 2009 the China Program co-organized a roundtable discussion on the most recent draft revision of China’s Land Management Law with the Land Law Committee of the China Land Science Society in association with the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR). Experts and prominent scholars from across the political spectrum engaged in direct dialogue and discussion with government officials at MLR who are working on the revision.

The China Program is now compiling and translating several land management laws from a dozen developing and developed countries for use by Chinese officials and scholars. The Program also cosponsored a comprehensive survey of land use and farmland conservation issues in a dozen provinces in China, and is building a database for future research on land management issues.

Urban Planning and Development

Rapid urbanization has led to the explosive growth of Chinese cities and their populations, presenting an enormous challenge in terms of city planning, infrastructure, and transportation. New approaches to urban planning are fundamental to the development and management of cities, as well as a prerequisite to ensuring the efficient use of land and integrated development in China. Efforts also must be made to use land sensibly and to coordinate the spatial layout of urban areas, thereby avoiding rampant and uncontrolled urbanization.

The China Program cooperated with the Chinese Society for Urban Studies and the Urban Planning Society of China, affiliated with the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, in organizing the July 2009 International Forum on Urban Development and Planning, which featured the theme “Harmony and Ecology: Sustainable Cities.”

In cooperation with the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form, more than 20 international speakers attended a symposium on megaregions and spatial planning practice worldwide, held in Beijing in October 2008.

Affordable Housing

Housing policy, and in particular affordable housing, is becoming an important focus for China’s policy makers during this period of rapid urbanization. With upwards of 15 million new urban residents expected annually over the next decade, the growth in the supply of affordable housing is an immediate concern. In addition to a one-year joint policy research project with the DRC, the China Program is conducting original research in the field of housing policy and introducing international experience to China’s policy makers and the academic community.

For example, in July 2009 the China Program organized a symposium on low-income housing policy in China to provide a platform for international and domestic scholars and government officials from DRC, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, and the People’s Bank of China to engage in dialogue and discussion. Papers from the symposium will be published in an edited volume for distribution in China. The China Program also hosted an international conference entitled Housing Policy and Housing Markets in China in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in May 2009, and is preparing an edited conference volume for publication in both English and Chinese.

Environmental Challenges

With international attention focusing on recent climate negotiations in Copenhagen, there is a pressing need for timely research on low-carbon development and the complex linkages between land, transportation, and urban and environmental policies in China and globally. The China Program is leading research on environmental taxation in China from a global perspective and developing a database of environmental tax statistics.

The Program organized a roundtable on green cities at Peking University in September 2009, which drew strong interest from domestic and international academics and signaled the need for further study of environmental policy issues in the future. And in May 2008, the Program, joined by Loeb Fellows from the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and Chinese policy makers and academics, held a roundtable discussion at Peking University that addressed urban transformation and sustainability.

Building Capacity to Address the Issues

Since its inception the China Program has been committed to enhancing the capacity of both current policy makers and academics and researchers whose analysis and opinions will influence China’s future policies and reforms. This educational emphasis continues with the establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, which has become an important platform for reaching and engaging students and scholars at Peking University and other academic institutions through training programs, fellowships, lecture series, online education, and research publications.

Training the Trainers

This annual program aims to enhance the capacity and awareness of scholars throughout China regarding urban economics, planning, public finance, and related land policy issues. The courses target university faculty and professional researchers, as well as select government officials, with the goal to increase competence through intensive professional seminars on issues related to land policy in China. More than 70 participants on average attend each two-week training program. Leading experts in their fields from around the world offer the participants an invaluable international perspective. The China Program’s recently launched online education platform seeks to build on previous training programs and to move progressively toward more specialized trainings.

Fellowships

The China Program awards several types of fellowships to international and Chinese scholars and graduate students working on Chinese land and urban policy. Two or three international fellowships are awarded annually to leading scholars and professional researchers based at universities around the globe. In addition to producing important research on issues ranging from the spatial structure of megacities to household carbon emissions in Chinese cities, the international fellowship is an invaluable tool to increase scholarly dialogue between China and the world. These fellows are an integral component of the China Program’s other activities, such as teaching at Training the Trainers programs, reviewing other fellowship proposals, and speaking at seminars.

Fellowships for Chinese graduate students and junior researchers are administered through the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center to bring young scholars into Chinese land and urban policy studies. Approximately 15 dissertation fellowships are awarded to aspiring scholars annually, while an additional 6 or 8 research fellowships help strengthen the capacity of scholars based in China’s leading institutions.

The China Program’s in-country presence at the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center also facilitates interactions among the fellows, including the provision of constructive feedback on their ongoing research. All fellows are invited to Beijing for a mid-term progress report, where they share their initial research findings with peers and a panel of international experts. This event has proven to be an effective way to help domestic junior scholars and graduate students build research skills and promote studies of urban and land issues in China.

Speaker Series

The China Program also regularly invites distinguished individuals drawn from the Lincoln Institute’s network of leading scholars and policy makers to speak to the Beijing scholarly community on vital topics ranging from planning support systems to fiscal federalism and decentralization in the United States. This speaker series helps meet the demand for knowledge about international development and urbanization experiences and how these cases can be adapted to fit China’s needs.

Online Education

The Lincoln Institute has long history of employing online education as a tool to reach a broader audience and maximize its resources. Given the vast geographic distances in China and its emphasis on training and capacity building, the China Program has similarly been interested in online education for some time. The establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center has accelerated the process of making information, analysis, and data available online, and widened the network of collaborators interested in tapping into the Institute’s expertise.

Through the Center, the China Program engaged a local online education company to develop a China-centric platform, which was inaugurated in the summer of 2009 during the China Program’s Training the Trainers session on urban economics and planning. The two-week program was recorded and translated into Chinese, and is accompanied online by Chinese transcripts of lectures and associated PowerPoint presentations and other materials.

The value of the online platform has become apparent almost immediately. During the fall 2009 program and demonstration on property taxation and CAMA, which was also recorded for later conversion to the online platform, attending SAT officials expressed their eagerness to use the platform to demonstrate the concepts to their colleagues and superiors.

Publications and Web-based Resources

As the China Program has increased its research capacity and professional support with the establishment of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, it is producing a steadily increasing series of working papers, books, and training materials that are extending the Lincoln Institute’s and the China Program’s expertise on and influence in China. During 2008 and 2009, nine books were published or made ready for print, and eight other books are at various stages of development. The China Program and the Center’s fellows and visiting fellows have also produced about 40 working papers and a number of focused reports and policy briefs, which will soon be available online.

Complementing all of these activities is the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center’s revamped Web site. It provides a window into the China Program’s mission and vision, and is an important link between the Lincoln Institute’s and the China Program’s dual educational and research objectives. Drawing together Chinese and English working papers, training and education materials, and conference proceedings from both the Lincoln Institute and the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center, the Web site is a rich repository of impartial knowledge and an expanding platform for scholarly dialogue concerning the ascendant land, urban, and environmental policy issues in China.

In 2010, the China Program will continue to strengthen its online resources to synthesize and disseminate its recent research to a broader audience of Chinese scholars and policy makers through new publications and focused policy reports, while also striving to advance academic debate through research, demonstration projects, conferences and other activities.

About the Author

Joyce Yanyun Man is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s China Program, as well as director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy. She is also professor of economics in the Peking University College of Urban and Environmental Science.