Topic: Public Finance

Lecciones aprendidas de la experiencia de América Latina con la recuperación de plusvalías

Martim O. Smolka and Fernanda Furtado, July 1, 2001

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En los últimos cinco años el Instituto Lincoln ha respaldado el estudio de las políticas e instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías en muchos países latinoamericanos. Pese a la diversidad de enfoques y la variedad de casos específicos, hemos podido identificar siete lecciones preponderantes que pueden ayudar a aclarar parte de la confusión y los conceptos errados que se asocian con la implementación de los principios de recuperación de plusvalías. Cada lección resumida más adelante presenta uno o dos ejemplos tomados de libro Recuperación de Plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el Desarrollo Urbano.

La recuperación de plusvalías se refiere al proceso por el cual el sector público recupera la totalidad o una porción de los incrementos en el valor del suelo atribuibles a los “esfuerzos comunitarios” más que a las acciones de los propietarios. La recuperación de estos “incrementos inmerecidos” puede hacerse indirectamente mediante su conversión en ingresos públicos en forma de impuestos, contribuciones, exacciones y otros mecanismos fiscales, o directamente mediante mejoras locales para beneficio de la comunidad por entero.

1. El concepto de recuperación de plusvalías no es nuevo en América Latina. La experiencia latinoamericana en este campo tiene largos años de precedentes históricos. En varios países los debates públicos sobre el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías e instrumentos asociados comenzaron a principios del siglo XX. En los años de 1920, el debate surgió por acontecimientos concretos, como el problema de la pavimentación de las calles en São Paulo, Brasil y la falta de financiamiento externo para obras públicas necesarias en Colombia. En otros casos, los factores políticos e ideológicos han motivado discusiones de alcance nacional. Los representantes del Partido Radical en Chile intentaron introducir la idea en varias ocasiones y en los años 1930 el Presidente Aguirre Cerda propuso una ley para crear un impuesto nacional sobre las plusvalías (incrementos en el valor del suelo) con fundamento en las ideas de Henry George.

2. No obstante, sigue siendo limitada su aplicación en los planes de política urbana. A pesar de los numerosos informes sobre experiencias pertinentes que integran los principios de la recuperación de plusvalías, el tema no están bien representado ni ha ganado suficiente reconocimiento dentro de la esfera de las políticas urbanas. En algunos casos, han surgido valiosas iniciativas para la recuperación de plusvalías que han cobrado notoriedad en su momento, sólo para quedar olvidadas más tarde. Un ejemplo destacado es el conocido Informe Lander en Venezuela durante los años 1960, en el cual se proponía que el suelo y los incrementos de su valor debían ser la fuente principal de financiamiento para los proyectos de desarrollo urbano. Sentaba las bases para recomendaciones sobre las finanzas del desarrollo urbano incluidas en las deliberaciones de la cumbre Habitat I (1976).

En otros casos, se están perdiendo o desestimando oportunidades interesantes para usar la recuperación de plusvalías como una herramienta de las políticas urbanas. Actualmente algunos países de América Latina no están aprovechando los posibles incrementos del valor del suelo generados por grandes proyectos de renovación en los cascos urbanos. Aunque está generalmente aceptada la noción de recuperación de plusvalías, en realidad es poco lo que efectivamente se ha recuperado y redistribuido de los incrementos del valor del suelo derivados de las acciones urbanísticas.

3. A menudo existe la legislación, sólo que no se aplica. Como en muchos otros países de la región, la variedad de los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías existentes en México –desde la contribución por mejoras (una tasación especial o gravamen por mejora dirigido a recuperar los costos de las obras públicas), hasta los impuestos sobre las plusvalías– ilustra la discrepancia entre lo que es legalmente posible y lo que verdaderamente se implementa. Contrario a lo que suele aducirse, el problema general no radica en que los planificadores o funcionarios públicos carezcan de acceso legal o práctico a estos instrumentos, sino que tienden a prevalecer las siguientes condiciones:

  • Con frecuencia se concibe y diseña la legislación y los instrumentos –algunas veces adrede– de una manera tan confusa y contradictoria que prácticamente paralizan toda iniciativa de política operativa. Por ejemplo, la ley nacional de expropiaciones de 1947 estipula un impuesto del 75% de los incrementos del valor del suelo resultantes de obras públicas, mientras que la constitución municipal general (Ley Orgánica de Régimen Municipal) limita el impuesto al 5% del valor total de la propiedad en cuestión. En realidad, ni siquiera se recauda este pequeño gravamen.
  • Incluso cuando la ley hace posible la recuperación de plusvalías, puede ser difícil de interpretar. Por ejemplo, el debate entre juristas eminentes en los años 1970 en Brasil con respecto a la constitucionalidad de la legislación de “Solo Criado” (un instrumento basado en la separación del suelo y los derechos de construcción) reflejó una falta fundamental de comprensión de los antecedentes legales de la recuperación de plusvalías y sus correspondientes instrumentos.
  • No siempre se conocen bien las posibilidades que ofrece la ley, ni siquiera en sus respectivos países. Este parece ser el caso en México, donde el impuesto tradicional a la propiedad en la ciudad de Mexicali, basado en el valor combinado del suelo y las construcciones, fue reemplazado con éxito por un impuesto basado exclusivamente en el valor del suelo (Perló 1999). Otras ciudades mexicanas no parecen estar enteradas de disposiciones similares en la legislación de sus estados o no las han aprovechado.

4. La resistencia obedece más a la ideología que a la lógica. Incluso cuando se entienden la legislación y los instrumentos para la recuperación de plusvalías –o en algunos casos justamente porque se entienden–, es posible que no puedan implementarse a cabalidad debido a la manifiesta “falta de voluntad política”. Esta resistencia puede tomar la forma de interpretaciones engañosas, racionalizaciones estereotipadas y hasta “prédicas” puramente ideológicas.

Resulta sencillo encontrar justificación pública de que la aplicación de tales instrumentos es inoportuna o inapropiada, especialmente si la justificación se basa en interpretaciones engañosas. Algunos de estos argumentos sostienen que las imposiciones sobre el valor del suelo son inflacionarias y alteran el buen funcionamiento de los mercados, o que provocan una doble tributación inaceptable de la misma base. Estos conceptos erróneos parecen hallarse detrás de la renuencia que muestra el Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo de Chile para promover la revisión y reintroducción ante el Congreso de algunas disposiciones sobre la recuperación de plusvalías en el nuevo marco legal de urbanismo del país.

Las objeciones basadas en racionalizaciones estereotipadas pueden recurrir a los siguientes argumentos:

  • los ingresos correspondientes no son significativos o no están justificados al compararlos con los costos administrativos causados;
  • las administraciones públicas no serían competentes en términos de recursos técnicos y humanos; o
  • la aplicación de los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías sería antisocial y regresiva, ya que la población pobre, que tiene la mayor necesidad de nuevas obras de infraestructura urbana, posee la menor capacidad de pago.

No obstante, en oposición a estos argumentos, están los programas participativos de mejoras que se han llevado a cabo con éxito en áreas pobres de muchas ciudades (por ejemplo, en Chile, Brasil y Perú). Estos programas han sido eficaces técnica y económicamente y por lo general han contado con un apoyo sólido de la población de bajos ingresos afectada.

Finalmente, algunas objeciones son de índole netamente ideológica. Por ejemplo, la resistencia a la implementación de la participación en plusvalías en Colombia se basa en la aseveración de que este mecanismo, si bien se reconoce que tiene una buena formulación técnica, representa una forma más de “interferencia” pública indeseable en el negocio inmobiliario urbano, como lo son una mayor carga fiscal, limitaciones de los derechos de propiedad o más regulación (Barco de Botero y Smolka, 2000). Esta posición ha quedado sustituida recientemente por un amplio consenso entre los políticos, líderes empresariales y el público general de que la aceptación de este instrumento es una mejor opción que la exigencia de otros impuestos a la propiedad.

5. La recuperación de plusvalías se va haciendo cada vez más popular. A pesar de los obstáculos y la resistencia política, la experiencia reciente en América Latina con la recuperación de plusvalías muestra un creciente interés en el tema y en las condiciones que justificarían su utilización. Atrae la atención de planificadores municipales en toda la región y comienza a percibirse como una iniciativa importante de las políticas urbanas. Esta popularidad creciente está vinculada a varios factores que se presentan en la región.

En primer lugar, una mayor descentralización administrativa y fiscal exige más autonomía para redefinir y obtener fuentes alternativas de fondos públicos para financiar el proceso de urbanización. La necesidad de más recursos locales se ha visto acentuada por las demandas sociales y las presiones políticas asociadas con los actuales procesos de redemocratización y el mayor grado de participación popular. La generación de fondos no presupuestados requeridos para financiar programas sociales especiales está vinculada a casi todas las nuevas iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías y ha sido una de las razones más poderosas para implementar dichas políticas.

En segundo lugar, la redefinición de las funciones del estado (incluida la privatización), en conjunto con la disminución de la planificación integral, ha dado pie a la materialización de intervenciones públicas más flexibles y negociaciones directas sobre la regulación del uso del suelo y las alianzas entre los sectores público y privado. También cobra significación la apertura de áreas públicas al mercado inmobiliario privado, así como una mejor coordinación entre los intereses de los propietarios privados y el sector público con miras a fomentar nuevas áreas en las ciudades. Cabe destacar que incluso en Cuba encontramos un programa pujante mediante el cual la Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de La Habana, que funciona como una suerte de compañía inmobiliaria, refinancia las operaciones del estado con los incrementos del valor del suelo provenientes de proyectos de rehabilitación urbana en forma de impuestos cobrados a los “socios” privados en las obras de desarrollo (Núñez, Brown y Smolka, 2000).

Otros factores favorables incluyen las condiciones estipuladas por los planes de los organismos multilaterales, que claramente promueven la universalización de los gravámenes al usuario y la recuperación de los costos de las inversiones públicas. La creciente popularidad de los nuevos instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías también puede atribuirse a cierta frustración causada por los resultados mediocres que se obtuvieron en décadas anteriores con la aplicación de impuestos y otras contribuciones tradicionales relacionadas con el suelo urbano, en cuanto a los ingresos y los objetivos de las políticas urbanas.

6. El pragmatismo prevalece sobre las justificaciones éticas o teóricas. Como corolario al punto anterior tenemos que la creciente popularidad de la recuperación de plusvalías parece inspirarse más en razones fundamentalmente pragmáticas que en criterios éticos, nociones de igualdad o justificaciones teóricas o políticas. Algunas reformas tal vez se han introducido sin plena conciencia política del proceso, o de su importancia teórica, como se ilustró anteriormente en el caso de Mexicali. Los indicios históricos muestran que en su mayoría las iniciativas de recuperación de plusvalías han respondido más que todo a la necesidad de enfrentar las crisis fiscales y otros problemas locales en el financiamiento del desarrollo urbano. Es el mismo caso que ocurre en Argentina, donde la necesidad de ingresos predominó sobre los principios establecidos que se oponían a nuevos impuestos cuando se recurrió a un aumento provisional del 5% en el impuesto a la propiedad como una de las iniciativas para financiar las inversiones en el nuevo sistema de subterráneo de Buenos Aires.

No obstante, no debería darse por sentado a partir de los ejemplos anteriores que la acumulación de experiencia no es importante para el perfeccionamiento de instrumentos y la evolución de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías. Un caso pertinente es la experiencia colombiana con la contribución de valorización desde los años 1920 y los innumerables intentos para resolver algunas de sus limitaciones, especialmente en los últimos 40 años. La participación en plusvalías promulgada recientemente es una versión de mayor logro técnico y políticamente aceptable de un instrumento dirigido a recuperar los incrementos –en ocasiones enormes– del valor del suelo asociados con las decisiones administrativas con respecto a la zonificación, niveles de densidad y otras normas y regulaciones urbanísticas.

7. La recuperación de plusvalías no es necesariamente progresiva o redistributiva. Es necesario señalar que de ninguna manera la referencia a las plusvalías es un monopolio de la izquierda política. Las experiencias recientes de Argentina y Chile indican claramente la disposición hacia el tema en contextos neoliberales. Además, las operacões interligadas (operaciones interligadas), desarrolladas en São Paulo y aplicadas con efectividad por administradores con tendencias políticas e ideológicas opuestas, fungieron como argumento convincente de la imposibilidad de etiquetar estos instrumentos a priori.

Los gobiernos locales progresistas, por otra parte, a veces son renuentes a utilizar estos instrumentos, y hasta pueden rechazar de un todo la noción, por tres razones: Primero, es posible que crean que tales contribuciones serían un mero mecanismo para imponer nuevos gravámenes fiscales sin ningún efecto redistributivo. Segundo, incluso cuando los ingresos generados se destinen a la población de bajos ingresos, pueden resultar insuficientes para reducir las diferencias entre ricos y pobres en lo concerniente al acceso al suelo urbanizado (Furtado 2000). Tercero, el argumento intergeneracional de que tales gravámenes se imponen a los residentes más nuevos –generalmente pobres– que necesitan servicios, mientras que las generaciones anteriores no pagaron por servicios de infraestructura o instalaciones recreativas.

De tal modo, la naturaleza progresista de dichas políticas no se resuelve “creando impuestos” sobre los incrementos del valor del suelo ni tampoco apuntando hacia los contribuyentes de altos ingresos. La imagen de Robin Hood de tales políticas se diluye en cuanto queda claro que la parte del valor realmente recuperada de esta manera tiende a ser sólo una fracción –a menudo pequeña– de lo que el propietario recibe en realidad en beneficios. Este punto parece haber sido bien entendido por muchas poblaciones de bajos ingresos, como las de Lima, donde un programa exitoso que comprendía unos 30 proyectos se valió de la contribución de mejoras para financiar obras públicas a principios de la década de 1990.

Este ejemplo y otros indicios fuertes confirman la necesidad de reconsiderar las nociones convencionales sobre la tensión que existe entre los principios de beneficio y la capacidad de pago. En la práctica, la estrategia de atraer cierta intervención pública hacia nuestro vecindario (incluso si ello implica pagar su costo) es más ventajosa que la alternativa de quedar relegado. Sin embargo, este punto debería tratarse con cautela, a la luz de ciertas experiencias en las que se ha aplicado la contribución de mejoras en áreas de bajos ingresos con fines distintos al beneficio de los ocupantes; por ejemplo, para justificar el desalojo o provocar la partida de aquellos residentes que no pueden pagar las mejoras (Everett 1999).

Consideraciones finales

A pesar de las dificultades de interpretación y resistencia a la implementación descrita más arriba, las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías sin duda están despertando nuevo interés y logrando mayor aceptación. Los esfuerzos para utilizar la recuperación de plusvalías se han multiplicado en número y creatividad y sus virtudes, aparte de ser una fuente alternativa de financiamiento público, se entienden cada vez más. Los funcionarios de la administración pública se están dando cuenta del “valor de mercado” de su competencia privativa para controlar los derechos de uso del suelo, así como para definir la ubicación y fecha adecuada de las obras públicas. Asimismo ven que la negociación transparente del uso del suelo y las relaciones de densidad reducen el margen de transacciones que solían realizarse “por debajo de la mesa”. Como el vínculo entre la intervención pública y el incremento del valor del suelo se hace cada vez más notorio, las actitudes están cambiando para hacerse más favorables a la creación de una cultura fiscal que fortalezca los impuestos a la propiedad y los ingresos locales en general.

Sin embargo, todavía queda mucho por hacer en ambas esferas: investigar la naturaleza compleja de las políticas de recuperación de plusvalías y promover un mayor entendimiento por parte de los funcionarios públicos de la manera en que pueden usarse para beneficiar a sus respectivas comunidades. Es indispensable conocer mejor ciertas idiosincrasias latinoamericanas, como cuando los incrementos significativos del valor del suelo se generan bajo regímenes alternativos de tenencia de la tierra que no gozan de la protección del estado, y en casos en que el suelo representa un importante mecanismo de capitalización para los pobres.

Más allá de las limitaciones tradicionales estructurales de patrimonialismo, corrupción, intereses velados, insensibilidad ideológica y demás, una parte considerable de la “variación inexplicable” en las diferentes experiencias con la recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina puede atribuirse a la falta de información. Con el fin de mejorar la comprensión de los principios e implementación de la recuperación de plusvalías, quedan muchas oportunidades para documentar y analizar las experiencias actuales con valoración alternativa del suelo y los instrumentos impositivos.

Martim Smolka es miembro principal y director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln, y Fernanda Furtado es miembro del Instituto y profesora del Programa de Posgrado en Urbanismo de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro.

Land Value Taxation

Could It Work Today?
Dick Netzer, March 1, 1998

Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty, the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax—land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either as utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector.

Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value tax is a serious contender as a revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value tax compelling. This article examines the efficiency of the land value tax as well as land value tax as a substitute for other taxes;

Edwin Mills examines the issue of land value tax in the context of an urban economy, showing that the land value tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed.

Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation.

Author of this article, Dick Netzer, argues that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates.

Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse. State governments may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments?

Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries.

Edward Wolff suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income.


Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty (published in 1879), the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. Unlike other taxes, it causes no distortions in economic decision making and therefore does not lower the efficiency of a market economy in allocating resources. Also, it was obvious in the nineteenth century that a tax on the value of land would be highly progressive.

There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax, as well. Land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either in the form of utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector. Individual landowners did nothing to increase the value of their own land but rather realized “unearned increments” over time, unlike those who contributed labor and capital to production and thus earned their compensation.

In George’s day there was little question that the tax could provide adequate revenue, at least in the United States where the role of government was small-no more than a tenth as important relative to gross domestic product as it today. Virtually all government services were supplied by local governments, which relied entirely on property taxes. Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value taxation is a serious contender as an important revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value taxation compelling.

In January, the Lincoln Institute sponsored a conference to address these issues: “Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?” In the opening paper, William Fischel focuses on the special nature of local government in this country, stressing its importance as an instrument of enhancing property values within communities. He argues that, in pursuing that role, local land use controls actually achieve substantial efficiency advantages by more closely matching consumer preferences to local government services and taxes. This is what economists refer to as the Tiebout-Hamilton model.

Fischel maintains that there is substantial justice in this outcome, which might be improved only marginally by land value taxation. That is, land use controls permit local governments to appropriate much of the value generated by community growth. Moreover, this system is widely used, which argues that it is more workable than land value taxation, although the latter is, in principle, more fair.

Efficiency of the Land Value Tax

Two papers treated the efficiency characteristics of the land value tax. Edwin Mills examines the issue in the context of an urban economy, showing that the tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed. But he believes that this is immaterial because the land value tax cannot yield more than trivial revenues, even at rates that are so high that the courts would find them to be an unconstitutional “taking” of property. Moreover, it is so difficult to value land properly that the efficiency advantages cannot be realized.

Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation. Given his assumptions, the model predicts that the reduction in taxation of capital will so increase the aggregate amount of capital that the demand for land on which to use the capital will generate substantial increases in land values. That in turn will permit the land value tax to generate considerable revenues at a rate that is not confiscatory. Most economists would consider the significant increases in total national output predicted by the model to be real gains in economic efficiency.

Land Value Taxation as a Substitute for Other Taxes

Another pair of papers examines the land value tax as a substitute for other taxes used by sub-national governments in rich countries. In my own paper I argue that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates. But the main thrust of my argument is that those rich countries in which substantial government spending is done by local governments are the most plausible candidates for the use of the land value tax (see Table 1). Furthermore, its use is probably most feasible in those countries familiar with the idea of valuing real property for tax purposes. The combined administrative, compliance and evasion costs of most other taxes are so large that, even if the administrative costs of land value taxation are high, land value taxation is still promising.

Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse, in the not too distant future. For a variety of reasons, state governments in particular may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments? He concludes, first, that the economic gains from the adoption of a new land value tax would be modest, compared to increasing the rates of existing state taxes. Second, a land value tax should help improve the equity of the state tax system. Third, he believes that it would add an element of cyclical stability to state revenue systems.

Nevertheless, Reschovsky remains skeptical about the tax on administrative grounds and is not convinced that it can generate enough revenues to replace any important existing state tax source. In the case of large central cities, however, he rates the land value tax somewhat higher as a replacement for existing tax sources, largely because of the probable lack of adverse locational effects. He views it as especially appropriate for those cities like Philadelphia that now receive relatively small percentages of tax revenue from the property tax.

Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries. There is widespread agreement that the property tax is the appropriate major local government tax, and in some countries this agreement extends to site value taxation as well. But, Bahl notes, the property tax usually provides negligible revenues, because of low nominal rates, low and inaccurate valuations, and poor collection experience. Almost everywhere, the basic requisites of good administration are lacking. Moreover, the political unpopularity of the tax generally is far greater than in the United States. Nonetheless, the property tax, especially the site value tax variant, is considered the best local revenue source in these countries.

Perhaps the most surprising research finding reported at the conference was the conclusion of Edward Wolff, who has written extensively on the distribution of income and wealth in the United States. He suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income (see Table 2). This result may be explained by the fact that the ratio of the value of land owned to household income rises steeply with the age of the householder. That is, mean household income declines sharply with age after age 54, while the mean value of land owned declines only slowly. On the other hand, a land value tax would be much more progressive with respect to wealth than is the income tax.

Broader Principles and Questions

Nicolaus Tideman, a convinced follower of Henry George, argues that the basic principles of and justifications for land value taxation apply to much more than the problems of land use in cities and suburbs-the usual focus for discussion of this form of taxation. He offers applications to environmental, congestion and population problems and to questions of efficient resource use and economic growth on a worldwide scale. He bases his views on the general principle that “all persons have equal rights to natural opportunities and should therefore pay for their above-average appropriations of natural opportunities.”

Throughout the conference, there was lively disagreement about whether the land value tax could really produce substantial revenues. Some, like Mills, held that it could not even replace the conventional American property tax on land and buildings, much less a substantial portion of other state and local taxes as well. Others, including Tideman, Nechyba and I, presented data that suggested the possibility that land value taxation indeed could be an important factor in the American fiscal system. Participants also discussed the problems of administering a land tax so that tax liabilities actually and accurately reflect the value of individual parcels of land as bare sites, which is essential if the tax is to be a truly efficient one.

The conferees did not produce an agreed answer to the basic conference question, Can and will land value taxation work today? But they made it clear that the question remains a relevant one that deserves serious and continuing attention.

Dick Netzer is professor of economics and public administration in the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University. He was the conference coordinator and is the editor of a book containing the eight conference papers and the remarks of the formal discussants, which will be published by the Lincoln Institute later this year.

Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?

Authors of Conference Papers

Roy Bahl, Professor of Economics and Dean, School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

William A. Fischel, Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College

Edwin Mills, Professor of Real Estate and Finance, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University

Thomas Nechyba, Professor of Economics, Stanford University

Dick Netzer, Professor of Economics and Public Administration Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University

Andrew Reschovsky, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Nicolaus Tideman, Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic University

Edward Wolff, Professor of Economics, New York University

Discussants

Alexander Anas, Professor of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo

Daniel Bromley, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison Karl Case, Professor of Economics, Wellesley College

Riel Franzsen, Professor of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa

Yolanda Kodrzycki, Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Daphne Kenyon, Professor of Economics, Simmons College

Therese McGuire, Professor of Economics, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois-Chicago

Amy Ellen Schwartz, Professor of Economics, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University

Robert Schwab, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland

Robert Solow, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

American Spatial Development and the New Megalopolis

Armando Carbonell and Robert D. Yaro, April 1, 2005

This article is adapted from a policy roundtable report on national spatial development strategies prepared under the auspices of the Lincoln Institute, Regional Plan Association and the University of Pennsylvania School of Design. The roundtable was held in September 2004 at the Pocantico Conference Center of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The impetus for this project developed in the spring of 2004 in a graduate city planning studio directed by Robert Yaro and Jonathan Barnett, both Practice Professors in City and Regional Planning at Penn, and Visiting Professor Armando Carbonell. With funding support from the Ford Foundation’s Institute of International Education, additional input was provided by a distinguished team of European and American planning experts hosted by Professor Sir Peter Hall at the Institute of Community Studies in London, England.

European efforts to develop policies and investments for the entire continent and for regions that cross national boundaries have been organized under the umbrella of the European Spatial Development Perspective, a set of policy directives and strategies adopted by the European Union in 1999 (Faludi 2002). Over the past generation the EU has initiated a large-scale approach to planning for metropolitan growth, mobility, environmental protection and economic development. Europeans use the umbrella term “spatial planning” to describe this process, involving plans that span regional and national borders and encompass new “network cities” spread out over hundreds of kilometers (see Figure 1). The EU is also mobilizing public and private resources at the continental scale, with bold plans and investments designed to integrate the economies of and reduce the economic disparities between member states and regions, and to increase the competitiveness of the continent in global markets.

By contrast, the United States has no strategy to anticipate and manage comparable concerns, even though the U.S. population is expected to grow another 40 percent by 2050. How can this growth be accommodated in metropolitan regions that are already choking on congestion and approaching build-out under current trends and policies? How can we improve the competitiveness and livability of our own emerging constellation of network cities? How can the U.S. reduce the growing disparities in wealth and population among fast-growing coastal regions, vast interior rural areas and declining industrial cities? How can the U.S. promote regional strategies designed to address these concerns?

Two important precedents have shaped this analysis of America’s spatial development. The national development and conservation strategies prepared by President Thomas Jefferson in 1807 and President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907 stimulated the major infrastructure, conservation and regional economic development strategies that powered America’s economic growth in its first two centuries. Other major strategies and investments promoted in the administrations of Presidents Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt and Eisenhower also had a profound impact on the nation’s growth. Some examples are the Morrill Act land grant university system, the Homestead Act, and creation of the national rail and interstate highway systems.

Economic, Demographic and Spatial Trends

Rapid population growth

The U.S. Census Bureau forecasts that the nation’s population will grow by 40 percent to 430 million by 2050, whereas most European countries are expected to lose significant numbers of residents, due to declining birth rates and limited immigration. This means we must build half again as much housing and as much commercial and retail space and the infrastructure needed to support these activities in the next half century as we have in the past two centuries.

The study of historical settlement patterns sheds light on current and future patterns. While early settlers clung primarily to the coasts and in compact urban regions, the inventions of rail transportation and later the automobile forever changed settlement patterns and allowed people to set up homes in the interior of the country and in highly decentralized metropolitan areas. Fast-growing Sunbelt states, such as Texas, California and Florida, are expected to see sustained rapid population growth, spurred by the trend of immigrant populations settling in those and surrounding states.

While most central cities will continue to grow at a moderate pace, many metropolitan regions around these urban cores are expected to experience remarkable development. As the city of Philadelphia continues to lose population, for example, its adjacent suburbs and areas further outside the city continue to grow. In general, however, the number of people living in urbanized areas as opposed to rural areas is projected to continue rising, signaling an increase in the amount of urbanized land in the coming decades.

The building out of suburban America

Since 1970 the vast majority of the nation’s economic and population growth has occurred in 30 large metropolitan regions, mostly in their sprawling outer rings. While some cities and inner-ring suburbs are now experiencing infill development and renewed population growth, many others are approaching “build-out,” which increases traffic congestion and commuting times, contributes to loss of farmland, and creates conflicts between new development and green infrastructure, such as public water supplies and wildlife habitat.

In less than three centuries, 46 million acres of America’s virgin landscape have been converted to urban uses. In the next 25 years that number will more than double to 112 million acres. If current growth and land consumption rates continue, another 100 million acres will be urbanized by 2050, at a rate seven times faster than the population will grow.

Uneven and inequitable growth patterns

While most population and economic growth has been in large metropolitan regions, other areas of the country have experienced losses. Large rural regions where resource-based economies or groundwater reserves are in permanent decline are left without the means to support even basic services. A number of large urban centers and second-tier cities also have experienced decades of decline. For example, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, St. Louis and New Orleans have lost a third or more of their populations since 1960. Even in cities where the outer-ring suburbs have grown, many inner cities and inner-ring suburbs have lost residents, tax base and economic activity, and poverty has become highly concentrated. Many of these places have high concentrations of African-Americans, Native Americans, Latinos and poor whites who will be increasingly disadvantaged as economic opportunities in these regions decline.

In contrast with the U.S., the European Union for decades has invested vast sums to promote development and redevelopment of comparable bypassed areas. These investments have produced dramatic results in revitalizing the economies of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, and formerly depressed cities and regions in Europe’s periphery. Similar strategic investments in America’s disadvantaged cities and regions could produce comparable results.

Limited infrastructure capacity

Metropolitan infrastructure of all kinds, most of it built in the last half of the twentieth century, will reach its capacity limits in the first decades of the twenty-first century. Unless new capacity is created in roads, rails, airports, seaports and other systems, the nation’s economic potential will be artificially limited. Federal transportation investments over the past decade have been largely focused on maintaining the existing infrastructure, not on expanding the capacity of these systems.

Over the last 50 years, Americans have become increasingly mobile. The increase in miles traveled per person has been most pronounced in car and aircraft travel, creating new challenges to keep various types of transportation corridors congestion-free. At the same time, congestion poses a serious threat to manufacturing and freight sectors of the economy. Experts believe that by 2020 there will be nearly a doubling of trucks on the roadways over current numbers. Significant policy measures are needed to channel more resources into high-capacity transportation systems for both individual and commercial activity.

Emergence of megalopolis

In 1961 French geographer Jean Gottman described the Boston–Washington Megalopolis. Between now and 2050, more than half of the nation’s population growth, and perhaps as much as two-thirds of its economic growth, will occur in this and seven other emerging megalopolitan regions whose extended networks of metropolitan centers are linked by interstate highway and rail corridors. Similar networks of cities in Europe and Asia are now seen as the new competitive units in the global economy. Major public and private investments are being made in high-speed rail, broadband communications and other infrastructure to strengthen transportation and economic synergies among their component centers.

The New Megalopolis

The new megalopolis is a model for cooperation among the cities and regions in the U.S. that are growing together and creating diseconomies in congested transportation networks, which in turn affect the economic vitality and quality of life of these regions. This model is based on the idea that if the cities in these colliding regions work together they can create a new urban form that will increase economic opportunity and global competitiveness for each individual city and for the nation as a whole.

These component metropolitan areas will have to cooperate in the formation of a structure that takes advantage of the complementary roles of each area while addressing common concerns in the areas of transportation, economic development, environmental protection, and equity. The new megalopolis model will contribute to improving social and economic cohesion along with a better territorial balance, and will support more sustainable development by emphasizing collaboration on important policy issues, infrastructure investments and instruments for facilitating economic growth and job creation.

To facilitate the development of megalopolitan areas, the U.S. could focus on creating a truly intermodal network linking rail, highway and air transportation. Such connections would relieve congested airports and provide greater options for freight movement. The resulting transportation flexibility would be less vulnerable to terrorist attacks and disaster. Furthermore, regional infrastructure and development focused around rail stations would shape and redirect urban growth in more efficient, less sprawling patterns.

Our current direction is building a country whose competitiveness is threatened by inefficient urban forms and declining rural communities. The new megalopolis concept points us in a different direction, one in which urban areas and their surrounding regions work together on a larger scale to address common concerns and share their complementary strengths. This new model would produce an America that is environmentally sustainable, socially equitable, and competitive in an increasingly global economy.

Six distinctive regions can be identified based on common history, geographic location and topography: the Northeast, Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, Southwest and West. Most of the nation’s rapid population growth, and an even larger share of its economic expansion, is expected to occur in eight emerging metropolitan areas spread over thousands of square miles and located in every one of these regions (see Figure 2). These megalopolitan areas are becoming America’s economic engines: centers of technological and cultural innovation where the vast majority of immigrants who are driving population and economic growth will assimilate into the economic and social mainstream.

In Europe and Asia similar network cities are already being seen as the new competitive units in the global economy. The European Union and national governments in Europe, China and Japan are investing hundreds of billions of dollars in new intermodal transportation and communication links and other infrastructure to underpin the capacity, efficiency and livability of these regions. In all of these places, new high-speed rail networks are integrating the economies of formerly isolated regions.

Toward an American Spatial Development Perspective

An American Spatial Development Perspective (ASDP) could encompass long-range strategies to achieve five broad national goals.

  1. Facilitate the emergence of eight new megalopolitan areas that can compete with similar emerging networks of cities in Europe and Asia.
  2. Create capacity for growth and improved global competitiveness in the nation’s transportation and other infrastructure systems.
  3. Provide resiliency, redundancy and capacity in the nation’s infrastructure to respond to national security needs.
  4. Revitalize bypassed urban and rural regions.
  5. Protect and reclaim important nationally significant natural resource systems and promote less land-consuming patterns of growth.

The federal government could play a crucial role in this process, through collaborations with existing and emerging “bottom-up” networks of interconnected regional strategies, encompassing each of the emerging megalopoli. Ideally, the federal government would help coordinate and “incentivize” these planning efforts, but rely on local and regional initiatives to drive each region’s own strategies.

The federal government could also lead in coordinating infrastructure planning and investments for national and regional intermodal, high-speed transportation networks, as it did in promoting creation of the national rail and interstate highway systems. These investments would be made through partnerships between federal, state and regional government, and private investors. User fees, tolls and fares would cover a substantial portion of the cost of developing and managing these systems.

Regional strategies could also promote investments in major higher education and research institutions needed to maintain the nation’s competitive advantage in technology and create a lifelong learning system to help skilled workers adapt to economic change. This broad approach could also identify the important natural resource systems that sustain public water supplies, biological resources, sense of place and recreational opportunities. Future growth could be designed to reuse formerly used sites and to reclaim and restore impaired landscapes and natural resource systems.

Plans for these infrastructure systems should be closely coordinated with strategies for smaller-scale urban and regional development, to ensure that future development patterns support, and are supported by, these infrastructure investments. Federal and state governments could invest in demonstration projects to test innovative transportation, land use, environmental and other strategies.

Building and Financing the ASDP

The proposed new infrastructure systems and urban development outlined in this article could cost trillions of dollars, much of which could be financed through user fees and public-private partnerships. It should also be possible to employ modest payroll or other taxes to finance some of these investments, which would generate trillions of dollars of new economic capacity for the whole nation. The expected doubling of the national economy by 2050 would expand the gross domestic product by more than $14 trillion (in constant dollars). Redirecting even a small share of the growth of tax revenues in these strategic investments could secure the nation’s economic future.

For over a hundred years, the U.S. has financed major infrastructure projects through a “top-down” system, with major funding from the federal government complemented by state resources. Based on general public agreement of national priorities, this model financed several generations of growth and paid for one of the world’s great infrastructure systems. However, this approach is now being challenged as the needs of maintaining our aging infrastructure systems outpace federal and state funding, to say nothing of new capacity expansion. Today we witness a debate between “donor” and “donee” states over the fairness of federal transportation funds, even as the total amount of federal dollars falls far short of estimated needs. As a result, we find ourselves increasingly starved for capital for infrastructure systems.

To provide more funding for system maintenance and expansion, metropolitan regions are looking to new and innovative financing systems. Public authorities use their tax-free status to attract private dollars through bond issuances, sales and lease-back arrangements. New user fees, such as congestion pricing or high-occupancy-vehicle lanes on toll roads, link charges to those who benefit the most from new investments, creating new revenue streams. And value capture models, such as tax increment financing, allow increases in land values to finance infrastructure investments.

The federal government is advancing instruments such as TIFIA, the Transportation Infrastructure Innovation Act, to stimulate the development of these projects. However, megalopolitan areas have a critical role to play in this emerging system. They provide a vital link between state and federal government and local jurisdictions, which in many cases have the last word over land use decisions. These regional areas transcend political boundaries and capture the true economic and social geography of their communities. And they have the size, capacity and expertise to undertake complex planning strategies.

Armando Carbonell is senior fellow and co-chair of the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Planning and Development. Robert D. Yaro is president of the Regional Plan Association in New York City.

References

Faludi, Andreas, ed. 2002. European spatial planning. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Regional Plan Association. 2004. Toward an American spatial development perspective. Policy Roundtable Report. September.

University of Pennsylvania School of Design. 2004. Planning for America in a global economy: 2004–2005. City Planning Studio Report. Spring.

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