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This month, like conquistadors of centuries past, tens of thousands of us will ascend the Andes to Quito, Ecuador, in search of El Dorado. But, unlike our brutal and greedy predecessors, we are not pursuing metallic wealth beyond our wildest dreams. The golden city we seek promises a sustainable urban future. Our map—the New Urban Agenda, which will be announced and adopted during Habitat III, the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development in October 2016—tells us where we are going, but it does not tell us how we will get there.
We know that we will encounter monumental challenges as we navigate this path to welcome some 2.5 billion people to the world’s cities over the next three decades. We will be tasked with providing jobs and housing for both these newcomers and current urban residents who are inadequately housed or underemployed. And we will have to make unprecedented investments in infrastructure to provide basic services for these new city dwellers. Our local governments will need to step up, as never before, to implement and finance measures to handle extraordinary growth. But while the bulk of responsibility for managing this last epoch of urbanization will fall on local governments, the rest of us are not off the hook. In fact, it is safe to say that the actions of other institutions—particularly national and subnational governments and certain NGOs—will determine whether urbanization succeeds. We will all need to pull together to find our way to larger, more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable El Dorados.
And here is how these golden cities will function. Local, provincial, and national governments will align and coordinate their actions to manage urban growth successfully. This sounds easy enough, but what will it mean in practical terms? It means that different levels of government will commit to getting urbanization right and adopt some new modus operandi. It means that higher levels of government will stop devolving expenditure responsibilities to lower levels of government without identifying or providing sufficient revenues to cover the expenditures. It means that national governments will provide local governments the statutory authority to raise their own funds to meet many of their own financial obligations. It means that we will ensure local governments have the capacity—both technical and human—to make efficient use of all available resources. And it means that national governments will commit to adapt and adjust their policies to match the changing needs of local governments and the contexts in which they work.
Powers conveyed and responsibilities mandated from higher levels of government to lower levels through constitutions and legislation will reflect strategic alignment. Resources transferred from higher government levels to lower levels through agencies or ministries will be less encumbered by earmarks or overbearing compliance rules. Local governments’ powers and responsibilities will be codified in constitutional and legislative “rules of the game” that define a better-groomed playing field. Rules that enable localities to manage their affairs—granting them the power to levy certain taxes and fees or the legal authority to enforce tax collection—will displace regulations that constrain the ability of localities to attend to their own needs, such as property tax rate limitations.
Playing by national rules will no longer be difficult or impossible for cities. Other municipal governments will follow Detroit’s lead and find ways to avoid leaving tens of millions of already-allocated federal dollars on the table as Detroit did in the years preceding its bankruptcy. They will seek assistance to overcome the staff deficits and technical limitations that led to Detroit’s failure to adequately manage federal funding, as noted in the 2015 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report. And they will not fault themselves for their inability to use that money; they will recognize that defects in the design of funding programs are to blame, given that many thriving cities are likewise unable to utilize all of their national funding. And they will know that their problems are not exceptions but rules, as hundreds of cities across the world acknowledge that efficient use, or under-use, of intergovernmental transfers is an almost insurmountable challenge. This is something that we will fix on our way to El Dorado.
But how will we detect and correct defects in the design of intergovernmental transfer programs? Where is the forum where rules of these games are reviewed and refined? It is not surprising that the GAO would conclude that the failure of federal funds to reach the ground is a problem of local capacity. How would the national government get enough objective distance to consider the idea that its programs and policies are ineffective because of bad design? National governments will create programs crafted to fulfill policy goals, not to frustrate local governments’ attempts to meet citizens’ needs. But how? To know whether their programs are working, they will talk about them with their local counterparts. Although these discussions rarely occur now, they will become commonplace. Productive feedback through honestly brokered conversations will ensure that the troops on the ground are on the same page as the legislature and its ministries. And vice versa.
And this is where other key institutions will play a role. Specifically, NGOs and quasi-governmental organizations will connect the work of policy implementers with policy makers. Some institutions are familiar with the work of local governments and trusted by them as partners, but they also have access to and credibility with national leaders and policy makers. These organizations can serve as honest brokers and conveners to bridge the communication gap between policy conception and implementation and help to improve both. Hundreds of these mediators, or “conversation conduits”—including multilateral funders and social-change philanthropists, think tanks and practice-oriented departments of universities, membership organizations of public officials and development lenders, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy—will work together to complete a “virtuous circle” that leads to better policies and aligns the efforts of multiple levels of government to achieve the goals of sustainable urbanization. And they will develop and deliver training and technical assistance to build the capacity of local governments.
It is a bold vision of the future. But without efforts like these, it is hard to imagine how we will achieve the goals of the New Urban Agenda. A significant share of the approximately 4,300 cities in the world with populations greater than 100,000 can use some help to grow their skills and systems, and to communicate better with higher levels of government. And many of them are hungry for the help.
We started on this path with the launch of our global campaign for municipal fiscal health two years ago at a congressional briefing where we were invited to talk about the challenges that perpetuate weak economic performance of older industrial American cities. We will follow next spring with a roundtable co-convened with the Pew Charitable Trusts (a fellow mediator) to present findings from a study of unspent federal grants that we have underway with planning students from Northeastern University (another mediator). We will invite representatives from federal agencies to explore the implications of the findings for reforming formula-funding programs. In addition, we have begun to design and offer training modules to build capacity and technical assistance for cities. But we need help—a lot of it.
Let’s take advantage of the Habitat III meeting to network the institutions that want to help cities make efficient use of intergovernmental transfers and other resources—through policy dialogues convened with national governments, or through capacity building programs for local governments, or both. This effort requires more resources and skills than any of us can mobilize individually. We need to tackle this challenge together. The Lincoln Institute is ready to participate in a global effort to empower cities to solve their own problems, and we will identify others to begin the process of mobilizing and coordinating a new global practice. Please seek us out in Quito if you want to learn more about what we are doing and how we might work together.
We will not get another chance to get urbanization right. By the middle of this century, 70 percent of humanity will reside in cities. We must ensure that they are the cities we need. Habitat III is a rare occasion when national governments focus on their urban centers and the outsized role they play in their nations’ futures. Let’s use this moment to focus our collective efforts to implement the New Urban Agenda in the next two decades, and travel together on the road to a new El Dorado.
Photograph by pxhidalgo / iStockPhoto
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The government of China has been concerned about its ability to continue feeding its growing population since the mid-1990s. It has targeted conversion of farmland to industrial and residential uses, especially in the most productive agricultural regions, as the chief threat to the nation’s continued capacity to produce adequate levels of staple cereal crops. China is land poor. Only about one-third of its total land area, which is roughly equal to that of the United States, can be utilized productively for agriculture. Several measures have been introduced with the aim of protecting farmland, especially farmland with the greatest production potential. For example, current regulations require each province to keep 80 percent of its land currently designated as primary farmland under cultivation. Other policies require each province to take measures to ensure self-sufficiency in grain production and to draw up farmland protection plans.
Cultivated Land versus Farmland
Most attention has been focused on “cultivated” land, that is, land used to grow major food grains, feed grains, soybeans, and tubers. Not included is land used for horticultural crops and aquaculture, which would be categorized as farmland in most countries. Roughly 20 to 25 percent of the observed reduction in cultivated land in China in recent years was due to its conversion to orchards and fish ponds (Smil 1999; Ministry of Land and Resources 2003).
Reallocation of cultivated land from cereals and tubers to fruits, vegetables, and fish is a natural accommodation to changing consumer demand and increased income rather than a sign of an inability to maintain staple food production. Urban Chinese households consume much less grain than rural households (Gale 2002). Thus, changes in diets caused by rural-to-urban migration have resulted in less consumption of grains in China between 1995 and 2002, even though total population increased by about one-eighth during that period.
Farmland and Food Security
Even after correcting for reallocations of cultivated land to other food products, China has lost a significant amount of cropland, although the exact amount is difficult to determine because of the poor quality of historical statistics. Estimates of gross cropland losses between 1987 and 1995 have ranged from 3 to 5 million hectares out of a total estimate of 125 to 145 million hectares. Some of that loss consisted of land that was marginal in terms of agricultural productivity, but was highly vulnerable to erosion, desertification, and other forms of land degradation; much of this land was subsequently allowed to revert to more sustainable uses, such as pasture, grassland, and forest. Because the productivity of this land was quite low, its removal from cultivation represents little reduction in agricultural production capacity.
Most observers believe that China can remain largely self-sufficient in food production because of its ability to increase the agricultural productivity of land. For example, China’s agricultural research system has been quite successful in developing and promulgating new crop varieties and cultivation methods that have increased potential grain yields an average of 1.5 to 2.5 percent annually (Jin et al. 2002). A study conducted under the auspices of the International Food Policy Research Institute indicates that China’s ability to remain self-sufficient in food production depends more on investment in irrigation, flood control, and agricultural research infrastructure than on farmland preservation (Huang, Rozelle, and Rosegrant 1999).
Water is likely to be more of a bottleneck than land. Many farming regions face shortages of water for irrigation, so farmers who rely on groundwater have been pumping at unsustainably high rates, causing water tables to fall rapidly. Even regions with abundant water resources have shortages because of poor maintenance and operation of irrigation systems. Improved flood control is also sorely needed to prevent natural disasters that affect cropland losses.
Impacts of Urbanization
Even if the loss of cultivated land does not threaten China’s food security, there are substantial inefficiencies in land allocation generally, and in the conversion of farmland to urbanizing areas in particular. The most worrisome aspect is that farmland conversion has been concentrated in the most productive farming areas of the country, notably the coastal and central provinces that have both fertile soils and climates that allow multiple crops and harvests. Net losses of cropland in these provinces alone between 1985 and 1995 were on the order of 2 to 4 million hectares. Urbanization, industrialization, infrastructure, and other nonagricultural uses have been the primary cause of farmland loss in these rapidly industrializing provinces.
The two sites selected for a recent Lincoln Institute/Ministry of Land and Resources farmland protection study illustrate the scope of this problem. Most of the land around Pinghu City, located halfway between Hangzhou and Shanghai in Zhejiang Province, is prime agricultural land that can be harvested two or three times a year. Cultivated land and orchards account for about two-thirds of the total land area, and little land is left unused. Land taken for construction increased eightfold between 1998 and 2001. The local government has used consolidation of plots to meet its “no net loss” requirements, but the scope for further gains from consolidation is quite limited. Recorded conversion of farmland to urban uses during this period of rapid growth amounted to almost 2 percent of Pinghu City’s 1998 farmland.
Jingzhou City, located in the Yangtze River basin west of Wuhan in Hubei Province, shows the limited impact of urbanization outside of the rapidly growing coastal provinces. Cultivated land and orchards together account for about half of the total land area. Between 1997 and 2003, cultivated land in Jingzhou also decreased by almost 2 percent, but only a tenth of that loss was due to transportation infrastructure and other urban uses. Over half of the loss was due to an increase in areas covered by water caused by flooding and new aquaculture facilities. The remainder was largely due to abandonment of marginal land brought under cultivation prior to 1978, which was either allowed to revert to forest or was simply left unused.
Institutional Impediments
The greatest impediments to China’s ability to maintain adequate levels of food production are not physical but institutional. Inefficient uses of existing farmland arise from policies that affect income generation from farming, including the lack of tenure security, water shortages and poor irrigation management institutions, and the lack of adequate marketing infrastructure.
Tenure Security: Economists have long argued that secure tenure is essential for efficient land use, including appropriate levels of investment in maintaining and enhancing land productivity as well as allocating land to the most efficient uses and/or users. Rural and suburban land in China belongs to village collectives and is administered by the village committee or economic organization, subject to oversight by township, provincial, and in some cases state entities. Rural collectives have the authority to allocate land to alternative uses.
Farmland is leased to households under contractual arrangements in which the household pays a fee to the collective in return for a residual claim on the products of the land. The contract may contain other stipulations as well (for example, requirements that the land be farmed and maintained in good condition). The size of each household’s allocation is based on the size and composition of the household, and may be altered as those factors change. Tenure insecurity has been documented as a deterrent to investing in agricultural improvements (Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle 2002; Deininger and Jin 2003).
Concerns over adverse effects of insecure tenure on long-term investment in land productivity have led the Chinese government to experiment with lengthening the duration of farmland contracts. In 1984 collectives were urged by the state to contract with member households for a period of 15 years, and in 1993 the state urged an extension of standard contracts to 30 years. Revisions to the Land Management Law in 1998 explicitly required that all farmland contracts be written and be effective for a term of 30 years with few or no adjustments allowed.
Farmers also have acquired some ability to alter land allocations by exchanges or subcontracting Exchanges of land among villagers to consolidate holdings were declared legal in 1986, and subcontracting of land to outsiders, subject to approval of two-thirds of the village membership, was declared legal in 1998. Fully implementing these enhanced tenure security and transferability measures remains difficult, however, because they run contrary to longstanding practices and principles of administration in China. For example, they limit the power of the village leadership, and may also result in less equitable land allocations by ruling out reallocations to accommodate demographic or other changes in circumstances.
Ensuring that farmland reforms take hold and preventing abandonment of productive farmland are likely to be increasingly important for maintaining agricultural productivity, especially in areas experiencing rapid urban growth. Urban employment opportunities for working-age men are widely available in fast-growing coastal areas, leaving the farm labor force to be composed primarily of women and the elderly. As many as 80 percent of the young men in the environs of Pinghu City (and 20 percent in Jingzhou) worked in industrial jobs in nearby cities. Lack of urban residency rights keeps farm-based families tied to the land, but since their main source of income is now nonagricultural, they have little incentive to invest in maintaining and enhancing land productivity. Moreover, limitations on labor time and capacity may induce them to leave some land uncultivated.
Such flows of labor out of farming can be accommodated by consolidating plots into larger operational units to exploit economies of scale, thereby lowering land productivity investment costs and increasing farming income sufficiently to make such investments worthwhile. But secure, transferable use rights are essential to accomplish these goals. In areas like Pinghu, for example, wages in urban employment are so much higher than income from farming that farmers have little incentive to invest in the maintenance and enhancement of land productivity by applying organic fertilizer or keeping irrigation and drainage systems in good repair.
Secure tenure rights can also serve as a check on the arbitrary exercise of authority by village leaders who have been known to expropriate land from farmers in order to lease it to rural enterprises or sell it to local governments, often without paying compensation and in many cases pocketing the returns themselves. Illegal land development of this kind has become a national scandal in China, and millions of farmers are known to have lost land as a result. According to the Ministry of Land and Resources (2003), farmers were owed at least $1.2 billion in compensation and relocation fees.
Water Management: The second type of institutional impediment to agriculture relates to water shortages, notably (1) lack of clearly delineated and enforced use-rights for water; (2) inadequate financing of water delivery infrastructure; and (3) failure to price water at its opportunity cost. The lack of clear use-right assignments results in upstream users taking too large a share of the water available, leaving inadequate supplies for downstream users—a phenomenon that applies at both the provincial level, where upstream provinces divert excessive quantities of stream flow, and the farm level, where farmers with land at the heads of delivery canals take excessive amounts, leaving little or nothing for those at the tails of those canals.
Funding for construction, maintenance, and operation of irrigation systems has been inadequate because these activities have no dedicated funding source, and maintenance varies with the overall status of government finances. According to local officials in Pinghu and Jingzhou, for instance, maintenance of irrigation and drainage systems virtually ceased around 1980. Recent attempts to remedy the neglect by investing in repair and upgrades of irrigation systems are hampered by lack of funds. In Jingzhou, for instance, officials estimate that at current funding levels it will take 50 years to repair all irrigation systems currently in need. Many systems that have been repaired recently are likely to require further maintenance before systems currently in need of repair have been upgraded.
Additional inefficiencies in water use arise in China because water prices are set below opportunity costs, leading to overuse. Many farmers are charged for water according to the amount of land farmed rather than the amount of water used. Charges may be set to raise revenue for the township or provincial treasury rather than to induce economically efficient water use. Experiments with water pricing indicate that farmers’ use of water conservation methods is quite price-responsive, so that water price reform has a significant potential to alleviate water shortages.
Marketing Institutions: Inadequate marketing infrastructure and institutions are the third major impediment to realizing potential gains from regional specialization as well as a deterrent to investment in agriculture in many localities. China has a long tradition of promoting self-sufficiency at the local and provincial levels, yet this self-reliance can become an impediment to economic growth by limiting the scope for gains from specialization. China has been moving away from this traditional stance. Grain trading, for example, has been partially liberalized and grain traders are creating more integrated national markets.
Greater market liberalization could contribute to farmland preservation and the maintenance of food production capacity generally. More closely integrated national markets should increase average prices and decrease price volatility, making farming more attractive relative to other forms of employment. Greater market integration should be especially beneficial in poorer inland areas where incentives to migrate toward fast-growing coastal cities have been especially strong.
This market liberalization will require significant investment in infrastructure, however. China’s transportation network has not expanded fast enough to keep pace with the growth of trade volume, and the country lacks sufficient warehouse and cold storage facilities. China has sufficient cold storage capacity to accommodate only 20 to 30 percent of demand, resulting in spoilage losses of perishable freight on the order of one-third (Gale 2002). Increases in such capacity could increase food availability substantially by reducing both spoilage losses and price volatility, giving farmers an incentive to increase their production of vegetables and other perishable products. Expanded provision of electricity could further increase the effective food supply by allowing consumers to reduce spoilage losses by refrigerating produce.
Urban Policies on Farmland Conversion
The current urban policy structure encourages municipal and regional governments to convert farmland, even in areas where the central government has made farmland preservation a top priority. Policies influencing government finance, residential construction, and urban land transactions combine to create a high demand for land. Policies governing payment for land also make farmland conversion the most attractive means of meeting that demand.
Urban land is allocated by a combination of administrative and market mechanisms that create substantial arbitrage opportunities for private enterprises and government entities. Private enterprises can lease land from municipal governments in return for payment of a conveyance fee. Local governments can acquire land by paying a compensation package set according to administrative formulas based on agricultural income, which is typically far lower than the conveyance fee. Revenue from land transactions is a major source of funding for local governments; according to some estimates, it can account for between a quarter and a half of all municipal revenue. As a result, local governments have strong incentives to expand into rural areas in order to finance their ongoing obligations in the areas of infrastructure and housing.
Current regulations also make it more attractive for local governments to provide housing for growing populations by expanding into rural areas rather than increasing density within existing urban boundaries. Redevelopment of existing municipal land requires governments to pay compensation to current tenants and to cover resettlement expenses. Compensation paid to current residents is much higher than that paid to rural inhabitants. In Beijing, for example, land costs (primarily compensation) make up as much as 60 percent of the redevelopment cost of existing urban areas compared to 30 to 40 percent of the cost of developing converted rural land. Tenants may also resist displacement tenaciously, which at the very least creates significant delays. In addition, it is more expensive to provide infrastructure to areas already densely developed.
Industrial development is widely seen as the key to economic growth and a rising standard of living for municipalities. Low land costs have encouraged local governments to acquire and set aside land for industrial development speculatively, in the hope of attracting industrial investment. Much of that land has remained idle as hoped-for investment failed to materialize. By 1996, there were roughly 116,000 hectares of idle, undeveloped land in economic development zones, over half of which was converted farmland that could no longer be converted back.
Low administratively set compensation levels for rural land also create incentives for illegal land transactions that allow rural collectives, rather than urban governments, to profit from conversion, thereby undermining the state’s control over land use. These low compensation levels also create incentives for other types of illegal land transactions, notably forcible takeovers by local officials of land whose owners are unwilling to sell.
Conclusion
The central government’s attempts to limit farmland conversion by administrative measures are likely to continue to be ineffectual as long as local governments and rural collectives continue to have such strong incentives to convert farmland. Institutional reform is thus critical for improving farmland preservation efforts and increasing land use efficiency in general. Reform efforts are also hampered by fragmentation of authority. The Ministry of Land and Resources has jurisdiction over land but not residential construction, industrial development, or local government finance; the latter are overseen by various ministries, each of which has its own distinct set of interests and concerns. Reform requires a cooperative effort that takes these diverse interests into account.
Erik Lichtenberg is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park.
Chengri Ding is an associate professor of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, College Park, and is director of the Chinese Land Policy and Urban Management Program cosponsored by the University of Maryland and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
This article summarizes their 2004 Lincoln Institute working paper, Farmland Preservation in China: Status and Issues for Further Research, which is available here.
References
Deininger, K., and S. Jin. 2003. The impact of property rights on households’ investment, risk coping, and policy preferences: Evidence from China. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 851–882.
Gale, F., ed. 2002. China’s food and agriculture: Issues for the 21st century. Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 775, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC (April).
Ho, S.P.S., and G.C.S. Lin. 2004. Converting land to nonagricultural use in China’s coastal province. Modern China 30: 81–112.
Huang, J., S. Rozelle, and M.W. Rosegrant. 1999. China’s food economy to the twenty-first century: Supply, demand, and trade. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 737–766.
Jacoby, H. G., G. Li, and S. Rozelle. 2002. Hazards of expropriation: Tenure insecurity and investment in rural China. American Economic Review 92: 1420–1447.
Jin, S., J. Huang, R. Hu, and S. Rozelle. 2002. The creation and spread of technology and total factor productivity in China’s agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 84: 916–930.
Ministry of Land and Resources. 2003. Communique on Land and Resources of China, 2002. Beijing.
Smil, V. 1999. China’s agricultural land. The China Quarterly, 414–429.
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In June the Lincoln Institute convened a roundtable of experts from around the country to examine how and why property ownership and title problems exacerbate abandonment. The group debated the merits of public policy intervention, identified policies with the greatest potential for success, and outlined anticipated complications and issues in remedying abandonment. This article reports on that discussion.
The prevalence of vacant and abandoned property in U.S. cities has reached crisis proportions despite efforts to foster reuse of these sites. A mix of macroeconomic and demographic trends, such as deindustrialization, population shifts from urban and rural to suburban communities, and the shrinking urban middle class, have precipitated the decline in real estate demand that can lead to property abandonment in certain neighborhoods.
These trends, along with other factors, have resulted in various abandonment “triggers” (Mallach 2004) depending on the property type: inadequate cash flow; multiple liens; liens that exceed market value; fraudulent transactions; predatory lending; and uncertainties regarding environmental, legal, and financial liability. These triggers often prolong abandonment or relegate a property to permanent disuse, particularly in markets characterized by widespread disinvestment. Many of these triggers also “cloud” the property title and interfere with a potential new owner’s efforts to acquire property title or obtain site control in order to make improvements or commence reuse activities.
Comparable data on vacancy and abandonment across cities are difficult to obtain and vary widely due to different definitions and gaps in data sources, particularly in commercial and industrial land uses. Estimates of the amount of abandoned housing stock range from 4 to 6 percent in “declining” cities to 10 percent or more in “seriously distressed” cities (Mallach 2002). The following city statistics from Census 2000 data and city records only suggest the scope of the problem.
The abandonment problem is even more profound and perhaps less susceptible to reversal in some smaller cities of less than 100,000 that have lost at least 25 percent of their population over the last few decades. The situation in Camden, New Jersey, East St. Louis, Missouri, and other cities with large-scale abandonment suggests a severely weakened market with multiple contributing socioeconomic factors. Where the number of abandoned properties indicates a systemic problem, there may be an inherent limitation on the ability to stimulate market activity.
This problem has ramifications for the quality of our public and private lives, because abandonment can lead to other detrimental social and fiscal impacts: depressed property values of surrounding properties (Temple University 2001); increased criminal activity; health and safety concerns due to environmental hazards; and additional disinvestment. All of these outgrowths of abandonment raise costs for the city, including site cleanup and demolition, provision of legal services, police and fire protection, and legal enforcement.
As urban vacancy and abandonment increase and suburban open space becomes less available or attractive for development, market pressures may improve redevelopment prospects, as in Boston, Chicago, and Atlanta. However, for several reasons we cannot just wait for this to happen everywhere.
First, the market does not always operate perfectly, in part because it is subject to existing laws and regulations (e.g., tax foreclosure statutes and clean title requirements) that impose high transaction costs to taking title and therefore affect market redevelopment. Some level of public policy innovation is needed, whether reform of existing laws or new laws and practices. Second, preserving open space is arguably a public benefit, but that also implies the need for public action to steer new development to previously developed properties. Finally, decisions about whether to spend public money, time, and effort are not made in a vacuum, but require an understanding of the problem, the available tools, and the resources and skills to implement them.
The magnitude of the problem suggests there are no easy answers. Multiple, interconnected market factors and differing state legal frameworks mean that the remedies to abandonment vary. In an effort to better define the public strategies for addressing the problem in different settings, this article sets forth the challenges of overcoming property acquisition barriers to abandonment, outlines a range of remedies, and explores potential next steps.
Neighborhood Redevelopment in New Jersey
Several years ago, Housing and Neighborhood Redevelopment Services, Inc. (HANDS), a nonprofit community development corporation (CDC) in Orange, New Jersey, tried to acquire an abandoned multifamily property. The property was burdened by tax liens that the city had sold to third-party purchasers, a strategy that cities use to raise revenue for other needs. The lien holders included out-of-state investment groups and speculators, and the current property owners did not have the financial ability or desire to redeem the liens. No entity was taking responsibility for property upkeep, so it sat idle and accumulated more tax liens, further elevating the stakes involved in clearing the title and heightening the financial, legal, and psychological barriers to acquisition. HANDS had a plan for neighborhood revitalization and a productive use for the property, but it lacked the funds for acquisition and the tools to clear the legal title.
Over the past few years, however, New Jersey reformed state programs to provide up-front subsidies for property acquisition, removal of liens, and other activities necessary for CDCs to establish site control (Meyer 2005). At the same time, a new state law, the Abandoned Properties Rehabilitation Act (2004), accelerated foreclosure action on vacant property by eliminating the waiting period between the time a potential new owner gives notice of its interest in foreclosing and lien acquisition. In cases where the owner will not rehabilitate a property, the new law allows the municipality to undertake rehabilitation or find a CDC to do so.
In this instance, HANDS took advantage of the new state law and financial incentives to acquire the multifamily property and convert it into housing for first-time homebuyers as part of the CDC’s larger neighborhood revitalization strategy. A few other organizations have begun to use these tools to acquire and redevelop single-family and multifamily homes around the state.
Ownership and Title Issues
Where abandonment or prolonged vacancy occurs due to owner inaction, two options exist for reuse. First, the property may be left abandoned indefinitely, or until the market changes. Alternatively, a new owner (e.g., the municipality, a CDC, or a private developer) may intervene, acquire the property, and carry out rehabilitation or reuse. It is this second alternative and the remedies for implementing it that concern us here. New methods for acquiring abandoned property will help to obtain property control from unwilling, unknown, or incapable owners.
However, the debate between these two alternatives raises significant issues that need further exploration. If the primary objective is to put the property back into productive use, one impetus for intervention is to eliminate the legal barriers to transferring the property to a new owner. Clear title is a critical issue. The multiple tax liens that encumber the title, and often cause the property’s abandonment in the first place, can cloud the title and prevent effective title transfer.
These title complications can be further compounded by the use of certain supposed remedies. For example, forcing title transfer involuntarily, from an unwilling owner or in abandonment cases where ownership is in doubt, can result in a cloudy title that may jeopardize obtaining title insurance—a mandatory precursor to procurement of conventional financing—and thereafter present title problems whenever the property changes hands. Clear title is part of the larger challenge for many states that do not have efficient, workable processes for moving title into the hands of responsible owners.
Remedies: Laws, Practices, and Tools
Municipalities seeking to reduce their stocks of vacant and abandoned property may be inspired by strategies and programs used in other localities, but they should carefully assess their own situations first. Differences in state laws may require a variety of approaches, such as reforming existing laws; improving local practices and implementation; and introducing innovative new tools. Some remedies to facilitate acquisition of vacant and abandoned properties for redevelopment seek to
Remedy choice depends on the property’s stage of abandonment, the current land use (e.g., multifamily rental, single-family house, commercial, or industrial), the property’s ownership status, and state statutes and regulations. A property at an early stage of abandonment due to general neglect and code violations, including conditions that adversely affect the health, safety, or well-being of building residents or neighbors, may be turned around with regular inspections and enforcement. These preventive remedies can slow disinvestment and prevent permanent abandonment by forcing a known owner to either renovate the property or transfer it to another entity willing to do so. Effective code enforcement varies widely because it is a function of local practice, but persistent municipal issuance of orders for code violations is critical.
Localities may also enforce state-authorized nuisance abatement laws to address these code violations by requiring an owner to make repairs or improvements, such as trash removal, structural repairs, and building demolition. If an owner refuses, then the municipality can enter the property to undertake these activities and seek to collect the costs from the owner. If that fails, the municipality may place liens on the abandoned property equal to the costs of these actions, enforcing them through foreclosure actions, or in many states by attaching the owner’s assets. The effectiveness of nuisance abatement laws varies across states, depending on the definition of “nuisance,” the prescribed statutory penalties, and how the local authority chooses to carry out nuisance actions (Mallach 2004).
Significant disinvestment generally occurs where property owners fail to undertake property management responsibilities that cause significant disrepair; stop paying back taxes, utilities, or other public services; and/or allow the property to remain vacant for more than a designated period, usually six to twelve months. Some of these complicated cases require innovative, sometimes controversial remedies.
Under Baltimore’s vacant property receivership ordinance, for example, the city or its CDC-designee may petition a court to appoint a receiver for any property with a vacant building violation notice, though it is generally used in the case of severely deteriorated single-family houses. The receiver may collect rents (if the property is still occupied), make repairs, and attach a super-priority lien on the property equal to the expense; or immediately sell the property to a private or nonprofit developer who will conduct the rehabilitation. Advocates argue that the receivership approach is beneficial because it focuses on fixing the property (bringing an action in rem, literally against the “thing”) rather than on punishing the owner (known as an in personam action, or against the person) (Kelly 2004).
In Cuyahoga County (where Cleveland is located), CDCs have used nuisance abatement as a form of receivership. In these cases, the CDC brings such an action in a special housing court to abate a nuisance and have a receiver appointed, and then the CDC collects the incurred improvement costs from the owner or conveys the property to a new owner.
In both Baltimore and Cleveland, the concept is used effectively against speculating investors who buy inexpensive, dilapidated properties and do nothing but pay taxes, hoping that the revitalization work of others in the community will increase their property values. These “free riders” frustrate efforts to identify them as targets in a legal action by creating sham ownership entities or providing the vacant house as the owner’s only mailing address (Kelly 2004).
Nuisance abatement or receivership actions ultimately may not provide secure title for the subject properties, or may cause properties to be more susceptible to unclear title outcomes. Receivership can create an encumbrance on the title that is difficult to extinguish, thus clouding the title and providing an excuse for banks not to lend on the property. The current title system, as adhered to by title companies and financial institutions, works relatively well for tracking and recording straightforward, linear property transactions, but is not set up to handle properties with multiple liens or encumbrances arising from checkerboard-type transactions that are characteristic of vacant and abandoned properties. Nevertheless, these actions constitute an underutilized and powerful tool, when used in the right legal and market circumstances.
Tax foreclosure is the most commonly used property acquisition tool for local government. It involves the taking of title to properties where owners have failed to pay their property taxes or other obligations to a government entity (e.g., a municipality, school district, or county). Third parties, such as CDCs or private developers, can also use tax foreclosure proceedings, as governed by state law, to acquire properties. The tax foreclosure process is based on the principle that a tax lien has priority over private liens, such as mortgages, so when the buyer forecloses on the tax lien, any private liens are extinguished and the property is acquired “free and clear” (Mallach 2004).
The common problems associated with this otherwise powerful tool arise from the lengthy time periods imposed by state statutes on different stages in the foreclosure process (e.g., the time in which the owner has a right to redeem his or her rights to the property); the length of time that taxes must be delinquent before a sale can occur; and whether the state first requires sale of the liens or sale of the property outright. Constitutionality standards also require strict notice requirements to all parties holding a legal interest in the property. Although rewriting state statutes to reduce or eliminate these time requirements may be a politically protracted process, state law reform can occur. For example, the law passed last year in New Jersey substantially reduced the notice periods, and Michigan’s tax foreclosure reform offers faster judicial proceedings to increase the timeliness of property transfer (Mallach 2004).
An increasingly popular tool is the local land bank, a governmental entity that acquires, holds, and manages vacant, abandoned, and tax-delinquent property. The properties are acquired primarily through tax foreclosure, and then the land bank develops or, more likely, holds and manages the properties until a new use or owner is identified. Land banks can provide marketable title to properties previously encumbered with liens and complicated ownership histories. They also provide localities with a way to create an inventory and monitor properties, and assemble properties into larger tracts to improve opportunities for targeted economic development.
Each city’s land bank is organized and operates differently. Some operate within city agencies, while others exist as legally separate corporations (Alexander 2005). The Genesee County, Michigan land bank has pioneered a way to self-finance redevelopment by using the financial returns on the sale of one property to support the costs of holding other properties, an approach that ultimately reduces municipal costs (Kildee 2004).
Exercise of eminent domain powers pursuant to the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is another remedy that transfers real property titles to the government for public use. Targeting blighted properties remains an agreed upon use of eminent domain, although state statutes differ on how it is carried out. Cities are certain to be more wary of using this tool in the wake of the controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision, Susette Kelo et al. v. City of New London, Connecticut, et al. (Kelo), which sanctioned New London’s condemnation of nonblighted private property for economic development purposes. The Kelo ruling has caused state legislatures around the country to consider reevaluating the meaning of public use and limiting the circumstances under which government entities can utilize this powerful remedy.
Without overall market improvements, it is unlikely that these remedies alone can give cities, neighbors, courts, or community nonprofit organizations the tools needed to address the vacant and abandoned property problem. However, anecdotal experience and discussions at the Lincoln Institute roundtable indicate that these tools have been used successfully on a case-by-case basis; whether they affect change on a neighborhood- or city-wide basis and over a period of years is still unclear. Success may depend, in part, on market strength and conditions, but also on localities’ vigilance (for instance, with code enforcement), willingness to take risks and use new tools, and institutional capacity.
Local Impacts of Remedy Implementation
Even where one or more of these tools is legal, available, and effective in eventually converting vacant and abandoned property to productive uses, there are three types of hurdles that may prevent valuable projects from being pursued: local administrative and procedural barriers; unintended and potentially negative consequences; and ancillary local strategies that can enhance or decrease their effectiveness.
Local barriers include costs to cities of administering, managing, and implementing these conversion activities; political opposition, inaction or apathy; and lack of local knowledge or capacity. The up-front costs to cities or nonprofit entities of taking ownership to dilapidated properties and making improvements are not trivial. Also, some tools may require investment in training, innovation, and minor risk-taking by local governments. Studies and experience are beginning to reveal that, for similar reasons, localities are not taking advantage of tools already provided for in some state statutes. One researcher found that local governments in Massachusetts were not utilizing existing mechanisms to address tax delinquent properties (Regan 2000). New Jersey is reportedly experiencing a similar phenomenon, where local entities are underutilizing tools available since adoption of new abandoned property laws and funding programs.
The possibility of unintended consequences fostered by intervention in the market should not be an argument for no intervention, but it is a reminder that any remedy needs to fit market conditions and be used with appropriate reuse restrictions or incentives to avoid new problems. One downside to successful neighborhood revitalization is gentrification, which is the displacement of lower-income residents by new, wealthier residents who can afford the higher prices placed on renovated properties. For instance, in Atlanta and Boston neighborhoods with relatively strong metropolitan-wide real estate markets, carrots and sticks must be used selectively to promote the transfer of abandoned property in some areas. One way to minimize the extent of gentrification is to require that any residential reuse maintain an income mix by preserving a percentage of units as long-term affordable housing. Another model is the nonprofit community land trust (CLT), which generally owns the land and provides affordable housing in perpetuity by leasing it to the building owners (Greenstein and Sungu-Eryilmaz 2005).
Local neighborhood revitalization strategies combined with other appropriate remedies can improve the chances of success as cities and CDCs work to address their redevelopment challenges. These strategies may include documenting and inventorying abandoned properties; targeting pivotal properties in neighborhoods selected for redevelopment; increasing home ownership; forging partnerships with business groups, city hall, hospitals, universities, and other nonprofits; and identifying and reforming significant policies and regulations on tax liens.
Communities must also continue to be innovative and to adapt available tools and remedies to address ever-changing local abandonment triggers. One such challenge is the recent phenomenon of lien securitization, which occurs when one entity buys up multiple liens on multiple properties and bundles or securitizes them for resale. This puts the liens into the hands of investors who presumably have no interest in the local economy or the property’s productive reuse, and can prevent title transfer, especially in weak secondary markets.
Next Steps in Meeting the Abandonment Challenge
Property title and acquisition obstacles are not the only barriers to fostering productive reuse of abandoned property, and removing these obstacles may not overcome the abandonment cycle. However, use of the remedies outlined here is an essential first step, and several next steps could significantly enhance their implementation. First, a pressing need exists to clarify the meaning of “clear title,” possibly by updating title insurance company standards to reflect new practices.
Second, case studies of successful and failed tools and mechanisms in weak and strong urban markets could provide valuable lessons. Possible criteria to evaluate a remedy’s success or failure include the frequency and extent of their use; their applicability to all property uses (residential, commercial, industrial); their effectiveness in fully clearing the title; unexpected consequences; and, if possible, the property’s ultimate reuse and its sustainability.
Third, a study of states where statutory reform has occurred, such as Michigan or New Jersey, would offer an analysis of how such reform has impacted property transfer and reuse. Finally, since local entities play a key role in tool implementation, improving local capacity through education about these tools and their importance in revitalizing urban areas would be another crucial next step in ultimately reducing the numbers of vacant and abandoned properties.
Lavea Brachman, a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy in 2004–2005, continues to research public policy remedies and the roles of local nonprofits and government entities in fostering brownfield and abandoned property reuse. She also directs the Delta Institute’s Ohio office, a nonprofit working on sustainable development solutions to environmental quality and community and economic development challenges.
References
Alexander, Frank. 2005. Land bank authorities: A guide for the creation and operation of local land banks. New York, NY: Local Initiatives Support Corporation.
Black, Karen. 2003. Reclaiming abandoned Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania Low Income Housing Coalition Report, March.
Greenstein, Rosalind, and Yesim Sungu-Eryilmaz. 2005. Community land trusts: Leasing land for affordable housing. Land Lines 17(2): 8–10.
Kelly, Jr., James J. 2004. Refreshing the heart of the city: Vacant building receivership as a tool for neighborhood revitalization and community empowerment. 13-WTR J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. Law 210.
Kildee, Dan. 2004. The Genesee County land bank initiative. Flint, MI: Genesee County Land Bank.
Mallach, Alan. 2002. Abandoned properties, redevelopment and the future of America’s shrinking cities. Working paper. Montclair, NJ: National Housing Institute.
———. 2004. Addressing the problem of urban property abandonment: A guide for policy makers and practitioners. Montclair, NJ: National Housing Institute, April.
Meyer, Wayne T. 2005. High-impact development for long-term sustainable neighborhood change: Acquiring, rehabilitating, and selling problem properties. Orange, NJ: HANDS, Inc.
National Vacant Properties Campaign. 2005. www.vacantproperties.org.
Regan, Charleen. 2000. Back on the roll in Massachusetts: A report on strategies to return tax title properties to productive use. Boston: Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA).
Temple University Center for Public Policy and Eastern Pennsylvania Organizing Project. 2001. Blight-free Philadelphia: A public-private strategy to create and enhance neighborhood value. Philadelphia, PA, October.
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A critical aspect of the property tax, but one that is rarely addressed in public debate, is its “economic incidence,” or who actually bears the burden of the tax, as opposed to its statutory incidence, or who literally pays the tax. For example, a landlord might pay a property tax bill, but if some of the tax is offset with a rent increase, then the tenant bears that part of the tax burden. Not surprisingly, estimates of the economic incidence of taxes depend on the relative responsiveness of supply and demand to tax-induced price changes—factors that explain the extent to which consumers and businesses can change their behavior to avoid the tax.
The economic incidence of a tax is also affected by the phenomenon of “capitalization”—changes in asset prices that reflect the discounted present values of the economic effects of future tax and/or public expenditure changes. For example, an increase in property taxes, holding expenditures constant, might be capitalized into land or house values. The prices of these assets might fall by the present value of the projected increase in future taxes, whereas increases in expenditures, holding property taxes constant, might have offsetting effects.
These capitalization effects should include the effects of other tax-induced price changes, such as changes in future housing or land rents. In principle, the economic incidence of all of these capitalization effects is on the owners of land and housing at the time of the imposition of the tax, when the effects are “capitalized” as one-time changes in the prices of these assets. These price changes also significantly affect the ultimate economic burden of the tax on subsequent purchasers.
Benefit Tax versus Capital Tax Views
The complexity of measuring all of these effects implies that determining the economic incidence of taxes is one of the most difficult problems in public finance, and the property tax is no exception. Indeed, the debate over the incidence of the residential property tax has raged for at least the last thirty years, and is still far from resolved. Professional opinion on the incidence of the tax is generally divided between the “benefit tax” view and the “new” or “capital tax” view (Zodrow 2001).
Under the benefit tax view, the property tax is considered a user charge for public services received. It thus serves the function of a local head tax or benefit tax as envisioned by Tiebout (1956) in his celebrated analysis of how interjurisdictional competition coupled with consumer mobility can lead to the efficient provision of local public services. The implications for taxpayers are threefold. First, as a benefit tax the property tax is simply a payment for public services received, analogous to purchases of goods and services for private markets. Second, because the property tax functions as a market price, its use implies that local public services are provided efficiently. Third, the property tax, like all benefit taxes, results in no redistribution of income across households and thus has no impact on the distribution of income.
By comparison, under the capital tax view derived by Mieszkowski (1972) and elaborated by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986b), the property tax is a tax on the use of capital and thus inefficiently distorts resource allocation by driving capital investment out of high tax jurisdictions and into low tax jurisdictions. The capital tax view divides the incidence of the property tax into two components. The national average tax burden is in effect a “profits tax” borne by all capital owners, including homeowners, businesses, and investors. The local or “excise tax” components of property tax rates that fall above or below the national average are borne locally through changes in land rents, wages, or housing prices.
The incidence effects of local taxes that are higher and lower than the national average tend to cancel one another in the aggregate. Therefore, the profits tax effect is the main factor determining the incidence and distributional effects of the property tax. From the perspective of any single taxing jurisdiction, however, the burden of local expenditures financed by the property tax tends to be borne primarily by local residents.
The capital tax view has different implications for taxpayers in all three of the areas noted above for the benefit tax view. First, the tax has some significant benefit aspects in that local tax increases tend to be borne by local residents. Second, the tax inefficiently distorts housing consumption decisions; moreover, use of the local property tax can also lead to inefficient underprovision of local public services if government officials, concerned about tax-induced loss of investment, then reduce the level of public services (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986a). Third, because the primary effect of nationwide use of the property tax is a reduction in after-tax returns to capital owners, it is a highly progressive tax. Nevertheless, from the perspective of a single taxing jurisdiction, the local tax is not borne by capital owners as a whole but rather by local residents and is a roughly proportional tax. (See Table 1 for a summary of these two views.)
Capitalization and the Incidence of the Property Tax
My recent research sponsored by the Lincoln Institute has focused on a single but critical aspect of this long-standing debate. Dating back to the seminal work of Oates (1969), empirical evidence of the interjurisdictional capitalization of the discounted values of local property taxes and public services into house prices has been interpreted as offering support for the idea that property taxes can be viewed as payments for local public services received, consistent with the benefit tax view.
This notion was extended to the case of intrajurisdictional capitalization in the pathbreaking work of Hamilton (1976). In this model, which is characterized by perfectly mobile households with heterogeneous demands for housing and fixed housing supplies, intrajurisdictional fiscal capitalization converts the local property tax into a pure benefit tax, even though all houses are not identical. Specifically, high-value homes sell at a discount that reflects the capitalized present value of their “fiscal differential”—the present value of the excess of future taxes paid relative to public services received.
Similarly, low-value homes should sell at a premium that reflects the capitalized present value of the extent to which future taxes paid are less than the value of public services received. As a result, all households “pay for what they get” in public services, and the property tax is an efficient benefit tax. Capitalization thus implies that it is futile to follow the conventional strategy of buying a low-value home in a high-value community in order to receive local services at relatively low cost.
In supporting the idea that the combination of strict zoning regulations and fiscal capitalization converts the property tax into a benefit tax, Fischel (2001) interprets the extensive literature on the capitalization of property taxes and public services as demonstrating that fiscal “capitalization is everywhere.” He concludes that empirical support of fiscal capitalization provides compelling evidence that the benefit tax view accurately describes the effects of the property tax. Fischel makes this argument in the context of a model in which local governments are analogous to municipal corporations that maximize the house values of “homeowner-voter shareholders” who strive to protect their housing investments.
The central result of my research is that even if empirical evidence of the phenomenon of fiscal capitalization implies that it is indeed “everywhere,” such evidence does not establish the validity of the benefit tax view. Rather, my model shows that if one adopts all of the admittedly stringent assumptions of the benefit tax view, complete intrajurisdictional land value fiscal capitalization is also entirely consistent with, and indeed predicted by, the capital tax view of the property tax.
When combined with earlier results that demonstrate that interjurisdictional capitalization is also consistent with the capital tax view, my research results imply that the widely observed phenomenon of property tax capitalization provides little if any grounds for distinguishing between the capital tax and benefit tax views. That is, capitalization does not tell us whether the property tax should be viewed primarily as a progressive tax on all capital that inefficiently distorts decisions regarding housing consumption (the capital tax view), or an efficient user charge that has no effects on the distribution of income (the benefit tax view).
A Reconstruction of the Benefit Tax View
My research begins by reconstructing the Tiebout-Hamilton benefit tax view within the context of a partial equilibrium version of the standard differential tax incidence model, which focuses on the effects of use of the property tax in a single taxing jurisdiction. This approach is necessary because the derivations of the benefit tax and capital tax views of the property tax are based on somewhat different theoretical approaches.
Hamilton’s benefit tax view model characterizes the properties of an economy in equilibrium, with local public services financed by residential property taxes rather than the head taxes assumed by Tiebout. In contrast, the derivations of the capital tax view, such as those in Mieszkowski (1972) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986b), are based on the differential tax incidence analysis pioneered by Harberger (1962). Under this approach, the effects of the property tax are analyzed by first constructing an initial equilibrium with either no taxes or only nondistortionary lump-sum taxes, and then introducing property taxes and analyzing their effects.
To facilitate a comparison of the two views, my analysis begins by deriving all of the benefit tax view results obtained in Hamilton’s model of intrajurisdictional fiscal capitalization within the context of a differential tax incidence model, one that is typical of the capital tax view but nevertheless makes the essential—and admittedly rather stringent—assumptions characteristic of derivations of the benefit tax view. In particular, households are perfectly mobile across competing local jurisdictions with an exogenous source of income, and there are a sufficient number of jurisdictions to satisfy all tastes for local public services.
Following Hamilton, the model has two different types of households, one of which demands relatively larger houses. Initially, the local economy is assumed to be in a Tiebout equilibrium, with local public services as well as housing and the composite good provided at efficient levels, and with local public services being financed by uniform head taxes per household. The fixed supply of land within a jurisdiction is used either for large houses for “high demanders” or small houses for “low demanders.”
Property taxes on all land and capital within the jurisdiction are then introduced into the model, with the revenues used to reduce the level of head taxation while holding the level of public services per capita fixed. Zoning is also introduced, by assuming that the amounts of land used for large and small houses are fixed. This is a weak version of the approach followed by Hamilton, who assumes fully developed communities and thus precludes any change in land or capital allocated to the two types of housing. Indeed, some form of land use zoning is required for any capitalization to occur since, in the absence of zoning, all land within the jurisdiction would in the long run sell for the same price and there would be no capitalization (Ross and Yinger 1999). In this derivation of the benefit view, housing capital is also assumed to be fixed, as in Hamilton’s analysis.
The effects of introducing property taxes on both housing capital and land in this initial equilibrium are identical to those predicted by Hamilton. First, for large homes, which experience a disproportionately larger increase in property taxes, the resulting negative fiscal differential is fully capitalized into lower housing prices. Similarly, small houses sell at a premium that exactly reflects the negative fiscal differential between total property taxes paid and the associated benefits of the tax change as measured by the reduction in head taxes.
Second, the net change in land values due to capitalization in a heterogeneous jurisdiction is zero; that is, the aggregate amount of the discount in land prices for larger homes equals the aggregate amount of the premium in land prices for smaller homes. Third, the price of each type of housing rises by just enough to offset the cost of the public services that must be financed with property taxes.
To sum up, all of the benefit tax view results obtained by Hamilton are obtained within the context of a partial equilibrium differential tax incidence model of a single taxing jurisdiction that is comprised of households that are homogeneous with respect to demands for public services, but heterogeneous with respect to demands for housing. Once again, capitalization implies that the property tax is a benefit tax. Accordingly, the combination of property tax payments and capitalization effects implies that (1) taxpayers pay for all their local public services; (2) both housing and local public services are consumed at efficient levels; and (3) the property tax results in no redistribution of income.
Capitalization Under the Capital Tax View
Converting this model to accommodate a version of the capital tax view is straightforward. Recall, however, that this approach considers the effects of the property tax from the perspective of a single taxing jurisdiction, which is modeled as a small open economy that faces a perfectly elastic supply of capital. Since the net rate of return to capital is fixed by assumption, the effect of nationwide use of the property tax on the return to capital cannot be analyzed. Nevertheless, within the single taxing jurisdiction framework the effects of the property tax on the allocation of housing capital, as well as the effects of this tax-induced reallocation on all other variables, including the changes in land prices that are the focus of the analysis, can still be derived.
The key distinction between the benefit tax and capital tax views of the property tax is that under the latter approach the stocks of housing capital are not assumed to be fixed (although the zoning assumption of fixed land supplies for the two types of housing is maintained). That is, under the capital tax view, which clearly reflects a relatively long-run view of incidence, households can reduce their housing consumption in response to an increase in the property tax.
Given these assumptions, the implications of the capital tax version of the model are as follows. First, capital flows out of the production of large houses where property taxes are high relative to benefits received, and into the production of smaller homes where the property tax bill is low relative to benefits received. This reallocation of housing capital is an important factor in determining incidence—who ultimately pays the property tax. The analysis shows that land rents unambiguously increase for land used for small houses and decrease for land used for large houses, and it is these changes in land rents that are capitalized into land prices. The key result is that these land value capitalization effects under the capital tax view are precisely the same as those calculated previously under the benefit tax view. Thus, the existence of capitalization does not help resolve the critical issue of whether the benefit view or the capital tax view more accurately describes the incidence and economic effects of the property tax.
The other results derived in Hamilton’s model obtain in this capital tax model as well. The net effect of property tax capitalization on aggregate land value within the taxing jurisdiction is zero. Similarly, the effects of the property tax on housing prices—which rise by an amount just sufficient to offset the value of public services received—are also identical under the two models, implying that housing prices for smaller homes increase proportionately more than prices for larger homes.
Despite this distortion of the allocation of housing capital under the capital tax view, the local effects of use of the property tax still have some very important features that are characteristic of a benefit tax. For example, residents pay for net local public services received (those not financed with head taxes) in the form of higher housing prices. Simultaneously, fiscal differentials are capitalized into land values, so that the net effect of the property tax burden and land value capitalization is that future purchasers of both types of houses effectively pay for what they get in public services.
Thus, the essential difference between the two views of the property tax is that, under the capital tax view, land value capitalization occurs due to capital reallocations across housing types, implying inefficiency in the housing market. Under the benefit tax view, capitalization occurs with respect to fixed housing capital stocks, and there is no distortion of the allocation of housing capital. For example, if a local government finances an increase in public expenditures with additional property taxes, the resulting capitalization effects are the same under both views (and cause the same gains and losses at the time of implementation). However, the capital tax view implies that in the long run housing demands will decline, while housing consumption remains unchanged under the benefit tax view.
My model also shows that under the capital tax view per capita housing consumption declines unambiguously for both types of households, which is the standard result that the property tax causes an inefficient reduction in housing consumption. In addition, the number of households that purchase small houses unambiguously increases, while the net effect on the number of households that purchase large houses is theoretically ambiguous, and the total population in the jurisdiction increases.
Conclusion
This analysis shows that, within the context of a partial equilibrium analytical framework characterized by assumptions typical of the benefit view of the property tax, intrajurisdictional capitalization into land values of fiscal differentials is entirely consistent with, and indeed predicted by, the capital tax view of the property tax. Earlier results demonstrate that interjurisdictional capitalization is also consistent with the capital tax view (Kotlikoff and Summers 1987). Together, these results suggest, counter to the claims of benefit tax proponents, that empirical evidence supporting full capitalization of property taxes in land values—either within or across jurisdictions—provides little if any evidence that allows researchers to distinguish between the capital tax and benefit tax views.
Instead, the key issue is whether the zoning restrictions or other mechanisms stressed by proponents of the benefit tax view are sufficiently binding to preclude the long-run adjustments in housing capital predicted by the capital tax view. This issue promises to be a fertile topic for future research, which may help clarify the answer to the long-standing and critical question of who pays the residential property tax.
George R. Zodrow is professor of economics and Rice Scholar in the Tax and Expenditure Policy Program of the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas.
References
Fischel, William A. 2001. Municipal corporations, homeowners and the benefit view of the property tax. In Property taxation and local government finance, Wallace E. Oates, ed., 33–77. Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Hamilton, Bruce W. 1976. Capitalization of intrajurisdictional differences in local tax prices. American Economic Review, 66 (5): 743–753.
Harberger, Arnold C. 1962. The incidence of the corporate income tax. Journal of Political Economy, 70 (3): 215–240.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1987. Tax incidence. In Handbook of Public Economics, Volume I, Alan J. Auerbach and Martin S. Feldstein, eds., 1043–1092. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Mieszkowski, Peter. 1972. The property tax: An excise tax or a profits tax? Journal of Public Economics 1 (1): 73–96.
Oates, Wallace E. 1969. The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values: An empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis. Journal of Political Economy, 77 (6): 957–961.
Ross, Stephen, and John Yinger. 1999. Sorting and voting: A review of the literature on urban public finance. In Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Volume 3, Paul Cheshire and Edwin S. Mills, eds., 2001–2060. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64 (5): 416–424.
Zodrow, George R. 2001. Reflections on the new view and the benefit view of the property tax. In Property taxation and local government finance, Wallace E. Oates, ed., 79–111. Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Zodrow, George R. and Peter Mieszkowski. 1986a. Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation and the under-provision of local public goods. Journal of Urban Economics, 19 (3): 356–370.
———. 1986b. The new view of the property tax: A reformulation. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 16 (3): 309–327
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Although property taxes continue to be a fundamental and important revenue source for local government, they also remain exceptionally controversial. Still, the topic of property taxation seems to be one for which improved education and understanding is especially necessary.
Public policy changes often have unintended consequences—side effects, feedback effects, benefits to individuals not in the target group, unexpected costs, perverse incentives, new opportunities to game the system, and the like. Early experiences with assessment limitation measures reveal an unanticipated result: some property owners seemingly targeted to benefit from lower assessments may be harmed instead.
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The property tax is, in my view, a good local tax, though it is far from perfect. Relative to the other tax bases available to local government, I think the property tax gets high marks, in spite of some telling but, in part, misplaced criticism.
Traditional Tax Theory
Public finance economists have historically evaluated taxes in terms of their efficiency properties, their incidence and their ease of administration. From the perspective of economic efficiency, the basic issue is the extent to which a tax introduces distortions into the economic system, thereby creating an “excess burden” in addition to the basic burden of payment of the tax. On this matter, there is currently a lively controversy. On one side, Bruce Hamilton, William Fischel and others argue (persuasively, I believe) that local property taxation, in conjunction with local zoning ordinances, produces what is effectively a system of benefit taxation that promotes efficient location and fiscal decisions on the part of households. On the opposing side, Peter Mieszkwoski and George Zodrow view local tax differentials much like excise taxes, which have a distorting effect on local decisions and tend to discourage the use of capital. Thus, the case for property taxation purely on efficiency grounds is not altogether clear (although it probably gets better marks than other available tax bases aside from user charges).
As to the incidence of the tax, the older view of the property tax, which saw it simply as an excise tax on housing and business structures, suggested that it was a regressive tax: housing expenditure, it was claimed, took a larger fraction of income from poorer rather than from wealthier households. Later studies of the income elasticity of demand for housing cast some doubt on this proposition. The finding that housing expenditure is roughly proportional to permanent income suggested that property taxation was something more akin to a proportional tax relative to income.
The more recent and so-called “new view” of the property tax sees the average tax rate across communities as essentially a tax on capital; as such, it is likely to be quite progressive in its incidence. The differentials across communities are another matter: they may function like excise taxes on specific factors, but overall this approach suggests that the property tax is likely to be a good deal more progressive than, say, a sales tax. The third issue, the administration of the property tax, raises one troublesome matter. Since housing units are sold only infrequently, tax liabilities must be based on an estimated or “assessed” value. The vagaries of assessment practices have been the source of some unhappiness with the tax, as the ratio of assessed value to true market value can sometimes vary widely within a single taxing jurisdiction. Reforms and improvement of assessment practices, however, have gone some distance in mitigating this problem.
A Public-Choice Perspective
The public-choice approach to issues in public finance has focused attention on another dimension of tax systems: their role in promoting effective decision making in the public sector. In this framework, a critical function of a tax system is to provide an accurate set of signals, or “tax-prices,” that make clear to local taxpayer-voters the costs of public programs on which they must make decisions. In a local context, this implies that the local tax system should generate tax bills that are highly visible and that provide a reasonable indication of costs so that individuals have a clear sense of the financial commitment implied by proposed programs of public expenditure. If taxes are largely hidden or don’t reflect the cost of local services, they are unlikely to provide the information needed for good fiscal decisions. For example, if a local government were to finance its budget through a local corporation income tax, the residents would have little idea of the true cost of local public programs to their household. Hidden taxes with uncertain incidence are not conducive to good fiscal choices. From this vantage point, the local property tax comes off quite well as a source of local revenues. Property tax bills are highly visible and they promote a high degree of voter awareness of the cost of local programs. In fact, local property tax rates are often tied directly to proposed programs on which the voters must decide in a local referendum. It is this high degree of visibility that, I think, explains much of the unpopularity of the tax!
The local property tax thus appears to function well in its public-choice role of providing a reasonably accurate set of tax-prices to residents. There is, however, one important reservation here: renters. Owner-occupants receive regular property tax bills that indicate the cost to them of the local services they receive, but occupants of rental dwellings receive no such tax bills. Under the present administration of the property tax, tax bills go to the owner of the unit, not the occupant, so that renters never see the exact amount of property tax assessed on their residence. This does not, of course, mean that renters avoid the burden of the property tax. There is good reason to believe that property taxes on rental units are (eventually at least) shifted onto tenants. The point is that renters do not face the same visible tax-prices that confront owner-occupants.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence to suggest that renters behave as if they think they pay no local property taxes. They appear to provide much more support for public expenditure programs than they would if they owned their own homes and knew exactly what they paid in property taxes. The impact of this “renter illusion” on local public budgets needs to be studied further. If it is large, there may be a strong case for reforming the administration of the tax so that property tax bills go directly to occupants rather than to landlords.
Interjurisdictional Fiscal Inequality
Over the past three decades, systems of local property taxation have been the subject of intense public attack accompanied in some instances by court decisions requiring their replacement or reform. The basis for these attacks is primarily an equity issue arising from disparities in the size of the tax base across different localities. In several states, the system of school finance, based on local property taxes, has been declared unconstitutional because of the sometimes large differences in the property tax base per pupil across local school districts; this can result in large differences in per-pupil expenditure. A little reflection, however, suggests that this problem of disparities is not a problem intrinsic to the property tax per se. It is really a result of virtually any system that relies heavily on local taxation. A system of local sales or income taxes, for example, would surely involve major disparities in tax bases across local jurisdictions-probably at least as large as those associated with local property taxes.
The basic point is that fiscal and other economic conditions vary across local areas. (This, incidentally, is a major rationale for local finance: to cater to these differences!) Thus, taxable resources at the local level are bound to vary significantly across jurisdictions. We may well wish to provide additional support to fiscally weak jurisdictions through some kind of intergovernmental fiscal assistance, but this will be true whether local tax systems rely on property taxation or some other local tax base.
Alternative Local Tax Bases
Two major tax bases offer themselves as alternatives: sales taxes and income taxes. Both, however, have serious shortcomings as the primary source of tax revenues in a nation of many small local governments.
The base of a local sales tax is likely to vary dramatically across local jurisdictions. Communities that are largely residential would have small bases and would have to set a relatively high rate to generate the requisite revenues. Significant sales tax differentials would give rise to costly trips among jurisdictions, as consumers seek to purchase goods and services in jurisdictions with low tax rates. Moreover, sales taxes do not get very good marks on a fairness or ability-to-pay criterion. In addition, they do not stack up at all well on the public-choice criterion of providing the electorate with accurate and visible signals of the costs of public programs. Income taxes have a good deal more appeal on equity grounds, although most state and local income taxes are not very progressive. They also have the advantage of visibility. But, like sales taxes, they encounter the mobility problem to some extent. A jurisdiction that opts for relatively high income tax rates runs the risk of deterring the entry of new households, especially those with above-average incomes that would face relatively large tax payments.
More generally, there is something to be said for avoiding excessive reliance in the economy as a whole on a single tax instrument. The federal and many state governments rely on income taxation as a primary source of revenue, and there is considerable concern that marginal tax rates on income have become sufficiently high to discourage various sorts of productive activity. From this perspective, local government may contribute to an improved overall tax system by avoiding heavy use of income taxation and staying instead with the revenue source that has been historically its own-the property tax.
The other appealing source of local revenues is user fees, which represent a form of benefit taxation and provide almost a kind of market test for the provision of the service. The problem is that they are limited in their application. It may be possible to charge for the use of certain public services like refuse collection, but it is much more difficult to employ charges for collectively consumed services like police protection and local roads. Fees can be used to finance a limited number of local services, but they cannot supplant the need for a major local tax.
For local fiscal choice to have real meaning, it is essential that local residents bear the costs of their decisions to adjust levels of local services. The populace must be in a position to weigh the benefits of public programs against their costs. For this to occur, local governments must have their own revenue systems with some discretion over tax rates. There is surely some scope for mitigating fiscal disparities across jurisdictions with an appropriately designed system of equalizing intergovernmental grants. However, the grants must not be so large as to undermine local fiscal autonomy, and they should, in principle, be lump-sum in form so that localities bear the cost of their fiscal decisions at the margin.
The question here is which of the available tax bases offers the greatest promise for effective local fiscal decision making. In my view, it is the property tax.
Wallace E. Oates is professor of economics at the University of Maryland and University Fellow at Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C. He is also a member of the Lincoln Institute Board of Directors. This article is adapted from a longer paper that he prepared for the Institute’s Fall 1998 Chairman’s Roundtable on property taxation and that he also presented as the Founder’s Day Lecture in January 1999. The original paper will be published in the Institute’s 1999 Annual Review.
References
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Hamilton, Bruce W. “Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local Tax Prices,” American Economic Review 66 (Dec. 1976): 743-53.
Mieszkowski, Peter, and Zodrow, George R. “Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land, Rents, and Property Taxes,” Journal of Economic Literature 27 (Sept. 1989): 1098-1146.
Oates, Wallace E. “On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey,” in G. Brennan et al., eds., Taxation and Fiscal Federalism (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1988): 65-83.
—. “The Theory and Rationale of Local Property Taxation,” in Therese J. McGuire and Dana Wolfe Naimark, eds., State and Local Finance for the 1990’s: A Case Study of Arizona (Tempe, Arizona: School of Public Affairs, Arizona State University, 1991): 407-24.
