Topic: Water

The Wild West of Data Centers: Energy and water use top concerns

December 18, 2025

By Anthony Flint, December 18, 2025

It’s safe to say that the proliferation of data centers was one of the biggest stories of 2025, prompting concerns about land use, energy and water consumption, and carbon emissions. The massive facilities, driven by the rapidly increasing use of artificial intelligence, are sprouting up across the US with what critics say is little oversight or long-term understanding of their impacts.

“There is no system of planning for the land use, for the energy consumption, for the water consumption, or the larger impacts on land, agricultural, (forest) land, historic, scenic, and cultural resources, biodiversity,” said Chris Miller, president of the Piedmont Environmental Council, who has been tracking the explosion of data centers in northern Virginia, on the latest episode of the Land Matters podcast.

“There’s no assessment being made, and to the extent that there’s project-level review, there’s a lot of discussion about eliminating most of that to streamline this process. There is no aggregate assessment, and that’s what’s terrifying. We have local land use decisions being made without any information about the larger aggregate impacts in the locality and then beyond.”

Miller appeared on the show alongside Lincoln Institute staff writer Jon Gorey, author of the article Data Drain: The Land and Water Impacts of Data Centers, published earlier this year, and Mary Ann Dickinson, policy director for Land and Water at the Lincoln Institute, who is overseeing research on water use by the massive facilities. All three participated in a two-day workshop earlier this year at the Lincoln Institute’s Land Policy Conference: Responsive and Equitable Digitalization in Land Policy.

There is no federal registration requirement for data centers, and owners can be secretive about their locations for security reasons and competitive advantage. But according to the industry database Data Center Map, there at least 4,000 data centers across the US, with hundreds more on the way.

A third of US data centers are in just three states, with Virginia leading the way followed by Texas and California. Several metropolitan regions have become hubs for the facilities, including northern Virginia, Dallas, Chicago, and Phoenix.
Data centers housing computer servers, data storage systems and networking equipment, as well as the power and cooling systems that keep them running, have become necessary for high-velocity computing tasks. According to the Pew Research Center, “whenever you send an email, stream a movie or TV show, save a family photo to “the cloud” or ask a chatbot a question, you’re interacting with a data center.”

The facilities use a staggering amount of power; a single large data center can gobble up as much power as a small city. The tech companies initially promised to use clean energy, but with so much demand, they are tapping fossil fuels like gas and coal, and in some instances even considering nuclear power.

Despite their outsized impacts, data centers are largely being fast-tracked, in many cases overwhelming local community concerns. They’re getting tax breaks and other incentives to build with breathtaking speed, alongside a major PR effort that includes television ads touting the benefits of data centers for the jobs they provide, in areas that have been struggling economically.

Listen to the show here or subscribe to Land Matters on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, YouTube, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

 


Further Reading

Supersized Data Centers Are Coming. See How They Will Transform America | The Washington Post

Thirsty for Power and Water, AI-Crunching Data Centers Sprout Across the West | Bill Lane Center for the American West

Project Profile: Reimagining US Data Centers to Better Serve the Planet in San Jose | Urban Land Magazine

A Sustainable Future for Data Centers | Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences

New Mexico Data Center Project Could Emit More Greenhouse Gases Than Its Two Largest Cities | Governing magazine

  


Anthony Flint is a senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, host of the Land Matters podcast, and a contributing editor of Land Lines. 


Transcript

Anthony Flint: Welcome back to the Land Matters Podcast. I’m your host, Anthony Flint. I think it’s safe to say that the proliferation of data centers was one of the biggest stories of 2025, and at the end of the day, it’s a land use story braided together with energy, the grid, power generation, the environment, carbon emissions, and economic development – and, the other big story of the year, to be sure, artificial intelligence, which is driving the need for these massive facilities.

There’s no federal registration requirement for data centers, and sometimes owners can be quite secretive about their locations for security reasons and competitive advantage. According to the industry database data center map, there are at least 4,000 data centers across the US. Some would say that number is closer to 5,000, but unquestionably, there are hundreds more on the way.

A third of US data centers are in just three states, with Virginia leading the way, followed by Texas and California. Several metropolitan regions have become hubs for these facilities, including Northern Virginia, Dallas, Chicago, and Phoenix, and the sites tend to get added onto with half of data centers currently being built being part of a preexisting large cluster, according to the International Energy Agency.

These are massive buildings housing computer servers, data storage systems, and networking equipment, as well as the power and cooling systems that keep them running. That’s according to the Pew Research Center, which points out that whenever you send an email, stream a movie or TV show, save a family photo to the cloud, or ask a chatbot a question, you’re interacting with a data center. They use a lot of power, which the tech companies initially promised would be clean energy, but now, with so much demand, they’re turning largely to fossil fuels like gas and even coal, and in some cases, considering nuclear power.

A single large data center can gobble up as much power as a small city, and they’re largely being fast-tracked, in many cases, overwhelming local community concerns. They’re getting tax breaks and other incentives to build with breathtaking speed, and there’s a major PR effort underway to accentuate the positive. You may have seen some of those television ads touting the benefits of data centers, including in areas that have been struggling economically.

To help make sense of all of this, I’m joined by three special guests, Jon Gorey, author of the article Data Drain: The Land and Water Impacts of Data Centers, published earlier this year at Land Lines Magazine; Mary Ann Dickinson, Policy Director for Land and Water at the Lincoln Institute; and Chris Miller, President of the Piedmont Environmental Council, who’s been tracking the explosion of data centers in Northern Virginia.

Well, thank you all for being here on Land Matters, and Jon, let me start with you. You’ve had a lot of experience writing about real estate and land use and energy and the environment. Have you seen anything quite like this? What’s going on out there? What were your takeaways after reporting your story?

Jon Gorey: Sure. Thank you, Anthony, for having me, and it’s great to be here with you and Mary Ann, and Chris too. I think what has surprised me the most is the scale and the pace of this data center explosion and the AI adoption that’s feeding it. When I was writing the story, I looked around the Boston area to see if there was a data center that I could visit in person to do some on-the-ground reporting.

It turns out we have a bunch of them, but they’re mostly from 10, 20 years ago. They’re pretty small. They’re well-integrated into our built environment. They’re just tucked into one section of an office building or something next to a grocery store. They’re doing less intensive tasks like storing our emails or cell phone photos on the cloud. The data centers being built now to support AI are just exponentially larger and more resource-intensive.

For example, Meta is planning a 715,000-square-foot data center outside the capital of Wyoming, which is over 16 acres of building footprint by itself, not even counting the grounds around it. That will itself use more electricity than every home in Wyoming combined. That’s astonishing. The governor there touted it as a win for the natural gas industry locally. They’re not necessarily going to supply all that energy with renewables. Then there’s just the pace of it. Between 2018 and 2021, the number of US data centers doubled, and then it doubled again by 2024.

In 2023, when most people were maybe only hearing about ChatGPT for the first time, US data centers were already using as much electricity as the entire country of Ireland. That’s poised to double or triple by 2028. It’s happening extremely fast, and they are extremely big. One of the big takeaways from the research, I think, was how this creates this huge cost-benefit mismatch between localities and broader regions like in Loudoun County, Virginia, which I’m sure Chris can talk about.

The tax revenue from data centers, that’s a benefit to county residents. They don’t have to shoulder as much of the bills for schools and other local services. The electricity and the water and the infrastructure and the environmental costs associated with those data centers are more dispersed. They’re spread out across the entire utilities service area with higher rates for water, higher electric rates, more pollution. That’s a real discrepancy and it’s happening pretty much anywhere one of these major data centers goes up.

Anthony Flint: Mary Ann Dickinson, let’s zoom in on how much water these data centers require. I was surprised by that. In addition to all the power they use, I want to ask you, first of all, why do they need so much water, and where is it coming from? In places like the Southwest, water is such a precious resource that’s needed for agriculture and people. It seems like there’s a lot more work to be done to make this even plausibly sustainable.

Mary Ann Dickinson: Well, water is the issue of the day right now. We’ve heard lots of data center discussion about energy. That’s primarily been the focus of a lot of media reporting during 2025. Water is now emerging as this issue that is dwarfing a lot of local utility systems. Data centers use massive amounts of water. It can be anywhere between 3 and 5 million gallons a day. It’s primarily to answer your question for cooling. It’s a much larger draw than most large industrial water users in a community water system.

The concern is that if the data centers are tying into local water utilities, which they prefer because of the affordability and the reliability and the treatment of the supply, that can easily swamp a utility system that is not accustomed to that continuous, constant draw. These large hyperscale data centers that are now being built can use hundreds of millions of gallons yearly. That’s equivalent to the water usage of a medium-sized city.

To Jon’s point, if you look at how much water that is being consumed by a data center in very water-scarce areas in the West in particular, you wonder where that water is going to come from. Is it going to come from groundwater? Is it going to come from surface water supplies? How is that water going to be managed and basically replaced back into the natural systems, like rivers, from which it might be being withdrawn? Colorado River, of course, being a prime example of an over-allocated river system.

What is all this water going for? Yes, it’s going for cooling, humidification in the data centers, it’s what they’re calling direct use, but there’s also indirect use, which is the water that it takes to generate the electricity that supplies the data center. The data center energy loads are serious, and Chris can talk about the grid issues as well, but a lot of that water is actually indirectly used to generate electricity, as well as directly used to cool those chips.

This indirect use can be substantial. It can be equivalent to about a half a gallon per kilowatt hour. That can be a fair amount of water just for providing that electricity. What we’re seeing is the average hyperscale data center uses about half a million gallons of water a day. That’s a lot of water to come from a local community water system. It’s a concern, and especially in the water-scarce regions where water is already being so short that farmers are being asked to fallow fields, how is the data center water load going to be accommodated within these water systems?

The irony is the data centers are going into these water-scarce regions. There was a Bloomberg report that showed that, actually, water-scarce regions were the most popular location for these data centers because they were approximate to areas of immediate use. That, of course, means California, it means Texas and Phoenix, Arizona, those states that are already struggling with providing water to their regular customers.

It’s a dilemma, and it’s one that we want to look at a lot more closely to help protect the community water systems and give them the right questions to ask when the data center comes to town and wants to locate there, and help them abate the financial risk that might be associated with the data center that maybe comes and then goes, leaving them with a stranded asset.

These are all complex issues. The tax issues tie into the water issues because the water utility system and impacts to that system might not be covered by whatever tax revenues are coming in. As sizable as they might be, they still might not be enough to cover infrastructure costs that then would otherwise be given to assess to the utility ratepayers. We’re seeing this in the energy side. We’re seeing electric rates go up. At the same time, we know these data centers are necessary given what we’re now as a society doing in terms of AI and digital computing.

We just have to figure out the way to most sustainably deal with it. We’re working with technical experts, folks from the Los Alamos National Lab, and we’re talking with them about the opportunities for using recycled water, using other options that are not going to be quite as water-consumptive.

Anthony Flint: Yes, we can talk more about that later in the show — different approaches, using gray water or recycled water, sounds like a promising idea because at the end of the day, there’s only so much water, right? Chris Miller, from the Piedmont Environmental Council, you pointed out, in Jon’s story, that roughly two-thirds of the world’s internet traffic essentially passes through Northern Virginia, and the region already hosts the densest concentration of data centers anywhere in the world. What’s been the impact on farmland, energy, water use, carbon emissions, everything? Walk us through what it’s like to be in such a hot spot.

Chris Miller: The current estimate is that Virginia has over 800 data centers. It’s a little hard to know because some of them are dark facilities, so not all of them are mappable, but the ones we’ve been able to map, that’s what we’re approaching. For land use junkies, there’s about 360 million square feet of build-approved or in-the-pipeline applications for data centers in the state. That’s a lot of footprint. The closest comparison I could make that seemed reasonable was all of Northern Virginia has about 150,000 square feet of commercial retail space.

We are looking at a future where just the footprint of the buildings is pretty extraordinary. We have sites that are one building, one gigawatt, almost a million square feet, 80 feet high. You just have to think about that. That’s the amount of power that a nuclear reactor can produce at peak load. We’re building those kinds of buildings on about 100 acres, 150 acres. Not particularly large parcels of land with extraordinary power density of electricity demand, which is just hard to wrap your head around.

The current estimate in Virginia for aggregate peak load demand increase in electricity exclusively from data centers is about 50 gigawatts in the next 20 years. That’ll be a tripling of the existing system. Now, more and more, the utilities, grid regulators, the grid monitor for PJM, which is a large regional transmission organization that runs from Chicago all the way to North Carolina.

As Anthony said, the existing system is near breaking point, maybe in the next three years. If all the demand came online, you would have brownouts and blackouts throughout the system. That’s pretty serious. It’s a reflection of the general problem, which is that there is no system of planning for the land use, for the energy consumption, for the water consumption. Larger impacts on land, agricultural, forestal land, historic scenic, cultural resources, biodiversity sites. There’s no assessment being made.

To the extent that there’s project-level review, there’s a lot of discussion about eliminating most of that to streamline this process. There is no aggregate assessment. That’s what’s terrifying. We have local land use decisions being made without any information about the larger aggregate impacts in the locality and then beyond. Then the state and federal governments are issuing permits without having really evaluated the combined effect of all this change.

I think that’s the way we’re looking at it. Change is inevitable. Change is coming. We should be doing it in a way that’s better than the way we’ve done it before, not worse. We need to do it in a way that basically is an honest assessment of the scale and scope, the aggregate impacts, and then apply the ingenuity and creativity of both the tech industry and the larger economy to minimize the impact that this has on communities and the natural resources on which we all depend on.

It’s getting to the point of being very serious. Virginia is water-constrained. It doesn’t have that reputation, but our water supply systems are all straining to meet current demand. The only assessment we have on the effect of future peak load from data centers is by the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, which manages the water supply for Washington metropolitan region in five states.

Their conclusion is, in the foreseeable future, 2040, we reach a point where consumption exceeds supply. Think about that. We’re moving forward with [facilities]  as they create a shortage of water supply in the nation’s capital. It’s being done without any oversight or direction. The work of the Lincoln Institute and groups like PEC is actually essential because the governmental entities are paralyzed. Paralyzed by a lack of policy structure, they’re also paralyzed by politics, which is caught between the perception of this is the next economic opportunity, which funds the needs of the community.

The fact is, the impacts may outweigh the benefits. We have to buckle down and realize this is the future. How do we help state, local, federal government to build decision models that take into account the enormous scale and scope of the industry and figure out how to fix the broken systems and make them better than they were before? I think that’s what all of us have been working on over the last five years.

Anthony Flint: It really is extraordinary, for those of us in the world of land use and regulations. We’ve heard a lot about the abundance agenda and how the US is making it more difficult to build things and infrastructure. Whether it’s clean energy or a solar farm or a wind farm, they have to go through a lot of hoops. Housing, same way. Here you have this — it’s not just any land use; it’s just this incredibly impactful land use that is seemingly not getting any of that oversight or making these places go through those hoops.

Chris Miller: They are certainly cutting corners. Jon mentioned the facility outside of Boston. What did you say, 150 acres? We have a site adjacent to the Manassas National Battlefield Park, which is part of the national park system, called the Prince William Digital Gateway, which is an aggregation of 2100 acres with plans for 27 million square feet of data centers with a projected energy demand of up to 7.5 gigawatts. The total base load supply of nuclear energy available in Virginia right now is just a little bit over 3 gigawatts.

The entire offshore wind development project at Dominion is 80% complete, but what’s big and controversial is 2.5 gigawatts. The two biggest sources of base load supply aren’t sufficient to meet 24/7 demand from a land use proposal on 2100 acres, 27 million square feet, that was made without assessing the energy impact, the supply of water, or the impact of infrastructure on natural, cultural, and historic resources, one of which is hallowed ground. It’s a place where two significant Civil War battlefields were fought. It’s extraordinary.

What’s even more extraordinary is to have public officials, senators, congressmen, members of agencies say, “We’re not sure what the federal next steps [are].” These are projects that have interstate effects on power, on water, on air quality. We haven’t talked about that, but one of the plans that’s been hatched by the industry is through onsite generation and take advantage of the backup generation that they’ve built out. They have to provide 100% backup generation onsite for their peak load. They’ve 90% of that in diesel without significant air quality controls.

We have found permits for 12.4 gigawatts of diesel in Northern Virginia. That would bust the ozone and PM2.5 regulatory standards for public health if they operated together. It’s being discussed by the Department of Environmental Quality in Virginia as a backup strategy for meeting power demand so that data centers can operate without restriction. These are choices that are being proposed without any modeling, without any monitoring, and without any assessment of whether those impacts are in conflict with other public policy goals, like human health. Terrifying.

We are at a breaking point. I have to say that the grassroots response is a pox upon all your houses. That was reflected in the 2025 elections that Virginia just went through. The tidal wave of change in the General Assembly and statewide offices and data centers and energy costs were very, very high on the list of concerns for voters.

Anthony Flint: I want to ask all three of you this question, but Jon, let me start with you. Is there any way to make a more sustainable data center?

Jon Gorey: Yes, there are some good examples here and there. It is, in some cases, in their best interest to use less electricity. It’ll be less expensive for them to use less water. Google, for its part, has published a pretty more transparent than some companies in their environmental report. They compare their water use in the context of golf courses irrigated, which does come across as not a great comparison because golf courses are not a terrific use of water either.

They do admit that last year, 2024, they used about 8.1 billion gallons of water in their data centers, the ones that they own, the 28% increase over the year before, and 14% of that was in severely water-stressed regions. Another 14% was in medium stress. One of their data centers in Council Bluffs, Iowa, consumed over a billion gallons of water by itself. They also have data centers, like in Denmark and Germany, that use barely a million gallons over the course of a year.

I don’t know if those are just very small ones, but I know they and Microsoft and other companies are developing … there’s immersive cooling, where instead of using evaporative water cooling to cool off the entire room that the servers are in, you can basically dunk the chips and servers in a synthetic oil that conducts heat but not electricity. It’s more expensive to do, but it’s completely possible. There are methods. There’s maybe some hope there that they will continue to do that more.

Mary Ann Dickinson: Immersive cooling, which you’ve just mentioned, is certainly an option now, but what we’re hearing is that it’s not going to be an option in the future, that because of the increasing power density and chips, they are going to need direct liquid cooling, period, and immersive cooling is not going to work. That’s the frightening part of the whole water story is as much or as little water is being used now, is going to pale against the water that’s going to be used in the next 5 to 10 years by the new generation of data centers and the new chips that they’ll be using.

The funny thing about the golf course analogy is that, in the West, a lot of those golf courses are irrigated with recycled water. As Chris knows, it also recharges back into groundwater. It is not lost as consumptive loss. That’s the issue is, really, to make these sustainable, we’re going to need to really examine the water cooling systems, what the evaporative loss is, what the discharge is to sewer systems, what the potential is for recycled water. There’s going to be a whole lot of questions that we’re going to ask, but we’re not getting any data.

Only a third of the data centers nationally even report their energy and water use. The transparency issue is becoming a serious problem. Many communities are being asked to sign NDAs. They can’t even share the information that a data center is using in energy and water with their citizens. It is a little bit of a challenge to try and figure out the path going forward. It’s all about economics, as Chris knows. It’s all about what can be afforded.

The work we’re doing at the Lincoln Institute, we would like to suggest as many sustainable options from the water perspective as possible, but they’re going to have to be paid for somewhere. That is the big question. Data centers need to pay.

Chris Miller: I think we’re entering a [time] where innovation is necessary. It has to be encouraged, and it’s where a crisis, just short of what we saw with lapse of the banking system in 2008, 2009, where no one was really paying attention to the aggregate system-wide failures. Somebody had to step up and say it’s broken. In the case of the mortgage crisis, it was actually 49 states coming to a court, saying, “We have to have a settlement so that we can rework all these mortgages and settle out the accounts and rebuild the system from no ground up.”

I think that’s the same place we’re at. We have to have a group of states get together and saying, “We are going to rebuild a decision model that we use for this new economy. It’s not going away. Any gains in efficiency are going to be offset by the expansion on demand for data. That’s been the trend for the last 15 years. We have to deal with the scale and the scope of the issue. I’ll give you just one example.

Dominion Energy has published at an aggregated contracts totaling 47.1 gigawatts of demand that they have to meet. Their estimate of the CapEx to do that ranges for 141 billion to 271 billion depending on whether they comply with the goals of the Virginia Clean Economy Act and move towards decommissioning and replacement of existing fossil fuel generation with cleaner sources. That range is not the issue. It’s the bottom line, which is 150 to 250 $300 billion in CapEx in one state for energy infrastructure. That’s enormous. We need a better process than a case-by-case review of the individual projects.

The state corporation does not maintain a central database of transmission and generation projects, which it approves. The state DEQ does not have a central database for water basin supply and demand. The state DEQ does not have a database of all of the permits in a model that shows what the impacts of backup generation would be if they all turned on at the same time in a brownout or blackout scenario. The failure to do that kind of systems analysis that desperately needs to be addressed. It’s not going to be done by this administration at the federal level.

It’s going to take state governments working together to build new systems decision tools that are informed by the expertise of places like the Lincoln Institute, so that they’re looking at this as a large-scale systemic process. We build it out in a way that’s rational, that takes into account the impacts of people and on communities and on land, and does it a way that fairly distributes the cost back to the industry that’s triggering the demand.

This industry is uniquely able to charge the whole globe for the use of certain parts of America as the base of its infrastructure. We should be working very hard on a cost allocation model and an assignment of cost to data center industry that can recapture the economic value and pay themselves back from the whole globe. No reason for the rate payers of Virginia or Massachusetts or Arizona, Oregon to be subsidizing the seven largest corporations in the world, the [capital expenditures] of over $22 trillion. It’s unfair, it’s un-American, it’s undemocratic.

We have to stand up to what’s happening and realize how big it is and realize it’s a threat to our way of life, our system of land use and natural resource allocation and frankly, democracy itself.

Anthony Flint: I want to bring this to a conclusion, although certainly there are many more issues we could talk about, but I want to look at the end user in a way and whether we as individuals can do anything about using AI, for example. I was talking with Jon, journalist-to-journalist, about this. I want to turn to you, Jon, on this question. Should we be trying not to use AI, and is that even possible?

Jon Gorey: The more I researched this piece, the more adamant I became that I shouldn’t be using it where possible. Not that that’s going to make any difference, but to me, it felt like I don’t really want to be a part of it. I expect there’s legitimate and valuable use cases for AI and science and technology, but I am pretty shocked by how cavalier people I know, my friends and family, have been in embracing it.

Part of that is that tech companies are forcing it on us because they’ve invested in it. They’re like, “Hey, we spent all this money on this, you got to use it.” It takes some legwork to remove the Google Assist from your Google searches or to get Microsoft Copilot to just leave you alone. I feel like that’s like it’s ancestor Clippy, the paperclip from Microsoft Office back in the day.

Here’s something that galls me more in a broader sense. I don’t know if we want to get into it, but I’m an amateur musician. I’m amateur because it’s already very difficult to make any money in the arts. There’s a YouTube channel with 35 million subscribers that simply plays AI-generated videos of AI-generated music, which is twice as many subscribers as Olivia Rodrigo has and 20 times as many as Gracie Abrams. Both of them are huge pop stars who sell out basketball arenas. It astounds me, and I don’t know why people are enjoying just artificially created things. I get the novelty of it, but I, for one, am trying to avoid stuff like that.

Chris Miller: We were having a debate about this issue this week on a series of forums. The reality is there’s stuff that each of us can do to significantly reduce our data load. It takes a little bit of effort. Most of us are storing two or three times what we need to, literally copies of things that we already have. There’s an efficiency of storage thing that takes time, and that’s why we don’t do it. There’s the use of devices appropriately.

If you can watch a broadcast television show and not stream it, that’s a significant reduction in load, actually. Ironically, we’ve gone from broadcast through the air, which has very little energy involved, to streaming on fiber optics and cable, and then wireless, which is incredibly resource-intensive. We’re getting less efficient in some ways in the way we use some of these technologies, but there are things we can do.

The trend in history has been that doesn’t actually change overall demand. I think we need to be careful as we think about all the things we can do as individuals to not lose sight of the need for the aggregate response, the societal-wide response, which is this industry needs to check itself, but it also needs to have proper oversight. The notion that somehow they’re holier than the rest of us is totally unsustainable.

We have to treat them as the next gold rush, the next offshore drilling opportunity, and understand that what they are doing is globally impactful, setting us back in terms of the overall needs to address climate change and the consumption of energy, and threatens our basic systems for water, land, air quality that are the basis of human life. If those aren’t a big enough threat, then we’re in big trouble.

Anthony Flint: Mary Ann, how about the last word?

Mary Ann Dickinson: When I looked up and saw that every Google search I do, which is AI backed these days, is half a liter of water, each one, and you think about the billions of searches that happen across the globe, this is a frightening issue. I’m not sure our individual actions are going to make that big a difference in the AI demand, but what we can require is, in the siting of these facilities, that they not disrupt local sustainability and resiliency efforts. That’s, I think, what we want to focus on at the Lincoln Institute. It’s helping communities do that.

Anthony Flint: Jon Gorey, Mary Ann Dickinson, and Chris Miller, thank you for this great conversation on the Land Matters Podcast. You can read Jon Gorey’s article, Data Drain, online at our website, lincolninst.edu. Just look for Land Lines magazine in the navigation. On social media, the handle is @landpolicy. Don’t forget to rate, share, and subscribe to the Land Matters Podcast. For now, I’m Anthony Flint signing off until next time.

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Planning for a Just Transition in the California Delta

By Jon Gorey, December 15, 2025

Some 50 miles inland from the iconic San Francisco Bay—east of the Golden Gate Bridge, beyond the Berkeley Hills and Mount Diablo—is the lesser-known California Delta, more than 1,100 square miles of lowlands and estuaries near the city of Stockton, at the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers.  

Those two waterways alone drain about half of California, and much of that water gets pumped southward and westward to more populous areas of the state. Almost all the land in the delta—98 percent, much of it farmland—has been reclaimed since the 19th century with the help of hundreds of miles of levees and channels that drained what was once an inland sea during the wet winter months.

However, those drained wetlands, deprived of their natural sogginess, have been subsiding for decades as the peaty soil gets exposed to oxygen. “When you dry those out and make them terrestrial, they subside, the land elevation sinks,” says Brett Milligan, professor of landscape architecture and environmental design at the University of California, Davis. Despite its inland setting, “you have many places in the delta that are up to 20 or 25 feet below sea level.”

As sea levels rise, tidal saltwater intrusion from San Francisco Bay is increasingly a problem—especially during droughts and the summer dry season, when there’s less freshwater draining from the rivers to push back against rising tidal flows. Higher sea levels also put added strain on protective levees as the delta behind them sinks, increasing the risk of their potential failure.

An increase in salinity creates a lot of problems—for agriculture, for the ecosystem, and for the drinking water supply of millions of Californians. “We have one of the largest water infrastructure systems in the world,” Milligan says, largely focused on moving water from the wetter northern parts of the state to the more arid southern regions—“and the delta is sort of that switching point from north to south.”

An aerial photo of fields, roads, and rivers.
The California Delta covers 1,100 square miles at the confluence of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers. Credit: Freshwater Trust via USGS.

This tangle of interconnected issues is why the delta is often regarded as a “wicked problem,” Milligan says. “There are so many factors involved. It’s very complex; conditions are also changing quite fast.” Climate change is exacerbating nearly every challenge facing the delta: Tides are getting higher. Droughts are getting more frequent and more intense. Winter snowpack in the uplands would once have held back freshwater long into the spring, but it now melts earlier, and more precipitation falls as rain rather than snow to begin with.

That variety of factors makes the problem more complex, but it also means there are multiple ways of looking at—and perhaps addressing—the overarching issue of salinity in the delta. To help the delta community discuss and better understand some of the available solutions, Milligan and colleagues are conducting a series of participatory scenario planning workshops focused on salinity management as part of a four-year, multi-campus University of California project called Just Transitions in the Delta.

Exploring Multiple Futures to ‘Liberate the Present’ 

Scenario planning is a type of collective visioning process that invites community members to imagine and evaluate a set of specific, possible futures. It’s an inherently participatory process, but Milligan is foregrounding that idea of inclusion and equity, intentionally seeking out voices who don’t typically have a seat at the decision-making table.

By engaging dozens of people from across the delta’s diverse population—from farmers to Indigenous tribal members to residents of communities bearing a disproportionate burden of environmental pollution—Milligan hopes to build a broader understanding of the adaptation strategies available, and what tradeoffs each one presents. “We were really interested in trying to explore, within a context where people are often at odds, could this type of scenario planning around salinity management options be a way to build trust and mutual understanding?” he says.

The project is now in its third year, and Milligan and his colleagues presented their progress at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s Consortium for Scenario Planning conference in 2025. (Registration is now open for the 2026 conference, to be held February 4–6, 2026, in Salt Lake City, Utah.)

So far, Milligan’s team has conducted more than half a dozen workshops with well over 100 total participants—including two main public workshops in 2024 and 2025, as well as smaller sessions requested by Indigenous groups and vulnerable communities—with the goal of first deciding upon the suite of scenarios to be included, then designing and refining them.

An aerial image of several people scattered around a large, wood-floored room, reading signs at a scenario planning workshop. The sign in the foreground reads, "What delta? What future?"
Participants in a scenario planning event held by the University of California, Davis as part of the multicampus Just Transitions in the Delta project. Credit: Courtesy of Brett Milligan.

“The first thing we did was a lot of outreach and interviews,” Milligan says, to determine and design the six main scenarios to be considered. The questions ranged from what people valued most about the delta, to which salinity management practices they wanted the team to explore, to who else ought to be included in adaptation discussions. Notably, Milligan says, 83 percent of respondents felt that past decision-making in the delta had not been equitable.

Using feedback from those interviews, the team designed a set of six scenarios for evaluation, which continue to be refined as workshops yield more feedback, and created an immersive, interactive exhibition of scenario narratives and maps ahead of the second full public workshop.

The first scenario is simply “Business as Usual,” which extrapolates current trends into the future as a sort of baseline from which to compare other adaptation measures. The second scenario models the Delta Conveyance Project, a long-discussed, partially permitted 40-mile water supply tunnel that could be built beneath the delta. The controversial tunnel is not particularly popular among many residents, Milligan explains, “but a lot of people wanted us to model that, to compare it to the other options.”

The third and fourth scenarios are nature-based restoration solutions. The “Eco Machine” approach would use strategically placed green infrastructure to reduce salinity intrusion and create recreational and ecological benefits. The “New Green Watershed,” meanwhile, is more ambitious in scope, phasing in green infrastructure across the entire region, along with carbon banking, land repatriation to Indigenous communities, and wet soil agriculture (such as rice farming) to reverse land subsidence and transition the delta to a regenerative green economy.

“That was driven by tribal input asking us to think about the delta more holistically,” Milligan says. “A lot of people are concerned about flooding, and interested in what can be done upstream in terms of land management, better fire stewardship, restoration of meadows, and things like that, that will influence when and how water comes down,” he says. “Could you reinvent the delta in a way that’s more sustainable and make that economically viable?”

The last two scenarios focus on more traditional infrastructure, but implemented and managed in smarter ways. “Bolster and Fortify” models how major engineering investments in the delta’s gray infrastructure—such as barriers, operable gates, and augmented levees—could reduce salinity and protect subsided land from levee breaches. “Calling on Reserves” focuses on operating upstream dams and reservoirs differently—allowing more water out when necessary to push back against tidal intrusion, for example—combined with statewide investments in increased water efficiency and storage.

A map of the California Delta. The base map is dark brown, with planned levee fortifications outlined in red, yellow, orange, blue, and purple.
A map from the “Bolster and Protect” scenario of the Just Transitions in the Delta project shows where different plans have prioritized levee fortifications in the region. Credit: University of California.

In the large public workshops, participants have so far ranked the two nature-based solutions most favorably (with the tunnel and business-as-usual scenarios battling it out for last place).

Those workshops also sought input on how each scenario ought to be assessed. The team is now using hydrodynamic and other modeling methods to evaluate and score each scenario according to six criteria participants selected: water quality and flow, ecological restoration, Indigenous sovereignty, environmental justice, recreation, and economy. A final public workshop in 2026 will present the fully modeled and scored scenarios, and ask participants to rank their preferences.

“What I find most useful about scenario planning is exploring multiple futures as a way to kind of liberate the present and how we think about futures. There’s not just one way the world can be,” Milligan says. He notes that people seem to be more open to understanding other people’s perspectives in the context of specific scenarios.

Encouragingly, post-workshop surveys have confirmed that participants feel the process has been useful. “We get very positive feedback from people saying they felt heard,” Milligan says. But voicing opinions is not the only reason people are attending the workshops; many have said they specifically came to hear what others had to say. “I’ve never heard that in my 12 years working in the delta,” he says.

“People are showing up because they’re curious about how other people experience this and think about this, which was a goal for our project—can we foster that kind of learning space? It seems that many people are coming to these because they want to learn; they want to understand other ways of how it can be.”


Jon Gorey is a staff writer at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lead image: Middle River Bridge near Discovery Bay in the California Delta. Credit: toddarbini via iStock/Getty Images Plus.

Data Drain: The Land and Water Impacts of the AI Boom

By Jon Gorey, October 17, 2025

A low hum emerges from within a vast, dimly lit tomb, whose occupant devours energy and water with a voracious, inhuman appetite. The beige, boxy data center is a vampire of sorts—pallid, immortal, thirsty. Sheltered from sunlight, active all night. And much like a vampire, at least according to folkloric tradition, it can only enter a place if it’s been invited inside.

In states and counties across the US, lawmakers aren’t just opening the door for these metaphorical, mechanical monsters. They’re actively luring them in, with tax breaks and other incentives, eager to lay claim to new municipal revenues and a piece of the explosive growth surrounding artificial intelligence.

That may sound hyperbolic, but data centers truly are resource-ravenous. Even a mid-sized data center consumes as much water as a small town, while larger ones require up to 5 million gallons of water every day—as much as a city of 50,000 people.

Powering and cooling their rows of server stacks also takes an astonishing amount of electricity. A conventional data center—think cloud storage for your work documents or streaming videos—draws as much electricity as 10,000 to 25,000 households, according to the International Energy Agency. But a newer, AI-focused “hyperscale” data center can use as much power as 100,000 homes or more. Meta’s Hyperion data center in Louisiana, for example, is expected to draw more than twice the power of the entire city of New Orleans once completed. Another Meta data center planned in Wyoming will use more electricity than every home in the state combined.

And of course, unlike actual clouds, data centers require land. Lots of it. Some of the largest data centers being built today will cover hundreds of acres with impermeable steel, concrete, and paved surfaces—land that will no longer be available for farmland, nature, or housing—and require new transmission line corridors and other associated infrastructure as well.

Data centers have been part of our built landscape for over a decade, however—many of them tucked into unassuming office parks, quietly processing our web searches and storing our cellphone photos. So why the sudden concern? Artificial intelligence tools trained with large language models, such as Open AI’s ChatGPT, among others, use exponentially more computing power than traditional cloud services. And the largest technology companies, including Amazon, Meta, Google, and Microsoft, are investing quickly and heavily in AI.

The number of US data centers more than doubled between 2018 and 2021 and, fueled by investments in AI, that number has already doubled again. Early in the AI boom, in 2023, US data centers consumed 176 terawatt-hours of electricity, roughly as much as the entire nation of Ireland (whose electric grid is itself nearly maxed out, prompting data centers there to use polluting off-grid generators), and that’s expected to double or even triple as soon as 2028.

This rapid proliferation can put an enormous strain on local and regional resources—burdens that many host communities are not fully accounting for or prepared to meet.

“Demand for data centers and processing has just exploded exponentially because of AI,” says Kim Rueben, former senior fiscal systems advisor at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Virginia and Texas have long had tax incentives in place to attract new data centers, and “other states are jumping on the bandwagon,” she says, hoping to see economic growth and new tax revenues.

But at a Land Policy and Digitalization conference convened by the Lincoln Institute last spring, Rueben likened the extractive nature of data centers to coal mines. “I don’t think places are acknowledging all the costs,” she says.

Yes, Virginia, There Is a Data Clause

At that conference, Chris Miller, executive director of the Piedmont Environmental Council, explained how roughly two-thirds of the world’s internet traffic passes through Northern Virginia. The region already hosts the densest concentration of data centers anywhere in the world, with about 300 facilities in just a handful of counties. Dozens more are planned or in development, ready to consume the region’s available farmland, energy, and water, enticed by a statewide incentive that saves companies more than $130 million in sales and use taxes each year.

Despite the state-level tax break, the data centers make significant contributions to local coffers. In Loudon County, which has over 27 million square feet of existing data center space, officials expect the total real and property tax revenues collected from local data centers in fiscal year 2025 to approach $900 million, nearly as much as the county’s entire operating budget. The proportion of revenue derived from data centers has grown so lopsided that the county’s board of supervisors is considering adjusting the tax rate, so as not to be so reliant on a single source.

Existing and planned data centers in Northern Virginia. The state has been dubbed “the data center capital of the world.” Credit: Piedmont Environmental Council.

While many communities see data centers as an economic boon due to that tax revenue, the facilities themselves are not powerful long-term job engines. Most of the jobs they create are rooted in their construction, not their ongoing operation, and thus are largely temporary.

Decades ago, PEC supported some of the data center development in Northern Virginia, says Julie Bolthouse, PEC’s director of land policy. But the industry has changed dramatically since then. When AOL had its headquarters in what’s known as Data Center Alley, for example, the company’s data center was a small part of a larger campus, “which had pedestrian trails around it, tennis courts, basketball courts … at its peak, it had 5,300 employees on that site,” Bolthouse says. The campus has since been demolished, and three large data center facilities are being built on the site. “There’s a big fence around it for security purposes, so it’s totally isolated from the community now, and it is only going to employ about 100 to 150 people on the same piece of land. That’s the difference.”

The facilities have also gotten “massive,” Bolthouse adds. “Each one of those buildings is using as much as a city’s worth of power, so that power infrastructure is having a huge impact on our communities. All the transmission lines that have to be built, the eminent domain used to get the land for those transmission lines, all of the energy infrastructure, gas plants, pipelines that deliver the gas, the air pollution associated with that, the climate impacts of all of that.”

Across Northern Virginia, on-site diesel generators—thousands of them, each the size of a rail car—spew diesel fumes, creating air quality issues. “No other land use that I know of uses as many generators as a data center does,” Bolthouse says. And while such generators are officially classified as emergency backup power, data centers are permitted to run them for “demand response” for 50 hours at a time, she adds. “That’s a lot of air pollution locally. That’s particulate matter and NOx [nitrogen oxides], which impacts growing lungs of children, can add cases of asthma, and can exacerbate heart disease and other underlying diseases in the elderly.”

And then there’s the water issue.

‘Like a Giant Soda Straw’

A study by the Houston Advanced Research Center (HARC) and University of Houston found that data centers in Texas will use 49 billion gallons of water in 2025, and as much as 399 billion gallons in 2030. That would be equivalent to drawing down the largest reservoir in the US—157,000-acre Lake Mead—by more than 16 feet in a year.

Anyone who’s accidentally left their phone out in the rain or dropped it in a puddle might wonder what a building full of expensive, delicate electronics could want with millions of gallons of water. It’s largely for cooling purposes. Coursing with electrical current, server stacks can get very hot, and evaporative room cooling is among the simplest and cheapest ways to keep the chips from getting overheated and damaged.

What that means, however, is that the water isn’t just used for cooling and then discharged as treatable wastewater; much of it evaporates in the process—poof.

“Even if they’re using reclaimed or recycled water, that water is no longer going back into the base flow of the rivers and streams,” Bolthouse says. “That has ecological impacts as well as supply issues. Everybody is upstream from someone else.” Washington, DC, for example, will still lose water supply if Northern Virginia data centers use recycled or reclaimed water, because that water won’t make it back into the Potomac River. Evaporative cooling also leaves behind high concentrations of salts and other contaminants, she adds, creating water quality issues.

There are less water-intensive ways to cool data centers, including closed-loop water systems, which require more electricity, and immersion cooling, in which servers are submerged in a bath of liquid, such as a synthetic oil, that conducts heat but not electricity. Immersion cooling allows for a denser installation of servers as well, but is not yet widely used, largely due to cost.

Ironically, it can be hard to confirm specific data about data centers. Given the proprietary nature of AI technology and, perhaps, the potential for public backlash, many companies are less than forthcoming about how much water their data centers consume. Google, for its part, reported using more than 5 billion gallons of water across all its data centers in 2023, with 31 percent of its freshwater withdrawals coming from watersheds with medium or high water scarcity.

A 2023 study by the University of California Riverside estimated that an AI chat session of 20 or so queries uses up to a bottle of freshwater. That amount can vary depending on the platform, with more sophisticated models demanding larger volumes of water, while other estimates suggest it could be closer to a few spoonfuls per query.

“But what goes unacknowledged, from a natural systems perspective, is that all water is local,” says Peter Colohan, director of partnerships and program innovation at the Lincoln Institute, who helped create the Internet of Water. “It’s a small amount of water for a few queries, but it’s all being taken from one basin where that data center is located—that’s thousands and thousands of gallons of water being drawn from one place from people doing their AI queries from all over the world,” he says.

“Wherever they choose to put a data center, it is like a giant soda straw sucking water out of that basin,” Colohan continues. “And when you take water from a place, you have to reduce demand or put water back in that same place, there’s no other solution. In some cases, at least, major data center developers have begun to recognize this problem and are actively engaging in water replenishment where it counts.”

Locating data centers in cooler, wetter regions can help reduce the amount of water they use and the impact of their freshwater withdrawals. And yet roughly two-thirds of the data centers built since 2022 have been located in water-stressed regions, according to a Bloomberg News analysis, including hot, dry climates like Arizona.

The warm water-cooling system at a Sandia Labs data center in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The data center earned LEED Gold certification for efficiency in 2020. Credit: Bret Latter/Sandia Labs via Flickr CC.

It’s not just cooling the server rooms and chips that consumes water. About half of the electricity currently used by US data centers comes from fossil fuel power plants, which themselves use a lot of water, as they heat up steam to turn their massive turbines.

And the millions of microchips processing all that information? By the time they reach a data center, each chip has already consumed thousands of gallons of water. Manufacturing these tiny, powerful computing components requires “ultrapure” treated water to rinse off silicon residue without damaging the chips. It takes about 1.5 gallons of tap water to produce a gallon of ultrapure water, and the typical chip factory uses about 10 million gallons of ultrapure water each day, according to the World Economic Forum—as much as 33,000 US households.


As communities consider the benefits and risks of data center development, consumers might consider our own role in the growth of data centers, and whether our use of AI is worth the price of the water, power, and land it devours.

There could be important uses for artificial intelligence—if it can be harnessed to solve complex problems, for instance, or to improve the efficiency of water systems and electric grids.

There are clearly superfluous uses, too. A YouTube channel with 35 million subscribers, for example, features AI-generated music videos … of AI-generated songs. The MIT Technology Review estimates that, unlike simple text queries, using AI to create video content is extremely resource-heavy: Making a five-second AI-generated video uses about as much electricity as running a microwave nonstop for over an hour.

Data center defenders tend to point to the fact that Americans use more water each year to irrigate golf courses (more than 500 billion gallons) and lawns (over 2 trillion gallons) than AI data centers use. However, that argument rings false: America has a well-documented addiction to green grass that is also not serving us well. The solution, water experts say, lies in water conservation and consumer education, not comparing one wasteful use to another.


 

Putting a Finite Resource First

Even a small data center can place an immense, concentrated burden on local infrastructure and natural resources. In Newton County, Georgia, a Meta data center that opened in 2018 uses 500,000 gallons of water per day—10 percent of the entire county’s water consumption. And given Georgia’s cheap power and generous state tax breaks, Newton County continues to field requests for new data center permits—some of which would use up to 6 million gallons of water per day, more than doubling what the entire county currently consumes.

The intense demands that data centers place on regional resources make for complicated decision-making at the local level. Communities and regional water officials must engage in discussions about data centers early on, and with a coordinated, holistic understanding of existing resources and potential impacts on the energy grid and the watershed, says Mary Ann Dickinson, policy director for land and water at the Lincoln Institute. “We would like to help communities make smarter decisions about data centers, helping them analyze and plan for the potential impacts to their community structures and systems.”

“Water is often one of the last things that gets thought about, so one of the things that we’re really promoting is early engagement,” says John Hernon, strategic development manager at Thames Water in the UK. “So when you’re thinking about data centers, it’s not just about the speed you’re going to get, it’s not just about making sure there’s a lot of power available—we need to make sure that water is factored in at the earliest possible thinking … at the forefront, rather than an afterthought.”

Despite its damp reputation, London doesn’t receive a whole lot of rainfall compared to the northern UK — less than 25 inches a year, on average, or roughly half of what falls in New York City. Yet because so much growth is centered on London, the Thames Water service area holds about 80 percent of the UK’s data centers, Hernon says, and another 100 or so are proposed.

What’s more, their water usage peaks during the hottest, driest times of the year, when the utility can least accommodate the extra demand. “That’s why we talk about restricting or reducing or objecting to [data centers],” Hernon says. “It’s not because we don’t like them. We absolutely get it, we need them ourselves. AI will massively help our call center … which means we can have more people out fixing leaks and proactively managing our networks.”

Keeping the Lights On

One way for data centers to use less water is to rely more heavily on air-cooling technology, but this requires more energy —which may in turn increase water use indirectly, depending on the power source. What’s more, regional grids are already struggling to meet the demand of these power-hungry facilities, and there are hundreds more in the works. “A lot of these projects have been announced, but it’s not clear what can come on fast enough to power them,” says Kelly T. Sanders, associate professor of engineering at University of Southern California.

The government wants US technology companies to build their AI data centers domestically—not just for economic reasons, but for national security purposes as well. But even as the Trump administration appears to understand the enormous energy demands data centers will place on the electric grid, it has actively squashed new wind power projects, such as Revolution Wind off the coast of Rhode Island.

NREL (the National Renewable Energy Laboratory) created this overlay map of transmission lines and data center locations to “help visualize the overlap and simplify co-system planning.” Credit: NREL.gov.

Other carbon-free alternatives like small modular reactors (SMRs) and geothermal energy have bipartisan support, Sanders says. “But the problem is, even if you put shovels in the ground for an SMR today, it’s going to take 10 years,” she says. “The things that we can do the fastest are wind, solar, and batteries. But in the last six months we’ve lost a lot of the incentives for clean energy, and there’s an all-out war on wind. Wind projects that are already built, already paid for, are being canceled. And to me, that’s peculiar, because that’s electricity that would be ready to go out on the grid soon, in some of these regions that are really congested.”

Data centers are among the reasons ratepayers nationwide have seen their electric bills increase at twice the rate of inflation in the past year. Part of that is the new infrastructure data centers will require, such as new power plants, transmission lines, or other investments. Those costs, as well as ongoing grid maintenance and upgrades, are typically shared by all electric customers in a service area, through charges added to utility bills.

This creates at least two issues: While the tax revenues of a new data center will benefit only the host community, the entire electric service area must pay for the associated infrastructure. Secondly, if a utility makes that huge investment, but the data center eventually closes or needs much less electricity than projected, it’s the ratepayers who will foot the bill, not the data center.

Some tech companies are securing their own clean power independent of the grid—Microsoft, for example, signed a 20-year agreement to purchase energy directly from the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. But that approach isn’t ideal either, Sanders says. “These data centers are still going to use transmission lines and all those grid assets, but if they’re not buying the electricity from the utility, they’re not paying for all that infrastructure through their rate bills,” she says.

Aside from generating new power, Sanders says, there are strategies to squeeze more capacity from the existing grid. “One is good old energy efficiency, and the data centers themselves have all of the incentives aligned to try to make their processes more efficient,” she says. AI itself could potentially also help enhance grid performance. “We can use artificial intelligence to give us more information about how power is flowing through the grid, and so we can optimize that power flow, which can give us more capacity than we would have otherwise,” Sanders says.

Another strategy is to make the grid more flexible. Most of the time, and in most regions of the US, we only use about 40 percent of the grid’s total capacity, Sanders says, give or take. “We build the capacity of the grid to meet the hottest day … and that’s where we worry about these large data center loads,” she says. A coordinated network of batteries, however —including in people’s homes and EVs—can add flexibility and stabilize the grid during times of peak demand. In July, California’s Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) conducted the largest-ever test of its statewide “virtual power plant,” using residential batteries to supply 535 megawatts of power to the grid for two full hours at sundown.

With some intentional, coordinated planning—”it’s not just going to happen naturally,” Sanders says—it may be possible to add more capacity without requiring a lot of new generation if data centers can reduce their workloads during peak times and invest in large-scale battery backups: “There is a world in which these data centers can actually be good grid actors, where they can add more flexibility to the grid.”

Confronting Trade-Offs With Land Policy

As the demand for data centers grows, finding suitable locations for these facilities will force communities to confront myriad and imperfect trade-offs between water, energy, land, money, health, and climate. “Integrated land use planning, with sustainable land, water, and energy practices, is the only way we can sustainably achieve the virtuous circle needed to reap the benefits of AI and the economic growth associated with it,” Colohan says.

For example, using natural gas to meet the anticipated electricity load of Texas data centers would require 50 times more water than using solar generation, according to the HARC study, and 1,000 times more water than wind. But while powering new data centers with wind farms would consume the least water, it would also require the most land—four times as much land as solar, and 42 times as much as natural gas.

Absent an avalanche of new, clean power, most data centers are adding copious amounts of greenhouse gases to our collective emissions, at a time when science demands we cut them sharply to limit the worst impacts of climate change. Louisiana regulators in August approved plans to build three new gas power plants to offset the expected electricity demand from Meta’s Hyperion AI data center.

While towns or counties compete with one another to attract data centers, the host communities will reap the tax benefits while the costs—the intense water demand, the higher electricity bills, the air pollution from backup generators—will be dispersed more regionally, including to areas that won’t see any new tax revenue.

That’s one reason data center permitting needs more state oversight, Bolthouse says. “The only approval that they really have to get is from the locality, and the locality is not looking at the regional impacts,” she says. PEC is also pushing for ratepayer protections and sustainability commitments. “We want to make sure we’re encouraging the most efficient and sustainable practices within the industry, and that we’re requiring mitigation when impacts can’t be avoided.”

Too close for comfort? A data center abuts homes in Loudoun County, Virginia. Credit: Hugh Kenny via Piedmont Environmental Council.

PEC and others are also pressing for greater transparency from the industry. “Very often, data centers are coming in with non-disclosure agreements,” Bolthouse says. “They’re hiding a lot of information about water usage, energy usage, air quality impacts, emissions—none of that information is disclosed, and so communities don’t really know what they’re getting into.”

“We need communities to be educated about what they’re facing, and what their trade-offs are when they let in a data center,” Colohan says. “What is the cost—the true cost—of a data center? And then how do you turn that true cost into a benefit through integrated land policy?”

Rueben says she understands the desire, especially in communities experiencing population loss, to tap into a growing industry. But rather than competing with each other to attract data centers, she says, communities ought to be having broader conversations about job growth and economic development strategies, factoring in the true costs and trade-offs these facilities present, and asking the companies to provide more guarantees and detailed plans.

“Forcing data center operators to explain how they’re going to run the facility more efficiently, and where they’re going to get their water from—and not just assuming that they have first access to the water and energy systems,” she says, “is a shift in perspective that we kind of need government officials to make.”


Jon Gorey is a staff writer at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lead image: Data center facilities in Prince William County, Virginia. The county has 59 data centers in operation or under construction. Credit: Hugh Kenny via Piedmont Environmental Council.

Requests for Proposals

Planejamento exploratório por cenários para abordar a resiliência hídrica na América Latina e no Caribe

Submission Deadline: November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

O Instituto Lincoln convida organizações comunitárias parceiras da América Latina ou do Caribe a apresentarem candidaturas para coorganizar, em 2026, um workshop de planejamento exploratório por cenários (XSP) sobre resiliência hídrica. Os parceiros selecionados trabalharão com o Consórcio para Planejamento por Cenários do Instituto Lincoln no projeto e na realização de um workshop fundamentado no contexto local que envolva as partes interessadas na exploração de um desafio urgente relacionado à água por meio de um processo imersivo e participativo. O workshop de XSP terá como foco compreender os impactos das questões locais dentro de um lugar ou região específica, explorar múltiplos futuros plausíveis e identificar estratégias para lidar com incertezas e criar resiliência hídrica a longo prazo.

Os diretrizes de submissão também estão disponíveis em espanhol.

Um documento com perguntas frequentes também está disponível.


Details

Submission Deadline
November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

Downloads


Keywords

Scenario Planning, Water

Requests for Proposals

Planificación exploratoria de escenarios para abordar la resiliencia en América Latina y el Caribe

Submission Deadline: November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

El Instituto Lincoln invita a presentar postulaciones de contrapartes comunitarias en América Latina o el Caribe que estén interesados en ser coanfitriones de un taller de planificación exploratoria de escenarios (XSP, por su sigla en inglés) sobre resiliencia hídrica en 2026. Los socios seleccionados trabajarán con el Consorcio para la Planificación de Escenarios del Instituto Lincoln a fin de diseñar y ofrecer un taller con base local que involucre a las partes interesadas en la investigación de un desafío hídrico apremiante mediante un proceso participativo e inmersivo. El taller de XSP se centrará en comprender las consecuencias de problemas locales en un lugar o región específicos, explorar múltiples futuros plausibles e identificar estrategias para responder a la incertidumbre y desarrollar resiliencia hídrica a largo plazo.

La guía de postulación también está disponible en portugués.

Un documento de preguntas frecuentes también está disponible.


Details

Submission Deadline
November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

Downloads


Keywords

Scenario Planning, Water

Requests for Proposals

Exploratory Scenario Planning for Water Resilience in Latin America and the Caribbean 

Submission Deadline: November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

The Lincoln Institute invites applications from community-based partners in Latin America or the Caribbean who are interested in cohosting an exploratory scenario planning (XSP) workshop on water resilience in 2026. Selected partners will work with the Lincoln Institute’s Consortium for Scenario Planning to design and deliver a locally grounded workshop that engages stakeholders in exploring a pressing water-related challenge through an immersive, participatory process. The XSP workshop will focus on understanding the impacts of local issues within a specific place or region, exploring multiple plausible futures, and identifying strategies to respond to uncertainty and build long-term water resilience.     

The deadline to apply to cohost the workshop is November 13, 2025. 

The application guidelines are also available in Spanish and Portuguese.

A Frequently Asked Questions document is also available.

 


Details

Submission Deadline
November 13, 2025 at 11:59 PM

Downloads


Keywords

Scenario Planning, Water

Una vista del Charles

La influencia duradera de conservación del suelo de un poeta estadounidense
Por Lily Robinson y James N. Levitt, May 12, 2025

Este artículo es un extracto de un documento publicado recientemente por la Red Internacional de Conservación del Suelo. 

En 1807, nació un niño en las costas de Portland, Maine, que en ese momento era una escarpada ciudad portuaria habitada por marineros. Con un abuelo que había sido héroe de la Independencia estadounidense y representante en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos, y un padre que también sirvió en el Congreso de los Estados Unidos, al niño se le enseñó a venerar la historia de su nación. Al mismo tiempo, la riqueza de la naturaleza en su ciudad natal provocó un romance entre el niño y el mundo natural en el que se sumergiría por el resto de su vida. Su amor por la historia y la belleza natural lo llevó a poseer, cuidar y venerar una casa y una parcela de propiedad junto al río que una vez había servido como el cuartel general de George Washington en Cambridge, Massachusetts.  

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, más conocido por sus contribuciones a la literatura estadounidense, también fue un defensor de la tierra durante toda su vida y su legado forma parte de un capítulo importante en la historia del despertar conservacionista de la nación.

Hoy en día, Cambridge es conocida por ser una ciudad rebosante de innovación, cultura, espacios verdes y universidades de prestigio mundial. El rico abanico de comodidades de la ciudad es el legado de los visionarios como Longfellow y su familia. Ellos supieron ver el valor de los espacios abiertos y las conexiones locales con la naturaleza, y anticiparon cómo el rápido crecimiento de la ciudad podría cambiar de forma radical el paisaje junto al río Charles. Como uno de los primeros conservacionistas, el amor de Longfellow por una bucólica finca frente al río hizo que algunas hectáreas de la ciudad se mantuvieran intactas y abiertas al público mucho después de que escribiera sus últimas palabras.

El amor por la casa Craigie y el río Charles

En 1837, Longfellow se estaba reconstruyendo a sí mismo. Dos años antes, había estado viajando por Europa y estudiando lenguas modernas para prepararse para una cátedra en la Universidad de Harvard cuando su esposa de 22 años, Mary Storer Potter Longfellow, murió después de un aborto espontáneo. Apenado por la situación, Longfellow terminó sus estudios en Europa y viajó a Cambridge para ocupar su cátedra. El cuerpo de su esposa fue enterrado en una parcela que adquirió en Indian Ridge Path, en el cementerio Mount Auburn, en Cambridge y Watertown. Ese paisaje, hoy considerado histórico, se había consagrado solo unos años antes, tras ser diseñado por el primo hermano de Longfellow, Alexander Wadsworth.

Longfellow halló consuelo en la tranquilidad de los terrenos del cementerio. En una carta de 1837 a un amigo de la infancia, escribió: “Ayer estuve en Mount Auburn y vi cavar mi propia tumba; quiero decir, mi propio sepulcro. Le aseguro que miré hacia su interior con tranquilidad, sin sentir el más mínimo temor. Es un lugar hermoso”.

Longfellow, de 30 años, también se enamoró de una finca cercana, entonces propiedad de Elizabeth Craigie, a la que llamó la casa Craigie. En su primera visita, se enamoró de la grandeza de la casa, la tranquilidad de sus alrededores y su asociación con George Washington, que tenía allí un cuartel general improvisado durante el asedio de Boston. Longfellow escribió lo siguiente sobre esa primera visita a la casa, que se encuentra en el territorio tradicional del pueblo de Massachusetts: “Las persianas de las ventanas estaban cerradas, pero a través de ellas se filtraba una agradable brisa y se podían ver las aguas del río Charles resplandeciendo en la pradera”. Tres meses después, se había convertido en un huésped que ocupaba dos habitaciones de la casa Craigie y se jactaba ante amigos y familiares de que vivía “como un príncipe italiano en su villa”.

Una postal de la casa Craigie. La postal está desgastada y la fotografía algo deteriorada.
Esta casa al estilo de renacimiento colonial, que una vez fue una sede para George Washington durante la Guerra de Independencia de los Estados Unidos, captó la atención de Henry Wadsworth Longfelllow. Él arrendó dos de los cuartos antes de convertirse en el propietario. Crédito: Colección del museo del sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters.

A pesar de lo mucho que disfrutaba del nuevo alojamiento, las amistades de Harvard y las vacaciones en las Montañas Blancas y la ciudad costera de Nahant, Longfellow sentía una melancolía constante por la pérdida de su esposa. Expresó su tristeza y la esperanza de que vengan días mejores en Días oscuros, que incluye la famosa frase “y es fuerza que en toda existencia lluvioso á las veces y oscuro esté el día”. Ese poema se publicó en Ballads and Other Poems a fines de 1841. En el mismo libro, Longfellow describe cómo el entorno natural le brindaba un profundo consuelo. El poema Al río Charles da una perspectiva del apego que tenía con el río que dio forma a gran parte de su vida, trabajo y filantropía. En el poema, Longfellow hace referencia a un lugar:

Donde los bosques te resguardan
y tus aguas se aclaran,
hay amigos que descansan
y tus orillas hoy admiran.

Es probable que estas líneas hagan referencia a la tumba de su esposa en el cementerio Mount Auburn, que se encuentra un kilómetro y medio río arriba al oeste. El consuelo que encontró mirando el río se puede comparar con el que sintió junto a la tumba de su esposa. 

Una vista en blanco y negro de un patio nevado. Un camino se ha limpiado que dirige a la entrada.
Vista desde la casa Longfellow en 1899. Crédito: Biblioteca Schlesinger, Instituto Radcliffe, Universidad de Harvard a través de History Cambridge.

Así comenzó el amor de Longfellow por los paisajes de Cambridge y sus alrededores. Durante las décadas que pasó en la ciudad, se sintió motivado a conservar la tierra por varias razones patrióticas, históricas, estéticas, emocionales y de salud. Adoraba la casa Craigie por sus vínculos con George Washington; sus extensos jardines, en los que Longfellow daba paseos contemplativos; sus majestuosos olmos que le daban sombra en los días cálidos; la dulzura de sus árboles frutales y, en especial, sus vistas al río, que le brindaban a Longfellow y a su familia tranquilidad, comodidad y alegría.   

A lo largo de su vida, Longfellow y su familia protegieron la casa y la propiedad para preservar su carácter original. Este trabajo condujo a la posterior creación y conservación del parque Longfellow y el sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House–Washington’s Headquarters, así como de partes del parque Riverbend y el complejo atlético Soldiers Field de la Universidad de Harvard. Los contemporáneos de Longfellow se vieron motivados por valores similares a proteger otros sitios históricos en el Gran Boston, incluidos Boston Common, el monumento de Bunker Hill, el cementerio Mount Auburn y varias fincas privadas extensas, como Gore Place en Waltham. 

Adquisición y ampliación del patrimonio 

El suceso que levantó el ánimo de Longfellow después de la muerte de su primera esposa fue la aceptación de la propuesta de matrimonio por parte de la mujer que se convirtió en su segunda esposa, la joven de la alta sociedad de Boston Frances (Fanny) Appleton. Fue Fanny, y la fortuna de su padre, lo que unió formalmente a Longfellow con la propiedad de la calle Brattle.

Después de su boda el 13 de julio de 1843, Fanny comenzó a vivir con Longfellow en su habitación de la mitad oriental de la casa Craigie, que para entonces había estado subarrendando a Joseph Worcester, quien había arrendado toda la casa a los herederos de la Sra. Craigie. De inmediato, Fanny comenzó a escribir cartas a su familia sobre la belleza de la casa y los terrenos y el amor de los recién casados por el lugar. Ella le insinuó a su adinerado padre, Nathan Appleton, que le gustaría ser propietaria de la finca, así como de la superficie circundante. Le escribió: “Si decide comprarla [la casa Craigie], ¿no sería importante asegurar la tierra al frente, ya que un bloque de casas podría arruinar la vista?”

Appleton no pudo resistir el deseo de su hija. Compró la casa y la superficie circundante por USD 10.000. La pareja recibió como regalo de bodas la casa y dos hectáreas. En la década siguiente, Longfellow compró el resto de la tierra circundante (alrededor de una hectárea y media en el lado sur de la calle Brattle) a su suegro por USD 4.000. Con los años, la historia de la propiedad y su valor estético y recreativo llevaron a Henry y Fanny, y más tarde a sus cinco hijos, a preservarla.

Una fotografía coloreada a mano de Henry Wadsworth Longfellow y su hija Edith en los escalones de la casa familiar. Crédito: Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters.

Desde finales de la década de 1840 hasta 1870, Longfellow continuó expandiendo la propiedad: compró terrenos adyacentes para preservar las vistas y establecer una herencia para sus hijos. Añadió casi una hectárea más a la pradera de una hectárea y media al sur de la calle Brattle y compró un triángulo de tierra de poco más de media hectárea entre la calle Mount Auburn y el río Charles. Luego comenzó a dividir la tierra entre sus hijos.

Los amigos de Longfellow que vivían cerca de Harvard seguramente aprobaron sus esfuerzos de conservación del paisaje. Longfellow vivía a poca distancia de muchas personalidades importantes que participaron de la fundación del movimiento moderno ecologista y de conservación en los Estados Unidos, incluido el juez Joseph Story, juez asociado de la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos y fundador del cementerio Mount Auburn; Edward Everett, quien se desempeñó a fines de la década de 1840 como rector de la Universidad de Harvard y su apoyo fue clave para la creación del monumento de Bunker Hill, que fue financiado con fondos privados, el cementerio Mount Auburn y la preservación de la finca Mount Vernon de Washington; Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr., cuya poesía de 1859 conmemoró el esfuerzo por recaudar fondos para erigir la estatua ecuestre de Washington que finalmente se construyó en el Jardín Público de Boston; y James Russell Lowell, quien en 1857 escribió una propuesta para crear una sociedad para la protección de los árboles en The Crayon.  

La lucha para salvar las praderas 

En 1869, se propuso construir un matadero al otro lado del río, lo que amenazaba con enturbiar la vista del agua de Longfellow. Longfellow se apresuró a constituir una sociedad para comprar el lote antes que el desarrollador. Al cabo de un año, se completó la adquisición. Luego, la sociedad donó la parcela a la Universidad de Harvard, con la condición de que permaneciera como pantanos y praderas, o se usara para crear jardines, paseos públicos, terrenos ornamentales “o zona de edificios de la Universidad que no fueran inconsistentes con estos usos”. Y a esta tierra se le dio el nombre de “Longfellow Meadows”, que significa las praderas de Longfellow.

El terreno que Longfellow fue comprando y que finalmente les dejó a sus herederos se extendía desde su casa hasta el lado norte del río Charles. Longfellow Meadows, que el propio Longfellow no poseía, extendía la vista panorámica sobre el lado sur del río. Hoy en día, Longfellow Meadows es parte del Soldiers Field, el complejo atlético de la Universidad de Harvard. Si bien las praderas no están protegidas del desarrollo en su totalidad, hay algunos espacios al aire libre y ciertas instalaciones, como la pista, que están abiertas al público.

Fotografía aérea del complejo Deportivo Soldiers Field de la Universidad de Harvard. El río Charles, de un color azul profundo, fluye a su lado.
Complejo deportivo Soldiers Field de la Universidad de Harvard, al otro lado del río Charles de Cambridge. Longfellow constituyó una sociedad para comprar casi 30 hectáreas y donarlas a la universidad para evitar la construcción de un matadero. Crédito: SuperStock/Alamy Stock Photo.

Además de conservar la tierra que rodeaba su casa a través de la adquisición privada o mediante sociedades con fines especiales, Longfellow estaba interesado en otras acciones de conservación pública. La archivista del sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House–Washington’s Headquarters, Kate Hanson Plass, informa que las colecciones del sitio incluyen dos impresiones de las famosas fotografías de 1861 de la secuoya Grizzly Giant en California que tomó Carleton Watkins. Quienes enviaron estas impresiones al este fueron el ministro unitario Thomas Starr King y el abogado Frederick Billings, dos exresidentes de Nueva Inglaterra con fuertes conexiones con líderes literarios, científicos y políticos de la época.

Se cree que las impresiones que se enviaron al este, a Boston, New Haven, Nueva York y Washington, DC, jugaron un papel clave para convencer al Congreso de proteger las tierras del oeste durante la era de la Guerra Civil. Abraham Lincoln firmó el proyecto de ley para crear un parque estatal en Yosemite en junio de 1864. Yosemite fue el precursor de Yellowstone, el primer verdadero parque nacional del mundo, que Billings ayudó a crear en 1872. Hoy en día hay parques nacionales en casi todos los países que son miembros de las Naciones Unidas.

Un intento de salvar a los olmos en la casa Craigie 

Los árboles de la finca eran otro de los intereses especiales de Longfellow, pero su amor por los viejos olmos de la propiedad le causaba angustia. A finales de la década de 1830, los árboles estaban afectados por gusanos cancro. Longfellow describió la infestación como una plaga más problemática que la guerra, la peste o el hambre. En una carta de lamentación a su padre, escribía sobre sentarse bajo la copa de los árboles “sin estar cubierto de bichos rastreros, ni ser de repente Martín Lutero y estar frente a una dieta. . . pero de gusanos”. Longfellow estaba desolado y hablaba de fundar una “Sociedad para la supresión de los gusanos cancro” para hacer “una cruzada en toda regla”.

Luchó su propia guerra contra las plagas y llenó los árboles de alquitrán con la esperanza de librarlos de los gusanos. Joseph Worcester cortó las copas de los árboles para tratar de detener la infestación, pero el esfuerzo fue inútil. Longfellow escribió: “Así cayeron los magníficos olmos que distinguían el lugar y bajo cuya sombra había caminado Washington”.

Además de honrar la memoria de Washington, Longfellow estaba preocupado por su propio legado. Soñaba con que sus descendientes caminen por donde él caminaba y que disfruten de la misma conexión con el lugar. En 1843, plantó una hilera de bellotas, de las que esperaba que crecieran grandes robles. Le escribió a su padre: “Puede imaginarse toda una fila de pequeños Longfellow, como los sombríos monarcas de Macbeth, caminando bajo sus ramas durante innumerables generaciones. . . .”

Un dibujo de 1855 del hijo de Longfellow, Ernest, a sus 10 años, que muestra la vista hacia el río Charles desde el segundo piso de la casa familiar en el 105 de la calle Brattle. Crédito: Colección del museo del sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters.

Longfellow hizo campañas reiteradas para evitar que la ciudad de Cambridge talara árboles a los lados de los caminos para ensanchar las calles. Al enterarse del amor de Longfellow por los árboles, los niños de Cambridge hicieron una colecta para ayudar a pagar una silla especial que se tallaría en el tronco de un castaño que una vez estuvo frente a la herrería en el 56 de la calle Brattle. Este era el árbol que había inspirado a Longfellow a escribir la línea “bajo el umbroso castaño arde la forja y trabaja el herrero” en el poema El herrero de aldea. Esa silla de madera de castaño, que se le regaló a Longfellow en 1872 por su cumpleaños, ahora se encuentra en el estudio principal de la casa Longfellow.

La administración como identidad social 

Otros artistas y escritores del siglo XIX, como Ralph Waldo Emerson, Emily Dickinson y Henry David Thoreau, expresaban su reverencia por la naturaleza, y Longfellow también incursionó en la escritura de esta materia, pero esta faceta de su obra nunca alcanzó la misma aclamación que sus otras piezas. También disfrutaba de los estilos artísticos centrados en la naturaleza y el paisaje que estaban ganando popularidad entre sus colegas. Viajó para asistir a exposiciones del grupo emergente de pintores paisajistas del noreste llamado la Escuela del río Hudson, asistió a conferencias de artistas y recolectó piezas de este estilo.

También fue influenciado por sus suegros, los Appleton, que eran ávidos entusiastas del arte y es posible que hayan alentado el interés de Longfellow en el tema. Una de las obras de Longfellow, La canción de Hiawatha, influenció a parte del arte emergente de ese momento. Varios paisajistas destacados se inspiraron en este poema épico para crear obras notables que representan sus escenas. Es importante señalar que, si bien el poema es una de las piezas más famosas de Longfellow, ahora se considera que perpetúa los estereotipos culturales y las falsas narrativas sobre los pueblos indígenas.

En ese momento, el movimiento ecologista contenía un trasfondo de conflicto cultural. Entre las élites estadounidenses de mediados del siglo XIX corría una vena de antiurbanismo y antimodernismo. Tanto Henry como Fanny Longfellow expresaron su preocupación por las casas que surgían a su alrededor, lo que sugería que querían proteger su disfrute exclusivo del lugar. Del mismo modo, la lucha de Longfellow por comprar la tierra frente a su casa y conservarla (y no hacerlo de forma directa, sino a través de una sociedad recién constituida), estaba impregnada con sentimientos del tipo “no se metan en mi patio trasero”.

Fanny escribió que la familia se sentía afligida “cada vez que dirigimos la mirada a nuestro hermoso río”, luego de que un vecino construyera una cerca en la pradera frente a la casa de los Longfellow. Cuando supo que se iba a construir una casa allí, se lamentó: “¿No es esto muy irritante? Hasta que llegamos, este vecindario permanecía en una belleza pacífica, y ahora parece haber una manía por construir en todos lados”.

Convertir la tierra en el legado de Longfellow  

Los valores de Longfellow con respecto a la propiedad sobrevivieron a través de sus seis hijos. Para honrar a su padre después de su fallecimiento, querían preservar una parcela a lo largo del río como homenaje. Cuando los amigos y colegas del poeta crearon la Longfellow Memorial Association para llevar a cabo este plan poco después de su fallecimiento, sus hijos donaron dos parcelas para que puedan comenzar a trabajar, pero no se unieron a la organización. El objetivo de la asociación era erigir una estatua de Longfellow para crear un monumento y designar el terreno en el que se colocara como parque público, para ser donado en fideicomiso a la ciudad de Cambridge.  

Un retrato de Henry Wadsworth Longfellow en 1868. Crédito: National Park Service.

A los hijos les preocupaba más conservar el lugar como espacio abierto que la creación del monumento en sí. Ernest Longfellow quería que el área fuera un “espacio para respirar” junto al río. Escribió que, a medida que la ciudad continuara poblándose, el valor del parque como tal crecería y “sería un mejor monumento a mi padre y estaría más en armonía con él que cualquier imagen esculpida que pudiera erigirse”.  

Sin embargo, los Longfellow sobrevivientes tenían una visión de un público objetivo que no era muy inclusiva. Luego de que se diseñara el parque y cuando el debate comenzó a centrarse en la ubicación del monumento de su padre, los hijos rechazaron las recomendaciones de la ubicación de la estatua. Les preocupaba que la ubicación sugerida fuera demasiado húmeda y que el área “no fuera frecuentada por la misma clase de personas” que otras zonas.  

Con la llegada de un nuevo siglo, los planes para el parque Longfellow continuaron desarrollándose. Cuando donaron el terreno, los herederos de Longfellow estipularon que se construyera una carretera a lo largo del lote en un plazo de cinco años. En 1900, se terminó de construir la calle Charles River Road, que luego se renombró Memorial Drive, y se bordeó con plátanos. La presa del río Charles, terminada en 1910, estabilizó la hidrología de la zona. Luego, la Comisión del Distrito Metropolitano incorporó el terreno a un parque lineal.  

Algunas de las personas involucradas en la creación del parque Longfellow hicieron contribuciones importantes al movimiento ecologista en toda la región. Charles Eliot, quien ayudó a diseñar el parque, más tarde fundó el primer fideicomiso de suelo de la nación, The Trustees of Reservations. También dirigió el establecimiento de la Comisión del Distrito Metropolitano, cuya primera adquisición fue la reserva Beaver Brook Reservation en Belmont, Massachusetts, para proteger los Waverly Oaks, un grupo de 22 robles blancos. Solo queda uno de estos árboles, pero el parque aún alberga impresionantes árboles con varios años de antigüedad, muchos de los cuales pueden ser incluso más antiguos que el propio parque.  

Al cuidado de Alice 

Alice Longfellow, la hija mayor del poeta, fue una de los dos únicos herederos que no construyó una casa en la finca después de que se dividiera entre los hermanos. Vivió en la casa Craigie y supervisó su mantenimiento desde 1888 hasta 1928. (Charles, el otro heredero que se resistió a construir, viajaba por el mundo y tenía un apartamento en el centro de Beacon Hill, en Boston).

Alice Longfellow nació en la casa Craigie y se crio en sus habitaciones y jardines, y su conexión con el hogar fue, tal vez, incluso más profunda que la de su padre y se cultivó durante toda su vida. La afinidad especial que cada uno de sus padres tenía con la casa se traspasó a su hija mayor. La solemne y precoz niña se convirtió en una mujer astuta y capaz que veía y respondía a la desigualdad en el mundo que la rodeaba. Fue líder y defensora de las oportunidades educativas para las mujeres y las personas de color y una filántropa en favor de escuelas para ciegos. Su habilidad política también se manifestó en su trabajo de conservación.

Su tiempo como matriarca de la finca marcó una era de intensa vida comunitaria. Alice contrató a la joven y ambiciosa arquitecta paisajista Martha Brookes Brown (más tarde Hutcheson), quien renovó y rediseñó los jardines. Las obras recuperaron parte del diseño de los días en que Henry Longfellow recorría la propiedad y también incorporaron cambios que facilitaron su uso para las reuniones sociales. Cuando Alice viajaba, lo cual hacía a menudo, la casa, el porche, el césped y los jardines quedaban abiertos a los visitantes. El espacio solía usarse para ceremonias, como área de juegos para niños y perros, como campo de béisbol y como sede de un circo todos los años.

A medida que los hijos de Longfellow envejecían, pensaban mucho sobre el futuro de la finca. Les preocupaba que las generaciones futuras no estuvieran bien posicionadas para cuidarla y preservarla. Alice expresó estas inquietudes con particular claridad. Después de considerar varias opciones para preservar la casa de Longfellow, los hermanos decidieron establecer un contrato de fideicomiso en 1913. El fideicomiso transfería la gestión de la propiedad al Longfellow House Trust para el beneficio inmediato de los descendientes de Longfellow y el legado a largo plazo para el pueblo estadounidense. Alice y otros herederos podrían seguir residiendo en la casa, pero, si se iban o cuando lo hicieran, esta se seguiría manteniendo.

Un mapa de la década de 1890 que muestra las parcelas que adquirió Longfellow y la división entre sus herederos. Detalle, Placa 20, G.W. Bromley & Co. Atlas de la ciudad de Cambridge, Massachusetts (Filadelfia, 1894). Biblioteca de Harvard a través de History Cambridge.

Después del fallecimiento de Alice Longfellow, el fideicomiso se hizo responsable de la propiedad y su mantenimiento. En la década de 1930, el fideicomiso empezó a tener dificultades financieras e inició una cruzada que duraría décadas para transferir la casa al Servicio de Parques Nacionales. El sitio histórico nacional Longfellow se estableció mediante una ley del Congreso en 1972. Más tarde pasó a llamarse sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters para preservar también la memoria del paso de Washington por el lugar durante la guerra de la Independencia.

A finales del siglo XIX, el área que rodea el parque Longfellow se comercializó con rapidez. Estaba rodeada por muelles, almacenes, una estructura de Cambridge GasLight Company y el Casino de Cambridge. La ciudad emprendió un ambicioso proyecto de mejora de la orilla del río dos décadas después de que Longfellow comprara la parcela triangular que pasó a formar parte del parque Riverbend. Sin la administración de la familia, es probable que ese terreno también hubiese sido víctima del desarrollo que se estaba dando a lo largo del río Charles.   

Un legado y una visión 

Aunque hoy solo es una parte de la propiedad que una vez floreció bajo la tutela de la familia Longfellow, la casa Longfellow es, tanto en cuanto a la historia como a lo financiero, más valiosa que nunca. La casa y los jardines se ubican en el corazón de la urbanizada Cambridge de hoy en día y ocupan casi una hectárea en la calle Brattle. Además, están flanqueados por el Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo y un campus de la Universidad de Lesley.

Los terrenos son un sitio histórico nacional y tienen vistas al parque Longfellow, otra franja de casi una hectárea que se extiende desde la calle Brattle hasta la calle Mount Auburn. La vista al río que tanto apreciaba Longfellow ha sido bloqueada en parte por Memorial Drive, una calle que la ciudad fue ampliando con el tiempo. Entre Memorial Drive y la orilla norte del río Charles, otra parcela de tierra escapó a la rápida urbanización de Cambridge gracias a la familia Longfellow. Hoy en día, es propiedad del Departamento de Conservación y Recreación del estado. Cuando Longfellow era dueño de la propiedad, era pantanosa y propensa a las inundaciones. En la actualidad, es un espacio verde, con arbustos y árboles que prosperan gracias a las condiciones hidrológicas estabilizadas diseñadas por la ciudad.

Un grupo de personas celebra en el patio enfrente de la casa Craigie. Un grupo de músicos toca instrumentos, y gente los observa y disfruta de la música.
Una reciente celebración del Día de la Liberación en el 105 de la calle Brattle, ahora conocida como sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters y administrada por el Servicio de Parques Nacionales. El hogar principal del poeta durante 45 años, permaneció en la familia durante 90 años después de su fallecimiento. Crédito: Servicio de Parques Nacionales/Chris Beagan.

Al otro lado del río, los estudiantes de la Universidad de Harvard disfrutan de un extenso complejo deportivo a lo largo de la calle Soldiers Field gracias, en parte, a Longfellow, quien reunió a amigos y familiares para comprar casi 30 hectáreas de tierra en 1870 y, luego, donarlas a la universidad. De regreso al margen opuesto del río y hacia el oeste, el cementerio de Cambridge y el cementerio adyacente Mount Auburn completan, a través de varias carreteras, un arco verde que se extiende desde Cambridge hasta Boston y Watertown. Con el embalse de Fresh Pond cercano, así como los senderos para bicicletas y las islas verdes a lo largo de la avenida Aberdeen, estos paisajes protegidos forman una amplia vía verde en medio de una ciudad moderna y activa.   

La vista protegida del río Charles desde el salón frontal de los Longfellow ayudó a imaginar lo que podría lograrse, mediante la acción conjunta de lo público y lo privado, no solo en Cambridge, sino en todo el país y en todo el mundo. 


Lily Robinson es coordinadora de programas en la Red Internacional de Conservación del Suelo (ILCN, por su sigla en inglés), un programa del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo que conecta a organizaciones de conservación del sector privado y cívico de todo el mundo. Trabajó como reportera independiente para Harvard Press y la revista CommonWealth.  

James N. (“Jim”) Levitt es director y cofundador de la Red Internacional de Conservación del Suelo. Es miembro del consejo directivo del cementerio Mount Auburn. 

Los autores quieren agradecer al servicial y dedicado personal del sitio histórico nacional Longfellow House-Washington’s Headquarters en Cambridge, Massachusetts, incluidos Chris Beagan, Kate Hanson Plass y Emily Levine.

Imagen principal:El río Charles continúa. Crédito: Artography vía Shutterstock.

La traducción del poema Al río Charles fue realizada por el equipo de traducción Guillermina López Peñaflor, María Lía Sánchez y Julieta Masci de Essence Translations.

Sete tendências que urbanistas precisam saber em 2025

Por Jon DePaolis, January 16, 2025

Este conteúdo foi desenvolvido em uma parceria entre o Lincoln Institute e a American Planning Association (APA), como parte da iniciativa APA Foresight. Ele foi originalmente publicado pela APA na Planning.

Nas palavras imortais de Ferris Bueller, “A vida passa muito depressa. Se você não curtir de vez em quando, a vida passa e você nem vê”.

Tenha isso em mente quando descobrir que sua próxima viagem em um fim de semana prolongado (o que pode acontecer todo fim de semana, já que mais e mais empresas estão adotando semanas de trabalho de quatro dias) será em um avião movido a energia solar. Ou quando você adquirir sua próxima ferramenta multifuncional, feita de um plástico capaz de alterar a forma e as características ao ser aquecido ou resfriado.

Com um mundo mudando mais rápido do que um ciclo de notícias de 24 horas pode acompanhar, é mais importante do que nunca que os urbanistas fiquem um passo à frente dos problemas e preparem as comunidades à medida que as mudanças ocorrem.

Relatório de Tendências para Urbanistas 2025

Em janeiro, a American Planning Association (APA) publicou o Relatório de Tendências para Urbanistas 2025 em parceria com o Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. A equipe de prospecção da APA e a Comunidade de Prospecção de Tendências da APA identificaram tendências existentes, emergentes e potenciais que os urbanistas devem conhecer e entender para que possam agir, se preparar e aprender.

O relatório inclui cerca de cem tendências e sinais, explorando-os em cenários futuros, aprofundamentos, podcasts e muito mais. Aqui estão algumas das tendências que você precisa conhecer.

1. Mais Obstáculos Habitacionais: Custos de Seguros, Impactos Climáticos e Mudanças Populacionais

A população está crescendo  muito mais lentamente nos EUA do que nas décadas anteriores, e o Census Bureau projeta um crescimento populacional de apenas 9,7% nos próximos 75 anos. O conceito de família também está mudando. Lares com pessoas que moram sozinhas e casais sem filhos (incluindo casais do mesmo gênero) agora representam  mais da metade de todos os domicílios dos EUA. O número de famílias com um único pai ou mãe e de famílias multigeracionais também está crescendo, assim como a prática de morar com colegas de quarto.

Menos de um quinto das famílias dos EUA agora se encaixam no modelo tradicional de “família nuclear”, e os conceitos convencionais sobre os domicílios continuam a evoluir. Mas uma coisa não mudou nos últimos anos: encontrar moradia acessível está ficando mais difícil. De acordo com a pesquisa da  Zillow, as famílias precisam ter uma renda US$ 47 mil superior à de quatro anos atrás para pagar uma moradia unifamiliar. A inflação, as altas taxas de juros e a escassez de moradias acessíveis colocaram o Sonho Americano fora do alcance de muitas pessoas, com a casa própria agora quase 50% mais cara  do que o aluguel.

Enquanto isso, as cidades do Nordeste e do Centro-Oeste dos EUA registram perdas populacionais, enquanto os estados do Sul e do Oeste continuam a ganhar moradores,  mesmo que os impactos das mudanças climáticas estejam atingindo essas áreas com mais força. A carga tributária relativa e o menor custo de vida são provavelmente fatores essenciais. Na verdade, os impactos drásticos das mudanças climáticas estão ameaçando a saúde, a segurança e a vida de milhões de pessoas, com 34%  das pessoas nos EUA vivendo em áreas em risco de desastres naturais e inundações e 41%  das unidades de aluguel vulneráveis às mudanças climáticas.

As perdas relacionadas às mudanças climáticas também estão gerando caos no mercado de seguros. As seguradoras estão aumentando substancialmente as taxas em muitas áreas e têm demonstrado relutância ou se recusado a fazer seguros de imóveis em áreas de risco. As grandes seguradoras se retiraram da Flórida, da Louisiana e da Califórnia, um estado em que a gigante dos seguros State Farm parou de aceitar novas apólices devido à “exposição a catástrofes que cresce rapidamente”. (Cenários futuros no Relatório de Tendências podem ajudar os urbanistas a explorarem como essa situação pode evoluir nos próximos dez anos.)

Para reduzir os impactos do mercado de seguros para os proprietários de imóveis, os reguladores podem adotar estratégias  como exigir transparência do setor de seguros e proibir o “bluelining”, o aumento dos prêmios ou a retirada de serviços em áreas de alto risco pelas seguradoras. A Associação Nacional de Comissários de Seguros adotou recentemente uma  Estratégia Nacional de Resiliência Climática para Seguros para orientar tanto reguladores quanto seguradoras, e a Flórida aprovou várias leis com o objetivo de reduzir os prêmios de seguro e fornecer subsídios de mitigação para proprietários de imóveis e de propriedades multifamiliares.

2. Espaços Públicos para o Salsicha e Também Para o Scooby

À medida que cresce a necessidade de espaços públicos, os chamados “terceiros lugares”, algumas cidades estão revendo como eles podem se adaptar ou onde novos espaços  podem ser criados. Isso inclui levar em conta espaços para pets, especialmente considerando que mais lares nos EUA têm animais de estimação do que crianças. A previsão é de que a indústria global de animais de estimação atinja quase US$ 500 bilhões até 2030. As cidades podem obter uma certificação  “pet-friendly” (“acolhedora de animais de estimação”) para atrair mais turistas, e o número de parques para cães nos EUA está em franca expansão, com um aumento de 40% no desenvolvimento de parques públicos para cães entre 2009 e 2020. Em São Francisco, as construtoras estão incluindo  áreas específicas para cães perto de complexos habitacionais para atrair compradores.

3. A Água é Preciosa e Está Ameaçada

O Golfo do México está com a temperatura mais alta da era moderna, causando tempestades de rápida formação, como os furacões Helene e Milton no ano passado, que devastaram a Costa Leste dos Estados Unidos. Enquanto isso, as temperaturas na Grande Barreira de Corais  atingiram os níveis mais altos em quatro séculos, enquanto a expansão oceânica  causada pelo calor foi responsável por um terço da elevação do nível do mar em todo o mundo. No Golfo Pérsico, a água é escassa e valiosa , à medida que o crescimento populacional e o desenvolvimento atingem níveis recordes. Globalmente, um quarto de todas as plantações de alimentos  está ameaçado por fornecimentos de água não confiáveis ou altamente precários. Ao mesmo tempo, as correntes de água no Ártico e no Atlântico parecem estar diminuindo, com o potencial de mudar os padrões climáticos e colocar em risco regiões produtoras de alimentos.

Enquanto isso, as operações comerciais em larga escala de engarrafamento de água, impulsionadas por investimentos privados, estão representando um risco crescente para a estabilidade das fontes locais de água nos EUA, assim como o crescimento de data centers  de inteligência artificial (IA), que necessitam de grandes quantidades de água para resfriamento. Isso está ameaçando reservatórios locais e regionais, aquíferos e fontes de água doce, e alguns lugares estão implementando regulamentos de uso da água  como resposta.

4. Poderíamos Evoluir Para Um Mundo Pós-trabalho?

A pandemia de COVID-19 e o aumento do trabalho remoto fizeram com que os padrões tradicionais de trabalho ficassem mais flexíveis e menos definidos. Considere a crescente popularidade das “workcations” (férias com trabalho) e “bleisure” (negócios com lazer), que sugerem que o trabalho e a vida pessoal podem se sobrepor cada vez mais. Nem todos gostam disso; a Austrália promulgou uma lei de “direito de desconexão” para os trabalhadores em agosto de 2024.

Experimentos de semana de trabalho de quatro dias,  implementados globalmente e nos EUA, mostram que a redução de horas pode levar a maior produtividade e maior satisfação com a vida. Os trabalhadores também pensam assim. Cerca de 80% disseram que seriam mais felizes e igualmente produtivos se abandonassem o horário tradicional, de acordo com o estudo Work in America de 2024.

Ao mesmo tempo, nossa relação com o trabalho está mudando. Um estudo do Pew Research Center de 2023 revelou uma nova tendência: apenas quatro em cada dez trabalhadores nos EUA enxergam o trabalho que realizam como central para sua identidade geral. Essa mudança é reforçada pela ideia de ver o trabalho como um verbo (algo que você faz) em vez de um substantivo (algo que você é, como um contador ou técnico).

As atitudes em relação ao lazer também estão mudando. Se as pessoas usarem o tempo livre para buscar projetos pessoais ou paixões, o lazer poderá substituir o trabalho como foco principal na vida. Com a porcentagem de americanos com mais de 65 anos prevista para atingir 23% até 2025, esses aposentados atuais e futuros também estão buscando aproveitar ao máximo a próxima etapa de suas vidas.

5. A Fadiga Digital (E a Reação Contrária) Começa a se Instalar

A fadiga digital é real. Ela está se manifestando de várias maneiras, desde uma crescente desconfiança em relação às notícias online e preocupações crescentes com o conteúdo gerado por IA até o desencanto com os aplicativos de namoro online. As escolas estão proibindo telefones celulares nas salas de aula e os estados estão restringindo o acesso das crianças a aplicativos sociais. O cirurgião-geral dos EUA chegou a sugerir que as plataformas de mídia social deveriam exibir rótulos de advertência semelhantes aos encontrados nos maços de cigarro. Em julho, o Senado aprovou o primeiro grande  projeto de lei de segurança na Internet para crianças  em duas décadas.

Essas medidas refletem um esforço mais amplo para equilibrar os benefícios da tecnologia com a necessidade de estar mais consciente do bem-estar da geração mais jovem. Para os urbanistas, essa tendência sugere uma necessidade maior de equilibrar o engajamento público digital com interações presenciais, promovendo uma comunicação significativa e empatia dentro das comunidades. Isso inclui criar oportunidades presenciais para envolver os jovens nos processos de planejamento, o que pode ajudar a conectar essas gerações com as comunidades e entre si.

6. Fungo é o Futuro

A cultura pop pode levar você a pensar que uma era dos fungos marca o nosso fim, mas os benefícios ecológicos e de saúde dos fungos devem fazer mais do que apenas “empreendedores de cogumelos” pularem de alegria. Os fungos podem nos ajudar a reduzir a dependência de combustíveis fósseis,  diminuir o colesterol, auxiliar em transplantes de órgãos bem-sucedidos, combater a poluição por plásticos, eliminar micropoluentes da água contaminada e promover a transição para sistemas alimentares mais sustentáveis. Em 2023, as vendas de cogumelos nos EUA atingiram US$ 1,04 bilhão, e o mercado  deve triplicar  nos próximos dez anos. À medida que os urbanistas buscam soluções baseadas na natureza para ambientes urbanos, os fungos podem se tornar um parceiro crucial na criação de espaços de vida melhores para todos.

7. Equilibrar a Demanda de Energia Verde com os Direitos Indígenas

Com o aumento do interesse em energia renovável, também cresceu a necessidade de minerar os minerais e metais brutos exigidos por essas tecnologias, e algumas estimativas apontam que a demanda quadruplicará  até 2040. Esses minerais incluem lítio, cobalto e silício, além de mais de uma dúzia de elementos terras-raras. No entanto, a mineração vem com inúmeros  custos humanos e ambientais, muitas vezes ocorrendo em áreas desfavorecidas e às custas delas. Isso pode colocar os interesses do governo e do setor privado contra os povos indígenas, principalmente por meio da extração e  exploração de recursos  em terras tribais.

Mais da metade dos projetos de extração de materiais para a transição energética estão em terras indígenas ou próximas a elas, e os povos indígenas são  diretamente impactados  por mais de um terço dos conflitos ambientais globais, seja por perda de paisagem, território ou meios de subsistência. Alguns esforços estão em andamento para fortalecer a soberania indígena.

Central para a questão (e para as potenciais soluções) estão o uso e a posse da terra, assim como a capacidade de aplicar diferentes perspectivas para entender os pontos de vista e as necessidades das pessoas que serão mais afetadas por essas decisões. Proteger os direitos soberanos dos povos indígenas poderia reduzir o impacto negativo dos conflitos ambientais relacionados à transição para a energia verde e oferecer soluções. Uma dessas maneiras é através da adoção do  conhecimento indígena  nas abordagens existentes para mitigação e adaptação às mudanças climáticas, a exemplo de como várias nações nativas americanas estão reintroduzindo o bisão  nas planícies dos EUA para melhorar os resultados ambientais e socioeconômicos.

 


O Relatório de Tendências 2025 para Urbanistas foi escrito por Petra Hurtado, PhD; Ievgeniia Dulko; Senna Catenacci; Joseph DeAngelis, AICP; Sagar Shah, PhD, AICP; e Jason Jordan. Ele foi editado por Ann Dillemuth, AICP. 

Jon DePaolis é editor sênior da APA.

Imagem principal: Vapor sobe das torres de resfriamento do data center do Google em The Dalles, Oregon. Foto cedida pelo Google.

Siete tendencias que los planificadores deben conocer en 2025

Por Jon DePaolis, January 16, 2025

Este contenido se desarrolló mediante una asociación entre el Instituto Lincoln y la American Planning Association como parte de la práctica APA Foresight. Originalmente, APA lo publicó en Planning.

Como dijo Ferris Bueller, “la vida pasa bastante rápido. Si no te detienes y miras a tu alrededor de vez en cuando, podrías perdértela”.

Téngalo en cuenta cuando descubra que el próximo viaje que haga durante un fin de semana largo (que podría ser todos los fines de semana, ya que más y más empresas están adoptando la semana laboral de cuatro días) será en un avión impulsado a energía solar. O cuando compre la próxima multiherramienta, que estará hecha de un plástico que cambia su forma y propiedades si se calienta o enfría.

En un mundo que avanza más rápido de lo que puede cubrir incluso un ciclo de noticias de 24 horas, es más importante que nunca que los planificadores se adelanten a los problemas y preparen a las comunidades a medida que se produce el cambio.

Informe de tendencias de 2025 para planificadores

En enero, la Asociación Americana de Planificación (APA, por su sigla en inglés) publicó el  2025 Trend Report for Planners  (Informe de tendencias de 2025 para planificadores) en asociación con el  Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. El equipo de Previsión y la comunidad encargada de la exploración de tendencias de la APA identificaron fenómenos actuales, emergentes y potenciales que los planificadores deben conocer y comprender para poder actuar, prepararse y aprender.

El informe incluye alrededor de 100 tendencias y señales, y ofrece una exploración de estas tendencias y señales en escenarios futuros, análisis profundos, pódcast y más. Estas son solo algunas de las tendencias que debe conocer.

1. Más obstáculos para la vivienda: costos de seguros, impactos climáticos y cambios poblacionales

En Estados Unidos, la población está creciendo con mucha más lentitud  que en décadas anteriores, y la Oficina del Censo proyecta un crecimiento de la población de solo un 9,7 % en los próximos 75 años. El concepto de familia también está cambiando. Los hogares unipersonales y las parejas casadas (incluidas las parejas del mismo sexo) sin hijos ahora representan más de la mitad de todos los hogares de Estados Unidos. Los hogares monoparentales y multigeneracionales también están en aumento, al igual que los hogares compartidos.

En la actualidad, menos de una quinta parte de las familias estadounidenses se ajustan al modelo tradicional de “familia nuclear”, y los conceptos típicos de hogar continúan evolucionando. Pero hay un aspecto que no ha cambiado en los últimos años: encontrar una vivienda asequible es cada vez más difícil. Según una investigación realizada por Zillow, los hogares necesitan ganar USD 47.000 más de lo que ganaban hace solo cuatro años para poder costear una vivienda unifamiliar. La inflación, las altas tasas de interés y la escasez de viviendas asequibles han hecho que el sueño americano quede fuera del alcance  de muchas personas, ya que la propiedad de la vivienda ahora es casi un 50 % más cara que el alquiler.

Mientras tanto, las ciudades del noreste y el medio oeste están experimentando pérdidas de población, y los estados del sur y el oeste continúan ganando residentes  aunque sean las áreas más afectadas por los impactos del cambio climático. Es probable que los factores clave sean las cargas fiscales relativas y los costos de vida más bajos. De hecho, los drásticos impactos del cambio climático amenazan la salud, la seguridad y la vida de millones de personas, ya que el 34 % de los estadounidenses viven en áreas que se encuentran en riesgo de desastres naturales e inundaciones y el 41 % de las unidades de alquiler son vulnerables al cambio climático.

Las pérdidas relacionadas con el cambio climático también están generando caos en el mercado de seguros. Los proveedores de seguros están aumentando las tarifas en gran medida en muchas áreas y se han vuelto reacios a asegurar viviendas en áreas peligrosas, o simplemente se han negado a hacerlo. Las grandes aseguradoras se han ido de  Florida, Luisiana y California, un estado donde el gigante de los seguros State Farm dejó de aceptar solicitudes debido a que la “exposición a las catástrofes está creciendo con rapidez”. (Los escenarios futuros que se presentan en el Informe de tendencias pueden ayudar a los planificadores a explorar cómo podría desarrollarse esta situación en los próximos 10 años).

Para mitigar las consecuencias del mercado de seguros para los propietarios de viviendas, los reguladores pueden emplear  estrategias,  como exigir transparencia en la industria de seguros y prohibir la discriminación por riesgo climático, el aumento de las primas o la retirada de servicios en áreas de alto riesgo. La Asociación Nacional de Comisionados de Seguros adoptó recientemente una  estrategia nacional de resiliencia climática para seguros  a fin de guiar a los reguladores y proveedores por igual, y Florida ha aprobado varias leyes con el objetivo de reducir las primas de seguros y proporcionar subvenciones de mitigación a los propietarios de viviendas y propietarios de propiedades multifamiliares.

2. Espacios publicos para Shaggy y Scooby

A medida que crece la necesidad por los espacios públicos, o “terceros lugares”, algunas ciudades están analizando cómo se pueden adaptar los espacios existentes o dónde se pueden crear  espacios nuevos. Esto incluye tener en cuenta los lugares para mascotas, en especial porque en Estados Unidos hay más hogares con  mascotas que con niños. Se espera que la industria mundial de mascotas alcance casi los USD 500.000 millones para 2030. Las ciudades pueden obtener una certificación  de “apta para mascotas” para atraer a más turistas. Además, la cantidad de parques para perros en EUA está aumentando; de hecho, el desarrollo de parques públicos para perros aumentó un 40 % de 2009 a 2020. En San Francisco, los desarrolladores están agregando  áreas específicas para perros cerca de los complejos de viviendas para atraer compradores.

3. El agua es muy valiosa y está bajo amenaza

El Golfo de México nunca ha tenido temperaturas tan elevadas en la era moderna, lo que ha causado tormentas de rápida formación, como los huracanes Helene y Milton del año pasado, que devastaron la costa este de Estados Unidos. En los últimos cuatro siglos, las temperaturas en la  Gran Barrera de Coral  nunca han sido tan elevadas, y la expansión del agua oceánica  impulsada por el calor ha causado un tercio del aumento del nivel del mar a nivel mundial. En el Golfo Pérsico, el agua es escasa y valiosa, ya que el crecimiento de la población y el desarrollo alcanzaron un máximo histórico. A nivel mundial, una cuarta parte de todos los cultivos alimenticios están amenazados por el estrés hídrico y los suministros de agua poco confiables. Al mismo tiempo, las corrientes de agua en el Ártico y el Atlántico parecen estar disminuyendo, lo que podría modificar los patrones climáticos y poner en riesgo las regiones productoras de alimentos.

Mientras tanto, las operaciones comerciales de embotellado de agua a gran escala impulsadas por el capital privado representan un riesgo creciente para la estabilidad de las fuentes de agua locales en Estados Unidos, al igual que el crecimiento de los centros de datos  de inteligencia artificial (IA) que necesitan grandes cantidades de agua para enfriarse. Esto representa una amenaza para los embalses, los acuíferos y las fuentes de agua dulce locales y regionales, y algunos lugares están implementando reglamentaciones sobre el uso del agua como respuesta.

4. ¿Podríamos evolucionar a un mundo poslaboral?

La pandemia por COVID19 y el aumento del trabajo remoto han desdibujado las líneas de los patrones de trabajo tradicionales. Tomemos como ejemplo la creciente popularidad de las vacaciones laborables y el turismo de negocios, conocidos en inglés como workations y bleisure respectivamente, que sugiere que el trabajo y la vida personal se pueden combinar cada vez más. Pero no a todos les gusta esto. En agosto de 2024, Australia promulgó una ley de “derecho a desconectarse” para los trabajadores.

Las pruebas piloto de una semana laboral de cuatro días realizadas a nivel mundial y en Estados Unidos muestran que la reducción de horas puede conducir a una mayor productividad y satisfacción con la vida. Los trabajadores coinciden. Alrededor del 80 % dijo que serían más felices e igual de productivos si trabajaran un día menos, según el estudio  2024 Work in America (Trabajo en Estados Unidos en 2024).

Además, nuestra relación con el trabajo está cambiando. En un  estudio del Centro de Investigaciones Pew  de 2023, se descubrió una nueva tendencia: solo cuatro de cada diez trabajadores estadounidenses consideran que el trabajo forma parte de su identidad general. Este cambio se ve reforzado por la idea de considerar al trabajo como un verbo (algo que hacemos) en lugar de un sustantivo (algo que somos, como contadores o técnicos).

La actitud en cuanto al ocio también está cambiando. Si las personas usan su tiempo libre para llevar adelante proyectos personales o perseguir pasiones, el enfoque principal en la vida podría pasar a ser el ocio en lugar del trabajo. Dado que se espera que el porcentaje de estadounidenses mayores de 65 años aumente al 23 % para 2025, los jubilados actuales y futuros también buscan aprovechar al máximo el próximo capítulo de su vida.

5. La fatiga (y el rechazo digital) es una realidad

La fatiga digital existe. Se presenta de varias maneras, desde la  creciente desconfianza de las noticias en línea  y una mayor preocupación por el contenido generado por IA, hasta la desilusión con las citas en línea. Las escuelas están prohibiendo los teléfonos móviles en las aulas, y  los estados están restringiendo el acceso de los niños  a las redes sociales. El Cirujano General de Estados Unidos incluso ha sugerido que las plataformas de redes sociales deberían llevar etiquetas de advertencia como las de los cigarrillos. En julio, el Senado aprobó el primer gran  proyecto de ley de seguridad en Internet para niños  de las últimas dos décadas.

Estas medidas reflejan las acciones llevadas a cabo con la intención de equilibrar los beneficios de la tecnología con la necesidad de ser más conscientes del bienestar de las generaciones más jóvenes. Para los planificadores, esta tendencia sugiere una mayor necesidad de equilibrar la interacción digital con la vinculación en persona, y así fomentar la comunicación significativa y la empatía dentro de las comunidades. Esto implica generar espacios presenciales donde los jóvenes puedan participar en los procesos de planificación, para así fortalecer su vínculo con la comunidad y entre ellos.

6. Los hongos son el futuro

La cultura pop puede llevarnos a pensar que una era dominada por los hongos representa el fin de la humanidad, ya que solemos relacionarlos con un mundo apocalíptico, pero los beneficios ecológicos y de salubridad que tienen los hongos deberían entusiasmar a más personas que solo a los emprendedores del mundo de las setas, o mushroompreneurs como son conocidos entre los angloparlantes. Los hongos nos pueden ayudar a alejarnos de los combustibles fósiles,  reducir el colesterol, realizar trasplantes de órganos exitosos, combatir la contaminación plástica, eliminar los microcontaminantes del agua contaminada y hacer la transición a sistemas alimentarios más sostenibles. En 2023, las ventas de hongos en Estados Unidos alcanzaron los USD 1.040 millones, y se prevé que el mercado se triplique  en los próximos 10 años. Dado que cada vez hay más interés por parte de los planificadores en buscar soluciones basadas en la naturaleza para los entornos urbanos, los hongos podrían comenzar a tener un papel clave en la creación de mejores espacios de vida.

7. Equilibrio entre la demanda de energía renovable y los derechos indígenas

Dado que el interés en la energía renovable se ha disparado, también lo ha hecho la necesidad de extraer los minerales y metales en bruto requeridos por estas tecnologías, y se estima que  la demanda se cuadruplicará  para 2040. Algunos de estos elementos son el litio, el cobalto y el silicio, así como más de una docena de tierras raras. Pero la minería conlleva innumerables costos humanos y  ambientales,  que a menudo ocurren en áreas desfavorecidas y a expensas de ellas. Esto enfrenta los intereses gubernamentales y privados con los pueblos indígenas, sobre todo por la extracción y  explotación de recursos  en tierras tribales.

Más de la mitad de los proyectos para extraer materiales para la transición energética se encuentran en tierras indígenas o cerca de ellas, y los pueblos indígenas se ven  directamente afectados  por más de un tercio de los conflictos ambientales mundiales, ya sea por la pérdida de tierras o de sustento. Se están llevando a cabo acciones para impulsar la soberanía indígena.

El uso y la propiedad de la tierra son cuestiones fundamentales para el problema y para las posibles soluciones, como también lo son la capacidad de tener en cuenta los diferentes puntos de vista y las necesidades de las personas a las que más afectarán estas decisiones. Proteger los derechos soberanos de los pueblos indígenas podría reducir el impacto negativo de los conflictos ambientales que presenta la transición a las energías renovables, además de proporcionar nuevas soluciones. Una de esas soluciones es aplicar el  conocimiento indígena  en los enfoques existentes para la mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático, por ejemplo, la forma en que varias naciones nativas están  reintroduciendo el bisonte  en las llanuras de Estados Unidos para mejorar los resultados ambientales y socioeconómicos.


El 2025 Trend Report for Planners fue escrito por Petra Hurtado, PhD; Ievgeniia Dulko; Senna Catenacci; Joseph DeAngelis, Instituto Americano de Planificadores Certificados (AICP, por su sigla en inglés); Sagar Shah, PhD, AICP; y Jason Jordan. Fue editado por Ann Dillemuth, AICP.  

Jon DePaolis el editor sénior de la APA. 

Imagen principal: Se ve cómo sale el vapor de las torres de refrigeración del centro de datos de Google en The Dalles, Oregón. Crédito: Google.