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Imagine for a moment that you are a political leader—a prime minister, president, or governor—and you awake to the news that natural disaster has struck. Citizens died, buildings collapsed, infrastructure is hobbled, and local leaders desperately need additional resources and support.
You respond immediately, sending personnel and equipment to the disaster zone and pledging additional assistance to local leaders. Your country, like many around the world, has institutionalized a scalable, tiered response system with regional, state, and national levels of government engaging as disaster-related demands exceed local capacities to respond. Yet within days, even hours—before all the casualties are treated and citizens are accounted for, and before the streets have been cleared of rubble and basic services have been restored—other leaders and the media are demanding answers to questions you haven’t had time to consider: How much money will be pledged to the rebuilding? What standards will guide it? Will all landowners be permitted to rebuild? Who will lead the process? Is a new institution or governance structure needed to cut through bureaucratic red tape and expedite the rebuilding?
This article summarizes ongoing research into the roles of various government levels in successful disaster recovery and rebuilding (table 1). It represents the synthesis of two decades of recovery research and planning practice following some of the largest disasters of our time in the United States, Japan, China, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, and elsewhere. Its purpose is to find common lessons in these disparate environments and help facilitate recovery for communities struck by disasters yet to come.
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Table 1: Recovery Management Experiences Around the World
Australia
Victoria Bushfire Recovery and Reconstruction Authority
Queensland Reconstruction Authority
Chile
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU- Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo)
China
General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief
India
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA)
Abhiyan
Project Management Unit
Indonesia
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency—BRR
Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction—TTN
Japan
National Reconstruction Agency
New Zealand
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
Taiwan
921 Post-Earthquake Recovery Commission
Morakot Post-Disaster Reconstruction Council
United States
Lower Manhattan Development Corporation
Louisiana Recovery Authority
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Recovery Management Around the World
Governments tasked with post-disaster reconstruction face an extraordinary set of management challenges. The first is the compression of activities in time, focused in space, as cities built over the course of decades if not centuries are destroyed or damaged suddenly and must be rebuilt in a fraction of the time it took to construct them. From this tension develops a second challenge: a keen tension between speed and deliberation, as the various recovery actors in stricken communities move with urgency while aiming to make thoughtful and deliberate decisions, to ensure optimal long-term recovery. From both these phenomena a third challenge arises: the need for immediate access to a deep wealth of money and information—the two currencies of the post-disaster recovery environment.
To meet these demands, governments in every country after every large disaster create new relief agencies or significantly rearrange existing organizations. The most common reason for these post-disaster governance transformations is lack of capacity. Governments still need to attend to their normal daily affairs while they coordinate the reconstruction or reinvention of impacted communities, so they appoint an entity that can focus daily attention on rebuilding while coordinating the recovery-related activities of multiple government agencies. Commonly designed to serve a variety of purposes and governmental settings, these recovery agencies provide a range of substantive functions as they rebuild infrastructure, housing, and economic activity. They differ depending on the type and scale of coordination they provide; the scope of their authority, especially regarding the flow of money and information; and the level of government they serve—at either the national, state, or intergovernmental level.
National governments handle very large disasters at the top political tier, mobilizing financial resources from national reserves or international aid and providing capacity support to lower levels of government in the disaster-stricken locality. When large disasters transcend state or provincial boundaries, national governments also assume active roles in developing recovery policies, and they create recovery organizations to assist them. Examples include Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency, established after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami; New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, created after the 2010 and 2011 earthquake sequence in Christchurch; and China’s General Headquarters for Earthquake Relief following the 2008 disaster in Wenchuan. Each of these international bodies hewed to the national administrative leadership, derived authority from the top rung of government, and articulated policies approved by the reigning administration.
Similarly, state-level recovery agencies are usually created in direct response to disasters that affect a region or other subnational jurisdiction. The authorities and legalities of these entities are more limited by their authorizing body’s secondary, subnational position in government. Examples include the Gujarat State’s Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), created after the 2001 earthquake in western India; Louisiana’s Recovery Authority, founded after Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Victoria State’s Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority (VBRRA), established after the 2009 Australian bushfires; and Queensland State’s Reconstruction Authority, founded after the summer 2010–2011 floods in Australia.
A third class of organizations are designed to operate between levels of government, such as the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, created as a state and city partnership for recovery planning and funding following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City. Another example, the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR) created in Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 tsunami, consisted of three independent agencies whose membership came from a wide range of local and national stakeholders. Likewise, the Indonesian government’s Coordination Team for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (TTN), following the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java, was designed to provide a bridge between national agencies and local agencies, and it also monitored and investigated local implementation issues.
In some cases, governments choose to modify or adapt existing institutions and procedures to help manage recovery. For example, Chile established a national interministerial task force after the 2010 earthquake and tsunami, but the existing Ministry of Housing and Urban Development took on expanded roles and responsibilities and managed the national planning and implementation efforts.
The Mastery of Money, Information, Collaboration, and Time
Considering these factors, common to all post-disaster recovery settings, our research demonstrates that the key to governing large-scale crises effectively is the mastery of money, information, collaboration, and time. For this article, we offer here some best practice examples and lessons learned from our various country-organization studies.
1. Managing Money: Sourcing and distributing recovery funding efficiently, effectively, and equitably.
When large amounts of public funds are involved in a disaster cleanup, the true power over the recovery resides with the level of government that controls the flow of money and how it is acquired, allocated, disbursed, and audited. Sometimes, the recovery organization assumes all or some of these powers, and sometimes all funding authority continues to reside where it did before the disaster, in the same legislative and administrative branches. Important functions in the post-disaster environment include setting policies and priorities for allocating large sums of recovery funding and establishing accounting systems that allow for timely disbursal of critical financing while also providing transparency and minimizing corruption.
Some organizations, such as India’s state-level GSDMA, are established specifically to collect all the recovery funds in one place and then allocate and disburse them. Some, such as one of the three legs of Indonesia’s intergovernmental BRR, are created to independently audit and monitor the expenditures of recovery implementation organizations. In contrast, the state-level Louisiana Recovery Authority recommended funding priorities to the state and provided oversight as needed, but it had no direct control over recovery funds. Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency received national funding and allocates that money to the relevant national ministries and local governments.
2. Increasing Information Flows: Effectively gathering, integrating, and disseminating information to enhance decision making and actions by all recovery actors.
A critical demand is to accelerate and broaden the flows of information among recovery actors about the dynamics of reconstruction actions and emergent opportunities. This challenge includes the planning and public engagement processes that provide information to citizens and institutions involved in the recovery, facilitate communication and innovations among recovery actors, and convey citizen concerns to government agencies and NGOs in a timely manner. It also includes providing information between both governmental and nongovernmental organizations and establishing forums to facilitate coordination.
In Victoria, Australia, after the 2009 bushfires, national and state leaders worked with affected communities to form more than 30 local recovery committees, which were then charged with developing a community recovery plan that identified local priorities and projects. These committees were used by state and national governments as focal points for local funding distribution and by local communities to raise additional funds and establish local policy guidance for rebuilding. In Yogyakarta, Java, after the 2006 earthquake, TTN kept a variety of local and national agencies mutually informed of each other’s activities—which, in turn, helped to provide early alerts to officials regarding potential problems.
A critical function appropriately provided by a government-supported agency is the acquisition, synthesis, and distribution of basic information on damage, reconstruction activities, population, social and economic issues, and various recovery indicators. Such agencies issue regular progress reports and monitor recovery indicators, as both Japan’s National Reconstruction Agency and New Zealand’s Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority have done, using a variety of communication mechanisms, including website postings, press releases, newsletters, and forums. Frequent information from credible sources can help to ensure that all actors understand the current recovery environment, and it can also help reduce the spread of rumors and misinformation.
3. Supporting Collaboration: Building sustainable capacity and capability for long-term recovery through genuine collaboration and coordination, both horizontally among local groups and vertically among different levels of government.
Vertically organized, hierarchical agencies—with clear organizational charts and streamlined channels of communication—are usually not well suited to manage disaster recovery, because the lack of “connecting flow” across vertical hierarchies limits collaboration as well as the flow of new and updated information among organizations. U.S. national agencies involved in recovery, for example, are more adept at administering individual programs than they are at solving complex problems that cut across governmental institutional boundaries.
By contrast, horizontally organized agencies can promote interagency coordination and information sharing, allowing individual groups to adapt to new contexts and information while remaining responsible to their parent organization. If multiple states or local jurisdictions are involved, cooperation among multiple jurisdictions is essential. Technical assistance and capacity building for the key recovery actors is also important for building local capabilities to sustain long-term recovery.
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Governor Kathleen Blanco appointed the members of the Louisiana Recovery Authority, so it was technically an extension of the state-level administration. But the legislature eventually formalized it. As an intentionally bipartisan body, it operated independently as it interacted with both U.S. national officials and local governments, made policy recommendations, and provided oversight of state agency recovery activities. Even though its power was limited to making policy recommendations, it was able to exert considerable influence at multiple levels in a very politically contentious atmosphere. It also collaborated with U.S. national agencies to set standards for long-term community recovery planning and helped match technical assistance and provide other planning resources at regional, local, and neighborhood scales.
Because they carried the authority of state leaders, India’s GSMDA and Queensland Australia’s reconstruction authority were able to successfully coordinate the activities of other state agencies. Similarly, Chile’s MINVU and Taiwan’s national recovery agencies have had the centralized authority to coordinate activities of other national agencies. Abhiyan, an NGO officially endorsed by the Gujarat government in India but without any defined governmental authority, also played a crucial role in coordinating the work of hundreds of NGOs and in establishing a network of local subcenters to provide information and technical support.
The hierarchical recovery process after the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in China succeeded in quickly reconstructing buildings, but it left little room for local innovation, as it lacked genuine local capacity building and involvement in decision making. Because local conditions were not always considered, economic recovery appears to be uneven.
Likewise, in many tsunami-affected communities in the Tohoku region of Japan, recovery has stalled because the hierarchical system established under the national government and the National Recovery Agency leaves insufficient room for local innovation. Furthermore, within the complex and powerful Japanese ministry system, the National Reconstruction Agency lacks power to compel actions by other ministries.
Increasingly, research shows that if residents are partners in reconstruction planning, they are tolerant of delays, and they are more satisfied with the results. Still, even the best examples of decentralized processes involve an agency at the top establishing the framework and rules. This trend strongly suggests that governments should resist the urge to manage the details of reconstruction and act less as managers and more as coordinators and facilitators of the process.
4. Balancing Time Constraints: Effectively meeting the immediate and pressing local needs of recovery while also successfully capitalizing on opportunities for longterm betterment.
Governments face a balancing act as they confront the tensions between speed and deliberation, and between restoration and betterment. The most fundamental way to address these challenges is to increase information flows, as described above. But recovery agencies have found several other specific ways to attain both speed and improvement.
To hasten reconstruction, there are often opportunities to streamline normal bureaucratic processes of decision making, especially regarding construction permits, without compromising quality. Because such processes often involve multiple agencies, a recovery agency can be helpful to the extent that it can facilitate or compel line agencies to cooperate more effectively.
New Zealand’s parliament conferred upon the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority and its minister a wide range of unilateral powers that would enable the timely and coordinated recovery of greater Christchurch. Parliament continued the emergency authorities granted under previous legislation and extended the expiration date of those authorities where appropriate; permitted the minister to acquire land compulsorily; and allowed the suspension of any part or all of the national land use, local government, and transport management, plans or policies developed under various acts. It directed CERA to prepare a draft recovery strategy within nine months of its authorization. Similarly, it issued the Christchurch city council a nine-month deadline to draft a recovery plan for the city’s damaged central business district.
Most recovery agencies include disaster risk reduction in their reconstruction policies. A common recovery slogan is “build back better.” The slogan of the Louisiana Recovery Authority was “Safer, Stronger, Smarter.” The easiest form of post-disaster betterment is to adopt disaster-resistant building standards. The incorporation of new structural standards need not slow down the rebuilding process, but land use improvements such as relocating neighborhoods or entire communities can require considerable time for planning and land acquisition. These projects involve difficult tradeoffs between speed, design quality, and public involvement. New Zealand is undertaking a major buyout of neighborhoods that sustained heavy damage in the 2010–2011 earthquakes and remain vulnerable to damage from future tremors. Japan is encouraging relocation of coastal communities from tsunami hazard areas, and some of these will likely take up to ten years to complete.
One way to manage these goals simultaneously is to support participatory planning processes to create long-term betterment while also trying to meet immediate needs. In many cases, professional planners worked with neighborhoods—in Japan, Chile, New Orleans, and Bhuj, India, for example—but each project also involved difficult compromises in order to meet time constraints. Victoria and Queensland’s creation of local recovery planning committees, however, are great examples of state and national support systems that helped build local capacity to carry forward the rebuilding processes over time.
Next Steps in our Research
Governments know that their task is to manage information and money flows among many actors in a compressed time. Up to this point, we have identified many examples of how to accomplish this. But, even better, we would like to be able to create menus of organizational and process choices, based on combinations of disaster magnitude and scope and economic, political, environmental, and governmental contexts.
We also have several remaining questions: Why do many of the same institutional problems continue to appear from one disaster to the next, and is there a way to avoid repeating some of them? What are the effective outcomes—negative and positive—of these institutional arrangements that may inform future leaders facing similar reconstruction challenges? What specific kinds of technical assistance and capacity building should international donors and national governments focus on providing for local governmental and non-governmental organizations, so they can do their jobs better during the recovery process? In large-scale disasters, how do the tiered goals of a recovery (i.e. rebuilding households, neighborhoods, cities, regions, nations) relate to each other, in terms of consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness? And what happens when these disaster-related organizations cease to exist? Is the local capacity and capability in place for long-term community sustainability? By studying varied national and organizational experiences, we can better understand how the time compression phenomenon of post-disaster recovery affects other theoretical constructs guiding public policy and city management; planning, land development and growth management; and fiscal and capital management.
About the Authors
Co-authors of Clear As Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans (2010, APA Planners Press), Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky are currently collaborating on a Lincoln Institute book and policy focus report on governing post-disaster recovery. For the past two decades, they have been researching and practicing post-disaster recovery planning following urban disasters around the world. Johnson is an urban planner based in San Francisco and specializing in disaster recovery and catastrophe risk management. Olshansky is professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Contact: laurie@lauriejohnsonconsulting.com or robo@illinois.edu
References
Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute.
Chandrasekhar, Divya and Robert B. Olshansky. 2007. Managing Development After Catastrophic Disaster: A Study of Organizations That Coordinated Post-Disaster Recovery in Aceh and Louisiana. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Olshansky, Robert B., Lewis D. Hopkins, and Laurie A. Johnson. 2012. Disaster and recovery: Processes compressed in time. Natural Hazards Reviews. 13(3):173–178.
Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, and Kenneth C. Topping. 2006. Rebuilding communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment. 32(4): 354–374.
Smith, G., and Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. In Handbook of disaster research (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research). ed. Havidan Rodriguez, 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.
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Strengthening Municipal Fiscal Health in China
Since 2013, Zhi Liu has been a senior research fellow and director of the China Program at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and director of the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy (PLC). Prior, Zhi was lead infrastructure specialist at the World Bank, where he worked for 18 years, with operational experiences in a number of developing countries.
Zhi received a B.S. in economic geography from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen University (China), a M.S. in city and regional planning from Nanjing University (China), and a Ph.D. in urban planning from Harvard University.
LAND LINES: The Lincoln Institute recently initiated a global research agenda on municipal fiscal health. This effort arises from the recognition that a number of cities in the United States and in many other countries including China suffer financial hardship. What is the nature of municipal fiscal distress in China?
ZHI LIU: It’s very different from the financial troubles faced by cities in the United States. The two countries are at very different stages of urbanization. While the U.S. is highly urbanized, with more than 80 percent of citizens living in urban areas, according to the 2010 census, China is only halfway through the urbanization process. Today, 750 million Chinese citizens live in cities, accounting for 55 percent of the total population. By 2050, the urban population is expected to reach 1.1 billion, or 75 percent of the total population. Over the last two decades, with the exception of a few mining cities, almost all municipalities have seen rapid population growth and spatial expansion, generating a significant demand for public investment in urban infrastructure.
In China, the main sources of funding for urban infrastructure investment are revenues from land concessions and local borrowing from commercial banks, often using land as collateral. Urban land is owned by the state, and rural land is collectively owned by villages. The Land Administration Law stipulates that only the state has the power to convert rural land into urban use. This sets the stage for the municipal governments to take rural land for urban development through the land concession process. As it goes, municipal governments expropriate rural land, service it with infrastructure, and sell the land use rights to real estate developers. The compensation to farmers for the farmland taken is low, based on the land’s agricultural production value instead of market value for urban use. When the demand for real estate development is high, the land concession fees are bid high, and the municipal governments stand to collect a huge amount of revenues. For the last 10 years, revenues from land concessions have accounted for more than one-third of total local fiscal revenues.
Moreover, municipal governments further expand their financing capacity by using land assets as collateral to secure commercial loans from commercial banks. Before a recent amendment, the Chinese Budget Law did not permit local governments to borrow. However, most municipal governments bypassed the law by creating their own local financing vehicles—known as urban development investment corporations (UDICs)—that borrowed commercial loans or issued corporate bonds for the governments. The size of outstanding local debts has grown rapidly over the last few years, reaching at least one-third of the GDP now.
The land-based financing mechanism has helped municipal governments in China raise a significant amount of funds for capital investment. However, the success has also created incentive for municipal governments to rely on land concessions and UDICs too heavily. Today, China’s economy is growing more slowly than before, and the mechanism is running out of steam in many localities where conversion of rural land for urban use exceeds the real demand. Some cities have borrowed much more than they can repay, leaving them heavily indebted.
Many empirical studies, including some funded by the Lincoln Institute, find that China’s land-based financing mechanism is one of the main causes of other urban issues that we face today. Skyrocketing housing prices, growing local debts, excessive land-taking, growing tension between the farmers and municipal governments over land-taking, and widening gaps of income and wealth distribution between urban and rural populations are among the major issues.
LL: The international mass media has been reporting on these issues. How will China address them?
ZL: There is a high level of consensus on the root causes of the problems. In November 2013, the central government announced a set of reforms, and a few are directly related to urbanization policy and municipal finance. For example, the scope of land expropriation will be narrowed to the confine of public purposes, and villages are allowed to develop their land for urban use under the premise that it conforms to planning. The reforms also call for acceleration of property tax legislation; reform of hukou, the household residential registration system, to help farmers become urban residents; and government efforts to make basic urban public services available to all permanent residents in cities, including all rural-to-urban migrants.
LL: What are the implications of hukou reform on municipal finance?
ZL: The government is phasing out China’s longstanding hukou system, and the implications for municipal finance will be significant. Hukou was designed to identify a citizen as a resident of a certain locality, but for several decades the government used the system to control rural-to-urban migration. A rural hukou holder could not become an urban hukou holder without the government’s approval. Without urban hukou, a rural migrant worker is not eligible for public services provided by the urban governments.
Since the economic reform, the expanding urban economy has absorbed a large number of rural-to-urban migrant workers. Earlier, I mentioned China’s urbanization rate of 55 percent and urban population of 750 million. These numbers include the 232 million rural migrants who stay in cities for more than half a year. If they were excluded from the calculation, the level of urbanization would be just 38 percent. Due to their rural hukou status, however, migrant workers don’t have access to many services enjoyed by urban hukou holders, despite the fact that many have labored and lived in cities for years. Municipal governments determine the extent of many urban public services—such as public schools and affordable housing—according to the number of urban hukou holders inside the municipal jurisdiction. Phasing out hukou would significantly increase the fiscal burden to the municipal governments for public service provision. Some scholars in China estimate that the cost of providing full urban public services to each rural migrant would be at least RMB 100,000 (roughly $16,000 U.S.). The total outlays for all current rural migrants would be at least RMB 23 trillion (about $3.8 trillion U.S.).
LL: China is introducing the residential property tax. What is the status of that initiative?
ZL: The government is drafting the first national property tax law as part of the ongoing reform of public finance. China is one of only a handful of countries without a local property tax. The current taxation system relies heavily upon taxes on businesses and transactions, and very little upon taxes on household income and wealth. In a more urbanized China with a wealthier population who own residential properties, the property tax would be a more viable source of municipal revenues. Today, 89 percent of urban households own one or more residential units, and the value of those properties has much to do with urban public services. Property tax will allow cities to tax urban residential properties whose value would benefit from the improved public services made possible by property tax revenues. It should also fill part of the fiscal gap left by the expected reduction of revenues from land concessions. However, property tax will not be a major source of municipal revenues any time soon. It may take one or two more years for the National People’s Congress to pass the new law. It would also take perhaps two to three years for cities to establish the property database and assessment and administration system.
LL: It must be tough for cities to deal with declining revenues from land concessions without an immediate alternative—especially as they are coping with growing local debt, which has been widely reported. How will Chinese cities get out of this situation?
ZL: The situation is indeed tough. China’s economy is slowing down. The real estate sector is no longer as hot as it was in the last 10 years, resulting in lower demand for land and thus lower revenues from land concessions for municipal governments. Cities are now facing a fiscal gap. One possible way to fill the gap would be local government borrowing. However, as I mentioned earlier, many cities are indebted and have little capacity to borrow further. In fact, most cities in China do not have adequate capacity for debt management. The newly amended budget law permits provincial-level governments to issue bonds within the limit set by the State Council, but also closes the door on other forms of local government borrowing. Currently, the central government actively promotes infrastructure financing through public-private partnerships (PPP). While this is a good move, it won’t be sufficient to fill the infrastructure financing gap, as PPP is suitable mainly for infrastructure projects with a strong revenue flow. There are many other urban infrastructure projects that generate little or no revenues. In the long term, I believe that China should actively establish a municipal government bond market to channel funds from institutional investors to municipal infrastructure investment and enable local governments to access commercial loans based on creditworthiness. To do so, municipal governments need to develop institutional capacity on several fronts, such as local debt management, capital improvement planning, multiyear financial planning, and municipal infrastructure asset management.
LL: Is PLC’s work relevant to the current reform?
ZL: The PLC was jointly established by the Lincoln Institute and Peking University in 2007. By the time I arrived, in 2013, the center had developed its reputation as one of China’s premier research and training institutions on urban development and land policy issues. The center supports a number of activities, including research, training, academic exchange, policy dialogue, research fellowship, demonstration projects, and publication. We focus on five core themes—property taxation and municipal finance, land policy, urban housing, urban development and planning, and urban environment and conservation. Over the last few years, our research projects have touched upon land-based finance, local debts, housing prices, infrastructure capital investment and finance, and other topics relevant to municipal fiscal health. We have also provided training to Chinese government agencies on the international experiences of property tax assessment and administration. I would say that our work is highly relevant to the current reform.
Implementation of the new comprehensive policy reforms is generating considerable demand for international knowledge and policy advice in the China Program’s focus areas, especially property taxation and municipal finance. We plan to initiate a pilot demonstration project with one or two selected cities in China, to support the institutional capacity required for the development of long-term municipal fiscal health. Our team has started a study to develop a set of indicators to measure municipal fiscal health for Chinese cities. It is the right time for us to initiate this agenda in China.
