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After spending more than a decade on restructuring central-provincial fiscal relations, the Chinese government is advancing its efforts to reform local public finance. In 2003 the central government issued a directive to ameliorate the real property tax system in China. To fulfill this mandate, tax authorities are reviewing international property taxation experiences, sending officials overseas to study pertinent models and inviting foreign experts to China for consultation. Yet comparable cases from which the government can draw relevant lessons for tailor-making a Chinese property tax system are few. The danger is that when public officials are under pressure to move the reform forward, they may be tempted to adopt concepts that do not match the country’s conditions.
One recent proposal that may develop into such a scenario is to establish an ad valorem property tax system in which leasehold land would be taxed as if it were freehold. This article explains what the Chinese government’s current proposal entails, why it may not be consistent with existing land tenure arrangements and, more tentatively, how the establishment of a land rent system could mediate potential contradictions of taxing land that is not private property.
China’s Property Tax Reform Proposal
The Chinese property tax system currently has as many as nine property taxes, depending on the definitions (see Hong 2003; 2004). The central government has proposed to consolidate three of these taxes into a single levy to simplify the existing tax structure. One of them is the Township and Urban Land Use Tax (LUT), which all land users (except foreign entities, government and nonprofit agencies, and agricultural industries) are required to pay. To collect this tax, local governments divide their jurisdictions into different taxing zones according to population size or land use. Land in different zones is taxed at an array of tax rates preset by the central government, ranging from 0.2 to 10 yuan per square meter (1 yuan = US$0.122). Some Chinese officials have admitted that the tax rates for the LUT have been set too low; hence its collections have little impact on local revenue. The government plans to eradicate this tax.
The other two taxes, the Building (or House) Tax and Urban Real Estate Tax (URET), will also be subject to reform. While the Building Tax is imposed on income-generating properties held by Chinese nationals, the URET is levied on all real estate owned by foreign entities and overseas Chinese. Both are ad valorem taxes whose bases can be the discount original purchasing cost, assessed capital value or gross annual rental value of the property.
When the assessed capital value (or the purchasing cost for the Building Tax) is used as the basis for tax assessment, the tax rate is 1.2 percent for the Building Tax and 1.5 percent for the URET. If an estimated rental value is used instead, the tax rates for the Building Tax and URET will be 12 and 15 percent, respectively. In some locales, like Beijing, if actual rental value is available because individual property owners rent their dwellings to another party at the market rate, the Building Tax rate will be 4 percent of gross rental income of the property. In view of this discrepancy in taxing local- and foreign-owned real estate, the government would replace these two levies with a single property tax as part of the upcoming reform.
The proposed new property tax would be imposed on both land and buildings at a uniform rate. The tax base would encompass all properties, domestic and foreign, located in rural as well as urban areas. As some public officials argue, a standardized property tax could have at least three advantages. First, the new property tax system may ease tax administration. Instead of administering the collection of the LUT, Building Tax and URET separately, local tax bureaus will be able to concentrate their effort on just one tax.
Second, the new property tax would be a value-based tax, which allows the government to capture future land value increments if property reappraisal can be done regularly. Third, one key purpose for creating the new property tax is to convert selected real estate development charges into a unified tax. Many scholars argue that some local governments might have abused the current system of user charges, thereby making payments for public services unduly cumbersome.
Collecting these charges through the new property tax may lower the transaction costs of doing business. As well-intentioned as the proposal may sound, policy designers might have underestimated the importance of one fundamental matter: the integration of the new property tax system with the current land tenure arrangements.
Property Taxation and Public Leaseholds
As specified in the Chinese Constitution, urban land is owned by the state and rural land is owned by collectives. Local governments, empowered by the state, can assign land use rights to users through a set of leasing arrangements. Lease terms are 40 years for commercial land, 50 years for industrial land and 70 years for residential land. If a local government wants to lease an urban land site to a private entity, it must be assigned through a bidding process. The winning bidder must pay the total set of leasing fees (including a “conveyance fee,” expropriation costs if land is acquired from the collective, and various land allocation charges) in a lump sum and immediately to obtain the land use rights.
The payment of the market-determined conveyance fee allows the lessee to transfer or rent the land use rights to another party and to use them as collateral. In the past, land rights were allocated mainly to private entities through negotiation, but this method failed to collect proper fees due to personal connections or corruption and it was suspended by the central government in 2002.
Users of land assigned administratively to public agencies or state-owned enterprises are not required to pay the conveyance fee, but must compensate the state for any allocation costs. The assignment of the land rights has no term limit. According to the law, if a state-owned enterprise wants to transfer its land rights to a private entity for commercial purposes, it must pay the conveyance fee to the state before doing so. For the transfer of rural land into urban uses or to nonmembers of the collective, the state will first expropriate the land from the collective with compensation and then lease the use rights to interested users for the payment of the conveyance fee and other leasing charges.
Owing to a long bureaucratic process and high transaction fees, many users have transferred their land rights to other parties without going through the proper procedure and registration. As such informal exchanges have gained in popularity, the official land leasing record is no longer reliable. Hence, any future attempt to identify the actual landholders, delineate their land rights, and estimate the leasehold value for tax purposes would no doubt be a difficult task.
The design of the new property tax system must take these unique land tenure arrangements into consideration. Aside from the extensive informality involved in land transaction and possession—a topic that is beyond the scope of this article—the most basic question is: How can the government convince lessees to pay property tax on lands that they do not own?
Certainly not all property tax systems are based on the premise that property owners should be taxpayers; occupiers are sometimes liable for tax payment. In some countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, taxes paid by occupiers are referred to as rates, a council tax or a user tax to avoid any confusion. Despite the different names, the calculation of these levies is still based on either the capital or rental value of the property, which is the same approach as for the property tax.
More fundamentally, since the supply of land is fixed, the landowner (the state government in the case of China) would bear the ultimate tax burden even if land users paid the property tax directly to the government. This is because the new tax would dampen the demand for land use rights and in turn reduce the fees that local governments could receive from leasing public land.
Because the Chinese government is both the landowner and property tax collector, lessees who leased land in the past and paid the entire leasehold value without anticipating the additional property tax burden would wonder why they should pay more land tax to the government. Thus it is essential to have a rationale for taxing leasehold land, so as to convince lessees to comply with their property tax obligation.
One way to analyze the matter is to treat property rights as a bundle of rights, which includes the right to own, use, develop, transfer, bequest and benefit from land. This bundle also comprises the right to exclude others from enjoying these privileges.
Viewing the Chinese land tenure arrangements through this lens, the government holds the ownership of land and leases other attributes of the bundle of land rights to private entities. So long as the privileges and obligations of holding the leased land rights are fully delineated and recognized, both legally and by the society, there is no reason why leasehold rights cannot be regarded as private property of the lessees for a specific period of time as stipulated in the lease.
In 1988 the Chinese National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to acknowledge the transferability of the right to use land. Further amendments are needed to explicitly recognize leaseholds as private property and empower the state to establish special legislation for the enforcement and protection of leasehold rights. In this way, the implicit contradiction in imposing property tax on leased public land would be clarified and resolved.
One technical issue remains, however: valuation of leasehold rights for tax purposes. Since the new property tax will be value-based, assessors will face the challenges of estimating the leasehold value of land independently, based on market data that normally reflect a combined value of land and all improvements. Most property valuation methods presume that land is freehold, and that developed real estate markets are present. Neither of these assumptions can be applied to China. Although there are practices that separate land and building values for tax purposes, the divisions are generally based on crude assumptions. How can assessors modify the existing (or invent new) valuation techniques to accommodate these special Chinese conditions?
More important, leasehold value is highly sensitive to the lease term and conditions, both of which can vary significantly from one case to another. At this moment, time-tested mass appraisal techniques for assessing large numbers of leasehold sites do not exist. Do these issues imply that property assessment for tax purposes under the Chinese leasehold system requires a case-by-case approach? If so, do local governments have the capability to carry out such detailed property appraisals for the collection of the new property tax? The Chinese government must find ways to deal with these practical matters if it decides to tax leasehold rights as private property.
It is also extremely important to educate would-be taxpayers and public officials about the distinctions between freehold and leasehold systems. Lessees must recognize that they possess only the leased land rights that are not designed to last in perpetuity. If the rights and obligations of both the state and lessees are not clearly delineated, taxing leasehold rights as if they were freehold could complicate the implementation of future land and tax policy. For example, in Canberra, Australia, and Israel, lessees are requested to pay the entire leasehold value up front, and thereafter they pay an annual property tax (or rates in Australia) for leasing public land. Lease terms in both cases are long and renewable—99 years in Canberra and 49 years in Israel with four automatically renewable terms totaling 196 years.
This method of collecting leasehold charges and taxes is tantamount to the payment system for land in countries where land is freehold. Due to this similarity, lessees have developed the perception that land is privately owned (Hong and Bourassa 2003). This view, albeit legally a fiction, has engendered the expectation that any government’s attempt to exercise its rights as the landowner to retake land for public uses or to demand additional payments from lessees for enlarging or extending land use rights would constitute an infringement on private property.
This expectation has added conflict to government efforts to redistribute land and land value between private landholders and the state on behalf of the public. As Neutze (2003) argued, had the Canberra government provided enough public education about its leasehold system, it would have spared the Australian capital from many intractable disputes over land ownership.
The Chinese government has no immediate plan to give fee simple deeds to private landholders. Thus, if local governments continue to collect all leasehold charges up front and then levy the new property tax on both land and buildings, they may be at risk of creating the same mistaken expectations, that is, that land is privately owned. This may put the government and lessees at odds with each other when there is a later need to reallocate land from private to public uses. Designing a real property tax that will not add more complications to the already unsettling land tenure system is a critical task that policy makers should not overlook.
Land tenure reform is a long, controversial process, however, and the Chinese government would be ill-advised to delay the implementation of the new property tax system until land reform is completed. What the government needs is a transition system in which property tax reform can proceed as planned without interfering with its endeavors to restructure land ownership. Establishing a land rent system seems to be an option.
Land Rent System
Under a land rent system, leasehold charges would be paid in the form of an annual land rent, not a one-time leasing fee. Local land bureaus could continue to assign land use rights by public auction, but the bidding would be to determine the amount of annual land rent. Similarly for lands that were assigned to state agencies administratively, users would pay their conveyance fee for transferring land rights to other private parties in annual installments, which would be equivalent to the yearly rental payments. The land rent system has pros and cons (see Hong 2004 for a detailed discussion); four important advantages are discussed here.
First, collecting a land rent is the most straightforward way to characterize the landowner-tenant relationships between the state and lessees. More important, requesting lessees to make their rental payments annually would serve as a constant reminder of their leasehold relationships with the state.
Second, if leasehold charges were paid in annual installments, local officials would no longer be able to generate a large amount of cash instantly to cover short-term fiscal shortfalls. This in turn may lower their incentive to lease land rapidly—a major malady of the current land leasing system.
Third, research using the input-output (I/O) technique and the 1997 I/O Table of China found that collecting land rent could facilitate the transition to the new property tax system (Hong 2004). Had the central government required all land users to pay an annual land rent in 1997, rental income would have added 29.8 billion yuan (US$3.6 billion) to the government treasury, representing a 2.9 percent increase in total tax revenue (see Table 1). This revenue increase would represent a net gain over estimated tax revenue losses under the proposed property tax reform.
The land rent system, however, may generate a cash flow problem for local governments. When leasing fees are deferred and paid by lessees in annual installments, fewer funds would be immediately available for local governments to cover public expenditures. To resolve this problem, local jurisdictions may borrow money from the central government or other financial intermediaries, using perhaps the future land rent collections as collateral. Loans would then be repaid in annual installments by funds gathered from yearly rental payments made by lessees.
Had the government decided to keep the total tax revenue approximately the same, it could have set the new property tax rate at 4 percent, which is the same as the Building Tax rate for personal dwellings rented at market prices, and then discounted the land rent by as much as 47 percent (see Table 1). With a reasonable tax rate and a substantial reduction on rental payment, taxpayers would be less resistant to the reform.
Table 1 also shows several possible combinations of rent level and property tax rate to produce a revenue-neutral shift. If the government were to increase the new property tax rate to deepen the tax reform, it could lower the rent level to avoid antagonizing taxpayers. This approach would provide local governments with an array of options to adopt the new property tax system in stages and at a pace that suits their economies.
Fourth, the proposed land rent system could keep future tenure choices open. If the sociopolitical sentiment of the country favors public leaseholds, local governments could continue to levy the land rent and property tax at the ratio that matches local needs. Subsequent adjustments to the rent-tax ratio could also be made when new circumstances arise.
If central authorities, in response to popular demand, were to grant fee simple deeds to all lessees, it could order local governments to phase out the collection of land rent and raise the new property tax rate accordingly. As shown in Table 1, directing the reform toward either path would not create adverse effects on local government budgets.
This analysis shows that choices available to the Chinese government are not limited to privatizing land ownership and relying solely on real property taxation to recoup land value. Undeniably, the Chinese government may eventually choose to do just that because it is indeed an option, but there are many other possibilities as well. Why, then, should the government make such a decision now, when there may be other viable alternatives that can keep all options open? Recognizing that there are many choices could unleash the creative powers of policy makers and scholars to imagine a unique Chinese system to capture land value.
References
Director General of State Statistics Bureau. 1999. Input-output table of China, 1997. Beijing: China Statistical Press.
Hong, Yu-Hung. 2003. The last straw: reforming local property tax in the People’s Republic of China. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
_____. 2004. Assessing property tax reform in China. Report for the David C. Lincoln Fellowship Program. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
_____ and Steven C. Bourassa. 2003. Why public leasehold? Issues and concepts. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds., Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Neutze, Max. 2003. Leasing of publicly owned land in Canberra, Australia. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Yu-Hung Hong is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. This article reports on selected preliminary results of his research funded by the David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation.
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In most countries, government property is not liable for property taxes; indeed, the whole idea may be seen as a circular shifting of money (Bird and Slack 2004; Youngman and Malme 1994). The United Kingdom has taken a very different perspective recently. Regarding it as important that both government and local government occupiers are aware of the true cost of holding property, the UK insists on a system of notional rents and ensures liability for local property taxes.
From the enactment of the Poor Relief Act in 1601, the generally accepted starting date for the taxing of local property in the UK, until 2000 when changes were enacted, property occupied by the government or Crown was not subject to property tax or “rates.” However, the Crown did accept that it was appropriate to make some contribution to meet the costs of local services and paid ex gratia contributions in lieu of rates (CILORs). This process suffered from a number of problems: the contributions were voluntary; Crown property did not appear in the valuation lists; and the basis upon which the contributions were made lacked the rigor and transparency of valuation that applied to all other property.
The Local Government and Rating Act was introduced in 1997 for England, Scotland, and Wales (with an amendment in 1998 for Northern Ireland) to effectively place all Crown property on the same footing as all other taxable property, liable to be assessed for rates. These provisions came into effect from April 1, 2000. As a result, such iconic buildings as the Palace of Westminster and the Tower of London are now being valued in the same way as all other property for the first time.
Valuing Commercial Property
Valuation officers of the Valuation Office Agency (VOA), a part of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), are responsible for compiling and maintaining commercial (nondomestic) property rating lists for England and Wales. The local assessors are responsible in Scotland, and the Land and Property Services have responsibility for Northern Ireland. Broadly speaking, the rateable value of a nondomestic property is based on the annual rent that it could have been let for on the open market at a standard date (the antecedent valuation date). For England and Wales, the antecedent date of the 2000 lists was April 1, 1998; for the 2005 lists it was April 1, 2003; and for the 2010 lists, which came into effect on April 1, 2010, it was April 1, 2008.
Table 1 shows the number of taxable properties in England and Wales and their total rateable (taxable) value. Comparisons with capital value-based property taxes are a little difficult because it is necessary to know the relevant yields to make the comparison, but even so it is clear the level of taxation is unusually high for a property tax. The tax level for England and Wales is approximately 45 percent, but this is on rental, not capital, values.
The UK government sets a separate uniform tax rate (poundage) for England known as the nondomestic rating multiplier. For Scotland and Wales, it is set by their respective assemblies, and for Northern Ireland each district council sets its own rate. This determines the sum payable on every pound sterling of rateable value to arrive at the full rates bill. Local authorities remain responsible for calculating the bills and collecting nondomestic rates payable on properties within the authority’s area. They do not, however, retain the rates they collect but pay them into a national pool (one each for England and Wales). The money in the pool is then redistributed to local authorities with special arrangements for the City of London.
Background on the Crown Exemption
Prior to the 2000 rating lists, certain properties occupied by the Crown, e.g., central government offices and Ministry of Defence establishments, were exempt from rating and did not appear in any rating list. The Crown did, however, make an ex gratia CILOR based on a notional rateable value.
The Crown was neither expressly mentioned in the Poor Relief Act of 1601, the original rating act sometimes referred to as The Statute of Elizabeth, nor in the General Rate Act 1967 that replaced it. As it was a principle of UK law that the Crown was not bound by an act of Parliament unless specifically mentioned, there was no liability for rates. Further, no rates could be imposed with respect to property occupied by its servants whose occupation amounted to occupation by the Crown. This position was upheld by Jones v. Mersey Docks 11 HL Cas. 443 (1865).
However, as far back as 1860, the government accepted the principle of the Crown paying something by way of ex gratia CILORs with respect to property occupied for public purposes. This practice was made uniform in 1874. The Treasury of the UK, by formal Minute, adopted the principle that property occupied for the public service should contribute to the local rates equally with the other property in the parishes in which it was situated, having regard to its character in each case. The Treasury Minute established the Rating of Government Property Department (RGPD) to undertake the assessment of all government property with the intention of adopting in each case as far as possible the same principles as were applicable to the valuation of private property. Nineteenth-century case law established that the exemption applied only to property occupied by the Crown itself or its servants, but not to other property occupied for public purposes. Generally, therefore, the exemption applied to property occupied for the purposes of the central government and the Royal palaces and parks, and to other property occupied by servants of the Crown (for example, occupation by government ministers or by military personnel of Royal Naval, army, and Royal Air Force bases).
In 1896, a further Treasury Minute reaffirmed the principle of equal contribution and made certain concessions in order to carry it fully into effect. The concessions included periodical revaluation, punctual payment, and a contribution with respect to the Houses of Parliament.
The following were the main characteristics of the CILOR in the last few years of its existence:
The CILOR arrangements differed from standard rating procedures in the following main respects:
Rationale for Removal of the Crown Exemption
The government debated the removal of the Crown exemption as far back as World War II. The Central Valuation Committee, in a letter of January 21, 1947, to the Minister of Health, while in effect suggesting such a removal also stated that it had long been its view that the then-arrangements for the rating of property occupied by the Crown were in many respects unfair and unsatisfactory to local authorities, who at the time set their own rate levels. In the 1950s, the English local authority associations expressed their dissatisfaction with the Crown exemption and went so far as to say that the manner of assessing CILORs was completely arbitrary and frequently worked to the detriment of local authorities. They estimated the rateable value of Crown property in England and Wales in 1952 to be around £14 million out of a total rateable value of about £341 million, which would equate to £2.2 billion based on levels of value at the 2010 revaluation.
In the mid-1990s the government considered several drivers for change:
The Local Government and Rating Act 1997 made provision to end the Crown exemption from nondomestic rates in England, Wales, and Scotland, effective April 1, 2000. Rating authorities would collect rates on Crown properties directly from the departments concerned, rather than from the CPU. These authorities also would be able to proceed with enforcement proceedings against the Crown, as they would with other ratepayers. Although this would happen in only the rarest of cases, rating authorities would in principle be able to take steps against a government department to obtain a liability order for unpaid rates if the need arose.
It has been suggested by the rating profession in the UK that, since rating is a tax, valuing and taxing properties occupied by public bodies is a waste of public resources. Properties that might fall in this category include those occupied by the Ministry of Defence, National Health Service, and local authorities. Superficially, valuing and taxing these properties may appear unjustified. The difficulty is that many activities traditionally carried out by central or local governments are now also performed in the private sector. Leisure centers are just one example. Exempting local authority properties from rates when they compete directly with the private sector could be argued to be unfair as it would give the public sector a fiscal advantage.
While the public sector occupies other buildings whose current use clearly does not compete with private business, it is difficult to justify exempting some publicly occupied properties and including others. The original justification for rating buildings occupied by public sector bodies (including the removal of Crown exemption in 2000) was to establish a level playing field, ensure that the costs of occupation were fully recognized, and make transparent the contribution of public sector bodies to the cost of providing local services.
The Valuation of Iconic Buildings
The removal of the Crown exemption precipitated the need to value a wide variety of unusual properties. Rating in the UK is an occupier’s not an owner’s tax and is based on broad actual use rather than highest and best use. Very old buildings often have to be valued, though many of them have been modernized and used for diverse purposes, such as offices, commercial mixed uses, or, at least in part, tourist attractions.
The traditional comparison valuation approach could be made with similarly used properties to enable determination of an indicative rental value for some structures, but for others the task was much more difficult. For example, Somerset House on the River Thames is a purpose-built office block, but it is the world’s first purpose-built government office block, dating back to 1776, and it has been used in commercial filmmaking, and so is difficult to compare to other buildings.
Valuing unusual properties is not confined to Crown properties or those for which the rental comparison method cannot be used because there are no relevant comparisons. In such cases, the use of the Receipts and Expenditure (R&E) or income method may be a more reliable guide to assessing the market rental value of a property. This method is appropriate if the property to be valued is commercial in nature or has a degree of monopoly, and an occupier would be motivated primarily by the prospect of profit in its use of the property and, indeed, makes a profit (Bond and Brown 2006).
If neither the comparison nor R&E methods can be used, then the Contractors Basis or cost method is applied where the property is provided primarily for public purposes and is not occupied for commercial profit, or where the property concerned is commercial but it is not a profit center with its own accounts. In both cases the occupier (or owner) would be prepared to incur the cost of a replacement property to carry on the use of the property.
In addition to the problem of valuation is the UK complexity of having a separate tax on domestic property. In England, Scotland, and Wales this is the Council Tax, but in Northern Ireland the system is one of Domestic Rates. If any part of a property is used for domestic purposes, as defined in the legislation, then that use is assessed for the domestic tax. Thus, Buckingham Palace and Windsor Castle, both royal palaces, have a rating assessment on the non-domestic, commercial element and a council tax on the domestic sections of the buildings.
Palace of Westminster
The Palace of Westminster, also known as the Houses of Parliament, is a royal palace and the meeting place of the two chambers of the Parliament of the United Kingdom—the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The Palace is the center of political life, and Westminster has become a metonym for the UK Parliament and the Westminster system of government for which it is named. The Elizabeth Tower, often referred to by the name of its main bell, Big Ben, is an iconic landmark of London. The Gothic Revival architecture by Sir Charles Barry dates from only 1840, but the remarkable Westminster Hall with its hammer beam roof dates from 1097.
The Palace of Westminster has been part of a World Heritage Site since 1987. The Palace had a rateable value of £14,700,000 in the local 2010 rating list (£5,500,000 in the 2000 rating list). If the standard tax rate of 45.8 percent is applied, then the tax liability ignoring any reliefs would be around £6,730,000 per year. The assessment actually combines four buildings: the Palace, Portcullis House, 1 Derby Gate, and the Norman Shaw buildings. All parts are valued on the comparative method with respect to offices, with allowances for layout and size if appropriate. In the case of the Palace the two chambers are valued at 65 percent of the main rate per square meter. There is a further end allowance to reflect the overall amount of floor space in the property.
Buckingham Palace
Buckingham Palace is the official London residence and principal workplace of HM Queen Elizabeth II, both with respect to her position as British monarch and head of state of many countries around the world, and as head of the Commonwealth. Located in the City of Westminster, the palace is a setting for state occasions and royal hospitality. Originally known as Buckingham House, the building that forms the core of today’s palace was a large townhouse built for the Duke of Buckingham in 1705. Buckingham Palace became the official royal palace of the British monarch on the accession of Queen Victoria in 1837.
Buckingham Palace is used in part as one of the monarch’s residences but consists mainly of offices. Recently limited commercial use has been introduced, as part of the building is open to visitors. The commercial portion has a rateable value of £1,300,000 in the local 2010 rating list. It is valued using two methods. First, the R&E or income method is used to reflect the commercial component (approximately 400,000 people visited during 2011). The property is open for 63 days per year with limited opening hours, so the relevant receipts are annualized, and 5 percent is added to reflect the fact that longer opening hours would generate more ticket sales. The trading accounts as published show that the rateable value equated to 6.3 percent of Fair Maintainable Receipts. Second, the Contractors or cost method is used for the Queen’s Gallery. The residential component of the palace has 775 rooms, including 52 Royal and guest bedrooms, 188 staff bedrooms, 19 state rooms, and 78 bathrooms. In 2011–2012 it had a council tax bill of £1,369.
Tower of London
Her Majesty’s Royal Palace and Fortress, commonly known as the Tower of London, is a historic castle on the north bank of the River Thames in central London. It dates to the Norman Conquest of England in 1066, and the White Tower, which gives the entire castle its name, was built by William the Conqueror in 1078. The Tower has served variously as an armory, a treasury, a prison, a menagerie, the home of the Royal Mint, and a public records office. Now it is home to the Crown Jewels and is one of the country’s most popular tourist attractions, having some 2.55 million visitors in 2011.
It is protected as a UNESCO World Heritage Site (and by some very high walls and elaborate alarm systems). It is valued by the R&E method, due to its particular value as a tourist attraction, and the rateable value equates to approximately 4.7 percent of fair maintainable receipts. For the local 2010 rating list the property had a rateable value of £1,790,000 (for the 2000 rating list the value was £1,180,000).
Stonehenge
Stonehenge is a prehistoric stone circle on Salisbury Plain comprising a megalithic rock monument of 150 enormous stones set in a circular pattern dating back to 3000 BC. While there are larger stone circles in the world, including one nearby at Avebury, Stonehenge is unique because the Sarsen stones are surmounted by lintels connecting to one another and once formed a complete, connected ring. Stonehenge was built over a period of 1,500 years. It is a World Heritage Site attracting some one million visitors per year. Given the commercial operation of the property, it has been valued using the R&E method at a rateable value of £700,000.
Summary
Crown-owned and occupied property is currently valued in accordance with normal valuation methods and principles. The removal of the Crown exemption has resulted in the “correct” valuation of unique and often iconic historic buildings. The valuation methods applied have to reflect the use of the buildings and, where rental evidence is limited, the cost-based approach may be required. This latter approach brings with it significant difficulties when applied to buildings that are several hundred years old. In such circumstances valuers have to be creative, artistic, and scientific in their valuations.
About the Authors
William McCluskey is a researcher in the Built Environment Research Institute, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK.
David Tretton FRICS FIRRV is a visiting professor in the School of the Built Environment, University of Ulster, Northern Ireland, UK. He was formerly Head of Profession and Director of Rating at the Valuation Office Agency, London, and is currently the technical editor of the RICS Valuation–Professional Standards (Red Book).
The authors thank Patrick Bond, BSc FRICS Dip. Rating IRRV (Hons), head of Commercial, Leisure and Civics National Specialists Unit, Valuation Office Agency, London.
References
Bird, R. M., and E. Slack. 2004. International handbook of land and property taxation. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Bond, P., and P. Brown. 2006. Rating valuation: Principles and practice. London: Estates Gazette.
Citizens Charter White Paper. 1991. Citizens Charter Open Government, Cm 2290, HMSO, London.
Youngman, J. M., and J. H. Malme. 1994. An international survey of taxes on land and buildings. Boston, MA: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers.
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The urban landscape typical of many small and medium-sized Italian cities is filled with historical richness but also with more recent incoherent and contradictory development patterns. As a result, planners are actively adopting new ideas and theories about urban planning and are studying policies and practices about open space from colleagues in other countries.
The concept of quality of life is a common theme in European planning programs seeking to improve the image and functionality of neighborhoods. This idea normally represents a complex set of values to describe socio-economic conditions, but it can also be a useful instrument to set policies, implement strategies, improve landscapes and preserve open spaces. As the quality of life in many Italian cities has improved over the past ten years, attention to the needs of urban settlements has shifted from the central historical districts to the peripheries. Smaller suburban and rural communities now are demanding better living conditions and enhanced local identity through broad-based citizen participation in urban planning and design projects.
England, France and the United States, in particular, provide inspiration to Italian planners and public officials concerned about how to better integrate urban planning and the natural landscape. The loss of what had been an important cultural tradition in Italy has resulted in a more simplified and standardized urban architectural language and a lack of consideration for open space as either a valuable natural resource or an opportunity for economic and cultural growth.
The European Union (EU) is also influencing important reforms in many aspects of governance and public administration. For example, Italy’s regions, which have long been the dominant level of local government, are managing their territories with more sophisticated planning techniques based on the principles of sustainable development. At the same time, recently passed national fiscal and land taxation reforms are helping the municipalities create new resources and policies for housing rehabilitation and for public services and infrastructure, such as schools, parks and sports facilities. For example, the Regional Government of Tuscany, through its 1995 Urban Planning and Development Act, has begun a number of institutional and administrative changes, including new planning tools and public grants that have encouraged urban regeneration projects and private-public partnerships to support their costs.
The Center for Urban Research (CRU) of the Department of Architecture at the University of Ferrara has been involved in many projects promoted by both the regional and the national governments. Most address both training programs for public officials and private professionals and initiatives to disseminate “best practices” in urban planning and land use. In the last few years, the Center has consulted with many municipalities, including Ferrara in the Emilia-Romagna region and Massa Marittima in Tuscany. While recognizing the different histories and needs of these two cities, the Center is helping their municipal authorities find new opportunities for economic and social development and for enhancing their quality of life.
Ferrara
Located between Venice and Bologna in the Po Valley close to the river delta, Ferrara currently has about 120,000 inhabitants. The city’s main development can be dated to the medieval period, but important transformations were introduced during the Renaissance by the Duke d’Este. Ferrara’s distinctive network of streets, squares, gardens and buildings owe their design to the Duke, who in 1492 implemented the so-called “Addizione Erculea,” which can be considered the first modern urban plan in Europe.
The basic traits of the urban fabric have not changed much since then. The historical center, enclosed inside a system of walls, is still well preserved, and bicycles and pedestrians still outnumber cars. During the winter the fog often softens the buildings, giving the city a magical appearance, and the pace of life slows down as in ancient times. Ferrara also has strong traditions with agriculture and water, including the Po River, the delta and lagoons along the coast, and the extensive network of drainage and irrigation canals.
The city’s beauty and sense of magic have influenced artists since the Renaissance, and Ferrara is home to one of the oldest and finest Italian universities, which is small but exerts an influential role in city life. At present, most jobs in the district are connected with government functions, education, research and design, medical services, agriculture-related industries and tourism. Ferrara’s relative isolation with respect to the Italian “grand tour” has enabled the city to develop balanced cultural tourism policies over the years.
The Barco, a public park designed for the Duke d’Este as a private hunting area, offers the city an interesting opportunity to link urban planning and open space development. This semi-rural landscape is enclosed by the town walls, the Po River and a large industrial petrol-chemical factory. Supported by a special regional grant for urban rehabilitation, CRU is beginning research and planning for this project, which will also involve private sector contributions to help realize this recreational and open space resource for the city.
Another important local government goal is to use the urban environment and surrounding landscape as elements to improve economic growth. The project involves extending the traditional idea of cultural tourism beyond the historic city to include a network of small rural communities. Visitors to Ferrara and the Po River Delta Park will thus have the opportunity to discover ancient villas, marvelous natural landscapes and archeological settlements, as well as inns, restaurants and other amenities throughout the region. At the same time, young people who do not want traditional jobs in farming and fishing will be able to find different employment opportunities and more reasons to stay in their towns. To accomplish this goal, the project is using a variety of planning strategies, including some EU measures that support economic regeneration through training courses and start-up enterprises.
Foreseeable constraints on the success of this project may come from some local residents who consider agriculture their only possible economic resource, a mentality strongly rooted in history. From the Renaissance until World War Two, people from other, poorer regions of Italy were brought to the Po valley to transform the wetlands into agricultural fields. Many of the original workers have become owners of small and mid-sized farms, and they fear the loss of their rights and traditions, even though the farm produce is of poor quality and it is very expensive to maintain flood controls over the fields. Winning the trust of both urban and rural residents is a challenge that will require collaboration to increase the quality of life of residents throughout the region.
Massa Marittima
Massa Marittima is a small city in Tuscany with a population of about 10,000, sixty percent of whom live in small outlying towns. It also is the capital of the Colline Metallifere (Metal Hills) district, where for almost four thousand years silver, copper, and iron mines have operated continuously. Mining started in the Bronze Age and continued throughout the Etruscan, Roman, and medieval eras, through the Siena domination and the Medici and Lorraine eras, until the present generation of large industrial corporations. Populonia, one of the most important Etruscan industrial centers, is twenty miles from Massa Marittima, and archeological remains are found near the steel center of Piombino.
The free commune of Massa Marittima passed the oldest known mining laws in the Western world at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The natural environment surrounding the city still bears the signs of this economic history. There are large forests, which once produced timber for the mines and fuel for the furnaces, and the countryside is only partially cultivated. A less attractive sign of this heritage are the highly polluting mine waste sites.
Massa Marittima experienced a severe economic and identity crisis when the last operating mine closed ten years ago. The local community was forced to make two major decisions. First, it had to change from being a specialized economy based on difficult but secure jobs and dependence on the mining company, along with a very protective welfare system, to becoming a diversified, dynamic and flexible economy where individual enterprise is central. Second, the residents had to accept tourism as the new main source of employment to take advantage of the most important local resources: the region’s cultural heritage and its natural environment.
As in the case of Ferrara, the relative isolation and the late emergence of a tourism-based economy helped Massa Marittima work out more balanced strategies and policies for its future. In this case the opportunity was offered by the national ministries of Heritage and Environmental Policies to develop a national park for the Colline Metallifere district. The Massa Marittima city government asked the CRU to research this program using national and EU plans and grants. The core concept is an open-air museum of local history, which could help preserve the natural environment and also create new jobs for the young people, who have few employment alternatives.
One of the most important tasks in managing the new national park is to create a regional network of economic activities, facilities and public services related to both cultural tourism and the concept of environmentally sustainable development, based on EU economic measures. By sharing these resources, the towns can reduce local competition and maximize the benefits to all residents. The core of the CRU’s proposal is to create new opportunities for cooperation among different levels of public administration and public-private partnerships to promote and finance projects of public interest, such as infrastructure, sports facilities, urban and rural parks, and other resources. A final decision on a national grant to fund the Massa Marittima project is expected in March from the Ministry of Public Works.
These two case studies represent the kinds of complex planning problems that are on the agendas of many local governments throughout Italy. Learning from the best practices and examples of other countries is one of the methods that Italian planners and researchers are using to implement innovative approaches to planning the future of Italy’s historic landscape.
____________ Francesca Leder is professor of urban theories in the Department of Architecture at the University of Ferrara. She was a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute during the fall of 1999 to study American planning practices regarding urban parks and open space.
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Property taxes based on market value have many features that recommend them as a source of local government revenue. They promote visibility and accountability in public spending by providing property owners with a means of evaluating the costs and benefits of local government services. They can provide stable, independent local revenue that is not at the mercy of state budget surpluses or deficits. They are now considered to be proportional or even mildly progressive, in contrast to earlier economic views that presumed the tax to be regressive.
Against these strengths, the greatest challenge to a value-based property tax is political: taxpayers’ strong and completely understandable resistance to sharp increases in tax payments that reflect rising markets but not necessarily rising incomes with which to pay the tax increases. The best known and most dramatic response to this situation was rejection of the value-based tax system in California in 1978. When voters approved Proposition 13, they changed the tax base to the value of the property at the time of purchase or construction, with a maximum 2 percent annual inflation adjustment. For property held by the same owner since 1978, the inflation adjustment is applied to its value on the 1975–1976 tax roll.
This change has greatly altered California’s fiscal landscape. It has restricted the role of local governments, centralized service provision and decision making, and redistributed the tax burden from long-time residents to new property owners. Local governments now have an incentive to seek sales tax revenue by encouraging large retail establishments, such as auto malls, in what has been termed the “fiscalization of land use.” Can the property tax achieve greater stability and predictability without such drastic social and governmental costs? Table 1 illustrates the wide range of residential property tax levies in large metropolitan areas, a factor that presents additional challenges to formulating uniform policies or practical recommendations.
A Lincoln Institute seminar in April 2005 brought together public finance and assessment officials, policy analysts and scholars to consider alternate approaches to the recurrent problems that volatile real estate markets pose for value-based property taxes.
Problems Related to Market-Value Assessment
Discussion began with the incontrovertible observation, “Taxpayers do not like unpredictability.” In theory, reductions in tax rates could balance increases in property prices to maintain stability in actual tax payments under market-value assessments. This approach faces two obstacles. The first and most straightforward is governmental reluctance to reduce tax rates and forego increased revenues when rising values provide a cover for greater tax collection. The second is nonuniform price appreciation in different locations and for different types of property. When one segment of the tax base experiences a disproportionate value change, a corresponding change in the tax rate applied to the entire property class will not maintain level tax collections. California faced both difficulties in the years preceding adoption of Proposition 13. There, rapid residential appreciation was not matched by the lagging commercial sector, and a $7.1 billion state surplus fueled taxpayer cynicism as to the actual need for increased government revenues.
While rapid market shifts are the most challenging source of unpredictable tax changes, taxpayer “shocks” can also be caused simply by long delays in reassessment. Maintaining outdated values on the tax rolls achieves short-term predictability in tax bills, but at the expense of uniformity, accuracy and even legality. Long-postponed reassessments have been followed by tax revolts in many jurisdictions, both in this country and overseas.
Options for Addressing Value Shifts
Seminar participants reviewed the benefits and drawbacks of various measures to address these problems.
Circuit breakers, as their name implies, attempt to reduce a property tax “overload” by providing a refund or credit for taxes that exceed a set percentage of the property owner’s income. When funded by the state and administered as part of the state tax system, they have the dual benefit of protecting local revenue and targeting aid to the most needy taxpayers. At the same time, they require state funding and administration, and taxpayers must file tax returns to order to obtain these benefits. Like all programs that require income information, they sometimes encounter taxpayer resistance and consequent underutilization.
Homestead exemptions, available in most states, reduce assessments on the taxpayer’s primary residence. These exemptions are often granted without regard to taxpayer income, and so are not targeted to the most needy. In predominantly residential communities, this results in a significant loss of municipal revenues unless the tax rate is increased or the tax burden is shifted to other taxpayers. Like all preferential programs for homeowners, these exemptions fail to benefit renters, who bear a portion of the property tax burden and generally are less affluent than homeowners.
Tax deferral measures, often available to low-income elderly homeowners, permit unpaid taxes to accumulate as a lien against the property, to be paid after the residence changes hands. However, the desire to retain property clear of encumbrances has traditionally led homeowners to avoid making use of this option.
“Truth in taxation” legislation requires local governments to take various measures, such as publishing voter information and requesting ballot approval, to treat increases in tax collections in the same manner whether they are the result of growth in the tax base or increases in the tax rate. These enactments seek to counter the temptation to allow rates to remain constant while market values rise, thus increasing taxes and spending without budgetary accountability.
Limitations on annual total property tax collection increases, such as Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts, restrict overall levy growth but do not address unpredictable tax bill changes for specific taxpayers. For example, after several decades of tax stability, Boston taxpayers are now facing assessment shifts that reflect a downturn in the commercial property market with simultaneous explosive growth in certain residential values.
Limitations on annual tax increases for individual properties have enormous political appeal, but face three hazards. First, there is often pressure to make the phase-in period as long as possible, or even longer than possible. Montana provided for an extended 50-year phase-in of new assessments. Second, initial success at limiting increases to a certain percentage may lead to efforts to reduce that limit again. Oklahoma instituted a 5 percent limit and now faces pressure to reduce it to 3 percent. Finally, the “catch-up” of tax assessments when values stabilize or even drop elicits opposition of its own as taxpayers face increasing assessments while property values are flat or falling.
Assessment “freezes” take limitations on increases to their ultimate conclusion, prohibiting any increases despite changes in market values. They often are restricted to specific groups of taxpayers, such as elderly homeowners. Proposition 13 is a type of assessment freeze for all property, with only a 2 percent annual inflation adjustment in the tax base. These measures are in many respects equivalent to the long delays in reassessments that lead to nonuniformity and resistance to new valuations. After values are frozen taxpayers may seek to transfer that value to other family members, as they do in California, or to new residences, as in Texas.
Possible New Approaches
Seminar participants discussed methods for utilizing these and other measures to address the problems of unpredictability while minimizing the problems of inequitable distribution of the tax burden and maintenance of collections. A major distinction was drawn between approaches that moderate tax bill shifts but maintain a market-value base and those that alter assessments themselves. Altering assessments by limiting increases in value can result in situations where owners of similar properties pay very different tax bills. Furthermore, over time properties with average or lesser value appreciation can experience an increasingly greater share of taxes compared with properties that have had larger market increases. As a result wealthier taxpayers are more likely than those of moderate or low incomes to benefit from assessment limits.
To maintain a market-value tax base, with its benefits of uniformity, understandability and administrative efficiency, participants offered suggestions to stabilize rapid increases in tax payments due to significant shifts in the assessment base.
Even significant increases in assessed value, if relatively uniform across the jurisdiction, do not result in increased taxes for most property owners if the municipal budget requires no additional property tax revenues and the tax rate is reduced proportionately. Better information about the relationship between assessed value and the tax rate will make it less likely that taxpayers will place the blame for their higher taxes on the assessors and their assessments. They may consider instead the adequacy of funding sources available to local governments, the effect of exemptions that reduce the property tax base, and unfunded mandates that require additional local expenditures.
The property tax, as the most important source of autonomous local revenue, often bears the brunt of criticism for the social, economic and fiscal pressures on local communities. Among these pressures are increased costs of new educational, environmental and security requirements, reductions in state and federal assistance, changing demographics and economic conditions, and increasing numbers of exemptions. Attention to these issues can clarify the debate over the role and burden of property taxes and the effectiveness of various tax relief measures.
Improving Educational Resources
There is an urgent need to provide government officials, lawmakers and the public with better information on property tax policy choices. Tax revolts and anti-tax initiatives make compelling news stories, but they should be balanced by concise and accessible information that sheds light on the problem and its solution. There is also a need for periodic research on such topics as:
The Institute will be collaborating with the seminar participants and others in continuing these discussions and will undertake further research and the preparation of publications on these property tax issues in the coming year.
Joan Youngman is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, where she chairs the Department of Valuation and Taxation. Her writings include Legal Issues in Property Valuation and Taxation (1994), and two books co-edited with Jane Malme, An International Survey of Taxes on Land and Buildings (1994) and The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition (2001). She is a contributing author on the property taxation chapter of Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein’s State and Local Taxation (7th ed. 2001), and writes on property taxation for State Tax Notes.
Jane Malme, fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is an attorney, author and consultant on property tax policy, law and administration in the U.S. and internationally. She directed the Massachusetts Department of Revenue’s Bureau of Local Assessment as it implemented major property tax reforms from 1978 to 1990.
The Lincoln Institute seminar on Property Taxes and Market Values—Responding to Post-Proposition 13 Challenges in April 2005 included participants from many states, including California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York and Oklahoma. The discussion leader was Alan Dornfest, property tax policy supervisor in the Idaho State Tax Commission.
The Institute will continue this discussion at the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) Annual Conference in Anchorage, Alaska, in September. Jane Malme will moderate a policy seminar on Property Tax Viability in Volatile Markets with speakers Alan Dornfest; Mark Haveman, director of development for the Minnesota Taxpayers Association and project director for its Center for Public Finance Research; and Andrew Reschovsky, professor of public affairs at the University of Wisconsin’s LaFollette School of Public Affairs.
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We suggest that a better approach is to link IH to the ongoing process of rezoning—either by the developer or by local government initiative—thus treating it explicitly as a vehicle for recapturing for public benefit some part of the gain in land value resulting from public action.
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Para que los procesos de planificación puedan resolver los temas candentes de la actualidad, tales como el cambio climático, la congestión de tráfico y la justicia social, los planes tienen que realizarse a la escala apropiada, tienen que promulgar herramientas de implementación apropiadas y tienen que hacerse cumplir por medio de una autoridad legítima. En otras palabras, nuestra capacidad para resolver los desafíos críticos depende de las bases legales e institucionales de la planificación.
En los Estados Unidos, la responsabilidad de sentar estas bases de planificación recae en los estados, los cuales a su vez han delegado la mayor parte de la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo en los gobiernos locales. En Europa, las bases de planificación se establecen en cada país, cuyos sistemas de planificación frecuentemente cuentan con planes nacionales y regionales, como también un mosaico de planes locales. Para mejor o peor, estas bases institucionales han enmarcado el proceso de planificación a ambos lados del océano Atlántico en la mayor parte del período de posguerra. Pero a medida que el tamaño de los desafíos de planificación sigue en aumento, y el descontento con el status quo sigue creciendo, varios estados y naciones europeas han comenzado a experimentar con metodologías de planificación nuevas e innovadoras.
La oportunidad para explorar y debatir estos temas congregó a académicos, profesionales, estudiantes y otros en Dublín, Irlanda, en octubre de 2012, en un seminario de dos días de duración patrocinado por el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy y organizado por la Escuela de Geografía, Planificación y Política Medioambiental de University College, Dublín y el Centro Nacional para el Crecimiento Inteligente de la Universidad de Maryland. Llevado a cabo en la histórica Newman House ubicada en St. Stephen’s Green, se presentaron ponencias sobre planificación en los Estados Unidos y Europa, y casos de estudio de cinco estados de los EE. UU. y cinco naciones europeas. Cada presentación fue seguida de un comentario por parte de un funcionario de alto nivel del estado o nación correspondiente (ver el recuadro 1).
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Recuadro 1: Presentaciones efectuadas en el Seminario sobre planificación por parte de estados y naciones/estados realizado en Dublín en octubre de 2012
Bierbaum, Marty
Plan de desarrollo del estado de Nueva Jersey
Faludi, Andreas
La europeización de la planificación y el papel de PEOT
Fulton, Bill
Planificación para el cambio climático en California
Galland, Daniel
El marco nacional de planificación espacial de Dinamarca
Geppert, Anna
Planificación espacial en Francia
Grist, Berna
La estrategia nacional espacial de Irlanda
Knaap, Gerrit
PlanMaryland: Un trabajo que está en vías de realizarse
Lewis, Rebecca
Plan de desarrollo del estado de Delaware
Needham, Barrie
La estrategia espacial nacional de los Países Bajos
Salkin, Patricia
Marcos de planificación en los Estados Unidos y el papel del gobierno federal
Seltzer, Ethan
Planificación del uso del suelo en Oregón: El mosaico institucional y la lucha por llegar a escala
Tewdwer-Jones, Mark
Planificación nacional en el Reino Unido
Para obtener más información sobre el seminario, visite el sitio web del programa: http://www.ucd.ie/gpep/events/seminarsworkshopsconferences/natplansymp2012
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Un marco de planificación espacial en Europa
En Europa, la planificación está regida por una serie de tradiciones y estructuras de gobierno (Faludi 2012). Algunas naciones europeas tienen estructuras de gobierno «unitarias», en las que la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo recae en última instancia en el gobierno nacional. Italia y España tienen estructuras «regionales» de gobierno, en las que la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo es compartida constitucionalmente entre el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales. Austria, Bélgica y Alemania tienen estructuras de gobierno «federalistas», en las que las funciones particulares sobre el uso del suelo se distribuyen entre el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales y locales. Dentro de estos marcos operativos ha surgido una variedad de culturas y tradiciones de planificación: “amenagement du territoire” en Francia; “town and country planning” en el Reino Unido; “Raumordnung” en Alemania; y “ruimtelijke ordening” en los Países Bajos. Si bien estos términos generalmente tienen la misma connotación que la «planificación urbana» en los Estados Unidos, existen diferencias importantes, sutiles y defendidas con vehemencia.
La expresión utilizada para la planificación urbana en la Unión Europea es «planificación espacial» (Comisión Europea 1997, 24).
“La planificación espacial se refiere a los métodos utilizados en general por el sector público para influir sobre la distribución futura de actividades en el espacio. Se adopta con el fin de crear una organización territorial más racional de los usos del suelo y vincularlos para equilibrar las demandas de desarrollo inmobiliario con la necesidad de proteger el medio ambiente y alcanzar objetivos sociales y económicos.
“La planificación espacial adopta medidas para coordinar el impacto espacial de otras políticas sectoriales, alcanzar una distribución más pareja de desarrollo económico entre regiones que lo que crearían de otra manera las fuerzas del mercado, y regular la conversión de suelos y el uso de las propiedades.”
La Unión Europea no tiene autoridad para elaborar planes espaciales, pero influye de manera directa en sus resultados por medio de iniciativas de desarrollo regional, directivas medioambientales y financiamiento estructural y de cohesión. Este objetivo está articulado en la Perspectiva Europea de Ordenación Territorial (PEOT) firmada en 1988 por los ministros responsables de la planificación espacial en los estados miembros, y por los miembros de la Comisión Europea responsables de las políticas regionales (Faludi 2002).
En general se acepta que la planificación espacial moderna en el contexto europeo incluye la planificación nacional, regional y local, donde los planes nacionales proporcionan estrategias amplias de desarrollo y pautas para los planes realizados en los niveles de gobierno menores; los planes regionales integran el desarrollo físico con las políticas sociales, económicas y medioambientales, pero sin especificar sitios individuales; los planes locales son específicos para ciertos lugares y definen los elementos físicos y de diseño urbano de la construcción. Aunque ninguno de los marcos de planificación de las naciones miembros se ajusta perfectamente a este ideal jerárquico, la PEOT ha influido en la actividad de planificación de cada una de las naciones.
La PEOT se basa a su vez en tradiciones europeas de planificación muy arraigadas que se remontan a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, cuando el desarrollo nacional o los planes de reconstrucción sin duda fueron necesarios para llevar a cabo las restauraciones de posguerra. Muchas naciones europeas siguen teniendo planes nacionales de desarrollo y estrategias nacionales espaciales complementarias. Pero la influencia e importancia de estos planes ha disminuido paulatinamente desde la reconstrucción. En la última década en particular, las naciones que antes se caracterizaban por un compromiso ambicioso y amplio con la planificación, como Francia, Dinamarca y el Reino Unido, no han adoptado planes nacionales nuevos y han puesto mayor énfasis en planes regionales y locales.
Estrategias y marcos espaciales nacionales europeos
Francia
Si bien Francia es una nación-estado unitaria y centralizada, el gobierno nacional nunca ha desempeñado un papel de liderazgo en la planificación estatal. Por el contrario, la responsabilidad de la planificación espacial se transfirió oficialmente a los gobiernos regionales y locales por medio de reformas descentralizadoras adoptadas en 1982 y 2003 (Geppert 2012). Aun cuando sigue habiendo coordinación entre los gobiernos de distintos niveles, este proceso genera con mayor frecuencia estrategias de inversión conjunta más que visiones espaciales compartidas u objetivos comunes. Antes que la mayoría de las naciones restantes, el gobierno nacional francés comenzó a centrarse menos en la planificación espacial y más en políticas sectoriales, dejando los temas espaciales para los niveles más bajos de gobierno.
Dinamarca
La planificación en Dinamarca comenzó históricamente con un marco de planificación nacional integral (Galland 2012). En las últimas dos décadas, sin embargo, como consecuencia de factores políticos y económicos interrelacionados, el papel del gobierno nacional y de los gobiernos locales y regionales con respecto al uso del suelo en el territorio nacional ha transformado significativamente el alcance, estructura y comprensión de la planificación espacial danesa (figura 1).
Como consecuencia de esta reforma, varias responsabilidades de planificación espacial han sido descentralizadas al nivel local, mientras que la planificación regional para el Gran Copenhague y otras funciones sectoriales han sido transferidas al nivel nacional. Además, la reciente abolición de los gobiernos de condado ha aumentado el riesgo de una planificación espacial descoordinada y ha disminuido coherencia entre las diversas instituciones e instrumentos de la política de suelo.
Países Bajos
Los Países Bajos tienen quizás la tradición más larga y conocida de planificación espacial nacional, y sus planes incluyen tanto políticas industriales como políticas espaciales detalladas (Needham 2012). Por varias décadas, los planes nacionales holandeses influyeron sobre la distribución de la población y las actividades del país. En las primeras décadas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, todos los niveles de gobierno —tanto nacional como provincial y municipal— tendieron a trabajar conjuntamente en la planificación espacial. En la década de 1990, sin embargo, comenzaron a distanciarse. En respuesta, el gobierno nacional aumentó su poder sobre los gobiernos locales (una forma de centralización) y al mismo tiempo redujo sus propias ambiciones de formular una estrategia espacial nacional (una forma de descentralización). La estrategia espacial nacional más reciente deja de lado expresamente algunas tareas de planificación llevadas a cabo anteriormente por el gobierno nacional.
Reino Unido
A comienzos del siglo XX, el Parlamento del Reino Unido renunció a su autoridad de planificación; en su lugar, los poderes de intervención, el desarrollo de nuevas viviendas estatales y la regulación del desarrollo de viviendas privadas se transfirieron a los gobiernos locales (Tewdwr-Jones 2012). En las décadas siguientes, el gobierno central volvió a adquirir nuevos poderes de planificación como consecuencia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el interés nacional por reconstruir las ciudades, la infraestructura y la economía. Desde 1945, el gobierno central ha retenido estos poderes, pero a su vez ha permitido que las autoridades locales vigilen la implementación del sistema de planificación.
Estos poderes han cambiado en forma drástica en los últimos 70 años. Después de 1999, la autonomía de Gales, Escocia e Irlanda del Norte fragmentó aún más el significado del término «nacional» en términos políticos y de planificación. En la década del 2000, el impulso hacia la planificación espacial regional en Inglaterra también volvió a equilibrar los temas de planificación nacionales hacia los intereses subnacionales. Como resultado de esta tendencia a la transferencia de poderes, descentralizadora, regionalista y localista de los últimos 20 años, es cada vez más cuestionable que el Reino Unido posea algo que se parezca a un sistema nacional de planificación, puesto que tanto ha cambiado espacialmente y en el ámbito de las instituciones y procesos políticos en distintas partes del país.
Irlanda
Irlanda es una de las pocas naciones europeas que no sigue la tendencia hacia la descentralización de la autoridad de planificación, en parte debido a que su sistema de planificación se ha descentralizado completamente (Grist 2012). Siguiendo en gran medida las pautas de la Unión Europea, Irlanda ha adoptado una serie de planes de desarrollo nacionales, de los cuales el más reciente es el Plan de Desarrollo Nacional 2007-2013. Basándose en las recomendaciones del plan nacional anterior, el Departamento de Medio Ambiente, Comunidad y Gobierno Local desarrolló en 2002 la Estrategia Espacial Nacional de Irlanda. Esta estrategia identificó cruces y centros geográficos críticos, y articuló planes para descentralizar la actividad económica desde Dublín al resto de la isla.
Luego de un período turbulento que vio el surgimiento y caída del Tigre Celta, al que se culpó en parte de las políticas laxas de planificación local relacionadas con un incentivo excesivo del desarrollo inmobiliario junto con corrupción política, el país está reconsiderando ahora dicha estrategia, fortaleciendo las pautas de desarrollo regional e imponiendo nuevos requisitos de coherencia sobre los gobiernos locales.
Bajo el nuevo régimen de planificación basado en la evidencia, los planes locales tienen que ajustarse mucho más a las pautas de planificación regional, y los planes locales tendrán límites en cuanto a la cantidad de desarrollo inmobiliario que puedan permitir. En la actualidad se está revisando el papel futuro de la Estrategia Espacial Nacional, mientras que el nuevo gobierno electo después del crash inmobiliario en Irlanda examina las políticas de planificación y desarrollo que predominaron durante la reciente burbuja inmobiliaria.
El gobierno federal y el uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos
El gobierno federal de los Estados Unidos, como la Unión Europea, no tiene la autoridad para planificar y administrar el uso del suelo, pero tiene una gran influencia sobre la ubicación y naturaleza de los patrones de desarrollo (Salkin 2012). Además de los miles de millones de dólares que asigna para infraestructura de transporte, servicios sociales, desarrollo y revitalización, el gobierno federal es dueño de más de 275 millones de hectáreas en todo el país. Las regulaciones federales también tienen una gran influencia. Las leyes de aire limpio y agua limpia, por ejemplo, no imponen por sí mismas restricciones al uso del suelo, pero al establecer metas para la calidad del aire ambiente y la carga de nutrientes en ríos, lagos y arroyos, influyen profundamente en los planes y regulaciones del uso del suelo y en los patrones de desarrollo inmobiliario de los gobiernos locales.
Más recientemente, la administración del presidente Barack Obama ha establecido un nuevo canal de influencia federal sobre la planificación y regulación del uso del suelo. Si bien el gobierno federal continúa absteniéndose de intervenir en forma directa en el uso del suelo local, el Secretario de Transporte, el Secretario de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano y la Agencia de Protección Ambiental han firmado un memorando de entendimiento que estableció la Sociedad de Comunidades Sostenibles. Para promover seis principios de las comunidades sostenibles, estas secretarías y agencias han lanzado una serie de programas nuevos de subvenciones, como las Subvenciones para la Planificación de Comunidades Sostenibles Regionales. Para poder acceder a esta subvención, los gobiernos locales tienen que formar consorcios interorganizacionales que incluyan a la Organización de Planificación Metropolitana (MPO por su siglas en inglés), la ciudad central, la mayoría de los gobiernos locales y representación de grupos cívicos y de defensa de los intereses medioambientales.
Si bien los propósitos explícitos de estas subvenciones novedosas incluyen la revitalización urbana, la protección ambiental, la justicia social y el desarrollo sostenible, un propósito igualmente importante es establecer nuevas relaciones interinstitucionales al promover una mayor inclusión y participación. La Planificación de Comunidades Sostenibles Regionales ha avanzado ahora en 74 áreas metropolitanas del país. Queda por ver, sin embargo, si los incentivos ofrecidos a los gobiernos locales para que se involucren en la planificación regional son suficientes para que participen en la implementación de planes regionales sin intervención adicional a nivel estatal.
Planes estatales y marcos de planificación estatal
Todos los estados habían establecido un marco para la planificación y regulación local en la década de 1920 y 1930, basándose en las leyes de planificación normalizada y zonificación preparadas por el Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos. A pesar de las expectativas de un amplio cambio institucional, caracterizado por la «Revolución silenciosa» de hace más de 40 años, la mayoría de los estados se limitan a autorizar a los gobiernos locales a que planifiquen (Salkin 2012).
Otros, como Oregón, ordenan, revisan y aprueban planes locales (Seltzer 2012). Si los gobiernos locales no presentan planes que cumplen con las metas y pautas de uso del suelo del estado, el estado puede retener fondos de financiamiento o negar autorización para emitir permisos de edificación. Varias instituciones especializadas en el uso del suelo respaldan el sistema de planificación de Oregón, como son una comisión de planificación estatal, una corte de apelaciones de uso del suelo y un gobierno regional electo en forma directa. Aunque su estructura es simple, y es cuestionado frecuentemente en los tribunales y en las urnas, el sistema de Oregón tiene la reputación de ser uno de los más efectivos, si no el más efectivo sistema de uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos (Ingram et al. 2009).
California es uno de los estados que ha delegado una cantidad importante de autoridad para regular el uso del suelo a los gobiernos locales. Aun cuando los proyectos de desarrollo inmobiliario importantes tienen que pasar por un proceso complejo de mini Ley Nacional de Política Ambiental, y la Comisión Costera de California fuera una institución estatal innovadora en su época, la planificación local sigue siendo predominante. Pero en 2008 el estado adoptó una nueva y ambiciosa iniciativa para enfrentar el cambio climático: el proyecto de ley 375 del Senado, que exige a las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas que desarrollen planes de transporte y de uso del suelo que cumplan con metas de emisión de gases de invernadero. La dificultad estriba en que son los gobiernos locales, no las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas, los que tienen la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo en California. Las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas y los gobiernos estatales están brindando incentivos a los gobiernos locales para adoptar planes compatibles con los planes metropolitanos, pero no está claro si la combinación de incentivos financieros y de otro tipo es suficiente para animar a los gobiernos locales a que sigan los planes de las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas (Fulton 2012).
En el otro extremo, no son comunes en los Estados Unidos los planes que abarcan todo el estado. En respuesta a los requisitos federales, la mayoría de los estados tienen planes de transporte, y algunos tienen planes de desarrollo económico, planes para desarrollar la fuerza laboral o planes de acción climática, pero sólo cinco estados tienen planes estatales de desarrollo inmobiliario: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Nueva Jersey y Rhode Island.
Nueva Jersey y Delaware tienen quizá los planes estatales más y menos conocidos, respectivamente. Nueva Jersey adoptó su Ley de Planificación Estatal en 1985, que exige que la comisión de planificación estatal desarrolle, adopte e implemente el Plan de Desarrollo y Revitalización del Estado de Nueva Jersey (Bierbaum 2012). El proceso de planificación incluyó un complejo procedimiento de aceptación conjunta para identificar y resolver las diferencias entre el gobierno estatal y los gobiernos locales. Desde su adopción, la influencia y atención recibida por el plan ha tenido altibajos a lo largo de las sucesivas administraciones estatales. Recientemente, la administración del Gobernador Chris Christie ha elaborado un plan estatal completamente nuevo, enfocado principalmente al desarrollo económico, pero sin el proceso de aceptación conjunta. La comisión de planificación estatal, sin embargo, no ha adoptado todavía dicho plan.
El plan de Delaware es mucho menos conocido y mucho menos controvertido que el plan de Nueva Jersey, y tanto el contenido como el proceso son menos complejos (Lewis 2012). El plan de Delaware comprende cinco designaciones de suelo generales (figura 2). El incentivo de cumplimiento por parte de los gobiernos locales recae en la coordinación estatal-local y se apoya en la amenaza de retener el financiamiento de infraestructura (sobre el cual el estado tiene una participación significativa). Como el estado no comenzó a recabar datos de seguimiento sobre los patrones del desarrollo inmobiliario hasta 2008, y no mantiene datos espaciales sobre los gastos estatales, es difícil discernir el impacto de esta estrategia sobre el desarrollo y la coherencia entre los gastos estatales y el mapa estatal de planificación.
Maryland es el único estado que está a la altura de California y Oregón en su adopción de estrategias nuevas y ambiciosas de planificación, que se asientan en su larga tradición de liderazgo en el uso del suelo y políticas medioambientales (Knaap 2012). Maryland estableció su primera comisión de planificación estatal en 1933 y apareció en la escena nacional en 1997, cuando adoptó su revolucionaria Ley de Crecimiento Inteligente y Conservación de Barrios. Desde 1997, el factor más importante de la estrategia de Maryland ha sido el uso de inversiones estatales para brindar incentivos al crecimiento inteligente. Mucho antes de que alguien pronunciara las palabras «crecimiento inteligente» en Maryland, sin embargo, el estado ya había adoptado en 1959 legislación que requería al Departamento de Planificación de Maryland que elaborara y adoptara un plan de desarrollo estatal. Más de 50 años después, la administración del Gobernador Martin O’Malley cumplió finalmente con dicho requisito.
El 19 de diciembre de 2011, el Gobernador O’Malley firmó el PlanMaryland, el primer plan de desarrollo estatal nuevo en muchos años en los Estados Unidos (figura 3). Pero a diferencia de los planes estatales de Nueva Jersey o Delaware, el plan de Maryland es más procedimental que sustantivo. Específicamente, establece seis categorías de designación de planes y, siguiendo una larga tradición en Maryland, permite a los gobiernos locales asignar suelo para cualquiera de estos usos designados. Las agencias estatales destinarían entonces fondos del programa para cada una de estas áreas. Desde que el plan fue firmado, las agencias estatales han estado desarrollando y perfeccionando los planes de implementación, y los gobiernos locales han comenzado sólo recientemente a presentar planes para su certificación estatal.
Conclusión
Los marcos de uso del suelo y planificación espacial varían mucho a lo largo de Europa y los Estados Unidos. A ambos lados del Atlántico, los gobiernos locales cargan con la mayor parte de las responsabilidades, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la comunidad, los barrios y los detalles específicos de cada sitio. Pero el papel de las regiones, los estados y las naciones sigue siendo importante.
En contraposición con su reputación en los Estados Unidos, la planificación en muchas naciones europeas se ha descentralizado en gran medida. Pocas naciones europeas cuentan con planes nacionales integrales que guían las inversiones nacionales y las regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo. De hecho, la planificación en Europa, si bien mucho más integradora de detalles sectoriales que en los Estados Unidos, comparte muchas características en su política con su contraparte en los Estados Unidos. Una excepción interesante es Irlanda, que continúa expandiendo el papel del gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales, parcialmente como respuesta al período reciente de extrema descentralización de planificación que no tuvo en cuenta ni implementó la estrategia nacional. Irlanda es también uno de los pocos países que se adhiere a los principios amplios de planificación espacial formalmente adoptados por la Unión Europea.
En los Estados Unidos, ni la planificación estatal del desarrollo inmobiliario ni la aprobación estatal de planes locales son prácticas que estén creciendo con rapidez. En efecto, a pesar del éxito demostrado por el programa de Oregón y del creciente reconocimiento de la necesidad de integración horizontal y vertical de políticas, la planificación del uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos sigue siendo un asunto marcadamente local. Si bien tanto el estado de California como el gobierno federal están proporcionando incentivos financieros para la coordinación intergubernamental y la planificación a escala metropolitana, no está nada claro si únicamente con incentivos se podrán lograr los cambios necesarios en los planes y regulaciones locales para generar ajustes significativos en el consumo de suelo, el comportamiento del tráfico y el acceso a oportunidades.
Hacen falta nuevos enfoques para que las ciudades y áreas metropolitanas sean más productivas, equitativas y ecológicamente sostenibles a la luz de los desafíos que se nos presentan en el futuro. Si estos problemas no se pueden resolver adecuadamente, es posible que otros tipos de experimentos de reforma de planificación institucional se hagan más comunes en muchos países.
Sobre los autores
Gerrit Knaap es profesor de Estudios urbanos y planificación, director del Centro Nacional de Crecimiento Inteligente y vicedecano de la Escuela de Arquitectura, Planificación y Preservación de la Universidad de Maryland.
Zorica Nedovic-Budic es profesora de Planificación espacial y sistemas de información geográfica (SIG) en la Escuela de Geografía, Planificación y Política Medioambiental de University College, Dublín.
Referencias
Ministerio del Medio Ambiente de Dinamarca. 2006. The 2006 national planning report–In brief. Copenhagen. http://www.sns.dk/udgivelser/2006/87-7279-728-2/html/default_eng.htm
Comisión Europea. 1997. The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Luxemburgo: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Faludi, Andreas. 2002. European spatial planning. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ingram, Gregory K., Armando Carbonell, Yu-Hung Hong y Anthony Flint. 2009. Smart growth policies: An evaluation of programs and outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
