Many scholars and analysts have suggested that public leasehold systems could allow governments to benefit from a share of future increased land value. Some have even argued that other policy objectives, including stabilizing land prices, controlling land uses and facilitating land redevelopment, could also be achieved through public land leasing. Although these proposals are persuasive at the theoretical level, there is only limited evidence to prove that governments could achieve these policy goals in practice. My research on Canberra and Hong Kong, which have two of the world’s most well developed leasehold systems, examines some of the benefits and problems of public land leasing.

Land Value Capture

Legal scholars have treated property in land as a bundle of rights. According to this perspective, the government can retain the right to own land and assign to a private party the right to use, develop, transfer, inherit and benefit from land. The private party can enjoy the land rights only for a specified time and as stipulated in the land contract. Theoretically, because the government is the landowner, it could retain a portion of the land value increments by asking a lessee to pay:

• a lump sum of money-called an initial land premium-at the beginning of the lease,
• an annual land rent,
• a premium when the lessee modifies lease conditions to acquire additional rights for land redevelopment, and
• a premium for renewing the land rights when the lease expires.

The Hong Kong leasehold system seems capable of helping the government recoup a large portion of development windfalls from landholders. For the period 1970-1991, I found that the government recaptured, on average, 39 percent of the increased land value from selected land sites through land leasing. This captured value financed an average of 55 percent of the annual infrastructure investment during the same period. (1)

More important, the money collected from leasing is not a substitute for property taxes in Hong Kong. Owners of residential properties must pay annual rates to the government that are 5 percent of the estimated rental value of their flats. Owners of commercial real estate pay a 15 percent property tax on income earned from their rental premises. Combining all land-related revenues, the Hong Kong government could recover, on average, 79 percent of the annual costs of public infrastructure investment.

In Canberra, by contrast, the percentage of infrastructure investment funded by lease revenues was only 5 percent. (See Figure 1.) There are at least two reasons for the difference: the abolition of land rent for residential leases and competition from other cities that weakens government’s ability to collect higher rents on public land.

In the first instance, then-Prime Minister John Gorton abolished all land rent for residential leases in 1970, an action that his opponents charged was designed to rally public support for his reelection. It was estimated that the government transferred 100 million Australian dollars in equity to lessees at that time, resulting in the loss of an important source of revenue. This incident raised the broader issue of politics in public land management, although leasehold systems do not necessarily induce “rent-seeking” behaviors for private or political gain.

Hong Kong’s government seems able to minimize this problem by establishing a tight internal control over the operations of leasing land. It also provides public officials with generous remuneration and fringe benefits to reduce the temptation of corruption. This demonstrates that, in designing a public leasehold system, a government must consider the need for a system of checks and balances to prevent opportunism or political maneuvering. No single person or department within a government should have the unchecked power to decide on the method and timing of allocating land resources.

The second reason for Canberra’s low lease revenues is its keen competition from other Australian cities in attracting capital. If the city government charged high land premiums and rents, businesses and industry would go to other cities. Thus, competition weakens the government’s bargaining position in negotiating with developers on the amount of land premiums or rent for leasing public land. Although Hong Kong also faces competition from other Asian cities, such as Shanghai, Singapore and Taipei, differences in taxation, government structure, business ethics and culture make capital flight less likely in Hong Kong.

This issue of competition is particularly important for developing economies where local governments are eager to attract investment. They may be willing to compromise by collecting a smaller amount of land premiums and rent from both domestic and foreign land investors. The use of land as a source of public funds may require some level of inter- or intra-regional cooperation to prevent developers from playing one government against another.

Land Speculation

In Hong Kong the government’s reliance on land revenues as a source of public funds presents another problem: its financial interest in land conflicts with its public role in stabilizing land prices. The government has relied heavily on initial land premiums because demanding premiums from lessees during lease renewals has proven to be politically difficult. In addition, the assembly of land rights for land redevelopment involves high negotiation costs because most land leases in Hong Kong have multiple leaseholders. These high costs deter private developers from undertaking land redevelopment by acquiring lease rights and modifying contract conditions. As a result, the government is unable to utilize this method fully to recoup land value. As for the land rent, before 1997 the amount of annual rent paid by lessees was fixed and bore no relationship with increases in land value. Hence, the amount of land rent collected has been minimal. (2) (See Figure 2.)

These difficulties have encouraged the government to retain land value at the beginning of the lease. Yet, this method can work only if officials lease land slowly to private developers. A rapid disposition of land when its value is low would impede the government’s ability to recoup land value in the future. Restrictions on land supply, however, have encouraged private land banking and property speculation, leading to high land and property prices and making Hong Kong one of the world’s most expensive cities. (3)

Officials of other countries could avoid this problem by relying more on lease renewals, contract modifications and the annual land rent than on the initial assignment of leases to capture land value. The plausibility of doing so, however, remains an empirical question. The experiences of Hong Kong suggest that such an attempt could encounter strong public resistance and high negotiation costs.

Managing Land Uses

In principle, public leasehold systems allow the government to manage urban growth by incorporating land use regulations into land leases. If lessees do not develop their land according to the lease provisions, the government has the right to take back the land, a contractual right not available to the government when land is privately owned.

To take full advantage of this special land right, the government must be capable of enforcing the contractual agreements. Despite having the ability to repossess land, there is no evidence to show that enforcement costs under public leasehold systems are lower than those found under freehold systems. This is partly because drafting a complete land contract is impossible. Neither public officials nor the contracting party has perfect information, so they cannot account for all contingencies when they negotiate. Contract language is imperfect and subject to interpretation, creating enforcement problems.

In 1995, a special committee was established in Canberra to review its leasehold system.(4) Analysts found that enforcing the lease purpose clause was a major problem in a town called Fyswick because the lease conditions were too complex and ambiguous. Local officials could not evict lessees who breached their contracts. Rather, they gave lessees an amnesty period to regularize their land uses by applying for lease modifications. In the end, lessees paid their modification premiums, but analysts who conducted the study argued that their payments were far less than the fair market value of the land rights obtained by lessees.

In Hong Kong, using lease conditions to control land uses has created a different problem. Although land contracting could give the government the flexibility to control land development in detail on a case-by-case basis, it is extremely inflexible in adjusting to changes in the overall zoning plan over time. As mentioned earlier, the government incorporates land use regulations into land contracts as conditions at the beginning of the lease. Unless lessees initiate a lease modification, these conditions will remain until the lease expires, which could be as long as 50 years in Hong Kong (and 99 years in Canberra).

When the government needs to update the master plan or revise land regulations to accommodate new urban development, the revised rules may be inconsistent with lease conditions established years ago. This problem has created confusion about which planning standards developers in Hong Kong should follow. To make matters worse, any regulatory changes that infringe on the lessees’ contracted land rights may trigger lawsuits against the government. The legal liability has impeded the government’s ability to modernize its land use plan for districts where outdated lease purpose clauses are still in effect.

Urban Redevelopment

Under public leasehold systems, the government can deny a lessee’s application for lease renewal if it needs the land to rebuild the neighborhood or for other public purposes. It can then take back the land and compensate the lessee only for the building. Thus, in theory, leasing should reduce the public costs of land acquisition for urban renewal or other public uses.

The government, however, must wait for leases to expire before it can assemble land for urban renewal. The long duration of land leases could again create a problem. Nor is there evidence that compensation negotiations for buildings are simpler than for both land and buildings. In Hong Kong, issues of holding out and disputes over compensation are as common as in countries where land is privately owned.

Conclusion

The difficulties that Canberra and Hong Kong face in leasing public land show that leasehold systems in and of themselves do not resolve land management problems. This does not mean, however, that leasing is not a viable means to manage land. In Hong Kong, the government retains a large portion of increased land value for public infrastructure investment. Canberra’s public leasehold system enables the government to obtain low-cost land for building the Australian capital.

The important lesson is that policymakers should not set unrealistic expectations on what public leasehold systems can achieve. Failure to deliver their promises could frustrate a well-intended reform and bring the effort to a halt. Because no land tenure system is perfect, the debate should not focus on the choice between leasehold and freehold systems. They are not mutually exclusive. Instead, future research should concentrate on designing specific institutions according to different political, economic and social contexts to minimize problems associated with both systems.

Yu-Hung Hong is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute this year. He previously taught at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in the Division of Social Science, after earning his Ph.D. in urban planning from Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Notes

1. See Yu-Hung Hong. 1996. “Can Leasing Public Land be an Alternative Source of Local Public Finance?” Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

2. See Yu-Hung Hong. 1998. “Transaction Costs of Allocating Increased Land Value: Hong Kong.” Urban Studies 35, 9: 1577-1595.

3. See Yu-Hung Hong and Alven H.S. Lam. 1998. “Opportunities and Risks of Capturing Land Values under Hong Kong’s Leasehold System.” Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

4. Members of the committee included Justice Paul Stein, Patrick Troy and Robert Yeomans. Findings of the review can be found in the Report into the Administration of the ACT Leasehold, published by the government of the Australian Capital Territory in 1995.

Los seres humanos han tenido una relación de amor y odio con la urbanización desde hace cientos de años. A mediados del siglo XVIII, en los albores de la Revolución Industrial, los campos y las tierras de pastoreo de uso común estaban cercados con el fin de obligar a los campesinos a realizar trabajo asalariado y vivir en los asentamientos informales de las ciudades industriales europeas. Estas personas, arrastradas en contra de su voluntad a la vida urbana, vivían en pésimas condiciones, hacinadas en viviendas de mala calidad y ahogadas por el humo que emanaba de las fábricas que utilizaban el carbón para funcionar. En el verano, las familias con recursos económicos se retiraban al campo para evitar los ineludibles brotes de peste, cólera, y otras enfermedades. Afortunadamente, al mismo tiempo, muchas de las características negativas de la urbanización comenzaron a tratarse por parte de un nuevo invento: el sector público o gobierno municipal. Las obras públicas se crearon para construir caminos y sistemas de alcantarillado, encontrar y proporcionar agua potable y segregar los usos del suelo para que las viviendas estuvieran separadas de las fábricas contaminantes.

Este progreso desembocó en una época, a mediados del siglo XIX, en la que las ciudades del mundo se vieron pobladas con una creciente ola de residentes voluntarios que eran atraídos por las comodidades y el entusiasmo de la vida urbana. Las obras públicas proporcionaban agua y energía directamente a las viviendas. Los nuevos sistemas de transporte trasladaban alimentos y materiales desde las granjas y minas, además de llevar a los trabajadores desde sus hogares al trabajo. Las ciudades florecieron y se convirtieron en la fuerza motriz de las economías nacionales; sin embargo, este nuevo modelo urbano se vio debilitado por dos contradicciones básicas. A medida que reorganizamos nuestro espacio con el fin de alimentar y brindar combustible a las ciudades, también ejercimos una creciente presión sobre nuestros sistemas naturales. Además, como países urbanizados, redujimos la miseria pero aumentamos la desigualdad. Asimismo encontramos nuevas formas de aislar a los ricos de los aspectos negativos de la vida urbana, creando barrios o suburbios urbanos exclusivos.

Durante la primera etapa de la urbanización, innovamos con el fin de resolver el problema de las pestes y enfermedades que eran resultado del hacinamiento de las personas en espacios mal organizados. Durante la segunda etapa, convertimos a nuestras ciudades en lugares brillantes que atraían a nuevos residentes, pero agotamos nuestros sistemas naturales. Redujimos la pobreza, pero aumentamos la desigualdad y la distancia social entre las personas que habitaban el mismo espacio. Tal vez, en el siglo XXI podamos ser lo suficientemente inteligentes para marcar el inicio de una tercera etapa de urbanización, en la que las ciudades brinden respuestas al estrés mundial por el medio ambiente y los países continúen experimentando una reducción de la pobreza, y también un menor nivel de desigualdad. No obstante, para lograr esto, necesitaremos recalibrar nuestra comprensión de la importante función que cumplimos como individuos a la hora de financiar esta evolución: debemos reafirmar el contrato social mediante el cual pagamos nuestros impuestos al gobierno municipal, quien, a su vez, nos recompensa con bienes y servicios públicos que definen una calidad de vida excepcional.

Fue un reconocimiento a la enorme reputación del Instituto Lincoln y un honor personal que me invitaran a liderar, junto con el Banco Mundial, una de las diez unidades de gestión de políticas dedicadas a la creación de un Nuevo Programa Urbano, que se anunciará en la segunda mitad de este año en Hábitat III, la Tercera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Asentamientos Humanos. Con la ayuda de más de una docena de expertos en políticas a nivel mundial designados por sus respectivos Estados miembro, elaboramos el Documento de Políticas sobre Finanzas y Sistemas Fiscales Municipales, que contiene recomendaciones sobre la forma en que el mundo puede financiar el Nuevo Programa Urbano.

Si usted nunca ha oído hablar de las reuniones de ONU-Hábitat, no se sorprenda: se realizan muy esporádicamente. Estas reuniones tienen lugar cada 20 años y su objetivo es brindar asesoramiento para elaborar políticas nacionales que den como resultado ciudades más seguras, más saludables y más habitables. En 1976, la Primera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Asentamientos Humanos, realizada en Vancouver, tuvo como oradores a ilustres pensadores a nivel mundial, como Margaret Mead, Buckminster Fuller y la Madre Teresa. El resultado de la conferencia fue el Plan de Acción de Vancouver, que brindó 64 recomendaciones de políticas para que los gobiernos nacionales “adoptaran políticas relativas a los asentamientos humanos y estrategias de planificación espacial que fueran audaces, significativas y efectivas”, con el fin de facilitar un desarrollo urbano de calidad.

En 1996, la conferencia Hábitat II se celebró en Estambul y siguió los pasos de la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo (Cumbre para la Tierra) de 1992. Hábitat II se centró en conectar el programa de urbanización con las medidas a nivel mundial dirigidas a promover el desarrollo sostenible. En aquel entonces, los urbanistas se encontraban desilusionados debido a que la Agenda 21 (el plan de acción de políticas elaborado por la Cumbre para la Tierra) casi ni mencionaba a las ciudades y, cuando sí lo hacía, estas se consideraban como parte del problema, no de la solución, para la sostenibilidad mundial. La Agenda de Hábitat que surgió de la conferencia de 1996 propuso un marco de políticas para orientar las medidas nacionales en las próximas dos décadas, con el fin de promover asentamientos urbanos sostenibles. Un avance significativo de Hábitat II consistió en la creación de un marco de compromiso de información, para que los gobiernos nacionales se responsabilizaran de dar cuenta sobre los avances de los objetivos establecidos en la Agenda de Hábitat, un aspecto que se había omitido en el Plan de Acción de Vancouver.

Aunque las anteriores conferencias de Hábitat fueron muy importantes, no generaron el impacto o la divisa cultural a la que aspiraban. Este año, existen varios motivos para creer que Hábitat III, que se realizará en octubre en Quito, Ecuador, será diferente. En primer lugar, hoy en día el planeta es predominantemente urbano: alrededor del año 2007, más de la mitad del mundo ya estaba urbanizada, y las tendencias actuales señalan que el planeta estará urbanizado en un 70 por ciento para el año 2050. La totalidad del crecimiento de la población mundial durante las próximas tres décadas tendrá lugar en las ciudades, lo que añadirá unos dos mil millones y medio de personas. Además, a menos que escojamos otro enfoque, se duplicará la cantidad estimada de 850 millones a 1.000 millones de personas que viven en todo tipo de asentamientos informales en las ciudades de todo el mundo.

En segundo lugar, los gestores de políticas internacionales están comenzando a tomar en serio la urbanización. Este cambio puede verse claramente en los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (SDG, por su sigla en inglés) recientemente elaborados por los Estados miembro de la ONU, con el fin de actualizar los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (MDG) adoptados en el año 2000 para regir las políticas mundiales de desarrollo económico hasta el año 2015. Los SDG establecerán un marco a nivel mundial con la finalidad de promover un desarrollo más efectivo y responsable para 2030. A diferencia de los MDG, los SDG contienen objetivos e indicadores específicos referidos a la urbanización.

En tercer lugar (y más importante), debido a que las naciones miembro tendrá la obligación de informar anualmente el progreso que han alcanzado para lograr los SDG, se tomará muy en serio el proceso de urbanización. Este acuerdo incluye la admisión tácita de que entender la urbanización de forma correcta es un factor clave para lograr un futuro humano sostenible en el planeta. Entender la urbanización de forma correcta requiere el compromiso de proporcionar servicios básicos a todos los residentes, tanto antiguos como nuevos, de utilizar los recursos naturales de manera más eficiente, y de reducir nuestra huella de carbono. Por último, aunque no menos importante, entender la urbanización de forma correcta significa encontrar formas de financiarla. Tal como se establece en el Documento de Políticas: “La salud fiscal de las ciudades es una condición necesaria para gestionar nuestro futuro urbano mundial. La salud fiscal permite a los gobiernos municipales invertir en la infraestructura social y económica que promueve una mayor calidad de vida, sostiene el crecimiento económico y ayuda a los municipios a prepararse ante cualquier crisis natural o financiera y mitigar sus efectos”.

Con el fin de lograr esto, necesitamos incrementar las fuentes de recaudación existentes y encontrar otras nuevas. Y la mayor fuente —antigua y nueva— de generación de ingresos municipales para financiar la urbanización puede encontrarse en el suelo.

Cuando invertimos en infraestructura urbana, posibilitamos los asentamientos urbanos densos y multiplicamos exponencialmente el valor de dicho suelo. La base fiscal que genera este suelo con más valor, así como las mejoras realizadas en el mismo, es la mayor y más antigua fuente de recaudación municipal que tienen las ciudades, instrumentada mediante el impuesto sobre la propiedad. No obstante, una nueva fuente de ingresos casi no explotada es la recuperación del incremento del valor del suelo que la infraestructura pública genera a favor de los propietarios privados, lo que se conoce como “recuperación de plusvalías”. Como hemos observado en América Latina, el incremento del valor del suelo generado por la inversión pública casi siempre multiplica la inversión en sí. La recuperación de una parte del incremento del valor del suelo puede ser muy útil a la hora de financiar la infraestructura que necesitaremos para recibir en nuestras ciudades a otros dos mil millones y medio de residentes hacia mediados del siglo.

Paradójicamente, nos resistimos mucho más a los impuestos basados en el suelo que a otras fuentes inferiores de ingresos. Aunque el impuesto sobre la propiedad es la fuente de ingresos municipales más estable, continúa representando una parte relativamente pequeña de los presupuestos municipales; además, debido a que este impuesto generalmente es el mayor tributo directo que pagan los propietarios, sufre constantemente el ataque del público. Los electores captan el apoyo de los gobiernos estatales, provinciales y nacionales para limitar la capacidad que tienen los municipios de recaudar el impuesto sobre la propiedad, imponiendo límites a las tasas, jugando con las valuaciones del suelo, o ambas cosas. Y cuando lo logran, socavan el avance del que puede decirse que es el más importante para alejarnos de nuestro pasado salvaje: el gobierno municipal.

El desafío del financiamiento municipal puede resumirse en una simple pregunta: ¿Quién pagará nuestras futuras ciudades y pueblos? Y la respuesta es bastante simple: nosotros, tal como siempre lo hemos hecho. Podríamos pedir prestados billones de dólares para invertir en nueva infraestructura, desarrollar nuevas asociaciones entre entidades públicas y privadas, mejorar las transferencias intergubernamentales u obtener los fondos del suelo (como creo que deberíamos hacerlo). Sin embargo, a la larga, todo gasto que realicemos se pagará con fondos que recaudamos de nosotros mismos de una u otra forma. Presumiblemente, estaremos felices con la calidad de la vida urbana que paguemos. Pero esto requerirá nuestro compromiso colectivo para pagar lo que cuesten los servicios que deseamos y necesitamos, y esto será posible cuando comencemos a recordar la función esencial que cumple el gobierno municipal para proporcionar estos beneficios.

Humans have had a love-hate relationship with urbanization for hundreds of years. In the mid-18th century, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, common fields and pastures were enclosed to force peasants into wage labor and life in the slums of the industrial cities of Europe. These involuntary urbanites lived in abysmal conditions, crowded into substandard dwellings and choked by fumes belched from coal-fired factories. Wealthy families retreated to the countryside in summers to avoid inevitable outbreaks of pestilence, cholera, and other diseases. Fortunately, at the same time, many of the negative attributes of urbanization were being addressed by a new invention—the public sector or local government. Public Works were created to build roads and sewers, to find and deliver potable water, and to segregate land uses so that residences were separated from dirty industries.

This progress ushered in an epoch, in the mid-19th century, during which the cities of the world grew with voluntary inhabitants who were drawn to the amenities and excitement of urban life. Public Works delivered water and power directly to residences. New transport systems moved food and materials from farms and mines, and moved workers from their homes to jobs. Cities flourished and became the economic powerhouses of national economies, but this new urban model was undermined by two basic contradictions. As we reorganized our space to feed and fuel cities, we put increasing pressure on natural systems. And, as countries urbanized, we reduced abject poverty but increased inequality. We also found new ways to insulate the wealthy from negative aspects of urban life in exclusive urban neighborhoods or suburbs.

During the first round of urbanization, we innovated to address the disease and pestilence that resulted from crowding people into poorly managed space. During the next round, we turned our cities into shiny places that attracted new residents, but we stressed out natural systems. We reduced poverty but we increased inequality and the social distance between people inhabiting the same space. Perhaps, in the 21st century, we can be clever enough to usher in a third round of urbanization, where cities provide the answers to global environmental stress, and countries continue to see declining poverty but also reductions in inequality. To do this, however, we’ll need to recalibrate our understanding of the important role we as individuals play in paying for this evolution—reaffirming the social contract through which we pay our taxes to local government, and it rewards us with the public goods and services that define an exceptional quality of life.

It was a testament to the outsized reputation of the Lincoln Institute and a personal honor to be asked to lead, with the World Bank, one of the ten policy units tasked with drafting a New Urban Agenda, to be announced this fall at Habitat III, the Third United Nations Conference on Human Settlements. With the assistance of more than a dozen global policy experts nominated by their member states, we wrote the Policy Paper for Municipal Finance and Local Fiscal Systems, which recommends how the world will pay for the New Urban Agenda.

If you have not heard of the UN Habitat meetings, it is not surprising. They rarely occur. The convenings happen every 20 years and seek to advise national policies that lead to safer, healthier, and more livable cities. In 1976, the first United Nations Conference on Human Settlements, held in Vancouver, involved such illustrious global thinkers as Margaret Mead, Buckminster Fuller, and Mother Teresa. The Vancouver Action plan generated at the conference provided 64 policy recommendations for national governments “to adopt bold, meaningful, and effective human settlement policies and spatial planning strategies” that would facilitate high-quality urban development.

In 1996, Habitat II, held in Istanbul, followed on the heels of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit). Habitat II focused on connecting the urbanization agenda with global efforts to promote sustainable development. At the time, urbanists were disappointed that Agenda 21, the policy action plan from the Earth Summit, barely mentioned cities. And where it did, cities were considered part of the problem, not a solution, for global sustainability. The Habitat Agenda that emerged from the 1996 conference proposed a policy framework to guide national efforts for the next two decades to promote sustainable urban settlements. An important advancement of Habitat II was the creation of a reporting framework to hold national governments accountable for achieving the goals set forth in the Habitat Agenda, something missing from the Vancouver Action Plan.

As important as previous Habitat conferences were, they did not generate the impact or the cultural currency to which they aspired. This year, there are several reasons to believe that Habitat III, to be convened in October in Quito, Ecuador, will be different. First, the planet is predominantly urban now. We passed the halfway point for global urbanization around 2007, and current trends suggest that the planet will be 70 percent urbanized by 2050. All global population growth in the next three decades will occur in cities, which will add some 2.5 billion people. And, unless we choose a new approach, we will double the estimated 850 million to one billion people living in slums, favelas, and other informal settlements in cities around the world.

Second, international policy makers are beginning to take urbanization seriously. This shift is best illustrated in recently penned Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) drafted by UN member states to update the Millennial Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000 to govern global economic development policy through 2015. The SDGs will establish a global framework to promote more effective and responsible development through 2030. Unlike the MDGs, the SDGs include specific goals and indicators that reference urbanization.

Third, and most importantly, because member nations will be required to report annually on their progress toward the SDGs, they will be taking the process of urbanization seriously. Built into this arrangement is a tacit admission that getting urbanization right is critical to achieving a sustainable human future on the planet. Getting urbanization right will require a commitment to deliver basic services to all residents, new and old, to use natural resources more efficiently, and to reduce our carbon footprint. And, last but not least, getting urbanization right means finding ways to pay for it. As stated in the Policy Paper: The fiscal health of cities is a necessary condition for managing our global urban future. Fiscal health enables local governments to invest in the social and economic infrastructure that supports a higher quality of life, sustains economic growth, and helps localities prepare for and mitigate the effects of natural and financial crises.

To accomplish this, we will need to grow existing sources of revenue and find new ones. And the biggest old and new source of local revenue to finance urbanization can be found in land.

When we invest in urban infrastructure, we make dense urban settlement possible and we increase the value of that land by many multiples. The tax base that is built from this more valuable land, and the improvements built on it, is the biggest old source of local revenue for cities, through the property tax. But a mostly untapped new source of revenue is the reclamation of land value increments that public infrastructure generates for private landowners, known as value capture. As we’ve seen in Latin America, the increase in land value through public investment is almost always a multiple of the investment itself. Capturing a share of land value increments can help us fund the infrastructure we’ll need to welcome another 2.5 billion residents to our cities by mid-century.

Ironically, we resist land-based taxes more than other inferior revenue sources. While the property tax is the most stable local revenue source, it still accounts for a relatively small share of local government budgets, and, because it is usually the biggest direct tax paid by property owners, it is constantly under attack. Voters enlist the support of state, provincial, and national governments to constrain the ability of localities to collect property tax revenues by imposing rate limitations, or monkeying around with land value assessments, or both. And when they succeed, they undermine the advancement that is arguably the most important for separating us from our barbarian past—local government.

The municipal finance challenge can be summarized in one simple question: Who will pay for our future cities and towns? And the answer is quite simple. We will—just as we always have. We might borrow trillions of dollars to invest in new infrastructure, engineer new public-private partnerships, enhance intergovernmental transfers, or leverage funding from the land, as I think we should. But, in the end, whatever expenditures we make will be covered by revenues we collect from ourselves in one form or another. Presumably, we’ll be happy with the quality of the urban life that we purchase. But that will require our collective commitment to pay what it costs for the services we want and need—and that will start by reminding ourselves of the essential role that local government plays in delivering these benefits.