In four years, there will be a fresh count of Americans. The 2000 Census will reveal how many of us there are, who we are in terms of race, nativity, income, family size and occupation, what kind of housing we occupy, where we live and where we work.
All these numbers, but especially the latter two, will reflect what is happening to what planners and social scientists call settlement patterns. The Census will show how people and jobs are distributed regionally between North and South and East and West; within regions between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas; and within metropolitan areas between cities and suburbs.
Settlement patterns have been transformed radically in the twentieth century (see graph 1). On a regional basis, the trend has been from East to West and North to South. In the decade between 1980 and 1990, for example, three states in the West and South accounted for 50 percent of the nation’s population growth: California, Florida and Texas.
Within all regions, the trend has been toward ever larger metropolitan agglomerations. By 1990, metropolitan areas of 1,000,000 or more accounted for 50 percent of the nation’s population. Within metropolitan areas, cities grew faster than suburbs at the beginning of the century, but by the 1950s the trend was sharply in favor of the suburbs, which now account for more than half of the nation’s population.
Will the 2000 Census confirm the continuation of these trends? What stakes do we have in the outcome? Quite a few. We worry about trends that erode the economic base of cities because we are concerned about job opportunities for the poor who are committed, by choice or circumstance, to live in the city. We are also concerned about the health of the tax base, which affects the capacity of the local government to deal with the needs of all its residents.
We also worry about land use patterns in the suburbs which both require and increase auto-dependency. This trend in turn leads to more auto travel, aggravates congestion, pollutes the air, and complicates our international relations because of our heavy dependence on imported oil.
We are in the throes of a revolution comparable in scope to the revolution in transportation technology that heavily influenced settlement patterns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The transportation revolution, from ships and trains to cars and planes, made it possible for both workers and their employers to have a wider choice of locations.
The pace of the revolution in data processing and communications, which began slowly in the middle of the twentieth century, has quickened rapidly in recent years. We speak of a post-industrial information economy. By that we mean that information constitutes an ever-increasing share of the Gross National Product, both as “input” to the production of other goods and services and as “output” in the form of entertainment and related activities.
Household Location Decisions
How will settlement patterns be affected by the transition to an information economy? Let us first consider the worker’s choice of a residential location. In classical urban economics, this choice is seen as a “trade-off” between the merits of a particular place in terms of quality of life and the cost of commuting to work. As the transportation revolution reduced the time and money costs of commuting, more and more workers were able to afford to locate in what they considered an attractive suburb that offered the lifestyle they preferred: a private home with a lawn, good schools, parks and open space, shopping facilities, and friendly neighbors.
The New York Times of July 14, 1996, reports that because of the revolution in communications and data processing, accompanied by company downsizing, as many as 40 million people work at least part time at home, with about 8,000 home-based businesses starting daily.
Logic suggests that some of this new-found workplace freedom will manifest itself in location choices that favor places considered desirable, be they in the farther reaches of suburbia, exurbia, or rural America. On the other hand, if these dispersed self-employed workers end up commuting less, their freedom may not “cost” the society more in terms of congestion and pollution.
Business Location Decisions
What about the conventional company and its location decisions? Like the household, the company does a “balancing” act when it chooses a location. From the perspective of product distribution, Place A might be preferred. From the perspective of the inputs of materials, Place B might be ideal. From the point of view of labor costs, Place C might be best. For tax purposes and related “public” issues, Place D might be most beneficial.
If the entire company has to be in one place, then compromise is inevitable. But if the communications revolution permits the “dis-integration” of the company via the physical separation of functions or the “outsourcing” of particular functions, then what used to be one location decision becomes a multiplicity of decisions, each component responding to a compelling argument for a particular place.
The classic example is the “front” office of a bank or insurance company in the midst of a congested city center with the “back” office in a rural area in another region or even in another country.
Settlement Trends
How these changes in household and business location choices will ultimately affect settlement patterns in metropolitan America was the subject of a major study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), an agency that served the U.S. Congress for many decades but was abolished by the Congress in 1995. The summary chapter in The Technological Reshaping of Metropolitan America states that “technology is connecting economic activities, enabling them to be physically farther apart, reducing the competitive advantage of high-cost, congested urban locations, and allowing people and businesses more (but not total) freedom to choose where they will live and work.”
But OTA concludes that “the new wave of information technologies will not prove to be the salvation of a rural U.S. economy that has undergone decades of population and job loss as its natural resource-based economy has shrunk.” Rather, most economic activity will locate in large and medium-sized metropolitan areas (see graph 2).
“Technological change. . .threatens the economic well being of many central and inner cities, and older suburbs of metropolitan areas,” the report continues. Overall, the trends suggest that these places will find it hard to compete without economic development policies designed to offset their competitive disadvantages.
In short, the OTA expects that, the communications revolution notwithstanding, the 2000 Census will report a continuation of the trends manifested throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. The favored locus of activity in both residential and business terms will be the outer suburbs of metropolitan areas. Given our concerns with the adverse effects of prevailing settlement patterns, the challenge to land policy is greater than ever.
______________
Benjamin Chinitz is an urban economist who served as director of research at the Lincoln Institute from 1987 to 1990. He continues to serve as a faculty associate at the Institute and as visiting professor in urban and regional planning at Florida Atlantic University.
Thomas Horan is director of Applied Social and Policy Research at Claremont Graduate School in Claremont, CA.
Julie Campoli, a landscape architect, land planner and principal of Terra Firma Urban Design in Burlington, Vermont, and Alex MacLean, a photographer, trained architect and principal of Landslides Aerial Photography in Cambridge, Massachusetts, have worked collaboratively for more than two years to research and document the phenomenon of residential density. They have developed a catalog of more than 300 aerial photographs that illustrate a wide range of density in both established and newer neighborhoods around the country. The Lincoln Institute has supported their work, which has been presented through lectures and courses and is available as a digital working paper titled “Visualizing Density” on the Institute’s website.
How did you join forces to begin this work on photographing and measuring density as a visualization tool for community planning?
We both have a longstanding interest in using visual images to illuminate land use issues. For years Alex has recorded human imprints on the land quite eloquently through his aerial photography. I am constantly experimenting with graphic techniques to communicate design ideas and to express how we shape the built environment. In our first collaboration, Above and Beyond (written with planner Elizabeth Humstone, APA Planners Press, 2001), we employed aerial photographs, many of which were digitally enhanced, to show how and why landscapes change over time. Our intent was to help readers understand the land development process by representing it in a very graphic way.
As we completed that book, we could see that fear of density was emerging as a major obstacle to the type of compact, infill development we were advocating. It became apparent to us that, although people liked the idea of channeling growth into existing areas, they seemed to balk at the reality. We saw many instances where developers trying to build higher-density housing met stiff resistance from a public who equated density with overcrowding. In many communities density is allowed and often encouraged at the policy level, but it is rejected at the implementation stage, mainly because the public has trouble accepting the high numbers associated with dense development.
We became interested in this ambivalent attitude and wanted to look more closely at those density numbers. It seemed to us that a preoccupation with numbers and a lack of visual information was at the heart of the density problem. We thought that some of the graphic approaches we used in Above and Beyond might help people understand the visual aspects of the density issue. We wanted to translate the numbers that were associated with various density levels into mental images, specifically to show what the density numbers mean in terms of real living places.
Why is density such a difficult concept to understand and visualize?
Anything is difficult to visualize if you have only a few pieces of information from which to conjure your mental image. Density is most often represented as a mathematical ratio. It is the number of units divided by the number of acres, or the gross floor area of a building divided by the size of its site. These measurements describe a place as a numerical relationship, which only takes you so far in being able to imagine it. Such information fails to convey the “look and feel” of density and often creates confusion in the community planning process.
An individual’s response to the issue of density often depends on past experience and the images that happen to be part of one’s visual memory. Someone might associate higher-density numbers with an image of Boston’s historic Beacon Hill neighborhood or central Savannah, but high-density development is more frequently imagined as something negative. This is the gap between density as it is measured and density as it is perceived. One is a rational process. The other is not.
What does your density catalog illustrate?
The catalog contains aerial photographs of neighborhoods in several regions of the country. They are arranged according to density level, ranging from exurban houses on 2-acre lots to urban high-rise apartments at 96 units per acre. Each site is photographed from a series of viewpoints to show its layout, details and context. The catalog can be used to compare different neighborhoods at the same density or to see how the design and arrangement of buildings changes as density levels rise. We included a wide array of street patterns, building types and open spaces, demonstrating how the manipulation of these components can create endless variations on neighborhood form.
What becomes apparent to anyone looking at the catalog is that there are many ways to shape density, and some are more appealing than others. We don’t try to suggest which images are “good” or which are “bad”; we let the viewer draw his or her own conclusions. Our hope is that after viewing the catalog people will not only have a clearer idea of what 5 units or 20 units per acre looks like, but, more important, they will be able to imagine attractive, higher-density neighborhoods for their own communities.
How do you measure density?
In the first phase of our project we focused on residential density as measured in units per acre. Using the 2000 U.S. Census, it is possible to find the number of housing units for any census block in the nation. We photographed neighborhoods across the country and calculated the number of units per acre for each site by determining the number of units from the census data and then dividing by the acreage.
Units-per-acre is a measurement commonly used in local zoning and in the review of development projects. It is familiar and understandable to the average person dealing with local density issues and provides a relatively accurate measure for primarily residential neighborhoods. In calculating the density of mixed-use or commercial sites, floor area ratio is a more precise measurement. We plan to extend our analysis to mixed and other uses with this measurement in the next phase of our work, to see how various design approaches can accommodate higher densities.
What is the connection between density and design
Design plays a profound role in the success of compact development. Although it seems that the smart growth movement is confronting a density problem, it’s really more of a design challenge. It is not density but design that determines the physical character and quality of a place. This was made clear to us when we found examples of existing neighborhoods with widely varying character yet the same density. One area might have a sense of spaciousness and privacy, while another appears cramped. Different design approaches can dramatically affect one’s perception of density. This defies the commonly held belief that fitting more people into a smaller area inevitably results in a less appealing living environment. Higher densities, especially on infill sites, pose a greater challenge to designers, but they do not dictate a certain type of form or character.
As we measured the density of existing neighborhoods and assembled the catalog, we began to see specifically how design accommodates density. The most appealing neighborhoods had a coherent structure, well-defined spaces and carefully articulated buildings. They were the kinds of places that offered a lot of variety in a small area. If planners and developers want to promote density, it is essential to identify the amenities that make a neighborhood desirable and to replicate them wherever possible. Interconnected neighborhoods with high-quality public, private and green spaces, and a diversity of building types and styles, will win more supporters in the permit process and buyers in the real estate market than those neighborhoods without such amenities.
How can planners, developers and community residents use the catalog to achieve the principles of smart growth in their local decision making to design new neighborhoods?
The catalog can be used as a tool to refocus the density discussion away from numerical measurements and onto design issues. In our workshops we ask participants to examine several photographs from the catalog showing nine neighborhoods that have a similar density but very different layouts. In articulating their impressions of the places they see, what they like and why, they are forced to think about how the design—the pattern of streets, the architecture or the presence of greenery—affects the quality of the place.
In a town planning process, if residents participate in a similar exercise, they will take the first steps toward a community vision for compact neighborhoods. They can see that the same design principles behind those preferred places can be used to create appealing dense neighborhoods in their own communities. Once they develop a vision for what they want, they can use the planning and regulatory process to guide development in that direction.
Developers of urban infill housing often find themselves on the defensive in the permit process, arguing that density does not necessarily equal crowding. The catalog provides images that can help bolster their case. More importantly, it offers developers, architects and landscape architects visual information on historic and contemporary models of compact development. They can use the photographs to inform their design process, instilling features of the best neighborhoods into their own projects.
What are some of your conclusions about why understanding density is so important to the planning process?
Density is absolutely essential to building strong communities and preventing sprawl. It’s also a growing reality in the real estate market. Instead of denying it or barely tolerating it, we can embrace density. The trick is to shape it in a way that supports community goals of urban vitality and provides people with high-quality living places. At this point though, we seem to be a long way from embracing density. It may be a deep cultural bias or simply that many Americans are unfamiliar the benefits of density, such as more choices and convenience to urban amenities. And in many cases, they have not been shown that neighborhoods of multifamily homes, apartments and houses on small lots can be beautiful and highly valued. We hope that our residential density project and the digital catalog can provide some material to fill the void.
Julie Campoli is principal of Terra Firma Urban Design in Burlington, Vermont, and Alex MacLean is principal of Landslides Aerial Photography in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Urban land management policies and land market operations have taken on greater status in the debate on urban public policy in Latin America, and they are given increased attention in academic research and the development agendas of many countries in the region. Over the past 10 years the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean has supported a network of Latin American scholars and practitioners who have developed seminars, promoted research, organized public debates, consulted with decision makers and published their findings on these timely issues. Members of this network met at a conference in Buenos Aires in April 2004 to assess their activities and prepare this summary declaration of core land policy issues crucial to the search for more sustainable urban development programs in the future.
Urban land policy in Latin America and the ways that land markets operate tend to produce cities that are economically unequal, politically and socially exclusionary, spatially segregated and environmentally unsustainable. The consequences of these policies can be seen in the high and often irrational prices for land, due in part to the absence of effective urban land management practices.
The Current Situation
Land markets are structurally imperfect. However, the functioning of urban land markets depends on social relations, just as the outcomes of land market operations affect those relations, making it both possible and necessary to influence the markets. Instead of removing the imperfections, many instruments and policies have in fact helped to distort urban land market operations even further. Moreover, many established policies have kept the “rules of the game” in urban real estate unchanged, and apparently untouchable.
A more comprehensive reading of the problem reveals that, rather than being the result of inconsistent rationalization, the current dysfunctional land market is the result of missed opportunities for socially sustainable development in Latin American cities. Yet there are promising and innovative alternatives that can overcome the existing bottlenecks evident in inadequate and destructive national government policies, the enduring difficulties in financing urban development, and poor management practices.
One of the most glaring negative outcomes of the current situation is the relative persistence, weight and importance of informal urban land markets dominated by many exclusionary practices, illegal titling, lack of urban services, and other problems. Deregulation in places that should be regulated (poor outlying areas on the urban fringe), overregulation of wealthy regulated areas, and privatization policies that disregard social criteria are factors that help to drive these negative processes, particularly the spatial concentration of the urban poor. Although the majority of regularization programs are well-intended, they instead cause perverse effects, including increased land costs for the poorest sectors.
Traditional urban planning processes and urban standards have lost importance and effectiveness as instruments for guiding urban development, especially the existing mechanisms for land management. Yet this situation offers opportunities to think about innovative ways to deal with land management and urban planning strategies. This opportunity has already been seized in some places, where new experiments and proposals are causing intense debates by questioning the predominant traditional approaches.
Creating new practices within this framework requires making one unavoidable step: rethinking urban land taxation by incorporating new methods and keeping an open mind regarding alternative fiscal instruments that must be intended as tools to redirect current urban development and discipline the operation of the urban land market. These new tools should not only collect funds in order to build infrastructure and provide urban services, but also contribute to a more equitable distribution of benefits and costs, especially those associated with the urbanization process and the return of recovered land value increments to the community.
Proposals for Action
Recognize the indispensable role of the government. It is critical that the government (from local to national levels) maintains an active role in promoting urban development. The local level should be more committed to structural changes in land management, while the national level should actively foster such local initiatives. Government must not ignore its responsibility to adopt urban land market policies that recognize the strategic value of land and the specific characteristics of how land markets operate, in order to promote the sustainable use of the land by incorporating both social and environmental objectives and benefiting the most vulnerable segments of the urban population.
Break the compartmentalization of fiscal, regulatory and legal authorities. Lack of cooperation among local authorities is responsible for major inefficiencies, ineffective policies, waste of scarce resources and inadequate public accountability. Furthermore, incongruent actions by different public authorities send misleading signals to private agents and create uncertainties if not opportunities for special interests to subvert government plans. The complexity and scale of the challenges posed by the urban social reality of Latin American cities require multilateral actions by numerous stakeholders to influence the operation of urban land markets (both formal and informal), thus insuring the achievement of joint objectives: promoting sustainable and fair use of land resources; reducing land prices; producing serviced land; recognizing the rights to land by the urban poor; and sharing the costs and benefits of urban investment more evenly.
These authorities must also coordinate urban development policies with land taxation policies. They should promote a new urban vision with legislation that recognizes the separation of building rights from land ownership rights, with the understanding that land value increments generated from building rights do not belong exclusively to landowners. Urban managers must also devise creative mechanisms whereby these land value increments may be mobilized or used to produce serviced land for low-income social sectors, thereby offsetting urban inequalities.
Recognize the limits of what is possible. Transforming the current regulatory framework that governs the use of urban land requires new legal and urbanistic thinking that recognizes that inequalities and socio-spatial exclusion are intrinsic to the predominant urban development model. Even within the current model there is substantial room for more socially responsible policies and government accountability. Urban regulations should consider the complexity of land appreciation processes and enforce effective traditional principles such as those that restrain the capacity of government agencies to dispose of public resources or proscribe the “unjustified enrichment” of private landowners.
Break vicious cycles. Alternatives to existing regularization programs are needed to break the vicious cycle of poverty that current programs help to perpetuate. It is important to recognize that these programs are only a stopgap measure and that urbanization, housing and land taxation policies must also be integrated into the process. Reliance on housing subsidy policies, although inevitable, can be nullified if there are no mechanisms to prevent these subsidies from being translated into an increase in land prices. City officials should give priority to the creation of more serviced land rather than new regularization programs, since the right to a home is a social right to occupy a viable “habitat” with dignity. It is also important to understand that the low production of serviced land per se contributes to withholding the supply and, therefore, to higher prices affecting all aspects of urban development.
Furthermore, individual solutions (such as plot-by-plot titling processes or case-by-case direct subsidies to individual families) ultimately result in more costs for society as a whole than broader, collective solutions that incorporate other aggregate values such as public spaces, infrastructure investment and other mechanisms to strengthen social integration. Many Latin American countries have witnessed subsidized housing programs, often supported by multilateral agencies, where the land component is overlooked or dismissed. Such programs seek readily available public land or simply occupy land in intersticial areas of the city. This disregard of a broader land policy compromises the replicability, expansion and sustainability of these housing programs on a larger scale.
Rethink the roles of public and private institutions. Land management within a wide range of urban actions, from large-scale production of serviced land for the poor to urban redevelopment through large projects, including facelift-type actions or environmental recovery projects, requires new thinking about how public institutions responsible for urban development can intervene through different types of public-private associations. Redeveloping vacant land and introducing more flexibility in the uses and levels of occupancy can play a crucial role here, provided such projects fall under the strategic guidelines of public institutions, are subject to monitoring by citizens, and incorporate a broadly shared and participatory vision of urban development.
Showcase projects such as El Urbanizador Social (The Social Urbanizer) in Porto Alegre, Brazil, the Nuevo Usme housing project in Bogotá, Colombia, and that country’s value capture legislation are examples of sensible and creative efforts that recognize the importance of adequate urban land management and new thinking on the role of land, particularly the potential of land value as an instrument for promoting more sustainable and equitable development for the poor in our cities. Creative and balanced new thinking is also exemplified by the joint ventures of public land and private capital in Havana, Cuba, with value increments captured for upgrading densely populated historic areas.
Empower the role of land taxation in public finance to promote urban development. National, state or provincial and local governments must share responsibility for promoting property taxation as an adequate and socially meaningful method of financing and fostering urban development. The property tax should be sensitive and responsive to Latin American cities that have a strong legacy of marked economic and socio-spatial differences. There may be good reasons to tax land at a higher rate than buildings, in a rational and differentiated manner, especially in outlying areas subject to urban speculation and lands offered ex ante to low-income sectors of society (making certain that paying the tax also helps to build citizenship in these sectors). As already noted, it is also critical to create innovative fiscal instruments appropriate to special situations and other methods for capturing the value generated.
Educate stakeholders in the promotion of new policies. All actors involved in these processes, from judges to journalists, from academics to public officials and their international mentors, need in-depth training and education in the operation of land markets and urban land management in order to achieve the above objectives. We must identify the “fields of mental resistance,” particularly in urban and economic thinking and in the legal doctrines that represent the obstacles to be overcome. We must recognize, for example, that an “informal right” exists and operates in many areas to legitimize land transactions socially, if not legally, and to create networks and spaces of solidarity and integration. It is urgent that we take steps to introduce these themes and proposals into political agendas at the various government levels, in political parties, social organizations, academia and the mass media.
Latin American Network
Pedro Abramo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Oscar Borrero, Bogotá, Colombia
Gonzalo Cáceres, Santiago, Chile
Julio Calderón, Lima, Perú
Nora Clichevsky, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Claudia De Cesare, Porto Alegre, Brasil
Matilde de los Santos, Montevideo, Uruguay
Diego Erba, São Leopoldo, Brasil
Edésio Fernandes, London, England
Ana Raquel Flores, Asunción, Paraguay
Fernanda Furtado, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Alfredo Garay, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Silvia García Vettorazzi, Guatemala City, Guatemala
Ana Maria González del Valle, Lima, Perú
Samuel Jaramillo, Bogotá, ColombiaCarmen Ledo, Cochabamba, Bolivia
Mario Lungo, San Salvador, El Salvador
María Mercedes Maldonado, Bogotá, Colombia
Carlos Morales Schechinger, Mexico City, Mexico
Laura Mullahy, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USARicardo Núñez, Havana, Cuba
Sonia Rabello de Castro, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil
Eduardo Reese, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Francisco Sabatini, Santiago, Chile
Martim Smolka, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Alvaro Uribe, Panama City, Panama
Ricardo Vanella, Córdoba, Argentina
Maria Clara Vejarano, Bogotá, Colombia
Isabel Viana, Montevideo, Uruguay
Post-apartheid South Africa is an experiment the like of which the world has never seen before,says Myesha Jenkins, performance poet from Los Angeles who emigrated in 1993, the year before Nelson Mandella became president. “We want this experiment to work.” Taxi-driver Vincent from the northern province of Limpopo, speaking of the elections that will take place later in 2007, says, “We must do it right. The eyes of the world are on us.”
In Latin American cities, especially in the larger ones, location is critical for vulnerable groups. In Buenos Aires, the population of shantytowns in the central area doubled in the last inter-census period (1991–2001), even though total population declined by approximately 8 percent. In Rio de Janeiro during the same decade, the fastest growing informal settlements were those considered to be in the best locations, generally near the beach in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods, although they were already the most crowded and congested slums.
Limited access to land is a substantial hindrance to economic development in many transition economies. Additionally, when the ability to gain appropriate permits to use the land is subject to delays, bribes, or corruption, the efficiency of the land allocation mechanism is compromised and overall economic growth is constrained.
In this article I summarize findings from empirical models of land access, permit activity, time costs, and corruption, using both country and firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Data come from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS 2009) for business enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, supplemented with country-specific economic measures and EBRD indices of reform. Results indicate that limited access to land and difficulty in obtaining permits are substantial impediments to economic development, and these conditions clearly create an environment in which bribery flourishes.
Land Markets in Transition Economies
The context of this study is analysis of firm-level performance in transition economies where access to land has been subject to varying types of land privatization regimes in the past 20 years since independence. Stanfield (1999, 1–2) provides a helpful strategy for thinking about how land markets have been created in such economies, recognizing that “Markets in land linked to markets in capital and labor are central to market economies.”
Indeed, land market liberalization must be linked to liberalization of capital and labor markets simultaneously if transition countries are to advance their economies. Stanfield also suggests that many existing institutions of land administration must make radical changes to support the privatization of land rights. Defining and enforcing property rights and providing transparent and efficient land registration mechanisms free of bribery and corruption are essential to supporting economic development (Estrin et al. 2009).
Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny (1995) suggest two ways that access to land and real estate is critical to restructuring a transition economy and promoting economic development in general. First, land and buildings are complementary to plants and equipment, which typically have already been privatized in these countries. Until land and buildings are also privatized, control of these productive assets continues to be held jointly by local politicians and managers, leading to an inefficient ownership structure. Second, privatization of land and real estate provides firms with a source of capital for restructuring their business investments. For example, a former state-owned enterprise that has surplus land and buildings can sell those assets to raise funds for other investments. However, Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny (1995, 136) conclude, “Because it serves local governments so well, politicization of urban land and real estate persists, and slows down the restructuring of old firms and the creation of new ones.”
Deininger (2003) makes the case that well-functioning land markets foster general economic development, citing four key tenets. First, in many developing economies the distribution of land ownership prevents operational efficiency. If land ownership cannot be transferred easily, or if land use is not separable from land ownership, then there may be a mismatch between the owners and the most efficient land users. If land markets are allowed to transfer land use from less productive to more productive uses, then overall economic efficiency is enhanced. Second, transferable land use rights can allow rural residents to move into the nonagricultural sector of the economy, which can help boost the output of that sector and the overall economy. Third, by making land use rights transferable the ownership and use of land can be separated, facilitating more efficient land use. Fourth, a well-developed land market allows land transfers to occur with low transaction costs, which frees up credit in the economy.
Economic Consequences of Limited Access to Land
Firms use a combination of land, labor, and capital inputs to produce a given quantity of output. Consider a situation where the first input is land, for which the firm faces a constraint on the quantity available, but the other two inputs are freely available in any quantity needed. In a competitive market, a profit-maximizing firm uses additional units of any freely available input until the value of the additional product derived from the last unit of the input used equals its market price. In this case, however, if the available land is constrained, the firm would purchase a less than optimal amount. Consequently, the firm would not achieve an optimal input combination, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources.
Even if the quantity of land is not constrained, obstacles to obtaining building, construction, or use permits may impede the conduct of business. In such circumstances, the amount of land may be accessible, but the permitting process increases its effective price. Once again, the firm is forced to operate inefficiently.
In either situation one could ask, “What would the firm be willing to pay in order to be able to operate most efficiently?” Clearly, the land constraint or permit restriction imposes a cost on the firm and reduces its efficiency, and the firm presumably would be willing to pay a bribe to a government official to gain access to additional land or obtain a permit to use the available land. Hence, limited access to land and permits can encourage informal payments or bribes. Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2007) have suggested that managers’ responses to survey questions regarding the business environment in which they operate and the constraints they face can measure the hidden implicit cost of those constraints.
Country and Firm Data and Survey Results
The primary data for this study are 15 country-specific characteristics from various sources and 13 firm characteristics from the 2009 round of the EBRD-World Bank BEEPS, which is conducted every three years. The survey covers a broad range of topics related to the business environment and performance of firms as well as questions on business-government relations. A total of 11,999 business enterprises in 30 transition economies of Europe and Central Asia are represented. These data have been used extensively in the transition and development literatures, most recently in Commander and Svenjar (2011). Table 1 lists the country and firm characteristics and indicates their effects on five aspects of economic development.
Access to Land as an Obstacle to Economic Development
The BEEPS questionnaire asks firms about a number of potential obstacles to efficient operation, including access to land. A key question asks, “Is access to land No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” Survey respondents may also respond “Do not know” or “Does not apply.” Overall, 43 percent of the firms surveyed reported land access as an obstacle to some extent. There is wide variation in firm responses across the countries in the sample, however, with the share of firms reporting land access as an obstacle ranging from a low of 6 percent in Hungary to a high of 62 percent in Kosovo (figure 1).
Nine of the 15 possible country-specific explanatory variables have a statistically discernable effect on the likelihood that a firm will report land access as an obstacle (table 1, column 1). Firms were more likely to report land access obstacles in CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent States, or former Soviet republics) and in faster growing countries. The CIS effect is particularly important, with firms in those countries approximately 28 percent more likely to report land access obstacles than comparable firms in non-CIS transition countries. In countries with a high VAT rate, firms were less likely to report access to land as an obstacle.
Among the EBRD indices of reform listed in table 1, the mixed likelihood of increases and decreases on these measures may indicate that uneven reforms across sectors of the economy can have opposing effects on firms’ experiences. If land privatization and policies providing land access are not moving in tandem with financial market reforms and broader privatization reforms, such a pattern of mixed signs may emerge.
Firm characteristics associated with a greater likelihood of land access obstacles include competition against unregistered or informal firms, subsidization of the firm by the government, the number of employees, and limited partnership legal status. Of particular note are the firms that report they compete against informal market firms and those that are subsidized by the government. These two characteristics increase the reported probability of land access obstacles by 8 and 6 percent, respectively.
Presumably, state-subsidized firms also report that they compete against unregistered or informal market firms, so the combined increase in probability may be approximately 14 percent. On the other hand, characteristics associated with lower probabilities of reporting land access as an obstacle include operating in the manufacturing sector or having a more experienced manager.
Beyond merely stating that land access is an obstacle, firms were asked to report on the severity of the obstacle (figure 2). On a scale from zero to 4 (with zero indicating no obstacle and 4 indicating a very severe obstacle), the overall mean for the 5,206 firms responding to this question is 2.47. When we correct for sample selection bias, we take into account that firms reporting land access as an obstacle may be systematically different from those not reporting an obstacle. Country and firm characteristics with statistically significant positive and negative effects of severity are shown in table 1, column 2.
The BEEPS also includes a way for the interviewer to respond to concerns about truthfulness in the survey responses: “It is my perception that the responses to the questions regarding opinions and perceptions (were): Truthful, Somewhat truthful, Not truthful.” Interviewer suspicions are associated with a greater likelihood of reporting land access as an obstacle (about a 3 percent greater probability). For example, among firms reporting land access as an obstacle, interviewer suspicions were associated with a significantly less intense reported obstacle. Apparently, suspicions are raised in the mind of the survey recorder when the firm representative is being overly optimistic relative to the recorder’s expectations.
Permit Seeking
In order to use the land to which it has access, a firm must be able to obtain relevant permits that can be crucial to the production process. By impeding land use, construction, or business occupancy permits, government officials may limit effective access to land. The BEEPS includes questions regarding the number of permits the firm obtained during the previous two years, the number of working days the staff spent on procedures related to obtaining those permits, formal and informal payments for permits, and waiting periods from application to receipt of permits. One question asks, “How many permits did this establishment obtain in the last two years?” Another asks, “How many working days were spent by all staff members on the procedures related to obtaining the permits applied for over the last two years?”
Responses to these questions are used in modeling both the number of permit applications and the related time costs (figures 3 and 4). About 34 percent of the businesses in the survey applied for permits, with a mean number of 3.9 applications, a mean number of 38.0 working days of effort, and a mean waiting time of 45.9 days. There is a very high variance among countries in the number of permits applied for, the days of effort expended, and the waiting time for permits.
The model of the number of permit applications reflects the interaction of supply and demand factors. A firm demands permits as it plans to develop its property while the government supplies permits according to its rules. Nine country characteristics have a significant effect on the number of permit applications requested, with four factors increasing the number and five factors decreasing it (table 1, column 3).
To understand time costs involved for firms seeking permits, the modeling approach involves a first-stage model to control for the selection bias that may exist with systematic differences between firms applying for permits and those that do not apply. The second-stage model results for permit time cost show that ten country-specific variables have statistically discernable effects—four factors increase staff time expended and six factors reduce staff time (table 1, column 4). Two firm-specific factors significantly increase days of effort, while six reduce the number of days of effort.
Bribes to Government Officials
The BEEPS also asks a question about informal payments to government officials: “Thinking about officials, would you say the following statement is always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom or never true?… It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments or gifts’ to get things done…” Responses are coded on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being never and 6 being always (figure 5). In a simple regression model of the frequency of bribes, ten country-specific explanatory variables and five firm-specific variables have statistically discernable effects (table 1, column 5).
Summary and Conclusions
Limited access to land and permits to use that land can contributes to economic inefficiency and corruption in transition countries. In this research I have estimated empirical models of firms reporting limited access to land and permits and instances of bribery as obstacles to economic development. Those models indicate that both country and firm characteristics affect land access, permit access and effort, and bribery.
At the country level, higher per capita GDP systematically reduces the likelihood of firms seeking permits, the number of permits, and the time cost to obtain them. That implies that more developed economies require fewer permits and present lower permit obstacles, thereby reducing costs. Furthermore, the higher the GDP growth rate the greater the likelihood that firms experience limited access to land and the need to apply for permits, as well as the likelihood that firms are asked to pay bribes. This may indicate bottlenecks in the development process as firms in CIS countries are much more likely to report that access to land is an obstacle. They also are required to apply for more permits, and they incur much larger time costs related to permit applications.
Higher corporate tax rates do not affect access to land or permits, but do increase the likelihood of being asked to pay bribes. Firms in more highly privatized economies report fewer problems with access to land and fewer permits needed, but more problems related to bribery. Indices of privatization and reform are often significant, but have both positive and negative impacts. This may reflect uneven reform processes in which liberalization in one sector of the economy does not have full impact due to constraints in other sectors.
Firms competing against others that are unregistered or operate in the informal market are more likely to report limited access to land, more likely to seek permits and incur time costs related to permits, and more likely to be asked to pay bribes. Firms subsidized by the government or those with larger numbers of employees also are more likely to report limited access to land, seek more permits, and incur larger permit time costs.
The primary lesson to be learned from this research is that limited access to land is a serious obstacle to economic development in transition countries. Furthermore, the ability to obtain permits to effectively use that land is crucial. Limited access to land and permits not only hinders economic development, but also contributes to a culture of bribery and corruption. Countries wishing to speed their development process should therefore remove impediments to land access by fostering markets for land and land use rights, and should also remove unnecessary obstacles in the permit process. The result will be a more efficient use of land and a more dynamic economy.
About the Author
John E. Anderson is the Baird Family Professor of Economics in the College of Business Administration at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has served as an advisor to public policy makers in the fields of public finance, fiscal reform, and tax policy in the United States and in transition economies.
References
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1995. Privatizing Russia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. 2009. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/BEEPS
Carlin, Wendy, Mark E. Schaffer, and Paul Seabright. 2007. Where are the real bottlenecks? Evidence from 20,000 firms in 60 countries about the shadow costs of constraints to firm performance. Discussion Paper Number 3059. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Commander, Simon, and Jan Svenjar. 2011. Business environment, exports, ownership, and firm performance. The Review of Economics and Statistics 93: 309–337.
Deininger, Klaus. 2003. Land markets in developing and transition economies: Impact of liberalization and implications for future reform. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 1217–1222.
Estrin, Saul, Jan Hanousek, Evzen Kocenda, and Jan Svenjar. 2009. Effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature 47: 699–728.
Stanfield, J. David. 1999. Creation of land markets in transition countries: Implications for the institutions sof land administration. Working Paper Number 29. Madison: University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center.