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Q. You have been at the helm of the Lincoln Institute since May 1. What aspect of the program has captured most of your attention in the past few months?
A. My first task has been to work with the staff to develop a more focused direction for the Institute’s programs over the next several years. Without question, we are going to continue the Institute’s commitment to quality research, education and publications programs. We want to both raise the level of debate through our research and publications and also meet our educational objective of directly helping public and private decisionmakers improve their understanding of land-related issues.
To both sharpen and narrow our program focus, we have identified three substantive areas or clusters where we will concentrate our efforts:
Q. Can you elaborate on these topics?
A. Sure, although it is hard to do so in a few words. We are still working on the language to better describe these important areas of inquiry.
In the area of taxation of land and buildings, we are interested in the special nature of taxes on real property, particularly those based on market value. We address the economic effects of such taxes, their legal structure and interpretation, especially with regard to valuation. We are also interested in political aspects of implementing property taxes, particularly as instruments of fiscal decentralization. Our work provides practical assistance to policymakers dealing with existing tax systems and also explores current tax reform efforts around this country and overseas.
In the area of land values, property rights and ownership, we consider the elements that determine land value and what portion of that value may properly be claimed by various sectors of society, including the public sphere. This focus area, therefore, touches upon the larger issue of property rights, the operations of formal and informal land markets in creating and distributing land value, and methods for recovering the costs of public investment in land.
In the area of land use and regulation, we focus on the process, plans and policies that affect the development of land, especially in urban “fringe” areas most at risk from changing land uses. We also investigate issues around the reuse of vacant and underutilized land and the conservation of undeveloped land. While we are interested in the economic efficiency of the use of land, we take a more comprehensive perspective for evaluating land use and its regulation. We seek to understand how the development, reuse and conservation of land affect other public values and goals, such as access to land, fairness, the character of society and the quality of life.
Q. How do you implement specific programs to address these issues?
A. The Institute has three major program components, each of which is involved with all three focus areas. Through our research program, we support scholarly projects to improve our understanding of land and taxation issues and to develop new ideas that integrate theory and practice. The education program presents courses, conferences, seminars and policy discussion workshops taught by scholars and practitioners with varied academic backgrounds and professional expertise. The publications program develops and produces newsletters, books, policy focus reports, working papers, and other media to communicate the results of our own research and education programs and the work of other colleagues in the field of land policy.
Q. Who are your major constituents and how do you reach them?
A. The Institute’s major constituents are public officials and other citizens who are actively involved in making decisions about the taxation, regulation and use of land. As an educational institution, we bring together varying viewpoints to expand the body of useful knowledge about land and tax policy and to make that knowledge accessible and comprehensible. Our objective is to provide practical assistance to policymakers, while at the same time exploring alternative approaches, both in the U.S. and internationally.
We are in the process of establishing advisory groups composed of scholars and practitioners to help us continue to refine the three focus areas. They will offer valuable assistance in guiding and evaluating the collaborative research, education and publications programs in each area. We are also developing a more focused approach to outreach and marketing. This will benefit individual courses and publications, as well as our overall goal of sharing ideas and resources through a growing variety of face-to-face meetings and electronic opportunities, such as our World Wide Web Home Page and other multi-media delivery systems.
Q. Looking forward to the Lincoln Institute’s 25th anniversary in 1999, how would you characterize the organization’s mission for the twenty-first century?
A. The Institute owes its existence to two visionaries who came of age in the late nineteenth century, Henry George and John C. Lincoln. George was an economist and social philosopher best known for his book, Progress and Poverty, in which he argued that the ownership, use and taxation of land has far-reaching effects on economic growth, social relations and politics. His work captured the attention of Cleveland industrialist John C. Lincoln, who established the Lincoln Foundation in 1947 to support further study and inquiry into George’s ideas.
Many of the problems that George decried in the late nineteenth century are still with us at the end of the twentieth. This summer I commissioned eight scholars to review George’s writings and document his insights on land use and taxation problems in terms of their relevance for the next century. We will report more on this research in subsequent issues of Land Lines.
It is my hope that all of us connected with the Institute–Board members, staff, research and faculty associates, and the policymakers and citizens whom we reach through our education and publications programs–can make progress on understanding contemporary issues of property valuation, taxation and land use. In the process we will fulfill our mission of contributing to the ongoing debate over land and tax policies that can benefit all sectors of society.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Durante las dos décadas pasadas, y en particular en años recientes, en varios países latinoamericanos los gobiernos centrales, regionales y locales han instrumentado programas de regularización de la tierra y de mejoramiento en asentamientos irregulares. Aunque incipiente, esta política urbana está teniendo resultados que merecen no sólo ser estudiados para fortalecer las prácticas vigentes sino, también, para promoverlos como directrices para los gobiernos que experimentan este tipo fenómenos por primera vez y que enfrentan la necesidad de desarrollar políticas para responder a la cada vez más intensa dinámica de los procesos informales de desarrollo urbano.
Para responder a esta necesidad, el Instituto Lincoln patrocinó la tercera edición del curso de “Mercados Informales y Programas de Regularización de la Tierra en Áreas Urbanas”. El curso se celebró en noviembre de 2003 en Recife, Brasil, ciudad que se seleccionó por su tradición en planeación urbana, que comprende entre otras experiencias, un programa pionero de regularización (PREZEIS) que, aún con limitaciones, ha operado durante 20 años. El curso se desarrolló con la participación de 35 personas de 10 países de América Latina , representantes de una variedad de profesiones y posiciones institucionales.
A continuación se analiza un conjunto de 13 lecciones interrelacionadas entre sí, que derivan de los trabajos presentados en Recife de las experiencias discutidas en los dos cursos previos, celebrados en 2001 y 2002, y de los resultados de la reunión de la Red Latinoamericana sobre Regularización del Instituto Lincoln, que se llevó a cabo en Brasilia, Brasil en junio de 2003.
Los autores se hacen responsables de cualquier interpretación que resulte de una síntesis general, como la presente; aún cuando este breve y crítico análisis sobre los programas de regularización de la tierra incorpora contribuciones de múltiples personas, (ver Figura 1).
El proceso de favelización
En América Latina se ha incrementado de manera significativa el ritmo del proceso informal de generación de espacio urbano, a pesar de que a diferencia de África o Asia, la región ha experimentado un ritmo persistente de urbanización durante varias décadas.
Las áreas ocupadas se están densificando y diariamente se forman nuevos asentamientos. Estos últimos, se constituyen de manera cada vez más frecuente en zonas de alta sensibilidad medioambiental: cercanos a depósitos protegidos de agua, terrenos públicos y otro tipo de áreas no aptas para la ocupación humana o económicamente poco viables en el mercado formal de suelo.
Este proceso ha generado repercusiones negativas de todo tipo (sociales, medioambientales, legales, económicas y políticas) no sólo para los millones de personas que residen en los asentamientos informales, sino también para los gobiernos de las ciudades y la población urbana en general.
A pesar de los innumerables programas de regularización y mejoramiento que se han instrumentado en décadas recientes, la tasa de desarrollo de los nuevos asentamientos informales ha sido de dos a tres veces superior a la del crecimiento de la población urbana. Por ello, el incremento en la informalidad no se puede atribuir de forma exclusiva a los cambios demográficos, ni al incremento en la pobreza urbana, que si bien ha aumentado, lo ha hecho en tasas menores.
El círculo vicioso de la informalidad
El establecimiento de asentamientos informales es producto de una multiplicidad de factores. En un balance, se observa que las variables locales resultan de mayor peso en la conformación de las “discrepancias inexplicables”, que los factores demográficos y macroeconómicos que afectan la pobreza urbana (políticas de empleo e ingresos). Al actuar o dejar de actuar, las autoridades locales han fomentado el desarrollo del fenómeno con mecanismos excluyentes de regulación de usos del suelo, privilegiando la asignación de la inversión publica en zonas residenciales de altos ingresos; actuando en complicidad con los fraccionadores ilegales de terrenos, y con la aplicación de inadecuadas políticas fiscales de orden local.
El corolario de esta tolerancia de la informalidad es un factor clave en la política de valorización del suelo. Los valores en el mercado informal se benefician de una mayor libertad regulatoria y de los valores sociales vinculados a las redes entre los residentes de los asentamientos. Los precios del mercado informal se ven afectados por ambas dinámicas hasta puntos absurdos. Por ejemplo, una casucha de madera de 60 metros cuadrados (60 pies cuadrados) ubicada en una zona pantanosa de Recife, se valúa en US $1.300,00.
Las variaciones extremas en los precios son el reflejo de la diversidad de procesos informales que inciden en el acceso al suelo urbano y la vivienda, tanto en el interior de un mismo asentamiento como entre asentamientos. Por lo tanto, un ingrediente indispensable de cualquier política que pretenda mitigar las consecuencias de la informalidad deberá ser la lucha contra los factores que perpetúan el círculo vicioso en la formación de los precios.
El mundo de la diversidad
Lejos de ser un fenómeno homogéneo, la informalidad se manifiesta en una diversidad de formas, contextos y lugares. Es posible hallar enormes diferencias en el interior y entre asentamientos de una misma cuidad, que se acrecientan al comparar ciudades de un país y ciudades de distintos países.
Cada área informal tiene barrios buenos y malos; unas zonas de alto valor y otras de valor bajo; una distribución desigual de cualquiera de los servicios con que cuenta y propiedades con distintas modalidades de tenencia. Asimismo, se observan variaciones en los niveles de ingreso, con familias que perciben mayores ingresos que aquéllas que residen en asentamientos formales que, en general, pagan por algunos de los servicios públicos.
Al comparar la diversidad de asentamientos informales que se encuentran distribuidos entre los barrios formales en muchas ciudades latinoamericanas, no se ha logrado establecer una correlación entre los gradientes de precio de las propiedades, lo que revela la presencia de distintas fuerzas de mercado. Si bien los mercados del suelo en las áreas formales e informales son muy vigorosos, los factores determinantes del precio tienen órdenes distintos de magnitud para cada mercado. Como se mencionó, la mayor libertad regulatoria, así como las redes informales de intercambio de beneficios intangibles, afectan los valores de la propiedad. Estos factores son una realidad ineludible, que debe tomarse en cuenta en el diseño de programas de regularización para que éstos puedan conducir a una reforma positiva en la práctica tradicional.
Es necesario, también, adecuar los programas a las distintas condiciones de los asentamientos; diferenciado entre los de reciente creación y aquéllos con varios años de existencia, ubicados en zonas consolidadas. Se pueden rastrear con mayor claridad las cadenas de transacciones con el suelo en los asentamientos recientes, mientras que en las zonas con mayor antigüedad no se observan sucesiones lineales de transacciones. De hecho, en los asentamientos más consolidados se observa una compleja sobreposición de derechos y transacciones informalmente definidos, por ejemplo, la venta a terceros de techos como “terreno”, que potencialmente contribuirían a la ampliación de espacios habitables.
Aún no está claro si los programas de regularización debieran iniciarse en asentamientos recientes, donde los costos de mejoramiento son menores y se cuenta con mayores grados de libertad; o bien, en zonas más antiguas y consolidadas, en las que las acciones pueden conducir a consecuencias sociales más inmediatas y donde, sin embargo, puede haber algunos derechos legales establecidos.
Tolerancia de la informalidad
A pesar de todas las implicaciones negativas asociadas al desarrollo urbano informal, las autoridades han tolerado los procesos: siendo negligentes, aprovechándolos políticamente, realizando acciones ambiguas o promoviendo directamente las ocupaciones.
Sin embargo, hay una falta de conocimiento en relación con los derechos que en el tiempo se generan por la propia tolerancia, y de información respecto a los altos costos, absolutos y relativos, de los programas de mejoramiento.
Paralelamente, la tolerancia frente a la ocupación informal se acompaña de una creciente convicción tanto de las autoridades como de la opinión pública, de que los asentamientos consolidados deben mejorarse a través de la introducción de infraestructura, provisión de servicios urbanos básicos y de equipamiento. Un estudio reciente, desarrollado por la Alianza de Ciudades en Brasil, demostró que la decisión de regularizar un asentamiento irregular se toma, con frecuencia, más rápido que la decisión de aprobar un asentamiento regular (seis meses, comparada con dos o tres años).
Esta tolerancia oficial también se aplica a la aceptación de “soluciones de segunda clase” para “ciudadanos de segunda clase”, que frecuentemente resultan en un rápido deterioro de las zonas mejoradas. La combinación de materiales de baja calidad y costo, y la utilización de técnicas no convencionales conlleva a procesos de rápida obsolescencia de la infraestructura y consecuentemente a altos costos de mantenimiento. Adicionalmente, es frecuente que las zonas mejoradas no estén integradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales. La irresponsabilidad fiscal de las autoridades municipales, que es característica de la región, se agrava por una falta de responsabilidad sobre el desarrollo territorial de las localidades, así como por su negligencia, o en el mejor de los casos actitudes paternalistas respecto a estos asentamientos.
Expectativas y valores del suelo
Hasta la fecha los programas de regularización se han instrumentado en un porcentaje muy reducido de asentamientos informales, y como resultado la gran mayoría de las personas que viven de manera informal no han sido beneficiarias de ninguna intervención pública. En la práctica, muchos de los programas de regularización se han desarrollado sin considerar las causas de la informalidad, generando resultados contraproducentes que tienden a acentuar los procesos de segregación socio-espacial.
La mera expectativa de regularización conduce a incrementos en la cotización de la tierra que se prevé será sujeta al mejoramiento, lo cual impacta de manera significativa los precios en el mercado informal. Mientras más alta sea la expectativa de regularización a futuro de un área, más alto será el sobreprecio del suelo en cuestión, y en consecuencia aumentará la demanda de terrenos más baratos en otros lugares.
Lo anterior plantea dos formas de abordar el mejoramiento: programas integrales, aplicados en pocos lugares, con políticas destinadas a incidir en las expectativas futuras de mecanismos de recuperación de costos. O bien, programas de mejoramiento parcial, instrumentados en todas las áreas informales de la ciudad, destinados a promover un balance y mayor consistencia en la actividad futura del mercado. Sigue sin comprenderse la importancia e implicaciones de integrar las áreas mejoradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales.
Políticas aisladas y fragmentadas
Las intervenciones públicas a través de programas de regularización de asentamientos irregulares han sido de carácter sectorial, aisladas, y en consecuencia no se integran con el contexto urbano más amplio, donde operan las políticas generales de administración del suelo que impactan directamente tales asentamientos. Estas políticas comprenden, entre otros temas, los de la construcción de vivienda social; la rehabilitación de centros urbanos deteriorados; la ocupación de baldíos e inmuebles vacantes; la asignación más amplia de inversión pública para infraestructura y servicios urbanos; la modernización de catastros y de sistemas de recaudación de impuestos, así como la promoción de asociaciones entre los sectores público y privado.
La mayoría de los programas de regularización se ha aplicado en zonas habitacionales y poco se ha hecho en áreas informales de industria y comercio, en edificios públicos desocupados; terrenos en zonas centrales o en asentamientos irregulares en zonas rurales.
En todos los niveles de gobierno, los programas de regularización se identifican por su fragmentación estructural (dentro de los programas, entre las diferentes secretarías y ministerios, y entre los distintos niveles de gobierno nacional, estatal y municipal), y como resultado los recursos son malgastados o bien no llegan a la población a la cual se dirigen.
Los programas también han adolecido de una falta de continuidad administrativa, generalmente producto de cambios en los contextos políticos locales. En lugar de apoyar a otras iniciativas, los programas de regularización frecuentemente consumen los limitados recursos de los gobiernos locales, en detrimento de otros tipos de programas de vivienda que se restringen o sacrifican.
Este problema tiene su origen tanto en las amplias líneas de crédito proporcionadas por organismos nacionales y agencias internacionales y multilaterales, como en la falta de mecanismos para operar con aportaciones de las autoridades locales, como vía para compartir la carga de los programas y promover esfuerzos para que los gobiernos municipales aumenten sus fuentes propias de ingresos. En términos generales, las líneas de crédito para los programas de regularización se han establecido sin un análisis adecuado de la capacidad financiera de los gobiernos municipales.
La falta de recursos financieros
Como si los problemas señalados fueran pocos, hay que agregar la falta de recursos financieros suficientes para los programas de regularización. Las provisiones presupuestarias no son compatibles con las aspiraciones de los objetivos propuestos, y frecuentemente no se cuenta con recursos específicos para los programas. Los ingresos obtenidos de operaciones relacionadas con el desarrollo urbano (cobros por derechos de construcción en áreas formales y de altos ingresos) no han sido adecuadamente canalizados hacia los programas de mejoramiento. Los recursos obtenidos a través de agencias internacionales no se han utilizado de la mejor manera. Ha habido una falta de seguimiento en el cumplimiento de objetivos y metas, y de evaluación de los propios programas. Adicionalmente, destaca la ausencia de políticas de microcréditos que pudieran utilizarse para incentivar y apoyar las organizaciones comunitarias.
Disociación del mejoramiento y la legalización
Se podrá argumentar que la ilegalidad es producto de la oferta insuficiente de suelo servido a costos accesibles. Sin embargo, en la práctica, se observa que a pesar del énfasis en el concepto de mejoramiento, una gran mayoría de los programas de regularización opera al margen de los programas de mejoramiento de vivienda y de apoyo socioeconómico con los cuales se busca la integración de las comunidades, y no están vinculados a las políticas destinadas a la legalización de terrenos y lotes individuales.
El mejoramiento y la legalización se han concebido como procesos independientes, e incluso se ha llegado a sostener que la legalización es producto de los procesos de mejoramiento. Lo cierto es que la mayoría de los programas de mejoramiento no conduce al cumplimiento de las condiciones requeridas para poner en marcha los procesos de legalización en áreas informales. En los pocos programas en los que se ha logrado dar inicio al proceso de legalización, se han desarrollado soluciones legales y políticas ad-hoc, que con frecuencia son ajenas a las condiciones urbanas y fuerzas que operan en el entorno.
A pesar de la publicidad que se ha realizado en torno a los programas de regularización, el número de títulos de propiedad expedidos por las dependencias responsables es sorprendentemente bajo. Entre las explicaciones dadas se destacan la complejidad de las leyes y las actitudes conservadoras y de resistencia de parte de los notarios y de las autoridades responsables de los registros de la propiedad. Es importante agregar, también, que la mayoría de las familias, al recibir un título que reconoce su legítimo derecho sobre la propiedad, no concluye los procesos de registro, muchas veces por no entender el trasfondo legal, o por su complejidad y por los costos que significan.
En respuesta se ha propuesto, por un lado, la simplificación de los requisitos y procesos de titulación y registro y, por otro, la necesidad de restarle poder a las estructuras burocráticas responsables de los citados procesos.
La importancia de la titulación
Como resultado de los problemas mencionados, son pocos los programas en que se alcanza la etapa de legalización, y son menos aún en los que se concluye el registro de los lotes legalizados. Por ello, muchos analistas han concluido que los títulos no son importantes y que lo realmente significativo es la percepción de seguridad en la tenencia de la tierra que tengan los pobladores.
No se puede negar que la percepción de la seguridad es un elemento que promueve la inversión de las familias para consolidar sus viviendas, sin embargo la titulación es importante por dos razones: el interés personal de los residentes (por la seguridad de tenencia de la tierra, la protección contra desalojos, los conflictos domésticos, las separaciones maritales, las herencias, los conflictos vecinales y el acceso a formas diversas de crédito); y el interés de la ciudad en su conjunto, ya que la legalización puede contribuir a la estabilización de los mercados del suelo, y con ello permitir formas más racionales y articuladas de intervención pública.
Hoy todavía hay grandes resistencias del sistema judicial y del público en general, con respecto a los programas de titulación. Es importante señalar, también, que los beneficiarios individuales de estos programas con frecuencia desconocen la protección y las limitaciones que derivan de la titulación. Las preguntas ¿para qué sirve un título? y ¿por qué se tienen que registrar los títulos?, entre otras, apuntan a la necesidad de acompañar los programas de regularización con programas educativos tanto para los administradores de las ciudades como para los residentes de los asentamientos informales.
Otro punto a considerar es la falta de análisis sobre el impacto de los instrumentos que se emplean en la legalización de lotes. Como resultado del énfasis en la titulación individual, se ha tendido a ignorar la necesidad de generar soluciones legales colectivas, para responder a problemas sociales comunes. De hecho, cuando se han empleado estos nuevos instrumentos legales, no se ha logrado compatibilizarlos con la normatividad urbana existente y no han previsto sus implicaciones legales.
El análisis de alternativas legales ha sido insuficiente y carente de creatividad. Se requiere realizar mayores y más consistentes esfuerzos para desarrollar nuevos instrumentos y para lograr acreditarlos, no sólo ante los distintos organismos financieros, sino también ante la sociedad en su conjunto.
La falacia de la participación popular
Aun cuando los contextos políticos de los programas de regularización han variado inmensamente en el tiempo, en términos generales, la participación popular ha sido poco significativa en su formulación e instrumentación. Esta situación se ha agravado debido a la creación de formas de participación artificiales, para cumplir con los requisitos de los organismos financieros. Los mecanismos de participación popular diseñados han sido, en el mejor de los casos, una formalidad, y en el peor, una farsa.
Son muy pocos los programas en los que se ha logrado incorporar propuestas de soluciones generadas por las comunidades afectadas. El marco político-institucional y cultural en el que se ha desarrollado la mayoría de los programas de regularización, junto con las limitaciones que derivan de las formas de financiamiento, prácticamente eliminan las posibilidades de una participación pública efectiva, dado que la participación pública normalmente trae consigo cuestionamientos severos al status quo. Por ello, los programas de regularización tienden a percibirse como soluciones destinadas a promover o proteger la institucionalidad, más que como respuestas a las demandas de la mayoría de la población de menores ingresos.
Compatibilidad entre escala, traza y derechos
Quizás el problema central de los programas de regularización sea la dificultad de compatibilizar la escala de las intervenciones, con las patrones técnicos, urbanos y medioambientales propuestos para los asentamientos, y la naturaleza de los derechos que les serán reconocidos a los residentes. Para poder garantizar la sustentabilidad de los programas y su impacto, es necesario discutir los temas de escala, traza y derechos de manera conjunta.
Efectos de los programas de regularización en el tiempo
Concluidos los programas de mejoramiento y legalización, las autoridades suelen retirarse de los asentamientos, aun cuando podrían realizar una diversidad de funciones que van desde el monitoreo y evaluación del mantenimiento de la infraestructura provista (por ejemplo, de los sistemas de agua potable y drenaje), hasta el desarrollo de lineamientos y reglas para la incorporación de población nueva.
Los asentamientos tienden a deteriorarse muy rápidamente por la falta de presencia e intervenciones oficiales, al grado que la legitimidad provista por los programas de regularización puede “contaminar” a barrios de origen formal, promoviendo prácticas informales de usos del suelo.
En términos generales los programas de regularización no han logrado la integración urbana, social y cultural de las áreas mejoradas que se había anticipado. De manera tal que las áreas regularizadas siguen siendo consideradas como “de segunda”, mucho tiempo después de concluidos los programas. La idea de que los asentamientos regularizados experimentarán una trayectoria virtuosa, escasamente sobrevive a las justificaciones que dieron origen a los programas.
El equilibrio entre las libertades individuales y las funciones públicas
A pesar de la preocupación por garantizar que los beneficiarios de las intervenciones públicas sean efectivamente residentes de los asentamientos informales en los programas de regularización, no se ha logrado un equilibrio adecuado entre el respeto por los derechos y libertades individuales y las funciones públicas de los programas (los derechos sociales a la vivienda y la necesidad de generar áreas para tal efecto). Frecuentemente las soluciones legales propuestas implican restricciones que, en la práctica, congelan los procesos de movilidad que caracterizan a este tipo de asentamientos (afectando, por ejemplo, los términos de venta, compra y renta), lo cual tiende a reforzar la informalidad.
La estrategia de centrarse en un área o un grupo social parece ignorar la esencia y el origen de la informalidad, lo que representa una situación en sí misma tramposa. Por un lado, la falta de recursos de los programas, les dificulta a las familias capitalizar el beneficio obtenido, para reubicarse en otro asentamiento informal, esperando ser sujeto de un siguiente proceso de regularización en el futuro. Por otro lado, el costo de monitorear y controlar este tipo de prácticas puede ser muy alto y hasta inviable. Como se mencionó, la imposición de restricciones a las transacciones simplemente generará nuevos arreglos informales.
Es interesante observar que son muy pocos los programas que han reconocido y logrado responder a la movilidad (ascendente o descendente) de los residentes de los asentamientos regularizados. Los programas se diseñan pensando en una comunidad estática. La movilidad interurbana, particularmente entre residentes de asentamientos informales y entre áreas formales e informales, no es un proceso bien entendido y por ello, mejor se ignora. Una posible salida a este acertijo podría encontrarse en mecanismos para la recuperación de costos o para la recuperación de plusvalías, que operen desde de la fase de planeación de los nuevos programas de regularización.
Conclusiones
Generalmente en la formulación de los programas de regularización no se parte de metas y cronogramas de trabajo claramente establecidos, problema que se agudiza por la falta de indicadores de evaluación adecuados.
En suma, los objetivos formales de los programas de regularización en Latinoamérica (promoción de la seguridad de la tenencia y la integración socio-espacial de los asentamientos y su población) no se han logrado traducir en diagnósticos integrales, instrumentos efectivos y estrategias claras para su ejecución, como tampoco han podido incidir en las deficiencias en la capacidad administrativa de los ejecutores. Como resultado, a la fecha no se puede considerar que las experiencias latinoamericanas en materia de regularización sean exitosas.
Se puede decir, sin embargo, que los programas de regularización han tenido la virtud de despertar y sensibilizar la conciencia pública con respecto a la legitimidad de las demandas de un grupo significativo y creciente de ciudadanos, que al estar excluido del sistema socioeconómico formal, requiere respuestas integrales y efectivas.
Incluso con las limitaciones señaladas, estos programas han permitido que grupos de pobres urbanos puedan permanecer en zonas servidas ubicadas en áreas centrales de muchas ciudades latinoamericanas y han contribuido a mejorar las condiciones de vida de familias residentes de asentamientos regularizados. Estos logros son de gran importancia, sobre todo a la luz de la cruel dinámica de segregación socio-espacial que prevalece en la región.
Edésio Fernandes es profesor de medio tiempo en la Unidad de Planeación del Desarrollo (Development Planning Unit) del Colegio Universitario de Londres (University College, London). Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa de América Latina y el Caribe, del Instituto Lincoln.
Artículos relacionados, publicados en Land Lines
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in a global perspective. Abril: 8-11
Calderón, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit, April: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto´s The Mystery of Capital. Enero: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. Faculty profile, Julio: 12-13
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Enero: 4-7
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective on the Latin America program. Octubre: 8-12
Figura 1: Aciertos y Desaciertos de los Programas de Regularización
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In the past decade, nearly 50 mansions have been demolished and replaced in the historic Chicago suburb of Kenilworth. Four demolition permits are currently pending review, while permits have been approved for two other historically significant houses. To slow the teardown trend, Kenilworth has enacted a nine-month waiting period between issuance of a demolition permit and initiation of the teardown process. However, the village does not have a historic preservation ordinance, and local officials generally support the rights of property owners to demolish and replace their houses. The National Trust for Historic Preservation included Kenilworth on its 2006 list of the 11 most endangered places nationwide (Black 2006).
The practice of demolishing and replacing houses in high-priced areas generates passionate controversy. The fight to save the Skiff House in Kenilworth is illustrative (Nance 2005). That property at 157 Kenilworth Avenue is one of the premier locations in one of Chicago’s most expensive suburbs, three blocks west of Lake Michigan and five blocks from the commuter train station in the village center.
The house was built in 1908 for Frederick Skiff, the first director of Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History. This beautiful and historically significant house was designed by the architectural firm of Daniel H. Burnham, who was considered the preeminent architect in America at the turn of the twentieth century. He oversaw the construction of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition and helped design a series of lakefront parks as part of the 1909 Plan of Chicago.
Plans to demolish the Skiff House shortly after it was purchased in 2004 for $1.875 million created an uproar. While many neighbors supported the owner’s right to tear down the property—after all, they might want to do the same—others saw it as an assault on the community’s character. “Save 157 Kenilworth” signs began to appear in front yards throughout the village, and a neighborhood group, Citizens for Kenilworth, led a campaign to save the house. After months of controversy, and only days after an auction to sell off valuable parts of the house before demolition, a neighbor purchased the house for $2.35 million in order to save it.
Historic houses continue to be torn down in Kenilworth and elsewhere, but not all teardowns generate controversy. Residents of many Chicago suburbs have been supportive of the teardown trend. Naperville is a representative case. Founded in 1831 and incorporated in 1857, Naperville grew slowly until plans for the East-West Tollway (I-88) were announced in 1954. The population grew from 7,013 in 1950, to 21,675 in 1960, to 140,106 today.
Naperville’s downtown has undergone a renaissance over the last decade, attracting new restaurants, shops, and residences. Although the city has a historic district just to the east of the downtown area, teardown activity has been concentrated in what were formerly more humble areas. Small, older houses are being purchased for about $400,000 and replaced by much larger houses that may sell for $1 million.
The teardown trend in Naperville is illustrated by one small house being sold as a teardown, with an announcement of an upcoming public hearing posted in the yard. It is likely to be replaced by a house that is similar to the recently constructed house next door (see pages 6 and 7). Though teardown activity is not entirely without controversy in Naperville, it does not generate the same passion as the Skiff House did.
How Widespread is the Teardown Phenomenon?
Nationwide the teardown phenomenon has attracted much media and public attention. The decennial Census of Population and Housing offers a way to quantify the practice using the “net replacement method.” For example, suppose the Census lists 10,000 housing units in an area for 1990 and 10,500 units in 2000—an increase of 500 units. Now suppose the Census shows that 800 housing units were built during the decade. Then 300 of the newly built units must have simply replaced existing units. The 300 replacement units are a crude but nonetheless enlightening measure of teardown activity in that community.
Figure 1 shows counties where at least one census tract had a net replacement rate in excess of 4 percent. Teardown activity is clustered in older urban areas in the Northeast, Midwest, and California. In fact, the map does not look substantially different from a map of population density in the United States. This simple analysis shows that replacement of the preexisting housing stock is an extensive phenomenon that is national in scope.
Nevertheless, it is surprisingly difficult to track teardown activity on a case-by-case basis. The classic teardown is a house whose sale is followed by the issuance of both demolition and building permits, but timing is a key factor in tracking these permits. If a demolition permit is issued four years after a sale, was the house really sold as a teardown? Similarly, a building permit may be issued long after a dilapidated house was demolished, yet this situation is not what most people have in mind when they think of teardowns.
Some teardowns are carried out by the current owner without a sale. Other houses are so extensively remodeled that they are effectively teardowns, even though no demolition permit is issued. Even when data on sales, demolition permits, and building permits are available, it is difficult to merge the different sources of information since they frequently come from different agencies that vary in the quality of their database management.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation has described the Chicago metropolitan area as the “epicenter of teardowns.” Aside from Kenilworth, teardowns are common in both the city of Chicago and its suburbs. The Village of Skokie (2005) surveyed 20 of its neighbors in Chicago’s near north suburbs and compared the number of detached single-family housing unit demolition permits from 2000 to 2003 to the total number of such units as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census. Thirteen of the 20 communities reported demolition permits representing more than 1 percent of the housing stock over the four-year period.
Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) have used data from Chicago and six suburban communities to document the degree of teardown activity in the region. We were able to obtain data on house sales and demolition permits for Chicago; one of its suburbs to the west, Western Springs; the northwest suburb of Park Ridge; and four suburbs on the North Shore—Glencoe, Kenilworth, Wilmette, and Winnetka.
Between 1996 and 2003, the number of demolition permits ranged from 29 in Kenilworth to 273 in Winnetka and 12,236 in Chicago. Of course, Kenilworth has only 2,494 residents, whereas Winnetka’s population is 12,419, and Chicago has 2.9 million residents. Figure 2 shows the number of demolition permits as a percentage of total housing units for each community. More than 9 percent of Winnetka’s housing stock was torn down between 1996 and 2003, and teardown rates were also quite high in Winnetka and Kenilworth. Even Chicago, with more than 400,000 housing units, had a demolition rate near 3 percent.
These six suburbs were not chosen randomly. All had high median incomes in 2000, ranging from $73,154 in Park Ridge to more than $200,000 in Kenilworth. All of these suburbs have stations on commuter train lines to downtown Chicago, little or no vacant land on which to build, and good schools and other local public services. In other words, demand to live in these suburbs is high. Teardown activity in Chicago is concentrated in comparable neighborhoods within the city, such as Lincoln Park, West Town, and Lakeview on the near north side.
The Costs and Benefits of Teardowns
Teardowns can impose significant social costs. Local residents often complain that new houses destroy the character of a neighborhood. Those houses may be built to the limits of the zoning code, tower above their neighbors, and reach to the edge of the property line. Sometimes neighbors simply dislike the design of new buildings, particularly those that replace historic houses. When tall apartment buildings replace single-family houses or two-family houses in the city, neighbors complain of the loss of sunlight, lack of parking spaces, and increased traffic congestion. The construction process itself can be noisy and disruptive. New, expensive houses may cause assessments to increase in the neighborhood. And, teardowns may reduce the stock of affordable housing.
Teardowns also carry some benefits, however. In places that rely on the property tax to fund local services, the additional revenue from high-priced replacement houses is often quite welcome. Not all teardown buildings are historic, architecturally significant, or mourned when they are demolished. Some teardowns are simply eyesores.
Some of the new houses being built today will eventually be viewed as historically significant properties in their own right. Once entire blocks are rebuilt, the new housing no longer looks out of place. It is surprising to discover how stark and incompatible some properties built in the early 1900s appear in historic photographs taken before trees grew and the neighborhood filled in with similar houses.
It also is important to recognize that teardowns may help to curb sprawl. One reason people move to the urban fringe is to build a new house in a contemporary construction style. Allowing people to tear down a small, outdated house and replace it with a modern house may induce them to stay in centrally located areas. In general, encouraging housing and economic growth helps maintain the vitality of previously developed areas, which is a strategic complement to anti-sprawl policies designed to limit growth at the fringe.
Policy Responses
Local jurisdictions have been creative in responding to teardowns. Some policies are designed to the slow the amount of teardown activity by making it more costly, through demolition fees and fines for illegal demolitions. Others, such as a moratorium on new demolition permits or an enforced waiting period between permit issuance and the time when demolition can start, are simply designed to cool a potential teardown fever. Such policies also raise the cost of teardowns by making developers wait for some time after purchasing a property before being able to recoup their costs. Complementary policies include landmark designation and historic district designation, which make it more difficult or even impossible to tear down existing structures.
Policies on the other side of the balance sheet may give developers an incentive not to demolish existing structures. Communities may offer tax breaks to owners who rehabilitate existing houses rather than demolish them to build new ones. Or, owners may be granted variances from restrictive zoning provisions in order to enlarge rather than demolish an existing house.
At the same time, jurisdictions often use zoning to influence the type of new housing that is built in their community. Lot-coverage and floor-area restrictions are used to ensure that new structures do not dwarf their neighbors. Other policies include maximum building sizes; set-back and open space requirements; and restrictions on such design elements as garage and driveway locations, roof pitch, bulk limits, solar access, and the alignment of the new house with neighboring structures. Many communities have design review boards that can revoke building permits for structures that are not in compliance. These standards are not always clear beforehand, however, and they can increase the level of uncertainty for developers, delay construction, and raise costs.
Even if communities do not attempt to curb teardown activity, they often adopt policies designed to reduce the disruption caused by new construction. The builder may be required to notify neighbors when construction is about to begin, and a time window may be imposed for completion of the building. Construction activity may be limited to certain hours of day, the site may need to be fenced, and work vehicle and dumpster location requirements are often imposed. Communities also may require that contractors be bonded and certified.
How successful are these policies in slowing the rate of teardown activity? As we have seen, the Skiff House was saved because Kenilworth’s nine-month waiting period between permit issuance and the start of demolition provided enough time for a buyer to step forward before the house was razed. However, the potential for profits in such transactions make it difficult to stop teardowns completely. If a developer can purchase an existing property for $300,000, demolish it for $20,000, and spend $400,000 to build a new house according to current construction standards, then he has incurred $720,000 in costs. With new upscale houses routinely selling in excess of $1 million in communities with many teardowns, it should not be surprising that developers continue this practice.
Implications for Land Values
Assessors encounter enormous difficulties in placing a value on land in built-up areas. When few vacant lots exist, it is nearly impossible to find enough sales of vacant land to assess the value of land accurately. In the absence of direct land sales data, land values can be estimated by subtracting construction costs less depreciation from the sale price of improved properties in the area.
Statistical analysis of mass appraisal data can account for such structural characteristics as square footage in order to control for the contribution of the building to total property value. With a complete set of these characteristics, the residual from the regression reflects the contribution of location to property value—in other words, land value. Unfortunately, any unobserved structural characteristic will also be part of the residual.
Teardowns can help estimate the value of land in developed areas. Consider the earlier example of a property that is purchased for $300,000, demolished for $20,000, and replaced by a million-dollar house. If the developer could purchase a vacant lot of the identical size next door for $290,000, which property would he prefer? If there is no salvage value for parts of the existing house, it will cost the developer $320,000 before it is possible to build on the lot with the existing house. Yet the vacant lot is available in the same general location for $30,000 less. The vacant lot is preferable even though it does not include a house—in fact, it is preferable precisely because it does not include an existing structure.
If the price of the vacant lot rises to $310,000, the developer still obtains a lot that is ready to build upon for $10,000 less than the cost of building on the neighboring lot. Only at $320,000 will the developer be indifferent between the two lots. It follows that the value of land in this case is $320,000. This key insight leads to an extremely useful method of valuing land in areas experiencing teardowns. The value of land is simply the sales price of a teardown property plus any demolition cost.
An important implication of this line of reasoning is that only location determines the value of a teardown property; characteristics of the structure are irrelevant except insofar as they influence demolitions costs or salvage value. This implication is somewhat surprising to people who think that a historic house has intrinsic value. Though it is tempting to think that the Skiff House in Kenilworth is worth approximately $2 million because of its historic and architectural value, a vacant lot next door would sell for nearly the same price. Any house near Lake Michigan in Kenilworth will sell for well more than $1 million. The conclusion to be drawn is simply that land is expensive along Chicago’s North Shore.
Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) test the prediction that only location characteristics influence sales prices in our sample of seven communities in the Chicago area. Our measures of location include such variables as lot size, distance from the nearest commuter train station, and proximity to Lake Michigan. Structural characteristics include such variables as building size, age, and whether the house is built of brick and has a basement, garage, or fireplace. We identify teardowns as houses for which a demolition permit was issued within two years of a sale. As predicted, structural characteristics do not significantly influence the sales price of teardown properties. Teardowns are purchased for the land underneath.
Final Thoughts
The teardown phenomenon is not new. Houses have been demolished and replaced for as long as they have been built. American cities grew rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and again in the years just after World War II. Tastes now appear to be changing toward larger houses with spacious rooms and high ceilings. Many people find the existing housing stock less desirable than new construction. In this situation, it is not surprising that buyers purchase, demolish, and build new houses, especially in high-demand areas. The trick for local governments is to keep the costs of teardown activity from overwhelming the less obvious benefits.
Daniel P. McMillen is professor in the Department of Economics and the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at University of Illinois at Chicago. He has published widely in urban economics, real estate, and applied econometrics. He is a visiting fellow in 2006–2007 at the Lincoln Institute.
References
Black, Lisa. 2006. Kenilworth added to list of endangered historic towns. Chicago Tribune, May 20.
Dye, Richard, and Daniel P. McMillen. Forthcoming. Teardowns and land values in the Chicago metropolitan area. Journal of Urban Economics.
Nance, Kevin. 2005. Teardown ‘madness has to stop’: Developer rescues historic Burnham house, but says it’s just a start. Chicago Sun-Times, November 6.
Village of Skokie. 2005. Comprehensive Plan Appendix C: Near north suburban housing activity study. http://www.skokie.org/comm/Appendix%20C.pdf.
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The character of institutions, political settings, and social relationships is critical in determining whether nonprofit developers are effective in reusing vacant, abandoned, and contaminated properties in their communities.
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Hace cinco años, Mandy Pumilia, residente de Nueva Orleáns, estaba preocupada por la gran cantidad de estructuras aparentemente deterioradas que existían en su barrio, conocido como Bywater, donde actualmente se desempeña como vicepresidente de la asociación de vecinos. A pesar de todos los esfuerzos realizados con posterioridad a la catástrofe de Katrina, resultaba muy difícil identificar y rastrear las propiedades que verdaderamente presentaban problemas y, además, Pumilia no tenía acceso a los datos municipales que podrían haberle sido de utilidad. En lugar de ello, elaboró su propia planilla de cálculo en Google y la llenó con los resultados de su propia investigación y trabajo de campo. Según recuerda, “fue un proceso arduo”. Y a pesar de sus conocimientos tecnológicos y su determinación, esta tarea sólo fue una solución limitada: no resultaba fácil compartir la información más allá de las personas que ella conocía directamente y, además, estar al día de las audiencias municipales relacionadas con temas de la propiedad era una tarea enorme.
A partir de entonces, la aplicación web BlightStatus (blightstatus.nola.gov) –que se traduciría como “status de deterioro”– se ha convertido en una nueva y valiosa herramienta a la hora de tomar medidas de recuperación en su barrio. Creada en el año 2012 por Code for America, una organización sin fines de lucro especializada en proyectos de código abierto dirigidos al gobierno municipal, BlightStatus facilita a ciudadanos como Pumilia el acceso a datos sobre propiedades, permitiéndoles participar de manera más estrecha en la gestión del deterioro y otros desafíos de planificación. Esta iniciativa llamó la atención de otras ciudades, lo que generó una iniciativa derivada, denominada Civic Insight, que actualmente despliega su tecnología en Dallas, Atlanta, Palo Alto, Sacramento y otros lugares.
En Nueva Orleáns, BlightStatus reúne información sobre inspecciones, quejas relativas a las normas, audiencias, juicios, ejecuciones hipotecarias, etc. Por lo general, estos datos se encuentran encriptados o resulta muy difícil acceder a los mismos; sin embargo, esta aplicación reúne y actualiza la mayoría de los datos a diario. Los usuarios pueden buscar por dirección o utilizar un mapa interactivo para buscar a nivel de barrio o de ciudad. Un aspecto particularmente útil es la función “lista de observación”, que permite a un usuario como Pumilia mantener pestañas abiertas relacionadas con ciertas propiedades específicas y oportunamente envía alertas sobre audiencias o cualquier otra novedad. Pumilia agrega: “Además, me facilita empoderar a otros residentes, por lo que no soy la única persona que posee esta información”.
Cuando otras ciudades conocieron el uso extensivo que Nueva Orleáns hacía de esta aplicación y, como consecuencia, expresaron su interés en disponer de una herramienta similar, Code for America adaptó la tecnología para que pudiera funcionar en cualquier lugar. Tal como lo expresa Eddie Tejeda, uno de los creadores de BlightStatus: “Parecía que habíamos tocado una fibra sensible”. Los aspectos específicos variaban de un lugar a otro, pero la lucha para obtener datos inmobiliarios oficiales era, claramente, una frustración común a todos. Mucha gente quiere información sobre edificios y propiedades, pero lo único que suele estar disponible, según Tejeda, “es realmente muy difícil de utilizar”, ya que profundizar en estos datos requiere conocimientos y experiencia.
Con una inversión de la Fundación Knight, el grupo creó Civic Insight en el año 2013, utilizando el trabajo que habían realizado en Nueva Orleáns como un modelo que pudiera adaptarse a otras ciudades, ya fueran más grandes o más pequeñas, con diferentes necesidades y conjuntos de datos (las cuotas de configuración y suscripción anual varían según la población: aproximadamente de US$1.000 a US$10.000 para la tarifa básica, más un monto de entre 20 y 70 centavos de dólar per cápita). Entre los nuevos clientes, Dallas está resultando ser un caso de estudio particularmente importante. Esta metrópoli en franco crecimiento, que presenta una gran variedad de barrios muy diferentes entre sí –desde los caros y prósperos hasta aquellos con graves problemas económicos–, demuestra que esta estrategia de tecnología de datos de código abierto no sólo sirve en casos selectivos como el de Nueva Orleáns después del huracán Katrina.
La conexión se dio a través de la organización Hábitat para la Humanidad. La delegación que esta entidad sin fines de lucro tiene en Nueva Orleáns ha sido un usuario entusiasta de la aplicación BlightStatus. Los miembros de esta organización hicieron correr la voz a sus colegas en Dallas, ciudad que ha estado luchando por lograr estrategias para utilizar datos con el fin de definir, rastrear y abordar el problema del deterioro y otras cuestiones, como la identificación de propietarios problemáticos. La versión de Blight-Status para Dallas, cuyo lanzamiento fue a finales del año 2014 con datos similares a la información recabada en Nueva Orleáns, incorporará estadísticas adicionales relativas a delincuencia y tributación, ya que los residentes desean acceder a estos datos más fácilmente, como afirma Theresa O’Donnell, directora de planificación municipal que habló sobre la aplicación en la conferencia de Directores de Planificación de Grandes Ciudades organizada por el Instituto Lincoln en Cambridge en octubre de 2014. Según O’Donnell, “a medida que estos programas se configuren y se comiencen a utilizar, podremos contar cada vez más con los ciudadanos para que nos hagan saber si [las medidas que tomamos contra el deterioro] están funcionando o no”.
Atlanta y Sacramento están poniendo en funcionamiento sus propios programas para poder utilizar la aplicación este año, y Civic Insight está tomando medidas para que pueda utilizarse muy pronto en Fort Worth, Texas, y otros lugares. Los objetivos de los clientes no se limitan a los problemas relacionados con el deterioro, según destaca Tejeda, que actualmente se desempeña como director ejecutivo de Civic Insight: en Palo Alto, donde la zonificación, el desarrollo y la construcción son temas candentes, tanto arquitectos como propietarios utilizan la aplicación para mantenerse al día en los procesos de obtención de permisos. Esta flexibilidad es deliberada. Tal como explica Tejeda, “podemos cartografiar con relativa rapidez [datos sin procesar] en nuestra aplicación. El papel que desempeñamos es el de un traductor que interpreta lo que tiene la ciudad y las necesidades de la comunidad” (la aplicación está diseñada también para recibir nuevos conjuntos de datos, y no es de sorprender que ciudadanos activos de Nueva Orleáns, como Pumilia, tengan muchísimas sugerencias que Civic Insight está tratando de incorporar).
Los conjuntos de datos integrales y otras herramientas digitales han servido de guía a los planificadores y otros funcionarios municipales durante años, pero Civic Insight está ahora pensando en dar el siguiente paso lógico. Según Peter Pollock, fellow del Instituto Lincoln y exdirector de planificación de Boulder, Colorado, “tenemos la gran oportunidad de aprovechar estos datos –que, para muchas ciudades, son datos ocultos– y sacarlos a la luz”, de manera que resulten útiles tanto para los ciudadanos como para los planificadores.
Este nivel de accesibilidad es muy importante, ya que los gestores de políticas deben “coproducir la buena ciudad” junto con los residentes, tal como lo expresa Pollock, quien continúa: “Los planificadores tienen la tarea de aprovechar la energía de la comunidad y encauzarla hacia una visión para el futuro”. Esto implica aspectos tales como la zonificación y la obtención de permisos, pero también los referentes al mantenimiento y el cumplimiento de normas. Pollock concluye: “No se trata sólo de construir la ciudad, sino de cuidar y alimentar a la ciudad a lo largo del tiempo”.
Aun así, la propuesta de Civic Insight puede parecer confusa al principio: ¿Cómo se beneficia una ciudad al esperar que los ciudadanos analicen cuidadosamente la información que ya posee? Sin embargo, esa es la cuestión. Poner los datos a disposición de las personas que realmente conocen los barrios donde viven y trabajan equivale a una especie de estrategia de crowdsourcing –o externalización distribuida– para el mantenimiento de la ciudad en lo relativo a la planificación.
Si no, preguntémosle a Pumilia. Esta es la esencia de lo que ella trataba de hacer en Nueva Orleáns hace unos pocos años con su planilla de cálculo casera y muchísimo coraje. Ahora puede monitorear su barrio más fácilmente, y puede además recomendar BlightStatus a otras personas para que puedan también obtener rápidamente la información que necesitan y presionar al municipio para que tome medidas respecto a las propiedades problemáticas.
Mientras hablamos, Pumilia busca unos datos y nos cuenta la historia de una dirección en particular: “Sobre esta propiedad pesan no una, dos, tres, ni cuatro causas, sino ¡cinco!”. En pocas palabras, Pumilia acaba de improvisar un expediente listo para usar sobre el abandono de la propiedad, que ayudó a persuadir a los funcionarios públicos a iniciar un proceso que debería desembocar en la subasta pública de la propiedad.
A veces, Pumilia dice, riendo: “Se necesita la acción de los ciudadanos para animar a la gente a realizar su trabajo”.
Rob Walker (robwalker.net) colabora con Yahoo Tech, Design Observer y The New York Times.
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St. Petersburg was the host city for an international conference on “Land Reform and the Emerging Property Market in Russia,” organized by the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research and the Lincoln Institute in May 2001. Experts from government agencies, commercial entities and academic institutions in Russia, the U.S. and Europe convened to assess the progress of Russian land reforms and discuss future implementation. The conference focused on two key points: the principal obstacles to be targeted by various land reform actions and the triggers that are needed to set a series of decisive steps in motion.
From an academic and historical perspective, the unfolding story of Russian land privatization is intellectually engaging and, from a practical point of view, the process and its implications have far-reaching implications for the Russian people. The Lincoln Institute’s interest in convening the conference and its continuing involvement in Russia allow us to learn from local experts, to share Institute experience and perspectives from other countries, and to provide support for ongoing land reform efforts. The conference revealed the need for professional training for Russians working in the emerging land market, and the Lincoln Institute and the Leontief Centre are developing curriculum and training courses to be offered in St. Petersburg later this year. For example, many private business owners now find themselves in the new role of property manager, and sometimes their land and buildings are a more valuable asset to the enterprise than the business itself. However, they lack knowledge and experience regarding property rights, leases, appraisal, zoning, regulation, planning and a range of other topics.
In the post-Soviet period, privatization of the real estate sector in Russia has been most advanced in its urban centers, and St. Petersburg was one of the first cities to start selling land plots occupied by either privatized (i.e., former state) or new businesses. Yet even there, by 2000 only about 5 percent of urban land had been privatized. The main problems with regard to the land market in Russia arise from the lack of clear definitions provided by Russian law; the failure of the law to develop fundamental provisions contained in the Russian Constitution regarding private ownership of land; and the consequent lack of firm guarantees for private property and inadequate protections through the courts. A brief history of land policies in Russia will help to provide a context for the current situation.
Land in Russian History
Land has been a central social and economic force throughout Russian history, although Russia has never had private ownership of land for any length of time or in any full sense of the term. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, state property was the predominant form of property ownership. Moreover, a considerable part of that property, including land, was unregistered and unconnected to the broader economy. It was only in 1906 that the Stolypin reforms began destroying the obshchina (the existing feudal-like peasant communities) as the main structure upon which allotment-based land use depended, while extending private land ownership through land tenure regulations, a peasants’ land bank and a resettlement policy. In this pre-Soviet period, Russia’s towns and cities experienced a growing market in urban land plots that were already built upon or earmarked for further development.
Following the revolutions of 1917, private ownership of land was abolished, civil transactions involving land were forbidden, and land was transferred to the use of all who worked on it. A 1918 decree abolished private ownership of real estate in cities and towns, and the process of nationalizing land was completed with the adoption of the Land Code of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics in 1922. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, land could be leased for periods of not more than six years (although subletting was not allowed) and tenants involved in working the land could use additional hired labor. However, by 1929 large-scale collectivization was under way, resulting in the creation of so-called cooperative-collective property. Leasing of land was abolished, and hiring labor on small peasant holdings was forbidden. Under socialism land was neither sold nor bought, and all land transactions were prosecutable under the law.
The situation today is reminiscent of that at the end of the nineteenth century, prior to the Stolypin reforms, when land law consisted of piecemeal legislation applying to ownership of different types of land. Private ownership of land was introduced in 1990 by the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics, beginning a gradual liquidation of the state monopoly on land ownership. The 1990 laws “Regarding Peasant Smallholdings” and “Regarding Land Reform” permitted citizens to hold in private ownership plots of land for use as smallholdings for horticultural purposes, the construction of houses and other personal uses. The terminology of these laws included “the right of use of land,” “life-long possession with the right to pass on as an inheritance,” “rent” and “property.” This wide variety of bases for property rights necessitated subsequent amendments of existing legislation, a development that was also stimulated by the collapse of the USSR.
Over the past decade, land relations continued to evolve. In December 1991 the president of the Russian Federation issued a decree and the Duma passed a resolution that allowed for the privatization of land in a two-step process. First the decree granted collective ownership of land and other assets to collective and soviet farms. Subsequently, shares of farms could be owned by the individuals who worked on them. Only at the end of 2001 was the right to own land, which is inseparable from the right to buy and sell land, ratified in Russia, and this right applied only to urban lands. However, the prohibition on the sale of agricultural land has no absolute force; laws introduced since 1991 permit the sale of land that is to be used as a private subsidiary smallholding for construction of a one-family residential building, or by members of stock-rearing and garage cooperatives.
According to a former minister for agriculture, there is a flourishing black market in land, which denies the general public access to information on the market values of land and negatively affects economic development. The absence of shared information on land market values means the absence of an objective criteria against which to measure land use efficiency. The extensive black market in leasing also deprives governmental budgets of property tax income since real estate cannot be properly taxed without accurate information on levels of ground rent. Under the current Civil Code of the Russian Federation (RF), land plots are considered to be objects of real estate and rights to these plots are categorized as property rights. The land privatization process was initiated in 1997 but then stalled because the RF government overruled buyout prices established by local administrations that were perceived as too low. The RF government indexed prices at a rate higher than locally established lease rates, thus undermining the transition to a private market in real estate. At the same time, under certain conditions (such as stable lease rates or minimal investment conditions), long-term leasing may turn out to be an acceptable substitute for title ownership. On the issue of real estate registration, the existing Russian system does not protect bona fide purchasers, nor does it provide adequate reimbursement when a purchaser’s title is contested. Furthermore, purchasers are normally unable to get a comprehensive review to determine whether their title is clear in the first place.
Obstacles to Land Reform
While the evolution of a private market in land is encumbered by history and politics, the participants at the St. Petersburg conference were interested in changes and adjustments in practice that land professionals might make to facilitate the transition. Zoning and surveying, as well as investment decisions, are among the areas where changes in practice might be made at the level of local government to address some of the following obstacles to land reform.
Slow implementation of legal zoning
Legal zoning, though mandatory according to the RF Urban Planning Code, is being introduced slowly in Russian cities. Some speakers attributed this situation to reluctant municipalities that cling to the “operative space” currently under their direct control, for fear of losing that land. Others maintained that key municipal officials have a number of more specific concerns: (1) their professional image and the stability of their administration depend on the actions they take to attract investment; (2) the arrival of new investors automatically expands the amount of “operative space;” and (3) the realization that even a perfect system of urban planning regulations will leave out a sufficient number of special cases that will have to be considered separately. Further, municipal officers are citizens, too, and they sincerely wish to raise more funds for their cities’ renovations. The problem is that their attention is too often distracted by more immediate economic and political challenges. Nevertheless, an increasing number of Russian cities are introducing legal zoning regulation systems, including Novgorod Veliky, Ufa, Kazan, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Tver, Chelyabinsk and Nizhni Novgorod. St. Petersburg’s recent practice of issuing “by-plot urban planning regulations” raised questions about whether or not they conform to the RF Urban Planning Code, which defines urban planning regulations as a set of requirements and restrictions applicable to zones, not to individual units or parcels. The practice of issuing plot-specific regulations was found dramatically inefficient for a number of reasons. First, it precludes making investment decisions from a representative sample of properties, since each property in the city is subject to different regulations. Second, it is more labor intensive than applying regulations to an entire zone. Finally, it is laden with higher developer risks, thus impairing the city’s overall investment profile. Participants from other cities noted that these delays in introducing zonal urban planning regulations evidently clashes with St. Petersburg’s image as the frontrunner of Russia’s reforms in legal and institutional real estate market development.
Inferior surveying
Many land-related problems in Russian cities stem from inferior surveying. Some plots are limited by the uncertainty of the parcel and/or building boundaries, and others suffer from poor siting. That is, many properties that are new to the market have no direct access to transport, communications, storm water collection systems, or other infrastructure networks. The result is a host of deficient properties that in turn inhibit the development of adjacent properties, and can bring down the value of an entire urban area. The conference discussions emphasized the importance (or even inevitability) of conducting an extensive urban land survey, which could provide more certainty to both investors and developers, reduce the time needed to prepare investment proposals, and help to expand property ownership.
Confusion over privatization of apartments
Most urban residents have not taken advantage of the recent privatization of apartments. Not only did this initiative fail to produce a new class of motivated and effective property owners capable of acting as responsible customers for housing maintenance agencies, but it created baffling new legal challenges as well. No one in St. Petersburg, where the privatization of apartments is most advanced, understands who (and on what legal basis) should be in charge of issuing permits to reconstruct general-purpose premises or reassign residential apartments for nonresidential use. As a result, apartment owners can exercise only a limited set of property rights, which in turn hampers the extension of the private real estate market. The conference participants discussed to what extent a law requiring apartment owners to purchase condominiums could help address the situation. Moreover, given an environment where apartment owners have limited experience with such ownership arrangements, discussion centered around whether economic stimulation or economic sanctions would be most successful in dealing with those who fail to meet their ownership obligations.
Investment in infrastructure
The complicated issues of engineering and infrastructure support for construction and renovation projects are evident in St. Petersburg. When determining title payments, the city takes into account the developer’s contributions to urban infrastructure development and actively mediates between the developer and the resource supplier. Provision of full, authentic and timely information is the principal factor behind the attractiveness of real estate investments, since this information allows for the quick and safe selection of investment opportunities. St. Petersburg has made progress in this direction, but its database will remain inadequate until the city fully adopts urban planning regulations (i.e., legal zoning), formulates clear heritage protection standards for its many historic properties, undertakes an overall land survey, allocates areas for municipal developments, and maps at least the contours of infrastructure networks.
Intergovernmental taxation systems
A reform of intergovernmental budget relations is necessary to improve the current taxation system. Most cities receive budget support from their oblasts (similar to U.S. states). Thus, they are not interested in reporting increased property tax revenues, because those revenues would then be subject to redistribution to the oblast. For example, to simplify its taxation system and stimulate investment in real estate, the city of Novgorod Veliky replaced its two-part land and property tax with a single real estate tax. For legal persons, as opposed to business establishments, the tax is charged on full title owners only. Despite a certain dip in the tax proceeds from the unified tax (compared to revenues from the former two taxes), the city’s overall tax revenues increased because of a higher profit-tax yield due to enhanced business activities.
Lessons from Russia and around the World
The RF government’s meetings and decisions on the notorious electric supply failures in the Far East and floods in Yakutia during the late spring of 2001 show that, unfortunately, only large-scale catastrophic events seem to be able to galvanize public administrators to change their old ways. One would like to believe that less destructive developments could stimulate action as well. For example, it would be worthwhile comparing investment activities in different Russian cities to see if such activity varies with the development levels of their local regulatory bases, the amount and types of information provided to developers, and the time required to develop project applications and the time it takes for local government bureaucrats to make project decisions. The case of recent German urban planning history is instructive to the situation in Russia. Beginning in 1990, the German system lost some of its characteristically strict reliance on municipal plans and initiatives for development and moved toward more reliance on private-sector initiatives. Now it is more common for private developers, rather than municipalities, to prepare detailed zoning plans, and then to purchase and develop the site. However, a direct borrowing of this German method is not recommended for Russian cities, since any system must take into account specific local challenges and cultural traditions. American participants had a similar view on the risks of borrowing planning methods from other countries. Although the general guidelines and principles may seem to be similar across countries or jurisdictions, local regulations, procedures and techniques can vary significantly due to different historical precedents and the specificity of current challenges. Some principles to consider include the following:
This opinion was supported by Russian speakers who referred to urban planning regulations in Russia before 1917 or to the current situation that compels cities to illegally hide their revenue growth and thus evidently hamper economic development. In closing, H. James Brown, president of the Lincoln Institute, reminded the participants that it is important to build mutually acceptable decisions rather than to continue disputes and quests for the ultimate (and not always absolute) truth. He called on those present to listen to their opponents’ arguments in order to arrive at fruitful agreements, not to waste time and effort on trying to prove one’s own case.
Leonid Limonov is the research director of the Leontief Centre for Social and Economic Research in St. Petersburg.
References
Limonov, Leonid E., Nina Y. Oding and Tatyana V. Vlasova. 2000. Land Market Development in St. Petersburg: Conditions and Peculiarities. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper. Malme, Jane H., and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Brasilia, la capital de Brasil, fue inaugurada a principios de los años 1960 como una “nueva ciudad” que daría comienzo a una era distinta para las metrópolis en América Latina y que demostraría cómo el gobierno hacía un uso eficaz de la tierra en aras de un crecimiento urbano planificado. Tal propósito se servía de dos instrumentos básicos: un control normativo del uso de la tierra basado en un plan general diseñado por Lucio Costa y el gobierno como propietario de las tierras de la capital federal, lo que permitiría que ésta fuera planificada sin los tipos de restricciones y conflictos que normalmente surgen cuando la tierra está en manos privadas. Sin embargo, tres décadas y media más tarde, los problemas asociados con el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia no se diferencian sustancialmente de los que padecen otras ciudades grandes de América Latina.
Falta de visión para la tenencia de la tierra y padrinazgo administrativo
Brasilia se presenta como un ejemplo único de la gestión de tierras urbanas en América Latina porque la responsabilidad de administrar las tierras públicas siempre ha recaído sobre el gobierno local. Sin embargo, la periferia de la ciudad ha sufrido un índice explosivo de crecimiento con un patrón concomitante de ocupación irregular de la tierra, subdivisiones ilegales y carencia de infraestructura. En Brasilia la posibilidad de dirigir el proceso de crecimiento urbano a través de una política explícita de acceso a las tierras públicas se ha visto comprometida de forma lenta e irremediable por la ocupación espontánea (e ilegal) de la tierra. Esta falta de visión en el uso de las tierras públicas suele ser disfuncional tanto para la densidad urbana como para las finanzas públicas, por lo que obstruye los esfuerzos que hace el gobierno local para proveer infraestructura a esos asentamientos irregulares.
Más aún, las influencias políticas que intervienen en el proceso de desarrollo han menoscabado en gran medida las posibilidades de manejar con eficacia la oferta de tierras públicas en Brasilia. A principios de los años 1990 el gobierno distribuyó unas 65.000 parcelas en áreas que carecían de infraestructura básica. Además de reducir las reservas de tierras públicas, este “padrinazgo de la tenencia de la tierra” generó la necesidad de encontrar otras fuentes para financiar nueva infraestructura. Dado que el principal recurso que tiene disponible la entidad de desarrollo urbano del Distrito Federal (Terracap) es la tierra misma, esta política de padrinazgo trajo como resultado la venta de otras tierras públicas para financiar la construcción de infraestructura en los asentamientos irregulares. Este círculo vicioso ha provocado graves distorsiones que la administración local actual pretende resolver usando tierras públicas como “capital” para crear una política efectiva que permita controlar los ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y los costos urbanos.
La experiencia de Brasilia parece confirmar los argumentos de Henry George y otros de que la propiedad de tierras públicas no conduce por sí sola a un crecimiento urbano más equilibrado y equitativo socialmente. La estrategia del gobierno local actual de definir maneras de manejar el ingreso proveniente de tierras públicas para así controlar el uso de tierra urbana indica una nueva modalidad de interacción gubernamental con el mercado inmobiliario. En tal sentido, el gobierno cambia su función y deja de ser el propietario principal para convertirse en el administrador de los beneficios de la tierra.
Tierras públicas como capital de tenencia de la tierra
El principio medular de la nueva estrategia de Brasilia para administrar la equidad de la tierra es la definición de tierra pública como “capital de tenencia de la tierra”. El uso de esta tierra se somete a una serie de acciones estratégicas que transforman el capital de las tierras públicas en un factor que propicia la consolidación del complejo tecnológico del Distrito Federal. Se trata de la contraparte pública en el proceso de reconvertir el uso de la tierra en el centro de la ciudad en un instrumento de promoción social en el programa de regulación de la tenencia de la tierra: las tierras públicas se usan como activos mediante ventas, arrendamientos y asociaciones en proyectos urbanos.
La aplicación de estrategias diferenciadas para la tenencia de la tierra confiere mayor flexibilidad al gobierno para coordinar sus acciones. La búsqueda del equilibrio entre las iniciativas de índole social y otras en las que el gobierno intenta maximizar sus ingresos está cobrando la apariencia de una verdadera política de administración de tierras públicas que rompe con las anteriores prácticas de padrinazgo.
En este contexto de exploración de nuevos enfoques para el uso de tierras públicas con la finalidad de controlar el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia, el Instituto Lincoln, el Instituto de Planificación del Distrito Federal y Terracap organizaron un seminario internacional sobre gestión de ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y costos urbanos en junio de 1998.
El programa reunió a expertos internacionales, ministros gubernamentales y administradores locales con miras a evaluar las experiencias internacionales en el uso de tierras públicas para financiar el crecimiento urbano en Europa, los Estados Unidos y América Latina. Martim Smolka del Instituto Lincoln describió las relaciones entre las operaciones del mercado inmobiliario, las regulaciones sobre el uso de la tierra y la recuperación pública de plusvalías. Alfredo Garay, arquitecto y exdirector de planificación de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, expuso las experiencias en el desarrollo de terrenos públicos en los alrededores del puerto de esa ciudad.
Bernard Frieden del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts describió cómo se usan las actividades comerciales realizadas en tierras públicas en el oeste de los Estados Unidos para recaudar fondos para la educación y otros fines locales. Henk Verbrugge, director del organismo fiscal de Rotterdam y representante de Holanda ante la Asociación Internacional de Peritos, describió el sistema que tiene el país para la tenencia hereditaria, una regulación legal con la cual la tierra puede tener uso y beneficios completamente privados al tiempo que permanecen bajo control y propiedad económica de la municipalidad.
Los participantes discutieron la medida en que estas experiencias eran comparables a la situación en Brasilia y concluyeron que el éxito de varias estrategias para el uso de tierras públicas depende de la idoneidad de los proyectos específicos para la cultura empresarial del país en cuestión y las prácticas institucionales vigentes en la administración local.
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My father John C. Lincoln (1866-1959) had a strong code of ethics that played a prominent role in both his practice of business and his ideas about land. In 1895 he founded the Lincoln Electric Company of Cleveland, Ohio, which became the world’s leading manufacturer of arc welding equipment. He drew his ideas about land from the 1879 book Progress and Poverty, by the American political economist and social philosopher Henry George.
My father’s core ethical principle was to treat people as you would like to be treated. This implied the following precepts:
1) Treat people with absolute fairness. This means all people. In business it includes all the constituents of a company—employees, customers, owners, and the community. In society it means government must treat individuals fairly, and vice versa.
2) Whoever creates something should be entitled to keep it. Receiving the fruits of someone else’s labor—a windfall—often occurs. But for each windfall there is a wipeout—someone doesn’t get all he or she produced. Both the windfall and the wipeout are unethical.
3) People are important. They should be treated with respect and dignity, not as machines or cogs in a wheel.
Ethics in Business
Largely as a result of following these principles, the Lincoln Electric Company has demonstrated superior performance for its entire 100-year history. Many things have to happen to run a business ethically. One of them is making an adequate profit, which benefits the shareholders. But in my opinion, any company and all its constituents are better served if the customer comes first.
At Lincoln Electric, most employees are on piece work. If they produce more, they get more. The company has an annual bonus program, and the kitty for this bonus is composed of the extra profit beyond the returns required to run the business. Running the business includes providing a fair but not excessive dividend to shareholders and investing in new products and production methods. Beyond these costs, employees at Lincoln Electric get to keep any extra profit they produce. Recently bonuses have been about 50 to 60 percent of annual salaries. There are no windfalls, and no wipeouts.
Nowadays, manufacturing is no longer as much the “thing” as it once was. Making Lincoln Electric a successful global company requires more emphasis on company-wide teams. Individual pay is more dependent upon cooperation across departmental lines. This can work just as well as more individual programs of the past, but it is more difficult to manage. Incentives must be tailored to each location where we operate.
Ethics in Land
The heritage of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy stems from my father’s interest in the ideas of Henry George, especially the land value tax. The ethics of this tax concept are parallel to those used at Lincoln Electric.
Someone who works the land should be entitled to keep the fruits of his labor. If he produces more because of increased skill or effort, he should reap a higher reward. However, Henry George said that land is a natural monopoly. Its value is largely created by things unrelated to the actions of the land’s owner, such as population pressure or mineral deposits. The landowner or user has nothing to do with these factors, yet if they cause the land value to increase, the owner gets a windfall.
This ethical dilemma disturbed my father, as it disturbs me. He subscribed to the remedy proposed by Henry George, which is to take as a tax each year the full rental value of land produced by natural or social factors. This would eliminate the windfall. It would still leave for landowners and users the value created by their own investments and labor.
A hundred years ago land was considered one of the three factors of production, along with labor and capital. Land was essential as both a place to work and a source of raw materials. Things are more complex today. A great deal of the economy has to do with telecommunications and computer software, which allow businesses to locate anywhere and use few or inexpensive natural resources. These changes may not negate the basic economic theories of Henry George’s time, but they do make it a bit more difficult to analyze the role of land in the economy.
There are many positive illustrations that ethical business practices lead to economic success. Unfortunately, there are not clearcut illustrations showing that land value taxation produces broad economic benefits. Nevertheless, economic research suggests that land value taxation could encourage the productive and careful use of land. Individuals who used the land in ways that increased its production would be able to keep the full value they had created, and society would keep the value it created.
I believe ethical practices will benefit all sides in any transaction. Ethical land taxation should lead to an improved economy, just as ethical business practices lead to more successful companies. One should get to keep the fruits of one’s labor, but the fruits of speculation or monopolies should accrue to the community as a whole, not to individuals as windfalls. Both the private sector and the public sector would benefit. Good ethics is good business. Good ethics is good for society as well as the economy.
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David C. Lincoln, president of the Lincoln Foundation and former chairman of the Lincoln Institute, presented the annual Founder’s Day lecture on August 1 at Lincoln House. He had served as chairman for the Institute’s first 22 years before stepping down in May 1996. His talk, excerpted here in part, commemorated the 130th anniversary of the birth of his father, John Cromwell Lincoln, the Cleveland, Ohio, industrialist who founded the Lincoln Foundation in 1947.
Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.
To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).
1. The Process of Favelización
The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.
2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality
Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.
The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.
3. A World of Diversity
Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.
In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.
There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.
4. Tolerance of Informality
Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).
This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.
5. Expectations and Land Values
Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.
6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies
Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.
At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.
7. Lack of Financial Resources
As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.
8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization
Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.
Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.
9.The Importance of Titling
Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.
There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.
In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.
10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation
The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.
11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights
Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.
12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs
After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.
13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions
In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.
The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.
Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.
Conclusion
Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.
It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.
Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Related Land Lines Articles
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in global perspective. April: 8–11.
Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.
———. 2002. Faculty profile. July: 12–13.
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.
Figure 1:
Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs
Dos
Don’ts
