The property tax in Brazil is an annual tax on urban land and buildings administered at the local government level. The tax base is derived from market value and is standardized across different local authorities, although procedures for establishing the tax base and rates vary considerably.

In the city of Porto Alegre, the cost approach is the method traditionally employed for assessing real estate property for taxation purposes. No legal requirement exists concerning intervals between valuations, and the last general valuation took place in 1991. In years without valuations, the tax base has been readjusted uniformly according to prevailing inflation rates. The property tax rates are progressive, with sliding rates for six classes of assessed values to insert an element of “ability-to-pay” into the system. The tax is calculated by the sum of each portion of the assessed value multiplied by the respective rate for that class. The maximum rate for residential property reaches 1.2 percent.

Analysis of the Current System

A recent analysis of the property tax system in Porto Alegre sought to provide a full examination of the relationship between assessed values and sale prices. Some of the results are summarized below.

Assessment level and uniformity

Residential apartments in Porto Alegre were assessed on median at only 34 percent of their sale prices, much less than the statutory level of 100 percent. Using the coefficient of dispersion about the median [COD] of the assessed value to sale price ratio as a measure of variability, the results showed a low degree of assessment uniformity (approximately 36 percent). In Brazil, there are neither local nor national standards for evaluating assessment performance. By comparison, a commonly accepted degree of uniformity for single-family residential property in the United States is a coefficient between 10 and 15 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the ample spread of the assessment ratios in this study.

Factors determining assessment inequity

To examine the simultaneous effects of the factors determining assessment bias, a multivariate model was used to investigate both vertical and horizontal inequities. The model detected a large number of factors causing systematic differences in assessment levels, including location attributes, building quality, building year, presence of elevators and similar variables. Vertical assessment regressivity was also identified.

Assessment method

It is plausible to assert that the method traditionally employed for assessing real property, that is, the cost approach, is a major cause of the lack of assessment uniformity identified in this study. Some theoretical weaknesses of the approach are associated with the extensive number of simplifications implemented by the local authority to make its application easier, and these adjustments are likely to have determined assessment bias. Inconsistencies with the standard cost model include the lack of connection between cost tables and the performance of the real estate market, and low correlation between the ad hoc depreciation rates adopted and the reduction in price caused by age, obsolescence, or deterioration of building structures. Furthermore, lack of systematic control over valuation performance seems to have contributed to the high inaccuracy of assessed values.

Time lags between valuations

The method used to make an overall adjustment to assessed values based on prevailing inflation rates for years without valuation has clearly contributed to the reduction of the tax base. For instance, properties were assessed on median at 38 percent of their sale prices in 1993, but only 27 percent in 1995.

Effective versus statutory rates of property tax

Rates for residential property are progressive according to six classes of assessed value. The effective rate results from the actual amount raised from property taxation, without regard to tax evasion, divided by the sale price. The statutory rate results from the expected tax that could be raised per property, if the tax were established on the basis of sale price, divided by its sale price. The effective rate is much lower than the statutory rate and represents on median only 0.17 percent of sale price.

Improper assessment practices have affected the distribution of the tax burden, not only because assessed values do not bear a consistent relationship to sale prices but also because many properties are classified incorrectly. The actual property tax revenue collected in the period under study represented approximately 25 percent of the potential revenue to be raised if assessed values were equal to sale prices.

Causes of Poor Property Tax Administration

Historical factors may help to explain the current poor administration of the property tax in Porto Alegre and its inefficient use as a revenue source. During the 1970s, large transfers of revenue from the central government and private estates to municipalities complemented the revenue raised at the local government level. Consequently, local authorities were not interested in collecting their own taxes, and taxpayers were used to paying insignificant property tax bills. The achievement of good performance in terms of valuation and an acceptable degree of assessment equity were secondary issues.

Recent financial crises combined with the urgent need for public investment in infrastructure equipment and services have stimulated some local authorities to improve their tax systems. However, due to the high visibility of the property tax and taxpayer antipathy, efforts to recover revenue and achieve assessment equity often result in tax revolts. Furthermore, changes in the tax base must be approved by locally elected members of the Chamber of Councilors. Whenever general valuations are planned, the Council members are responsible for supporting capping systems in the name of protecting the poor and retired taxpayers. However, the capping systems actually favor high-income and wealthy taxpayers because low-income and retired taxpayers can receive relief based on their income.

Since 1991, two proposals for altering the property tax base in Porto Alegre have been rejected by the Chamber of Councilors because the estimated value of some properties would have been adjusted over the inflation rate at the time. However, the existing vertical assessment inequity means that high-valued properties are the ones benefiting from poor property tax administration.

Recommendations on Revising Practices and Attitudes

Knowledge about the weaknesses of a particular tax system is fundamental for its improvement, and the analysis undertaken in Porto Alegre provides greater understanding of the current system, the degree of assessment inequity and its main causes. For the first time, the drawbacks and weaknesses of the system are both quantified and measured, including which properties are benefiting from the system and the amount of revenue being lost. Now Porto Alegre has the opportunity to improve its property tax system on the basis of accurate data rather than political expediency.

Several measures would contribute to the overall equity of the tax system while also improving revenue collection to provide the community with higher standards of living:

§ Reassessment of properties based on current market values using the sales comparison approach to assessing residential property, such as multiple regression analysis (MRA), artificial neural networks (NN), or multilevel modeling (hierarchical linear models – HLMs).

§ Systematic control over assessed property values, including testing before the release of the valuation roll to recognize and adjust for eventual bias in the estimated tax base.

§ Assurance of regular assessment updates.

§ Establishment of market adjustments to assessed values based on ratio studies for years without valuation.

§ Transparency in the administration of the property tax, especially in graduating the size of the tax burden, instead of overriding estimates of market values arbitrarily for this purpose.

§ A definition of minimum standards for assessment performance at the local or national level.

The achievement of property tax equity and the provision of a high standard of public services are common goals for politicians, the community, administrators and others. Public officials need to take advantage of new technologies for property tax assessment and data gathering to make tax systems operate both efficiently and fairly. However, technical improvements are just a part of the process. It is also vital to work on public opinion. An important step is to encourage dialogue between community residents and politicians, showing the drawbacks of the current system and the consequences of keeping its structure. Confidence in the property tax system is likely to increase if revisions are discussed seriously in the public domain.

Claudia M. De Cesare is an assessor in the Department of Local Taxation for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She received a Lincoln Institute Dissertation Fellowship in 1999 to support the research reported here and in her Ph.D. thesis, which she completed at the University of Salford in England. The Lincoln Institute is continuing to develop educational programs with administrators, politicians, scholars and the community in Porto Alegre to help improve the equity and efficiency of the property tax system.

In the context of entirely new fiscal policies and new approaches to property rights in central and eastern Europe over the past decade, taxes on land and buildings have taken on significant new roles—politically as adjuncts to privatization, restitution and decentralization, and fiscally as revenue-raising tools for local governments.

The Lincoln Institute is particularly interested in the complex debate over property-based taxes and in how different countries experience the transition from communism to democracy and from planned to market-driven economies. Over the past four years, the Institute has undertaken a series of educational programs to help public officials and business leaders in eastern Europe understand both underlying principles and practical examples of property taxation and valuation through offering varied perspectives and frameworks for decision making.

The Institute is also sponsoring a series of case studies to compare the implementation of ad valorem property tax systems in eastern European countries. These studies provide a unique perspective from which to review the initiation of land privatization, fiscal decentralization and land markets, as well as to compare the various legal and administrative features adopted for the respective tax systems.

Programs in Estonia

The Baltic country of Estonia was the first of the new independent states to recognize the benefits of land taxation and thus has been the focus of several Lincoln Institute programs. The Institute’s work in Estonia began in September 1993 when Fellow Jane Malme and Senior Fellow Joan Youngman participated in a conference with the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the design of a property taxation system. Estonia had just instituted its land tax program, and since then the Institute has continued to support programs there relating to land reform and property taxation.

The most recent education program, on “Land and Tax Policies for Urban Markets in Estonia,” was presented in the capital of Tallinn in May to nearly 30 senior-level state and city officials interested in public finance, land reform and urban development. President H. James Brown, Jane Malme, Joan Youngman and a faculty of international experts explored current issues concerning land reform, valuation and taxation. They also discussed methods of urban planning, land management and taxation to both encourage development of urban land markets and finance local governments.

Estonia is also serving as the pilot case study for a survey instrument to gather and analyze information from countries adopting new fiscal instruments for market-based economies. Malme and Youngman are working closely with Tambet Tiits, director of a private real estate research and consulting firm in Tallinn, to draft the survey, research and collect data, and analyze the results.

Other Case Studies and Conferences

A second case study examines Poland, where an ad valorem property tax law is under legislative consideration. Dr. Jan Brzeski, director of the Cracow Real Estate Institute, serves as the country research director and liaison with the Institute. Subsequent studies will survey Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. In addition, Professors Gary Cornia and Phil Bryson of the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University in Utah are using the Lincoln Institute survey instrument to study property tax systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

The Lincoln Institute was a sponsor of the fourth international conference on local taxation and property valuation of the London-based Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation (IRRV) in Rome in early June. The conference attracts about 300 senior level officials from central as well as local governments throughout Europe. Dennis Robinson, Lincoln Institute vice president for programs and operations, was on the conference advisory committee and chaired a session on “Case Studies in Local Taxation in the New Democracies,” at which Jane Malme and Joan Youngman discussed the Institute’s case studies on land and building taxation in transitional economies. Other participants in that session were Institute associates Tambit Tiits of Estonia and Jan Brzeski of Poland. Board member Gary Cornia spoke about his research on property taxation in the Czech Republic. Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean, presented a paper on “Urban Land Management and Value Capture” at another session chaired by Joan Youngman. Jane Malme also was a discussion leader for a session on “Tax Collection and Administration.”

The Institute is planning another program with OECD in December 1997 for public officials and practitioners in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to examine policy aspects of land valuation and mass appraisal concepts for ad valorem taxation.

The land market allocates land and access to urban amenities, and it does so with impressive efficiency. Yet, economists and planners continue to debate the extent to which the market fails to achieve broader social goals, how far regulation can offset for that failure, and even whether regulation results in land market outcomes being even farther from the socially desired outcome than would be the case without any regulation. To examine this debate and the underlying issues, more than 30 economists and planners met at the Lincoln Institute in July 2002 to encourage new policy-relevant analysis on land markets and their regulation, and to foster more fruitful communication between the disciplines.

At the center of the substantive debate was the basic question of regulation within a market economy and the unintended consequences that can result. The discussions touched upon many themes including gentrification, the use of public resources for private consumption, distributional issues, urban form and its regulation. If perspectives regarding market regulation differed between the two disciplines, so too did views regarding the strengths and limitations of the analytic tools that academics from different disciplines bring to such thorny problems. Among the challenges are the basic questions of how to define the problem, how to measure the current conditions in light of limited data, and how to interpret findings. Throughout the conference, the differences in the perspectives, assumptions, tools and references between planners and economists were ever present, in particular with regard to the role of politics in planning and policy making.

Unintended Consequences of Land Market Regulations

Despite their differences, concern for land markets and their centrality to social, political and economic life was the common focus of both economists and planners at the conference. They agreed that land markets are about far more than land. These markets have an important role in delivering life experiences and conditioning the welfare of the majority of people in developed and developing countries alike who live and work in cities. In addition, their regulation has both direct and indirect economic effects that extend into many areas of economic life and public policy. For example, the urban poor are likely to have worse schools and to experience higher levels of neighborhood crime because land markets capitalize the values of neighborhood amenities, such as better school quality and lower crime, thereby pricing poorer households into less desirable neighborhoods.

This power of land markets to reflect and capitalize factors that affect a household’s welfare was revealed in a study of impact fees levied on new development in Florida. Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy found that impact fees appear to be fully capitalized into house prices for owners of new and existing houses by redistributing the costs of new infrastructure provision from existing taxpayers to a reduced value of development land. In fast-growing Miami the cost of impact fees was borne by developers, yet offset by the increases they received in higher prices for new housing, “while buyers of new homes are compensated for a higher price by the property tax savings they experience. In contrast to the neutral effects that fees have on developers, landowners, and purchasers of new housing, impact fees provide existing homeowners a capital gain” (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 26).

One complement to their story of Florida’s impact fees was illustrated in several other papers concerned with the unintended outcomes of regulation. British participants reported that Britain’s containment policy has generated higher densities within urbanized areas, but cities leapfrog out across their Greenbelts (or growth boundaries) to smaller satellite settlements; the consequence is that development becomes less contiguous and travel times increase. Villages become high-density suburbs surrounded by a sea of wheat: London in functional terms extends to cover most of southeastern England.

In a U.S. example based on an econometric simulation, Elena Irwin and Nancy Bockstael found that a clustering policy intended to preserve open space could instead backfire. Using Maryland data, they simulated the effects of a policy that was intended to preserve rural open space and found that it would instead accelerate development if “small to moderate amounts of open space are required to be preserved (specifically, 20 acres or less) and would slow the timing of development if larger amounts of open space are required to be preserved” (Irwin and Bockstael, 26). Their simulation results yield an interpretation that is highly nuanced and requires careful thought. That is, under certain conditions the cluster policy can backfire, while under other specific conditions the policy can yield an intended policy outcome.

These hypothetical clusters in Maryland may be echos of a real situation that Jean Cavailhès and his colleagues observed in the French countryside, where some urban dwellers moved to farm regions to create a mixed-use area that is neither entirely urban nor entirely rural. These former urbanites appear to value their proximity to a functioning rural landscape in exchange for longer commutes and (surprisingly) smaller residential lots. The authors hypothesize that these peri-urban dwellers benefit in different ways from living among the farmers.

In another example of the unintended consequences of regulations, Donald Shoup analyzed curbside parking. Many U.S. municipalities require developers to provide minimal parking per square foot of new commercial or, in some communities, residential space. The requirement for off-street parking, coupled with a systematic underpricing of curbside parking, has a double impact, according to Shoup. It imposes a substantial tax on affected developments (equivalent to up to 88 percent of construction costs), increases land taking, and means that public revenues annually lost an amount equal to the median property tax.

In these cases of unintended consequences of policy or regulatory interventions in the market, the authors argued for more careful design of both policies and regulations so state and local governments could reasonably achieve their policy goals. Despite the fact that the conference debate tended to pit regulation against the market, there was probably a tendency—if not full-fledged consensus—to favor market incentives and disincentives to achieve policy goals, rather than to rely strictly, or even largely, on regulation. Roger Bolton’s comments on Shoup’s paper cogently reflected this viewpoint. He said that Shoup’s work was valuable because it urges us to pay attention to a whole package of “important and related phenomena: inefficient pricing of an important good, curb parking; inefficient regulation of another good, privately owned off-street parking; and missed opportunities for local government revenue.”

Data and Measurement Challenges

Growth management and urban form were referenced extensively throughout the conference. The paper presented by Henry Overman, and written with three colleagues (Burchfield et al.) provided useful grounding to that conversation. They attempted to measure the extent of sprawl for the entire continental U.S. Using remote sensing data they calculated and mapped urban development and the change in urban land cover between 1976 and 1992. They defined sprawl as either the extension of the urban area, or leapfrog development, or lower-density development beyond the urban fringe. They concluded that only 1.9 percent of the continental U.S. was in urban use and only 0.58 percent had been taken for urban development in the 16-year period covered by the study. Furthermore, during this period, urban densities were mostly on the increase.

This study found development to be a feature of the “nearby urban landscape,” whether that was defined as close to existing development, or near highways or the coasts, and thus was perceived as encroaching on where people lived or traveled. The authors use this last observation to reconcile the apparent contradiction between their finding that less than 2 percent of the continental U.S. has been developed and the fact that containing and managing sprawl is at the center of policy agendas in many states and regions across the U.S. While relatively little land might have been consumed by new development in aggregate during the study period, many people see and experience this development on a daily basis and perceive it to represent significant change, often the kind of change they do not like.

The conference discussion touched upon some of the data questions raised by this work. The paper’s discussant, John Landis, noted some challenges he has faced in working with these and similar data to measure growth patterns in California. The estimates by Burchfield et al. are extremely low, possibly for technical reasons, according to Landis. Among the reasons is the difficulty in interpreting satellite images and the different outcomes that can occur when different thresholds are used for counting density, for example. That is, an area can be classified as more or less dense depending on what threshold the analysts establishes. “Ground-truthing” is required to remove some of the arbitrariness from the analysis, but this is an enormously costly undertaking.

Policy analysts are always faced with data limitations. Sometimes the problem is missing data, while other times it is data with questionable reliability. Yet, all too often researchers spend very little time paying attention to how serious that deficiency is for the policy problem at hand. When the available data is a very long time series with frequent intervals that relies on a well-structured and well-understood data collection method, and where few transformations occur between data collection and data use, most researchers and policy analysts would feel extremely comfortable interpolating one or two or even a handful of missing data points. Econometricians relying on data collected at regular intervals from government surveys frequently face this situation and are quite adept at filling in such “holes in the data.” In the world of limited data, that might be considered the best-case scenario.

At the other extreme we might have data that are collected using relatively new methods and that require significant transformation between collection and use. Data reliability likely decreases under these circumstances. Given the imperfect world in which we live, the answer is probably not to insist on using only the “best data.” However, researchers and policy analysts do have the obligation to use care in interpreting results based on weak data and to convey that weakness to their audience.

Another side of the limited data problem is the translation from concept to measure, and it explains why the conference participants spent so much time discussing “What is sprawl?” For researchers this question becomes “How does one define sprawl in such a way that one can measure it?” Burchfield et al. define sprawl as leapfrog or discontiguous urban development. Landis argues for “a more multi-faceted definition of sprawl, one that also incorporates issues of density, land use mix, and built-form homogeneity.”

Definitions are not trivial in policy analysis. If we cannot define the problem or the outcome, and we cannot measure it, how can we know if it is getting better or worse, and if our policies are having an impact? On the other hand, a very precise definition of a different but perhaps related concept may lead to unnecessary intervention. The new policy may improve the score on the measure but have little or no effect on the problem. For a variety of reasons (perhaps in part the customs and cultures within different disciplines) the economists at the conference tended to favor concepts that are simple and for which the data exist. On the other hand, the planners tended to favor concepts that are messy. In the end, one is left with weaknesses on both sides. The uni-dimensional definition, and therefore the uni-dimensional measure, may provide many of the desirable properties that allow statistical analyses. Multi-dimensional concepts are difficult to translate into measures. Which is better for policy making?

The Political Nature of Land Policy

Planning as a political activity was emphasized by several authors, notably Chris Riley (discussant of papers by Edwin Mills and Alan Evans), to emphasize the importance for economists to recognize this role and the constraints it imposes on significant change (particularly given the capacity of land markets to capitalize into asset values the amenities generated by planning policies themselves). Richard Feiock added there was also evidence that the forms of planning policies that communities selected (both the severity of such policies and the degree to which they relied on regulation in contrast to market instruments) could be largely accounted for by the political structure and socioeconomic and ethnic composition of those communities.

Participants reacted differently to the political nature of land policy and planning. For some this was problematic: it meant that the market was not being allowed to work. For others, it meant that the political process in a democracy was being allowed to work: the people had spoken and the policy reflected the expressed will of the body politic.

Reflections on Debate

The differences between economists and planners will continue, and differences among practitioners in different countries and even different parts of the same country (notably the large United States) can either stimulate or thwart future debates over the study of land market policies and implementation. Perhaps, though, the word debate itself thwarts our efforts. In debates, the debaters rarely change their minds. They enter the debate with their point of view firmly fixed and do not get “points” for admitting that their debating opponent taught them something or that they have consequently changed their own mind. However, one purpose of a professional conference is, indeed, for thoughtful people to consider their own assumptions and to be informed and changed by the points of view of others. In the future, perhaps debates will be supplanted with reflective conversation.

Paul Cheshire is professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics, England; Rosalind Greenstein is senior fellow and cochair of the Department of Planning and Development at the Lincoln Institute; and Stephen C. Sheppard is professor in the Department of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts. They jointly organized the Lincoln Institute conference, “Analysis of Urban Land Markets and the Impact of Land Market Regulation,” on which this article is based.

Conference Papers

The conference participants whose papers are cited in this article are noted below. All conference papers and discussants’ comments are posted on the Lincoln Institute website (www.lincolninst.edu) where they can be downloaded for free

Burchfield, Marcy, Henry Overman, Diego Puga and Matthew A. Turner. “Sprawl?”

Cavailhès, Jean, Dominique Peeters, Evangelos Sékeris, and Jacques-François Thisse. “The Periurban City.”

Feiock, Richard E. and Antonio Taveras. “County Government Institutions and Local Land Use Regulation.”

Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and Timothy Shaughnessy. “An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets.”

Irwin, Elena G. and Bockstael, Nancy E. “Urban Sprawl as a Spatial Economic Process.”

Shoup, Donald. “Curb Parking: The Ideal Source of Public Revenue.”

C. Lowell Harriss is Professor Emeritus at Columbia University, where he taught economics from 1938 until his retirement in 1981. He then served as executive director of the Academy of Political Science until 1987. He has been a consultant to and a member of numerous government commissions and boards of professional organizations. He has written and edited many books and hundreds of articles, and is the recipient of countless honors and awards. Dr. Harriss has been a valued associate of the Lincoln Institute since its founding in 1974, as a faculty member, research scholar, and board member. Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, spoke with him about his lifelong commitment to education, public service, and property taxation.

Joan Youngman: How does land value differ from improvement value as a property tax base?

Lowell Harriss: The significant factor with land is location, the unimproved condition of nature in the most fundamental economic sense. Whatever results from private or public investment and labor, such as streets, buildings, and so forth, is not part of land in this definition. Land differs from other productive resources because it is immobile and its quantity is fixed.

Land exists not because people produce it, but because it’s there by nature. The price one pays for land, as contrasted with other resources, has no role in creating supply. Land is also unique in that no two pieces are the same, so the kind of analysis appropriate for labor and capital with fungible aspects is not applicable to land.

Another important element is the ability to control land use–for example, to receive rent as payment for access, rather than because the owner created anything. The person who controls land use can serve a constructive function by directing it into better instead of poorer uses, and I think there should be the prospect of rewards for doing so. Market forces will indicate demand, and one interested in public policy hopes that the land will be used in the best possible ways. The owner of desirable land will get higher returns, but not because of anything he or she did to create it.

Almost any urban use illustrates this. Some thirty or forty years ago, I was walking down Park Avenue and I saw a very fine building in a key location, 64th Street, I think, housing some offices of the New York City Board of Education—much too valuable a location to be used for administrative purposes. I raised this point with someone in the school system, and he said that they were moving out. They had come to the same economic realization.

Any use of land prevents another use. Holding land idle or partially idle affects not only the owner but neighbors and society at large. Others will have to travel further to get to work or to the grocery store or to school. Land is so crucial, so important to life, that society will be better off if there are forces, market forces or governmental forces, inducing better rather than poorer uses.

JY: How can the tax system encourage better land use?

LH: A tax system that imposes higher taxes on land creates pressure on owners to make more productive use of their land. I don’t like the term “land value tax,” because it emphasizes the tax aspect. My focus over the years has been on reducing the tax rates on structures to induce more investment in improvements. I have not emphasized increasing the tax rates on land to increase pressure for better land use, but these can go together. If the tax system can create a built-in inducement, year in and year out, for better use of land, that will be a plus. I don’t want to be unduly skeptical about more direct land use regulation, but government is politics and the political pressures that affect government regulation do not always represent mankind at its best.

JY: How would you deal with past improvements to land, before the implementation of a land-based tax?

LH: I would just establish the tax on the current condition of the land. The past is past. We’re not talking about a tax on capital gains but a recurring tax on an immobile resource. Some of its current value does reflect prior capital investment, the same as for structures, but I don’t see how to make any differentiation for an annual tax on land value. As a practical matter we have no market for land the way it was hundreds of years ago.

Going forward, it would be desirable to distinguish the value of unimproved land from the value of capital improvements to the land, such as infrastructure and grading, that aren’t viewed commonly as “buildings” but that represent investment and effort. The tax system should not create obstacles to investment. I would certainly be open to learning more about what might be administratively feasible in that regard.

JY: What about the taxation of farms, forests, and open space?

LH: Well, this raises complicated concerns. On one hand, I think it would be good to have additional pressure on some owners of agricultural land to speed up nonagricultural development, especially in the urban fringe. On the other hand, decisions about land use are often irreversible. Covering more acres in Westchester County, where I live, with asphalt and buildings will affect drainage for years to come. I think if anything there should be bias against decisions that are costly in the long run and difficult to reverse if conditions change. But it’s also pretty clear that interests vary, and what is in the interest of farmers is not always in the interest of the public as a whole.

Land is a large part of farm investment, and anticipated future income is reflected in land prices. The market value of land does not necessarily reflect current cash flow, so if taxes are high they may constitute a substantial portion of farm income. I’m sometimes considered not very sympathetic to farmers, because I think they have undue political influence.

The effect of many state and federal programs to benefit farms will be capitalized into higher land values. The consumer will pay forever, and the benefits will go to the person who owned the land when the policy was established. This is not a new conclusion. It’s been in the literature since farm programs began in the 1930s, but it has not affected the political decision-making process. Congressman Barney Frank of Massachusetts asked why the family farm deserves more consideration than the family shoe store, and I agree with the implication of his question.

JY: What about two people who own identical parcels of land, side by side, but one has a small, older house and the other has a new commercial building or shopping center? Many people think it’s unfair to impose the same tax on both.

LH: There are real problems here, too, partly because of imperfections in the capital markets. The person with unimproved land, let’s say it’s a widow, might ideally get a reverse mortgage to realize cash income from her property. The logical thing at that stage of life is to consume capital, for example, by drawing down retirement accounts. We have a systematic market that enables us to live off of our capital when it’s in the form of financial investments, but it’s not that well developed for the real estate market.

I always want to be sympathetic with the person who is having trouble, but wise public policy cannot be made well by concentrating on the extreme cases. Society needs to deal both with the cases of human need and with other problems such as the pressures on land use. Those whose land has become valuable, not because of what they did, but because of their neighborhood, are lucky, even though they may not recognize it. We need separate instruments to deal with separate problems, such as the person whose tax bill goes up even when his cash income does not.

Another aspect of the question is that the property tax is not a personal tax and cannot be evaluated on the same grounds as, say, an income tax. To attempt to do so can mislead. A rich person may own no land and a person with very little cash may own a good deal of land. There are ways to deal with the cash-flow problem, such as circuit breakers that limit property taxes to a certain percentage of income or deferral of tax payments until the property is sold.

JY: Is speculation a special concern? Is everyone who holds property with the hope that it will rise in value a speculator?

LH: I’ve always been reluctant to use the term “speculation,” and I certainly would not say that public policy should penalize the speculator. But, to the extent that government plays a role, I would say its bias should be toward use rather than idleness, and tax policy also supports this view. There is a whole range of speculation, from an owner deciding not to sell a house this week because of hopes for a better price next week, to holding a plot of ground idle in downtown Manhattan, knowing that someone is going to offer a very high price for it eventually.

The developer is presumably a constructive element in the total process. I don’t think anyone really wants equilibrium, but something better than what would be equilibrium. More people live better by reasonable standards now than was the case 20 or 100 years ago, and the real estate developer has played a part in that process. Sometimes it’s fashionable to be disparaging of developers, but we owe a lot to them. Maybe we’ve overpaid some of them, but plenty of them have lost their shirts. It can be a very risky business.

JY: How should the tax system treat government-financed improvements to land?

LH: In New York City, for example, I don’t know how much of the cost of building and extending subways could be borne by taxing the increments of the land value in the neighborhood, but probably a good deal. It’s not going to slow down progress to use those land value increases to help finance the expansion of the subway system.

We need to distinguish, however, between year-in, year-out financing of government by taxes on land and more or less one-time charges. That is, if the subway system is extended, there will be immediate capital gains as well as a long-term increase in the property tax base. Each of these effects deserves consideration in public policy.

JY: What is the difference between someone who invests in a piece of land and then watches as the price of land rises and someone who invests in a stock and then watches the stock market rise?

LH: Well, as far as income taxation is concerned I would think they are the same, but for financing local government they’re very different. The land stays in place, yet the stockholder can move. The ability of the landowner and stockholder to pay may be the same, but that isn’t the only relevant consideration. In thinking about how to tax gains you need to take into account whether the taxpayer can move from the jurisdiction.

I think that taxing people annually to finance local government, based on their ownership of land, is good public policy. The effort to apply that same principle to intangibles was a complete failure in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because you can’t tax people locally on the basis of resources that are so mobile.

The distinction here is not between earned and unearned income. For income tax purposes the tax is applied after a sale when the owners have realized their gain. But, to finance schools and other services you don’t want to rely on residents’ decisions about whether or not to sell their land. You want a permanent and steady source of tax revenue.

This is quite different from the question of unearned income, that is, whether or not the owner grew rich in his sleep. If the Astors became rich from owning land in Manhattan, but paid their property taxes year in and year out, well, so be it. I think that the property tax can take only a very limited account of differences in wealth. The administrative difficulties of a net wealth tax could be enormous. And the identification of a property tax with a tax on wealth or net worth is, I think, diverting and dangerous. It shifts attention from the goal of financing government to issues of personal status and relative position.

JY: Could you say more about the problem of jurisdictions competing for business by offering tax reductions?

LH: It seems to me there is no need for property tax exemptions on land. Special concessions may be appropriate for buildings, as an acceptable means of competition, but I’m dubious and favor broad reduction of taxes on structures. In any case, the land is not going to move. If you give concessions for land, they will tend to be capitalized into capital gains for the present owners. Under a two-rate land and buildings tax system, any concessions should be made on the basis of the variable resource, which is the building value. Inducements are not going to create more land, but they might create more structures. In this way, economic development incentives might be more effective under a land tax.

For many years, researchers have puzzled over the causes and consequences of voter-approved tax and expenditure limits (TELs), a fiscal rule that weakens the ability of elected officials to raise revenues or make expenditures.

Municipalities around the country face a daunting fiscal crisis. Federal stimulus assistance has expired, and many states have made significant cuts in aid to municipalities. Meanwhile property values have declined 31 percent since their 2006 peak according to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home price index.

It will take several years to know how this historic decline will affect property tax revenues, because changes in property tax bills significantly lag changes in market values. However, cities faced declines in general fund revenues of 2.5 percent in 2009, and approximately 3.2 percent declines in 2010 (Hoene 2009; Hoene and Pagano 2010). Municipal responses to revenue shortfalls have included making cuts to personnel (71 percent of cities), delaying or cancelling capital projects (68 percent), and making across the board cuts (35 percent) (McFarland 2010).

To avoid further cuts, municipalities will need to raise additional revenues. But with anti-tax sentiment running high, many cities and towns may try to avoid raising tax rates and look instead to increased reliance on fees and other alternative revenue sources. One alternative that has attracted the attention of many local officials recently is payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) by nonprofit organizations.

PILOTs are voluntary payments made by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes. These payments typically result from negotiations between local government officials and individual nonprofits, but the exact arrangements vary widely. PILOTs can be formal, long-term contracts, routine annual payments, or irregular one-time payments. The payments can go into a municipality’s general fund, or be directed to a specific project or program. PILOTs are most frequently made by hospitals, colleges, and universities, but also by nonprofit retirement homes, low-income housing facilities, cultural institutions, fitness centers, and churches. Some such payments are not even called PILOTs, but are know as “voluntary contributions” or “service fees.”

Since 2000, PILOTs have been used in at least 117 municipalities in at least 18 states (Kenyon and Langley 2010). These payments are concentrated in the Northeast, and especially in Massachusetts where they have been made in 82 out of 351 municipalities (figure 1). It is hard to make definitive statements about trends in the use of PILOTs, because there is no comprehensive source that tracks them, but press accounts suggest growing interest in PILOTs since the early 1990s, with a noticeable uptick in recent years. Major multiyear agreements have recently been reached in Pittsburgh and Baltimore; commissions have studied PILOTs in Boston, New Orleans, and Providence; and many smaller municipalities have reached new agreements with local charities.

The Revenue Potential of PILOTs

The revenue potential of PILOTs varies across municipalities because of large differences in the impact of the charitable property tax exemption on their tax bases. Figure 2 shows that in 23 large U.S. cities the value of tax-exempt nonprofit property as a share of total property value ranged from 10.8 percent in Philadelphia to 1.9 percent in Memphis and El Paso. Similarly, a fiscal year 2003 study of 351 municipalities in Massachusetts found that if the tax exemption for charitable and educational nonprofits were removed, these organizations would account for more than 10 percent of the property tax levy in 18 municipalities and between 2.5 and 10 percent in another 68, but less than 1 percent of the tax levy in 179 municipalities (McArdle and Demirai 2004).

Since nonprofit property tends to be highly concentrated in a relatively small number of municipalities, especially central cities and college towns, PILOTs have the potential to be a very important revenue source for some municipalities, even if they are unlikely to play a significant role in financing local government in the majority of cities and towns. Table 1 looks at PILOTs in ten municipalities where they rarely account for more than 1 percent of total revenues, but the dollar figures are often significant.

The impact of the charitable property tax exemption on municipal budgets also depends on the degree of reliance on property taxes as a revenue source. Local governments with a heavier reliance on sales and excise taxes, user fees, or state aid are in a better position to deal with forgone property tax revenues through those other sources.

Collaboration on PILOT Agreements

In seeking PILOT agreements, local officials sometimes resort to adversarial pressure tactics, which can backfire and jeopardize important relationships between municipalities and nonprofits. A more collaborative approach is usually more successful when local officials work to build genuine support among nonprofits for a PILOT program that is rooted in shared interests and mutual dependence for each other’s long-term success.

Many large nonprofits like hospitals and universities are quite immobile, and other smaller nonprofits may be committed to serving their local communities even if they could relocate with relative ease. The long-term success of these organizations depends on the municipality’s success. Because population loss, crime, and crumbling infrastructure can imperil a nonprofit’s future, having a local government with the capacity to provide quality public services is in its own self-interest.

Similarly, nonprofits are often major employers and provide services and activities that attract people to a city and improve the quality of life for local residents. Thus, the success of these organizations is also crucial for a municipality’s future. Even if the nonprofits are tax-exempt, their presence can significantly expand the local tax base by attracting businesses and homeowners.

Recognition of these shared interests by both sides is crucial to reaching sustainable PILOT agreements. Private conversations between high-ranking municipal and nonprofit officials can help break down barriers that sometimes block PILOTs. To make the case for PILOTs, municipalities often appeal to the nonprofits’ sense of fairness and community responsibility—arguing that it is fair for nonprofits to pay for the cost of public services they consume, and that a contribution will directly benefit the community.

These conversations should also touch on what the nonprofits need for their future success. In practice, municipalities are often most successful in obtaining PILOTs when nonprofits need something from the local government, such as building permits or zoning changes. The quid pro quo nature of these agreements is often viewed negatively—as a form of extortion or special treatment. However, accommodating these requests is often in a municipality’s own interest.

For major nonprofit development projects, a shortened approval process with less red tape can cut overall costs significantly, and such discussions can result in more creative arrangements. For example, as part of a 20-year PILOT agreement with Clark University, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts agreed to work with the university to convert a short section of a street into a pedestrian area.

When local officials use more aggressive tactics to obtain PILOTs, such as trying to shame nonprofits into making payments or threatening to challenge their tax-exempt status in court, the organizations may become defensive and less willing to cooperate. Charitable nonprofits have a strong record of defending their property tax exemptions, so such divisive tactics are likely to leave a municipality with no PILOT, potentially significant legal fees, and a damaged reputation.

Problems with PILOTs

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities with large nonprofit sectors, but there are many problems with these payments compared to more conventional taxes and fees.

First, at the same time that municipalities face a fiscal crisis caused by the recession, nonprofits face their own fiscal crisis due to declining endowment values and donations. In addition, government contracts—a major funding source for health and human service nonprofits—were cut, and some government entities are delaying contracts or payments. A 2009 survey found that 80 percent of nonprofit organizations were experiencing fiscal stress in the wake of the recession (Center for Civil Society Studies 2009). To nonprofits facing uncertain financial futures, it appears unfair for local governments to begin requesting PILOTs at this time (National Council of Nonprofits 2010).

Second, some degree of horizontal and vertical inequity in PILOT programs is almost inevitable, because their voluntary nature means there is no way to ensure that nonprofits with similar property values make comparable PILOTs. For example, even with Boston’s long-standing PILOT program, the four largest universities in the city made very different contributions in fiscal year 2009. Boston University paid $4,892,138 (8.53 percent of what it would pay in property taxes if taxable); Harvard University paid $1,996,977 (4.99 percent); Boston College paid $293,251 (1.92 percent); and Northeastern University paid only $30,571 (0.08 percent).

Third, PILOTs are a limited and frequently unreliable revenue source, rarely accounting for more than 1 percent of total revenues. This limited revenue potential must be weighed against some potentially significant costs associated with reaching PILOT agreements, such as upfront administrative costs, time spent by high-ranking officials negotiating agreements, or costs to obtain accurate assessments of exempt properties. PILOTs can also be an unreliable revenue source from one year to the next if they rely on short-term agreements.

Finally, the process used to reach PILOT agreements is often contentious and secretive, with contributions determined in an ad hoc manner lacking objective criteria. A collaborative approach can make PILOT requests less controversial, but reliance on private conversations also makes the process less transparent.

Systematic Programs to Mitigate Problems

Many of these problems with PILOTs can be mitigated if municipalities set up a systematic program that does not rely solely on case-by-case negotiation, especially for municipalities with a large number of nonprofits. A framework that applies to all organizations can provide guidance and bring consistency to the negotiations with individual nonprofits. The recommendations of Boston’s PILOT Task Force provide a concrete example (box 1).

Baltimore, Maryland: The city reached a $20 million six-year PILOT agreement with hospitals and universities in June 2010, with $5.4 million to be paid in each of the first two years. In return, the city dropped a proposed $350 fee per dorm and hospital bed, and protected hospitals and universities from increases in telecommunications and energy tax rates over the next six years (Walker and Scharper 2010).

Boston, Massachusetts: Beginning in January 2009, a task force of representatives from nonprofits, city government, business, labor, and the community met with a goal of making the city’s existing PILOT program more consistent. The final report has recommendations on key features of a systematic PILOT program: only nonprofits with property values exceeding a $15 million threshold are included in the program; the target PILOT for each institution is equal to 25 percent of what it would pay in property taxes, because roughly one-quarter of the city’s budget is devoted to core public services that benefit nonprofits; assessed value is used as a basis for the payments; and guidelines determine which types of services will count for community benefit offsets (City of Boston 2010).

New Orleans, Louisiana: A Tax Fairness Commission has been tasked with recommending changes to make the city’s tax system fairer and to broaden the tax base. While the commission may consider PILOTs, it is particularly interested in narrowing the nonprofit property tax exemption (Nolan 2011). Louisiana has a very broad charitable exemption compared to most states, with all properties owned by eligible institutions exempt from taxation regardless of use, including those not typically tax-exempt such as fraternal organizations, labor unions, and trade associations (Bureau of Government Research 1999).

Providence, Rhode Island: The mayor and city council members sought to increase the amount of PILOTs from the city’s four colleges and universities, but the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions (2010) recommended against renegotiating the 20-year $48 million PILOT agreement reached in 2003. Instead the commission recommended that the city should focus on forming partnerships with local nonprofits to foster economic growth, and the state should provide full funding of its PILOT program and provide Providence with a share of new income and sales tax revenues that result from nonprofit expansion.

Municipalities interested in establishing a systematic PILOT program should consider the following features.

Use a threshold level of property value or annual revenues to determine which nonprofits to include in the PILOT program. Excluding from PILOT requests certain types of nonprofits, such as religious organizations or small social service providers, may be a popular notion, but it can result in arbitrarily targeting some nonprofits while ignoring others. A more systematic policy with a threshold approach is easy to administer and will exclude only those nonprofits that do not meet the financial threshold to make significant contributions, rather than favor some organizations based on the nature of their activities.

Set a target for contributions that is justified. Instead of reaching an arbitrary dollar figure in negotiations, a target that applies to all nonprofits in the program can reduce horizontal inequities and may raise more revenue by creating the expectation for a certain contribution. For example, the target can be justified by estimating the cost of local public services that directly benefit nonprofits, such as police and fire protection and street maintenance.

Use a basis to calculate suggested payments. Using a basis with the rate set to reach the target contribution will also promote consistency. The fairest basis is the assessed value of exempt property, because the PILOT request will be proportional to the tax savings each organization receives from the property tax exemption. However, municipalities that want to avoid having to accurately assess tax-exempt properties can use another basis, such as the square footage of property or the organization’s annual revenues.

Include community benefit offsets, so nonprofits can reduce their target cash PILOTs in return for providing certain public services for local residents. Charitable nonprofits are typically more willing to provide in-kind services than to make PILOTs, and are well positioned to leverage their existing expertise and resources to provide needed services. For example, nonprofit hospitals can set up free health clinics, and universities can establish after-school tutoring programs. Local officials should be clear and consistent about which services are most needed by local residents and will count for community benefit offsets, and should rely on nonprofits to estimate the cash value of these donated in-kind services.

Reach long-term PILOT agreements. Both municipalities and nonprofits are better off with a long-term approach that allows them to build predictable payments into their respective budgets. Additionally, because PILOT requests can require considerable time to negotiate, both parties will benefit from reaching an agreement and then moving on to focus on their primary missions and perhaps other partnerships to serve the community. Several municipalities have 20- or 30-year PILOT agreements in place.

Alternatives to PILOTs

Given some of the common problems with PILOTs, municipalities with large nonprofit sectors that face revenue shortfalls may want to consider alternative revenue-raising measures.

Increase reliance on traditional user fees or special assessments. This alternative may be the most palatable in the current anti-tax climate. One consideration favoring this option is that nonprofits are typically not exempt from these charges, so increasing reliance on such sources will obtain revenue from a broad group of entities, including tax-exempt nonprofits. For example, a municipality could finance garbage collection through a fee instead of the property tax, or use special assessments to pay for sewer hookups in new subdivisions.

Establish municipal service fees. Some municipalities have carved out specific services that are normally funded through property taxes and instead charged nonprofits a fee for the service. These fees may or may not be assessed solely against tax-exempt nonprofits, and they often use a basis for the payments related to the size of the property rather than the assessed value. For example, Rochester, New York, has a local works charge to fund snowplowing and street repair. It is applied to both taxable and tax-exempt organizations using the property’s street frontage as the basis. Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a street maintenance fee that also uses square footage as the basis, but is only charged to nongovernmental tax-exempt properties.

Develop agreements for needed services. Local officials can decide not to pursue cash PILOTs, but instead develop formal partnerships with nonprofits to provide specific services for local residents or work together to foster economic development. Direct provision of needed services, sometimes known as services in lieu of taxes or SILOTs, will help the fiscal situation of the municipality in the short run, while joint efforts to foster economic development can have significant long-run benefits.

Expand the tax options for municipalities. This final alternative would require a change in state law in many instances. Some municipalities across the country have the ability to levy sales taxes, special excise taxes such as hotel taxes, income taxes, or payroll taxes. But most cities in the Northeast do not have these alternative tax sources, and are especially reliant on the property tax, which can be problematic if the tax-exempt sector is large or growing rapidly.

Conclusion

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities that have a significant share of total property value owned by tax-exempt nonprofits, both as a stop-gap in the current municipal fiscal crisis and in the future. However, PILOTs rarely account for more than 1 or 2 percent of municipal revenues, so expecting these payments to eliminate local government deficits is unrealistic. Furthermore, singling out nonprofits to help address a municipal fiscal crisis is unfair since they face their own challenges due to the recent recession.

Local officials who do want to pursue PILOT agreements must tread carefully if they want to avoid some common pitfalls. First, PILOT requests can be highly contentious when local officials resort to heavy-handed pressure tactics to reach agreements. It is preferable for local officials to work collaboratively with nonprofit leaders to craft PILOT agreements that serve their mutual interests. Second, the voluntary nature of PILOTs limits the revenue potential of these agreements, results in inconsistent treatment of nonprofits, and leads to other problems. Municipalities with a large number of nonprofits can mitigate these problems by establishing a systematic PILOT program to provide guidance and bring consistency to their negotiations with individual nonprofits.

About the Authors

Daphne A. Kenyon is a visiting fellow in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates, Windham, New Hampshire.

Adam H. Langley is a research analyst in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and a master’s student in economics at Boston University.

References

Bureau of Government Research. 1999. Property tax exemption and assessment administration in Orleans parish. New Orleans, LA.

Center for Civil Society Studies. 2009. Impact of the 2007-09 Economic Recession on Nonprofit Organizations. Communique No. 14. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University for Policy Studies. June 29.

City of Boston. 2010. Mayor’s PILOT task force: Final report and recommendations. December.

Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. 2010. A call to build the capital city partnership for economic growth: Report to the Providence City Council from the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. Providence, RI. November.

Hoene, Christopher W. 2009. City budget shortfalls and responses: projections for 2010-2012. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Hoene, Christopher W. and Michael A. Pagano. 2010. Research brief: City fiscal conditions in 2010. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Kenyon, Daphne A. and Adam H. Langley. 2010. Payments in lieu of taxes: Balancing municipal and nonprofit interests. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lipman, Harvy. 2006. The value of a tax break. The Chronicle of Philanthropy 19(4): 13.

McArdle, Regina, and Donna Demirai. 2004. A study of charitable and educational property tax exemptions. City and Town, January. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services.

McFarland, Christiana. 2010. State of America’s cities survey on jobs and the economy. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

National Council of Nonprofits. 2010. State budget crises: Ripping the safety net held by nonprofits. Washington DC. March 16.

Nolan, Bruce. 2011. N.O. Tax Fairness Commission begins rethinking property taxes. The Times-Picayune. February 3.

Walker, Andrea K., and Julie Scharper. 2010. Baltimore City Council committee backs $15 million in new taxes; deal with hospitals and universities announced for $20 million more. Baltimore Sun. June 10.

La conversión del suelo de producción agrícola a desarrollo urbano e industrial es uno de los procesos de cambio críticos en las economías en vías de desarrollo que experimentan la industrialización, urbanización y globalización. Los cambios en el uso del suelo urbano que están ocurriendo en China han atraído la atención de muchos académicos, especialmente en vista de las grandes reformas económicas, el significativo crecimiento económico y los profundos cambios estructurales que han tenido lugar en las últimas tres décadas. La transición de una economía planificada a una economía de mercado, y de un gobierno provincial y municipal autoritario a un tipo de gobierno más descentralizado ha generado un nuevo marco institucional para los cambios del uso del suelo (Lin y Ho 2005).

La opinión general es la de calificar el cambio del uso del suelo como resultado del crecimiento económico y de los cambios estructurales. Este punto de vista está alineado con el modelo de crecimiento neoclásico en el que el suelo cumple un papel cada vez menor en el crecimiento económico. No obstante, estos cambios en el uso del suelo pueden ser tanto la consecuencia del crecimiento económico como los factores impulsores de dicho crecimiento (Bai, Chen y Shi 2011; Ding y Lichtenberg 2011).

Pero la realidad resulta mucho más compleja. En lugar de estar impulsada por una población en crecimiento, la expansión del suelo urbano en China está motivada por el financiamiento de suelo, en virtud del cual los gobiernos municipales recaudan ingresos y atraen inversiones mediante el arrendamiento y desarrollo de terrenos. Como resultado, la política urbana centrada en el suelo se ha identificado con una de las fuerzas impulsoras más importantes de la espectacular expansión de las ciudades desde mediados de la década de 1990 (Lin 2007). La oferta de suelos agrícolas para fines no relacionados con la agricultura permite de hecho al gobierno municipal “matar varios pájaros de un tiro” (Ping 2011). En consecuencia, el desarrollo del suelo fomenta el crecimiento económico, especialmente en áreas urbanizadas.

Los cambios en el uso del suelo en China también se ven afectados en gran manera por las políticas de oferta de terrenos, que se han visto ajustadas en forma regular a fin de suplir la demanda del desarrollo económico. La oferta ilegal de terrenos es una de las causas principales de una inversión excesiva y descontrolada, que se produce cuando el gobierno municipal no ofrece terrenos a las personas que utilizan el suelo de acuerdo con los planes de uso del suelo en curso o después del permiso definitivo del gobierno central. Como resultado, el gobierno central comenzó a utilizar las políticas de suelo como herramienta fundamental del control macroeconómico nacional a fines del año 2003.

Entre otras medidas, la transferencia de terrenos se ha llevado a cabo mediante subastas o licitaciones desde 2004, y la política sobre oferta de terrenos dio un giro desde el control de la cantidad al control estructural desde 2006. Los índices sobre el uso del suelo distribuidos por el gobierno central a los gobiernos municipales sólo hacían hincapié en la cantidad de terrenos antes de 2006; sin embargo, en la actualidad, la distribución de los usos del suelo en categorías la realiza el gobierno central, que define, incluso, hasta la intensidad del uso del suelo.

Este legado puede observarse en la decisión del Consejo de Estado de establecer el sistema altamente centralizado de Supervisión Estatal del Suelo (SES) en 2006. Se crearon nueve oficinas regionales nuevas, encargadas de investigar la oferta ilegal de terrenos en todo el país (Tao y otros 2010). La nueva política de suelo ha representado un papel activo en la mejora del uso del suelo, mediante la prohibición de arrendamiento de suelo para proyectos que no se encuentren en línea con la política industrial nacional, los planes de desarrollo y las normas de ingreso. Con posterioridad a la introducción de estas reformas y gracias a un estricto control, se ha reducido significativamente la cantidad de suelo ofrecido de manera ilegal, mientras que el PIB generado por unidad de suelo desarrollable ha aumentado sustancialmente (Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China 2007). Se espera que esta estricta política de suelo tenga un impacto significativo en el patrón espacial del uso del suelo y tenga efectos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico en China.

Cambios en los patrones de uso del suelo en China

La política de suelo en China ha sufrido cambios drásticos desde 2004, por lo que podría también esperarse un patrón diferente del uso del suelo desde entonces. En base a los datos oficiales a nivel de condado de 2004 a 2008, examinamos los cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura y analizamos la relación espacial entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los datos oficiales sobre cambios en el uso del suelo se dividen en varias categorías de uso del suelo dentro de tres niveles todos los años. El primer nivel incluye el suelo agrícola, el suelo para construcción y el suelo sin utilizar. El segundo nivel incluye diez categorías de utilización del suelo. El tercer nivel incluye 52 subcategorías.

La tabla 1 muestra los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel nacional de 2004 a 2008, período durante el cual se reconvirtió una mayor cantidad de suelo para usos de construcción, mientras que la cantidad de suelo agrícola y suelo sin utilizar disminuyó. Entre las categorías de suelo agrícola, el suelo para pastoreo y el suelo cultivado se redujeron en 12,69 millones de mu (0,85 millones de hectáreas) y 11,27 millones de mu (0,75 millones de hectáreas), respectivamente. El suelo sin utilizar se redujo en 17,91 millones de mu (1,19 millones de hectáreas).

Debido a las recientes y rápidas industrialización y urbanización, no es de sorprender que las reconversiones de suelo que se llevaron a cabo a mayor velocidad en China hayan sido las destinadas para uso de construcción, que sumaron 18,83 millones de mu (1,26 millones de hectáreas). En la categoría de asentamientos y emplazamientos industriales y mineros, las ciudades, las ciudades designadas y los emplazamientos industriales y mineros fueron los que experimentaron una expansión del suelo más rápida, llegando a tasas de crecimiento del 19,61 por ciento, 13,33 por ciento y 12,42 por ciento, respectivamente, mientras que la superficie de suelo destinada a asentamientos rurales disminuyó. Asimismo, grandes cantidades de suelo se reconvirtieron para su utilización en el transporte, particularmente para la construcción de autopistas.

El presente análisis a nivel nacional oculta diferentes variaciones espaciales en los cambios en el uso del suelo en provincias y regiones concretas (figura 1). Así, analizamos los cambios en el uso del suelo a nivel provincial, centrándonos en los cambios acaecidos en el suelo cultivado, el suelo urbano (que incluye ciudades y pueblos designados), los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos, los asentamientos rurales y el suelo para transporte destinado a autopistas.

La figura 2 muestra que la pérdida de suelo cultivado se dio principalmente en la región este y central de China. El crecimiento económico, la urbanización y la industrialización se han acelerado en las provincias de Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong y Guangxi, donde la mayor parte del suelo cultivado se reconvirtió con fines urbanos, industriales y de transporte. Las provincias de Shanxi, Shaanxi, Chongqing y Sichuan también experimentaron una rápida reconversión de su suelo cultivado para fines de actividades no relacionadas con la agricultura. Dichas provincias se encuentran en el cinturón geográfico de transición en China, donde el suelo cultivado es la mejor opción a la hora de realizar proyectos de construcción y desarrollo. Por el contrario, las provincias del interior, tales como Tíbet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Mongolia interior y Heilongjiang, experimentaron ciertos incrementos en el suelo cultivado.

El suelo destinado a asentamientos rurales se ve influenciado tanto por las nuevas políticas sobre el campo y el crecimiento de los ingresos rurales. El aumento en los ingresos ha tenido un impacto sobre la reconversión del suelo para asentamientos rurales en las provincias del este, como Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Hebei y Tianjin, y en ciertas provincias del interior, como Heilongjiang, Mongolia interior, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tíbet, Yunnan, Guizhou, Hubei y Shanxi. Sin embargo, algunas provincias experimentaron descensos significativos en la cantidad de terrenos utilizados para asentamientos rurales, particularmente en Jiangsu, Jiangxi y Anhui. Este descenso puede tener relación con las nuevas políticas sobre el campo, que literalmente han obligado a los campesinos a mudarse a las ciudades.

La urbanización y la industrialización son los principales motores de la expansión del suelo no destinado a usos agrícolas en China. La tasa de urbanización creció del 40,50 por ciento al 45,68 por ciento entre 2004 y 2008, período en el que todas las provincias experimentaron una expansión del suelo urbano e industrial (figura 3). No obstante, la mayor parte de la expansión del suelo urbano se dio al sur del río Yangtze. En el norte, sólo Shandong, Anhui y Jiangsu experimentaron cambios importantes en el suelo urbano e industrial.

El rápido crecimiento de la cantidad de suelo utilizado para emplazamientos industriales y mineros se observa principalmente en las provincias del este, tanto en términos de cambios absolutos como relativos, en concreto en Fujian, Jiangsu, Zhejiang y Hebei (figura 4). Con tasas de crecimiento relativamente menores, Guangdong, Shandong y Liaoning experimentaron también la reconversión de una gran cantidad de suelo para emplazamientos industriales y mineros. Las provincias de Mongolia interior, Qinghai y Tíbet en el oeste del país experimentaron un rápido crecimiento de terrenos para emplazamientos industriales y mineros, aunque se observó un bajo crecimiento absoluto.

De 2004 a 2008, China dio un gran impulso al desarrollo de redes de transporte mediante la construcción de nuevos ferrocarriles y autopistas para sostener el crecimiento económico. A nivel nacional, el suelo destinado al transporte creció cerca de 10 por ciento durante dicho período. En muchas provincias se observó un crecimiento más rápido en la cantidad de suelo utilizado para el transporte que en el país en su conjunto, incluyendo Mongolia interior, Hebei, Qinghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Chongqing, Hubei, Anhui, Jiangxi y Guangxi. La confiscación de terrenos para construir autopistas se concentró principalmente en las provincias del este, y los mayores aumentos absolutos se dieron en las provincias de Zhejiang, Jiangsu y Hebei.

En general, China ha experimentado cambios muy importantes en el uso del suelo, en concreto en las provincias del este y en algunas de la región central. El patrón espacial de cambios en el uso del suelo es coherente con el cambio espacial del crecimiento económico, ya que las provincias del este gozan de ventajas institucionales y de ubicación y economías de aglomeración. Estas provincias han atraído la mayor parte de las inversiones extranjeras, particularmente aquellas relacionadas con las industrias que utilizan el capital y la tecnología de forma intensiva, y son las exportadoras líderes de los productos chinos.

La aceptación dentro de la Organización Mundial de Comercio ha redundado en aún mayores beneficios para las industrias ubicadas en la región este de China, ya que tienen mayor acceso a los mercados internacionales. Por otro lado, a medida que las industrias continúan aglomerándose, la región este ha experimentado un aumento en los costos del suelo, de la mano de obra y del medio ambiente, obligando a algunas industrias tradicionales a mudarse a las provincias centrales. Algunas de estas áreas recientemente han atraído inversiones y han experimentado un crecimiento económico más rápido, lo que elevó su nivel de importancia entre las economías regionales de China.

Correlaciones entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico

A fin de investigar la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico de forma sistemática en todas las ciudades y provincias, calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y la tasa de cambios en diferentes categorías de suelo. La extensión de dicha correlación puede depender de diferentes factores económicos, de ubicación e institucionales. Analizamos el impacto que tiene el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la cantidad de inversiones extranjeras directas (IED) y las limitaciones en la oferta de terrenos sobre la relación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Los coeficientes de correlación se calculan además utilizando submuestras de las ciudades clasificadas según dichos factores.

Los resultados inesperados muestran que sólo existen unos pocos, y pequeños, coeficientes de correlación significativos entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y la tasa de crecimiento económico (He, Huang y Wang 2012). Los cambios en el suelo destinado a otros tipos de transporte (tales como aeropuertos, puertos y ductos) poseen un coeficiente significativamente positivo. Los coeficientes de correlación para suelo urbano, emplazamientos industriales y mineros, ferrocarriles y autopistas resultaron apenas significativos.

Algunas evidencias muestran que el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación geográfica, la situación fiscal, la oferta de terrenos y las IED realizadas pueden moderar la correlación existente entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico. Por ejemplo, la expansión del suelo urbano se relaciona con el crecimiento económico de manera positiva en la región central de China, pero de manera negativa en las regiones del este y el oeste. Los emplazamientos industriales y mineros autónomos aumentan significativamente junto con el crecimiento económico en el oeste de la China. Sin embargo, en general, la correlación entre la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico es algo débil.

Dado que el suelo puede tomarse como un factor en la función productora, la cantidad de suelo puede contribuir en forma directa al crecimiento del PIB. Calculamos los coeficientes de correlación entre el crecimiento absoluto del PIB de 2005 a 2009 y los cambios absolutos en el uso del suelo de 2004 a 2008 a fin de analizar esta relación y descubrir si presentan una estrecha correlación. A nivel nacional, la reconversión de una mayor cantidad de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye significativamente al crecimiento absoluto del PIB, con un coeficiente de correlación de -0,26. Una mayor cantidad de suelo para uso urbano y para fines industriales y mineros se relaciona en forma significativa y positiva con los aumentos en el PIB.

La existencia de coeficientes de correlación significativos entre los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento económico sugiere que el suelo ha sido un importante factor impulsor del crecimiento económico, aunque dicho aporte positivo se ve moderado por diferentes factores, tales como el tamaño de la ciudad, la ubicación, la estructura industrial, la situación fiscal y la utilización de IED. Se observa que la reconversión de suelo cultivado para fines no relacionados con la agricultura contribuye al crecimiento económico, especialmente en ciudades de más de 5 millones de habitantes, que realizaron IED por más de US$200 millones, y que poseen mayores limitaciones en el suelo para fines agrícolas, un dominio de la industria secundaria y una ubicación en la región central de China.

Claramente, el suelo no agrícola es más productivo que el suelo cultivado en las ciudades grandes e industriales. En los últimos años, a medida que la implementación de políticas del gobierno central se centró en el desarrollo de la región central de China, las provincias del interior han atraído mayores inversiones, tanto nacionales como extranjeras, y han experimentado un rápido crecimiento económico a medida que el suelo cultivado se ha ido reconvirtiendo para usos urbano e industrial.

En términos comparativos, la expansión del suelo urbano posee una mayor correlación con el crecimiento del PIB en las ciudades más pequeñas y en aquellas ubicadas en el interior. Estos tipos de ciudades tienen más probabilidades de depender del arrendamiento de suelos a fin de generar ingresos municipales, ya que enfrentan mayores limitaciones fiscales. En dichas áreas, la acumulación de capital derivada del arrendamiento de suelos es una típica estrategia de desarrollo municipal. Además, la expansión del suelo urbano cumple una importante función para estimular el crecimiento económico cuando las limitaciones fiscales son mayores, la oferta de terrenos se encuentra estrictamente controlada, dominan las industrias terciarias y se utilizan más inversiones extranjeras. La expansión del suelo industrial también contribuye de manera significativa al crecimiento económico, especialmente en las ciudades que tienen más limitaciones fiscales y más actividades industriales.

La reciente explosión experimentada en el desarrollo de infraestructura del transporte también ha contribuido al crecimiento económico. El aumento del suelo para construir autopistas ha estimulado el crecimiento económico sin ningún tipo de límites. Las ciudades ubicadas en las regiones del oeste y aquellas que presenten un bajo nivel de recaudación fiscal son las que más se benefician de las nuevas autopistas, mientras que la expansión del ferrocarril se relaciona en menor medida con el crecimiento económico. La construcción de otros tipos de infraestructura de transporte (aeropuertos, puertos, ductos) ha representado un papel fundamental para facilitar el crecimiento económico en ciudades más pequeñas y ubicadas hacia el este, así como también en aquellas ciudades cuyas economías se encuentran dominadas por las industrias de servicios.

El análisis de correlación ofrece pruebas claras que demuestran que el aumento de suelo urbano, industrial y para fines de transporte se relaciona de forma significativa y positiva con el crecimiento económico. La reconversión de suelo cultivado ha contribuido a la expansión económica en varias regiones de China; no obstante, la importancia de la ampliación del suelo no destinado a actividades agrícolas en función del crecimiento económico se encuentra moderada por condiciones sociales, económicas y geográficas.

Conclusión y debate

Desde la implementación de su reforma económica, China ha perseguido un modelo de crecimiento basado en el uso intensivo de recursos que ha obligado al suelo a cumplir un papel fundamental en el sostenimiento de su rápido crecimiento económico. Esto ha dado como resultado una gran oferta de suelo desarrollable y una rápida reconversión de suelos agrícolas en suelos no relacionados con la agricultura. En China, el suelo no es sólo el resultado del crecimiento económico sino también su motor.

La conversión del suelo cultivado para fines no agrícolas se ha concentrado en las regiones del este y del centro del país. Con la implementación de nuevas estrategias de desarrollo del campo y la imposición de limitaciones más estrictas en cuanto a la oferta de terrenos, China ha experimentado una reducción de los asentamientos rurales en la mayor parte de la región central y noreste. La expansión del suelo urbano e industrial ha dominado los cambios del uso del suelo en todo el país. El desarrollo del transporte, incluyendo nuevas autopistas, ferrocarriles, aeropuertos, puertos y ductos, también ha sido una de las principales causas de consumo de terrenos en los últimos años, particularmente en las regiones este y central.

El análisis de componentes principales en base a los datos sobre cambios en el uso del suelo de las ciudades a nivel de prefectura indicó una significativa variación espacial en los cambios en el uso del suelo entre las ciudades chinas y demuestra que tienen una autocorrelación espacial. El análisis de correlación también demostró una débil relación entre la tasa de crecimiento del PIB y la tasa de cambios en el uso del suelo. Sin embargo, en términos absolutos los cambios en el uso del suelo y el crecimiento del PIB presentan una fuerte correlación, lo que indica que la cantidad de terrenos constituye un factor fundamental en el crecimiento económico.

Por lo general, las teorías occidentales sobre crecimiento económico consideran que el suelo cumple una función marginal en el crecimiento económico. Nuestro análisis exploratorio sugiere que, en China, se da la situación contraria. A medida que China se urbaniza, se industrializa y se globaliza, va experimentando cambios significativos en el uso del suelo que presentan una correlación con el crecimiento económico. Esta relación significativa se asocia a los particulares sistemas de propiedad estatal del suelo y de derechos de uso del suelo en China. Como tal, el suelo puede utilizarse como una poderosa herramienta de intervención macroeconómica. El arrendamiento a largo plazo de derechos de utilización del suelo incentiva a los gobiernos locales a vender terrenos para generar ingresos totales que posteriormente se utilizan para financiar el desarrollo urbano e industrial y la provisión de infraestructura.

En consecuencia, el suelo ha cumplido una función fundamental en el rápido crecimiento económico de China. Sin embargo, este tipo de urbanización e industrialización basada en el suelo ya ha causado graves tensiones sociales, una degradación del medioambiente y fluctuaciones económicas. Los ingresos totales generados por el arrendamiento de suelo no son sustentables, si se tiene en cuenta que, aún siendo tan extensa, China posee una limitada oferta de suelo. Puede esperarse que el papel del suelo como factor impulsor del crecimiento económico se reduzca a medida que China experimente gradualmente un avance industrial.

Sobre los autores

Canfei He es profesor asociado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín, además de director asociado del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Zhiji Huang es estudiante de doctorado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Weikai Wang es estudiante de posgrado en la Facultad de Ciencias Urbanas y Ambientales de la Universidad de Pekín y del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln en Beijing.

Referencias

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Centro de Derecho sobre Recursos de Suelo y Mineros de China. 2007. The evolution of land policy’s involvement in macro-control policies of China. China Land 6, 53–56 (en chino).

Ding, C. y E. Lichtenberg. 2011. Land and urban economic growth in China. Journal of Regional Science 51(2): 299–317.

He, Canfei, Zhiji Huang y Weikai Wang. 2012. Land use changes and urban economic growth in China: An exploratory analysis. Documento de trabajo. Beijing: Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Políticas de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln.

Lin, G. C. S. 2007. Reproducing spaces of Chinese urbanization: New city-based and land-centered urban transformation. Urban Studies 44 (9): 1827–1855.

Lin, G. C. S. y S. P. S. Ho. 2005. The state, land system, and land development processes in contemporary China. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95(2): 411–436.

Ministerio de Suelo y Recursos. 2008. Land use change survey data. República Popular China.

Ping, Y. C. 2011. Explaining land use change in a Guangdong county: the supply side of the story. The China Quarterly 2107: 626–648.

Tao, R., F. Su, M. Liu y G. Cao. 2010. Land leasing and local public finance in China’s regional development: Evidence from prefecture level cities. Urban Studies 47(10): 2217–2236.

In the wake of the housing market collapse and the Great Recession—which caused a substantial increase in residential foreclosures and often precipitous declines in home prices that likely led to additional foreclosures—many observers speculated that local governments would consequently suffer significant property tax revenue losses. While anecdotal evidence suggests that foreclosures, especially when spatially concentrated, lowered housing prices and property tax revenue, the existing body of research provides no empirical evidence to support this conclusion (box 1). Drawing on proprietary foreclosure data from RealtyTrac—which provides annual foreclosures by zip code for the period 2006 through 2011 (a period that both precedes and follows the Great Recession)—this report is the first to examine the impacts of foreclosures on local government property tax values and revenues. After presenting information on the correlation between foreclosures and housing prices nationwide, we shift focus to Georgia in order to explore how foreclosures affected property values and property tax revenue across school districts throughout the state. Our empirical analysis indicates that, indeed, foreclosures likely diminished property values and property tax revenues. While still preliminary, these findings suggest that foreclosures had a range of effects on the fiscal systems of local governments.

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Box 1: Existing Research into the Impacts of Economic Factors on Property Tax Revenues

While there is existing research examining the various impacts of economic factors on property tax revenues, these studies use data that reflect only a previous recession (e.g., the 2001 recession) or that cover only the very start of the housing crisis in the Great Recession. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2010), for example, focus directly on the effects of house prices on local government revenues, using detailed panel data on Florida home prices during the 2000s. They conclude that changes in the real price of Florida single-family housing had an asymmetric effect on government revenues. Price increases do not raise real per capita revenues, but price decreases tend to dampen them. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt also find that asymmetric responses are due largely to caps on assessment increases, positive or negative lags between changes in market prices and assessed values, and decreased millage rates in response to increased home prices. Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2011) document the overall trends in property tax revenues in the United States from 1998 through 2009—when local governments, on average, were largely able to avoid the significant and negative budgetary impacts sustained by state and federal governments, at least through 2009, although there was substantial regional variation in these effects. Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2009) also examine the relation between education expenditures and property tax revenues for the 1990 to 2006 period. In related work, Alm and Sjoquist (2009) examine the impact of other economic factors on Georgia school district finances such as state responses to local school district conditions. Finally, Jaconetty (2011) examined the legal issues surrounding foreclosures, and the MacArthur Foundation has funded a project on foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois.

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Potential Links between Housing Prices, Foreclosures, and Property Values

Local governments in the United States rely on various own-source revenues, including local income, property, and general sales taxes and specific excise taxes, fees, and user charges. Of these, the dominant source is by far the property tax. In 2011, local property taxes accounted for roughly three-fourths of total local government tax revenues and for nearly one-half of total local own-source revenues (including fees and charges).

Some local taxes, such as income and sales taxes, have bases that vary closely with the levels of economic activity, and the Great Recession seriously depressed revenues from such taxes. The basis of the property tax is assessed value, which does not automatically change in response to economic conditions; in the absence of a formal and deliberate change in assessment, a decrease in the market value does not necessarily translate into a decrease in assessed value. Assessment caps, lags in reassessments, and the ability to make deliberate changes in millage or property tax rates combine so that economic fluctuations that influence housing values may not affect the property tax base or property tax revenues in any immediate or obvious way. Over time, however, assessed values tend to reflect market values, and property tax revenues also come under pressure.

A weakened housing market—with lower housing values and more foreclosures—may reduce local government tax revenues from several sources (Anderson, 2010; Boyd, 2010; Lutz, Molloy, and Shan, 2010), including real estate transfer taxes, sales taxes on home construction materials, and income taxes from workers in the housing construction and home furnishings industries. Because property tax revenues are such a large share of local tax revenue, however, changes in property tax revenues are often larger than the changes from these other housing-related taxes.

Foreclosure Activities Nationwide During and After the Great Recession

Figure 1 (p. 24) presents the total nationwide numbers of foreclosures at the 5-digit zip code level as a share of the number of owner-occupied homes in 2010. This figure demonstrates the clear geographic concentration of foreclosures. Arizona, California, and Florida were especially hard hit by the collapse of the housing bubble. However, other areas also experienced significant foreclosure activity.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) produces a housing price index for each metropolitan statistical area (MSA). We matched the RealtyTrac foreclosure data to the FHFA housing price index for 352 metropolitan statistical areas. Figure 2 (p. 24) presents a simple scatterplot that relates total foreclosures over the years 2006 to 2011 as a share of the number of owner-occupied housing units in 2010, to the change in the housing price index over the period 2007 to 2012 for all 352 metropolitan areas. The simple correlation coefficient between foreclosures per owner-occupied housing units and the change in housing price index is -0.556; if we consider only those MSAs with non-zero foreclosures over the period, the correlation coefficient is -0.739. This simple analysis suggests that foreclosures have a significant negative relation with housing values. The next step is to explore the effect of foreclosures on the property tax base and on property tax revenues. In the next section, we examine this issue for the state of Georgia.

More Detailed Analysis: Foreclosures, Property Values, and Property Tax Revenues in Georgia

By examining the effect of foreclosures on property values and property tax revenues in a single state, we eliminated the need to control for the many ways in which institutional factors may differ across states. Georgia is a suitable focal point because in many ways it is roughly an “average” state. For example, local governments in Georgia rely on property taxes only slightly less than the national average; in 2008, property tax revenue as a share of total taxes for local governments was 65.1 percent in Georgia compared to 72.3 percent of the U.S. (Bourdeaux and Jun 2011).

We measure foreclosure activity with the Realty-Trac data, aggregating zip code observations into the corresponding counties. The Georgia Department of Revenue supplied the annual property tax base (referred to as “net digest” in Georgia) and property tax rates. Property tax and total local source revenues for school districts came from the Georgia Department of Education. The tax base is as of January 1 of the respective year. The property tax rate is set in the spring with tax bills being paid in the fall, the revenue from which would be reported in the following fiscal year. School districts are on a July 1 to June 30 fiscal year, so the 2009 tax base and millage rates, for example, would be reflected in revenues for fiscal year 2010. We also use various demographic and economic data (income, employment, and population) measured at the county level to help explain changes in the base. Because these variables are at a county level, for the analysis that follows, we added the property tax base and revenue variables for city school districts to those for the county school systems in each city’s county to obtain countywide totals for 159 counties. For counties that include all or part of a city school system, the tax rate is the average of the county and city school tax rates, weighted by the respective property tax base.

Only county governments conduct property tax assessment in Georgia, but the state evaluates all property tax bases annually, comparing actual sales of improved parcels during the year to assessed values, and determining if the assessment level is appropriate relative to fair market value, which is legally set at 40 percent. The resulting “sales ratio studies” report an adjusted 100 percent property tax base figure for each school district in the state, along with the calculated ratio. We use these adjusted property tax bases, covering the periods 2000 through 2011, to measure the market value of residential property.

Georgia has very few institutional property tax limitations. School district boards can generally set their property tax rates without voter approval, which is required only if the property tax rate for a county school district exceeds 20 mills. Currently, the cap is binding on only five school systems. Also, there is no general assessment limitation, although one county has an assessment freeze on homesteaded property. In 2009, the State of Georgia imposed a temporary freeze on assessments across the state, potentially affecting property tax revenue only in school year/fiscal year 2010; however, with net and adjusted property tax bases declining on a per capita basis for most counties in 2009 through 2011, it is unlikely that the freeze has constrained assessments.

Foreclosures

Table 1 provides the statewide mean and median number of foreclosures by zip code for 2006 through 2011. Total foreclosures almost doubled between 2006 and 2010, before declining in 2011. The mean number of foreclosures is much larger than the median, implying that the distribution is highly skewed.

Table 2 shows the distribution of Georgia zip codes by the number of years that the zip code had non-zero foreclosures. Over 65 percent of the zip codes had foreclosures in each of the six years, while only 7 percent had no foreclosures in all six years. This distribution suggests that very little of the state was immune to the foreclosure crisis.

Figure 3 (p. 25) shows the distribution of foreclosures across the state over the period 2006 through 2011. Because zip codes differ in size and housing density, we also map the number of foreclosures per owner-occupied housing units for 2010 in figure 4 (p. 25). Note that zip codes marked in white either have no foreclosures or are missing foreclosure data. As one would expect, urban and suburban counties (particularly in the Atlanta metropolitan area) have the most foreclosures. However, there are large numbers of foreclosures in many of the less urban zip codes as well.

Figure 5 shows the annual distribution of foreclosures per hundred housing units in each of Georgia’s 159 counties. Note that the bar in the box represents the median value, the box captures the observations in the second and third quartile, the “whiskers” equal 1.5 times the difference between the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles, and the dots are extreme values. The median number of foreclosures by county increased from 0.17 per 100 housing units in 2006 to 1.18 per 100 units in 2010—more than a sixfold increase in the median. There is a high positive correlation between foreclosure activity in 2006 and 2011 across the counties. This correlation is 0.78 when measured relative to housing units and 0.74 when measured on a per capita basis, indicating that counties with above (below) average foreclosure activity before the housing crisis remained above (below) average at its peak.

Property Values

As for changes in property values, figures 6 and 7 show the distributions of annual changes, respectively, in the per capita net property tax base and in the per capita adjusted 100 percent property tax base across the 159 counties from 2001 through 2011. Studies suggest that foreclosures may have spillover effects on the market values of other properties in the jurisdiction (Frame, 2010). We attempt to estimate the effect of foreclosures on market values as measured by the adjusted 100 percent property tax base.

Our results are preliminary, in that the analysis included only Georgia data. Even so, they suggest significant negative effects of foreclosures on property values, controlling for year-to-year percent changes in income, employment, and population. The coefficient estimates on the foreclosures variable suggest that a marginal increase of one foreclosure per 100 homes (or approximately the increase in median foreclosures from 2006 to 2011) is associated with a roughly 3 percent decline in the adjusted 100 percent property tax base over each of the two following years. Similarly, an increase of one foreclosure per 1,000 population is associated with nearly a 1 percent decline in the adjusted 100 percent property tax base after one year, and a slightly lower percent decline in the following year.

Property Tax Revenues

We also explore the effect of foreclosures on property tax revenues. Figure 8 (p. 27) depicts the distribution of nominal changes by county in total maintenance and operations property tax revenues since 2001, showing considerable variation across the school systems in the annual changes in property tax revenues. Even in the latest three years of declining property values, at least half the counties annually realized positive nominal growth in property tax revenue. To understand the effect of foreclosure activity on local government property revenues, we estimate regressions that relate foreclosures to property tax levies and to actual property tax revenues.

We find that a rise in foreclosures is associated with a reduction in the levy, after controlling for changes in the property tax base as well as fluctuations in income, employment, and population. An increase of one foreclosure per 100 housing units is associated with about a 1.5 percent subsequent decline in the levy, all else held constant. We also find that foreclosures have a negative impact on revenues, all else constant. Like our earlier estimates, these results are for Georgia only, but they indicate a significant negative relationship between foreclosures and local government property tax levies and revenues. It may be that higher foreclosure activity makes local officials hesitant to raise property tax rates to offset the effect of foreclosures on the tax base.

Conclusions

How have foreclosures driven by the Great Recession affected property values and property tax revenues of local governments? Our results suggest that foreclosures have had a significant negative impact on property values, and, through this channel, a similar effect on property tax revenues, at least in the state of Georgia. Our results also suggest additional effects on levies and revenues after controlling for changes in the tax base. Further work is required to see whether these results extend to other states.

About the Authors

James Alm is a professor and chair of the department of economics at Tulane University.

Robert D. Buschman is a senior research associate with the Fiscal Research Center in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

David L. Sjoquist is a professor and holder of the Dan E. Sweat Chair in Educational and Community Policy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies.

Resources

Alm, James and David L. Sjoquist. 2009. The Response of Local School Systems in Georgia to Fiscal and Economic Conditions. Journal of Education Finance 35(1): 60–84.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, and David L. Sjoquist. 2009. Economic Conditions and State and Local Education Revenue. Public Budgeting & Finance 29(3): 28–51.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, and David L. Sjoquist. 2011. Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax. Regional Science and Urban Economics 41(4): 320–331.

Anderson, John E. 2010. Shocks to the Property Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

Bourdeaux, Carolyn and Sungman Jun. 2011. Comparing Georgia’s Revenue Portfolio to Regional and National Peers. Report No. 222. Atlanta, GA: Fiscal Research Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

Boyd, Donald J. 2010. Recession, Recovery, and State and Local Finances. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

Doerner, William M. and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt. 2010. House Prices and Local Government Revenues. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

Frame, W. Scott. 2010. Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature. Economic Review 95(3): 1–9.

Jaconetty, Thomas A. 2011. How Do Foreclosures Affect Real Property Tax Valuation? And What Can We Do About It?” Working paper presented at National Conference of State Tax Judges, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA (September).

Lutz, Byron, Raven Molloy, and Hui Shan. 2010. The Housing Crisis and State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, DC (May).

Antes de incorporarme al Instituto lincoln de Políticas de Suelo, tuve la responsabilidad de hacer el seguimiento de la ciudad de detroit para la fundación ford durante casi una década. Allí pude ser testigo de primera mano de los desafíos sin precedentes que implicaba la tarea de revertir la suerte de la que fue la ciudad más poderosa e importante de los Estados Unidos de mediados del siglo XX. La magnitud de estos desafíos requirió la coalición de algunos de los mejores y más brillantes reconstructores de comunidades con los que he tenido el privilegio de trabajar. La calidad y el compromiso de este enérgico grupo de funcionarios públicos, líderes cívicos y comunitarios y visionarios del sector privado ayudaron a Detroit a recuperar un futuro brillante.

Uno de los proyectos distintivos llevados a cabo por esta asociación filantrópica pública y privada fue la planificación, la construcción y el financiamiento de la primera inversión de Detroit en obras de transporte público durante más de cinco décadas: el ferrocarril M1, que se inauguró en julio de 2014 gracias a una inversión de fondos privados combinados de más de US$100 millones. El liderazgo de este proyecto no sólo construyó una línea simbólica de ferrocarril liviano de 5,3 kilómetros a lo largo de la avenida Woodward, el eje de la ciudad, sino que también aprovechó la inversión privada para garantizar el compromiso del gobierno estatal y el gobierno federal de crear la primera autoridad para el transporte de la región.

Algunos filántropos líderes a nivel municipal y nacional también recaudaron más de US$125 millones para lanzar la Nueva Iniciativa Económica, un proyecto de 10 años destinado a revitalizar el ecosistema empresarial en la región a través de la incubación estratégica de cientos de nuevos negocios, miles de empleos nuevos y una duradera colaboración a largo plazo entre empleadores y desarrolladores de la fuerza laboral. Además, en lo que podría considerarse como el proyecto colectivo más controvertido y heroico de esta Iniciativa, estos filántropos trabajaron junto con el estado de Michigan para recaudar más de US$800 millones para The Grand Bargain (El gran pacto), mediante el cual no sólo se salvó la legendaria colección del Instituto de Artes de Detroit de la subasta, sino también las futuras pensiones de los funcionarios públicos de Detroit.

Increíblemente, mientras los empresarios sociales hacían lo imposible por recaudar cientos de millones de dólares para ayudar a Detroit, supuestamente la ciudad devolvía al gobierno federal sumas similares en concepto de subvenciones de fórmula no utilizadas. Una ciudad con más de 100.000 propiedades vacantes y abandonadas e índices de desempleo cercanos al 30 por ciento no lograba encontrar una manera de utilizar las subvenciones de las que disponía libremente: sólo debía solicitarlas y monitorear su uso. Los funcionarios públicos de la atribulada Detroit, que se vieron diezmados debido a la pérdida de población y a la insolvencia fiscal de la ciudad, no tenían la capacidad ni los sistemas para gestionar de manera responsable las normas sobre subvenciones federales ni para cumplirlas. Y, en este sentido, Detroit no es muy diferente a otras ciudades industriales históricas u otros lugares con problemas fiscales.

En un informe de marzo de 2015 elaborado por la Oficina de Rendición de Cuentas Gubernamental, denominado “Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis” (Municipios en crisis fiscal) (GAO-15-222), se analizaban cuatro ciudades que se habían declarado en quiebra (Camden, Nueva Jersey; Detroit, Michigan; Flint, Michigan; y Stockton, California), y se llegaba a la conclusión de que la incapacidad de estas ciudades para utilizar y gestionar las subvenciones federales se debía a una inadecuada capacidad del capital humano, a las reducciones de personal, a una capacidad financiera reducida y a sistemas de tecnología informática desactualizados. Los autores del informe también se lamentaban de que estas ciudades no sólo eran incapaces de utilizar las subvenciones de fórmula (por ejemplo, los subsidios en bloque para el desarrollo comunitario que se distribuyen de acuerdo con criterios objetivos, tales como el tamaño de la población o las necesidades de la comunidad), sino que también se privaban repetidamente de solicitar fondos competitivos. En un análisis independiente del año 2012, llevado a cabo por el senador Tom Coburn (Republicano de Oklahoma) y denominado “Money for Nothing” (Dinero para nada), se detectaba una suma de aproximadamente US$70 mil millones en fondos federales que no se utilizaron “debido a leyes mal redactadas, obstáculos burocráticos y mala administración, así como también a una falta generalizada de interés o de demandas por parte de las comunidades a las cuales se habían asignado los fondos”.

¿Cómo puede ser que las ciudades más necesitadas sean incapaces de utilizar la ayuda que tienen a su disposición? No es de sorprender que una ciudad como Detroit, que perdió casi dos tercios de su población en seis décadas, viera una reducción de personal y una disminución de las capacidades de los empleados en las oficinas municipales. Tampoco no es de sorprender que Detroit no tuviera sistemas de tecnología informática actualizados. Cuando un municipio enfrenta problemas fiscales, la infraestructura siempre queda en el último lugar. La incapacidad de utilizar los fondos asignados probablemente no es un pecado de comisión sino una lamentable omisión mucho más profunda que debe solucionarse. Pero ¿dónde comenzamos? Veamos lo que nos dicen los datos. ¿Qué programas de subvenciones de fórmula tienen el menor rendimiento? ¿Cuáles son las ciudades con el peor aprovechamiento? Sin lugar a dudas, no lo sabemos. Y si las agencias federales saben cuáles son los programas y las ciudades que se encuentran en las listas de los mejores y peores, evidentemente no están informando de ello. Además, la mayoría de los ciudadanos en Detroit, que soportan una de las tasas más altas del impuesto sobre la propiedad del país, no saben que su ciudad está desaprovechando millones de dólares en subvenciones federales cada año.

El verano pasado, sin bombo ni platillo pero con gran ambición, el Instituto Lincoln lanzó una campaña mundial para promover la salud fiscal municipal. Esta campaña centra su atención en varios factores que impulsan la salud fiscal municipal, entre los que se incluye el papel que desempeñan los impuestos sobre el suelo y la propiedad con el fin de brindar una base de recaudación estable y segura. En este número de Land Lines, analizamos algunas maneras en que las ciudades y regiones están desarrollando nuevas capacidades (tales como un monitoreo fiscal confiable y una administración transparente de los recursos públicos; comunicación y coordinación efectivas entre el gobierno federal y los gobiernos municipales, de los condados y de los estados; etc.) para superar las barreras económicas y medioambientales más importantes. Analizamos la forma en que las ciudades están mirando dentro y fuera de sus límites para obtener ayuda de otras fuentes. Esperemos que estas historias nos inspiren a trabajar para encontrar formas más amplias, más profundas y más creativas de progresar juntos, en lugar de luchar en soledad.

Dos herramientas tecnológicas que presentamos en este número están modificando la forma en que se organiza y se comparte la información financiera municipal. Estas herramientas permiten a los ciudadanos y al electorado pedir la rendición de cuentas a sus líderes comunitarios y asegurarse de que, una vez que se accione el interruptor de la ayuda económica, se complete el circuito. PolicyMap (pág. 18) se fundó con el objetivo de fundamentar la toma de decisiones públicas basada en datos. Los investigadores de PolicyMap han organizado docenas de bases de datos públicas y han desarrollado una sólida interfaz en la que los usuarios pueden visualizar los datos en mapas. Esta herramienta contiene miles de indicadores que rastrean el uso de los fondos públicos y el impacto que tienen. La ciudad de Arlington, Massachusetts, ha desmitificado sus finanzas municipales mediante el Presupuesto Visual (pág. 5), un programa de código abierto que ayuda a los ciudadanos a entender en qué se gastan los impuestos que pagan. Tanto PolicyMap como el Presupuesto Visual tienen el potencial de rastrear todas las fuentes de ingresos y gastos de una ciudad y hacer que la administración sea transparente para los contribuyentes. Para aquellas ciudades o agencias federales que desean divulgar este tipo de información, estos emprendimientos sociales están listos para rastrear e informar del uso (o la falta de uso) de los fondos públicos.

La alineación vertical de varios niveles gubernamentales para lograr la meta de salud fiscal municipal no sólo es una solución en este país. Nuestra entrevista con Zhi Liu (pág. 30) contiene información sobre las medidas tomadas por el gobierno central de la República Popular China para desarrollar una base de recaudación estable en cada gobierno municipal a través de la promulgación de una ley del impuesto sobre la propiedad; esta medida ayudará a los gobiernos municipales a sobrevivir a las arenas movedizas de la reforma del suelo.

En nuestro informe sobre Working Cities Challenge (Desafíos para Ciudades en Funcionamiento) (pág. 25), los investigadores del Banco de la Reserva Federal de Boston identifican lo que posiblemente es la capacidad más importante para promover no sólo la salud fiscal municipal sino también ciudades prósperas, sustentables y resilientes: el liderazgo. El liderazgo —que puede provenir de funcionarios públicos visionarios, emprendedores cívicos audaces o implacables académicos peripatéticos— está en la esencia de otros casos inspiradores que analizamos en este número. Los líderes en Chattanooga (pág. 8) hicieron una apuesta fuerte por la infraestructura (servicio de Internet de altísima velocidad a bajo costo, proporcionado a través de una red municipal de fibra óptica) con el fin de ayudar a la ciudad a pasar de ser una ciudad industrial retrógrada y contaminada a un centro tecnológico moderno y limpio. Y funciona.

Super Ditch (pág. 10) es otro ejemplo de cómo varios gobiernos pueden trabajar junto con el sector privado con el fin de encontrar soluciones creativas para los desafíos conjuntos. Super Ditch está innovando la gestión del agua urbana y agropecuaria a través de nuevos acuerdos entre el sector público y el sector privado que detienen las antiguas estrategias de “buy-and-dry” (comprar y secar) practicadas por las ciudades con escasez de agua y continúan supliendo la demanda municipal de agua sin despojar a las principales tierras de cultivo de este recurso.

Antes de que nos hallemos inmersos en una interminable polémica partidista acerca de si los gobiernos nacionales deberían rescatar a las ciudades en quiebra, tal vez deberíamos encontrar una forma de garantizar que, en primer lugar, estas ciudades no lleguen a la quiebra, mediante el uso de la ayuda que ya hemos prometido. Sólo un sádico o un cínico pondría intencionalmente estos recursos a la vista pero fuera del alcance de las personas o ciudades necesitadas. Si invertimos sólo una fracción de los fondos no utilizados con el fin de desarrollar las capacidades municipales adecuadas, las comunidades podrán solucionar sus propios problemas. Ya sea mediante una asociación filantrópica pública y privada, una herramienta tecnológica innovadora o una nueva forma de cooperación entre los gobiernos y el sector privado, los emprendedores sociales están ampliando la inventiva humana para ayudarnos a superar el mayor desafío que enfrentamos: encontrar nuevas formas de trabajar juntos para no perecer en soledad.

Thomas J. Nechyba is professor of economics at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, where he also serves as director of undergraduate studies for the Department of Economics. In addition, he is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and he serves as associate editor for the American Economic Review and the Journal of Public Economic Theory. His research and teaching focus on the field of public economics, in particular primary and secondary education, federalism and the function of local governments, and public policy issues relating to disadvantaged families.

Professor Nechyba has lectured and taught in courses at the Lincoln Institute for several years, and he recently completed a working paper based on Institute-supported research, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” This conversation with Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, explores his interest in land taxation and his research findings.

Joan Youngman: How is a land tax different from a conventional property tax?

Thomas Nechyba: It’s really a question of tax efficiency. Any tax has two effects, which economists call the income and substitution effects. The income effect of a tax is the change in the choices made by the taxpayer because payment of the tax has reduced the taxpayer’s real income. The substitution effect arises because the very existence of the tax changes the relative prices of the taxed goods, and therefore gives an incentive to taxpayers to substitute non-taxed goods for taxed goods. The income effect does not give rise to any efficiency problems; it simply implies that some resources are transferred from taxpayers to the government, and we hope the government will do something useful with the money. But, the change in behavior from the substitution effect causes an economic distortion that does not benefit anyone. That is, when the higher price of a taxed good causes me to substitute to a different non-taxed good purely because of the distorted prices, then I am worse off and the government gets no revenue. This is the source of the loss of economic efficiency from taxation, because people are worse off than they were previously, and by a larger amount than the tax collections themselves. This phenomenon is sometimes called a deadweight loss.

Once I asked my students to react to the following statement on an exam: “People hate taxes because of income effects, but economists hate taxes because of substitution effects.” One student wrote that it was undeniably true because it showed that economists aren’t people! Well, I think at least some economists are also people. However, it is true that people dislike taxes primarily because they don’t like paying money to the government. Economists especially dislike those taxes that cause greater deadweight losses, i.e., taxes that have greater substitution effects.

A land tax is a very unusual tax. It does not carry this deadweight loss because it does not give rise to a substitution effect. No one can make a decision to produce more land or less land, and the fact that land is taxed will not distort economic decisions. If we think of the price of land as the discounted present value of future land rents, a tax that reduces expected future rents will cause the price of land to drop. But the total cost of the land, which is the purchase price plus the tax, remains unchanged. Those who are considering the purchase of land therefore face the same cost before and after the tax: before the tax, they simply pay a single price up front; after the tax, they pay a lower price up front but they know they will also have to pay all the future taxes. There is no substitution effect, only an income effect for those who currently own land, because now they can sell it for less than before. Property taxes that tax both land and buildings, on the other hand, do give rise to substitution effects because they distort the cost of making improvements to the property.

A revenue-neutral shift to land value taxation would reduce other, distortionary taxes. A shift to a more efficient tax can improve economic welfare without a loss in tax collections. This much is well known. What is not well known is the magnitude of this benefit and of the cost to landowners in terms of lower land prices. Conventional wisdom predicts that a shift to an efficient land tax would increase income and output but reduce land prices. This kind of general statement isn’t much help to policy makers. If one is suggesting major changes in a tax system, policy makers need to know whether the benefits and the costs are going to be large or small. My recent Lincoln Institute working paper, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform,” constructs a model of state economies in the U.S. to help us think about the effects of such changes.

JY: How did you become interested in developing an economic model for land taxation?

TN: A few years ago, Dick Netzer, professor of economics and public administration at New York University, suggested that I look at the implications for the U.S. economy of replacing capital taxes with land value taxes. Most economists know of the Henry George Theorem and recognize that land taxation is efficient, but they associate his ideas with nineteenth-century economic thought. We assume that all the changes in the economy since then, and changes in the economic role of land, have left these ideas inapplicable to contemporary tax systems. So I was quite surprised that my model indicated that substituting a land value tax for capital taxes on a national level would not only be efficient, as expected, but would actually raise the value of many types of land. However, property taxes are state and local taxes, and the U.S. constitution places special impediments to a national property tax, so a land tax would not be possible on a national level. Further, since each state economy is different, the results of substituting land value taxes for other taxes will also vary from state to state.

JY: How can a tax on land increase land prices?

TN: In and of itself, a tax on land does not increase land prices; it actually reduces land prices, because it reduces the discounted present value of land rents. My research does not consider a land value tax in isolation, but as part of a revenue-neutral tax reform that replaces other, distortionary taxes with a land value tax. Lower taxes on capital will increase capital usage, and more intensive use of capital will raise land prices. For example, if constructing a building becomes more profitable because the tax on the building is lowered or eliminated, an investor may be willing to pay a higher price for its components, including the land.

JY: How did you go about estimating the magnitude of these effects?

TN: I developed a general equilibrium model of an economy that uses land, man-made capital and labor in production. A general equilibrium model is one that examines how changes in one kind of market affect all other markets. This model is then applied to different states, as well as to one hypothetical “average” state, to see how various tax reforms that substitute land value taxes for taxes on capital or labor would affect prices and production. The division of capital into land and man-made capital is a departure from standard analysis, which generally looks at capital as a single category.

One critical element is the elasticity of substitution among these factors; that is, the ease with which one can be substituted for another. Technically, it is the percentage change in one factor that results from a 1 percent change in the other. This is the key to efficiency gains from reducing the tax on man-made capital and on labor and increasing the tax on land. A lower tax on man-made capital will increase the use of that capital, which in turn will produce greater output and more hiring of labor. The easier it is to substitute man-made capital and labor for land, the greater the benefit from a switch to land value taxation.

JY: Where do the elasticity numbers come from?

TN: I use a range of estimates drawn from the economic literature. For example, most studies of the substitution between capital and land give elasticity estimates between 0.36 and 1.13. My paper uses the relatively conservative estimates of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25 as high, medium and low values, and looks at the result under each assumption. This number is then adjusted to reflect the amount of land in the state devoted to farming, on the assumption that farmland is less easily substituted for capital in the production process. I also ask similar questions with regard to substitution between land and labor.

The elasticities of the actual supplies of man-made capital and labor are also crucial. If taxes on them are reduced, how much extra capital and labor will be available as a result of the increased after-tax return? Often in studies of this sort we make what is called a “small open economy assumption.” We assume that the economy we are looking at is small in relation to the rest of the world, and that capital and labor flow freely into and out of the jurisdiction. In that case, the elasticity of supply is infinite. The opposite extreme would be an economy with the equivalent of closed borders, where no capital could enter or leave. In that case the elasticity of supply would be zero. In looking at U.S. states, the small open economy assumption is not completely accurate, and zero elasticity is not accurate either. The right number is somewhere in between. Neither capital nor labor is as mobile internationally as within the U.S., and labor in particular is less mobile across state boundaries than within a state or a small region. The small open economy assumption may be appropriate in some circumstances for smaller states, but we have to introduce more complex assumptions in other cases.

JY: How does your model compute taxes on land and labor and man-made capital? This isn’t a standard classification of taxes.

TN: This is complicated, because it involves payroll taxes, federal and state corporate taxes, federal and state income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and so on. So the model looks at all these taxes and makes assumptions about who is paying them to estimate an overall tax rate on labor from all sources—federal, state and local. Similarly, the model estimates an overall tax rate on land and on man-made capital. This allows us to move from an illustrative example in which taxes on labor and capital are replaced by land value taxes to considering changes in real-world taxes, which of course are never based solely on labor or capital.

JY: How do you represent the shift in taxes from labor and man-made capital to land?

TN: This is a hypothetical policy experiment in the model. Suppose, for example, you wanted to eliminate all sales taxes in a revenue-neutral way, making up the lost collections through a land value tax. Sales taxes are the average state’s largest revenue source, so this shift would be quite ambitious. The model shows what would happen under various elasticities of substitution and elasticities of supply, as described above. The tables in the paper show what land tax would be necessary to maintain revenue, and the changes in capital investment and land prices that would result.

JY: How do you move from the hypothetical average state to the 50 individual states?

TN: You have to begin by asking what factors might cause states to have different experiences with land value taxation. We consider each state’s taxes, because the benefits of shifting to a more efficient system will vary according to how much current taxes distort economic choices. Some states have no income taxes. Some states tax property heavily, while others tax sales heavily. The other critical component concerns the state’s sources of income—how they are divided among land, labor and man-made capital. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports income from various sources by state, but does not account separately for income from land. For that information we draw on the Census of Agriculture data on the amount and market value of farmland to estimate an income figure.

JY: What kinds of results did you obtain?

TN: Since taxation of land is always economically efficient, and since taxation of other factors is always economically inefficient, a shift to land taxes always increases capital, income and labor use. For the “typical” state it seems that most of the simulated tax reforms are feasible, particularly those that reduce taxes on capital. A 20 percent cut in the sales tax, for instance, requires a nearly 24 percent increase in the tax on land, while a similar cut in property taxes requires virtually no change (0.2 percent) in the tax on land. Even a complete elimination of the state and local property tax calls for only a 23 percent increase in the tax on land, while an elimination of the sales tax would require a whopping 131 percent increase. Landowners would be deeply and adversely impacted by reforms that cut the sales tax (losing up to two-thirds of their wealth under a complete elimination of the sales tax), while they would barely feel the impact of most reforms focused on the property tax. They would experience at most a 7 percent decline in their wealth under the complete elimination of the property tax, and an actual increase in their wealth for less dramatic property tax reforms.

But these results differ substantially by state. For instance, the percentage change in the tax on land required to maintain constant state and local government revenues as taxes on capital are eliminated ranges from -1.91 percent to over 104 percent. Similarly, the impact on land prices varies greatly, with prices barely declining (or even increasing) in some states while falling by as much as 85 percent in others. While the elimination of all state and local taxes on capital is therefore technically feasible in all states, it is clearly politically more feasible in some states than in others. Overall, of course, replacing distortionary taxes with nondistortionary taxes on land always brings growth in the employment of capital and labor and increases output—but the size of these impacts also varies greatly. Given that the main political hurdle to land taxation is the expected adverse impact on landowners, these results seem to indicate that, as in the case of the “typical” state, such reforms should emphasize the simultaneous reduction in taxes such as the corporate income tax or the property tax.

JY: What do you take as the central lessons of this work?

TN: Several broad lessons emerge from the analysis of a typical state. First, elasticity assumptions are crucial to the exercise of predicting the likely impact of tax reforms. Second, under elasticity assumptions that are both plausible and relatively conservative, this model predicts that some types of tax reforms are more likely to succeed than others. In particular, tax reforms that reduce taxation of capital in favor of land taxation will have more positive general welfare implications while minimizing the losses to landowners. So policy makers might consider reforming corporate income and property taxes rather than sales and personal income taxes. Third, since elasticities tend to be lower in the short run, it is likely that some of the positive gains of tax reforms that reduce distortionary taxes in favor of land taxes will emerge only with time.

The most striking lesson from simulating tax reforms for the 50 different states is how greatly results can vary depending on underlying economic conditions and current tax policies in those states. Thus, far from arriving at “the answer” regarding the impact of land tax reforms, this study suggests that such answers are likely to differ greatly depending on the context in which the reforms are undertaken. Reforms that raise the tax on land are likely to be more effective the larger the size of the reform, the higher the initial distortionary taxes in the state, and the lower the current level of state income. And, reforms are more likely to be politically feasible (in the sense of not causing great declines in land values) when they involve reductions in taxes on capital.

The idea that land value taxation is unrealistic or would drive land prices into negative numbers is based on a static view of the economy, where no one responds to tax changes by substituting one factor for another. Once you accept that behavior will change in response to taxes, that static view no longer applies. Under these fairly conservative assumptions, tax reforms that use land taxes to eliminate entire classes of distortionary taxes are economically feasible in virtually all states. This work shows that, far from being quaint or outmoded, the idea of taxing land value is quite relevant to the contemporary policy debate.

Working Paper Information: Thomas Nechyba. 2001. “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” 70 pages. The complete paper is posted on the Lincoln Institute website at www.lincolninst.edu and may be downloaded for free.