At the train station for Bijlmermeer, in the fringe development area of Amsterdam known as Southeast, a landscape comes into view that seems very un-Dutch-a huge enclosed mall, a gleaming new sports stadium, and an oversized boulevard lined with big-box retail stores. How could this be, in a land with such a proud tradition of good design and even better planning; in a country that embraces compact development, density and mass transit; in a place where virtually no land is privately owned but rather is leased by the government and thus tightly controlled.

Welcome to the Netherlands in 2001: experimenting with market forces as never before, and increasingly conflicted about the same development patterns facing the United States. Just as postmodern architecture is all the rage in the Netherlands while a resurgence of modernism washes over the U.S., the state of planning in the two countries is in some respects moving in equally opposite directions. In the U.S., some two dozen states have established growth management plans and many have created regional governance systems to guide development. In the Netherlands, the Dutch are flirting with a kind of free-market liberation and leaving many old assumptions and methodologies behind.

There is still planning, to be sure. The guiding document, known with great reverence as the 5th memorandum (the National Policy Document on Spatial Planning), elegantly organizes relationships between the major cities of the Netherlands, including Amsterdam, Utrecht, The Hague and Rotterdam. Regional strengths among so-called “polynuclear city regions” or “urban networks” are thoughtfully mapped out to establish interconnections in transportation or housing. And the added framework of the European Union emphasizes connections in transportation and commerce, both within and between countries. Centuries-old national borders increasingly fade into the background as other geographical definitions, such as the Rhine River, take on greater significance.

But against that backdrop, other attitudes in the Netherlands are changing, allowing more experimentation with public-private partnerships, a greater sensitivity to market demands, and acceptance of development projects that have a distinctly American flavor. Scholars in university planning departments around the country are candid in their admission: sometimes we do too much planning, they say, and the results are by no means universally acclaimed.

These are some of the comments heard and observations made during a study trip to the Netherlands in May by the Loeb Fellowship Class of 2001. The Loeb Fellowship, based at Harvard University Graduate School of Design, supports mid-career professionals in the design fields to study at Harvard for one year. The year-end trip was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute and the Loeb Fellowship Alumni Association as part of an ongoing collaboration between the two organizations.

Some of what the Loeb Fellows found was expected: a national rail system and urban tram systems that work so efficiently that climbing into a private car seemed unthinkable; a marvelous system of pedestrian walkways and bicycle paths and an elegant sensibility for sharing the street; and compact development concentrated in urban areas with a clearly defined edge, and countryside beyond.

The Southeast district of Amsterdam, however, was a somewhat surprising example of a new and different approach-and evidence of perhaps inevitable infection by the global virus. The site overall is badly in need of redevelopment. It is home, on one side the rail line, to Bijlmermeer, the Le Corbusier-inspired high-rise slabs that have been a disaster since inception in the mid-1960s. Across the tracks is the 50,000-seat Amsterdam Arena and Arena Boulevard, lined with big-box retail, a temporary music hall, a cinema complex, and a huge mall devoted to home furnishings and interior design stores. The development team is a consortium including the City of Amsterdam and private development and real estate conglomerates. The thinking behind Southeast, though not explicitly stated, is that the central core in Amsterdam is best left to tourists, and that a shopping and entertainment center will serve residents who don’t want to drive into the city anyway. Although a new metro-rail-bus station, due in 2006, can accommodate tens of thousands, 80 percent of the Southeast clientele is expected to come by car.

A similar sense of providing what people want pervades several development projects around Nijmegen, on the western edge of the country, near Germany. The Grootstal housing project on an infill site outside the city center, for example, is a curious mix of sustainable design and driveways at every unit’s front yard. Garages, wide roads, easy motorway access and abundant fast-food outlets are similarly encouraged in the Beuningen subdivision, where new suburban homes are fashioned in kitchy 1930s styles. The expansive Waalsprong development area (literally to “spring over” the river embracing the core of Nijmegen) includes plans for 11,000 housing units in a scheme vaguely reminiscent of New Urbanism, though the most notable achievement so far is the slick marketing campaign undertaken by the private-sector partners.

“This is what the Dutch middle-class people want,” said University of Nijmegen planning professor Barrie Needham. “People get wealthier and they want more space. Part of the problem with planning in the 1960s was that we didn’t ask people what they want.”

There is no question the Dutch approach continues to be far more iterative than that of the U.S. The Dutch planners choose where to intervene much more carefully, and with much more analysis. They are experimenting with lower-density development in stages, not letting it take over the landscape unrestrained. The Dutch, also, can readily admit when planned development has failed, and set out to fix the things that don’t work. Transportation remains at the heart of all planning, and the quality of design remains essential.

While none of the Loeb Fellows on the trip concluded that the Netherlands is tilting towards a wholesale retreat from planning, the challenge of striking a balance between market forces and government control struck many of us as daunting. How much are the Dutch willing to experiment? Is a balance possible or somehow illusory? Is the proud tradition of subsidized and affordable housing in danger of atrophy? In Nijmegen and the Southeast district of Amsterdam, where one official was late for a presentation because of a traffic jam on the motorway, only time will tell. The current recalibrations could result in the best of two worlds, or the worst of both.

Anthony Flint is a reporter for The Boston Globe, covering land use, planning and development. For more information about the Loeb Fellowship, see the website at www.gsd.harvard.edu/loebfell.

Loeb Fellows, Class of 2001

Marcel Acosta, senior policy advisor, National Capital Planning Commission, Washington, DC

Terrence Curry, former director of design, Detroit Collaborative Design Center

Anthony Flint, reporter, The Boston Globe

Ben Hamilton-Baillie, consultant in sustainable transportation and urban planning, Bristol, England

Anthony Irons, city architect, San Francisco.

William H. McFarland, community development consultant, Peoplestown Revitalization Corporation (PRC), Atlanta.

Paul Okamoto, architect, San Francisco

Roxanne Qualls, former mayor, Cincinnati, Ohio; graduate student, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Robert Stacey, chief of staff, Office of Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Oregon), Washington, DC

Rebecca Talbott, consultant in private-public land management partnerships, Cambridge, MA

Katy Moss Warner, former director of horticulture and environmental initiatives, Walt Disney Resort, Orlando, Florida

In Santo Andre and all Brazilian cities, the value per square meter of land is fixed by law, thus hindering the capacity of the city administration to tax real estate property according to its market value. In 1993 the Santo Andre city administration passed a law to grant a 40 percent discount on the property tax, which was to be valid only for that year. However, this reduction has been maintained as a result of several legal clauses that determined that the value of the tax in the current year could not exceed its value in the previous year, thus establishing a tax cap.

Value capture in Santo Andre

The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Municipality of Santo Andre in Sao Paulo State organized a three-day program on “Instruments and Techniques for Land-based Finance for Urban Development” in May 1998 where organizers and participants shared their expertise on zoning instruments, value capture, and local economic development in such diverse settings as New York City, Mexico City and Colombia. Their discussions addressed three broad topics: value capture and urban finance; urban planning and the land market; and negotiations and public/private partnerships.

This article explores the lessons learned from the Santo Andre program and the need to develop better measurements of land value increments resulting from zoning changes to promote value capture through more efficient taxation systems.

In many Brazilian cities, land and building taxes are significantly underutilized. According to data from the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM), for example, in half of the municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants the property tax represents less than 30 percent of total tax resources. Considering that for most of these municipalities, local tax revenues represent less than 30 percent of total resources, the property tax does not amount to more than 10 percent of financial resources (including intergovernmental transfers). These percentages are even less in smaller municipalities. Other land-based taxes, such as the real estate transfer tax and betterment tax, show a similarly disappointing pattern.

Especially since Brazil’s new constitution of 1988, when the major responsibility for land use planning was transferred to the local level, municipalities have become increasingly aware that land use regulation and public investments in infrastructure create changes in land values. Many public officials are now looking for planning strategies aimed at capturing part of the “unearned” benefits that may result. In addition, local governments are facing problems with traditional planning instruments such as the Plano Diretor, a constitutional provision that requires cities with a population of 20,000 or more to develop a master plan. These cities have become increasingly involved in the debate about the flexibility of the regulatory framework on land use. Consequently, the idea of flexible zoning in exchange for developers’ contributions has also become popular.

To investigate the economic, financial and urban planning aspects of these negotiated land use changes, the Lincoln Institute and the Municipality of Santo Andre in Sao Paulo State organized a three-day program on “Instruments and Techniques for Land-based Finance for Urban Development” in May 1998. During the first two days, municipal officials from Santo Andre met with invited guest speakers who shared their expertise on zoning instruments, value capture and local economic development in such diverse settings as New York City, Mexico City and Colombia. Their discussions addressed three broad topics: value capture and urban finance; urban planning and the land market; and negotiations and public/private partnerships.

The program ended with a public debate involving a regional audience of some 200 planners, developers, and representatives from non-governmental organizations, the private sector and local communities within the Greater ABC region-(seven municipalities around Sao Paulo, including Santo Andre, which constitute the densest industrial core area in Latin America). A panel discussion on the effectiveness of land-based negotiations and public/private partnerships in the Brazilian context included the participation of guest speakers from the University of Sao Paulo, the real estate sector and the local governments.

A number of conclusions were drawn from this program. First, negotiated land use changes typically proliferate in an environment where property taxes do not work well. In Santo Andre, for example, existing legal and operational restrictions make it difficult to overhaul the property tax system. (See Figure 1.)

Second, negotiated land use changes in Santo Andre seem to accompany the ongoing shift from industrial land uses toward uses associated with the tertiary and modern service sector. Through the negotiation process more flexibility is brought to the existing legal framework, as is seen in recently completed negotiations between the Plaza ABC shopping center and Pirelli, the multinational tire company.

Third, although land use negotiations apparently fulfill expectations in terms of complementing the dynamics of the local economy, there is no well-established methodology and framework to allow transparent and stable rules based on solid cost-benefit analysis. Compared with international experiences, for example in New York, it remains difficult to predict what monetary compensations can be expected in Brazilian cities and whether these compensations are really Pareto efficient compared to situations where the development permit would have been denied.

Finally, negotiated land use changes should be seen as an essential element of the overall local economic development strategy. In the Greater ABC region, various strategic partnerships among key stakeholders from the private and public sectors are increasingly important in light of the ongoing process of local and regional economic restructuring that has had dramatic negative effects on employment and income levels.

Among the lessons to be learned from the Santo Andre program is the need to develop better measurements of land value increments resulting from zoning changes in order to then develop the means to capture those values through more efficient taxation systems. The New York experience further shows that it is better to collect taxes at a lower rate through a universal and stable system rather than on an arbitrary, case-by-case negotiated basis that can be susceptible to abuse and corruption.

Jeroen Klink, an urban economist, is the adviser to the mayor of Santo Andre. He is a former Lincoln Institute Dissertation Fellow who is completing his Ph.D. thesis on “Sources of Urban Finance: The Applicability of the Standard Economic Model to the Brazilian Case” at the School of Architecture and Urbanism, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. Luis Carlos Afonso, an economist, is the secretary for finance in Santo Andre. Irineu Bagnariolli Jr., an urban sociologist, is the secretary for housing and urban development in Santo Andre.

Figure 1: Restraints on Revising the Property Tax

In 1993 the Santo Andre city administration passed a law to grant a 40 percent discount on the property tax, which was to be valid only for that year. However, this reduction has been maintained as a result of several legal clauses that determined that the value of the tax in the current year could not exceed its value in the previous year, thus establishing a tax cap.

Another restriction on a more aggressive use of the tax, especially as a way to promote more equity, is the interpretation given by the Supreme Court that the tax cannot be progressive. The only exception is its application as punishment for unused or underutilized property, a clause that itself depends on additional federal lawmaking and has not even been discussed by Congress. (See Claudia M. De Cesare, “Using the Property Tax for Value Capture: A Case Study from Brazil,” Land Lines, January 1998.)

During 1990 and 1991, a previous Santo Andre administration had tried to give discounts on the property tax based on the physical characteristics, current use and size of the property, but that effort was subsequently rejected by Court rulings because of its supposed hidden progressive character. Thus, the cap on the property tax, despite being formally revoked by a subsequent law, remains basically unchanged because if taxes were increased the poorer segments of the population would be most negatively affected.

Finally, in Santo Andre and all Brazilian cities, the value per square meter of land is fixed by law, thus hindering the capacity of the city administration to tax real estate property according to its market value.

Most urban areas are experiencing significant disinvestment in older industrial-warehouse areas, along with a net loss of employment, tax base and related activity. The few recent surveys done to measure vacant industrial land suggest that, in Northeastern and Midwestern cities, 15 to 20 percent of industrial sites are inactive. In major cities such as Chicago or Philadelphia, vacant land can amount to several hundred parcels comprising several thousand acres. Often there are significant financial liabilities associated with the ownership of these “brownfield” sites due to the high incidence of contamination and related safety and environmental problems.

Vacant or underused properties are often located in areas suffering generally from physical decline, concentrations of low-income households and high crime rates. Thus, older cities are faced with the dual challenge of improving the capacity of the resident population to participate productively in the labor force and restoring the competitive market standing of areas with declining fiscal capacity.

While recent economic changes have resulted in a net decline in business activity in older industrial areas, many of these sites have the potential for residential, commercial or office reuse, with varying degrees of investment required. However, reuse is often constrained by factors including fragmentation in ownership, risks associated with the ownership or use of contaminated property, and the high market risks associated with front-end investment in environmental assessments, market studies, land assembly and area planning.

Currently, federal laws and regulations dealing with contaminated sites add to the high risk for new owners, investors and users who might otherwise contribute to reinvestment in and reuse of these areas. Also, federal and state clean up programs tend to operate independently of concerted area-wide redevelopment strategies and programs.

Special Situations for Industrial Reuse

Unfortunately, examples of successful reuse approaches which effectively orchestrate federal, state and local government policies and actions with private landowner, investor and business development actions are limited and tend to be concentrated in a few special situations. One circumstance involves a strong private owner such as a financially healthy major corporation which cannot avoid the liabilities associated with the site yet cannot afford the adverse publicity of simply abandoning it.

Another situation is when a strong private reuse market for the site creates a high reuse value relative to the current “as is” value. This typically involves waterfront or other property adjacent to growing downtowns or sites which happen to fit the development needs for a major, publicly subsidized facility such as a new stadium or convention center. In these situations, the private or public reuse benefit calls forth the financial and political resources necessary to acquire, clean up and redevelop the land.

However, most vacant or underused former industrial-warehouse properties do not meet these conditions. Generally the demand for reuse is weak or declining, in part due to deteriorating neighborhood conditions. Because of low land values, even for clean, ready-to-develop sites, finding investors for either equity or debt investment in acquisition, renovation or new development is problematic. These areas typically require more concerted efforts involving business, government and civic group participation.

Site-Specific vs Integrated Redevelopment

While interest in brownfields reuse has increased over the last several years, policy discussions at the national level and programs in the states tend to approach brownfields as a site-specific contamination cleanup problem rather than an area-wide reuse problem within the context of the metropolitan economy.

The case for integrating site treatment into a broader redevelopment strategy can be argued from several angles. One is simply that giving priority to cleanup expenditures may do little to foster area reuse and may preclude the more effective use of public funds. If the contamination is contained within a small area and the public can be protected from any potential harm, then area reuse may be more effectively fostered by focusing on the removal of other constraints to investment. These constraints may include improving access, removing unsightly buildings, installing landscape improvements, clearing sites of obsolete structures, and subdividing the area to better meet current facility demands.

Another argument for integrating site cleanup into an overall redevelopment strategy is that the cleanup costs are difficult to finance in a situation where the value of clean sites is very low. If an area-wide redevelopment effort focuses initially on increasing the overall demand to reuse sites, putting vacant clean sites into use will improve the demand/supply balance. Then, the cleanup costs can in most cases be funded out of the increased site value, and private owners of such sites will be motivated to clean up the sites voluntarily. Area-wide financing schemes using tax increment financing (TIF) and special taxing and benefit districts can also facilitate the funding required for remediation and indemnification against any future liabilities.

New Models and Strategies

The Lincoln Institute, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, is undertaking a research project to explore the problem of recycling urban industrial areas which fall outside of the special situations described above. The study builds on recent work conducted by the Lincoln Institute, the Northeast-Midwest Institute, the author and others who have researched reuse potential and demand/supply constraints in industrial areas. Some examples are the American Street industrial area in Philadelphia, the Collinwood area in Cleveland, the Southwest industrial area in Detroit, the south side of Chicago and several areas in Pittsburgh.

Research directed at discovering common opportunities and constraints and the related strategies most effective at addressing different types of situations is very limited. Therefore, our approach is to conduct a broad survey of industrial reuse markets based on a review of existing reports and interviews with local experts, and then to develop a series of in-depth case studies to assess alternative reuse strategies appropriate to common types of situations.

Each case study will include a survey and assessment of the city-wide situation and the conditions in various industrial subareas. Model solutions will focus on a single subarea chosen to represent a combination of factors, including the relevance of that case to other cities and the relative importance of the subarea to its city’s overall reuse plan. In each case, a group of development professionals familiar with the local real estate market will be involved in assessing opportunities and constraints, alternative strategies and implementation measures. Ultimately, our objective is to identify changes in federal, state and local techniques, policies and programs that would support the implementation of the strategies being developed.

J. Thomas Black, visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is an urban development economist and the principal investigator for this project. The study is in its early stages and the author invites your insights, ideas and suggestions on the subject, particularly for case examples demonstrating opportunities, general strategies, particular techniques, financing methods or organizational structures that work well.

FYI

The Collinwood Yard in northeast Cleveland is a 48-acre, mainly vacant industrial site which has lost 20,000 jobs since 1970. Its access to Interstate 90 and the rail lines is a key element in the revitalization of the area.

The Union Seventy Center in St. Louis is a multi-tenant industrial/warehouse facility occupying a remodeled 2.7 million square foot General Motors assembly plant. It is part of a 171-acre redevelopment project which demonstrates the reuse and investment potential of older urban industrial areas.

The mighty Mekong, tenth largest river in the world, faces conflicting pressures for developing its floodplains and harnessing its powerful flow, which spans 4200 kilometers from the Himalayas through China, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam to the South China Sea. Turbulence characterizes the river’s upper portions, but the lower Mekong is more placid, and annual flooding supports a biologically diverse ecosystem. Agriculture is the primary economic activity along the river, complemented by fish production, transportation and electricity generation.

Hydropower development has long been a critical issue for the people, planners and government officials of the Mekong’s riparian countries, but the approach has changed over time. In a 1957 plan, the US Army Corps of Engineers proposed a cascade of seven large-scale dam projects that would create 23,300 megawatts of power and curb perceived flooding problems. The Indochina War halted implementation of this plan. Today, development planning has shifted from structural flood control to a regional approach based on participation and resource-sharing among countries.

Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam signed an Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin in April 1995. It provides that signatories shall “cooperate in all fields of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the waters and related resources of the Mekong River Basin, including but not limited to irrigation, hydropower, navigation, flood control . . . and to minimize the harmful effects that might result.” These include inundation of large areas of agricultural lands and displacement of established populations, causing additional economic and cultural losses to this already endangered region.

In 1994, the four countries commissioned a study to determine the viability of Mekong hydropower development if it was deliberately constrained to minimize such impacts. Recognizing the negative effects of large reservoir-dependent dams, the study focused on a “run-of-river” dam structure that uses daily natural water flows rather than a reservoir to regulate the river. The study categorized nine sites (See map) according to social and environmental impacts, as well as by economic performance.

Conflicting Pressures on Land and Water Resources

The rationale for hydropower stems from Asia’s rapidly growing energy demand, which is doubling every 12 years. Yet, each country has its own unique concerns. Laos, for example, has enormous export capacity since it contains 80 percent of the Mekong’s potential hydropower energy, and its small population consumes only a fraction of this potential. Thailand, in contrast, has 8.5 million hectares of arable land but a limited water supply. It needs electricity for its rapid industrialization and could import energy to boost development of its poor northeastern region. Cambodia has witnessed an 80 percent reduction in irrigated land in the last 20 years due to war. It seeks to develop domestic energy capacities and to export hydropower in the long run. Vietnam is most concerned about the impacts of its upstream neighbors’ actions on the river’s flow through its land on the way to the sea.

Proponents of hydropower assert its comparative advantages over other energy sources, but opponents are concerned about the implications of the Mekong River Commission’s alleged pro-dam policies. When the Mekong Agreement was signed, for example, Thai nongovernmental organizations agreed with the concept of cooperation, but strongly opposed the influence of the dam-building industry. Along with other environmentalists, the Thai NGOs feared that the Agreement equated “development” of the Mekong with dam building and elimination of natural floodplains.

The International Rivers Network voiced concerns about the recommendations of the 1994 Run-of-River Study, in particular the impact on local populations. The nine proposed run-of-river projects would displace an estimated 61,200 people and increase land pressures in resettlement areas. Agriculture would be affected if the dams reduced or eliminated the nutrient-rich silts deposited by floodwaters, and the remaining floodplain soils would be threatened by salinization if reservoirs caused underground salt deposits to dissolve and leach to the surface. The fishing industry that supports many local economies would also be affected by blocked fish migration routes, loss of nutrient movements downstream, inundation of spawning areas and turbine mortality.

Recognizing Risks and Developing Alternative Plans

The river basin countries recognize the risks posed by hydropower development, but seem to be caught between two difficult positions. Cambodia, for example, acknowledges downstream impacts of dam construction, yet it still senses the urgent need to develop its hydropower potential. The fact that 85 percent of its own population depends on subsistence farming and the river as a source of protein and transportation does not make its choice any easier.

The US, with its long history of large-scale dam building, offers a number of lessons. Daniel Beard, former commissioner of the US Bureau of Reclamation, highlighted these in his address at the Mekong River Conference held in Washington, DC, in November 1995. First, large-scale developmental and operating costs cannot be repaid through user charges alone. Other effects have manifested themselves in soil salinization, elimination of fisheries, reduction of wetlands, and agricultural degradation. Now the government must determine how to solve and pay for these problems that were caused in part by top-down planning and lack of accountability to local officials and the public.

The need for open decision making is critical to finding convergence between proponents and opponents of power projects, wherever they arise. Jon Kusler, of the Institute for Wetland Science and Public Policy, emphasizes the need for stakeholder involvement. Suraphol Sudara, of the Siam Environmental Club, believes that the Mekong River Commission could “play a more useful role if it looked to managing the river rather than building big projects.” He would include consideration of non-structural alternatives and a broader definition of “river system development” that recognizes the economic and cultural value of the floodplains.

Yasunobu Matoba, newly appointed CEO of the Mekong River Commission’s Secretariat, acknowledges, “In developing and using water resources, priority has to be given to the satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems.” It remains to be seen whether stated policy is ultimately implemented in the region’s development plans.

Trang D. Tu is an editorial/research assistant at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and is completing her master’s degree in urban planning at Harvard University Graduate School of Design. In November 1995 she attended the Mekong River Technical Workshop on Sustainable Development in Washington, DC.

For Reference

Mekong Mainstream Run-of-River Hydropower: Executive Summary. December 1994. Prepared by Compagnie Nationale du Rhone, Lyon, France, in cooperation with Acres International Limited, Calgary, Canada, and the Mekong Secretariat Study Team, Bangkok, Thailand.