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Para que los procesos de planificación puedan resolver los temas candentes de la actualidad, tales como el cambio climático, la congestión de tráfico y la justicia social, los planes tienen que realizarse a la escala apropiada, tienen que promulgar herramientas de implementación apropiadas y tienen que hacerse cumplir por medio de una autoridad legítima. En otras palabras, nuestra capacidad para resolver los desafíos críticos depende de las bases legales e institucionales de la planificación.
En los Estados Unidos, la responsabilidad de sentar estas bases de planificación recae en los estados, los cuales a su vez han delegado la mayor parte de la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo en los gobiernos locales. En Europa, las bases de planificación se establecen en cada país, cuyos sistemas de planificación frecuentemente cuentan con planes nacionales y regionales, como también un mosaico de planes locales. Para mejor o peor, estas bases institucionales han enmarcado el proceso de planificación a ambos lados del océano Atlántico en la mayor parte del período de posguerra. Pero a medida que el tamaño de los desafíos de planificación sigue en aumento, y el descontento con el status quo sigue creciendo, varios estados y naciones europeas han comenzado a experimentar con metodologías de planificación nuevas e innovadoras.
La oportunidad para explorar y debatir estos temas congregó a académicos, profesionales, estudiantes y otros en Dublín, Irlanda, en octubre de 2012, en un seminario de dos días de duración patrocinado por el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy y organizado por la Escuela de Geografía, Planificación y Política Medioambiental de University College, Dublín y el Centro Nacional para el Crecimiento Inteligente de la Universidad de Maryland. Llevado a cabo en la histórica Newman House ubicada en St. Stephen’s Green, se presentaron ponencias sobre planificación en los Estados Unidos y Europa, y casos de estudio de cinco estados de los EE. UU. y cinco naciones europeas. Cada presentación fue seguida de un comentario por parte de un funcionario de alto nivel del estado o nación correspondiente (ver el recuadro 1).
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Recuadro 1: Presentaciones efectuadas en el Seminario sobre planificación por parte de estados y naciones/estados realizado en Dublín en octubre de 2012
Bierbaum, Marty
Plan de desarrollo del estado de Nueva Jersey
Faludi, Andreas
La europeización de la planificación y el papel de PEOT
Fulton, Bill
Planificación para el cambio climático en California
Galland, Daniel
El marco nacional de planificación espacial de Dinamarca
Geppert, Anna
Planificación espacial en Francia
Grist, Berna
La estrategia nacional espacial de Irlanda
Knaap, Gerrit
PlanMaryland: Un trabajo que está en vías de realizarse
Lewis, Rebecca
Plan de desarrollo del estado de Delaware
Needham, Barrie
La estrategia espacial nacional de los Países Bajos
Salkin, Patricia
Marcos de planificación en los Estados Unidos y el papel del gobierno federal
Seltzer, Ethan
Planificación del uso del suelo en Oregón: El mosaico institucional y la lucha por llegar a escala
Tewdwer-Jones, Mark
Planificación nacional en el Reino Unido
Para obtener más información sobre el seminario, visite el sitio web del programa: http://www.ucd.ie/gpep/events/seminarsworkshopsconferences/natplansymp2012
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Un marco de planificación espacial en Europa
En Europa, la planificación está regida por una serie de tradiciones y estructuras de gobierno (Faludi 2012). Algunas naciones europeas tienen estructuras de gobierno «unitarias», en las que la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo recae en última instancia en el gobierno nacional. Italia y España tienen estructuras «regionales» de gobierno, en las que la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo es compartida constitucionalmente entre el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales. Austria, Bélgica y Alemania tienen estructuras de gobierno «federalistas», en las que las funciones particulares sobre el uso del suelo se distribuyen entre el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales y locales. Dentro de estos marcos operativos ha surgido una variedad de culturas y tradiciones de planificación: “amenagement du territoire” en Francia; “town and country planning” en el Reino Unido; “Raumordnung” en Alemania; y “ruimtelijke ordening” en los Países Bajos. Si bien estos términos generalmente tienen la misma connotación que la «planificación urbana» en los Estados Unidos, existen diferencias importantes, sutiles y defendidas con vehemencia.
La expresión utilizada para la planificación urbana en la Unión Europea es «planificación espacial» (Comisión Europea 1997, 24).
“La planificación espacial se refiere a los métodos utilizados en general por el sector público para influir sobre la distribución futura de actividades en el espacio. Se adopta con el fin de crear una organización territorial más racional de los usos del suelo y vincularlos para equilibrar las demandas de desarrollo inmobiliario con la necesidad de proteger el medio ambiente y alcanzar objetivos sociales y económicos.
“La planificación espacial adopta medidas para coordinar el impacto espacial de otras políticas sectoriales, alcanzar una distribución más pareja de desarrollo económico entre regiones que lo que crearían de otra manera las fuerzas del mercado, y regular la conversión de suelos y el uso de las propiedades.”
La Unión Europea no tiene autoridad para elaborar planes espaciales, pero influye de manera directa en sus resultados por medio de iniciativas de desarrollo regional, directivas medioambientales y financiamiento estructural y de cohesión. Este objetivo está articulado en la Perspectiva Europea de Ordenación Territorial (PEOT) firmada en 1988 por los ministros responsables de la planificación espacial en los estados miembros, y por los miembros de la Comisión Europea responsables de las políticas regionales (Faludi 2002).
En general se acepta que la planificación espacial moderna en el contexto europeo incluye la planificación nacional, regional y local, donde los planes nacionales proporcionan estrategias amplias de desarrollo y pautas para los planes realizados en los niveles de gobierno menores; los planes regionales integran el desarrollo físico con las políticas sociales, económicas y medioambientales, pero sin especificar sitios individuales; los planes locales son específicos para ciertos lugares y definen los elementos físicos y de diseño urbano de la construcción. Aunque ninguno de los marcos de planificación de las naciones miembros se ajusta perfectamente a este ideal jerárquico, la PEOT ha influido en la actividad de planificación de cada una de las naciones.
La PEOT se basa a su vez en tradiciones europeas de planificación muy arraigadas que se remontan a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, cuando el desarrollo nacional o los planes de reconstrucción sin duda fueron necesarios para llevar a cabo las restauraciones de posguerra. Muchas naciones europeas siguen teniendo planes nacionales de desarrollo y estrategias nacionales espaciales complementarias. Pero la influencia e importancia de estos planes ha disminuido paulatinamente desde la reconstrucción. En la última década en particular, las naciones que antes se caracterizaban por un compromiso ambicioso y amplio con la planificación, como Francia, Dinamarca y el Reino Unido, no han adoptado planes nacionales nuevos y han puesto mayor énfasis en planes regionales y locales.
Estrategias y marcos espaciales nacionales europeos
Francia
Si bien Francia es una nación-estado unitaria y centralizada, el gobierno nacional nunca ha desempeñado un papel de liderazgo en la planificación estatal. Por el contrario, la responsabilidad de la planificación espacial se transfirió oficialmente a los gobiernos regionales y locales por medio de reformas descentralizadoras adoptadas en 1982 y 2003 (Geppert 2012). Aun cuando sigue habiendo coordinación entre los gobiernos de distintos niveles, este proceso genera con mayor frecuencia estrategias de inversión conjunta más que visiones espaciales compartidas u objetivos comunes. Antes que la mayoría de las naciones restantes, el gobierno nacional francés comenzó a centrarse menos en la planificación espacial y más en políticas sectoriales, dejando los temas espaciales para los niveles más bajos de gobierno.
Dinamarca
La planificación en Dinamarca comenzó históricamente con un marco de planificación nacional integral (Galland 2012). En las últimas dos décadas, sin embargo, como consecuencia de factores políticos y económicos interrelacionados, el papel del gobierno nacional y de los gobiernos locales y regionales con respecto al uso del suelo en el territorio nacional ha transformado significativamente el alcance, estructura y comprensión de la planificación espacial danesa (figura 1).
Como consecuencia de esta reforma, varias responsabilidades de planificación espacial han sido descentralizadas al nivel local, mientras que la planificación regional para el Gran Copenhague y otras funciones sectoriales han sido transferidas al nivel nacional. Además, la reciente abolición de los gobiernos de condado ha aumentado el riesgo de una planificación espacial descoordinada y ha disminuido coherencia entre las diversas instituciones e instrumentos de la política de suelo.
Países Bajos
Los Países Bajos tienen quizás la tradición más larga y conocida de planificación espacial nacional, y sus planes incluyen tanto políticas industriales como políticas espaciales detalladas (Needham 2012). Por varias décadas, los planes nacionales holandeses influyeron sobre la distribución de la población y las actividades del país. En las primeras décadas después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, todos los niveles de gobierno —tanto nacional como provincial y municipal— tendieron a trabajar conjuntamente en la planificación espacial. En la década de 1990, sin embargo, comenzaron a distanciarse. En respuesta, el gobierno nacional aumentó su poder sobre los gobiernos locales (una forma de centralización) y al mismo tiempo redujo sus propias ambiciones de formular una estrategia espacial nacional (una forma de descentralización). La estrategia espacial nacional más reciente deja de lado expresamente algunas tareas de planificación llevadas a cabo anteriormente por el gobierno nacional.
Reino Unido
A comienzos del siglo XX, el Parlamento del Reino Unido renunció a su autoridad de planificación; en su lugar, los poderes de intervención, el desarrollo de nuevas viviendas estatales y la regulación del desarrollo de viviendas privadas se transfirieron a los gobiernos locales (Tewdwr-Jones 2012). En las décadas siguientes, el gobierno central volvió a adquirir nuevos poderes de planificación como consecuencia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el interés nacional por reconstruir las ciudades, la infraestructura y la economía. Desde 1945, el gobierno central ha retenido estos poderes, pero a su vez ha permitido que las autoridades locales vigilen la implementación del sistema de planificación.
Estos poderes han cambiado en forma drástica en los últimos 70 años. Después de 1999, la autonomía de Gales, Escocia e Irlanda del Norte fragmentó aún más el significado del término «nacional» en términos políticos y de planificación. En la década del 2000, el impulso hacia la planificación espacial regional en Inglaterra también volvió a equilibrar los temas de planificación nacionales hacia los intereses subnacionales. Como resultado de esta tendencia a la transferencia de poderes, descentralizadora, regionalista y localista de los últimos 20 años, es cada vez más cuestionable que el Reino Unido posea algo que se parezca a un sistema nacional de planificación, puesto que tanto ha cambiado espacialmente y en el ámbito de las instituciones y procesos políticos en distintas partes del país.
Irlanda
Irlanda es una de las pocas naciones europeas que no sigue la tendencia hacia la descentralización de la autoridad de planificación, en parte debido a que su sistema de planificación se ha descentralizado completamente (Grist 2012). Siguiendo en gran medida las pautas de la Unión Europea, Irlanda ha adoptado una serie de planes de desarrollo nacionales, de los cuales el más reciente es el Plan de Desarrollo Nacional 2007-2013. Basándose en las recomendaciones del plan nacional anterior, el Departamento de Medio Ambiente, Comunidad y Gobierno Local desarrolló en 2002 la Estrategia Espacial Nacional de Irlanda. Esta estrategia identificó cruces y centros geográficos críticos, y articuló planes para descentralizar la actividad económica desde Dublín al resto de la isla.
Luego de un período turbulento que vio el surgimiento y caída del Tigre Celta, al que se culpó en parte de las políticas laxas de planificación local relacionadas con un incentivo excesivo del desarrollo inmobiliario junto con corrupción política, el país está reconsiderando ahora dicha estrategia, fortaleciendo las pautas de desarrollo regional e imponiendo nuevos requisitos de coherencia sobre los gobiernos locales.
Bajo el nuevo régimen de planificación basado en la evidencia, los planes locales tienen que ajustarse mucho más a las pautas de planificación regional, y los planes locales tendrán límites en cuanto a la cantidad de desarrollo inmobiliario que puedan permitir. En la actualidad se está revisando el papel futuro de la Estrategia Espacial Nacional, mientras que el nuevo gobierno electo después del crash inmobiliario en Irlanda examina las políticas de planificación y desarrollo que predominaron durante la reciente burbuja inmobiliaria.
El gobierno federal y el uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos
El gobierno federal de los Estados Unidos, como la Unión Europea, no tiene la autoridad para planificar y administrar el uso del suelo, pero tiene una gran influencia sobre la ubicación y naturaleza de los patrones de desarrollo (Salkin 2012). Además de los miles de millones de dólares que asigna para infraestructura de transporte, servicios sociales, desarrollo y revitalización, el gobierno federal es dueño de más de 275 millones de hectáreas en todo el país. Las regulaciones federales también tienen una gran influencia. Las leyes de aire limpio y agua limpia, por ejemplo, no imponen por sí mismas restricciones al uso del suelo, pero al establecer metas para la calidad del aire ambiente y la carga de nutrientes en ríos, lagos y arroyos, influyen profundamente en los planes y regulaciones del uso del suelo y en los patrones de desarrollo inmobiliario de los gobiernos locales.
Más recientemente, la administración del presidente Barack Obama ha establecido un nuevo canal de influencia federal sobre la planificación y regulación del uso del suelo. Si bien el gobierno federal continúa absteniéndose de intervenir en forma directa en el uso del suelo local, el Secretario de Transporte, el Secretario de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano y la Agencia de Protección Ambiental han firmado un memorando de entendimiento que estableció la Sociedad de Comunidades Sostenibles. Para promover seis principios de las comunidades sostenibles, estas secretarías y agencias han lanzado una serie de programas nuevos de subvenciones, como las Subvenciones para la Planificación de Comunidades Sostenibles Regionales. Para poder acceder a esta subvención, los gobiernos locales tienen que formar consorcios interorganizacionales que incluyan a la Organización de Planificación Metropolitana (MPO por su siglas en inglés), la ciudad central, la mayoría de los gobiernos locales y representación de grupos cívicos y de defensa de los intereses medioambientales.
Si bien los propósitos explícitos de estas subvenciones novedosas incluyen la revitalización urbana, la protección ambiental, la justicia social y el desarrollo sostenible, un propósito igualmente importante es establecer nuevas relaciones interinstitucionales al promover una mayor inclusión y participación. La Planificación de Comunidades Sostenibles Regionales ha avanzado ahora en 74 áreas metropolitanas del país. Queda por ver, sin embargo, si los incentivos ofrecidos a los gobiernos locales para que se involucren en la planificación regional son suficientes para que participen en la implementación de planes regionales sin intervención adicional a nivel estatal.
Planes estatales y marcos de planificación estatal
Todos los estados habían establecido un marco para la planificación y regulación local en la década de 1920 y 1930, basándose en las leyes de planificación normalizada y zonificación preparadas por el Departamento de Comercio de los Estados Unidos. A pesar de las expectativas de un amplio cambio institucional, caracterizado por la «Revolución silenciosa» de hace más de 40 años, la mayoría de los estados se limitan a autorizar a los gobiernos locales a que planifiquen (Salkin 2012).
Otros, como Oregón, ordenan, revisan y aprueban planes locales (Seltzer 2012). Si los gobiernos locales no presentan planes que cumplen con las metas y pautas de uso del suelo del estado, el estado puede retener fondos de financiamiento o negar autorización para emitir permisos de edificación. Varias instituciones especializadas en el uso del suelo respaldan el sistema de planificación de Oregón, como son una comisión de planificación estatal, una corte de apelaciones de uso del suelo y un gobierno regional electo en forma directa. Aunque su estructura es simple, y es cuestionado frecuentemente en los tribunales y en las urnas, el sistema de Oregón tiene la reputación de ser uno de los más efectivos, si no el más efectivo sistema de uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos (Ingram et al. 2009).
California es uno de los estados que ha delegado una cantidad importante de autoridad para regular el uso del suelo a los gobiernos locales. Aun cuando los proyectos de desarrollo inmobiliario importantes tienen que pasar por un proceso complejo de mini Ley Nacional de Política Ambiental, y la Comisión Costera de California fuera una institución estatal innovadora en su época, la planificación local sigue siendo predominante. Pero en 2008 el estado adoptó una nueva y ambiciosa iniciativa para enfrentar el cambio climático: el proyecto de ley 375 del Senado, que exige a las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas que desarrollen planes de transporte y de uso del suelo que cumplan con metas de emisión de gases de invernadero. La dificultad estriba en que son los gobiernos locales, no las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas, los que tienen la autoridad sobre el uso del suelo en California. Las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas y los gobiernos estatales están brindando incentivos a los gobiernos locales para adoptar planes compatibles con los planes metropolitanos, pero no está claro si la combinación de incentivos financieros y de otro tipo es suficiente para animar a los gobiernos locales a que sigan los planes de las organizaciones de planificación metropolitanas (Fulton 2012).
En el otro extremo, no son comunes en los Estados Unidos los planes que abarcan todo el estado. En respuesta a los requisitos federales, la mayoría de los estados tienen planes de transporte, y algunos tienen planes de desarrollo económico, planes para desarrollar la fuerza laboral o planes de acción climática, pero sólo cinco estados tienen planes estatales de desarrollo inmobiliario: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Nueva Jersey y Rhode Island.
Nueva Jersey y Delaware tienen quizá los planes estatales más y menos conocidos, respectivamente. Nueva Jersey adoptó su Ley de Planificación Estatal en 1985, que exige que la comisión de planificación estatal desarrolle, adopte e implemente el Plan de Desarrollo y Revitalización del Estado de Nueva Jersey (Bierbaum 2012). El proceso de planificación incluyó un complejo procedimiento de aceptación conjunta para identificar y resolver las diferencias entre el gobierno estatal y los gobiernos locales. Desde su adopción, la influencia y atención recibida por el plan ha tenido altibajos a lo largo de las sucesivas administraciones estatales. Recientemente, la administración del Gobernador Chris Christie ha elaborado un plan estatal completamente nuevo, enfocado principalmente al desarrollo económico, pero sin el proceso de aceptación conjunta. La comisión de planificación estatal, sin embargo, no ha adoptado todavía dicho plan.
El plan de Delaware es mucho menos conocido y mucho menos controvertido que el plan de Nueva Jersey, y tanto el contenido como el proceso son menos complejos (Lewis 2012). El plan de Delaware comprende cinco designaciones de suelo generales (figura 2). El incentivo de cumplimiento por parte de los gobiernos locales recae en la coordinación estatal-local y se apoya en la amenaza de retener el financiamiento de infraestructura (sobre el cual el estado tiene una participación significativa). Como el estado no comenzó a recabar datos de seguimiento sobre los patrones del desarrollo inmobiliario hasta 2008, y no mantiene datos espaciales sobre los gastos estatales, es difícil discernir el impacto de esta estrategia sobre el desarrollo y la coherencia entre los gastos estatales y el mapa estatal de planificación.
Maryland es el único estado que está a la altura de California y Oregón en su adopción de estrategias nuevas y ambiciosas de planificación, que se asientan en su larga tradición de liderazgo en el uso del suelo y políticas medioambientales (Knaap 2012). Maryland estableció su primera comisión de planificación estatal en 1933 y apareció en la escena nacional en 1997, cuando adoptó su revolucionaria Ley de Crecimiento Inteligente y Conservación de Barrios. Desde 1997, el factor más importante de la estrategia de Maryland ha sido el uso de inversiones estatales para brindar incentivos al crecimiento inteligente. Mucho antes de que alguien pronunciara las palabras «crecimiento inteligente» en Maryland, sin embargo, el estado ya había adoptado en 1959 legislación que requería al Departamento de Planificación de Maryland que elaborara y adoptara un plan de desarrollo estatal. Más de 50 años después, la administración del Gobernador Martin O’Malley cumplió finalmente con dicho requisito.
El 19 de diciembre de 2011, el Gobernador O’Malley firmó el PlanMaryland, el primer plan de desarrollo estatal nuevo en muchos años en los Estados Unidos (figura 3). Pero a diferencia de los planes estatales de Nueva Jersey o Delaware, el plan de Maryland es más procedimental que sustantivo. Específicamente, establece seis categorías de designación de planes y, siguiendo una larga tradición en Maryland, permite a los gobiernos locales asignar suelo para cualquiera de estos usos designados. Las agencias estatales destinarían entonces fondos del programa para cada una de estas áreas. Desde que el plan fue firmado, las agencias estatales han estado desarrollando y perfeccionando los planes de implementación, y los gobiernos locales han comenzado sólo recientemente a presentar planes para su certificación estatal.
Conclusión
Los marcos de uso del suelo y planificación espacial varían mucho a lo largo de Europa y los Estados Unidos. A ambos lados del Atlántico, los gobiernos locales cargan con la mayor parte de las responsabilidades, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la comunidad, los barrios y los detalles específicos de cada sitio. Pero el papel de las regiones, los estados y las naciones sigue siendo importante.
En contraposición con su reputación en los Estados Unidos, la planificación en muchas naciones europeas se ha descentralizado en gran medida. Pocas naciones europeas cuentan con planes nacionales integrales que guían las inversiones nacionales y las regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo. De hecho, la planificación en Europa, si bien mucho más integradora de detalles sectoriales que en los Estados Unidos, comparte muchas características en su política con su contraparte en los Estados Unidos. Una excepción interesante es Irlanda, que continúa expandiendo el papel del gobierno nacional y los gobiernos regionales, parcialmente como respuesta al período reciente de extrema descentralización de planificación que no tuvo en cuenta ni implementó la estrategia nacional. Irlanda es también uno de los pocos países que se adhiere a los principios amplios de planificación espacial formalmente adoptados por la Unión Europea.
En los Estados Unidos, ni la planificación estatal del desarrollo inmobiliario ni la aprobación estatal de planes locales son prácticas que estén creciendo con rapidez. En efecto, a pesar del éxito demostrado por el programa de Oregón y del creciente reconocimiento de la necesidad de integración horizontal y vertical de políticas, la planificación del uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos sigue siendo un asunto marcadamente local. Si bien tanto el estado de California como el gobierno federal están proporcionando incentivos financieros para la coordinación intergubernamental y la planificación a escala metropolitana, no está nada claro si únicamente con incentivos se podrán lograr los cambios necesarios en los planes y regulaciones locales para generar ajustes significativos en el consumo de suelo, el comportamiento del tráfico y el acceso a oportunidades.
Hacen falta nuevos enfoques para que las ciudades y áreas metropolitanas sean más productivas, equitativas y ecológicamente sostenibles a la luz de los desafíos que se nos presentan en el futuro. Si estos problemas no se pueden resolver adecuadamente, es posible que otros tipos de experimentos de reforma de planificación institucional se hagan más comunes en muchos países.
Sobre los autores
Gerrit Knaap es profesor de Estudios urbanos y planificación, director del Centro Nacional de Crecimiento Inteligente y vicedecano de la Escuela de Arquitectura, Planificación y Preservación de la Universidad de Maryland.
Zorica Nedovic-Budic es profesora de Planificación espacial y sistemas de información geográfica (SIG) en la Escuela de Geografía, Planificación y Política Medioambiental de University College, Dublín.
Referencias
Ministerio del Medio Ambiente de Dinamarca. 2006. The 2006 national planning report–In brief. Copenhagen. http://www.sns.dk/udgivelser/2006/87-7279-728-2/html/default_eng.htm
Comisión Europea. 1997. The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Luxemburgo: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Faludi, Andreas. 2002. European spatial planning. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ingram, Gregory K., Armando Carbonell, Yu-Hung Hong y Anthony Flint. 2009. Smart growth policies: An evaluation of programs and outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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Conventional wisdom and basic economic principles would suggest that an area subject to higher commercial and industrial property taxes than its nearby neighbors will suffer reduced economic development in comparison to those neighbors. On the other hand, any effort to reduce such unequal or “classified” property tax rates will produce a revenue shortfall. Raising taxes on homeowners to equalize rates and recover this lost revenue will encounter enormous and obvious political resistance.
This is the situation currently facing Cook County and the city of Chicago, and was the subject of a conference led by Therese McGuire of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Held last September and cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute, the IGPA, and the Civic Federation of Chicago, the program brought together more than a hundred business and civic leaders, academics and practitioners to consider alternative methods of addressing the problems presented by the Cook County classification system.
In Illinois, the use of a property tax classification system by Cook County has been blamed for the economic decline of Chicago and the inner suburbs. The classification system is also seen as a barrier to reforming school funding and the state’s tax system. Are these charges valid? Does the classification system put Cook County at an economic disadvantage compared to its rapidly growing adjacent “collar counties”? If classification has so many shortcomings, why was it instituted in the first place? If we are only now recognizing those shortcomings, what steps can be taken that are both economically and politically feasible to overcome the problems?
Overview of Tax Classification
Illinois has long operated under the twin principles of uniformity and universality for both real and personal property, and both principles were incorporated into the Illinois Constitution of 1870. However, de facto or administrative classification of real property developed in Cook County as a response to the difficulty in taxing personal property in the same manner as real property. By the 1920s, the Cook County assessor publicly acknowledged assessing residential property at 25 percent of real value and business property at 60 percent.
A 1966 Illinois Department of Revenue report noted that Cook County was using 15 different classification groups. Despite the fact that classification was clearly in violation of the 1870 Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court had refused to confront the issue. By the late 1960s, however, the court was prepared to overturn the existing system, and the 1970 constitutional convention faced the potential threat of court intervention.
The convention was the product of numerous reform efforts in Illinois during the previous decade. The state had failed to find a compromise redistricting plan after the 1960 census, causing the entire Illinois House to be elected as at-large members in 1964. That election brought many reformers to office, and a House-created commission charged with recommending constitutional reforms subsequently called for the 1970 convention.
Several delegates on the convention’s revenue committee were passionately in favor of uniformity, and they had considerable support from experts who opposed classification as a matter of economic policy. On the other hand, the Chicago delegation was adamant in demanding that the new constitution legalize classification. It was generally believed that without legalization, the new constitution would not have the support of Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and his delegation, in which case it would fail to pass.
As a result, the 1970 Illinois Constitution allowed counties with a population greater than 200,000 to classify property for taxation. The extension of classification to these large counties was also allowed for the collar counties because many taxing districts crossed those county boundaries. Cook County’s system was thus guaranteed, but the Constitution gave the General Assembly the power to apply limitations because of concerns there would be a crazy quilt of classifications should the collar counties adopt that system. Nevertheless, no collar county has done so.
Today, Cook County’s classification system is considered by many to be an impediment to Illinois’ attempts to deal with a variety of social and economic issues. Politically, classification is believed to be partly to blame for the failure to reform education funding in Illinois. In 1997, then Governor James Edgar led an unsuccessful attempt to convince the General Assembly to gradually shift the burden of education funding from property taxes to income taxes. One of the strongest arguments against the effort was that it would be a windfall for businesses and corporations, whose property taxes would be shifted to individual taxpayers. That shift would have even been greater in Cook County, which has more than 47 percent of the state’s entire assessed value and where businesses pay property taxes at a rate double that of homeowners.
Impacts on Economic Development
In terms of economic development, some observers believe that classification puts Cook County at a disadvantage in the eyes of business people who might consider locating in Illinois or expanding their operations in the state. While there are obviously other factors involved, the concern is that classification would cause these companies to look more favorably at locations in the collar counties or other states.
Recent research has shown that high property taxes do have a negative effect on the market value of property and do deter businesses from locating in the affected areas. Studies of property tax differences in the Boston, Phoenix and Chicago areas have shown that, because higher property taxes mean higher rents and lower market values, real estate development shifts from the high-tax area to the low-tax area over time. Other studies have shown that manufacturers seeking to relocate are very sensitive to local property tax rates. New construction and retail trade are also affected negatively, although the service sector is not as influenced by high property taxes.
Is this the case in Cook County? A recent study by Richard Dye, Therese McGuire and David Merriman, all affiliated with the IGPA, found that the effective tax rate of Cook County (5.52 percent for commercial and 5.78 percent for industrial property) is higher than in the collar counties, which have an average rate of 2.54 percent on all property. Furthermore, they found that four measures of economic activity-growth in the value of commercial property, the value of industrial property, the number of establishments and the employment rate-were measurably lower in Cook County than in the collar counties. But is that the end of the story?
No, according to the study’s authors. A multifaceted national trend is dispersing population, employment and business activity away from metropolitan centers to outlying counties. To determine if it is this national trend or specific property tax differences that is causing slower economic growth in Cook County, the study examined the characteristics of 260 municipalities in the Chicago metropolitan area. The researchers used two samples of municipalities-one metro-wide and the other limited to those near the Cook County border, where the effects of higher tax rates should be most potent.
The researchers presented their results, at the conference finding, “weak evidence at best that taxes matter.” Once other influences on business activity were factored out, the researchers determined that, for the entire six-county region, employment was the only economic activity that seemed to be adversely affected by property taxes, although in the border region the market value of industrial property was also affected. “The bottom line is that the evidence is mixed and inconclusive,” said McGuire. “There is no smoking gun.”
Another participant in the conference challenged this interpretation of the results. Michael Wasylenko of Syracuse University, who had been asked to review the study in advance and discuss it at the conference, said he was convinced that the researchers did find significant effects because the employment measure is a better measure of economic activity than the others. “I think the weight of the evidence suggests that these results are consistent with previous findings that property tax differentials will have a substantial effect on employment growth within a metropolitan area.”
If the employment factor, then, is the one to be given the most weight and Cook County’s property tax classification system is economically disadvantageous, in addition to being a political roadblock to reform, what is to be done? “It comes down to whether the economic gains that might be realized if you went to a non-classified tax are worth the political battles. Are the economic development advantages enough to want to do this,” said Wasylenko.
The economic and political stakes in this decision are high, since Cook County currently levies more than 50 percent of all property taxes in the state. The county cannot rapidly shift a large part of the tax burden among classes of property, but neither can it ignore concerns that the tax burden on businesses located there place it at an economic disadvantage with regard to its nearby neighbors. Any solution must be approached as a component of the overall tax system, be grounded in verifiable data, and have significant support from the public, the media and business interests. The September conference sought to contribute to that process of informed public debate on a crucial fiscal topic.
In early December, the Cook County assessor proposed reducing the assessment ratio (the ratio of assessed value to market value) for certain types of business property: from 36 to 33 percent for industrial properties such as factories and distribution facilities; from 33 to 26 percent for large investor-owned residential property; and from 33 to 16 percent for multiuse storefront businesses with apartments on upper floors. The assessor’s hope is that more favorable treatment of business will lead to even more rapid growth of the tax base over time. While these recommendations came out of several different tax studies, any changes in assessment rates must by approved by the Cook County Board before they can be implemented.
Scott Koeneman is communications manager at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs (IGPA) of the University of Illinois in Urbana, Illinois.
References
Dye, R., T. McGuire and D. Merriam. 1999. “The Impact of Property Taxes and the Property Tax Classification on Business Activity in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper.
Giertz, J.F., and T. McGuire, “Cook County, Ill., Assessor Proposese Changes in Assessment Levels,” State Tax Today. Dec. 7, 1999.
Man, J. 1995. “The Incidence of Differential Commercial Property Taxes: Empirical Evidence,” National Tax Journal, 48: 479-496.
McDonald, J. 1993. “Incidence of the Property Tax on Commercial Real Estate: The Case of Downtown Chicago,” National Tax Journal, 46: 109-120.
Wheaton, W. 1984. “The Incidence of Inter-jurisdictional Differences in Commercial Property Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 37: 515-527.
Source: Illinois Department of Revenue
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The Lincoln Institute’s China Program was established several years ago, in part to develop training programs on property taxation policy and local government finance with officials from the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The Institute and SAT held a joint forum on international property taxation in Shenzhen in December 2003, and more than 100 participants attended another course held in China in May 2004. In January 2005, 24 Chinese tax officials from 15 provinces visited the United States for additional programs; many of them are developing property tax systems in six pilot cities. The Institute also supports the Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council to research property tax assessment in China, and they jointly organized a forum in February 2005.
Economic growth and institutional reforms in China over the past two decades have created profound changes within the society. The central authorities now need to set forth new policies and procedures for modern governance to address devolution of certain authority to local governments, rapid urban and rural development, and changes in land uses and land and fiscal policies. The national government’s commitment to further modernization is most evident in the effort to develop and implement a new property taxation system.
This article describes the current system and discusses issues and challenges that must be overcome to implement a successful property tax policy in China. Given the complexity of this endeavor and the huge variation in economic development across the country, a gradualist approach, which has proved effective in China’s modernization process, may be the best way to initiate property tax reform and development.
Current Taxation System
China collects 24 types of taxes. The central and local governments share the value added tax (VAT) and business tax revenues; the former tax is the primary revenue source for the central government, whereas the latter is the most important tax for local governments. Two other important tax sources for the central government are the consumption (excise) tax and the personal income tax. Twelve taxes are related to land and property, but most do not generate significant revenues. The business tax accounted for 14.41 percent of total central and local government revenues in 2002, but only a small portion of that amount was generated from property-related sources. The reason is that business and income taxes are collected only when land or property is rented or sold, and thus do not provide a steady stream of revenue. It is hard to imagine that any of the 12 property-related taxes could play a key role in resource allocation and local government finance over the long term.
An evaluation of the current tax system reveals additional concerns.
The shortcomings in the current taxation system have resulted in major fiscal problems for the central government, such as declining revenue mobilization and ineffective use of tax policy to leverage macroeconomic policy (Bahl 1997). When the government conducted tax reform in 1993 to overcome some of the problems, one of the largest initiatives shifted responsibility for urban and public services to local governments.
This measure was successful in improving the central government’s fiscal condition; however, the revenue share for local governments was not increased at a level commensurate with their increased responsibility. Consequently, many local governments face increasing budgetary deficits. Figure 1 illustrates the financial deficit for local governments after the 1993 tax reform. More than one-third of county-level governments have serious budget problems and over half of the local governments directly below the provincial level have budgets that merely cover the basic operations of public entities.
Public Land Leasing
One of the means by which local governments increase revenues in the absence of an effective taxation system is through public land leasing. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state introduced market principles into the decision-making process regarding land use and allocation by separating land use rights from ownership. This separation promotes the development of land markets, which in turn have created tremendous impacts on real estate and housing development, urban land use and land allocation. Except for a short yet dramatic drop in the early 1990s due to a macroeconomic policy designed to prevent the national economy from overheating, the prices for access to land use rights and public land leasing rates have been increasing steadily.
Despite the significant number of land leasing transactions, the government closely regulates and controls the amount of land being leased by maintaining a monopoly on land supply (Ding 2003). Most land in rural areas still belongs to the collectives, and urban construction is prohibited on rural land unless it is first acquired by the state. Land developments that occur on collectively owned rural land are considered illegal, and administrative efforts such as monitoring and inspecting have been implemented to eliminate these violations.
General land use plans and regulations to preserve cultivated land further control the amount of land available for urban development. The land use plans determine the total amount of land that can be added to existing urbanized areas through an annual land supply quota. At the same time, China’s preservation policy for cultivated land influences both land supply and the location of land available for urban development. The Land Administration Law specifies that at least 80 percent of cultivated land should be designated as basic farmland and prohibited from land development. Land productivity is the dominant factor used to delineate the boundaries of basic farmland. Since most cities are located in areas with rich soil resources, farmland protection designations commonly exist in urbanizing areas. Thus farmland protection inevitably results in urban sprawl and leapfrog development patterns requiring costly infrastructure investments and land consumption.
Financing Local Government. As a result of the government’s regulations and monopoly on selling land use rights, local authorities use the public land leasing system to increase their revenues through land use conveyance fees. For instance, Hangzhou City, the capital of Zhejiang Province with a population of almost four million, is among the top five in per capita national income and GDP. The city generated land conveyance fees of more than six billion YMB in 2002, more than 20 percent of the total municipal government revenues.
Interestingly, these fees were generated largely from selling to commercial users the right to access the state-owned land, yet commercial land development represented only 15 percent of total land uses in newly developed areas. The rest of the land was allocated to users through negotiation in which the sale price either barely covered the costs of acquiring and improving the land, or land was offered free to generate competition for businesses and investments.
Local governments can raise enormous revenues from limited-market transactions of land use rights, in part because land conveyance fees represent lump-sum, up-front land rent payments for a leasing period and in part because local governments exercise their strong administrative powers to require farmers to sell their land at below-market rates. When the government later resells the land at market rates, the price could be more than 100 times the purchase price. After considering the costs of land improvement, however, net revenues may be only ten times the total cost of the land.
Rising land prices resulting from the government monopoly allow local governments to use the land as collateral to borrow money from banks. These loans plus the revenue generated from conveyance fees accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the Hangzhou municipal government budget in 2002. In turn these revenues were used to fund more than two-thirds of the city’s investments in infrastructure and urban services.
Hangzhou City specializes in textiles, tourism, construction and transportation, and generates substantial revenue from business and value-added taxes, although the city’s share of income generated through the public land leasing system is also large. Many smaller cities and towns with fewer commercial and business resources use land leasing directly through land conveyance fees or indirectly as collateral to support up to 80 or 85 percent of their total investments in urban initiatives. These smaller cities must turn to land to generate revenues to fuel economic growth, launch urban renewal projects, and provide infrastructure and urban services that were neglected for a long time prior to the reform era. Land-generated revenue is also used to improve the overall financial environment, attract businesses and investments, and support the reform and reallocation of state-owned enterprises.
Negative Consequences. Despite the importance of public land leasing for income generation, the practice of using this tool to finance local governments may have serious consequences in the long run. The fiscal incentives that compel local governments to control and monopolize the land markets will negatively impact real estate and housing development, industrialization and land use. Furthermore, land is a fixed resource and ultimately there will be no more land left to lease for revenue.
Increasing pressure to protect the rights of farmers also makes it more difficult and costly to acquire land from farmers. As a result, local governments must increase land prices or face reduced revenues from land leasing. Finally, not only does land scarcity and farmer compensation pose a challenge to income generation, but recent policy reform now permits land owned by a collective to enter the land market directly. This change will prevent local governments from acquiring collective lands and exacting conveyance fees for these transfers.
Taxation Reform: Principles and Challenges
The fiscal deficits experienced by local governments and the problems with the resulting public land leasing system provided the impetus for the central government to restructure the entire taxation system. That reform is based on four guiding principles: (1) simplify the tax system; (2) broaden the tax base; (3) lower tax rates; and (4) strictly administer tax collection and management. The central authorities in charge of tax policy and administration offer several specific goals with respect to property-related taxes.
Considerable debate exists over the merits of the proposed property-related tax reform. Despite the lack of consensus as to the best option, the costs and benefits must be assessed to effectively guide the development and implementation of a new property tax system. In addition, several outstanding issues need to be resolved in order to implement the proposed land and property tax reform.
The implementation of a value-based tax also will require the assembly and cataloguing of massive quantities of data, which historically have not been collected systematically. Furthermore, the data that have been collected are stored in different locations and in paper format. The Ministry of Land and Resources records and handles land-related data and information, whereas the Ministry of Construction is in charge of structure-related information. Matching related records from different ministries and digitizing this data will take years if not decades and will require a huge investment of resources.
The Chinese public has limited understanding of property taxation systems, so education will be required to avoid potentially significant political resistance. Capacity building within the Chinese government also will require professional training in appraisal, evaluation, appeals and collection to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the new tax system.
Conclusions
Despite these unanswered issues and challenges, the Chinese government appears committed to implementing property taxation reform. The application of the widely used and successful gradualist approach for implementing policy and institutional reforms will ensure that the development and institutionalization of the property tax system proceeds on course. For example, data for industrial and commercial structures is more complete and of higher quality than data for residential structures. Furthermore, newer structures tend to have better records than older structures, and records are more complete for structures in urban areas than in rural areas. Thus, applying the property taxation system first to commercial and industrial structures, newly developed land with residential structures, and urban areas will allow the system to take hold before attempts are made to implement change in the areas with greater obstacles to overcome.
References
Bahl, Roy. 1997. Fiscal policy in China: Taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations. Burlingame, CA: The 1990 Institute.
Development Research Center. 2005: Issues and challenges of China’s urban real estate administration and taxation. Report submitted to the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ding, Chengri. 2003. Land policy reform in China: Assessment and prospects. Land Use Policy 20(2): 109-120.
Liu, Z. 2004. Zhongguo Suizi Gailan. Beijing: Jinji Chuban She. (China’s taxation system. Beijing: Economic Science Publisher).
Lu, S. 2003. YanJiu ZhengDi WenTi TaoShuo GaiKe ZhiLu (II). Beijing: Zhongguo Dadi Chuban She. (Examination of land acquisition issues: Search for reforms (II). Beijing: China Land Publisher.)
Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.
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For many years, researchers have puzzled over the causes and consequences of voter-approved tax and expenditure limits (TELs), a fiscal rule that weakens the ability of elected officials to raise revenues or make expenditures.
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For planning processes to resolve the pressing issues of our day—such as climate change, traffic congestion, and social justice—plans must be made at the appropriate scale, must promulgate appropriate implementation tools, and must be enforced with legitimate authority. That is, our ability to meet critical challenges depends on the legal and institutional foundations of planning.
In the United States, responsibility for establishing these foundations for planning rests with the states, which in turn have delegated most land use authority to local governments. In Europe, the foundations of planning are established by each country, whose planning systems often feature national and regional plans as well as a mosaic of local plans. For better and for worse, these institutional foundations have framed the planning process on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean for most of the post-war period. But as the scope of our planning challenges continues to broaden, and discontent with the status quo continues to spread, several states and European nations have begun to experiment with new and innovative approaches to planning.
The opportunity to explore and discuss these issues brought scholars, practitioners, students, and others to Dublin, Ireland, in October 2012 for a two-day seminar sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and organized by the School of Geography, Planning, and Environmental Policy at University College Dublin and the National Center for Smart Growth at the University of Maryland. Held in the historic Newman House on St. Stephen’s Green, the meetings featured overview papers on planning in the United States and Europe and case studies of five U.S. states and five European nations. Each presentation was followed by commentary from a high-level official from the corresponding state or nation (see box 1).
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Box 1: Papers Presented at the Dublin Seminar on Planning for States and Nation/States, October 2012
Bierbaum, Marty
The New Jersey State Development Plan
Faludi, Andreas
The Europeanisation of Planning and the Role of ESPON
Fulton, Bill
Planning for Climate Change in California
Galland, Daniel
The Danish National Spatial Planning Framework
Geppert, Anna
Spatial Planning in France
Grist, Berna
The Irish National Spatial Strategy
Knaap, Gerrit
PlanMaryland: A Work in Progress
Lewis, Rebecca
The Delaware State Development Plan
Needham, Barrie
The National Spatial Strategy for The Netherlands
Salkin, Patricia
Planning Frameworks in the United States and the Role of the Federal Government
Seltzer, Ethan
Land Use Planning in Oregon: The Quilt and the Struggle for Scale
Tewdwer-Jones, Mark
National Planning for the United Kingdom
For more information about the seminar, see the program website: http://www.ucd.ie/gpep/events/seminarsworkshopsconferences/natplansymp2012
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A Framework for Spatial Planning in Europe
Planning in Europe is governed by a variety of traditions and governance structures (Faludi 2012). Some European nations have “unitary” governance structures, in which all land use authority ultimately rests with the national government. Italy and Spain have “regional” governance structures, in which land use authority is constitutionally shared between the national government and regional governments. Austria, Belgium, and Germany have “federalist” governance structures, in which particular land use functions are distributed among the national, regional, and local governments. Within these frameworks a variety of planning cultures and traditions have evolved: “amenagement duterritoire” in France; “town and country planning” in the UK; “Raumordnung” in Germany; and “ruimtelijke ordening” in The Netherlands. While these terms generally connote what “urban planning” means in the United States, there are important, nuanced, and fiercely defended differences.
The expression for urban planning used by the European Union is “spatial planning” (European Commission 1997, 24).
“Spatial planning refers to the methods used largely by the public sector to influence the future distribution of activities in space. It is undertaken with the aims of creating a more rational territorial organization of land uses and the linkages between them, to balance demands for development with the need to protect the environment, and to achieve social and economic objectives.
“Spatial planning embraces measures to co-ordinate the spatial impact of other sectoral policies, to achieve a more even distribution of economic development between regions than would otherwise be created by market forces, and to regulate the conversion of land and property uses.”
The European Union has no authority to engage in spatial planning, but directly influences spatial planning outcomes through regional development initiatives, environmental directives, and structural and cohesion funding. This goal is articulated in the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) signed in 1998 by the ministers responsible for spatial planning in the member states and the members of the European Commission responsible for regional policy (Faludi 2002).
Modern spatial planning in the European context is broadly understood to include national, regional, and local planning, where national plans provide broad national development strategies and guidelines for plans at lower levels of government; regional plans integrate physical development with social, economic, and environmental policies but without site-level specificity; and local plans are site-specific and address the physical and urban design elements of the built environment. While none of the planning frameworks for the member nations matches this neat hierarchical ideal exactly, the ESDP has influenced planning activity in every nation.
The ESDP itself is based on longstanding European planning traditions dating to World War II, when national development or reconstruction plans were indisputably necessary for post-war reparations. Many European nations still have national development plans and complementary national spatial strategies. But the influence and importance of those plans has diminished steadily since reconstruction. In the last decade in particular, nations once known for their ambitious and extensive commitment to planning—France, Denmark, and the United Kingdom among them—have failed to adopt new national plans and expressly placed greater emphasis on regional and local plans.
National European Spatial Strategies and Frameworks
France
Although France is a unitary, centralized nationstate, the national government has never played a leading role in spatial planning. Rather, responsibility for spatial planning was officially transferred to regional and local governments in devolutionary reforms adopted in 1982 and 2003 (Geppert 2012). Although coordination between governments at different levels continues, this process results more often in joint investment strategies rather than in shared spatial visions or common objectives. Before most other nations, the French national government began focusing less on spatial planning and more on sectoral policies, leaving spatial issues for lower levels of government.
Denmark
Planning in Denmark historically began with a comprehensive national planning framework (Galland 2012). Over the last two decades, however, as a result of interrelated political and economic factors, the land use roles of national, local, and regional governments within the national territory have significantly transformed the scope, structure, and understanding of Danish spatial planning (figure 1).
Among the implications of this reform, several spatial planning responsibilities have been decentralized to the local level while regional planning for Greater Copenhagen and other sectoral functions have been transferred to the national level. Moreover, the recent abolition of the county level of government has increased the risk of uncoordinated spatial planning and decreased coherence across diverse policy institutions and instruments.
The Netherlands
The Netherlands has perhaps the longest and best-known tradition of national spatial planning, and its plans include industrial as well as detailed spatial policies (Needham 2012). For several decades, Dutch national plans influenced the distribution of people and activities throughout the country. In the first decades after World War II, all levels of government—national, provincial, and municipal—tended to work together in their spatial planning. In the 1990s, however, they started to move apart. In response, the national government strengthened its own powers over the local governments (a form of centralization), and at the same time reduced its own ambitions to pursue a national spatial strategy (a form of decentralization). The latest national spatial strategy expressly withdraws from some planning tasks previously carried out by the national government.
United Kingdom
In the early 1900s, the UK Parliament divested its direct powers to plan; instead, the powers of intervention, new state housing development, and regulation of private housing development were handed over to local governments (Tewdwr-Jones 2012). In the following decades, the central government did acquire new planning powers of its own as a consequence of World War II and the need to rebuild cities, infrastructure, and the economy in the national interest. Since 1945, central government has retained these powers, while also permitting the monitoring of local authorities in their operation of the planning system.
These powers have changed dramatically over the last 70 years. After 1999, devolution in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland further fragmented the meaning of “national” in policy and planning terms. During the 2000s, the push toward regional spatial planning in England also rebalanced national planning matters toward sub-national interests. As a result of this trend in devolution, decentralization, regionalism, and localism over the last 20 years, it is increasingly questionable whether the UK now possesses anything that could be regarded as a national planning system, since so much has changed spatially and within policy-making institutions and processes across different parts of the country.
Ireland
Ireland is one of few European nations not following the trend toward decentralization of planning authority, partly due to the fact that its planning system has been fully decentralized (Grist 2012). Largely following EU guidelines, Ireland adopted a series of national development plans, the latest one being the National Development Plan 2007–2013. Based on recommendations in the previous national plan, the Department of Environment, Community and Local Government in 2002 developed the Ireland National Spatial Strategy. This strategy identified critical gateways and hubs and articulated plans to decentralize economic activity from Dublin and throughout the island.
Following a turbulent period that saw the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger, blamed in part on lax local planning policies allied with extensive incentivizing of property development and political corruption, the country is now revisiting that strategy, strengthening regional development guidelines, and imposing new consistency requirements on local governments.
Under the new evidence-based planning regime, local plans must conform more closely with regional planning guidelines, and local plans will have quantitative limits on how much development can be allowed. The future role of the National Spatial Strategy is currently in the review process as the new government, elected following the property crash in Ireland, examines the planning and development issues that prevailed during the property bubble.
The Federal Government and Land Use in the United States
The U.S. federal government, like the European Union, has no authority to plan and manage land use, but probably has a greater influence on the location and nature of development patterns (Salkin 2012). Besides the billions of dollars it allocates for transportation infrastructure, social services, development, and redevelopment, the federal government is a major landowner of more than 630 million acres across the country. Federal regulations are also highly influential. The Clean Air and Water Acts, for example, impose no restrictions on land use per se, but in establishing targets for ambient air quality and nutrient loadings to rivers, lakes, and streams, both acts profoundly influence local land use plans, regulations, and development patterns.
More recently, President Barack Obama’s administration has established a new channel of federal influence on land use planning and regulation. While the federal government continues to refrain from direct intervention in local land use governance, the secretaries of the Departments of Transportation and Housing and Urban Development and of the Environmental Protection Agency signed a memorandum of understanding establishing the Sustainable Communities Partnership. To promote six principles of sustainable communities, these agencies launched a number of new grants programs, including the Regional Sustainable Communities Planning Grants. To be eligible for such a grant, local governments must form inter-organizational consortia that include the metropolitan planning organization (MPO), the central city, the majority of local governments, and a representation of civic and advocacy groups.
While the stated purposes of these path-breaking grants include urban revitalization, environmental protection, social justice, and sustainable development, an equally important purpose is to establish new inter-institutional relationships by promoting greater inclusion and participation. Regional Sustainable Communities Planning is now underway in 74 metropolitan areas across the country. It remains to be seen, however, whether the incentives offered to local governments to engage in regional planning are sufficient to get them to participate in regional plan implementation without additional state-level intervention.
State Plans and State Planning Frameworks
Every state established a framework for local planning and regulation in the 1920s and 1930s based on the standard planning and zoning enabling acts prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce. Despite expectations of extensive institutional change, characterized in the “Quiet Revolution” more than 40 years ago, most states merely authorize local governments to plan (Salkin 2012).
Others, like Oregon, mandate, review, and approve local plans (Seltzer 2012). If local governments do not submit plans that meet the state’s land use goals and guidelines, the state can withhold funds or the authority to issue building permits. Several unique land use institutions also support the Oregon planning system, including a state planning commission, a land use court of appeals, and a directly elected regional government. Though simple in structure, and frequently challenged in the courts and at the ballot box, the Oregon system has a reputation as one of the most, if not the most, effective land use systems in the United States (Ingram et al. 2009).
California is among the states that delegated substantial land use authority to local governments. Although major development projects have to pass a complex mini-National Environment Policy Act process, and the California Coastal Commission was an innovative new statewide institution in its day, local planning remains dominant. But in 2008, the state adopted a bold new initiative to address climate change—Senate Bill 375, which required MPOs to develop transportation and land use plans that meet state greenhouse gas targets. The difficulty is that local governments, not MPOs, retain land use authority in California. MPOs and the state governments are providing incentives for local governments to adopt plans that conform with metropolitan plans, but it remains uncertain whether the combination of financial and other incentives are sufficient to nudge local governments to follow the MPO plans (Fulton 2012).
At the other extreme, plans for entire states are not common in the United States. In response to federal requirements, most states do have transportation plans, and some have economic development plans, workforce development plans, or climate action plans, but only five have state development plans—Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.
New Jersey and Delaware have perhaps the best- and least-known state plans, respectively. New Jersey adopted its State Planning Act in 1985, requiring the state planning commission to develop, adopt, and implement the New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan (Bierbaum 2012). The planning process included a complex cross-acceptance procedure for identifying and resolving differences between the state and local governments. Since its adoption, the influence of and attention received by the plan has ebbed and flowed over successive gubernatorial administrations. Most recently, Governor Chris Christie’s administration developed an entirely new state plan, focused primarily on economic development without the cross-acceptance process. The state plan commission, however, has not yet adopted the plan.
The Delaware plan is much less well-known and far less controversial than the New Jersey plan, and both the content and process are less complex (Lewis 2012). The Delaware plan includes five general land designations (figure 2). It depends on state-local coordination and relies on the threat of withholding infrastructure funding (of which the state pays a significant share) to incentivize compliance by local governments. Because the state did not begin tracking data on development patterns until 2008, and does not maintain spatial data on state expenditures, it is difficult to discern the impact of the approach on development and the consistency of state spending with the state plan map.
Maryland is the only state that rivals California and Oregon in its adoption of bold new approaches to planning, based on its long tradition of leadership in land use and environmental policy (Knaap 2012). Maryland established the first state plan commission in 1933, and broke into the national spotlight in 1997, when it adopted the path-breaking Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Act. Since 1997 the use of state expenditures to provide incentives for smart growth has been the signature feature of the Maryland approach. Long before anyone in Maryland spoke the words “smart growth,” however, the state had passed legislation in 1959 that required the Maryland Department of Planning to develop and adopt a state development plan. More than 50 years later, the administration of Governor Martin O’Malley finally met that requirement.
On December 19, 2011, Governor O’Malley signed PlanMaryland, establishing the first new state development plan in the United States in many years (figure 3). But unlike state plans in New Jersey or Delaware, the Maryland plan is more procedural than substantive. Specifically, it established six plan designation categories and, following a longstanding Maryland tradition, enabled local governments to allocate land for any or all designated uses. State agencies would then target programmatic funds to each of these areas. Since the plan was signed, state agencies have been developing and refining implementation plans, and local governments have just recently begun submitting plans for state certification.
Concluding Comments
The frameworks for land use and spatial planning vary extensively across Europe and the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, local governments carry much of the load, especially with respect to community, neighborhood, and site-specific details. But the role of regions, states, and nations remains important.
Contrary to its reputation in the United States, planning in many European nations has decentralized extensively. Few European nations are engaged in full-scale national plans that guide national investments and land use regulations. In fact, planning in Europe, while still far more comprehensive in sectoral details than in the United States, shares many policy features with its North American counterpart. An interesting exception is Ireland, which continues to expand the role of national and regional governments partly as a response to the recent period of extremely decentralized planning that failed to take into account and implement the national strategy. Ireland is also one of the few countries adhering to the broad principles of spatial planning formally adopted by the European Union.
In the United States, neither state development planning nor state approval of local plans is a rapidly growing practice. Indeed, despite the demonstrated success of the Oregon program and the growing recognition of the need for horizontal and vertical policy integration, land use planning in the United States remains a fiercely local affair. Although both the state of California and the federal government are providing financial incentives for intergovernmental coordination and planning at the metropolitan scale, it remains far from certain that incentives alone will secure the changes in local plans and regulations required to institute meaningful adjustments in land consumption, travel behavior, and access to opportunities.
New approaches are needed to make cites and metropolitan areas more productive, equitable, and environmentally sustainable in light of anticipated challenges in the future. If these issues cannot be addressed adequately, other kinds of experiments in institutional planning reforms may become more common in many countries.
About the Authors
Gerrit Knaap is professor of urban studies and planning, director of the National Center for Smart Growth, and associate dean of the School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation at the University of Maryland.
Zorica Nedovic-Budic is professor of spatial planning and geographic information systems (GIS) in the School of Geography, Planning and Environmental Policy at University College Dublin.
References
Denmark Ministry of the Environment. 2006. The 2006 national planning report–In brief. Copenhagen. http://www.sns.dk/udgivelser/2006/87-7279-728-2/html/default_eng.htm
European Commission. 1997. The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
Faludi, Andreas. 2002. European spatial planning. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ingram, Gregory K., Armando Carbonell, Yu-Hung Hong, and Anthony Flint. 2009. Smart growth policies: An evaluation of programs and outcomes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues its long process of reconstruction and reconciliation, four years after the November 1995 signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which marked the end of a three-and-one-half-year war. Under the terms of the Accords, the state was set up within the original borders of what had been the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was divided into two largely independent entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska). Sub-entity levels of government include cantons and municipalities in the Federation and municipalities in the Republika Srpska.
The task of rebuilding a country ravaged by war is never an easy one. International donor organizations have dedicated large amounts of human and financial resources to the cause, greatly assisting in the development of new government institutions and rebuilding the economy. One of the many challenges facing the country is ensuring that there are sufficient resources available to carry out necessary governmental functions. Of particular concern are service responsibilities and infrastructure needs, including reconstruction, which are straining the already limited budgets of the municipalities.
The Lincoln Institute, the World Bank and the United States Treasury have been involved in a joint project that provides assistance to cantonal and municipal governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina as they explore ways to enhance existing revenues and identify new revenue sources. A number of revenue-generating ideas have been discussed, and one option under serious consideration is an area-based property tax.
Ad Valorem vs. Area-based Tax Systems
Ideally, a property tax system should be ad valorem based in order to promote vertical and horizontal equity in the overall tax system. However, an ad valorem system has a number of administrative complexities that limit its full adoption, especially in developing and transitional economies. An efficient and effective ad valorem property tax system requires a functioning market for property, a network of professional appraisers, substantial amounts of exogenous data, and a sophisticated administrative infrastructure. Because Bosnia and Herzegovina is both a transitional and a post-war economy, these necessary elements are not readily available.
The country does not have a robust market for property, although a real estate market is beginning to emerge around the capital city of Sarajevo. A weekly gazette advertises available properties, but the number is limited and the transactions that do occur tend to be cash or barter-based. An initiative to privatize residences and businesses promises to stimulate the supply of privately held property, ultimately increasing the pool of available properties for real estate transactions. However, the privatization effort does not involve “arms-length” transactions because prices are being established by administrative fiat.
Currently no professional appraisal training is available in the country, but it is a necessary condition for a properly functioning ad valorem system of property taxation. Even if such a system is not adopted, training is still needed, as tax authorities administer the tax on non-movables that has been adopted recently in a few cantons. This tax is similar to the property transaction tax used in various states in the U.S. To assure that the sales price being reported by the seller is reasonable, an appointed committee of citizens is asked to validate it. Ideally these citizens would receive training in appraisal techniques before embarking on their duties.
Efficient and effective administration of an ad valorem property tax system requires an extensive administrative infrastructure and substantial amounts of exogenous data. Neither the infrastructure nor the data, such as financial information, cost of construction and mortgage information, are readily available. Therefore, instituting an ad valorem property tax system in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be very costly and would require a substantial amount of lead time to begin collecting the necessary data and to build the required infrastructure.
However, there are at least three property-based alternatives that are appropriate for developing and transitional economies and are worthy of consideration in this case. The first alternative is a flat fee on occupiers/owners of land and/or improvements with no adjustments for size, value or use of the property. A second alternative is an area-based tax that takes into account the size or area of the property, including both land and improvements. The physical area of the land and improvements provides the base for the tax, and the base is multiplied times the rate of the tax, which is generally low. The third alternative is to adjust the aforementioned area-based tax for such factors as the location of the property, its use, and the quality of the improvements on the land.
A hybrid of alternatives two and three-an area-based tax with adjustments for the location and use of the property-seems to make the most sense for Bosnia and Herzegovina, for several reasons:
The Process of “Discovering” Property
For an area-based property tax system to work properly, all property must be discovered. Ideally, discovery would be accomplished by reading digitized cadastral records. However, such information is limited and technological constraints make this approach infeasible at this time.
Both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska have reasonably good cadastral records considering their 40 years of socialism, the nationalization of property, and the effects of war. The legal cadastral records contain data on legal ownership of property, while the land cadastral records document the size of land. Two key missing components are complete information on improvements to the land and accurate property ownership information, due to the mass dislocations of citizens during the war.
It will take a substantial amount of work to update the cadastral records sufficiently to support an area-based property tax system. In the meantime, it makes sense to use existing information to assist in the identification and discovery of property. Public housing records, which are quite complete and in some instances are computerized, are one source. For example, the Sarajevo Housing Authority has detailed information on the size, quality, amenities and location of publicly owned residential apartments, and its rent collection system is computerized.
Other sources are the gas and electric utilities that must possess information about their customers in order to efficiently and effectively bill them for service. Sarajevo Gas appears to have fairly complete customer records and it makes a serious effort to keep these data files up-to-date. The largest of three electric utilities operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Public Enterprise Elektoprivreda BiH, also maintains very good customer records on approximately 560,000 customers, including approximately 60,000 businesses.
These housing, gas and electric records contain a lot of information on property and its owner/occupier, yet no single set of records appears to be sufficient for the level of detail necessary for an efficiently operating property tax system. Given the incomplete information contained in the cadastral records, tax administration officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina are faced with the challenge of developing a data discovery process that can best utilize these existing databases.
An active approach to discovery would require occupants to provide the necessary information to the taxing authorities. The reason that occupants rather than owners should be enlisted in this task is because land and property ownership records are incomplete and inaccurate in many parts of the country. The first step would be to develop a form that asks for the name of the occupant, a cadastral identification number, the location of the property, the area of the land, the size of improvements to the land, and the use of the land. In the Federation, it makes sense for the cantons, in cooperation with the municipalities, to develop these records, whereas in the Republika Srpska, municipalities most likely would do this with assistance from the entity-level government.
The second step would involve collecting this information. Asking occupants to fill out the form voluntarily would require a public information campaign explaining why the information is needed, how to comply with the request, and the penalties associated with non-compliance. Occupants would be encouraged to pick up the forms from the local cadastral office, complete them, and return them. A second approach would be to prepare a list of known properties using existing cadastral, housing, and gas and electric utility records, and then either hand deliver or mail the property record form to the occupants.
Once the municipalities have compiled the property information, it should be audited for accuracy and completeness by comparing information on the forms with similar information contained in the records of the electric and gas utilities. In many cases this comparison could be performed electronically. Then a manual comparison could be done with housing and cadastral records. The result will be a list of properties and occupants who have failed to comply with the request for property record information. Non-compliers could be sent a reminder of their responsibility to comply, and in extreme cases of non-compliance, individual visits to the property can be conducted.
Revenue Potential and Administrative Challenges
Despite the presence of property-based taxes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, officials at the cantonal and municipal levels of government do not fully appreciate the revenue potential of area-based property taxes. However, these taxes have the potential to generate sizable amounts of revenue, relative to current local budgets, and eventually produce more than one percent of gross domestic product (See Table 1).
There also are sizable administrative challenges associated with the implementation of such a tax. Foremost is the development of a legal and administrative framework that will ensure uniformity, an important criterion for any property tax system. Fortunately, the current government system is designed to promote uniformity because the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina grants sole responsibility for fiscal policy to the Federation. Therefore, a framework law, outlining the methodology for determining the property tax base and the range of allowable tax rates, and authorizing cantons to pass enabling legislation for municipalities to levy the tax, should be prepared at the Federation level. Similarly, a framework law would be prepared at the entity level in the Republika Srpska authorizing municipalities to pass enabling legislation.
To overcome any misconceptions regarding the revenue potential from or the administrative challenges posed by the implementation of an area-based system of property taxation, the cosponsors of this research are planning a short training conference in Sarajevo in the late fall. It will provide a common foundation of knowledge about property taxes to officials for both the Federation and the Republika Srpska and foster discussion about the best way to implement an area-based system.
Three pilot studies will then be launched to test whether sufficient property information can be obtained at a reasonable level of effort and cost. In addition, these studies will help determine the roles that various participants at the entity and sub-entity levels of government should play in the discovery phase. If the pilot studies prove successful, a significant step will have been taken toward the introduction of an area-based property tax and diversification of the local government tax base in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
C. Kurt Zorn is professor of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University in Bloomington. Jean Tesche is resident tax advisor for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the United States Treasury, Office of Technical Assistance, in Arlington, Virginia. Gary Cornia is professor at the Romney Institute of Public Management at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah.
The authors have prepared a Lincoln Institute Working Paper available for free on the web titled “The Potential for a Property Tax in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
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Jack Huddleston is professor of urban and regional planning and is affiliated with the Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received his Ph.D. in economics from Oklahoma State University and worked as chief economic development planner and chief of local fiscal policy analysis for the State of Wisconsin prior to joining the university. He teaches planning methods and financial planning in the graduate planning program at Madison and is a faculty member in the land resources, water resources management, and energy analysis and policy programs within the Gaylord Nelson Institute. His recent research has focused on applied local government finance issues in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union; energy subsidy schemes in the Dominican Republic and Indonesia; and watershed management and sustainable development in western Mexico.
Land Lines: What do planners need to know about local budgeting, and why?
Jack Huddleston: Planners tend to think narrowly within the boundaries of the functional or physical areas for which they plan. For example, planners charged with preparing and implementing land use plans often are mainly concerned with forecasting land use needs, reconciling land use conflicts, and developing and administering implementation tools such as zoning ordinances. They are not overly concerned with such facts as over the last decade the city’s tax base has been growing at only one percent per year, city spending has been growing by three percent per year, and the city’s bond rating has slipped from Aa to B. The thinking is, “planners plan; others budget.”
Arguably, planners have more impact on the fiscal health of cities and regions than any other civil servant or elected official. They set the path for tax base growth and local government spending patterns far into the future. The things planners do on a daily basis—land use planning, transportation planning, environmental planning, social services planning and so forth—directly affect local government budgets.
When planners approve development on the urban fringe, for example, they have just affected economic conditions throughout the region. Decisions to approve commercial rather than industrial development have similar impacts. The final development project will determine the specific impact on local government revenues and spending, but the decisions made by planners set the direction and relative dimensions of the tax base and local government spending impacts that will occur later. Thus, it is important that planners understand what the local government budget represents, how it is composed, and how it changes over time if they are to understand how their activities affect local budgets.
LL: What kinds of direct impacts can planners have on the community budgeting process?
JH: The local budget serves both existing development, such as current residents, businesses, churches, commuters and visitors, and new development. Public revenues from property, sales and income taxes and user charges from existing activities are relatively stable over time, after adjusting for the impacts of inflation. Similar stability exists for local government spending to support existing activities.
Planners have their greatest impact on local government budgets when they adopt or approve plans for new development. It is here that the dimensions of new tax base growth are determined. It is also here that local government spending patterns are established. Residential development will require new streets and schools; commercial development will require streets, storm water management, and transportation system improvements; and industrial development will require special kinds of fire protection, major shipping services, and so forth. All types of development will involve the exhaustion of excess capacity in existing public infrastructure and require investment in new infrastructure.
LL: How do you get planning board members and planning practitioners to become concerned about and interested in these issues?
JH: There is actually very little need to get planning board members more interested in the fiscal side of planning than they already are. They feel the political pressure to keep taxes low on almost every decision they make. Their concern is largely how to measure the fiscal impacts of their decisions, in terms of both revenues and spending. In addition, they want to know how to evaluate the fiscal impact of their decisions against other goals and constraints, such as economic growth, social justice and fairness, environmental sensitivity, and so forth.
The knowledge/motivation gap for practicing planners is more significant and probably started during their graduate studies and training. Courses dealing with the fiscal side of planning, if available, are often the course taken after all the “useful and fun” courses are completed. After all, planning job listings often announce positions for “land use planners” or “transportation planners,” but few advertise for “financial planners.”
The key to getting practicing planners more interested in the fiscal side of planning is to establish the view that good planning without good finance is largely nonsustainable planning. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison we have included financial planning in the basic toolbox of skills and knowledge we think all planners should command. These skills, which we call intrinsic planning skills, include other tools such as map making, public participation, public speaking and effective communications.
LL: What current trends in local budgeting are relevant to planning goals?
JH: Most of the trends in local budgeting that directly affect attainment of planning goals come from external sources. For example, federal and state governments increasingly are getting out of urban development and redevelopment efforts. The need for such efforts has not diminished and, if anything, has increased, but higher levels of government have decided that such efforts are primarily of local interest. At the same time local governments are being required to fund new programs for efforts such as homeland security and environmental remediation. In general, pressures have been building for ever-increasing spending on the part of local governments.
On the revenue side of the local budget, state statutes limit the amount of revenues that local governments can raise. State governments have preferred reserving the high-yield income tax to fund state government, leaving the property tax as the primary source of funds for local governments. This reliance on the property tax has led to the property tax “revolts” and “restraint movements” that we read about across the country. In general, the sentiment to reduce property tax burdens has led local governments to find alternatives to the property tax, placing more importance on user charges and other locally based financial tools such as tax increment financing.
LL: How can planners address public resistance to property tax increases?
JH: Planners will need to become part planner and part public educator. Citizens value the public goods and services provided by local governments, but they also perceive that the costs of government are getting too high. To some extent there is a disconnect between the value of public goods and services received by local residents and businesses and the need to fund these services. Most of us appreciate the fact that citizenship has a price, but we are more willing to pay when we understand the uses to which public resources are being put and the benefits that will be generated.
This is where the planner as educator comes in. As planners, we often think of our activities as acres of land, dwelling units per acre, traffic flow per hour, or biological oxygen demand of the river [BOD is a measure of water pollution]. These same concepts can be translated into fiscal terms. We need to be able to talk about how various planning activities will affect the local budget, both in the short run and in the long term.
Comprehensive plans, for example, will affect the property tax base of a community for years into the future. Development patterns will affect how cities and regions spend their limited resources over time. Public infrastructure projects not only affect how and when development will take place, but they also place financial commitments on current and future residents. Sustainable development requires that planners be able to anticipate physical, social and financial needs and constraints, and that they are able to communicate these factors convincingly to interested citizens and decision makers.
LL: How is your work with the Lincoln Institute helping to broaden awareness about fiscal planning?
JH: I am working with Roz Greenstein, co-chair of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development, on an effort to “train the trainers” in the fiscal dimensions of planning. The concept is to assemble leading scholars and practitioners in the fields of public finance and planning in order to develop educational materials that can be used initially in graduate planning programs and subsequently in professional continuing education programs. The materials will cover the basics of municipal budgeting and finance for planners and will stress both how the activities of planners affect local budgets and how local fiscal conditions affect the activities of planners.
The first year of this effort is producing educational materials on the legal and institutional context for local budgets, the intersection between planning and local budgets, the content and process for developing local government operating and capital budgets, property tax administration and policy, fiscal impact analysis and fiscal impacts of development. This material will be presented and discussed in a workshop at the Lincoln Institute in July 2005. Invited participants include senior and junior faculty and professionals from across the U.S. and Canada. This group will not only test the first phase of these materials, but also will develop the agenda for topics to be covered in future sets of materials.
The goal of the overall effort is to increase planners’ understanding of the fiscal dimensions of planning. In concept, participants in the July workshop will be better able to incorporate fiscal thinking into courses at their respective institutions. Educational materials will also be made available to the broader academic community for the same purposes. The Institute’s investment in this important initiative has the potential to enhance planning education in the near term, but more importantly to change the way planning practitioners think about the work they do on an everyday basis.
Related Publication
Venkatesh, Harini. 2004. Local public finance: A glossary. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/Pub-Detail.asp?id=982
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Imagínese por un instante que usted es un líder político –un primer ministro, presidente o gobernador– y que se despierta con la noticia de que se produjo un desastre natural. Hubo víctimas, se derrumbaron edificios, la infraestructura está colapsando y los líderes locales necesitan desesperadamente recursos adicionales y soporte.
Usted responde inmediatamente, enviando personal y equipos a la zona del desastre y prometiendo ayuda adicional a los líderes locales. Su país, como muchos en el mundo, ha institucionalizado un sistema de respuesta escalonado, que va incorporando por niveles a los gobiernos regional, estatal y nacional a medida que las demandas de la catástrofe exceden la capacidad de respuesta local. Pero a los pocos días, o incluso horas –incluso antes de haber tratado a todas las víctimas y de haber hecho un recuento de todos los ciudadanos, antes de haber quitado los escombros de las calles y de haber restaurado los servicios básicos– otros líderes y los medios de comunicación ya están exigiendo respuestas a cuestiones que usted no ha tenido siquiera tiempo para considerar. ¿Cuánto dinero se destinará a la reconstrucción? ¿Qué criterios se usarán para guiarla? ¿Se permitirá a todos los propietarios que reconstruyan sus propiedades? ¿Quién dirigirá el proceso? ¿Es necesaria una nueva institución o estructura de gobierno para reducir las trabas burocráticas y acelerar la reconstrucción?
Este artículo reseña las investigaciones en curso sobre el papel de los diversos niveles de gobierno en la recuperación y reconstrucción exitosa después de una catástrofe (tabla 1). Representa la síntesis de dos décadas de investigaciones y prácticas de planificación sobre recuperación después de algunos de los desastres más grandes de nuestra era en los Estados Unidos, Japón, China, Taiwán, Indonesia, India, Nueva Zelanda, Australia, Chile y otros lugares. Su propósito es extraer lecciones comunes en estos ambientes tan diversos y ayudar a facilitar la recuperación de comunidades afectadas por desastres en el futuro.
La gestión de recuperación en el mundo
Los gobiernos responsables de la reconstrucción después de catástrofes enfrentan una serie extraordinaria de desafíos de gestión. El primer desafío es la compresión de las actividades en el tiempo y concentradas en el espacio, ya que ciudades construidas en el curso de décadas, si no siglos, se destruyen o dañan de improviso, y se deben reconstruir en una fracción del tiempo que se tardó en edificarlas. Esta tensión genera un segundo desafío: una aguda tensión entre velocidad y reflexión, ya que los diversos actores del proceso de recuperación en las comunidades afectadas tratan de tomar con urgencia decisiones bien pensadas y meditadas que aseguren recuperación óptima a largo plazo. Estos dos fenómenos generan un tercer desafío: la necesidad de acceder inmediatamente a una gran cantidad de dinero e información, las dos monedas más valiosas en la recuperación posterior a una catástrofe.
Para satisfacer estas demandas, los gobiernos de todos los países crean nuevas agencias de ayuda o reorganizan de manera significativa sus organizaciones existentes después de cada catástrofe importante. La causa más común de estas transformaciones en el gobierno después de una catástrofe es la falta de capacidad. Los gobiernos siguen teniendo que atender sus actividades diarias normales, y al mismo tiempo coordinar la reconstrucción o reinvención de las comunidades afectadas, de manera que crean o designan una entidad que pueda centrarse diariamente en la reconstrucción y coordinar las actividades pertinentes de las múltiples agencias gubernamentales. Estas agencias de recuperación, designadas generalmente para una variedad de propósitos e instancias gubernamentales, se hacen cargo de una gama de funciones esenciales, a medida que se reconstruyen la infraestructura, las viviendas y la actividad económica. Difieren en el tipo y escala de coordinación que brindan; el alcance de su autoridad, especialmente con respecto al flujo de dinero e información; y el nivel de gobierno en el que actúan, ya sea nacional, estatal o intergubernamental.
Los gobiernos nacionales gestionan las catástrofes de gran envergadura al nivel político más alto, movilizando los recursos financieros de las reservas nacionales o de ayuda internacional, y proporcionando el nivel de respaldo necesario a los niveles menores de gobierno en la localidad afectada por el desastre. Cuando se producen grandes catástrofes que transcienden los límites estatales o provinciales, los gobiernos nacionales también adoptan un papel activo en el desarrollo de las políticas de recuperación, y crean organizaciones para asistirlos. Algunos ejemplos son la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional de Japón, establecida después del terremoto y maremoto de 2011; la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury en Nueva Zelanda, creada después de la secuencia de terremotos de 2010 y 2011 en Christchurch; y el Cuartel General de Ayuda para Terremotos en China, después del desastre de 2008 en Wenchuan. Cada uno de estos organismos internacionales se atenía a la dirección de la administración nacional, su autoridad derivaba de los niveles más altos de gobierno y articulaban sus políticas con la aprobación de la administración vigente.
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Tabla 1: Experiencias de gestión de recuperación alrededor del mundo
Australia
Autoridad de Reconstrucción y Recuperación de Incendios Forestales de Victoria
Autoridad de Reconstrucción de Queensland
Chile
Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo—MINVU
China
Cuartel General de Ayuda para Terremotos
India
Autoridad para la Gestión de Catástrofes del Estado de Gujarat (GSDMA)
Abhiyan
Unidad de Gestión de Proyectos
Indonesia
Agencia de Reconstrucción y Rehabilitación—BRR
Equipo de Coordinación para la Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción—TTN
Japón
Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional
Nueva Zelanda
Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury
Taiwán
Comisión de Recuperación Post-Terremoto del 921
Consejo de Reconstrucción Post-Desastre de Morakot
Estados Unidos
Corporación de Desarrollo del Bajo Manhattan
Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana
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De forma similar, las agencias de recuperación a nivel estatal en general se crean como respuesta directa a catástrofes que afectan una región u otra jurisdicción subnacional. La autoridad y legalidad de estas entidades están más limitadas por la posición secundaria y subnacional de la entidad que les otorga autoridad en el gobierno. Ejemplos de estas entidades son la Autoridad de Gestión de Catástrofes del Estado de Gujarat (GSDMA), creada después del terremoto de 2001 en India Occidental; la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, fundada después del huracán Katrina en 2005; la Autoridad de Recuperación y Reconstrucción de Incendios Forestales (VBRRA) del estado de Victoria, establecida después de los incendios forestales de 2009 en Australia; y la Autoridad de Reconstrucción del estado de Queensland, establecida después de las inundaciones en Australia en el verano de 2010-2011.
Existe una tercera clase de organizaciones diseñadas para operar entre distintos niveles de gobierno, como la Corporación de Desarrollo del Bajo Manhattan, creada como una asociación entre el estado y la ciudad para planificar y financiar las actividades de recuperación después de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001 en la Ciudad de Nueva York. Otro ejemplo, la Agencia de Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción (BRR), creada en Aceh, Indonesia, después del maremoto de 2004, consistía en tres agencias independientes cuya composición provenía de una amplia gama de actores locales y nacionales. En forma similar, el Equipo de Coordinación para Rehabilitación y Reconstrucción (TTN) del gobierno indonesio después del terremoto de 2006 en Yogyakarta y Java Central fue diseñado como puente entre agencias nacionales y locales, y también supervisó e investigó los problemas de implementación a nivel local.
En algunos casos, los gobiernos deciden modificar o adaptar instituciones y procedimientos existentes para ayudar a gestionar la recuperación. Por ejemplo, Chile estableció un comité interministerial a nivel nacional después del terremoto y maremoto de 2010, pero el Ministerio de Vivienda y Urba-nismo existente amplió sus funciones y responsabilidades, y coordinó los esfuerzos de planificación e implementación a nivel nacional.
El control del dinero, la información, la colaboración y el tiempo
Considerando estos factores comunes a todos los entornos de recuperación posteriores a catástrofes, nuestra investigación demuestra que la clave para gobernar efectivamente estas crisis de gran envergadura es el control del dinero, la información, la colaboración y el tiempo. Ofrecemos en este artículo algunos ejemplos de buenas prácticas y lecciones aprendidas en nuestros diversos estudios de organizaciones a nivel de país.
1. La gestión del dinero: obtención y distribución de fondos en forma eficiente, efectiva y equitativa para la recuperación
Cuando se tiene que movilizar una gran cantidad de fondos públicos en la reconstrucción después de desastres, el verdadero poder reside en el nivel de gobierno que controla el flujo de dinero y cómo lo adquiere, asigna, desembolsa y audita. A veces, la organización encargada de la recuperación asume algunos o todos estos poderes, y otras veces toda la autoridad de financiamiento reside en el mismo lugar que antes de la catástrofe: las ramas legislativa y administrativa. Algunas funciones importantes en el entorno posterior al desastre son la fijación de políticas y prioridades para asignar grandes sumas de dinero, y el establecimiento de sistemas de contabilidad que permitan el desembolso oportuno de fondos críticos, proporcionando al mismo tiempo transpa-rencia y minimizando la corrupción.
Algunas organizaciones, como la entidad a nivel estatal GSDMA de India, se establecen específicamente para reunir todos los fondos de recuperación en un solo lugar, para poder asignarlos y desembolsarlos más adelante. Algunas entidades, como una de las tres ramas de la agencia intergubernamental BRR de Indonesia, se crean para auditar y controlar en forma independiente los gastos de las organizaciones a cargo de implementar la recuperación. En contraste, la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, una agencia a nivel estatal, recomendaba las prioridades de financiamiento al estado y proporcionaba supervisión en la medida de lo necesario, pero no tenía control directo sobre los fondos. La Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional de Japón recibió fondos nacionales y asignó el dinero a los ministerios nacionales y gobiernos locales pertinentes.
2. El aumento del flujo de información: recopilación, integración y diseminación efectivas de información para mejorar la toma de decisiones y las acciones de todos aquellos involucrados en la recuperación.
Una demanda crítica es acelerar y ampliar el flujo de información entre aquellos involucrados en la recuperación sobre la dinámica de las medidas de reconstrucción y las oportunidades emergentes. Este desafío comprende los procesos de planificación y participación pública que proporcionan información a los ciudadanos y las instituciones involucradas en la recuperación, facilitan la comunicación y las innovaciones entre los encargados de la recuperación, y comunican las inquietudes de los ciudadanos a agencias gubernamentales y ONG de manera oportuna. También exige intercambiar información entre organizaciones gubernamentales y no gubernamentales, y establecer foros para facilitar la coordinación.
En Victoria, Australia, después de los incendios forestales de 2009, los líderes nacionales y estatales colaboraron con las comunidades afectadas para formar más de 30 comités locales de recuperación, que tuvieron la responsabilidad de desarrollar un plan de recuperación comunitario e identificar prioridades y proyectos locales. Estos comités fueron utilizados por los gobiernos estatales y el gobierno nacional como puntos focales para la distribución de financiamiento local, y por las comunidades locales para recaudar fondos adicionales y establecer pautas normativas locales de reconstrucción. En Yogyakarta, Java, después del terremoto de 2006, TTN mantuvo mutuamente informadas a agencias locales y nacionales sobre las actividades realizadas por las demás, lo cual, a su vez, ayudó a alertar a los funcionarios sobre problemas potenciales.
Una función crítica, apropiadamente provista por una agencia con respaldo gubernamental, es la adquisición, síntesis y distribución de información básica sobre el daño causado, las actividades de reconstrucción, problemas sociales y económicos con la población, y varios indicadores de recupe-ración. Dichas agencias publican informes periódicos del progreso realizado y controlan los indicadores de recuperación, como lo han hecho tanto la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional en Japón y la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury en Nueva Zelanda, usando una variedad de mecanismos de comunicación, como publicaciones en sitios web, comunicados de prensa, boletines y foros. La información frecuente de fuentes confiables puede ayudar a que todos los actores comprendan el entorno de recuperación actual, y también a reducir los rumores y la información falsa.
3. El fomento de la cola-boración: construcción de capacidad y competencia sustentable para una recuperación a largo plazo mediante la colaboración y coordinación genuinas, tanto horizontalmente entre grupos locales como verticalmente entre los distintos niveles de gobierno.
Las agencias jerárquicas organizadas verticalmente, con organigramas claros y canales de comunicación bien definidos, en general no se adaptan bien a la gestión de recuperación después de catástrofes, porque la falta de “conexión” a través de las jerarquías verticales limita la colaboración y el flujo de información nueva y actualizada entre las organizaciones. Las agencias nacionales de los Estados Unidos involucradas en la recuperación, por ejemplo, son más capaces de administrar programas individuales que de resolver problemas complejos que traspasan las fronteras institucionales gubernamentales.
En contraste, las agencias organizadas horizontalmente pueden promover la coordinación entre agencias y compartir información, permitiendo que grupos individuales se adapten a nuevos contextos e información sin perder su dependencia de la organización madre. Si hay múltiples estados o jurisdicciones locales involucradas, es esencial la cooperación entre ellas. La asistencia técnica y la construcción de capacidad en los organismos claves a cargo de la recuperación también son elementos importantes para que las organizaciones locales puedan adquirir la capacidad necesaria para una recuperación a largo plazo.
Después del huracán Katrina en 2005, la gobernadora Kathleen Blanco nombró a los miembros de la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana, de manera que, desde el punto de vista técnico, se trataba de una extensión de la administración estatal. Pero, finalmente, la asamblea legislativa la formalizó. Como entidad bipartidaria por diseño, operaba en forma independiente en su interacción con funcionarios nacionales de los EE.UU. y gobier-nos locales, realizaba recomendaciones de política y supervisaba las actividades de recuperación de las agencias estatales. Si bien su poder se limitaba a realizar recomendaciones de políticas, pudo ejercer una influencia considerable a múltiples niveles en una atmósfera políticamente muy contenciosa. También colaboró con las agencias nacionales para establecer normas de planificación para la recuperación a largo plazo de la comunidad, y ayudó a distribuir asistencia técnica y brindar otros recursos de planificación a escala regional, local y de barrio.
Dado que su poder emanaba de los líderes estatales, la GSMDA en India y la autoridad de reconstrucción de Queensland Australia pudieron coordinar exitosamente las actividades de otras agencias estatales. De forma parecida, el MINVU de Chile y las agencias de recuperación nacional de Taiwán contaban con una autoridad centralizada para poder coordinar las actividades de otras agencias nacionales. Abhiyan, una ONG avalada oficialmente por el gobierno de Gujarat en India, pero sin una autoridad gubernamental definida, también desempeñó un papel crucial en la coordinación del trabajo de cientos de ONG y el establecimiento de una red de subcentros locales para proporcionar información y respaldo técnico.
El proceso de recuperación jerárquico después del terremoto de 2008 en Wenchuan, China, pudo reconstruir edificios rápidamente, pero dejó poco espacio para la innovación local, ya que carecía de una auténtica construcción de capacidad local ni participación en la toma de decisiones. Debido a que no siempre se tuvieron en cuenta las condiciones locales, la recuperación económica parece haber sido dispareja.
De igual manera, en muchas comunidades afectadas por el maremoto en la región de Tohoku de Japón, la recuperación se ha frenado porque el sistema jerárquico establecido bajo el gobierno nacional y la Agencia de Recuperación Nacional no deja espacio suficiente para la innovación local. Más aún, dentro del complejo y poderoso sistema ministerial japonés, la Agencia de Reconstrucción Nacional no tiene poder suficiente para forzar a otros ministerios a tomar determinadas medidas.
Cada vez más, las investigaciones demuestran que si los residentes participan en la planificación de reconstrucción, toleran más las demoras y están más satisfechos con los resultados. Sin embargo, aun el mejor ejemplo de proceso descentralizado necesita de una agencia que la encabece para establecer el marco de referencia y las reglas. Esta tendencia sugiere que los gobiernos deberían resistir el impulso de gestionar los detalles de la reconstrucción, y actuar menos como administradores y más como coordinadores y facilitadores del proceso.
4. El equilibrio en las limitaciones de tiempo: gestión efectiva de las necesidades locales inmediatas y urgentes de la recuperación, sin dejar de aprovechar satisfactoriamente las oportunidades de mejora a largo plazo.
Los gobiernos deben equilibrar las tensiones entre velocidad y reflexión, y entre restauración y mejora a largo plazo. La manera fundamental para resolver estos desafíos es aumentar el flujo de información, tal como se describió anteriormente. Pero las agencias encargadas del proceso de recuperación han encontrado varias otras maneras específicas de ser veloces y al mismo tiempo generar mejoras.
Para acelerar la reconstrucción, frecuentemente hay oportunidades para agilizar los procesos burocráticos normales de toma de decisiones, sobre todo con respecto a permisos de edificación, sin comprometer la calidad. Como estos procesos frecuentemente involucran a múltiples agencias, una agencia de recuperación puede ser útil para facilitar u obligar a las agencias implicadas a cooperar de manera más efectiva.
El parlamento de Nueva Zelanda otorgó a la Autoridad de Recuperación del Terremoto de Canterbury (CERA) y a su ministro, una amplia gama de poderes unilaterales que permitiera una recuperación oportuna y coordinada del área de Christchurch. El Parlamento extendió los poderes de emergencia otorgados bajo la legislación anterior y postergó la fecha de vencimiento de dichos poderes a cuando se considerara adecuado, permitiendo que el ministro adquisiera suelo de forma obligatoria, y consintiendo la suspensión de todos los planes o políticas de uso del suelo nacionales, de los gobiernos locales, y de administración de transporte adoptadas bajo diferentes leyes. Ordenó a CERA que preparara un borrador de estrategia de recuperación en un plazo de nueve meses después de haberle conferido dichos poderes. Similarmente, le fijó un plazo de vencimiento de nueve meses al concejo municipal de Christchurch para crear un borrador de plan de recuperación para el distrito comercial del centro de la ciudad, que se había dañado.
La mayoría de las agencias de recuperación adopta medidas de reducción del riesgo de catástrofes en sus normas de recuperación. Un lema de recuperación común es “reconstruir mejor que antes”. El lema de la Autoridad de Recuperación de Luisiana fue: “Más seguro, más fuerte, más inteligente”. La forma más fácil de mejora después de una catástrofe es la adopción de normas de edificación resistentes a desastres. La incorporación de nuevas normas estructurales no tiene por qué retrasar el proceso de reconstrucción, pero las mejoras en el uso del suelo, como la reubicación de barrios o de comunidades enteras, puede requerir un tiempo considerable para la planificación y adquisición del suelo. Estos proyectos exigen un compromiso difícil entre rapidez, calidad de diseño y participación pública. Nueva Zelanda ha iniciado un importante proceso de compra de barrios que sufrieron graves daños en los terremotos de 2010–2011, y que siguen siendo vulnerables a futuros temblores. Japón está alentando la reubicación de comunidades costeras de zonas sensibles a maremotos, y algunos de estos proyectos tardarán hasta diez años en completarse.
Una manera de gestionar estos objetivos de forma simultánea es respaldar procesos de planificación participativa para crear mejoras a largo plazo mientras se trata al mismo tiempo de satisfacer necesidades inmediatas. En muchos casos, los planificadores profesionales trabajaron con los barrios –como en Japón, Chile, Nueva Orleans y Bhuj, India–, pero cada proyecto también exigió compromisos difíciles para poder cumplir con los plazos. La creación de comités locales para planificar la recuperación en Victoria y Queensland, no obstante, es un buen ejemplo de sistemas estatales y nacionales de respaldo que ayudaron a construir capacidad local para llevar adelante los procesos de reconstrucción a lo largo del tiempo.
Próximos pasos en nuestra investigación
Los gobiernos saben que tienen el deber de gestionar la información y el flujo de dinero entre los múltiples actores en un período de tiempo comprimido. Hasta aquí hemos identificado muchos ejemplos de cómo lograrlo. Pero, mejor aún, quisiéramos estar en condiciones de crear menús de opciones organizativas y de proceso, según lo dicte la combinación de magnitud del desastre y el alcance y los contextos económico, político, medioambiental y gubernamental.
También quedan varias preguntas: ¿Por qué siguen apareciendo los mismos problemas institucionales de una catástrofe a otra? ¿Hay alguna manera de evitar repetir algunos de ellos? ¿Cuáles son los resultados –tanto negativos como positivos– de estas disposiciones institucionales de las que pueden informar a futuros líderes que se enfrentan con desafíos de reconstrucción similares? ¿En qué tipo específico de asistencia técnica y construcción de capacidad de los gobiernos locales y organizaciones no gubernamentales se deberían concentrar los donantes internacionales y los gobiernos nacionales para que puedan mejorar su tarea durante el proceso de recuperación? En catástrofes de gran escala, ¿cómo se escalonan los objetivos entrelazados de una recuperación (reconstrucción de hogares, barrios, ciudades, regiones, naciones) en términos de consistencia, eficiencia y eficacia? Y, ¿qué pasa cuando estas organizaciones creadas para gestionar la recuperación dejan de existir? ¿Queda suficiente capacidad en el lugar para sustentar a la comunidad a largo plazo? Al estudiar las diversas experiencias nacionales y organizativas, podemos comprender mejor cómo el fenómeno de compresión del tiempo en la recuperación después de catástrofes afecta otras teorías de políticas públicas y la gestión municipal; la planificación, el desarrollo y la gestión del crecimiento del suelo; y la administración fiscal y de inversión de capital.
Sobre los autores
Los coautores de Clear As Mud: Planning for the Rebuilding of New Orleans [Claro como el fango: la planificación de reconstrucción en Nueva Orleans] (2010, APA Planners Press), Laurie A. Johnson y Robert B. Olshansky están colaborando actualmente en un libro e informe sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo sobre la gestión de recuperación después de catástrofes. Han estado investigando y practicando la planificación de recuperación después de catástrofes urbanas por todo el mundo durante las últimas dos décadas. Johnson es una planificadora urbana radicada en San Francisco, especializada en recuperación de desastres y gestión de riesgo de catástrofes. Olshansky es profesor de Planificación urbana y regional en la Universidad de Illinois en Urbana-Champaign. Contacto: laurie@lauriejohnsonconsulting.com o robo@illinois.edu.
Referencias
Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, y James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute.
Chandrasekhar, Divya y Robert B. Olshansky. 2007. Managing Development After Catastrophic Disaster: A Study of Organizations That Coordinated Post-Disaster Recovery in Aceh and Louisiana. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Olshansky, Robert B., Lewis D. Hopkins, y Laurie A. Johnson. 2012. Disaster and recovery: Processes compressed in time. Natural Hazards Review. 13(3): 173–178.
Olshansky, Robert B., Laurie A. Johnson, y Kenneth C. Topping. 2006. Rebuilding communities following disaster: Lessons from Kobe and Los Angeles. Built Environment. 32(4): 354–374.
Smith, G., y Dennis Wenger. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an existing agenda. In Handbook of disaster research (Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research). Ed. Havidan Rodriguez, 234–257. New York, NY: Springer.
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Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty, the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax—land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either as utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector.
Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value tax is a serious contender as a revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value tax compelling. This article examines the efficiency of the land value tax as well as land value tax as a substitute for other taxes;
Edwin Mills examines the issue of land value tax in the context of an urban economy, showing that the land value tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed.
Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation.
Author of this article, Dick Netzer, argues that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates.
Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse. State governments may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments?
Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries.
Edward Wolff suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income.
Decades before Henry George made a passionate case for the “single tax” in Progress and Poverty (published in 1879), the classical economists had recognized that, in theory, the land value tax was almost the perfect tax. Unlike other taxes, it causes no distortions in economic decision making and therefore does not lower the efficiency of a market economy in allocating resources. Also, it was obvious in the nineteenth century that a tax on the value of land would be highly progressive.
There was a strong moral basis for the land value tax, as well. Land value increased over time because of growth in population and improvements made by the community, either in the form of utility infrastructure or transportation investments by government and the private sector. Individual landowners did nothing to increase the value of their own land but rather realized “unearned increments” over time, unlike those who contributed labor and capital to production and thus earned their compensation.
In George’s day there was little question that the tax could provide adequate revenue, at least in the United States where the role of government was small-no more than a tenth as important relative to gross domestic product as it today. Virtually all government services were supplied by local governments, which relied entirely on property taxes. Today, many scholars and practitioners question whether land value taxation is a serious contender as an important revenue source. But, whatever its political potential may be, economists continue to find the theoretical case for land value taxation compelling.
In January, the Lincoln Institute sponsored a conference to address these issues: “Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?” In the opening paper, William Fischel focuses on the special nature of local government in this country, stressing its importance as an instrument of enhancing property values within communities. He argues that, in pursuing that role, local land use controls actually achieve substantial efficiency advantages by more closely matching consumer preferences to local government services and taxes. This is what economists refer to as the Tiebout-Hamilton model.
Fischel maintains that there is substantial justice in this outcome, which might be improved only marginally by land value taxation. That is, land use controls permit local governments to appropriate much of the value generated by community growth. Moreover, this system is widely used, which argues that it is more workable than land value taxation, although the latter is, in principle, more fair.
Efficiency of the Land Value Tax
Two papers treated the efficiency characteristics of the land value tax. Edwin Mills examines the issue in the context of an urban economy, showing that the tax is indeed efficient in its effects on land use, as claimed. But he believes that this is immaterial because the land value tax cannot yield more than trivial revenues, even at rates that are so high that the courts would find them to be an unconstitutional “taking” of property. Moreover, it is so difficult to value land properly that the efficiency advantages cannot be realized.
Thomas Nechyba explores the land value tax in the context of a general model of the entire economy. He develops what is known as a “computable general equilibrium model” that quantitatively describes the changes in the macro-economy that will occur with the substitution of the land value tax for income taxation. Given his assumptions, the model predicts that the reduction in taxation of capital will so increase the aggregate amount of capital that the demand for land on which to use the capital will generate substantial increases in land values. That in turn will permit the land value tax to generate considerable revenues at a rate that is not confiscatory. Most economists would consider the significant increases in total national output predicted by the model to be real gains in economic efficiency.
Land Value Taxation as a Substitute for Other Taxes
Another pair of papers examines the land value tax as a substitute for other taxes used by sub-national governments in rich countries. In my own paper I argue that, although the empirical evidence on land values is poor, some reasonable estimates suggest that, at least in the United States, the land value tax could replace the conventional local property tax at reasonable tax rates. But the main thrust of my argument is that those rich countries in which substantial government spending is done by local governments are the most plausible candidates for the use of the land value tax (see Table 1). Furthermore, its use is probably most feasible in those countries familiar with the idea of valuing real property for tax purposes. The combined administrative, compliance and evasion costs of most other taxes are so large that, even if the administrative costs of land value taxation are high, land value taxation is still promising.
Andrew Reschovsky points out that the current balmy climate for state and local finance in the United States is likely to change radically, for the worse, in the not too distant future. For a variety of reasons, state governments in particular may be looking for substantial additional revenues. Is the land value tax the right, or the likely, choice for hard-pressed state governments? He concludes, first, that the economic gains from the adoption of a new land value tax would be modest, compared to increasing the rates of existing state taxes. Second, a land value tax should help improve the equity of the state tax system. Third, he believes that it would add an element of cyclical stability to state revenue systems.
Nevertheless, Reschovsky remains skeptical about the tax on administrative grounds and is not convinced that it can generate enough revenues to replace any important existing state tax source. In the case of large central cities, however, he rates the land value tax somewhat higher as a replacement for existing tax sources, largely because of the probable lack of adverse locational effects. He views it as especially appropriate for those cities like Philadelphia that now receive relatively small percentages of tax revenue from the property tax.
Roy Bahl reviews the many difficulties and deficiencies in the use of property taxes by local governments in both developing countries and former Communist countries. There is widespread agreement that the property tax is the appropriate major local government tax, and in some countries this agreement extends to site value taxation as well. But, Bahl notes, the property tax usually provides negligible revenues, because of low nominal rates, low and inaccurate valuations, and poor collection experience. Almost everywhere, the basic requisites of good administration are lacking. Moreover, the political unpopularity of the tax generally is far greater than in the United States. Nonetheless, the property tax, especially the site value tax variant, is considered the best local revenue source in these countries.
Perhaps the most surprising research finding reported at the conference was the conclusion of Edward Wolff, who has written extensively on the distribution of income and wealth in the United States. He suggests that substitution of the land value tax for the federal individual income tax would make the U.S. tax system less rather than more progressive with respect to income (see Table 2). This result may be explained by the fact that the ratio of the value of land owned to household income rises steeply with the age of the householder. That is, mean household income declines sharply with age after age 54, while the mean value of land owned declines only slowly. On the other hand, a land value tax would be much more progressive with respect to wealth than is the income tax.
Broader Principles and Questions
Nicolaus Tideman, a convinced follower of Henry George, argues that the basic principles of and justifications for land value taxation apply to much more than the problems of land use in cities and suburbs-the usual focus for discussion of this form of taxation. He offers applications to environmental, congestion and population problems and to questions of efficient resource use and economic growth on a worldwide scale. He bases his views on the general principle that “all persons have equal rights to natural opportunities and should therefore pay for their above-average appropriations of natural opportunities.”
Throughout the conference, there was lively disagreement about whether the land value tax could really produce substantial revenues. Some, like Mills, held that it could not even replace the conventional American property tax on land and buildings, much less a substantial portion of other state and local taxes as well. Others, including Tideman, Nechyba and I, presented data that suggested the possibility that land value taxation indeed could be an important factor in the American fiscal system. Participants also discussed the problems of administering a land tax so that tax liabilities actually and accurately reflect the value of individual parcels of land as bare sites, which is essential if the tax is to be a truly efficient one.
The conferees did not produce an agreed answer to the basic conference question, Can and will land value taxation work today? But they made it clear that the question remains a relevant one that deserves serious and continuing attention.
Dick Netzer is professor of economics and public administration in the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service at New York University. He was the conference coordinator and is the editor of a book containing the eight conference papers and the remarks of the formal discussants, which will be published by the Lincoln Institute later this year.
Land Value Taxation in Contemporary Societies: Can It and Will It Work?
Authors of Conference Papers
Roy Bahl, Professor of Economics and Dean, School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
William A. Fischel, Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College
Edwin Mills, Professor of Real Estate and Finance, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University
Thomas Nechyba, Professor of Economics, Stanford University
Dick Netzer, Professor of Economics and Public Administration Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University
Andrew Reschovsky, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Nicolaus Tideman, Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic University
Edward Wolff, Professor of Economics, New York University
Discussants
Alexander Anas, Professor of Economics, State University of New York at Buffalo
Daniel Bromley, Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison Karl Case, Professor of Economics, Wellesley College
Riel Franzsen, Professor of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa
Yolanda Kodrzycki, Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Daphne Kenyon, Professor of Economics, Simmons College
Therese McGuire, Professor of Economics, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois-Chicago
Amy Ellen Schwartz, Professor of Economics, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New York University
Robert Schwab, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland
Robert Solow, Professor of Economics, Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
