La “contribución de valorización”, que en Estados Unidos se conoce como betterment levy o special assessment y en otros países, especialmente de América Latina, se denomina “contribución por mejoras”, es una “carga impositiva generada por un gobierno a los propietarios de un grupo de inmuebles seleccionados para sufragar, totalmente o en parte, el costo de una obra o servicios públicos que generan mejoras específicas o servicios que se presumen de beneficio general para el público y de beneficio específico para los dueños de tales propiedades” (IAAO 1997, 10–11). En Colombia la contribución de valorización (CV) se ha aplicado desde 1921.

Si bien la contribución de valorización se aborda conceptualmente en la mayoría de las legislaciones latinoamericanas, su implementación muchas veces encuentra resistencia. Los principales argumentos en su contra son que es un instrumento poco práctico y técnicamente complicada, que falta capacidad para implementarlo, y que es impopular. Sin embargo, la experiencia de Colombia pareciera contradecir estos argumentos, al sugerir que la resistencia tiene sus raíces en de prejuicios, ideologías, o falta de información. Este instrumento no sólo tiene una larga historia de aplicación continua (aunque irregular), pero también una historia demostrada de recaudar ingresos significativos para financiar obras públicas.

Bogotá recoge actualmente cerca de mil millones de dólares para invertir en obras públicas utilizando este gravamen, y otras ocho ciudades importantes están cobrando, en conjunto, otros mil millones de dólares. Es de destacar analizando cobros recientes en la contribución sobre 1.500.000 predios en Bogotá, que su cobro ha sido generalmente aceptado por los contribuyentes, con tasas de no pago relativamente bajas (baja cartera morosa) – de hecho, más bajas que para el impuesto a la propiedad inmobiliaria. Si bien su legitimidad no está puesta en duda, incluso entre la comunidad empresarial, ha habido controversia sobre la aplicación metodológica de la carga y hay discusión en otras ciudades colombianas sobre el modelo a utilizar. Esto trae una pregunta interesante: ¿por qué, a pesar de sus imperfecciones técnicas, es la contribución de valorización tan aceptada por la sociedad?

A pesar de su relevancia, es muy poca la bibliografía existente en Colombia y en América Latina sobre este instrumento (Fernandes 1981; Bustamante 1996; Manon and Macon 1977). Mis colegas y yo hicimos un estudio de los métodos utilizados para aplicar la contribución de valorización en Bogotá y Manizales que representan dos modelos de cobro en Colombia (Borrero et al. 2011). Este artículo resume las principales conclusiones de ese estudio, las cuales esperamos puedan servir de guía a otras ciudades de la región latinoamericana interesadas en la aplicación de este instrumento en sus territorios.

En Colombia la contribución de valorización ha jugado un papel importante en el financiamiento de obras públicas y ha tenido una considerable participación en los ingresos de las ciudades. A finales de los años 1960 alcanzó a representar el 16% del total de los ingresos de Bogotá y el 45% de los ingresos del municipio de Medellín. A principios de la década de 1980 permitió recaudar el 30% de los ingresos de Cali y en 1993 el recaudo alcanzó el 24% de los ingresos de Bogotá. Durante la década del 2000 este instrumento ha sido muy utilizado en Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Manizales, Bucaramanga, Barranquilla y en general en casi todas las ciudades con más de 300.000 habitantes en Colombia.

Se escogieron Bogotá y Manizales como ciudades típicas para estudiar porque durante los últimos 20 años han mantenido vigente este instrumento para financiar sus vías y desarrollo urbano. Aplicaron metodologías diferentes y tienen vasta experiencia para asesorar a otras ciudades. Cali y Barranquilla están haciendo un cobro para obras viales utilizando la metodología y asesoría del “modelo de Bogotá”, mientras que Bucaramanga y Pereira han utilizado la experiencia y método de Manizales (también conocido como el “modelo de Medellín”, otra de las ciudades pioneras en la aplicación de este instrumento). Ambos enfoques son legales en Colombia, pero la metodología y enfoque utilizados para distribuir el instrumento son muy diferentes.

La ley colombiana estipula tres parámetros para calcular la CV: (i) el costo de la obra de construcción, (ii) la valorización o plusvalía generada y (iii) la capacidad de pago del contribuyente. El Decreto Ley 1604 de 1966 exige que si el mayor valor generado por la obra no alcanza al costo, solo se puede cobrar hasta el costo de la obra. Asimismo debe tenerse en cuenta para fijar el monto distribuible la capacidad de pago del contribuyente, límite que deberá observarse aunque la valorización o el costo de la obra sean mayores. Por ejemplo, en Manizales uno de los proyectos recientes tuvo plusvalías pequeñas que representaban un valor considerablemente menor que el costo del proyecto. Sin embargo, se aplicó la contribución sobre la base de la plusvalía. La única ciudad que no cumple con esta norma es Bogotá, donde la contribución equivale al costo del proyecto.

El “modelo Bogotá” aplica para el beneficio local el método de factores para repartir el costo de la obra, teniendo en cuenta la capacidad de pago del contribuyente y diferentes grados de beneficio. Estos factores incluyen consideraciones tales como mejoramiento de condiciones de movilidad y otros aspectos de bienestar, pero sin cuantificar el beneficio por la plusvalía de los inmuebles generada por la obra.

Por su parte el “modelo Medellín” (aplicado en Manizales y otras ciudades) para la CV por beneficio local calcula primero el beneficio estimado en términos de la plusvalía que se generará después, mediante el método del “doble avalúo simple” y reparte luego el cobro, siempre teniendo en cuenta la capacidad de pago. El “modelo Bogotá” se parece más a un impuesto generalizado para cubrir el costo de las obras. El “modelo Medellín” se acerca más a la Participación en la Plusvalía por obras públicas (DL 388 de 1977, Artículo 87; Doebele 1998).

La experiencia de Bogotá

Bogotá, capital de Colombia, es una ciudad de 7,5 millones de habitantes y un área urbana que cubre 500 kilómetros cuadrados (50.000 hectáreas). Se ubica en el centro geográfico del país sobre la cordillera de los Andes en la Sabana de Bogotá, una planicie a 2.600 metros de altura que tiene cerca de 300.000 hectáreas de gran fertilidad agropecuaria. La administración de la CV en Bogotá lo realiza el Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano (IDU) quien también tiene a su cargo la identificación y construcción de las obras viales principales que se construirán con este instrumento. La CV se cobra a todos los inmuebles afectados por un proyecto determinado, y se calcula el cobro mediante el Método de Factores, consistente en la multiplicación de diferentes factores de beneficio. La tabla 1 (en anexo) muestra ejemplos de proyectos recientes realizados con fondos recaudados por la CV.

Área de influencia

Para poder efectuar el cobro de valorización por beneficio local, el IDU debe identificar el área de influencia, es decir, hasta donde podría generar beneficio en la movilidad y por lo tanto en la valorización de los inmuebles. El criterio para establecer las zonas de influencia y los grados de beneficio es que los predios que se incluyen son aquellos que por su cercanía y accesibilidad al proyecto registran una mayor frecuencia de uso y que así mismo pueden beneficiarse directamente por la construcción de la infraestructura según el impacto en los avalúos y condiciones económicas de los inmuebles.

Igualmente, con el objetivo de disminuir la contribución promedio de valorización, se trata de abarcar el mayor número posible de predios beneficiados dentro de los límites antes descritos, considerando las condiciones socioeconómicas de los predios. Los límites para cada zona de influencia resultaron de la superposición geográfica de las zonas de influencia individuales de cada obra, pero modificados y corregidos al considerar efectos de complementariedad de las zonas beneficiadas por el conjunto de obras como un todo (Borrero et al., 2011, 22).

Medición del beneficio en Bogotá

Los beneficios que resultan del proyecto o conjunto de proyectos se calculan por zona, tomando en cuenta los factores de beneficio de cada proyecto. Utilizando el ejemplo de un proyecto vial reciente, los factores de beneficio son: (1) mayor movilidad, la cual se traduce en mayor velocidad de tránsito, disminución de tiempos de desplazamiento, costos operativos más bajos, y mejor calidad de vida; (2) beneficios urbanísticos generales en la medida en que el proyecto beneficia la red vial y racionaliza el uso del espacio público; (3) cambios generados en el uso de suelo y estimulación de actividades productivas y comerciales; (4) aumento del valor del mercado de propiedades inmobiliarias vecinas; (5) integración del proyecto en la estructura urbana de la ciudad; (6) optimización de circulación y movilidad; y (7) recuperación de áreas deterioradas o desvalorizadas (Borrero et al. 2011, 84).

Una vez definidos los beneficios del proyecto y estimado su costo, la distribución de la carga toma en cuenta factores adicionales: el tipo de uso del suelo, densidad, grado de beneficio asignado a cada lote, y la capacidad de pago de los propietarios, medida en base a encuestas de hogares y de calidad de vida. Esta es la principal crítica que se hace al “modelo Bogotá”. El beneficio no mide la valorización o plusvalía generada en los inmuebles sino otros indicadores de movilidad, calidad de vida, condiciones sociales, etc.

La experiencia de Manizales

Manizales es una ciudad de 400.000 habitantes situada en el centro del país a 300 Km al occidente de Bogotá, en medio de la zona cafetera. Su topografía es montañosa, lo que implica elevados costos en obras de ingeniería. Tiene gran experiencia en el desarrollo vial y procesos de renovación urbana utilizando el mecanismo de la CV, pero utiliza una metodología diferente a la de Bogotá y requiere una descripción más detallada. La institución que administra y ejecuta la CV, con autoridad plena delegada por la legislación municipal, es el Instituto de Valorización de Manizales (INVAMA).

En los últimos tres años se hicieron cuatro proyectos viales utilizando el cobro de CV: la renovación de la Plaza Alfonso López ; la pavimentación de la calle Alférez Real; la renovación del Paseo de los Estudiantes; y desarrollo de la malla vial del Área Oriental de la ciudad. Estos cuatro proyectos se financiaron con un cobro único de la CV que cubrió el 80% de la ciudad y recaudó US$ 24,6 millones (ver tabla 2 en anexo).

Medición del beneficio en Manizales

En Manizales se aplica la misma metodología que utilizó Medellín durante muchos años y se utiliza con éxito en Bucaramanga y otras ciudades. Se denomina el “método del doble avalúo”. Consiste en recaudar información de avalúos comerciales o catastrales por zonas geoeconómicas comparables a las de la zona analizada; es decir, se selecciona una zona con características similares a las que se estima generará la obra futura, y se traslada el comportamiento de los valores de la tierra a los sectores donde se ejecutará la obra. El supuesto es que los valores del suelo se comportarán de manera parecida en ambas zonas. También se realizan avalúos comerciales, por peritos expertos para obtener precios de mercado (muestra de avalúos iniciales), así como una proyección del valor con el proyecto, mediante avalúos a precios del mercado en las zonas geoeconómicas tomadas como referencia (avalúo final).

El método requiere tener información del efecto valorización o beneficio generado por obras viales anteriores. A esto denominamos “análisis ex post”. La ciudad de Manizales ha realizado un análisis ex post de las obras ejecutadas en los últimos años para examinar la valorización generada. Desafortunadamente los institutos o ciudades que cobran Valorización, incluyendo a Bogotá y Medellín, no le hacen seguimiento económico al efecto resultante de las obras desarrolladas.

El primer avalúo, que tiene como fin producir el plano de iso precios antes de la obra, es el resultado del análisis de los valores reales actuales y las variaciones históricas que tiene el sector en su estado actual. El segundo avalúo determina la plusvalía que hipotéticamente generará la construcción de esa obra nueva en la zona. El predio de “máxima valorización” es el que debe analizarse en detalle para calificar realmente el porcentaje de su incremento de valor.

Pasos críticos en el método del doble avalúo

1. Definir el área de influencia. Esta definición se hace con base en la mejora de movilidad que causará la obra vial o de infraestructura. Es similar al modelo aplicado en Bogotá.

2. Calcular el beneficio y elaborar un mapa de ISO precios basado en una muestra de predios. Inicialmente la zona se define lo más amplia posible con criterios de comunicación vial y distancias. Dentro de esta amplia zona, se seleccionan unos predios muestrales, que representen las características predominantes de los predios de la zona, teniendo en cuenta características generales, no particulares de los mismos. Con esta base se construye un plano de iso precios de valores del suelo antes de la obra. Estos avalúos muestrales, por lo general, en los estudios de ciudades intermedias se toman entre cien (100) y doscientos (200) según los tamaños de las zonas de irrigación y la heterogeneidad de las zonas de influencia o irrigación. Todo este estudio inicial debe producir un plano de iso precios antes de la obra que refleje los valores de los lotes tipo. Luego se elabora un segundo mapa de iso precios con los nuevos valores esperados. Un tercer mapa relaciona las diferencias de valor o de iso valorización entre el primero y segundo mapa de iso precios, y también se utiliza para distribuir el beneficio o mayor valorización.

3. Proyección de valorización. Para determinar el efecto valorización o beneficio predial se hace un ejercicio con la participación interdisciplinaria de profesionales experimentados que aportan los siguientes criterios: un estudio económico, que defina unas formulas matemáticas de calificación de los factores a considerar en los criterios de plusvalía; un estudio vial, para calificar y cuantificar en cifras el beneficio en cuanto a reducción de distancias de los barrios beneficiados por la obra; un estudio urbanístico, que mida las posibilidades de cambio de uso del predio; y un estudio inmobiliario, para cuantificar comparativamente qué actores pesan más para darles mayor o menor puntuación proporcional.

4. Calcular la distribución del beneficio según calificación de factores. Se le asigna un peso a cada uno de los siguientes factores: posible cambio de uso, es el que genera más plusvalía, aunque está orientado a un menor número de predios (40%); mejoramiento del sector, al quedar comunicado con zonas de más alto nivel o zonas comerciales (20%); tiempo de ahorro en transporte, medido por la reducción de tiempo de viaje en la ciudad, con distancias claramente medibles (20%); y reducción de contaminación o congestión vial en zonas conflictivas donde ocurre este problema (20%).

5. Establecer el nivel de beneficio (punto focal). El “punto príncipe” o punto focal de máxima valorización de toda la zona de influencia será el lote o la zona puntual que más alta valorización obtendrá porque confluyen allí los más importantes factores de plusvalía. Se calcula la plusvalía esperada sobre este punto – que debe tener la calificación más alta – en porcentajes que se multiplicarán por el valor comercial inicial de cada zona. Con estos valores se construirá el plano de plusvalía o de iso precios que se estima alcanzará la zona luego de ejecutadas las obras. Los estudios ex post en varias ciudades encontraron que las obras viales generaron una valorización promedio real del 10% al 15% sobre los inmuebles (en los siguientes 3 años después de la obra). De esta manera, asumiendo que el mejor lote o inmueble del sector podría tener una valorización del 15%, si un inmueble quedó calificado con 70 puntos (según la calificación de factores) se le aplicará una valorización esperada del 10.5%.

6. Distribuir el beneficio. Una vez que el costo del proyecto ha sido determinado y su impacto de plusvalía ha sido calculado, INVAMA con el reparto o liquidación de la CV (cuantificación del tributo que se impone a cada bien inmueble) lo aplica dentro del área utilizando modelos apropiados para el proyecto. Manizales, así como la mayoría de ciudades de Colombia, utiliza el método de factores de beneficio, que se basa en la determinación de un área virtual producto de la multiplicación de los factores de ponderación de las características de los predios y el grado de beneficio por el área física del suelo. Los criterios para la construcción de los factores que se seleccionan para hacer la distribución varían entre ciudades, pero el punto de referencia es el valor del inmueble total, contemplando el área de terreno más construcción (Borrero et al. 2011, anexo 2).

7. Determinar la capacidad de pago. Los usos y estratos sociales tienen una liquidación diferente del gravamen, ya que se relacionan con la mayor capacidad de pago del contribuyente. Para la determinación de esta capacidad de pago de la CV, varias ciudades hacen encuestas de hogares y estudios sociales, de calidad de vida y de ingresos y gastos de la población. También suelen aplicarse parámetros comparativos de la CV con otros tributos, tasas y contribuciones, como la relación con el pago de servicios públicos de cada hogar, o la proporción de la CV con respecto al pago anual por impuesto predial.

8. Definir el plazo del cobro. En Manizales, Medellín y Bucaramanga el cobro es generalmente simultáneo con la ejecución del proyecto. Otras ciudades han experimentado con otros enfoques. En Cali, el cobro del último plan de valorización se efectuó antes del inicio de la construcción de las obras, pero su recaudo se extenderá por mucho más tiempo luego de que éstas finalicen. Las ciudades suelen hacer un solo cobro en cada administración o período edilicio (4 años), pero en los proyectos recientes de Bogotá y Cali, por ejemplo, los planes previstos alcanzan un plazo de ejecución y derrame de la Contribución que se extiende por varios períodos administrativos.

Aunque el plazo máximo según la ley cubre hasta los cinco años siguientes a la ejecución de las obras, las experiencias más exitosas en recaudo demuestran que no debe ser superior a dos años. Cuando los plazos son más amplios, es difícil el recaudo y se generan problemas de caja en el municipio para la construcción de las obras. La CV también se puede cobrar hasta dos años antes de iniciar las obras, lo cual exige mucha capacidad de ejecución de las mismas, en especial cuando se aprueban grandes paquetes de obra. La experiencia reciente de Bogotá que autorizó el cobro de la contribución con dos años de anticipación ha generado polémica entre la población porque la construcción de las obras se inició a un ritmo muy lento. Para evitar este problema, en el nuevo Estatuto de Valorización propuesto para Bogotá, se harán los cobros simultáneos a la ejecución de las obras.

Legitimidad percibida

La CV tiene muy buen apoyo de los ciudadanos y propietarios como lo demuestra el alto nivel de satisfacción medido con las encuestas de Manizales y las entrevistas a los actores (tabla 3 en anexo). El cobro se efectúa antes del comienzo de las obras y el pago se efectúa hasta en un 80% durante el primer año del cobro. Esta encuesta, aplicada después de concluidas dos obras en Manizales, resume la percepción ciudadana sobre la gestión del INVAMA de dichas obras. Específicamente, los resultados demuestran un vínculo claro entre el beneficio y la disposición a pagar la contribución – un nivel de cumplimiento más alto que el del impuesto predial, aunque la contribución es más onerosa que el impuesto. Este resultado contradice la percepción común de que los contribuyentes latinoamericanos tienen una cultura de no-pago. También comprueba el alto nivel de legitimidad de la CV entre los ciudadanos y la buena gestión municipal de esta carga.

Conclusiones

La experiencia de Colombia con la contribución de valorización en los últimos 70 años demuestra que es un instrumento viable para financiar el desarrollo urbano, capaz de recaudar ingresos significativos, aunque la metodología para calcular y distribuir los ingresos es compleja y puede ser mejorada. Entre las lecciones que se aprenden de esa experiencia, la más importante es el vínculo claro entre la provisión de beneficios públicos y la voluntad de los propietarios a pagar la contribución. El éxito depende de la legitimidad del proyecto y de la capacidad institucional y estándares éticos de la agencia que administra la contribución. A fin de generar confianza entre los ciudadanos, el éxito también se vincula con garantizar la capacidad de pago del tributo, la aplicación de un modelo equitativo de distribución, la publicidad del beneficio económico del proyecto, y la participación de los ciudadanos durante la fase de implementación.

China has experienced rapid economic growth since 1978, when it adopted a policy of opening up to the world and instituting economic reform. It has become the second largest economy measured by the country’s GDP, and its tax revenue has experienced an average annual growth of about 20 percent since the fiscal reform of 1994.

However, many subnational governments in China have experienced fiscal stress and incurred large local debt in recent years because of numerous unfunded central mandates and the large fiscal gap between expenditure responsibilities and revenue capacity. For example, in 2008 subnational government in China accounted for 79 percent of total government expenditure, but only 47 percent of total government revenues (Man 2011).

Unlike many developed countries, China’s local governments (provincial, prefecture, county, and township) have not been granted any legal authority for taxing or borrowing, and the property tax plays a very limited role in the local public finance structure. As a result, many local governments turn to extra-budgetary revenue sources, fees for leasing land use rights, other fees and surcharges, and indirect borrowing from banks to finance infrastructure investment and local economic development.

During the period from 1991 to 2008, the land leasing fees (also known as land transfer fees) increased from 5.7 percent of total local budgetary revenue to 43.5 percent. The overreliance on land leasing fees has been criticized as an important factor in pushing up housing prices and in the growth of corruption cases and land disputes in China.

Problems with the Current Tax System

The current land and property tax system in China generates a limited amount of tax revenue, even though five types of taxes are levied on land-related property at various stages of production (table 1). Local governments collect the Farmland Occupation Tax and Land Value Added Tax (LVAT) at the stage of land acquisition and transaction. At the possession stage, the Urban Land Use Tax and Real Estate Tax are collected, while the Deed Tax is levied when the ownership of the property is transferred.

This tax system has many problems and warrants structural reform. First, various taxes on land and property account for only 15.7 percent of local tax revenues. It is an unstable and inadequate revenue source for the Chinese local governments. Local government officials have relied upon other revenues sources, including leasing state-owned land for a large lump-sum fee from developers, to finance infrastructure development and capital projects. In 2010, Chinese local governments collected 2.7 trillion RMB from land leasing fees in addition to 8.3 trillion RMB in taxes and other budgetary revenues. The ratio of leasing fees to tax revenue was 32.5 percent, compared to 4.5 percent in 1999.

Second, China’s current property tax structure focuses more tax burden at the transaction stage than the possession stage. For example, revenues collected from the annual urban land use tax and the real estate tax at the possession stage accounted for only 6.44 percent of local tax revenues in 2008, while about 9.25 percent of local tax revenue was raised at the land development and property transaction stages.

Third, owner-occupied residential property was not included in the tax base for the current real estate tax, thus significantly restricting the government’s ability to capture value from the booming housing market that was fueled by the privatization of public housing, income growth, and massive urban infrastructure investment. By 2010, homeownership rates reached 84.3 percent of the formal urban housing stock, and housing values have experienced substantial increases in the past five years in many big cities (Man, Zheng, and Ren 2011). But the exclusion of the residential properties from real estate tax has resulted in wealth disparity and excessive demand for housing for investment and speculative purpose, raising vacancy rates in many coastal cities.

Finally, unlike the property tax system in many developed countries, the real estate tax in China is not levied on the assessed value of the property. Instead, it is based on the original price minus 10 to 30 percent of depreciation at a rate of 1.2 percent or levied at 15 percent of the actual rental income for leasing property. Government officials have little experience in the mass appraisal of the market value of existing property, a fundamental skill for establishing a modern property tax system.

Recent Developments in Property Tax Reform

The Chinese central government has been exploring the possibility of reforming its current land and property tax system since 2003, when it first officially proposed to establish a modern property taxation system. Six cities were selected to con-duct pilot projects in 2006, and that number was expanded to 10 cities a year later.

In 2010 the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is in charge of this pilot project, ordered that every province must choose at least one city to experiment with property value assessment in order to verify the housing sales price self-reported by home purchasers for the deed tax. These experiments have played an important role in the technical and information-based preparation of mass appraisal for future property value assessment. On January 28, 2011, the cities of Shanghai and Chongqing were permitted to collect property taxes on newly purchased second homes or luxury residential property, respectively.

Major Achievements

China’s property tax reform aims to establish a system to tax the existing property (including both land and housing structures) based upon its assessed value on an annual basis to make the tax a significant revenue source for local governments. This system will utilize various assessment methods such as market comparison, cost, and income approaches and will be applied to business and industrial property as well as residential property, including owner-occupied housing.

Different versions of computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) have been studied and subsequently implemented by some pilot cities, such as Hangzhou, Dandong, and Chongqing. The SAT has been training officials from local tax bureaus in every province about CAMA system development and its applications. It has also tried to establish technology standards for each assessment approach.

In 2005, the SAT compiled a Real Property Assessment Valuation Regulation Trial that specified 12 chapters and 40 provisions covering data collection, standards, and the CAMA system. All the pilot cities have finished the simulation assessment and have calculated the tax burden and tax revenue according to different tax rate scenarios. In 2011 at least one city in each province had been selected to conduct property value assessment of newly purchased property for the collection of the deed tax.

The most important development occurred in early 2011, when Shanghai started to collect taxes on newly purchased second homes of residents and first homes of nonresidents based on transaction value, after the exclusion from the tax base of 60 square meters per person. The city of Chongqing is targeting the existing single-family residence and newly purchased luxury apartments of residents or newly purchased second homes of nonresidents. The program excludes 180 square meters for the single-family residences and 100 square meters for apartments in Chongqing.

About 8,000 parcels are reported to be levied a property tax in these two cities combined, although after this one-year experiment only a small amount of tax revenues has been collected, which was intended to finance low-income housing. Although the tax base, tax rate, and the collections are all very small in the two cities, these efforts represent a big step forward for property tax reform in China.

Future Challenges

China’s property tax reform still faces enormous challenges, although it is now much better understood by Chinese citizens and the media. First, it encounters resistance from various influential interest groups. The biggest opponents of a property tax are local government officials, in addition to real estate investors and speculators. Many local governments believe that the adoption of such a tax will lower housing values and consequently lower the demand for land, thereby substantially reducing the land leasing fees obtained from the leasehold of state-owned land. Furthermore, local government officials in China are evaluated on their role in spurring local GDP growth, and infrastructure investment projects are often used as a stimulus to boost local economic development. Officials want unlimited access to land leasing fees because they can be raised and spent with little scrutiny, and they can generate a large amount of revenue for use during an official’s tenure.

A second challenge is the slow progress on legal and assessment preparations for a property tax system. Property tax laws and regulations need to be established, including assessment laws and standards for assessors. Up to 100,000 assessors will have to be trained and certified to these standards. Third, consensus is still lacking with respect to the specifications of the tax base, exclusions, and exemptions; the assignment of responsibilities for administration, rate setting, and assessment; and the allocation of tax revenues. Fourth, general unfamiliarity with the property tax leads to continued misunderstanding and misperceptions about the tax.

At the same time, more urban dwellers realize that an annually collected tax on the assessed value of real property, both business and residential, can serve as an efficient and sustainable revenue source for local governments and help to reduce their reliance on land transfer fees and charges that contribute to higher house prices. Following the central government policy of house purchase restrictions and tighter monetary policy, fees from land leasing in 2011 have started to fall in many cities.

According to a recent report by the China Index Institute (2012), land transfer fees in 130 cities have decreased by 11 percent compared to 2010. In Shanghai and Beijing, they decreased by 16 and 35.7 percent, respectively. This rapid decrease may also offer opportunities for local governments to look for more sustainable ways to seek a balance between promoting economic growth and providing public goods and services. In the long run, establishing a property tax system to substitute gradually for the land transfer fees can offer an efficient, equitable, and sustainable way to finance local development and government spending.

The property tax has been perceived as an effective way to lower housing prices, dampen property speculation, and reduce vacancy rates. Many researchers believe that local governments tried to limit land supply to bid up land prices and maximize revenue, resulting in the rapid increase in housing prices and lack of affordable housing in urban China. Levying taxes on residential property can increase the opportunity cost of holding property vacant or idle and reduce incentives for speculative behavior. The tax is also viewed as an effective way to narrow the gap in income and wealth among urban residents and discourage speculative investment in the housing sector.

Conclusions

The property tax reform in China is making progress in research and in experiments with applications, and it has begun to accumulate momentum toward better understanding and acceptability among citizens and local governments. But the successful establishment of a property tax as a major revenue source in a modern local public finance system requires not only assessment techniques and tax design but also political determination and administrative reform. This reform could lead to a fundamental change in intergovernmental relations and the role of government in China’s political and economic structure.

The Lincoln Institute began to support research on property taxation in partnership with the Chinese government in 2004, in conjunction with the Development and Research Center of the State Council (DRC), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and State Administration of Taxation (SAT). In 2007 the Peking University–Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy (PLC) was established in Beijing, in part to help organize international conferences and training programs for government property tax officials in the pilot cities. The center continues to support international and domestic experts in conducting research and demonstration projects on property taxation and related issues.

About the Author

Joyce Yanyun Man is senior fellow and director of the China Program at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and serves as director and professor at the Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy at Peking University in Beijing.

References

China Index Institute. 2012. http://www.chinanews.com/estate/ 2012/01-04/3580986.shtml

Man, Joyce Yanyun. 2011. Local public finance in China: An overview. In China’s local public finance in transition, eds. Joyce Yanyun Man and Yu-Hung Hong. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Man, Joyce Yanyun, Siqi Zheng, and Rongrong Ren. 2011. Housing policy and housing markets: Trends, patterns and affordability. In China’s housing reform and outcomes, ed. Joyce Yanyun Man. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

National Bureau of Statistics. 2009. China statistical yearbook. Beijing: China Statistics Press.

When a handful of judges and tax experts met around a table at the Lincoln Institute’s original Moley House headquarters in January 1980, they could hardly have foreseen that their one-day seminar would initiate the major educational program for the nation’s state tax judges. Over the past 30 years, the Lincoln Institute has sponsored the annual National Conference of State Tax Judges as a means of improving land-related tax policy as applied and interpreted by adjudication in tax courts and tax appeal tribunals.

Participants in the conference include members of administrative and judicial tax tribunals who hear appeals of tax assessments, denials of refund requests, or other property tax disputes on a jurisdiction-wide basis in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the cities of Chicago (Cook County) and New York.

Tax Tribunals and Effective Tax Policy

Taxation is a highly complex and emotionally charged reality in countries throughout the world. Patrick Doherty, the past president of the United Kingdom’s Institute of Revenues, Rating, and Valuation, has observed that to be acceptable, it is not sufficient or sometimes even necessary for a tax to meet an abstract standard of fairness. The essential element is that the levy “feel fair” to the taxpayer. An open, accessible, timely, and unbiased forum for appeals is crucial to this sense of fairness.

Tax tribunals play a vital role in affording aggrieved taxpayers a fair opportunity for consideration of their claims. Legislation and regulation enunciate policy at general and sometimes abstract levels. The actual application of the law to specific factual situations and disputes effectuates that policy. Tax tribunal interpretations can carry the force of law and precedent. Judicial education is an investment in sound tax policy that, by reaching a targeted and highly influential audience, can reap public benefits long into the future.

Although consideration of appeals is central to any tax system, the special nature of the property tax increases the importance of access to a fair and equitable tribunal. Unlike income taxes withheld from one’s salary or sales taxes collected as part of numerous transactions and never totaled for the taxpayer, property taxes generally require significant and highly visible periodic payments. Furthermore, the intricacies of the income tax leave most taxpayers without any intuitive sense of potential errors in its calculation. The property tax, on the other hand, is usually based on fair market value, a dollar figure that a homeowner may be able to estimate with some precision.

The property tax is primarily a local tax that engenders a greater sense of personal involvement than levies that support more distant levels of government. Not incidentally, the property tax is also the primary focus of much taxpayer discontent. It is easier to mobilize opposition to a visible local taxing body than to state or federal revenue departments. State legislators are also far more receptive to pressure to constrain local revenues than to efforts to reduce their own budgets.

At the same time, property tax disputes may involve large business enterprises owning complex structures whose valuation may raise highly theoretical or technical questions. Courts may need to determine the value of manufacturing plants that can constitute the major portion of a locality’s tax base, or of property that is part of a going concern whose sale price represents intangibles such as business good will.

The Special Challenges of Judicial Education

The importance of judicial education is matched by the challenge of presenting ongoing, impartial, and up to date instruction, especially with regard to specialized subject matter. Judges grappling with complex factual and legal issues often face a lonely task, and specialized tribunals such as tax courts can be particularly isolated. Some state tax courts have only one member.

Before the establishment of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, no national association or other formal means existed for judges in one state to confer with colleagues facing similar issues in another jurisdiction. Training in highly technical tax issues requires faculty with specialized expertise and a sophisticated understanding of sometimes arcane provisions.

At the same time, judges must be far more cautious than lawyers in private practice when they seek advice and instruction. They must avoid even the appearance of special access or private influence, particularly when dealing with specialists who may at some point serve as expert witnesses or litigants in their courtrooms. Outside the judicial realm, many educational conferences are supported by commercial sponsors with special ties to the subject matter, but in the tax area these organizations and corporations would be the most likely to have a stake in future litigation. Public funding for judicial education is rarely a legislative priority, even when budgets are relatively generous, and is among the first items to be curtailed in economic downturns.

All of these factors present special hurdles to the development of effective, ongoing educational programs for members of tax tribunals. The success of the National Conference of State Tax Judges speaks to both the effectiveness of the Lincoln Institute’s support and the enthusiastic work of judges across the country who have found it a professionally and personally rewarding means of creating ties with colleagues in other states.

The judges who volunteer to produce each year’s program are the cornerstone of the organization. The planning committee members begin monthly telephone meetings soon after the close of the previous conference so they can evaluate participant suggestions and consider topics of particular current importance. Individual judges then contact scholars and professionals who can address these issues. Faculty members include academic experts in law and economics as well as legislators, policy analysts, appraisers, journalists, and specialists in fields such as housing and commercial property markets.

The central role of the judges themselves is highlighted by a session on case law updates. One of the most lively and interactive parts of the program, this forum offers the participants an opportunity to describe and comment on recent decisions of special interest in their own states. Judges submit these cases in the months preceding the conference to the session moderators, who have responsibility for choosing the cases to be examined and guiding the discussion. Moderating a conference of judges carries special challenges of its own.

Wide Scope within a Specialized Area

The range of topics covered by the conference reflects underlying property valuation problems confronted in changing economic, social, and technological conditions. In the early years, discussions included utility properties, office complexes, and rental apartments, whereas now the focus is likely to be subsidized housing, golf courses, or nonprofit landowners. More complex methods of valuation, made possible by the introduction of computer-based techniques, have also entered the agenda. What approach to value is best suited to a specific type of property? What properties are exempt from property taxation? How does one value properties that are partially taxable and partially exempt, such as a structure that includes a hospital (exempt) and doctors’ offices (taxable).

Tax exemptions for charitable institutions are often expressed in legislative language reflecting an earlier and far starker division between commercial and nonprofit enterprises, such as hospitals. Retirement communities that require significant initial and continuing payments may not fit the pattern of a “home for the aged,” just as a traditionally exempt YMCA may seem a commercial competitor to a neighboring health club. The continuing challenge of distinguishing exempt and taxable property takes on new forms over time.

Many similar issues of statutory interpretation and the application of legal analysis to new factual situations have been the subject of ongoing examination at the annual conference.

• An income-based approach to value, often useful in the assessment of commercial property, may require adjustment in the case of shopping malls that rely on the presence of prestigious department stores to draw traffic. These anchor tenants may be allowed to occupy space rent-free or receive concessions and special treatment as an incentive for them to locate in the mall. Should a normal rent per square foot be imputed to the space occupied by such tenants? Is the value of the anchor property reflected in the higher rents that can be charged to other stores as a result of the increased business because of the presence of the anchor tenant?
• Property contaminated by hazardous waste can be unsalable if a new purchaser is responsible for its remediation. Does this situation relieve the current owner of tax liability? Does it matter whether the owner bears responsibility for the contamination? What kind of expert testimony is required to establish the likely costs of and a reasonable schedule for this clean-up?
• The specialized features of a sophisticated manufacturing plant built to the current owner’s specifications may have little value to potential purchasers. Does this mean that the current owner’s investment has no effect on the property’s valuation for tax purposes? Should the result be influenced by the utility of the property, and whether the owner would replace it in the event of damage or loss? Can value to the owner be a factor in determining fair market value?
• The federal income tax code offers various incentives for private parties to invest in housing for low- and middle-income tenants. Should the limited rents that can be charged for these units form the basis of the property valuation, or is it legitimate to consider as well the income tax benefits that led the owners to make this investment?
• The value of a hotel as a business enterprise includes many intangible elements, from the existence of an assembled work force to the prestige and name recognition of a hotel chain to the use of computerized reservation systems. What are appropriate methods for valuing the real property component of the business?

In addition to valuation questions of this sort, the conference agenda includes a session on developments concerning state income and sales taxes, and presentations on such topics as judicial writing, ethical issues, and the effect of business cycles on property markets. Judges serving on appellate courts and state supreme courts have also contributed their perspectives on tax decisions that reach them on appeal.

Times of economic stress also require special attention to case management, as property tax appeals increase when market values fall. Courts require flexibility and excellent procedures to offer taxpayers accessible, timely determinations under these circumstances, particularly since economic downturns usually bring reductions in state budgets, and the need to do more with less.

In times of rapidly rising prices, taxpayers are often pleased to see an assessment figure that has not kept pace with market values. In downturns, taxpayers are more likely to be disturbed if bills reflect an earlier assessment date when prices were higher. The Minnesota Tax Court, for example, saw a 50 percent rise in appeals from 2,954 in 2008 to 4,760 in 2009 (through November). The state’s Chief Judge George Perez, the current chair of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, explained, “There’s a direct inverse relationship between Tax Court filings and the economy. When the economy is down, numbers are up. When the economy is up and healthy, the numbers begin to drop.”

Evidence of Impact

Strong ties have been formed among the members of tax courts and tribunals from over 30 states and the cities of New York and Chicago who have participated in the judges’ conference. These connections, as much as the technical material covered at the conference, have provided a means of improving the judicial process. Many participants have observed that the conference has produced a positive impact on the quality of tax decisions.

Glenn Newman, president of the New York City Tax Commission and Tax Appeals Tribunal, says, “It is remarkable how many issues cut across state lines. The issues we all face can be discussed and analyzed, helping all participants focus and come to a clearer understanding.”

Michelle Robert, counsel to the Maine State Board of Property Tax Review, states, “This is a wonderful conference that offers attendees a forum for exchange of ideas and viewpoints in this are of the law that is truly not otherwise available.”

Chief Judge George Perez of the Minnesota Tax Court, the current conference chair, sums up these perspectives: “It’s the best seminar given for tax judges and tax officials.”

The conference’s contribution to improved tax policy is a tribute to the foresight of those who gathered at Moley House 30 years ago, and the current participants who are eager to carry that benefit to future tax judges as well.

“Through informal as well as formal discussions at the annual meetings, and frequent phone calls during the rest of the year, judges have been able to tap the knowledge, experience, and intelligence of their colleagues all over the nation. The National Conference has provided an introduction and a phone number that have helped many of its members make a better decision concerning issues that at an earlier point seemed intractable. These personal connections may be one of the Lincoln Institute’s greatest contributions to the improvement of tax policy through the improvement of state and local tax adjudication.”
—Joseph C. Small

About the Authors

Joseph C. Small is the retired presiding judge of the Tax Court of New Jersey and a former chair of the National Conference of State Tax Judges.

Joan Youngman is an attorney and senior fellow and director of the Department of Valuation and Taxation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Most jurisdictions require residential assessments to be proportional to market value, but in practice assessment ratios—assessed value divided by sale price—are often lower for high-priced than low-priced properties. This tendency for assessment ratios to fall as sales prices rise is termed regressivity, because it means that property taxes are a higher percentage of property value for lower-priced properties. Regressive assessments have been identified in many jurisdictions and times (such as Cornia and Slade 2005; McMillen and Weber 2008; and Plummer 2010).

Assessment regressivity is an important issue because it has the potential to undermine support for a property tax system. Consider a simple system in which taxes are 1 percent of a home’s assessed value, with no exemptions or deductions. For example, a $100,000 home should have a $1,000 tax bill, and a $1 million home a $10,000 tax bill. However, it is not uncommon to find that a $1 million home is actually assessed at $800,000 or $900,000, resulting in effective tax rates of 0.8 or 0.9 percent rather than the statutory 1 percent.

Having lower-than-prescribed assessment rates for some high-priced properties may result in greater variability in assessments within price groups. One owner of a high-priced home may accept a $1 million assessment as an accurate measure of market value, while another owner may appeal and win a lower assessment. Different tax bills for identical properties can cause taxpayer resistance and resentment.

The Assessment Process in Illinois

I have analyzed data from two counties in the Chicago metropolitan area that provide quite different perspectives on assessment regressivity. In suburban DuPage County, assessment ratios decline uniformly with sales prices and there is no marked difference in the degree of variability in assessments across the range of sales prices. In the City of Chicago, which is part of Cook County, the degree of variability in assessment ratios is greater than the degree of regressivity. Notably, assessment ratios in Chicago are highly variable at low and very high sales prices, while not varying greatly with mid-range sales prices.

Illinois has a simple flat-rate property tax, but the homestead exemption produces a degree of progressivity. This exemption is generally a flat amount that does not vary by price, although Cook County has an “alternative general homestead exemption” that can make the exemption higher in areas with rapid price appreciation. The basic homestead exemption is designed to produce much lower effective tax rates for low-priced properties—where the exemption is often high relative to market value.

Assessment practices in DuPage County are similar to those in all but one of the 102 counties in Illinois, where properties are assessed on a four-year cycle at 33 percent of market value. In DuPage County, properties were most recently assessed in 2007 and new assessments will be established in 2011. Cook County alone has a classified system with varying statutory assessment rates. Prior to 2009, the statutory rates were 16 percent for residential properties, 38 percent for commercial, and 36 percent for industrial, although actual assessment rates were much lower. In 2009, the statutory rates were “recalibrated” to 10 percent for residential and 25 percent for commercial and industrial properties. Cook County assesses its properties on a rotating, three-year cycle. The City of Chicago was last reassessed in 2009, and all city properties will be reassessed again in 2012. Properties in the north suburban part of Cook County were reassessed in 2010, and south suburban properties will be reassessed in 2011.

Traditional Measures of Regressivity

The importance of assessment regressivity has led the International Association of Assessment Officers (IAAO 2007) to recommend that an analysis of regressivity be included as part of any study of assessment accuracy. One common procedure recommended by the IAAO to evaluate assessment regressivity is a descriptive statistic, the price-related differential (PRD), which is the ratio of the simple mean assessment ratio to a comparable statistic that places more weight on higher-priced properties. Typically this ratio is greater than one, which implies that higher-priced properties have lower average assessment ratios than lower-priced homes.

Table 1 presents traditional IAAO measures of residential assessment performance for the most recent reassessment year for which I have data—2006 in Chicago and 1999 in DuPage County. The data on sales prices and assessed values come from the Illinois Department of Revenue, which is responsible for monitoring assessment performance for all counties in the state. I focus on Chicago rather than all of Cook County to keep the sample size more manageable, to focus on a single assessment year, and to avoid combining the county’s three assessment districts.

Chicago’s average assessment rate (mean) of 9.4 percent differs significantly from the statutory value of 16 percent. In DuPage County, the average assessment rate of 29.8 percent is much closer to the statutory 33 percent rate, and it would likely be even closer if the timing of the sales prices and assessment origination dates were closer. The value-weighted mean is calculated by weighting each observation by its sale price. The finding that the value-weighted mean is less than the arithmetic mean implies that higher-priced properties tend to have lower than average assessment ratios in both counties.

The price-related differential (PRD), which is the ratio of the value-weighted mean to the arithmetic mean, formalizes this measure. IAAO standards call for the PRD to be no higher than 1.03; by this standard, DuPage County’s degree of regressivity is acceptable while Chicago’s is not. The coefficient of dispersion (COD) is the traditional measure of assessment variability. By IAAO standards for residential properties, the COD should not exceed 15. Again, Chicago’s COD indicates excessive variability while DuPage County’s degree of variability is within IAAO’s acceptable range.

Statistical Analysis of Regressivity

A second IAAO-recommended procedure to measure regressivity is a statistical regression of a sample of assessment ratios on sales prices, which typically produces a negative coefficient for the price variable, i.e., a downward sloping line. This type of analysis provides estimates of the conditional expectation of the assessment ratio for any given sale price. Although several approaches exist in the literature, the basic idea is to estimate a function that produces a simple relationship between sales prices and assessment ratios. If the function implies that assessment ratios decline with sales prices, the assessment pattern is said to be regressive.

Figure 1 shows the estimated functions when assessment ratios are regressed on sales prices using data from Chicago and DuPage County. The straight lines are simple linear regressions. The curved lines are a nonlinear estimation procedure—a locally weighted regression technique that estimates a series of models at various target values, placing more weight on values closer to the target points. For example, to estimate a regression with a target point of $100,000, one might use only observations with sales prices between $75,000 and $125,000, with more weight placed on sales prices closer to $100,000.

The linear and locally weighted regression estimates are much more discrepant for Chicago’s data set than for DuPage County’s. While both approaches indicate that assessment ratios fall with sales prices, the nonlinear procedure indicates that expected assessment ratios are extremely high in Chicago at very low sales prices—but still below the statutory rate of 16 percent.

The regression lines imply precise relationships, but they do not address differences in the degree of variability at different sales prices. It may be that both unusually high and unusually low prices are simply hard to assess accurately. If so, assessment ratios could have high variances at both low and high sales prices while being tightly centered on statutory rates near the mean sale price. Neither the traditional PRD statistic nor standard regression procedures are well-suited for analyzing a situation where the accuracy of the assessment process varies with sales prices.

Quantile Regressions Using Simulated Data

Another statistical procedure, quantile regression, provides much more information on the relationship between assessment ratios and sales prices by showing how the full distribution of ratios varies by price. The easiest way to understand quantile regression is to imagine two data sets, A and B, where both have 10,000 observations. Each observation represents a sale price and assessment ratio pair, but sales prices are constrained to integers between 1 and 10 (figure 2).

In constructing data set A, a sale price is assigned, and then an assessment ratio is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean (and median) of 0.33 (the statutory rate in DuPage County). Data set A then matches the assumptions of a classical regression model, where the variance of the assessment ratios is constant across all values of sales prices. In constructing data set B, however, the variance of the assigned assessment ratio is higher for lower sale price levels, but the mean is constant and equals 0.33 at each price.

In both data sets the mean is equivalent to the estimated linear regressions in this case, indicating no relationship between sale price and assessment ratio. If these regressions were estimated using real data, they would be interpreted as indicating that assessment ratios are proportional to sales prices, i.e., assessments are neither regressive nor progressive. Despite this finding, figure 2 clearly shows that in data set B assessments converge on the statutory 33 percent rate at high sales prices, whereas homes with low sales prices run the risk of having extremely high assessment rates.

Quantile regression estimates reveal the differences between data sets A and B in the degree of assessment ratio variability, and this approach can be estimated at any target value of the assessment ratio distribution. For example, since the 10 percent and 90 percent quantile lines are converging as sales prices increase, the quantile regression reveals what standard regression procedures do not—low sales prices have highly variable assessments and high sales prices have more precise assessments.

Quantile Regressions for the City of Chicago and DuPage County

In practice, linear regression, locally weighted regression, and a linear version of quantile regression all proved too restrictive to represent accurately the relationship between assessment ratios and sales prices in Chicago and DuPage County, especially for extremely low and extremely high sales prices. Instead, a nonlinear version of quantile regression provides the most accurate representation of the underlying relationship.

Figure 3 shows the results of nonlinear versions of the quantile regressions, which can be estimated at a series of target points, with more weight given to observations that are near the targets. From bottom to top, the graphs show the estimated 10, 25, 50, 75, and 90 percent quantile regression lines.

Chicago’s results suggest that assessment ratios are relatively high at all quantiles for quite low prices, but the high variability is evident in the large spread between the 10 and 90 percent quantile lines. However, as the sale price increases from about $250,000 to nearly $800,000, the regression lines are close to horizontal. The variability is also low in this range. The quantile lines begin to have a downward slope again for prices above $800,000, with a moderate increase in the variance. Thus, the Chicago results suggest that the standard analysis of regressivity is misleading in that most of the regressivity is concentrated at low sales prices where the variance is also quite high.

In contrast, DuPage County has relatively high assessment ratios and lower variances in the $100,000–$200,000 range of prices where most sales took place in 1999. Assessment ratios decline with sale price for all prices beyond about $100,000, while the variance is increasing. The pattern of results for DuPage County is closer to what is implicitly assumed in a standard regression analysis of assessment regressivity.

Assessment Ratios Distributions at Alternative Sales Prices

An alternative to quantile regression is to examine the actual distribution of assessment ratios at a variety of different target values for sales prices to see how assessment ratios vary at given sales prices. Since most of the interesting patterns occur at low sales prices, figure 4 shows estimated conditional density functions for sales prices ranging from $50,000 to $200,000. The density function for Chicago has a huge variance at a sale price of $50,000. As the price increases to $100,000, $150,000, and finally $200,000, the density function moves to the left, meaning that lower assessment ratios become more common—an indication of regressivity. The distribution is also much more tightly clustered around the mean value of 9–10 percent, which indicates that the variance is reduced substantially.

In the contrasting case of DuPage County, the conditional density functions simply shift to the left as the target sale price increases with no pronounced change in variance. This parallel leftward shift of the conditional density function shows what would be predicted by a classic regression analysis of a regressive assessment system.

Implications for Property Taxes

Assessment regressivity has important implications for individual tax bills, as exemplified in a simplified analysis of residential taxes in Cook County. Though not a literal representation of the county’s tax system, the analysis is a close approximation. The starting point for table 2 is the estimated market value, which we assume to be accurate. Although the statutory assessment rate in Cook County was 16 percent prior to 2009, I use an assessment rate of 10 percent because it is closer to the actual rate and it matches the recent recalibration. Thus, the proposed assessed valuation for the property is $10,000.

However, Illinois also requires that assessments across the state must average 33 percent of market value. If assessments average less than 33 percent—as is mathematically a near certainty under Cook County’s classification system—the Department of Revenue calculates an equalization factor by which all assessments are multiplied. Using a representative value of 2.7 for the multiplier in table 2, the $10,000 assessment turns into an adjusted equalized assessment value of $27,000. Finally, the standard homestead exemption of $5,500 (again, a representative value) is subtracted to produce the base for the homeowner’s property tax bill. Thus, the sample tax rate of 10 percent and the adjusted equalized assessed value of $21,500 produce a tax bill of $2,150.

Table 3 compares house values and property tax rates under the assumption that assessments are regressive and are more variable for $100,000 houses than for $500,000 houses. Due to the homestead exemption, the property tax is somewhat progressive even when assessments are proportional to market value. Thus, a $100,000 house that is accurately assessed at 10 percent of market value ($10,000) ends up with a tax bill of $2,150 or an effective tax rate of 2.15 percent, while a $500,000 house that is assessed correctly at $50,000 has a tax bill of $12,950, or 2.59 percent of market value.

But, suppose that assessment rates for $100,000 homes actually range from 9 to 14 percent, while the range for $500,000 homes is only 8 to 12 percent. In this case, the progressivity of the homestead exemption can be reversed completely. Owners of low-priced homes who are “unfortunate” in receiving high assessments end up with effective tax rates of 3.23 percent, which is much higher than the average 10 percent value for owners of $500,000 homes, and is even higher than the 3.13 percent tax rate paid by owners of high-priced homes assessed at 12 percent.

Moreover, actual tax payments vary significantly for otherwise identical homes—from $1,800 to $3,230 for $100,000 houses and from $10,250 to $15,650 for $500,000 homes. In other words, a homeowner may receive a tax bill that is nearly 80 percent higher than the neighboring house even if both have a market value of $100,000.

Conclusion

Because assessment accuracy is the key to an equitable property tax, statistical measures of regressivity are essential tools for evaluating property valuation systems. Standard measures of regressivity can present an incomplete or even misleading picture of the range of assessment ratios in a jurisdiction. Newer analytic tools such as quantile regression can improve our understanding of the distribution of tax burdens and in this way help improve assessment equity.

Note: The statistical tools used in this article are included in a contributed extension package for the statistical program R. The package (aratio) is designed to be accessible to people who have limited knowledge of the R program but are familiar with other statistical software packages. Both R and aratio can be downloaded at no charge from www.r-project.org.

About the Author

Daniel P. McMillen is a professor at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs and in the Department of Economics at the University of Illinois. He is also a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation in 2010–2011.

References

Cleveland, William S., and Susan J. Devlin. 1988. Locally weighted regression: An approach to regression analysis by local fitting. Journal of the American Statistical Association 83(403, September): 596–610.

Cornia, Gary C., and Barrett A. Slade. 2005. Property taxation of multifamily housing: An empirical analysis of vertical and horizontal equity. Journal of Real Estate Research 27(1, (January/March): 17–46.

International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO). 2007. Standard on ratio studies. Kansas City, MO: IAAO.

McMillen, Daniel P., and Rachel Weber. 2008. Thin markets and property tax inequities: A multinomial logit approach. National Tax Journal 61(4, December): 653–671.

Plummer, Elizabeth. 2010. The effect of land value ratio on property tax protests and the effects of protests on assessment uniformity. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.