How do the perceptions of informal settlement dwellers on tenure security translate into investment in housing improvement? Is a property title necessary to establish security or increase investment? And how are income and credit related to investment? Does the average dweller actually aspire to legalization of tenure, and if so, what is expected? Based on research conducted in two land invasions in Buenos Aires, Argentina, this article addresses these questions, focusing on two issues in particular: the concept of tenure security and the empirical measurement of perceptions of security related to investment in housing improvement (Van Gelder 2009b).

Tenure Security as a Tripartite Concept

In the face of rapidly increasing urban informality in the 1970s, organizations such as the World Bank started experimenting with programs that provided basic services to settlements and granted property titles to dwellers. The assumption was that with secure tenure dwellers would mobilize resources for housing construction more efficiently than they would under public housing programs. Self-help housing, thus, was viewed as a source of economic security and upward social mobility.

In the early 1990s, the economic dimensions of tenure legalization took on new importance in some policy circles (Bromley 1990; World Bank 1993). The mere provision of private property rights was believed to be both a sufficient and necessary condition for settlement development. It was assumed that by providing both the incentive to invest and the possibility to do so by making formal credit accessible, property rights would function as leverage for development.

Critics of this idea argued that, with respect to establishing tenure security and investment, one could better focus on the actual situation on the ground. Factors such as the official recognition of a settlement, introduction of infrastructure and services, and other factors that could strengthen de facto security of tenure were considered more fundamental than holding a legal document for a plot (e.g., Gilbert 2002).

A third point of view on investment in housing claims that security as perceived by the dwellers is the most important factor. Rather than legal security, as embodied by titling, perception is the actual driving mechanism behind investment. It is argued that residents invest in their dwellings regardless of legal status, as long as they think they will not be evicted and will be allowed by the authorities to remain in their homes (Broegaard 2005; Varley 1987).

The concept of tenure security thus can be viewed in three different ways: as a legal construct that often takes the form of title to property; as de facto security based on the actual situation; and as it is perceived by dwellers. However, these views are often confused or simply equated in the research literature and by policy makers, so it is important to distinguish among them in order to answer the questions posed earlier.

Legal tenure security is a formal concept that refers to authoritative documents that identify the owner of an asset recognized by state power, but de facto and perceived tenure security are empirical concepts. To understand the de facto situation, we need to study the facts on the ground and answer such questions as: Have forced evictions been rare or frequent occurrences in a certain city or area? Has the general attitude towards illegal occupation by authorities been lenient or strict? Perceived tenure security, on the other hand, resides in the mind of the dweller, and its measurement requires fine-tuned methods.

The different types of tenure security may overlap. For example, having a title may imply that a dweller also has de facto security and he may perceive his situation to be secure, but there is no necessary connection among these types. Property rights do not always have a bearing on any kind of empirical fact, nor do they have to be recognized as something meaningful in the eyes of dwellers (Van Gelder 2010). Rather, cities with extensive informality are characterized precisely by an absence of such correlations.

One problem with the titling approach is that it equates property rights with tenure security. This makes sense in situations where the facts on the ground reflect the norms of the legal system, but not necessarily when this is not the case. Furthermore, it is important to remember that if tenure security, whether legal or de facto in nature, influences investment, it must operate through psychological pathways.

The Psychological Side of Tenure Security

The literature reveals three critical issues with respect to measuring tenure security. First, whether it is considered legal, de facto, or perceived, tenure security is often seen as a yes–no issue; either you have it or you do not. Second, and related to the first issue, studies only rarely provide an indication of the degree to which tenure security contributes to (more) investment in housing, compared to other factors likely to influence investment, such as income level or the availability of credit. Third, perceived tenure security is nearly always operationalized as a dweller’s perceived probability of eviction.

These three issues expose a number of important limitations related to each point. First, the idea of viewing tenure security as a dichotomy does not fit the reality of developing countries, where tenure security is better conceived as a matter of degree. Most low-income settlements fall somewhere between being completely insecure and entirely secure. Second, to understand the strength of tenure security as a factor influencing investment, this relationship needs to be quantified and examined along with other factors likely to influence investment, such as household income.

With regard to the third point, social psychological research increasingly shows that people’s decisions are often influenced by what they feel about a situation, instead of or in addition to how they think about it (Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004; Kahneman 2003; Van Gelder, De Vries, and Van der Pligt 2009). These insights can be applied to the study of informal housing if we consider a dweller’s investment as a form of decision making under uncertainty. That is, besides operationalizing perceived security only as the perceived probability of eviction, which refers to a cognitive or thinking state, we can also examine the feelings or worry, insecurity, and fear that dwellers experience. We term this component of tenure security fear of eviction.

Does examining feelings add to understanding estimates of the probability of eviction? In the context of informal tenure, it is often suggested that dwellers think that the probability of a forced eviction is very low, in particular when a settlement is relatively consolidated. In these cases, using only perceived probability of eviction as an indicator of tenure security limits its predictive value because it is invariably low. Yet, the possibility of eviction, however small, may still generate intense feelings of worry and stress in dwellers whose decisions are influenced regardless of whether this probability is perceived as likely or not (Van Gelder 2007; 2009a).

To avoid considering (perceptions of) tenure security as a dichotomy, we can operationalize probability and fear of eviction using psychometric scaling techniques. In my research, dwellers were presented various statements about their tenure situation and asked to indicate to what extent they agreed with each statement using five-point scales that ranged from completely disagree to completely agree. For example: “The possibility of an eviction worries me sometimes,” or “The possibility that we could be evicted from this neighborhood is always present.” Both items refer to the possibility of eviction, but the second item, which measures perceived probability of eviction, refers to a chance estimate—a thinking state—whereas the first item inquires about feelings.

Separate composite scales consisting of multiple items measured the perceived probability of eviction and fear of eviction. Respondents, all of whom were heads of household, were also asked about their household income and whether they had taken out a loan in the previous years. To measure investment in housing improvement, surveyors scored participants’ dwellings on three defining elements: the floor, the walls, and the roof. The scores were subsequently combined into a housing improvement or consolidation index, the dependent variable. To isolate the effects of perceived tenure security on investment, the survey included only those heads of household who had lived in the settlement since its origin and were responsible for their home construction.

Case Study Settlements

A land invasion typically involves a few hundred people who gain access to land by collectively invading and immediately building on the site. Residents attempt to comply with land use legislation and other requirements that render the legal and technical subdivision of the land possible at a later stage. This active resident participation makes these settlements different from more irregular slums (e.g., villas miserias).

The study consisted of a structured survey as well as semi-structured interviews and focus groups with dwellers in two different land invasions in the southern cone of Greater Buenos Aires, which is known for its large-scale popular urbanization and high concentrations of poverty (table 1).

The settlements were similar in size, but differed in age and hence degree of consolidation. El Tala was one of the first invasions in the city, while San Cayetano had existed for only two years prior to the survey in 2008. Only half of the dwellers in El Tala had received legal title, creating the conditions for a valid comparison of titled and nontitled households in this settlement.

Results of Analysis

Regression and correlational analysis were employed to examine the strength of both perceived probability of eviction and fear of eviction as predictors of housing improvement. To obtain a better idea of their comparative strength, we also looked at household income. Table 2 shows that both probability and fear were significantly correlated with improvement in both settlements. In other words, both thinking about the probability of an eviction and the feelings evoked by it influence the extent to which people are willing to invest in their dwelling. The higher the perceived probability and fear of an eviction, the less improved their dwelling.

Household income was quite strongly correlated with housing improvement in San Cayetano, but not in El Tala. One likely explanation for these findings is that the most visible investment in housing occurs in the early years of settlement development. Recall that San Cayetano was only two years old at the time of the survey, while El Tala dates to the early 1980s. Another related explanation is that the current income of households, as measured in the survey, does not necessarily reflect income in preceding decades. That income fluctuation makes it more difficult to assess the valid relationship between income and investment for older settlements like El Tala.

The regression analysis in table 3 simultaneously tests probability, fear, and income as predictors of investment by looking at their unique contribution. The strength of the relationship for each separate variable is indicated by the β symbol, which can range from -1 to +1 (indicating a perfect linear negative and positive relationship respectively).

In El Tala the effect of probability of eviction is largely explained by fear of eviction. This appears to confirm the assumption discussed earlier that in cases where eviction is very unlikely, such as in consolidated settlements, fear of eviction is the better predictor of housing improvement. Stated differently, when deciding on whether and how much to invest in their dwellings, individuals are actually more influenced by how they feel about their situation and the risks involved than how they think about it. These results make a strong case for altering our view on perceived tenure security as merely consisting of perceptions of the probability of eviction. If we want to be able to predict behavior, we also need to understand how people feel.

In San Cayetano, however, a different picture emerges. Even though both perceived probability and fear of eviction are negatively correlated with investment in housing improvement, the results of the regression analysis show that household income explains most of the variance. In other words, household income dictated the investment more than perceptions of security, whether perceived probability of eviction or fear of eviction. My (speculative) assumption is that again these results can be attributed to the young age of the settlement, because financial abilities more than anything else dictate to what extent people can invest in their housing in the earliest phase of settlement consolidation.

Virtually all residents surveyed and interviewed in both settlements indicated that having a property title was important to them, and they expressed a strong desire to be legalized. This result presents an intriguing paradox: Even though forced eviction is rarely regarded as likely or even possible by residents, about half of them still gave security of tenure as the most important reason for wanting to have a title to their property. One resident of El Tala commented on different motivations for investment: “I think that there are two moments. One is in the beginning when constructing is a way of ensuring yourself that no one will kick you out. Nowadays, I think the situation is rather reversed. I don’t believe that it is worth putting money in your house if you do not have a title.”

This means that even in situations with very high de facto security of tenure, such as El Tala, property titles are still desired by residents, principally for additional security. This finding corresponds with the point made earlier about the importance of including fear of eviction alongside probability estimates as an indicator of perceived tenure security. The possibility of an eviction, however small, may still elicit strong feelings of worry and fear that can influence residents’ decisions, almost regardless of perceived probability (Van Gelder 2007)

Other frequently mentioned motivations for wanting a property title were expressed as “leaving something to my children” and ”being or feeling that I am the owner of my house.” Surprisingly few dwellers in either settlement mentioned commercial reasons (e.g., increased value of their dwelling or access to credit) for their desire to be an owner. In both settlements, more than 80 percent of the respondents thought that having title would further increase security. More than half of the residents thought they would invest more after having title, and more than half of the residents that had title indicated that they had in fact invested more after their tenure was legalized.

With respect to accessing credit, titled owners did not take out a bank loan more frequently than residents who lacked title. In El Tala only three people with a property title had taken out a mortgage loan in the previous five years versus two people in the untitled part of that settlement. More people—eight in the titled and five in the untitled areas—had taken out loans at lending institutions that charge high interest rates but do not require property as collateral. In other words, the owners did not pledge their dwellings as collateral to obtain the loans.

The majority of the respondents who had taken a loan had done so to improve or repair their dwellings. The small amounts of money borrowed and the very few loans intended for business investments raise doubts about the extent to which increasing access to credit will function as an engine for economic growth, as is sometimes suggested as a rationale for land titling programs.

Conclusions

These results shed some new light on the debate over tenure security and the discussion between advocates and critics of legalization. For example, even though legal title is not a necessary condition for investment in housing improvement, it is likely to be a contributing factor in some situations. Furthermore, nearly without exception, all dwellers aspire to be the legal owner of their home. However, the social and psychological effects seem to be much greater than economic factors in valuing legal tenure.

While policy increasingly has stressed mercantilist arguments in support of titling (e.g., credit and land markets), respondents tend to stress social reasons. Besides tenure security, the ability to leave something “safe” for offspring and the simple feeling that one is the (legal) owner of one’s dwelling were cited as more fundamental motivations for the desire to be a homeowner. Formal ownership is seen by many, realistically or not, as a way of escaping marginality and as a substitute for a largely deficient social security system.

One way to improve policy and more accurately anticipate the consequences of specific interventions, which all too often take straightforward top-down approaches, is to pay more attention to the perspectives of dwellers and to borrow methods and insights from disciplines such as psychology and sociology. These disciplines offer fine-tuned measures of varied constructs that development scholars, policy makers, and land experts should consider in future research and on-the-ground programs for informal developments.

About the Author

Jean-Louis van Gelder is a researcher at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement. He studied both organizational psychology and law at the University of Amsterdam and combined them into a Ph.D. on tenure security and informality in Buenos Aires. Other research interests include the role of affect and personality in risky and criminal decision making.

References

Broegaard, R.J. 2005. Land tenure insecurity and inequality in Nicaragua. Development and Change 36: 845–864.

Bromley, D.W. 1990. A new path to development? The significance of Hernando De Soto’s ideas on underdevelopment, production, and reproduction. Economic Geography 66: 328–348.

Gilbert, A.G. 2002. On the mystery of capital and the myths of Hernando De Soto: What difference does legal title make? International Development Planning Review 26: 1–19.

Hsee, C.K. and Y. Rottenstreich. 2004. Music, pandas, and muggers: On the affective psychology of value. Journal of Experimental Psychology 113: 23–30.

Kahneman, D. 2003. Perspectives on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist 58: 697–720.

Van Gelder, J-L. 2007. Feeling and thinking: quantifying the relationship between perceived tenure security and housing improvement in an informal neighborhood in Buenos Aires. Habitat International 31: 219–231.

———. 2009a. Legal tenure security, perceived tenure security and housing improvement in Buenos Aires: An attempt towards integration. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 33: 126–146.

———. 2009b. Assessing fit: Perceptions of informality and expectations of legality. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

———. 2010. What tenure security? The case for a tripartite view. Land Use Policy 27: 449–456.

Van Gelder, J-L., R.E. de Vries, and J. Van der Pligt. 2009. Evaluating a dual-process model of risk: Affect and cognition as determinants of risky choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22: 45–61.

Varley, A. 1987. The relationship between tenure legalization and housing improvements: Evidence from Mexico City. Development and Change 18: 463–481.

World Bank. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. World Bank Policy Paper. Washington DC: World Bank.

Housing is an important component of both a household’s net worth and aggregate national wealth or stock of residential capital. Aggregate residential wealth is the sum of the values of all housing units. In Brazil, residential structures represent about one-third of total net fixed capital, so their value is important for economic and social policy. This analysis asks: What variables determine the stock values of residential property? How do location and neighborhood conditions affect these values? What is the aggregate residential wealth in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region (Metro Rio)? What is its distribution among household income and housing value groups? In other words, what generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth is there? Who holds it? Where is it located? (Vetter, Beltrão, and Massena 2013.)

Methodology for Estimating Residential Wealth

To address these questions, we first calibrated a hedonic residential rent model with sample microdata from the 2010 population census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The units of analysis are households living in private, permanent housing units in urban areas of Metro Rio. The total number of households in 2010 was 3.9 million, and our sample is 223,534 (5.7 percent). We used the 41,396 renters in the sample to calibrate our model and then estimated the rents for homeowners and the landlords of rent-free units. Finally, we transformed the actual and imputed rents into housing values by dividing them by the monthly discount rate of 0.75 percent (9.38 percent annual rate), as is standard practice for Brazilian residential wealth studies (Cruz and Morais 2000, Reiff and Barbosa 2005, and Tafner and Carvalho 2007).

The underlying assumption in these studies is that the hedonic prices of the characteristics in the model and the discount rate are similar for rental and nonrental units. These are strong but necessary assumptions for the application of the methodology with the existing census microdata. The sum of estimated housing values is our measure of residential wealth. The objective is to estimate the aggregate value of all housing units and their average values.

In calculating average housing prices for these groups, we do not control for housing size or other characteristics, as would be done for hedonic housing price indices. Using census microdata, we can also estimate the residential wealth by household income as well as for smaller spatial units within municipalities, such as neighborhoods or districts. Even though the sample of rental units is relatively large, sample size drops rapidly as rents and household incomes rise, and the variances are particularly high for the open group at the top end of the distribution. Because we do not have data on the value of mortgages, our measure is of gross rather than net residential wealth.

Using rents from the census or a household survey compares favorably with other commonly used methods for estimating residential wealth for the Brazilian national accounts and related studies (Garner 2004), such as asking homeowners to estimate the selling price or monthly rent of their homes, using the asking prices for home sales, or using the prices registered when recording the sale. Whereas renters know their monthly rent payment, the informants may have little understanding of current trends in housing prices, and the original asking price is often higher than the final sale price. In Rio de Janeiro, the municipal government uses its own estimates of the sale prices based on asking prices, rather than the value registered in calculating the real estate transfer tax, because buyers and sellers often register lower prices.

In our hedonic residential rent model, the dependent variable is a vector of residential rents, and the independent variables are matrices of the structural characteristics of the housing unit, access to employment, and neighborhood characteristics, including indicators of access to urban infrastructure and services. The variables used are for the household per se and also for the census area in which it is located. Figure 1 shows Metro Rio’s 336 census areas and the larger municipal boundaries grouped into six subregions based on indicators analyzed in this and previous studies (Lago 2010).

The indicator for access to employment measures the average commute time to work for residents in each of the census areas. Figure 2 (p. 16) shows that the average commute time increases with distance from the center, but not by as much as one might expect—partly due to increased traffic congestion in all areas and to the fact that Metro Rio is polycentric with many subordinate centers.

The indicators of the quality of neighborhood infrastructure and services include the household`s access to the public sewer and water systems, garbage collection, and block conditions (e.g., street paving and drainage). As these indicators are highly intercorrelated, the component scores from a principal components analysis serve as the independent variables in the hedonic model. Component 1 explains 46.6 percent of the variance and shows high positive loadings on adequate block conditions and infrastructure, and high negative loadings on inadequate block conditions (e.g., garbage in the street and open sewers), indicating which areas have a higher level of attractiveness or desirability (figure 3). Although the lowest scores are clearly concentrated in the outlying areas, the patterns of attractiveness vary considerably. As with commute times, the distribution pattern of the attractiveness scores reveals the complexity of Metro Rio’s spatial structure.

Our hedonic model explains 73 percent of the variance of residential rent. The key independent variables are statistically significant; neighborhood quality and access to employment explain nearly two-thirds of the variance, while the structural characteristics of the housing explain only about one-third of the variance. In other words, the bulk of housing value is the capitalized value of access to employment and to neighborhood infrastructure and services, all of which are determined in large part by public expenditures. Figure 4 (p. 18) shows the distribution of average estimated housing values for census areas in US$ determined by our methodology. (The average exchange rate for 2010 is US$1=R$1.76.) These values tend to be highest in areas affording relatively low commute times and good access to urban infrastructure and services.

Distribution of Residential Wealth

How much residential wealth is the property of homeowners versus the landlords of rental properties and rent-free units used by employers, family members, or others? Our estimate of Metro Rio’s aggregate residential wealth of both occupied and unoccupied units in 2010 is US$155.1 billion (94.2 percent of Metro Rio’s 2010 GDP of US$164.4 billion) and US$140.2 billion for occupied units only (84.2 percent of Metro Rio’s GDP). Among total occupied units, 74.8 percent of this residential wealth (about US$105 billion) belongs to owner-occupied units, and the rest belongs to landlords of rented and rent-free units. In the case of lower-income households, the landlords could be another lower-income family.

Table 1 shows that the percent of homeowners is quite similar for all household income groups. For example, homeowners occupy nearly three-quarters of the households in the lowest household income group (with fewer than two minimum salaries or an average annual income of only US$4,407). A key reason for these high homeownership levels is that those living in favelas, squatter settlements, or other types of informal housing can declare themselves homeowners, even if they do not legally own the land on which their home is located. The 2010 Census showed more than 520,000 households (more than 15 percent of the total private permanent urban households) living in these types of settlements in Metro Rio. Land ownership in these settlements is a complex legal question on which even lawyers may not agree, since the chances of removal (at least removal without compensation) are quite low, and those living on land without a legal title may be eligible for squatter’s rights after five years under Brazilian law.

Although 25.3 percent of total households earned less than two minimum salaries (US$ 6,960 per year), the homeowners in this group held only 15.3 percent of the aggregate residential wealth of all homeowners. By contrast, only 15.6 percent of households earned 10 or more minimum salaries (US$34,800 per year), but homeowners in this income group held 34.5 percent of the aggregate residential wealth. Nonetheless, lower income households have more residential wealth than one might expect, in part because they are often homeowners in informal settlements.

Figure 5 (p. 19) shows the Lorenz Curve for the distribution of aggregate residential wealth of homeowners by housing value groups. This distribution is quite unequal, because the nearly 23.7 percent who are not homeowners have no such wealth (as shown where the Lorenz curve runs along the bottom of the axis) and because those living in higher-priced housing have greater residential wealth.

Distribution of Residential Wealth by Subregions

The bulk of aggregate residential wealth is held by those living in the suburbs and periphery around Metro Rio, although the average value of their housing units is lower. Table 2 shows that those subregions (4 and 6) together represent 79 percent of Metro Rio’s total households (3.1 million) and 58.1 percent of aggregate residential wealth (US$80.9 billion). Subregion 2 (the older, higher-income neighborhoods along the bay and coast) holds only 6.3 percent of Metro Rio’s households (about 242,000) and 19.0 percent of its residential wealth.

The percentage of renters is highest in the large squatter settlements (subregion 5), at 28.6 percent, with an additional 2.7 percent of rent-free units. Homeownership rates are highest (80.4 percent) in the periphery (subregion 6), where many owners live on land for which they do not have full legal title, though these areas generally are not squatter settlements as defined by IBGE.

Spatial Distribution of Household Income

One result of the interplay of market forces that shape residential rent and housing prices is that the distribution of aggregate household income tends to mirror the distribution of aggregate residential wealth. In other words, there is a relatively high residential segregation by income groups, with lower-income families concentrated in the large squatter settlements and in the suburbs and periphery (subregions 4, 5, and 6). High spatial concentration of higher-income households generates higher aggregate income and demand in areas that support higher-level services—in turn making these areas more attractive to higher-income homebuyers and renters. Figure 6 (p. 20) shows that the average annual household incomes for the census areas in 2010 reflect to a large extent the distribution of average housing values (figure 4), commute times (figure 2), and neighborhood attractiveness (figure 3).

In 2010, the high-income Barra da Tijuca area (subregion 3) held only 2.1 percent of total households in Metro Rio but 8.1 percent of aggregate household income and 7.6 percent of aggregate residential wealth. By comparison, the four large squatter settlements of subregion 5 held 2.5 percent of total households but only 1.0 percent of aggregate household income and 1.4 percent of residential wealth. Nonetheless, the aggregate residential value in these four squatter settlements was nearly US$2 billion, and the average housing value was almost US$21,000. These results show a relatively high spatial concentration of both aggregate household income and residential wealth that is tempered slightly by the home-ownership rate in squatter settlements.

Implications for Methodology and Policy Decisions

The methodology used in this analysis provides interesting insights into the macroeconomic and social importance of residential wealth; the variables that generate it; its distribution among household tenure, income, and housing value groups; and its allocation among subregions ranging from high-income neighborhoods to squatter settlements. The strong assumptions required in using the methodology must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Data from property registries or other sources with more detailed information on unit size could eventually be used to complement this methodology.

Government services, investments, and regulatory actions can result in benefits (e.g., access to employment, urban services, and amenities) and costs (e.g., taxes, fees, and negative environmental impacts) that are capitalized into the value of housing in the affected neighborhoods. For homeowners, positive net benefits from government actions increase their residential wealth, because they are capitalized in the value of their housing. However, for renters and new homebuyers, these same government actions can cause rents and housing prices to rise along with the net benefits. Some households, especially the lower-income renters and homebuyers, may have to leave the benefited area, and other potential new owners may be unable to locate in the area. Thus, housing tenure is important in determining whether or not a household receives the net benefits of government investments and regulatory actions.

Capitalization of the net benefits of government actions would clearly be an issue for the more than 30 percent of households in the four large squatter settlements that are not homeowners, as well as for those entering the housing market. Although there are no reliable data on housing turnover, we know that the total number of urban households in Metro Rio increased more than 20 percent, by almost 657,000, between 2000 and 2010. This increment was 14 percent higher than the total number of households in the Municipality of Curitiba (the state capital of Paraná) in 2010 and well over twice the number in Washington, D.C. All these new households, plus all the renters (about one-fifth of total households) and homeowners wishing to move, would be subject to increased rents and housing prices generated by the net benefits of government actions.

These results demonstrate a need for policies to ensure that rising rents and housing prices do not exclude some households from areas where public services and infrastructure are being improved. For example, financial assistance for home purchases could be part of the improvement program. One way of financing the needed lower-income housing and investment programs would be to capture part of the value being generated by infrastructure investments from higher-income households. Capturing part of the value generated by urban investments could help finance additional housing subsidies for lower-income families, as well as added investment, thereby providing a kind of investment multiplier.

About the Authors

David M. Vetter (Ph.D. University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America for Brazilian entities, at the World Bank and Dexia Credit Local, and also as a consultant.

Kaizô I. Beltrão (Ph.D. Princeton University) was the dean and a senior researcher at the National Statistics School (an entity of IBGE) and is now a full professor and senior researcher at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas.

Rosa M. R. Massena (Doctorate, Université de Bordeaux) was a senior researcher at the IBGE for 23 years and since then has worked as a consultant on social indicators programs for Habitat, the World Bank, UNDP, and other entities.

Resources

Cruz, Bruno. O. and Maria P. Morais. 2000. Demand for Housing and Urban Services in Brazil: A Hedonic Approach. Paper presented at the European Network for Housing Research Conference, Gavle, Sweden (June).

Garner, Thesia I. 2004. Incorporating the Value of Owner-Occupied Housing in Poverty Measurement. Prepared for the Workshop on Experimental Poverty Measures, Committee on National Statistics. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies.

Lago, Luciana C. 2010. Olhares Sobre a Metrópole do Rio de Janeiro: Economia, Sociedade e Território. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Observatório das Metrópoles, FASE, IPPUR/UFRJ.

Reiff, Luis. O. and Ana L. Barbosa. 2005. Housing Stock in Brazil: Estimation Based on a Hedonic Price Model. Paper No. 21. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.

Tafner, Paulo and Marcia Carvalho. 2007. Evolução da Distribuição Familiar da Riqueza Imobiliária no Brasil: 1995–2004. Revista de Economia 33(2) (Julho-Dezembro): 7–40.

Vetter, David M., Kaizô I. Beltrão, and Rosa R. Massena. 2013. The Determinants of Residential Wealth and Its Distribution in Space and Among Household Income Groups in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: A Hedonic Analysis of the 2010 Census Data. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Peter Nichols es un apasionado amante de la naturaleza y uno de los abogados de derecho hídrico más importantes de Colorado. No es infrecuente verlo entrar en el vestíbulo de su oficina de Berg Hill Greenleaf & Ruscitti en Boulder, una sala decorada con piedra, maderas nobles y una recepcionista elegantemente vestida, con su traje de letrado arrugado y calzando un par de gastadas sandalias de río. Según sus propias estimaciones, ser abogado de derecho hídrico es su sexta carrera profesional. “Ser un loco del esquí fue mi primera carrera”, confiesa. Después trabajó en la Asamblea General de Colorado, ayudó a las comunidades del Oeste a lidiar con el rápido desarrollo energético, y fue consultor de derechos de agua para las propias compañías de energía. En 2001, Nichols volvió a la Universidad de Colorado, donde había obtenido su maestría en Administración Pública en 1982, para obtener su título en Derecho con especialización en derecho hídrico. Desde entonces ha estado sentando precedentes en las cuencas de Colorado.

Uno de sus logros que más le enorgullece, dice, fue un caso de 2013 en que la Corte Suprema de Colorado reafirmó la prerrogativa de los grupos de conservación para gravar los derechos de agua en servidumbres de conservación con el objeto de resolver problemas ecológicos y de suministro de agua en los ríos de Colorado. También se enorgullece de la presentación que inspiró al Comité del Acuerdo entre Cuencas de Colorado, que supervisa la elaboración del Plan Hídrico de Colorado, un modelo histórico de gestión hídrica colaborativa para todo el estado, dado el rápido crecimiento de la población. Pero entre todos sus logros, el más importante ha sido su trabajo sobre la cuenca del río Arkansas en Colorado. Este es “el crisol” de cómo el Oeste va a gestionar la gran escasez de agua que se prevé en esta región de crecimiento acelerado de las Montañas Rocosas.

“El problema comenzó aquí”, dice, “y si vamos a resolverlo, vamos a tener que resolverlo aquí”. El problema al cual se refiere es la tendencia a la adquisición de agua para las ciudades conocida como “buy-and-dry” (comprar y secar).

En una adquisición buy-and-dry, una compañía municipal de aguas cubre la creciente demanda de agua de la población comprando intereses en tierras agrícolas de regadío, dejando dicho suelo en barbecho permanentemente, y utilizando el agua que le corresponde por derecho para surtir a los residentes de la ciudad. En el río Arkansas de Colorado, donde no hay agua disponible para usos nuevos, y hay una demanda constante de suministro adicional, las tácticas de buy-and-dry han reducido las tierras agrícolas de regadío de toda la cuenca. En el valle bajo del río Arkansas, donde el río corre por la pradera oriental de Colorado, algunas comunidades agrícolas de ciertos condados han quedado completamente devastadas.

Dice Nichols: “El plan hídrico de Colorado está muy enfocado en eliminar buy-and-dry“. La cuestión es cómo hacerlo. “No podemos impedir que las ciudades obtengan el agua que necesitan, pero quizá podamos cambiar las reglas [del juego] para que no se convierta en un sálvese quien pueda”.

La alternativa más prometedora, según él, es Super Ditch.

Puesta en marcha de Super Ditch

Al oeste del meridiano 100, donde es necesario riego suplementario para el cultivo, las acequias son una solución normal para suministrar agua de un río, lago o embalse a los usuarios que se encuentran en su curso. En el valle bajo del río Arkansas hay aproximadamente 20 importantes sistemas de acequias comunes. Sin embargo, Super Ditch no es una auténtica acequia. Más bien consiste en una corporación —Lower Arkansas Valley Super Ditch Company, Inc. (Compañía de la Mega Acequia del Valle Bajo del río Arkansas)— establecida para proporcionar agua agrícola por arrendamiento a las ciudades como alternativa a la política de buy-and-dry. Representa a siete compañías que operan ocho canales entre dos embalses: Pueblo y John Martin.

Super Ditch comenzó a arrendar agua por primera vez este año, por medio de un pequeño proyecto piloto. Pero se formó en 2008 con la asistencia del Distrito de Conservación de Agua del Valle Bajo de Arkansas (Lower Arkansas Valley Water Conservancy District, LAVWCD por su sigla en inglés), un distrito especial establecido por los votantes en 2002. Los que votaron por la formación del distrito, fueran dueños de agua o no, estaban cansados de ver cómo se desviaba “su río” a ciudades que estaban a más de 150 kilómetros de distancia, algunas de las cuales se encontraban en cuencas hídricas completamente distintas. Incluso los electores urbanos de la ciudad de Pueblo, una comunidad dedicada a la producción de acero del río Arkansas (con 108.000 habitantes) votaron a favor de los agricultores rurales debido a sus problemas económicos. “¡Ni una gota más!” fue el lema utilizado para oponerse a que el agua saliera del valle.

Nichols es consejero legal especial de LAVWCD y ayudó al distrito a desarrollar la propuesta de Super Ditch. La inspiración provino de California, donde el Distrito de Riego de Palo Verde estableció un programa de barbecho-arrendamiento de largo plazo con el Distrito Metropolitano de Aguas de California del Sur (Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, MWD por su sigla en inglés) en 2005. El contrato entre estas dos entidades se propone suministrar agua a 27 comunidades costeras del sur de California, incluidos San Diego y Los Ángeles, 4.500 millones de metros cúbicos de agua del río Colorado a través un canal durante un periodo de 35 años. Los agricultores participantes se comprometen a dejar de regar por un periodo específico de tiempo, dejan sus campos en barbecho y reciben un pago por su agua que, en vez de ser utilizada para regar sus campos, se destina a los clientes de MWD.

LAVWCD trató de crear un proyecto similar, basado en el concepto de rotación de barbecho-arrendamiento, pero Super Ditch fue un emprendimiento mucho más elaborado. Esta colaboración entre siete compañías mutuales de canales, cada una con su junta directiva y su estructura de gobierno, estuvo cargada de desafíos. La naturaleza compleja de las leyes hídricas de Colorado y los poderosos mecanismos del mercado y las dependencias de trayectorias que guían las estrategias de adquisición de agua urbana en el estado complican el tema más aún. Las municipalidades de Colorado dudan de depender del arrendamiento de agua, y con causa justificada. Es fundamental saber con certeza que habrá un suministro suficiente, y la naturaleza temporal del arrendamiento, en contraposición con la permanencia de la propiedad de los derechos de agua, inquieta a la mayoría de las empresas municipales proveedoras de agua. ¿Qué ocurriría si la población creciera en 50.000 habitantes, y el agua arrendada de la que esta gente depende ya no estuviera disponible, o se vendiera a otro proveedor de agua?

Nichols trató de desarrollar el concepto de Super Ditch para resolver estas inquietudes. Super Ditch reúne los suministros de agua de los distintos agricultores, y provee de agua a las ciudades bajo contratos de arrendamiento de largo plazo. Para garantizar que los insumos arrendados estén disponibles cuando termine el período de arrendamiento, LAVWCD comenzó a trabajar con los agricultores para establecer servidumbres de conservación en las granjas participantes, protegiéndolas del desarrollo inmobiliario y reservando el agua para el suelo a perpetuidad, con el objeto de garantizar la futura producción potencial. Si bien se permiten transferencias temporales, las servidumbres eliminan la posibilidad de cualquier separación, desvío o cambio permanente en el uso del agua. En otras palabras: no es buy-and-dry.

Las servidumbres de conservación han protegido el entramado de las comunidades agrícolas en Colorado y en el resto del país. Una base de suelos protegidos por servidumbre garantiza que se mantendrá la futura producción potencial de una comunidad agrícola, frente a la amenaza de conversión de suelo debido al crecimiento urbano desordenado, la explotación de petróleo y gas, o los programas buy-and-dry municipales. Una vez protegida la base del suelo, las industrias agrícolas asociadas pueden invertir con confianza en la región. Esto, a su vez, tiene un efecto positivo sobre las ciudades.

Super Ditch proporcionó su primer suministro de agua en mayo de 2015: cinco granjas del canal Catlin suministraron 600.000 metros cúbicos de agua a la ciudad de Fountain (27.000 habitantes), la ciudad de Security (18.000 habitantes) y el pueblo de Fowler (1.200 habitantes). El ingeniero del Departamento de Recursos Hídricos de Fountain, Michael Fink, explicó que “la ciudad recibió el agua sin ningún problema”, y añadió que el éxito a largo plazo del programa depende de que Super Ditch no utilice un modelo económico basado en la oferta.

Nichols dice que eso no es un problema. “Las ciudades pueden arrendar [de los agricultores] tres de cada 10 años, o el 30 por ciento del tiempo. Tienen la responsabilidad de informar a los agricultores por adelantado [cuando van a arrendar]. Pero en la mayoría de los casos, las ciudades no necesitan agua en años de sequía; la necesitan al año siguiente para volver a llenar [los embalses]”.

Al dejar en barbecho un tercio de sus campos tres de cada diez años, los agricultores “hacen descansar” el 100 por ciento de su suelo una vez cada 10 años. Este es un proceso compatible con las prácticas recomendadas de rotación de cultivos y gestión del suelo, permitiendo al mismo tiempo que el agua propiamente dicha se convierta en un cultivo comercial. Nichols señala que con una rotación de cultivo de tres de cada diez años se puede satisfacer una demanda de 30 millones de metros cúbicos de agua con la participación del 40 por ciento de los regantes. Algunos agricultores creen que hasta el 80 por ciento querrá participar. No cabe duda alguna de que harán falta muchos participantes. Se estima que el déficit de oferta de agua en la cuenca del río Arkansas se incrementará a 100 millones de metros cúbicos para el año 2050. La prueba definitiva para el éxito de esta propuesta será si las grandes ciudades responsables de la mayoría de la actividad de buy-and-dry (Aurora, con una población de 346.000 y Colorado Springs, con una población de 440.000) se suscriben al programa. “El desafío principal sigue siendo la aceptación, por parte de las municipalidades, de arrendar en vez de comprar”, dice Nichols.

De pioneros a buy-and-dry

En el valle bajo del río Arkansas, el agua ha dividido a las comunidades durante gran parte del siglo XX. En el siglo XIX, dividió a países enteros. Este río fue el límite de tres fronteras internacionales a lo largo del tiempo: entre España y los Estados Unidos después del Tratado de Adams-Onís de 1819, que determinó la frontera de la Compra de la Luisiana entre los dos países; entre México y los Estados Unidos después de la independencia mexicana de España en 1821; y entre la República de Texas y los EE.UU. antes de la anexión de Texas en 1845. Dos años después de la firma del Tratado de Adams-Onís, se construyó el Camino de Santa Fe a lo largo del curso del río, atrayendo a comerciantes, soldados, mineros y colonizadores a Colorado. Estos pioneros desarrollaron algunos de los asentamientos iniciales de Colorado y, junto con ellos, proyectos de desvío de agua a lo largo de las riberas del río.

El Oeste es seco, y, aunque el río Arkansas es el segundo tributario más largo del río Mississippi, lleva muy poca agua a Colorado. Veamos cuán rápidamente se apropiaron de las aguas en el valle bajo del río Arkansas. Después de las apropiaciones iniciales de 1861, se promulgó la Ley de Colonización de 1862. Con los asentamientos, se fueron apropiando de más derechos sobre el agua. En 1874 se dictó el último decreto de derechos sobre el agua con una prioridad del 100 por ciento (lo que significa que siempre habría agua suficiente en el río para satisfacerlos), dos años antes de que Colorado se convirtiera en un estado en 1876.

Los derechos de agua de los que se apropiaron en 1887 tienen hoy en día prioridad menos del 50 por ciento del tiempo. Hoy en dia, los derechos de agua de 1896 tienen prioridad menos del 10 por ciento del tiempo. Esto quiere decir que un agricultor moderno en el valle del río Arkansas que tenga un derecho de agua establecido en 1896 por su bisabuelo podrá regar sólo el 10 por ciento del tiempo con una precipitación promedio. El resto del tiempo, cuando hay un “aviso sobre el río” (es decir, que no hay agua suficiente en el sistema para todos los poseedores de derechos), tendrá que desistir de desviar agua a sus campos, para que los tenedores de derechos de agua más veteranos la puedan usar.

Dada la excesiva apropiación de derechos del río Arkansas desde antes de comienzos del siglo, las ciudades comenzaron a comprar agua a los agricultores ya en la década de 1890. Pero la escasez de agua o los conflictos también se abordaron desarrollando proyectos de trasvases entre cuencas (que trasladaban agua desde otras cuencas hídricas al río Arkansas) o proyectos de almacenamiento (que trataban de acumular agua excedente en embalses durante periodos de gran caudal). Estos proyectos llegaron a su límite en la década de 1970. Fue entonces cuando las ciudades comenzaron a considerar seriamente los terrenos de regadíos.

En las décadas de 1970 y 1980, Colorado Springs y Aurora, junto con terratenientes corporativos y la Ciudad de Pueblo, adquirieron intereses sobre 22.000 hectáreas de suelo agrícola servido por el Canal Colorado. Estas ciudades desviaron posteriormente cerca de 90 millones de metros cúbicos de agua para uso municipal, secando la mayor parte del condado de Crowley. Crowley se transformó en el símbolo de buy-and-dry, y sigue ostentando hoy en día este título tan poco distinguido. Las tasas de pobreza superan el 35 por ciento. Las calles principales son una sombra de las comunidades que existían allí a mediados del siglo XX. Las plagas de malas hierbas nocivas y las tormentas de polvo son frecuentes en los suelos secos. La restauración de estas granjas a su estado de pradera original no solamente es caro; en la práctica, sería difícil o imposible.

Hoy en día, la pérdida de agricultura de regadío a causa de la venta de agua en el valle bajo del río Arkansas afecta a más de 40.000 hectáreas, lo cual representa más de 185 millones de metros cúbicos de agua al año. Algunas granjas continúan con su actividad, arrendando temporalmente suelo o agua de las ciudades a las que se los vendieron, pero estos contratos de arrendamiento vencerán pronto, lo que generará pérdidas aún mayores. En una región que históricamente regaba 130.000 hectáreas de suelo agrícola, un tercio de la tierra labrada está hoy seca, hay muy pocas o ninguna alternativa de uso de suelo económicamente viable, y la gente se pregunta si no nos estamos acercando a un punto sin retorno que marcará el colapso de la agricultura de regadío en el área.

“Como en gran parte del Oeste, la agricultura es el corazón de la herencia cultural de esta región”, dice Summer Waters, directora de Western Lands and Communities, un programa conjunto del Sonoran Institute y el Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. “No obstante, hemos ingresado en una era en que las ciudades también son parte de nuestro legado cultural. Esto nos plantea una pregunta que tenemos que contestar colectivamente: ¿Qué aspecto tendrá el nuevo Oeste?”

“Idealmente, tanto las ciudades como las áreas agrícolas podrán coexistir en el nuevo Oeste”, dice Waters. “La clave para encontrar un punto de equilibrio estriba en cómo manejamos nuestros recursos hídricos. El concepto de Super Ditch es una manera innovadora de flexibilizar nuestros sistemas de agua, y esta flexibilidad es fundamental en los momentos en que el suministro es incierto”.

Un pimiento prometedor en un lugar poco prometedor

Mike Bartolo está visiblemente frustrado. Teme que los travases de agua desplacen a la agricultura. “Estamos perdiendo parte de las tierras más fértiles del estado”, dice. “Estas son tierras de alta calidad que no existen en otros lugares. ¿Cómo se puede generar certeza en el sector [cuando está ocurriendo todo esto]? Esa es la cuestión”.

Bartolo, que tiene un doctorado en Fisiología Vegetal por la Universidad de Minnesota, es miembro del cuerpo académico hídrico de la Universidad Estatal de Colorado (CSU) y científico senior en el Centro de Investigación del Valle del río Arkansas de CSU. Es miembro de la junta directiva de Super Ditch, en representación del canal Bessemer (uno de los ocho canales participantes), del cual es accionista. Con derechos de agua establecidos en 1861, el canal Bessemer es una de las fuentes más antiguas y confiables de agua de las granjas del valle bajo del Arkansas, y riega algunos de los mejores suelos del valle. Bartolo todavía está lamentando la pérdida del 28 por ciento del agua del canal en 2009, vendida por agricultores que él conoce a la Junta de Aguas de Pueblo (Pueblo Board of Water Works, PBWW), la empresa que suministra agua municipal a la ciudad de Pueblo.

Según Nichols, ha habido ocasiones en que las ciudades se aproximaron estratégicamente a los agricultores cuando la situación era mala —una combinación de recesión, sequía, precios bajos de las materias primas, endeudamiento excesivo y otros factores— obligándolos a negociar desde una posición desventajosa. Pero también es cierto que algunos agricultores que estaban por jubilarse se unieron para negociar convenios de venta de agua al por mayor a las ciudades. Los accionistas del canal Bessemer que vendieron 5. 540 acciones a PBWW por US$10.150 la acción (una acción de agua del canal Bessemer irriga aproximadamente media hectárea) se estaban jubilando y no tenían herederos, y, en un momento en que los precios de los productos agrícolas estaban cayendo, intentaron capitalizarse con el aumento del valor del agua después de la grave sequía de 2002. Con la venta, que tuvo lugar en 2009, obtuvieron una ganancia neta de US$56 millones de dólares. Si se tiene en cuenta que el suelo sin riego se vende frecuentemente en la región por menos de US$750 por hectárea, se puede ver dónde reside su valor: en el agua. Para proteger a otros productores y la vida agrícola de las comunidades regadas por el canal Bessemer, Bartolo trató de convencer a los agricultores de que no vendieran, pero fue en vano. “Les dije: ‘Busquemos otras opciones, en servidumbres de conservación, en Super Ditch, pero hay que tener en cuenta que los vendedores estaban pensando en esto desde hacía ya mucho tiempo. Incluso si se hubieran mostrado interesados en otras alternativas, ninguna podía competir con la cantidad de dinero que les ofrecían”. (En ese momento, Super Ditch ya se había establecido como empresa, pero aún no estaba funcionando).

Los agricultores de la región tienen un gran respeto a Bartolo. Es un agricultor de cuarta generación que desarrolló la variedad Mosco del pimiento (chile o ají) verde picante Mirasol, que es la variedad más popular de pimientos verdes que crecen en la región, y el centro del Festival de Pimientos y Frijoles de Pueblo, que atrae a más de 100.000 personas de Colorado todos los años. Whole Foods decidió recientemente vender los pimientos Mosco del Valle del Arkansas, en vez de los pimientos Hatch de Nuevo México — duro golpe para el orgullo de Nuevo México, cuya verdura estatal es el pimiento picante.

Bartolo desarrolló el pimiento Mosco a partir de unas semillas que su padre recogió en la casa del tío de Mike, Henry Mosco, después de su muerte en 1988. Mike plantó las semillas. “Una de las plantas creció distinta”, dijo. “Tenía mejor rendimiento, daba frutos más grandes y pulpa más carnosa que lo hacía más fácil de asar”. Mike comenzó a cultivar esta variedad a partir de esta planta. Aisló las características que quería y repitió el proceso, desarrollando el pimiento durante un periodo de quince años.

Hay muchos productos de granja reconocidos que provienen del valle bajo del Arkansas: los melones cantalupo Rocky Ford y los pimientos Mosco son los principales. Mike los ha cultivado todos. De todas maneras, cuando se trata de introducir una nueva manera de utilizar el agua, como está tratando de hacer Super Ditch, Mike concede que hay mucho trabajo todavía por realizar. “Buy-and-dry se ha convertido en una actividad políticamente incorrecta para las ciudades, pero eso no ha amedrentado a otros especuladores [de cumplir el papel que antes tenían las empresas municipales de agua]”. A principios de este año, Pure Cycle, una empresa de servicios de agua potable y agua para alcantarillado que arrienda 6.000 hectáreas de suelo en el canal Fort Lyon a arrendatarios agrícolas, vendió las granjas a una filial de C&A Companies y Resource Land Holdings, LLC. C&A es una compañía que planea suministrar agua del río Arkansas a ciudades de la región de Front Range más al norte. “Estos mecanismos de transferencia alternativos tienen que definirse muy bien, y deben tener un historial para poder competir”, dice Bartolo. Tienen que ser igualmente expertos y rápidos en pagar en efectivo como en una venta directa de agua.

El agua como cultivo comercial

El valor del agua en el Oeste aumenta cada vez más. En el valle bajo del río Arkansas, hay una gran riqueza relacionada con el agua de los agricultores. Es irónico que las comunidades que poseen un activo tan valioso se estén enfrentando a pobreza y decadencia. Más desconcertante es todavía que los agricultores estén liquidando un activo cuyo valor sigue creciendo. Si se le pregunta a un asesor de inversiones: “¿Vendería usted un activo cuyo valor seguirá creciendo?”, probablemente responda: “No…, a menos que no tuviera otra alternativa, o que no hubiera ninguna otra manera de obtener beneficios de ese activo”.

Con respecto al agua, el problema es que en la actualidad hay una estricta dicotomía de opciones. Los granjeros que la poseen tienen medios limitados para ganar dinero, salvo: (1) cultivar alimentos y obtener ganancias de acuerdo al precio del mercado; o (2) vender el agua y obtener dinero por su valor vigente. En parte, esta limitación tiene que ver con la complejidad del derecho hídrico de Colorado. Si una ciudad quiere arrendar agua de un agricultor, tiene que obtener aprobación para el cambio de uso en los tribunales de agua. Para ello hay que llevar a cabo estudios de ingeniería y recurrir a expertos legales, con un costo de decenas de miles de dólares. El peticionario del cambio tiene que demostrarle al tribunal que otras partes que tienen derecho al agua, como los agricultores aguas abajo de la misma acequia, no se verán perjudicados. Si los tribunales o estas terceras partes disputan esta premisa, el costo de la solicitud de cambio de uso puede aumentar en cientos de miles de dólares. Pasar por un proceso como este para un arrendamiento temporal, junto con el deseo de las ciudades de garantizar el suministro de agua de manera permanente debido al crecimiento de su población, es otro factor que ha limitado históricamente el arrendamiento de agua.

Super Ditch, gracias a legislación propuesta por Nichols en 2013, permite que este trámite de cambio de uso se realice de manera mucho más eficiente, por medio de procedimientos administrativos supervisados por la Junta de Conservación de Agua de Colorado (CWCB). Ahora, Bartolo y Nichols están a la espera de lo que ocurra cuando los agricultores tengan más de dos opciones. Están persuadidos de que, si los agricultores pueden retener la propiedad del agua, cultivar alimentos y obtener ganancias del arriendo de agua todo al mismo tiempo —como lo harían con otros tipos de activos— la perspectiva económica del valle bajo del río Arkansas cambiará.

Esta opinión coincide con estudios económicos. Mientras el concepto de Super Ditch estaba cobrando impulso en 2007, el economista agrario George Oamek de CH2M Hill comparó distintas opciones para los agricultores: vender el agua, seguir cultivando, o seguir cultivando y al mismo tiempo participar en un programa rotativo de barbecho y arrendamiento. Sus proyecciones muestran que, en un horizonte de 40 años, los agricultores que vendan su agua ganarían más que los agricultores que sigan cultivando, pero los agricultores que cultivan y participan del programa de barbecho y arrendamiento ganarían los que más. En un comentario publicado en el diario Pueblo Chieftain después de realizado el estudio, Oamek dijo que Super Ditch podría asegurar el mejor precio para los agricultores: “En economía, se usa la colaboración como manera de conseguir un precio más alto”.

Por la misma razón, sin embargo, el concepto de barbecho y arrendamiento es difícil de vender a las grandes ciudades. Siguiendo el principio de colaboración de Oamek, las ciudades han estado colaborando entre sí para adquirir fuentes de agua agrícola a precios más bajos. El escepticismo de las ciudades se intensifica la preocupación inflacionaria. Si el costo del agua seguirá creciendo, ¿por qué no comprarla ahora, que los precios son bajos, para no tener que subir las tarifas?

Para resolver esta cuestión, Nichols investigó distintos mecanismos para establecer escalamientos de precios que protegieran a compradores y vendedores, como:

1. un escalamiento en base al mercado, siguiendo los precios de otros suministros de agua;
2. un escalamiento basado en el aumento de la cuota de impacto promedio de agua municipal a lo largo del tiempo;
3. un escalamiento basado en el aumento promedio de la tarifa de agua municipal a lo largo del tiempo;
4. un escalamiento basado en los costos, de acuerdo al Índice de Precios al Consumidor y el Índice de Precios del Productor.

El proyecto piloto con Fountain, Security y Fowler garantiza la estabilidad de precios ajustando el precio del arrendamiento cada cinco años de acuerdo al cambio porcentual del Índice de Costos de Servicios Públicos de Colorado publicado por la Liga Municipal de Colorado.

Con un precio de US$0,40 por metro cúbico, el arrendamiento de agua vigente de Super Ditch se traducirá en un ingreso de un cuarto de millón de dólares este año para los cinco agricultores participantes, además del ingreso por el cultivo de las tierras que no están en barbecho. Algunos de estos cultivos, como el forraje, son de bajo valor, y el arrendamiento de agua genera un buen ingreso al contrario que estos cultivos. Otros, como los melones y pimientos, son cultivos de alto valor. Bartolo está entusiasmado con la retención de estos ingresos agrícolas, porque cree que generarán un efecto multiplicador en las diversas comunidades del valle. “Con 5.000 metros cúbicos de agua puedo cultivar una hectárea de pimientos, o sea, unos 35 metros cúbicos, lo cual genera de US$10.000 a US$15.000 en ingresos a puerta de granja”.

Aun cuando los precios del agua municipal están aumentando, si tenemos en cuenta la escasez que enfrenta el Oeste, siguen siendo bajos. Las ciudades han tratado de mantener los precios bajos adquiriendo la mayor cantidad de agua posible y lo antes posible, siempre dentro de los límites de la doctrina antiespeculativa de Colorado.

Al diversificar los “tipos” de agua que determinan los precios —tanto en la llave de paso (precio del servicio público) como en la compuerta del canal (precio de la materia prima)— Super Ditch puede crear una innovación disruptiva para alterar el precio del agua en consonancia con la realidad del Oeste. Si los agricultores retienen el control del agua y la arriendan a las ciudades, los precios se ajustarán de acuerdo a la demanda creciente, en un entorno de propiedad diversificada. Este es un nuevo tipo de competencia en el mercado, y enhorabuena por ello. El crecimiento urbano no tiene que venir acompañado de una decadencia rural. Y un vaso de agua puede seguir siendo la bebida más barata para acompañar un plato de pimientos rellenos cultivados en la región.

Scott Campbell es un galardonado planificador y consultor de conservación especializado en formar equipos diversos para resolver problemas medioambientales, sociales y económicos complejos. Scott fue fellow Lincoln Loeb de 2015 en la Escuela de Diseño para Graduados de la Universidad de Harvard, y también fellow en el Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. Anteriormente, Scott dirigió uno de los mayores fideicomisos de suelos del país: la Fundación William J. Palmer Parks.

Fotografía: John Wark/Airphoto NA