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In recent years, politicians, lobbyists and voters in the United States have often seemed polarized—or paralyzed—over where to draw the line between private and public rights in land. Common property, defined as group- or community-owned private property, straddles that line.
Most recognized common property is in natural resources, and most recognized commoners are rural people in developing countries. But the concept of commons might also apply to some aspects of urban land in the United States. At the least, common property theory may help U.S. policymakers understand more clearly what is at stake in debates about land rights.
At Voices from the Commons, the June 1996 conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property in Berkeley, California, the Lincoln Institute assembled a dozen researchers and practitioners from the U.S. to discuss these new forms of commons, some of which are described in this article:
Property Rights and Land Use Strategies
Economist Daniel Bromley and legal scholar Carol Rose have proposed independent but roughly compatible schemes for classifying property regimes. Bromley focuses on the form of land rights, while Rose focuses on management strategies:
PROPERTY IN LAND
Bromley Rose
1. private property rights
2. state keep out
3. nonproperty do nothing
4. common property right way
Option 1 on each of these lists is classically private property. The owner’s rights are exclusive, and the owner decides what to do with the land. Option 2 is often associated with public land, in the sense that government owns it and decides what, if anything, can be done and who can do it on the land. Option 3 is the situation often lamented as “the tragedy of the commons,” in which the land is owned by no one, and everyone therefore has both access and incentives to abuse it. Despite the “tragedy of the commons” language, this option is better described as “open access,” “unowned” or “nonproperty.” Option 4 is most often associated with common property, defined as private property owned and managed in a specific “right” way by a group of people.
There is not a perfect correspondence between Rose’s strategies and Bromley’s categories. “Keep out” as a strategy may apply to either private or group-owned property as well as public lands–wherever the main strategy is to restrict access to a defined group, or to no one. The “right way” strategy may apply to “nonproperty” as well as commons–if anyone, and not just members of a specific group, can use the resource simply by following the prescribed rules of use.
Nevertheless, putting Bromley’s and Rose’s lists side-by-side suggests that the distinguishing feature of common property may be assigning land both to a specific group of people and to prescribed uses.
Most urban land in the United States is defined as either private or public property. Yet such land may be more like common property than is usually recognized. Zoning and environmental regulations, for example, do not allow private landowners to do anything and everything with “their” land. Instead, for example, the private owners of land next to a river may not be permitted to install underground oil storage tanks. Those aspects of land use that affect the community’s quality of life or shared environment are managed almost like common property.
What Makes a Successful Commons?
Elinor Ostrom has identified two prerequisites for successful common property regimes: the system must face significant environmental uncertainty, and there must be social stability in the group of owners/users. As Ostrom puts it, commoners must have “shared a past and expect to share a future.” They must be capable not just of “short-term maximization but long-term reflection about joint outcomes.”
Environmental instability gives commoners an incentive to share risks. Social stability allows or forces them to preserve resources for future generations. For example, in many Alpine villages, herds are private property but summer pastures are common property. To avoid overgrazing and free-riding, individual farmers cannot graze more sheep and goats on the summer pastures than they can feed privately over the winter. Access to the summer pastures helps to guarantee all families, whatever their private resources, a chance to earn a living.
Environmental instability and social stability are usually associated with rural places. Rural landowners face the random risks of droughts, floods and plagues, and are known–accurately or inaccurately–for their sense of community.
Do these requirements exist in the urban United States? Perhaps. Environmental instability is easy enough to find, if “environment” is defined as social and economic as well as physical. For many inner-city residents, depopulation, gentrification, or plant and base closings are just as random and devastating as floods or plagues. The social stability of these neighborhoods may be largely involuntary, created by economic and racial barriers to mobility. But some community activists also see human knowledge, social relationships and the land itself in such places as “social capital,” which can be mobilized for development through new forms of ownership.
Pros and Cons of Common Property
Most scholars who have written about common property have seen commoners as political and economic underdogs. A classic example is villagers defending their traditional forest grazing grounds against timber companies or government foresters who want to prohibit grazing to protect tree seedlings or prevent erosion. But commoners may also be prosperous or even highly privileged. For example, many private or gated “common interest” communities attempt to wall in high home values and wall out social and economic diversity.
Commoners are by definition conservative. To preserve their shared resources, they must exclude or expel anyone not willing to follow their land use rules. They must also keep the individuals who make the most productive or profitable use of the common property from taking their share of the proceeds and “cashing out” of the system. Although less comforting than the stereotype of downtrodden commoners who share and share alike, exclusionary commons may still be preferable to either privatization or state control.
But in practice, both these options may speed up resource exhaustion. Private owners may extract the maximum cash value from their land as quickly as possible, rather than preserve resources for their own or anyone else’s future use. “Keep out” signs may not keep local people from extracting resources unsustainably from government lands–in fact, hostility toward a distant government may encourage such behavior.
Economist William Fischel has applied this implicit comparison to U.S. local governments’ primary dependence on land-based (property) taxes. He sees all residents in a jurisdiction as commoners who share an interest in maximizing local land values. Fischel argues that California’s Proposition 13 was exactly the equivalent of turning a village commons into a national park. By restricting local property taxes and giving state government a stronger role in school funding, Proposition 13 transferred “ownership” of the schools from face-to-face communities to a distant government.
From the local taxpayers’ vantage point, this upward transfer of responsibility changed their schools from a local “commons,” with strong norms about the “right way” to finance and use education, into state property, which local residents almost saw as nonproperty. As a result, the quality of California schools was leveled across local jurisdictions, but it was leveled down rather than up. Education was exhausted rather than managed sustainably.
New Commons
A few experimental forms of land ownership and management in the U.S.–including land trusts, neighborhood-managed parks, community-supported agriculture and limited-equity housing cooperatives–explicitly avoid the extremes of private or public property. All these “new” forms of common property fit Carol Rose’s description of option 4: “right way.” All aim to foster or protect specific land uses or groups of users.
These experiments with property rights and responsibilities raise questions that few researchers, either on urban development or on common property, have yet addressed. When and how should local policymakers support experiments with “common property”? For example, should local and state officials help to remove regulatory barriers to group ownership of land, or support new criteria for mortgage financing of group-owned land?
There are also long-standing legal objections to “perpetuities”–trying to tie the hands of future owners about how to use their land. To avoid these objections, land trusts must sometimes seek special legal exemptions, or even change state property laws. The long-term costs and benefits of common property experiments, however, may depend less on the initial distribution of land rights than on shifting local politics and economic conditions. Finding answers to these questions will require close collaboration between researchers and practitioners.
Sidebars
Land Trusts and Limited-Equity Cooperatives
Much of land’s market value depends on whether it contains important natural resources, is located in a thriving community, or has access to services and infrastructure provided by government. The nineteenth-century American philosopher Henry George argued that all these values were created by something other than private action, and should therefore be captured for public use through taxation.
In recent years, land trusts and other groups have experimented with distributing the costs and benefits of land development in much the same way as proposed by Henry George, but through new forms of land ownership rather than taxation. Some of these experiments include limited-equity cooperatives and land trusts such as Boston’s Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative. The Dudley Street project has made the land in an inner-city redevelopment area the common property of a nonprofit group, while allowing private ownership of homes and other buildings.
Using similar arguments, groups such as the Connecticut-based Equity Trust have dedicated the “social increment” in property values–the increase in land prices as a neighborhood recovers from blight, or a small town grows–to social purposes. For example, the portion of a home’s sale price that is due to the increase in land values rather than housing construction costs is used to subsidize the purchase price for the next homeowner.
Incidental Open Spaces
Vacant lots, old cemeteries and partially buried urban streams raise a host of questions about managing urban landscapes as commons. Groups seeking to reclaim or use such incidental urban open spaces must often persuade private owners to let them use and help to maintain the land. Some geographers and planners have remapped cities’ neglected, and in practice often “unowned,” open spaces.
Groups such as the Waterways Restoration Institute in Berkeley, California, have built on this research to help low-income city residents uncover and restore forgotten streams and their banks, turning them from neighborhood eyesores into neighborhood treasures. The process increases residents’ appreciation of the interdependence between the city and nature, which they often think of as exclusively suburban or rural.
Housing
For the elderly, single-parent households and many low-income families, detached single-family housing is either inappropriate or priced beyond reach. Yet traditional land use regulations, grounded partly in concerns about property values, favor only single-family housing. Advocates of privatization, in the U.S. as well as in developing or transitioning economies, often argue for converting common property into private ownership to promote reinvestment or increase property values. Organizations serving the homeless, such as San Francisco’s HomeBase, are seeing this argument applied even to traditionally public spaces such as doorways, parks and bus benches. To discourage the homeless from occupying these spaces, some local businesses and neighbors support regulations that convert them into quasi-private property.
Yet in all these settings, some researchers and practitioners have also proposed to manage the housing stock as a whole as a form of common property, both to meet needs not met by single-family detached housing and to encourage neighborhood reinvestment. In the U.S., researchers such as Cornell’s Patricia Pollak have examined the sources of opposition to, and the consequences of, converting some single-family homes into group quarters, accessory apartments and elder cottages. Many home and business owners who oppose these land uses in interviews, expecting them to depress property values, are ironically unaware that their neighborhoods already contain some of this alternative housing.
Converted Military Bases
For each base closed, the federal government offers planning funds to a single organization. That organization must represent the entire local community affected by the base closing, from public to private interests and across local political jurisdictions. Researchers such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Bernard Frieden are now studying the way that communities around these bases, which often include very diverse interests, are being forced to create at least temporary “commons” structures to receive federal grants.
Few bases have been all the way through the conversion process yet, so it remains to be seen whether these temporary structures will be converted for permanent land ownership or management. In the Oakland-San Francisco area, however, the Earth Island Institute’s Carl Anthony and others on the East Bay Conversion and Reinvestment Commission consciously considered long-term group or community ownership of some base lands as a way to meet regional needs for housing, open space and jobs.
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Alice E. Ingerson, director of publications at the Lincoln Institute, earned her Ph.D. in cultural anthropology, for research on the politics of rural industrialization in Portugal. She moderated the session “Is There an Urban Commons in the U.S.?” at the 1996 Voices from the Commons conference in California.
References
Steve Barton and Carol Silverman, Common Interest Communities: Private Governments and the Public Interest (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1994).
Daniel Bromley, Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991).
William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Carol M. Rose, “Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources,” Duke Law Journal 1991, no. 1 (February 1991), pp. 1-38.
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The collapse of communism in the early 1990s launched an era of political and economic reforms in Russia and throughout the former Soviet Union that introduced democracy and the free market economy to countries that previously had no experience with either of these concepts. In Russia privatization of land was one of the first items on the reform agenda, and by the end of 1992 the Russian Parliament had adopted the federal law On the Payment for Land. This law set normative land values differentiated by regions to be used for taxation, as well as a basis for land rent and purchase. At the time the country had no land market, so this was considered a very progressive measure. Lands that were previously held in public ownership were rapidly distributed to individuals, and by 1998 some 129 million hectares of land were privately held by some 43 million landowners. Introduction of private ownership rights in land also meant the introduction of the land tax, since owners or users of land plots became eligible to pay for their real property assets.
Economic reforms in Russia were accompanied by inflation that ran thousands of percent annually. To maintain revenue yields, local and regional authorities adjusted normative land values accordingly. As land market activity started to develop in the mid-1990s, some of these authorities used market price information to make land value adjustments. As a result land taxes became absolutely inconsistent with the economic situation, and tax amounts were not comparable for similar properties located in different jurisdictions.
By the late 1990s the land tax system had developed faults that required tax reform on a nationwide scale. The basic outline of the tax reform included the following features:
Reform of the land tax is seen as part of a wider property tax reform. The current property tax system in Russia includes a number of taxes: individual property tax; enterprise property tax; land tax; and real property tax. While the first three are operational, the fourth tax has been tested as an experiment since 1997 in two cities, Novgorod Veliky and Tver (Malme and Youngman 2001, Chapter 6). It is expected that when Russia is in a position to introduce the real property tax nationally, the first three taxes will be canceled.
In 1999 the Land Cadastre Service of Russia, a land administration authority of the federal government, was delegated the responsibility to develop mass valuation methods and to implement the country’s first mass valuation of all land. The government chose mass valuation, identifying the sales comparison, income and cost approaches as the basic valuation models that needed to be developed. Land is valued at its site value as if it were vacant.
Implementation of a mass valuation system has been constrained by the lack of reliable land market data, however. The housing market is the only developed market in Russia that can be characterized by a large number of sales transactions. These transactions are spread unevenly throughout the country, with large cities characterized by many transactions and high prices for apartments, whereas small towns and settlements have few examples of real estate sales. The national land market recorded some 5.5 million transactions annually, with only about 6 percent of them being actual buying and selling transactions. Official data from land registration authorities could not be used as a data source because transacting parties often conceal the true market price to avoid paying transfer taxes.
This lack of reliable market data has forced the developers of mass valuation models to identify other factors that may influence the land market. The model developed for valuation of urban land included some 90 layers of information that were geo-referenced to digital land cadastre maps of cities and towns. Apart from available market information, these data layers included features of physical infrastructure such as transport, public utilities, schools, stores and other structures. Environmental factors also are taken into consideration.
Mass valuation methods in Russia have identified 14 types of urban land use that can be assigned to each cadastral block. Thus, the model can set the tax base according to the current or highest and best land use. The actual tax base established for each land plot is calculated as the price of a square meter of land in a cadastral block multiplied by the area of the plot.
It took one year of development and model testing and two years of further work to complete the cadastral valuation of urban land throughout Russia. Actual valuation results suggest that the model works accurately with lands occupied by the housing sector. The correlation between actual market data and mass valuation results is between 0.6 and 0.7 on a scale of 0 to 1.0, with greater accuracy in areas where the land market is better developed.
Cadastral valuation of agricultural land is based on the income approach, since availability of agricultural land market information is extremely limited. Legislation allowing the sale of agricultural land became effective in early 2002. The data used to value agricultural land included information on soils and actual farm production figures over the last 30 years. Mass valuation of forested lands was also based on the income approach. Russian land law also identifies a special group of industrial lands located outside the city limits that includes industrial sites, roads, railroads, and energy and transport facilities. These lands proved to be a difficult subject for mass valuation because there are so many unique types of structures and objects on them; individual valuation is often applied to them instead.
Over the past four years, some 95 percent of Russia’s territory has been valued using mass valuation methodology. The Federal Land Cadastre Service continues to refine and improve its methods in preparation for the enactment of relevant legislation authorizing the introduction of a new value-based land tax. During this period, the Cadastre Service organized a Workshop on Mass Valuation Systems of Land (Real Estate) for Taxation Purposes, in Moscow in 2002, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It also assembled a delegation for the Lincoln Institute’s course Introducing a Market Value-Based Mass Appraisal System for Taxation of Real Property, in Vilnius in 2003 (see related article).
Alexey L. Overchuk is deputy chief of the Federal Land Cadastre Service of Russia and deputy chairman of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Working Party for Land Administration.
Reference
Malme, Jane H. and Joan M. Youngman. 2001. The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies from Central and Eastern Europe. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization/library9/malme_propertytax.pdf
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The core competence of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is the analysis of issues related to land, and ours is one of the few organizations in the world with this focus.
The Institute’s current work program, both in the United States and in selected countries around the world, encompasses the taxation of land, the operation of land markets, the regulation of land and land use, the impacts of property rights, and the distribution of benefits from land development. This focus on land derives from the Institute’s founding objective—to address the links between land policy and social and economic progress—as expressed by Henry George, the nineteenth-century political economist and social philosopher.
The Institute plays a leading role in the analysis of land and property taxation, land valuation and appraisal, the design of land information and cadastral systems, and the reform and establishment of property tax systems. Work on the operation of land markets includes the analysis of transit-oriented development and research on urban housing and the expansion of urban areas. The regulation of land encompasses work on smart growth and growth management, visualizing density and the physical impact of development, mediating land use disputes, land conservation, and the management of state trust lands in the West. Analysis of property rights includes research on diverse topics including informal markets and land titling in developing countries, the establishment of conservation easements, and the preservation of farmland. Much work is underway on the distribution of benefits from land development, including value capture taxation, tax increment financing, university-led development, and community land trusts that seek to promote affordable housing.
While the Institute’s work in recent years has emphasized urban land issues, it has also addressed problems beyond urban boundaries such as conservation, management of state trust lands, and farmland preservation. A balance of activities across urban and rural topics will persist as the Institute’s work program continues to focus on land issues of relevance to social and economic development. The Institute will not normally address topics that lack a strong link to land policy.
Communicating new findings through education programs, publications, and Web-based products is a core Institute activity. The overarching objective is to strengthen the capacity of public officials, professionals, and citizens to make better decisions by providing them with relevant information, ideas, methods, and analytic tools. The Institute offers traditional courses and seminars, and is moving aggressively to make many of its offerings available on the Web as either programmed instruction or as online courses with real-time interactions between students and instructors. The Institute also develops training materials and makes them available to others, for example through activities in several developing countries that involve the training of trainers in topics such as appraisal and tax administration.
Research strengthens the Institute’s training programs and contributes to knowledge about land policy generally. The Institute supports both mature scholars who conduct groundbreaking research and advanced students who are working on their dissertations or thesis research. The Institute offers several fellowship programs and other opportunities for researchers to propose work on important topics that can contribute to current debates on land policy. The results of this research are regularly posted on the Institute Web site as working papers and are published in books, conference proceedings, and policy focus reports.
Demonstration and evaluation activities constitute the third major component of the Institute’s agenda. Recently the Institute has begun to combine education, training, research, and dissemination in demonstration projects that apply knowledge, data collection, and analysis to the development and implementation of specific policies in the areas of property taxation, planning, and development. These projects are being expanded to include the analysis of policies as they are applied, and to assess and evaluate outcomes in terms of the intended objectives of the policies. The goal is to provide more rigorous evidence about how well and in what circumstances specific land and tax policies achieve their objectives so that information can be incorporated into future research and training programs.
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We suggest that a better approach is to link IH to the ongoing process of rezoning—either by the developer or by local government initiative—thus treating it explicitly as a vehicle for recapturing for public benefit some part of the gain in land value resulting from public action.
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Limited access to land is a substantial hindrance to economic development in many transition economies. Additionally, when the ability to gain appropriate permits to use the land is subject to delays, bribes, or corruption, the efficiency of the land allocation mechanism is compromised and overall economic growth is constrained.
In this article I summarize findings from empirical models of land access, permit activity, time costs, and corruption, using both country and firm characteristics as explanatory variables. Data come from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)–World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS 2009) for business enterprises in transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, supplemented with country-specific economic measures and EBRD indices of reform. Results indicate that limited access to land and difficulty in obtaining permits are substantial impediments to economic development, and these conditions clearly create an environment in which bribery flourishes.
Land Markets in Transition Economies
The context of this study is analysis of firm-level performance in transition economies where access to land has been subject to varying types of land privatization regimes in the past 20 years since independence. Stanfield (1999, 1–2) provides a helpful strategy for thinking about how land markets have been created in such economies, recognizing that “Markets in land linked to markets in capital and labor are central to market economies.”
Indeed, land market liberalization must be linked to liberalization of capital and labor markets simultaneously if transition countries are to advance their economies. Stanfield also suggests that many existing institutions of land administration must make radical changes to support the privatization of land rights. Defining and enforcing property rights and providing transparent and efficient land registration mechanisms free of bribery and corruption are essential to supporting economic development (Estrin et al. 2009).
Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny (1995) suggest two ways that access to land and real estate is critical to restructuring a transition economy and promoting economic development in general. First, land and buildings are complementary to plants and equipment, which typically have already been privatized in these countries. Until land and buildings are also privatized, control of these productive assets continues to be held jointly by local politicians and managers, leading to an inefficient ownership structure. Second, privatization of land and real estate provides firms with a source of capital for restructuring their business investments. For example, a former state-owned enterprise that has surplus land and buildings can sell those assets to raise funds for other investments. However, Boycko, Schleifer, and Vishny (1995, 136) conclude, “Because it serves local governments so well, politicization of urban land and real estate persists, and slows down the restructuring of old firms and the creation of new ones.”
Deininger (2003) makes the case that well-functioning land markets foster general economic development, citing four key tenets. First, in many developing economies the distribution of land ownership prevents operational efficiency. If land ownership cannot be transferred easily, or if land use is not separable from land ownership, then there may be a mismatch between the owners and the most efficient land users. If land markets are allowed to transfer land use from less productive to more productive uses, then overall economic efficiency is enhanced. Second, transferable land use rights can allow rural residents to move into the nonagricultural sector of the economy, which can help boost the output of that sector and the overall economy. Third, by making land use rights transferable the ownership and use of land can be separated, facilitating more efficient land use. Fourth, a well-developed land market allows land transfers to occur with low transaction costs, which frees up credit in the economy.
Economic Consequences of Limited Access to Land
Firms use a combination of land, labor, and capital inputs to produce a given quantity of output. Consider a situation where the first input is land, for which the firm faces a constraint on the quantity available, but the other two inputs are freely available in any quantity needed. In a competitive market, a profit-maximizing firm uses additional units of any freely available input until the value of the additional product derived from the last unit of the input used equals its market price. In this case, however, if the available land is constrained, the firm would purchase a less than optimal amount. Consequently, the firm would not achieve an optimal input combination, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources.
Even if the quantity of land is not constrained, obstacles to obtaining building, construction, or use permits may impede the conduct of business. In such circumstances, the amount of land may be accessible, but the permitting process increases its effective price. Once again, the firm is forced to operate inefficiently.
In either situation one could ask, “What would the firm be willing to pay in order to be able to operate most efficiently?” Clearly, the land constraint or permit restriction imposes a cost on the firm and reduces its efficiency, and the firm presumably would be willing to pay a bribe to a government official to gain access to additional land or obtain a permit to use the available land. Hence, limited access to land and permits can encourage informal payments or bribes. Carlin, Schaffer, and Seabright (2007) have suggested that managers’ responses to survey questions regarding the business environment in which they operate and the constraints they face can measure the hidden implicit cost of those constraints.
Country and Firm Data and Survey Results
The primary data for this study are 15 country-specific characteristics from various sources and 13 firm characteristics from the 2009 round of the EBRD-World Bank BEEPS, which is conducted every three years. The survey covers a broad range of topics related to the business environment and performance of firms as well as questions on business-government relations. A total of 11,999 business enterprises in 30 transition economies of Europe and Central Asia are represented. These data have been used extensively in the transition and development literatures, most recently in Commander and Svenjar (2011). Table 1 lists the country and firm characteristics and indicates their effects on five aspects of economic development.
Access to Land as an Obstacle to Economic Development
The BEEPS questionnaire asks firms about a number of potential obstacles to efficient operation, including access to land. A key question asks, “Is access to land No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Moderate Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” Survey respondents may also respond “Do not know” or “Does not apply.” Overall, 43 percent of the firms surveyed reported land access as an obstacle to some extent. There is wide variation in firm responses across the countries in the sample, however, with the share of firms reporting land access as an obstacle ranging from a low of 6 percent in Hungary to a high of 62 percent in Kosovo (figure 1).
Nine of the 15 possible country-specific explanatory variables have a statistically discernable effect on the likelihood that a firm will report land access as an obstacle (table 1, column 1). Firms were more likely to report land access obstacles in CIS countries (Commonwealth of Independent States, or former Soviet republics) and in faster growing countries. The CIS effect is particularly important, with firms in those countries approximately 28 percent more likely to report land access obstacles than comparable firms in non-CIS transition countries. In countries with a high VAT rate, firms were less likely to report access to land as an obstacle.
Among the EBRD indices of reform listed in table 1, the mixed likelihood of increases and decreases on these measures may indicate that uneven reforms across sectors of the economy can have opposing effects on firms’ experiences. If land privatization and policies providing land access are not moving in tandem with financial market reforms and broader privatization reforms, such a pattern of mixed signs may emerge.
Firm characteristics associated with a greater likelihood of land access obstacles include competition against unregistered or informal firms, subsidization of the firm by the government, the number of employees, and limited partnership legal status. Of particular note are the firms that report they compete against informal market firms and those that are subsidized by the government. These two characteristics increase the reported probability of land access obstacles by 8 and 6 percent, respectively.
Presumably, state-subsidized firms also report that they compete against unregistered or informal market firms, so the combined increase in probability may be approximately 14 percent. On the other hand, characteristics associated with lower probabilities of reporting land access as an obstacle include operating in the manufacturing sector or having a more experienced manager.
Beyond merely stating that land access is an obstacle, firms were asked to report on the severity of the obstacle (figure 2). On a scale from zero to 4 (with zero indicating no obstacle and 4 indicating a very severe obstacle), the overall mean for the 5,206 firms responding to this question is 2.47. When we correct for sample selection bias, we take into account that firms reporting land access as an obstacle may be systematically different from those not reporting an obstacle. Country and firm characteristics with statistically significant positive and negative effects of severity are shown in table 1, column 2.
The BEEPS also includes a way for the interviewer to respond to concerns about truthfulness in the survey responses: “It is my perception that the responses to the questions regarding opinions and perceptions (were): Truthful, Somewhat truthful, Not truthful.” Interviewer suspicions are associated with a greater likelihood of reporting land access as an obstacle (about a 3 percent greater probability). For example, among firms reporting land access as an obstacle, interviewer suspicions were associated with a significantly less intense reported obstacle. Apparently, suspicions are raised in the mind of the survey recorder when the firm representative is being overly optimistic relative to the recorder’s expectations.
Permit Seeking
In order to use the land to which it has access, a firm must be able to obtain relevant permits that can be crucial to the production process. By impeding land use, construction, or business occupancy permits, government officials may limit effective access to land. The BEEPS includes questions regarding the number of permits the firm obtained during the previous two years, the number of working days the staff spent on procedures related to obtaining those permits, formal and informal payments for permits, and waiting periods from application to receipt of permits. One question asks, “How many permits did this establishment obtain in the last two years?” Another asks, “How many working days were spent by all staff members on the procedures related to obtaining the permits applied for over the last two years?”
Responses to these questions are used in modeling both the number of permit applications and the related time costs (figures 3 and 4). About 34 percent of the businesses in the survey applied for permits, with a mean number of 3.9 applications, a mean number of 38.0 working days of effort, and a mean waiting time of 45.9 days. There is a very high variance among countries in the number of permits applied for, the days of effort expended, and the waiting time for permits.
The model of the number of permit applications reflects the interaction of supply and demand factors. A firm demands permits as it plans to develop its property while the government supplies permits according to its rules. Nine country characteristics have a significant effect on the number of permit applications requested, with four factors increasing the number and five factors decreasing it (table 1, column 3).
To understand time costs involved for firms seeking permits, the modeling approach involves a first-stage model to control for the selection bias that may exist with systematic differences between firms applying for permits and those that do not apply. The second-stage model results for permit time cost show that ten country-specific variables have statistically discernable effects—four factors increase staff time expended and six factors reduce staff time (table 1, column 4). Two firm-specific factors significantly increase days of effort, while six reduce the number of days of effort.
Bribes to Government Officials
The BEEPS also asks a question about informal payments to government officials: “Thinking about officials, would you say the following statement is always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom or never true?… It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay some irregular ‘additional payments or gifts’ to get things done…” Responses are coded on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 being never and 6 being always (figure 5). In a simple regression model of the frequency of bribes, ten country-specific explanatory variables and five firm-specific variables have statistically discernable effects (table 1, column 5).
Summary and Conclusions
Limited access to land and permits to use that land can contributes to economic inefficiency and corruption in transition countries. In this research I have estimated empirical models of firms reporting limited access to land and permits and instances of bribery as obstacles to economic development. Those models indicate that both country and firm characteristics affect land access, permit access and effort, and bribery.
At the country level, higher per capita GDP systematically reduces the likelihood of firms seeking permits, the number of permits, and the time cost to obtain them. That implies that more developed economies require fewer permits and present lower permit obstacles, thereby reducing costs. Furthermore, the higher the GDP growth rate the greater the likelihood that firms experience limited access to land and the need to apply for permits, as well as the likelihood that firms are asked to pay bribes. This may indicate bottlenecks in the development process as firms in CIS countries are much more likely to report that access to land is an obstacle. They also are required to apply for more permits, and they incur much larger time costs related to permit applications.
Higher corporate tax rates do not affect access to land or permits, but do increase the likelihood of being asked to pay bribes. Firms in more highly privatized economies report fewer problems with access to land and fewer permits needed, but more problems related to bribery. Indices of privatization and reform are often significant, but have both positive and negative impacts. This may reflect uneven reform processes in which liberalization in one sector of the economy does not have full impact due to constraints in other sectors.
Firms competing against others that are unregistered or operate in the informal market are more likely to report limited access to land, more likely to seek permits and incur time costs related to permits, and more likely to be asked to pay bribes. Firms subsidized by the government or those with larger numbers of employees also are more likely to report limited access to land, seek more permits, and incur larger permit time costs.
The primary lesson to be learned from this research is that limited access to land is a serious obstacle to economic development in transition countries. Furthermore, the ability to obtain permits to effectively use that land is crucial. Limited access to land and permits not only hinders economic development, but also contributes to a culture of bribery and corruption. Countries wishing to speed their development process should therefore remove impediments to land access by fostering markets for land and land use rights, and should also remove unnecessary obstacles in the permit process. The result will be a more efficient use of land and a more dynamic economy.
About the Author
John E. Anderson is the Baird Family Professor of Economics in the College of Business Administration at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. He has served as an advisor to public policy makers in the fields of public finance, fiscal reform, and tax policy in the United States and in transition economies.
References
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1995. Privatizing Russia. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. 2009. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/BEEPS
Carlin, Wendy, Mark E. Schaffer, and Paul Seabright. 2007. Where are the real bottlenecks? Evidence from 20,000 firms in 60 countries about the shadow costs of constraints to firm performance. Discussion Paper Number 3059. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Commander, Simon, and Jan Svenjar. 2011. Business environment, exports, ownership, and firm performance. The Review of Economics and Statistics 93: 309–337.
Deininger, Klaus. 2003. Land markets in developing and transition economies: Impact of liberalization and implications for future reform. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85: 1217–1222.
Estrin, Saul, Jan Hanousek, Evzen Kocenda, and Jan Svenjar. 2009. Effects of privatization and ownership in transition economies. Journal of Economic Literature 47: 699–728.
Stanfield, J. David. 1999. Creation of land markets in transition countries: Implications for the institutions sof land administration. Working Paper Number 29. Madison: University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center.
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A New Yorker cartoon by Jack Ziegler captures the essential irony of buying into condominiums, cooperatives, and other homeowner associations. A car is entering a driveway that leads to a group of townhouses in the distance, and a sign by the entrance proclaims, “Welcome to Condoville and the Illusion of Owning Your Own Property” (Ziegler 1984).
Despite this ambiguity, about a quarter of the American population now lives in association housing situations, collectively known as common interest communities (CICs). Figure 1 shows the tremendous increase in CICs over the past several decades. From 1970 to 2013, the number of housing units in such communities spiked from about 700,000 to 26.3 million, while the number of residents multiplied more than 30-fold from 2.1 million to 65.7 million.
With their growing popularity, common interest communities have raised policy challenges and legal issues that require ongoing resolution. These conflicts generally reflect either external concerns that CICs segregate the wealthy from the rest of society or internal disagreements between individual owners and their associations’ governing bodies. This article examines some of the controversies associated with the CIC model and its governance, and suggests approaches for enhancing the benefits of common interest communities for both property owners and society at large.
The Rise of Common Interest Communities
With increasing industrialization during the 19th century, the intrusion of pollution, traffic, noise, and disease led many planners and citizens to favor the separation of residential, commercial, and industrial uses. (Zoning had not yet emerged as a planning tool and would not be validated by the Supreme Court of the United States until 1926.) Some residential developers thus imposed “servitudes”—covenants, restrictions, and easements—on their subdivision projects. Servitudes generally restricted the properties to residential uses and often created shared rights to communal facilities and services in exchange for fees. Lot purchasers agreed to the servitudes, and once the restrictions were recorded, subsequent purchasers were also legally bound. The common law proved to be an effective vehicle for creating high-end residential areas, including New York City’s Gramercy Park (1831) and Boston’s Louisburg Square (1844).
After a slowdown during the Great Depression and World War II, construction of CICs began to boom in the late 1960s, after the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) recognized the condominium as an insurable ownership vehicle, and state statutory authorization followed. FHA mortgage insurance encouraged developers to build middle-class condominiums, which gained market acceptance as a result of the “new town” movement—exemplified by early planned communities such as Reston, Virginia (1964), and Columbia, Maryland (1967). The passage of California’s Proposition 13, the initiative that limited property taxation in 1978, and similar measures in other states also spurred an increase in CICs, as cash-strapped local governments, under increased pressure to provide more services, were unwilling to absorb the infrastructure and service costs from new development. As a result, they tended to approve new developments only in CIC form, where the developer (and ultimately the owners) covered the costs.
Today, CIC owners are generally subject to a variety of constraints related to their private units, from limitations on the layout and design of buildings and the type of construction materials used, to restrictions on visible home decorations, ancillary structures, and landscaping. There are often controls on the owner’s behavior and use of the property, which is typically limited to residential occupancy. Noise, parking, and traffic rules may also be imposed, along with vehicle restrictions. In some cases, political signs, leafleting, and related activities are also prohibited.
In exchange for their association dues, owners have access to common facilities, such as roads and recreational areas, and to private services, such as security, trash collection, street cleaning, and snow plowing. The CIC is usually administered by a private residential government and various committees, elected by the owners and subject to the law of contract rather than public administrative and Constitutional law (see Box 1).
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Box 1: Common Interest Community Models
CICs typically create a private government elected by the owners to administer and enforce contracts, and to promulgate rules to advance community interests. While the exact form of the arrangement may vary, the basic concepts are similar.
Homeowner Associations
Unit owners hold fee title to their individual properties, which are usually single-family or townhouse homes. The association holds title to common areas and grants the owners easement rights for their use. These can be created by common law or under statutes in some states. Homeowner associations make up more than half of community associations nationally.
Condominiums
Unit owners receive fee title to their units plus a percentage ownership in the common areas. The association administers the common areas but does not hold title to them. Condominiums may be vertical (high-rise) or horizontal (single-family or townhouse homes), and they are created exclusively pursuant to state statute. Condominiums represent 45 to 48 percent of community associations.
Cooperatives
A cooperative corporation owns the building, and the owners receive shares in the corporation and automatically renewable, long-term leases on their individual units. Unlike condominium and homeowner associations, the corporation can control transfer of leases and shares by cooperative owners. Only 3 to 4 percent of community associations are organized as cooperatives.
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Economic Benefits of CICs
CICs bring substantial economic benefits to owners and to society at large. Residents who buy into these communities have determined that shared facilities, such as recreational areas, are a better value than, say, personal swimming pools and other private facilities. Similarly, those joining CICs have determined that certain restrictions—such as a prohibition on parking mobile homes in driveways—increase property values.
These communities help to achieve efficient use of land as well. The costs of organizing and administering a private residential community are lower than in a public system (Nelson 2009). Transaction costs and rent-seeking through the political system are also reduced. Finally, because it is free from statutory and constitutional restraints, a private community has greater flexibility in the substance of its rules and operations, freeing it from adherence to public guidelines when entering into contracts with service providers and suppliers.
American courts have recognized these efficiency benefits when enforcing CIC arrangements and the owners’ reliance on them. As one court noted, “It is a well-known fact that [covenants] enhance the value of the subdivision property and form an inducement for purchasers to buy lots within the subdivision” (Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 17013 [1978]).
External Concerns: Secession from the General Community
Despite these benefits, various commentators have argued that the services and private facilities of CICs are available only to those who can afford them and facilitate the separation of the wealthy from the rest of society. The rest of a CIC’s municipality is forced to do without, creating a permanent, two-tier system of housing. Critics also claim that privatization of infrastructure and services isolates CIC residents and reduces their stake in broad communal issues.
By this logic, CIC dwellers are less willing to engage with public government on civic matters and more likely to resist tax increases, given that the CIC rather than the municipal government provides many services. Where community associations are part of suburban developments, isolation from the urban core may be acute. These concerns often center on a fear of class and economic segregation. As former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich wrote in a New York Times article called “Secession of the Successful”: In many cities and towns, the wealthy have in effect withdrawn their dollars from the support of public spaces and institutions shared by all and dedicated the savings to their own private services. . . . Condominiums and the omnipresent residential communities dun their members to undertake work that financially strapped local governments can no longer afford to do well (Reich 1991).
Freedom of Choice
This characterization of community associations, however, is at odds with the fundamental American values of freedom of contract and freedom of association. It is a shared value that people may spend their money for lawful purposes as they wish and enter into contracts as they please. The law intrudes on freedom of contract only in rare instances when major policy considerations are at stake. Courts have recognized freedom of contract as an important consideration for upholding private servitude arrangements: We start with the proposition that private persons, in the exercise of their constitutional right of freedom of contract, may impose whatever restrictions upon the use of land which they convey to another that they desire to impose (Grubel v. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).
CICs also reflect the American belief in freedom of association, exemplified in a long tradition of utopian communities and other belief-centered networks. Residents in modern CICs might share common interests, such as the homeowners living in golf or equestrian communities. Other residents may simply share a desire for neighborhood tranquility or character. In Behind the Gates, Setha Low suggests that CICs allow “middle-class families [to] imprint their residential landscapes with ‘niceness,’ reflecting their own aesthetic of orderliness, consistency, and control” (Low 2004). Whatever the reason, community associations are consistent with de Tocqueville’s observation about American interactions: Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds—religious, moral, serious, futile, extensive or restricted, enormous or diminutive (de Tocqueville 1835).
Moreover, the available evidence indicates that CIC residents are generally happy with their choice. In a 2014 survey conducted by Public Opinion Strategies for the Community Associations Institute, 64 percent of owners were positive about their overall experience, and 26 percent were neutral. While 86 percent of respondents indicated that they wanted either less or no additional governmental regulation, 70 percent maintained that association rules and restrictions protect and enhance property values.
The Issue of Double Taxation
While the rise of CICs reflects a variety of factors, the constrained finances of municipalities following the property tax revolts in the 1970s were key. In fact, a different take on the “secession” narrative is that some owners in common interest communities believe that municipal government abandoned them.
CIC owners pay property taxes at the same rates as other citizens, even though they privately purchase services such as trash collection, street cleaning, and security with their community association dues. This amounts to double taxation, charging association owners for a service they are not receiving.
If a no-service policy were in effect before an owner purchased a unit in a CIC, theoretically the buyer could lower the offer price to reflect the lack of municipal services and the double-taxation-effect. The unit owner would be protected, and the developer would absorb the loss. But if a municipality reduces services but not taxes after the unit purchase, the owner suffers an uncompensated loss. This outcome would be bad policy in that it permits rent seeking, allowing the majority of citizens in the town to select one group of residents to bear an extra tax burden even though they do not create extra costs. This offends notions of both fairness and efficiency, and it’s antithetical to community building and civic trust.
It is especially important for legislatures to avoid the use of double taxation as a matter of policy, given that judicial challenges are unlikely to succeed. The few courts that have entertained attacks on double taxation have been unsympathetic to claims that it violates due process of law, offends the equal protection clause of the Constitution, or works a taking of property without compensation. While double taxation may be bad policy, it is not unconstitutional. The courts should not overturn such legislative decisions, because these are essentially political outcomes that the public should challenge at the ballot box.
The Question of Inequality
The “secession of the wealthy” argument appears to be based on the notion that only higher-income owners with higher-value homes live in common interest communities. The available data, however, do not clearly support this assumption. As Figure 2 indicates, prices for condominiums and cooperatives—half of the units in CICs nationally—are below those for all existing homes (including condominiums, cooperatives, and single-family homes inside and outside of community associations). While these estimates are not deeply segmented (for example, they do not break out single-family homes inside and outside CICs), they do show that the values of condominiums and cooperatives are consistent with those of homes generally.
Housing affordability and access are significant challenges in the United States, but community associations are not necessarily the cause of these deep-seated, complex problems. Employed before CICs became popular, exclusionary zoning imposed by local governments in the form of large lot requirements has prevented developers from building affordable housing. CICs have in fact been found to lower the costs of home purchases. Multi-unit housing, such as condominiums and townhouses, is more affordable than single-family homes because it cuts the cost of land, infrastructure, and building (Ellickson & Been 2005). Affordable housing cooperatives permit restrictions on resale prices and owner income, thus ensuring that housing opportunities remain available for lower-income families. For these purposes, developers operating under city requirements or incentives often designate condominium units within a project as affordable units.
It is therefore simplistic and counterproductive to see community associations as a battleground between rich and poor. Similarly, pejorative use of the term “gated” communities to describe those CICs with limited public access does not advance understanding. Indeed, a moderate-income cooperative with a front door locked for basic security reasons falls within the definition of a “gated” community.
Guiding Principles
In what ways should the “secession of the successful” critique affect our understanding, acceptance, and authorization of common interest communities? The issue is complex and does not lend itself to binary choices. Instead, it is a matter of accommodating competing interests according to the following principles:
Internal Conflicts: Individual Owners vs. the Community
In his groundbreaking book Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments (1996), Evan McKenzie warned that: CICs feature a form of private government that takes an American preference for private home ownership and, too often, turns it into an ideology of hostile privatism. Preservation of property values is the highest social goal, to which other aspects of community life are subordinated. Rigid, intrusive, and often petty rule enforcement makes a caricature of . . . benign management, and the belief in rational planning is distorted into an emphasis on conformity for its own sake.
Conflicts between residents and CIC associations or boards often revolve around two general issues: the substance of the restrictions and the procedures for enforcement (see Box 2). As Figure 3 shows, disputes may focus on a range of topics, from landscaping restrictions to assessment collection. Indeed, 24 percent of CIC residents responding to the 2014 Public Opinion Strategies survey had experienced a significant personal issue or disagreement with their associations. Of this group, 52 percent were satisfied with the outcome and 36 percent were dissatisfied; in 12 percent of cases, the issue was still unresolved.
There are indeed certain risks that community associations can overstep with respect to the substance and enforcement of restrictions, but legislation and judicial supervision can address these substantive and procedural policy concerns.
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Box 2: Conflicts Make Good Copy
While the following headlines fail to represent the myriad positive interactions between individual owners and associations, they do suggest some of the difficult interactions that can occur.
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Freedom of Choice
As discussed earlier, individuals exercise their freedom of choice by purchasing homes in CICs and agreeing to be subject to their rules. Association living may not be for everyone, but the expectation of people who choose the CIC life should generally be respected and not be frustrated by someone who subsequently seeks to violate the compact. The courts generally reflect this view, as suggested by this 1981 ruling: [The original] restrictions are clothed with a very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing and accepting the restrictions to be imposed. . . . [A] use restriction in a declaration of condominium may have a certain degree of unreasonableness to it, and yet withstand attack in the courts. If it were otherwise, a unit owner could not rely on the restrictions found in the declaration . . . since such restrictions would be in a potential condition of continuous flux (Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).
There are several scenarios, though, where homeowners may have no freedom of choice. First, it is possible that the only new housing available to buyers would be in CICs—i.e., developers are no longer building new homes outside of associations. Indeed, a recent report found that in 2003, 80 percent of all homes being built at that time were in associations (Foundation for Community Association Research 2014). In addition, municipal government may require developers to create associations as a condition for subdivision approval. (Recent legislation in Arizona prohibiting this practice indicates that it still occurs.) Finally, some courts have suggested that while rules in place at the time of purchase should be enforced, a rule subsequently enacted by the association or board under a reserved power should not be enforced if an owner can show that it is “unreasonable.” Other courts disagree: Homeowner should not be heard to complain when, as anticipated by the recorded declaration of covenants, the homeowners’ association amends the declaration. When a purchaser buys into such a community, the purchaser buys not only subject to the express covenants in the declaration, but also subject to the amendment provisions. . . . And, of course, a potential homeowner concerned about community association governance has the option to purchase a home not subject to association governance. . . . For this reason, we decline to subject the amendments . . . to the “reasonableness” test (Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tenn. Sup. Ct. [2012]).
Guidelines for Protecting Personal Autonomy
Association restrictions raise concerns when they threaten the personal autonomy and fundamental individual rights of owners. Constraints of this type might include prohibitions of political signs or messaging, and restriction of occupancy to “traditional” families.
Courts should enforce restrictions if they limit spillovers (also known as fallout or externalities) from one owner to the rest of the community. They should not, however, enforce restrictions that limit the nature or status of the occupants or the behavior within a unit that does not create externalities. This approach is based on the theory that the primary purpose of CIC regimes is to enhance economic value and encourage efficient exchanges. Thus, if the owner creates no externalities, the courts should not enforce bans on the particular behavior. Moreover, some values of personal autonomy are too important and trump the usual rules of contract. We do not, for example, permit contracts of indentured servitude or the sale of human organs.
By this standard, limiting noise and banning smoking (because of seepage of odors) in multi-family units would be legitimate, but restrictions based on the marital status of residents would not. Some situations are trickier—for example, restrictions on pets. Under the suggested guidelines, it would usually be legitimate to bar pets because of the potential noise and the reluctance of some residents to share common areas with them. In the case of service animals, however, the unit owner’s health needs may trump community concerns.
First Amendment–type issues present special challenges. Free expression—such as political or issue-related signage, leafleting, demonstrations, or other manifestations—can cause spillovers that may include noise, aesthetic interference, and disruption of the community’s general ambience. At the same time, however, free speech is fundamental to our republican form of government, arguably whether it is addressed to the larger public government or the private government. In expression cases, courts might apply the longstanding doctrine that prohibits covenants that violate public policy, rejecting total bans on speech in favor of reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner. This would allow expression but limit, if not eliminate, spillover on the community.
Religious freedom is another fundamental American value. Restrictions on the placement of a mezuzah on doorposts and the display of crèches, statues of saints, and Christmas lights limit free exercise of religion. While it would open a Pandora’s box to engage in balancing the religious importance of colored versus white Christmas lights against CIC standards, it would nevertheless be appropriate for the courts to impose a general standard of reasonable accommodation on CIC regulations that affect religious practices.
Finally, in the development and enforcement of association rules, CIC property owners have a right to expect certain behavior from associations and boards. This expectation traces from the obligation of good faith and fair dealing that is incumbent on all parties to a contract. Thus, an owner should have a right to fair procedures, including notice and an opportunity to be heard; to be treated equally to other similarly situated owners; and to be free from bias, personal animus, and bad-faith decision making by the board and its members.
Conclusion
Common interest communities are a large part of the American residential landscape, currently providing homes for a quarter of the U.S. population. While CICs bring great economic advantages to residents and society in general, these types of housing arrangements do require nuanced interactions between the community association and the municipal government, and association rules can impinge on the personal autonomy of members. However, strategies are available to mitigate if not overcome these problems. Indeed, these approaches can make ownership of a home in a CIC less of an illusion and more of a reality.
About the Author
Gerald Korngold is Professor of Law at New York Law School and a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He teaches and writes in the fields of property and real estate law.
References
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley.
Ellickson, Robert C. & Vicki L. Been. 2005. Land Use Controls. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3rd edition.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2014. “Best Practices. Report #7: Transition.” www.cairf.org/research/bptransition.pdf.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2013. “National and State Statistical Review for 2013.” www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf.
Grubel v. McLaughlin Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, 17013, Texas Court of Appeals (1978).
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Florida Court of Appeals (1981).
Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tennessee Superior Court (2012).
Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. London: Routledge.
McKenzie, E. 1996. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Nelson, R. H. 2009. “The Puzzle of Local Double Taxation: Why Do Private Communities Exist?” The Independent Review. 13 (3) (Winter) 345–365.
Public Opinion Strategies. 2014. “Verdict: Americans Grade Their Associations, Board Members and Community Managers.” Falls Church, Virginia: Community Associations Institute.
Reich, Robert. 1991. “Secession of the Successful.” The New York Times Magazine. January 20.
Treese, C. J. 2013. Association Information Services, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors data. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_2LgTIYSqR4nLPRxN-HtCV-oOFK_QqN1AcO5JJTw-g/edit.
Ziegler, J. 1984. The New Yorker. September 3.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Una serie de tendencias convergentes llevaron a 40 académicos y profesionales de 15 países a reunirse en el Instituto Lincoln en julio de 1998 para discutir recientes reformas de los mercados de tierra. La primera de ellas es el reconocimiento de que la población mundial se está volviendo cada vez más urbana y en consecuencia se puede esperar que la cantidad de tierra convertida al uso urbano aumente significativamente. Segundo, la evidencia de que una mayor proporción de las familias más pobres del mundo viven actualmente en áreas urbanas (en el orden del 80% en Latinoamérica). Tercero, la percepción de una ola de cambio general en el papel del gobierno, de una posición de intervención y regulación hacia una gerencia urbana más selectiva. Durante los tres días del seminario, los participantes presentaron trabajos y discutieron la lógica de ciertas reformas legales e institucionales, la naturaleza de la transición de los mercados consuetudinarios o informales a formales, la evidencia de una mayor eficacia en el mercado de tierra y el acceso a la tierra por parte de los sectores pobres.
La Reforma Institucional y Legal
Varios participantes abogaron por la reforma institucional de los mercados de la tierra desde diversas perspectivas. Steve Mayo (Instituto Lincoln) identificó vínculos conceptuales y empíricos entre el funcionamiento de los mercados de la propiedad y la macroeconomía. Hizo notar que los mercados de la tierra que funcionan inadecuadamente influyen en la creación de riqueza y los porcentajes de movilidad, los cuales — en presencia de ciertas condiciones financieras — pueden agravar la inestabilidad macroeconómica. Refiriéndose a datos del Programa de Indicadores de la Vivienda, Mayo demostró que los precios de la tierra bruta y la tierra dotada de servicios tienden a converger hacia precios más altos de la tierra, indicando multiplicadores de desarrollo más altos a los precios más bajos. También destacó la presencia de una relación entre la elasticidad de los precios de la oferta de la vivienda y el ambiente político.
Aunque existe una percepción de que las reformas hacia ambientes de “capacitación” política son ampliamente empleadas en las economías en transición y desarrollo, Alain Durand-Lasserve (Centro Nacional para la Investigación Científica, Francia) observó la falta de referencia explícita a la “reforma del mercado de la tierra” en las propuestas de políticas en África. Más aún, sostuvo que la justificación ideológica de una mayor libertad en los mercados de la tierra está más avanzada que la práctica de establecer los prerequisitos para mercados efectivos y unitarios. En la práctica, varios de los trabajos presentados señalaron la presencia de agendas políticas conflictivas, ambigüedad legal y distintos grados de progreso en los procesos de reforma.
“La ley puede reformarse, la historia no”, dijo Patrick McAuslan (Birbeck College, Londres) al discutir el papel de las leyes como base necesaria para la reforma efectiva del mercado de la tierra. Describió la evolución de la recién aprobada Acta de la Tierra de Uganda, que busca establecer un mercado de la tierra basado en la propiedad individual. Felicitó al gobierno por combinar el proceso de reforma con un amplio debate público, pero apuntó que las versiones preliminares del Acta establecieron nuevas contradicciones en una historia secular de relaciones conflictivas entre la propiedad absoluta, la tenencia consuetudinaria y la nacionalización pública de tierras. Su trabajo enumeró una serie de “bombas de tiempo” dejadas por las administraciones coloniales y agravadas por los gobiernos posteriores a la independencia, de las cuales sólo unas pocas han sido tomadas en cuenta por la nueva legislación.
La inconsistente naturaleza de la reforma parece agudizarse en las economías de transición de Europa Oriental y África del Sur. En Europa Oriental, el legado del comunismo ha conducido a usos inadecuados de la tierra y a la asignación de valores no monetarios a la propiedad. Los cambios legales hacia la privatización de la tierra, sin embargo, han sido lentos. Tom Reiner (Universidad de Pennsylvania) argumentó que a pesar de la propuesta de normas a favor de la privatización y la demanda latente en Ucrania, las leyes actuales no contemplan provisiones para la venta libre. Presentó datos demostrando que la privatización produciría beneficios macroeconómicos y fiscales considerables: tan sólo los ingresos por ventas directas alcanzarían los 13 billones de dólares, además de los aumentos en los impuestos y la asignación más eficaz de recursos.
En Rusia, según Jan Brzeski (Instituto de Bienes Raíces de Cracovia), la emergencia de los mercados de la tierra ha sido inhibida por una concepción diferente del papel social de la propiedad y los territorios políticos. En Polonia, donde la privatización está mas avanzada, las reformas han sido insuficientes para superar la extendida asignación errónea de recursos. La asignación ha sido efectuada a precios simbólicos, sin reformas a las rentas de terrenos o los impuestos a la propiedad, y con altos costos de transacción. Aún así, el ciclo de compra y venta se está acelerando más rápidamente que el crecimiento económico, en tanto que las reventas representan cerca del 25% de la inversión de capital.
El programa de privatización de 1991 en Albania parece haber estimulado un mercado activo de tierras y propiedades. Investigaciones efectuadas por David Stanfield (Universidad de Wisconsin, Madison) indican que ha habido sustanciales aumentos en las transacciones de compra y venta y en el incremento de los precios, pero también extensos conflictos entre los propietarios anteriores a la colectivización y los posteriores a la privatización, contradicciones entre las numerosas leyes y errores en la nueva documentación. La investigación señala la facilidad relativa de establecer marcos para la privatización, y la gran dificultad de permitir que los mercados funcionen posteriormente.
Lusugga Kironde (Colegio Universitario de Estudios de Arquitectura y Tierras de Tanzanía) describió cómo descuidos en el sistema “planificado” de asignación en Tanzanía llevaron al 60% de la población a adquirir tierras a través de métodos informales. Esto, a su vez, disminuyó los ingresos del gobierno, ya que las transacciones se efectuaron sin aprobación oficial y, en algunos casos, familias con buena situación económica recibieron terrenos altamente subsidiados. Michael Roth (Universidad de Wisconsin, Madison) describió una situación similar en Mozambique, donde el legado del socialismo estatal todavía está presente en el nivel de intervención del gobierno y en la falta de representación de la propiedad libre.
En ambos países africanos, la evaluación de la reforma resultó ambivalente. La Nueva Política de Tierras de Tanzania (1995), si bien constituyó un paso exitoso hacia la aceptación de la existencia del mercado de la tierra y el aseguramiento de los terrenos ocupados en forma consuetudinaria, ha resultado insuficiente para remover las barreras a un mercado eficaz de la tierra. En particular, Kironde destacó que las nuevas medidas concentran la toma de decisiones en un Comisionado de Tierras a pesar de una política nacional de descentralización administrativa. La política no ofrece incentivos para estimular la formalización de prácticas informales o asegurar su acatamiento por parte de los importantes intermediarios. En Mozambique, desde finales de los años ’80, las reformas orientadas al desarrollo de mercados han resultado en responsabilidades administrativas confusas y en inciertos derechos a la tierra. Han sido características las disputas de tierras entre familias y asociaciones productoras con nuevos poderes legales. Las reformas de 1997 intentan garantizar la seguridad de la propiedad, suministrar incentivos a la inversión e incorporar ideas innovadoras sobre los derechos comunitarios a la tierra.
En Latinoamérica, la reforma se ha concentrado menos en el establecimiento de mercados de por sí que en la mejora de su funcionamiento, especialmente las reformas de la tierra iniciadas por motivos principalmente rurales pero que han tenido gran impacto urbano. Rosaria Pisa (Universidad de Gales) indicó que las reformas en México han creado las condiciones necesarias para la privatización de tierras comunitarias (ejidos), pero que el progreso ha sido lento. Menos del 1% de la tierra ha sido privatizada en cinco años, a causa de intereses dispares del gobierno y ambigüedades legales que han establecido un segundo mercado informal de la tierra.
Carlos Guarinzoli, del Instituto Nacional de Colonización y Reforma Agraria (INCRA) en Brasil, explicó que la reforma rural ha introducido la diversidad en el uso de la tierra, especialmente a través de la supervivencia de las pequeñas granjas familiares. La reforma también está afectando los mercados urbanos en Brasil, al trasladar capital de las áreas rurales a las áreas urbanas, probablemente incrementando los precios de la tierra urbana. Francisco Sabatini (Universidad Católica de Chile) argumentó que la liberalización en Chile no ha reducido los precios de la tierra porque las decisiones de los propietarios y promotores están menos influenciadas por las regulaciones que por la demanda.
En general, no se llegó a un consenso claro acerca de si las reformas estaban produciendo mercados unitarios y menos diversos o no. Los agentes y las instituciones están mostrando ser muy adaptables a las nuevas condiciones, una circunstancia común a las tres regiones. Ayse Pamuk (Universidad de Virginia) planteó que, en base a su análisis de instituciones informales en Trinidad, los investigadores deben alejarse de las regulaciones formales como barreras a la operación del mercado de la tierra. En cambio, deben considerar la forma en que instituciones sociales tales como la confianza y la reciprocidad producen soluciones flexibles a la falta de seguridad de la tenencia y a la resolución de disputas.
Clarissa Fourie (Universidad de Natal) describió la forma en que los registros locales de propiedad han podido combinarse, de manera cómoda para el usuario, con los registros de matrimonio, herencias, derechos de la mujer y deudas para producir un instrumento útil a la administración de tierras en Namibia. Sin embargo, aclaró, la incorporación de prácticas consuetudinarias a la administración de tierras, a fin de dotar de seguridad a la propiedad, requiere un cierto grado de adaptación de los sistemas sociales de tenencia de la tierra. Refiriéndose a investigaciones en Senegal y África del Sur, Babette Wehrmann de la fundación alemana GTZ, indicó que los agentes informales y consuetudinarios están multiplicándose y sirviendo como fuentes de alta calidad de información sobre el mercado.
La Formalización y la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra
Peter Ward (Universidad de Texas, Austin) describió la diversidad de programas de regularización a través de Latinoamérica, donde ciertos países consideran la regularización como un proceso jurídico y otros como mejoramiento físico. La regularización puede ser un fin en sí misma (programas masivos de adjudicación de títulos), o un medio hacia un fin (desarrollar los sistemas de crédito). Ward discutió que las diferencias entre los programas se originan a partir de la forma en que cada gobierno “construye” su proceso de urbanización y transmite esta visión al resto de la sociedad a través de las leyes y el lenguaje.
Edesio Fernandes (Universidad de Londres) explicó como el Código Civil de Brasil, originado a principios del siglo, creó un sistema de derechos individuales de propiedad que limitan la capacidad del gobierno para regularizar las favelas. La Constitución de 1998 intentó reformar esta situación al reconocer los derechos privados de propiedad cuando éstos cumplen una función social. Sin embargo, debido a tensiones legales internas los programas de regularización no han podido integrar las favelas a la “ciudad oficial”, conduciendo a algunas situaciones políticas peligrosas.
Bajo distintas circunstancias, Sudáfrica produjo un régimen regulatorio que le negó la libre propiedad a las familias negras y ofreció sólo complicados permisos sin necesidad de garantía a unos pocos. Lauren Royston (Alternativas de Planificación del Desarrollo, Johannesburg) explicó la manera en que el Documento de Política de la Tierra de dicho país contempla derechos no raciales legalmente vigentes, un rango más amplio de opciones de tenencia, y oportunidades para la adquisición de propiedades comunitarias.
Los dos países en vías de desarrollo con mayor número de programas masivos de adjudicación de títulos, México y Perú, fueron analizados por Ann Varley (Colegio Universitario, Londres) y Gustavo Riofrío (Centro para el Estudio y la Promoción del Desarrollo – DESCO, Lima). Varley contradijo dos supuestos prevalecientes en la literatura contemporánea sobre políticas: que la descentralización produce un manejo más efectivo de la tierra, y que la regularización de la tenencia consuetudinaria es más complicada que la regularización de la propiedad privada. En México, a pesar de la retórica de descentralización, un sistema altamente centralizado ha resultado ser cada vez más efectivo en suministrar la regularización de la tenencia de la tierra a los asentamientos en ejidos. Por otra parte, la regularización de la propiedad privada es tortuosamente larga y con frecuencia produce pobres resultados. Varley se mostró preocupada por las tendencias actuales en México a convertir los ejidos en propiedades privadas y encaminarse hacia una mayor descentralización.
Riofrío puso en duda la validez de los reclamos hechos a favor de la regularización de la tierra en Perú. Hizo notar que en realidad, el interés de las familias por tener título de propiedad es relativamente bajo, siendo uno de los motivos principales que los registros son imprecisos y por lo tanto ofrecen menos seguridad de la que prometen. Más aún, el mercado de financiamiento de la vivienda basado en las propiedades regularizadas se encuentra todavía en estado incipiente. Las familias tienen miedo de endeudarse, pero están dispuestas a dejar su vivienda en garantía para pedir pequeños préstamos para la instalación de microempresas o para consumo.
Nuevos Patrones Sociales y Formas de Entrega de Tierras
¿Producirá la liberalización mercados de la tierra más segregados? Brzeski planteó que la planificación estatal en Europa Oriental ha dejado un legado de espacios equitativos y escasa tenencia informal de la tierra, que no durará para siempre, y que los planificadores necesitan tomar en cuenta a la hora de instigar reformas. En países con niveles altos de segregación, como Chile, Colombia y África del Sur, tendencias menos predecibles están emergiendo. Los datos de Sabatini indicaron una menor segregación espacial en Santiago a pesar de la liberalización a medida que los espacios intermedios se desarrollan, alrededor de centros comerciales, por ejemplo, y a medida que nuevos estilos de vida se reflejan en los desarrollos de viviendas “de recreo” fuera del área metropolitana.
Carolina Barco (Universidad de los Andes) explicó que nuevas medidas en Colombia, específicamente la Ley de Ordenamiento Territorial de 1997, permitirán al gobierno de Bogotá capturar incrementos en el valor de la tierra y transferir dichos ingresos a la vivienda pública y a otros proyectos. El proceso todavía presenta problemas, sin embargo, incluso para una ciudad que tiene considerable experiencia en el uso de tasas de valorización.
En Sudáfrica, las estrategias para hacer frente a la “escasez de tierra” de la ciudad posterior al apartheid, especialmente el Acta para Facilitar el Desarrollo a nivel nacional y el Programa de Desarrollo Acelerado de Tierras en la provincia de Gauteng, han permitido la entrega rápida de tierras pero no han funcionado muy bien en relación a los principios de igualdad e integración. Royston explicó que el resultado ha sido un alto número de invasiones y la aceleración por parte de gobiernos locales de la entrega de tierras en la periferia urbana, donde no constituye un reto al “status quo” espacial.
Cambiar el método de entrega de tierras y el nivel de participación del gobierno tiene potencial para afectar la segregación y el acceso a la tierra. Geoff Payne (Geoff Payne y Asociados, Londres) resumió los principios y prácticas de las asociaciones público-privadas en los países en desarrollo. Si bien son muy aclamadas en la política internacional, estudios de investigación efectuados en África del Sur, India, Pakistán, Egipto y Europa Oriental demuestran que tales asociaciones han malbaratado su potencial.
Crispus Kiamba (Universidad de Nairobi) describió la transición en Kenya de esquemas patrocinados por el gobierno, que dejaron separados los sectores formales e informales, a nuevos enfoques que incorporan una mayor participación de organizaciones no gubernamentales, “ranchos colectivos” y asociaciones. En México, también, las asociaciones están vistas como un método para eliminar el ciclo de ilegalidad y regularización. Federico Seyde y Abelardo Figueroa, del gobierno mexicano, presentaron un nuevo programa llamado PISO, el cual –a pesar de numerosos inconvenientes– está resultando ser más efectivo al ser comparado con intervenciones previas (tales como las reservas de tierras).
Los Mercados de la Tierra y la Reducción de la Pobreza
En mis comentarios de apertura del seminario, expuse la idea de que la mayor parte de la investigación sobre mercados ha considerado la pobreza como un contexto legítimo, pero de ahí en adelante ha parecido concentrarse más en las operaciones del mercado que en la forma en que estas operaciones pueden afectar a la pobreza misma. En la sesión final, Omar Razzaz (Banco Mundial) presentó una propuesta para vincular las operaciones del mercado de la tierra con la reducción de la pobreza. La “Iniciativa de Tierras y Bienes Raíces” está dirigida a investigar formas de mejorar la liquidez de los bienes de tierras y el acceso de los sectores pobres, a través de la reestructuración de los registros de tierras (mejorando los procesos de negocio), el desarrollo de infraestructura normativa (en el área de cambios, hipotecas y aseguramiento) y el acceso y la movilización de tierras y bienes raíces por los sectores pobres. El propósito de esta iniciativa generó considerable debate, lo que podría ayudar a refinar ideas que beneficien a los 500 millones de personas que viven en la pobreza en las ciudades de los países en desarrollo.
Gareth A. Jones estuvo a cargo del desarrollo del programa y dirigió este seminario.
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Q. You have been at the helm of the Lincoln Institute since May 1. What aspect of the program has captured most of your attention in the past few months?
A. My first task has been to work with the staff to develop a more focused direction for the Institute’s programs over the next several years. Without question, we are going to continue the Institute’s commitment to quality research, education and publications programs. We want to both raise the level of debate through our research and publications and also meet our educational objective of directly helping public and private decisionmakers improve their understanding of land-related issues.
To both sharpen and narrow our program focus, we have identified three substantive areas or clusters where we will concentrate our efforts:
Q. Can you elaborate on these topics?
A. Sure, although it is hard to do so in a few words. We are still working on the language to better describe these important areas of inquiry.
In the area of taxation of land and buildings, we are interested in the special nature of taxes on real property, particularly those based on market value. We address the economic effects of such taxes, their legal structure and interpretation, especially with regard to valuation. We are also interested in political aspects of implementing property taxes, particularly as instruments of fiscal decentralization. Our work provides practical assistance to policymakers dealing with existing tax systems and also explores current tax reform efforts around this country and overseas.
In the area of land values, property rights and ownership, we consider the elements that determine land value and what portion of that value may properly be claimed by various sectors of society, including the public sphere. This focus area, therefore, touches upon the larger issue of property rights, the operations of formal and informal land markets in creating and distributing land value, and methods for recovering the costs of public investment in land.
In the area of land use and regulation, we focus on the process, plans and policies that affect the development of land, especially in urban “fringe” areas most at risk from changing land uses. We also investigate issues around the reuse of vacant and underutilized land and the conservation of undeveloped land. While we are interested in the economic efficiency of the use of land, we take a more comprehensive perspective for evaluating land use and its regulation. We seek to understand how the development, reuse and conservation of land affect other public values and goals, such as access to land, fairness, the character of society and the quality of life.
Q. How do you implement specific programs to address these issues?
A. The Institute has three major program components, each of which is involved with all three focus areas. Through our research program, we support scholarly projects to improve our understanding of land and taxation issues and to develop new ideas that integrate theory and practice. The education program presents courses, conferences, seminars and policy discussion workshops taught by scholars and practitioners with varied academic backgrounds and professional expertise. The publications program develops and produces newsletters, books, policy focus reports, working papers, and other media to communicate the results of our own research and education programs and the work of other colleagues in the field of land policy.
Q. Who are your major constituents and how do you reach them?
A. The Institute’s major constituents are public officials and other citizens who are actively involved in making decisions about the taxation, regulation and use of land. As an educational institution, we bring together varying viewpoints to expand the body of useful knowledge about land and tax policy and to make that knowledge accessible and comprehensible. Our objective is to provide practical assistance to policymakers, while at the same time exploring alternative approaches, both in the U.S. and internationally.
We are in the process of establishing advisory groups composed of scholars and practitioners to help us continue to refine the three focus areas. They will offer valuable assistance in guiding and evaluating the collaborative research, education and publications programs in each area. We are also developing a more focused approach to outreach and marketing. This will benefit individual courses and publications, as well as our overall goal of sharing ideas and resources through a growing variety of face-to-face meetings and electronic opportunities, such as our World Wide Web Home Page and other multi-media delivery systems.
Q. Looking forward to the Lincoln Institute’s 25th anniversary in 1999, how would you characterize the organization’s mission for the twenty-first century?
A. The Institute owes its existence to two visionaries who came of age in the late nineteenth century, Henry George and John C. Lincoln. George was an economist and social philosopher best known for his book, Progress and Poverty, in which he argued that the ownership, use and taxation of land has far-reaching effects on economic growth, social relations and politics. His work captured the attention of Cleveland industrialist John C. Lincoln, who established the Lincoln Foundation in 1947 to support further study and inquiry into George’s ideas.
Many of the problems that George decried in the late nineteenth century are still with us at the end of the twentieth. This summer I commissioned eight scholars to review George’s writings and document his insights on land use and taxation problems in terms of their relevance for the next century. We will report more on this research in subsequent issues of Land Lines.
It is my hope that all of us connected with the Institute–Board members, staff, research and faculty associates, and the policymakers and citizens whom we reach through our education and publications programs–can make progress on understanding contemporary issues of property valuation, taxation and land use. In the process we will fulfill our mission of contributing to the ongoing debate over land and tax policies that can benefit all sectors of society.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Durante las dos décadas pasadas, y en particular en años recientes, en varios países latinoamericanos los gobiernos centrales, regionales y locales han instrumentado programas de regularización de la tierra y de mejoramiento en asentamientos irregulares. Aunque incipiente, esta política urbana está teniendo resultados que merecen no sólo ser estudiados para fortalecer las prácticas vigentes sino, también, para promoverlos como directrices para los gobiernos que experimentan este tipo fenómenos por primera vez y que enfrentan la necesidad de desarrollar políticas para responder a la cada vez más intensa dinámica de los procesos informales de desarrollo urbano.
Para responder a esta necesidad, el Instituto Lincoln patrocinó la tercera edición del curso de “Mercados Informales y Programas de Regularización de la Tierra en Áreas Urbanas”. El curso se celebró en noviembre de 2003 en Recife, Brasil, ciudad que se seleccionó por su tradición en planeación urbana, que comprende entre otras experiencias, un programa pionero de regularización (PREZEIS) que, aún con limitaciones, ha operado durante 20 años. El curso se desarrolló con la participación de 35 personas de 10 países de América Latina , representantes de una variedad de profesiones y posiciones institucionales.
A continuación se analiza un conjunto de 13 lecciones interrelacionadas entre sí, que derivan de los trabajos presentados en Recife de las experiencias discutidas en los dos cursos previos, celebrados en 2001 y 2002, y de los resultados de la reunión de la Red Latinoamericana sobre Regularización del Instituto Lincoln, que se llevó a cabo en Brasilia, Brasil en junio de 2003.
Los autores se hacen responsables de cualquier interpretación que resulte de una síntesis general, como la presente; aún cuando este breve y crítico análisis sobre los programas de regularización de la tierra incorpora contribuciones de múltiples personas, (ver Figura 1).
El proceso de favelización
En América Latina se ha incrementado de manera significativa el ritmo del proceso informal de generación de espacio urbano, a pesar de que a diferencia de África o Asia, la región ha experimentado un ritmo persistente de urbanización durante varias décadas.
Las áreas ocupadas se están densificando y diariamente se forman nuevos asentamientos. Estos últimos, se constituyen de manera cada vez más frecuente en zonas de alta sensibilidad medioambiental: cercanos a depósitos protegidos de agua, terrenos públicos y otro tipo de áreas no aptas para la ocupación humana o económicamente poco viables en el mercado formal de suelo.
Este proceso ha generado repercusiones negativas de todo tipo (sociales, medioambientales, legales, económicas y políticas) no sólo para los millones de personas que residen en los asentamientos informales, sino también para los gobiernos de las ciudades y la población urbana en general.
A pesar de los innumerables programas de regularización y mejoramiento que se han instrumentado en décadas recientes, la tasa de desarrollo de los nuevos asentamientos informales ha sido de dos a tres veces superior a la del crecimiento de la población urbana. Por ello, el incremento en la informalidad no se puede atribuir de forma exclusiva a los cambios demográficos, ni al incremento en la pobreza urbana, que si bien ha aumentado, lo ha hecho en tasas menores.
El círculo vicioso de la informalidad
El establecimiento de asentamientos informales es producto de una multiplicidad de factores. En un balance, se observa que las variables locales resultan de mayor peso en la conformación de las “discrepancias inexplicables”, que los factores demográficos y macroeconómicos que afectan la pobreza urbana (políticas de empleo e ingresos). Al actuar o dejar de actuar, las autoridades locales han fomentado el desarrollo del fenómeno con mecanismos excluyentes de regulación de usos del suelo, privilegiando la asignación de la inversión publica en zonas residenciales de altos ingresos; actuando en complicidad con los fraccionadores ilegales de terrenos, y con la aplicación de inadecuadas políticas fiscales de orden local.
El corolario de esta tolerancia de la informalidad es un factor clave en la política de valorización del suelo. Los valores en el mercado informal se benefician de una mayor libertad regulatoria y de los valores sociales vinculados a las redes entre los residentes de los asentamientos. Los precios del mercado informal se ven afectados por ambas dinámicas hasta puntos absurdos. Por ejemplo, una casucha de madera de 60 metros cuadrados (60 pies cuadrados) ubicada en una zona pantanosa de Recife, se valúa en US $1.300,00.
Las variaciones extremas en los precios son el reflejo de la diversidad de procesos informales que inciden en el acceso al suelo urbano y la vivienda, tanto en el interior de un mismo asentamiento como entre asentamientos. Por lo tanto, un ingrediente indispensable de cualquier política que pretenda mitigar las consecuencias de la informalidad deberá ser la lucha contra los factores que perpetúan el círculo vicioso en la formación de los precios.
El mundo de la diversidad
Lejos de ser un fenómeno homogéneo, la informalidad se manifiesta en una diversidad de formas, contextos y lugares. Es posible hallar enormes diferencias en el interior y entre asentamientos de una misma cuidad, que se acrecientan al comparar ciudades de un país y ciudades de distintos países.
Cada área informal tiene barrios buenos y malos; unas zonas de alto valor y otras de valor bajo; una distribución desigual de cualquiera de los servicios con que cuenta y propiedades con distintas modalidades de tenencia. Asimismo, se observan variaciones en los niveles de ingreso, con familias que perciben mayores ingresos que aquéllas que residen en asentamientos formales que, en general, pagan por algunos de los servicios públicos.
Al comparar la diversidad de asentamientos informales que se encuentran distribuidos entre los barrios formales en muchas ciudades latinoamericanas, no se ha logrado establecer una correlación entre los gradientes de precio de las propiedades, lo que revela la presencia de distintas fuerzas de mercado. Si bien los mercados del suelo en las áreas formales e informales son muy vigorosos, los factores determinantes del precio tienen órdenes distintos de magnitud para cada mercado. Como se mencionó, la mayor libertad regulatoria, así como las redes informales de intercambio de beneficios intangibles, afectan los valores de la propiedad. Estos factores son una realidad ineludible, que debe tomarse en cuenta en el diseño de programas de regularización para que éstos puedan conducir a una reforma positiva en la práctica tradicional.
Es necesario, también, adecuar los programas a las distintas condiciones de los asentamientos; diferenciado entre los de reciente creación y aquéllos con varios años de existencia, ubicados en zonas consolidadas. Se pueden rastrear con mayor claridad las cadenas de transacciones con el suelo en los asentamientos recientes, mientras que en las zonas con mayor antigüedad no se observan sucesiones lineales de transacciones. De hecho, en los asentamientos más consolidados se observa una compleja sobreposición de derechos y transacciones informalmente definidos, por ejemplo, la venta a terceros de techos como “terreno”, que potencialmente contribuirían a la ampliación de espacios habitables.
Aún no está claro si los programas de regularización debieran iniciarse en asentamientos recientes, donde los costos de mejoramiento son menores y se cuenta con mayores grados de libertad; o bien, en zonas más antiguas y consolidadas, en las que las acciones pueden conducir a consecuencias sociales más inmediatas y donde, sin embargo, puede haber algunos derechos legales establecidos.
Tolerancia de la informalidad
A pesar de todas las implicaciones negativas asociadas al desarrollo urbano informal, las autoridades han tolerado los procesos: siendo negligentes, aprovechándolos políticamente, realizando acciones ambiguas o promoviendo directamente las ocupaciones.
Sin embargo, hay una falta de conocimiento en relación con los derechos que en el tiempo se generan por la propia tolerancia, y de información respecto a los altos costos, absolutos y relativos, de los programas de mejoramiento.
Paralelamente, la tolerancia frente a la ocupación informal se acompaña de una creciente convicción tanto de las autoridades como de la opinión pública, de que los asentamientos consolidados deben mejorarse a través de la introducción de infraestructura, provisión de servicios urbanos básicos y de equipamiento. Un estudio reciente, desarrollado por la Alianza de Ciudades en Brasil, demostró que la decisión de regularizar un asentamiento irregular se toma, con frecuencia, más rápido que la decisión de aprobar un asentamiento regular (seis meses, comparada con dos o tres años).
Esta tolerancia oficial también se aplica a la aceptación de “soluciones de segunda clase” para “ciudadanos de segunda clase”, que frecuentemente resultan en un rápido deterioro de las zonas mejoradas. La combinación de materiales de baja calidad y costo, y la utilización de técnicas no convencionales conlleva a procesos de rápida obsolescencia de la infraestructura y consecuentemente a altos costos de mantenimiento. Adicionalmente, es frecuente que las zonas mejoradas no estén integradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales. La irresponsabilidad fiscal de las autoridades municipales, que es característica de la región, se agrava por una falta de responsabilidad sobre el desarrollo territorial de las localidades, así como por su negligencia, o en el mejor de los casos actitudes paternalistas respecto a estos asentamientos.
Expectativas y valores del suelo
Hasta la fecha los programas de regularización se han instrumentado en un porcentaje muy reducido de asentamientos informales, y como resultado la gran mayoría de las personas que viven de manera informal no han sido beneficiarias de ninguna intervención pública. En la práctica, muchos de los programas de regularización se han desarrollado sin considerar las causas de la informalidad, generando resultados contraproducentes que tienden a acentuar los procesos de segregación socio-espacial.
La mera expectativa de regularización conduce a incrementos en la cotización de la tierra que se prevé será sujeta al mejoramiento, lo cual impacta de manera significativa los precios en el mercado informal. Mientras más alta sea la expectativa de regularización a futuro de un área, más alto será el sobreprecio del suelo en cuestión, y en consecuencia aumentará la demanda de terrenos más baratos en otros lugares.
Lo anterior plantea dos formas de abordar el mejoramiento: programas integrales, aplicados en pocos lugares, con políticas destinadas a incidir en las expectativas futuras de mecanismos de recuperación de costos. O bien, programas de mejoramiento parcial, instrumentados en todas las áreas informales de la ciudad, destinados a promover un balance y mayor consistencia en la actividad futura del mercado. Sigue sin comprenderse la importancia e implicaciones de integrar las áreas mejoradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales.
Políticas aisladas y fragmentadas
Las intervenciones públicas a través de programas de regularización de asentamientos irregulares han sido de carácter sectorial, aisladas, y en consecuencia no se integran con el contexto urbano más amplio, donde operan las políticas generales de administración del suelo que impactan directamente tales asentamientos. Estas políticas comprenden, entre otros temas, los de la construcción de vivienda social; la rehabilitación de centros urbanos deteriorados; la ocupación de baldíos e inmuebles vacantes; la asignación más amplia de inversión pública para infraestructura y servicios urbanos; la modernización de catastros y de sistemas de recaudación de impuestos, así como la promoción de asociaciones entre los sectores público y privado.
La mayoría de los programas de regularización se ha aplicado en zonas habitacionales y poco se ha hecho en áreas informales de industria y comercio, en edificios públicos desocupados; terrenos en zonas centrales o en asentamientos irregulares en zonas rurales.
En todos los niveles de gobierno, los programas de regularización se identifican por su fragmentación estructural (dentro de los programas, entre las diferentes secretarías y ministerios, y entre los distintos niveles de gobierno nacional, estatal y municipal), y como resultado los recursos son malgastados o bien no llegan a la población a la cual se dirigen.
Los programas también han adolecido de una falta de continuidad administrativa, generalmente producto de cambios en los contextos políticos locales. En lugar de apoyar a otras iniciativas, los programas de regularización frecuentemente consumen los limitados recursos de los gobiernos locales, en detrimento de otros tipos de programas de vivienda que se restringen o sacrifican.
Este problema tiene su origen tanto en las amplias líneas de crédito proporcionadas por organismos nacionales y agencias internacionales y multilaterales, como en la falta de mecanismos para operar con aportaciones de las autoridades locales, como vía para compartir la carga de los programas y promover esfuerzos para que los gobiernos municipales aumenten sus fuentes propias de ingresos. En términos generales, las líneas de crédito para los programas de regularización se han establecido sin un análisis adecuado de la capacidad financiera de los gobiernos municipales.
La falta de recursos financieros
Como si los problemas señalados fueran pocos, hay que agregar la falta de recursos financieros suficientes para los programas de regularización. Las provisiones presupuestarias no son compatibles con las aspiraciones de los objetivos propuestos, y frecuentemente no se cuenta con recursos específicos para los programas. Los ingresos obtenidos de operaciones relacionadas con el desarrollo urbano (cobros por derechos de construcción en áreas formales y de altos ingresos) no han sido adecuadamente canalizados hacia los programas de mejoramiento. Los recursos obtenidos a través de agencias internacionales no se han utilizado de la mejor manera. Ha habido una falta de seguimiento en el cumplimiento de objetivos y metas, y de evaluación de los propios programas. Adicionalmente, destaca la ausencia de políticas de microcréditos que pudieran utilizarse para incentivar y apoyar las organizaciones comunitarias.
Disociación del mejoramiento y la legalización
Se podrá argumentar que la ilegalidad es producto de la oferta insuficiente de suelo servido a costos accesibles. Sin embargo, en la práctica, se observa que a pesar del énfasis en el concepto de mejoramiento, una gran mayoría de los programas de regularización opera al margen de los programas de mejoramiento de vivienda y de apoyo socioeconómico con los cuales se busca la integración de las comunidades, y no están vinculados a las políticas destinadas a la legalización de terrenos y lotes individuales.
El mejoramiento y la legalización se han concebido como procesos independientes, e incluso se ha llegado a sostener que la legalización es producto de los procesos de mejoramiento. Lo cierto es que la mayoría de los programas de mejoramiento no conduce al cumplimiento de las condiciones requeridas para poner en marcha los procesos de legalización en áreas informales. En los pocos programas en los que se ha logrado dar inicio al proceso de legalización, se han desarrollado soluciones legales y políticas ad-hoc, que con frecuencia son ajenas a las condiciones urbanas y fuerzas que operan en el entorno.
A pesar de la publicidad que se ha realizado en torno a los programas de regularización, el número de títulos de propiedad expedidos por las dependencias responsables es sorprendentemente bajo. Entre las explicaciones dadas se destacan la complejidad de las leyes y las actitudes conservadoras y de resistencia de parte de los notarios y de las autoridades responsables de los registros de la propiedad. Es importante agregar, también, que la mayoría de las familias, al recibir un título que reconoce su legítimo derecho sobre la propiedad, no concluye los procesos de registro, muchas veces por no entender el trasfondo legal, o por su complejidad y por los costos que significan.
En respuesta se ha propuesto, por un lado, la simplificación de los requisitos y procesos de titulación y registro y, por otro, la necesidad de restarle poder a las estructuras burocráticas responsables de los citados procesos.
La importancia de la titulación
Como resultado de los problemas mencionados, son pocos los programas en que se alcanza la etapa de legalización, y son menos aún en los que se concluye el registro de los lotes legalizados. Por ello, muchos analistas han concluido que los títulos no son importantes y que lo realmente significativo es la percepción de seguridad en la tenencia de la tierra que tengan los pobladores.
No se puede negar que la percepción de la seguridad es un elemento que promueve la inversión de las familias para consolidar sus viviendas, sin embargo la titulación es importante por dos razones: el interés personal de los residentes (por la seguridad de tenencia de la tierra, la protección contra desalojos, los conflictos domésticos, las separaciones maritales, las herencias, los conflictos vecinales y el acceso a formas diversas de crédito); y el interés de la ciudad en su conjunto, ya que la legalización puede contribuir a la estabilización de los mercados del suelo, y con ello permitir formas más racionales y articuladas de intervención pública.
Hoy todavía hay grandes resistencias del sistema judicial y del público en general, con respecto a los programas de titulación. Es importante señalar, también, que los beneficiarios individuales de estos programas con frecuencia desconocen la protección y las limitaciones que derivan de la titulación. Las preguntas ¿para qué sirve un título? y ¿por qué se tienen que registrar los títulos?, entre otras, apuntan a la necesidad de acompañar los programas de regularización con programas educativos tanto para los administradores de las ciudades como para los residentes de los asentamientos informales.
Otro punto a considerar es la falta de análisis sobre el impacto de los instrumentos que se emplean en la legalización de lotes. Como resultado del énfasis en la titulación individual, se ha tendido a ignorar la necesidad de generar soluciones legales colectivas, para responder a problemas sociales comunes. De hecho, cuando se han empleado estos nuevos instrumentos legales, no se ha logrado compatibilizarlos con la normatividad urbana existente y no han previsto sus implicaciones legales.
El análisis de alternativas legales ha sido insuficiente y carente de creatividad. Se requiere realizar mayores y más consistentes esfuerzos para desarrollar nuevos instrumentos y para lograr acreditarlos, no sólo ante los distintos organismos financieros, sino también ante la sociedad en su conjunto.
La falacia de la participación popular
Aun cuando los contextos políticos de los programas de regularización han variado inmensamente en el tiempo, en términos generales, la participación popular ha sido poco significativa en su formulación e instrumentación. Esta situación se ha agravado debido a la creación de formas de participación artificiales, para cumplir con los requisitos de los organismos financieros. Los mecanismos de participación popular diseñados han sido, en el mejor de los casos, una formalidad, y en el peor, una farsa.
Son muy pocos los programas en los que se ha logrado incorporar propuestas de soluciones generadas por las comunidades afectadas. El marco político-institucional y cultural en el que se ha desarrollado la mayoría de los programas de regularización, junto con las limitaciones que derivan de las formas de financiamiento, prácticamente eliminan las posibilidades de una participación pública efectiva, dado que la participación pública normalmente trae consigo cuestionamientos severos al status quo. Por ello, los programas de regularización tienden a percibirse como soluciones destinadas a promover o proteger la institucionalidad, más que como respuestas a las demandas de la mayoría de la población de menores ingresos.
Compatibilidad entre escala, traza y derechos
Quizás el problema central de los programas de regularización sea la dificultad de compatibilizar la escala de las intervenciones, con las patrones técnicos, urbanos y medioambientales propuestos para los asentamientos, y la naturaleza de los derechos que les serán reconocidos a los residentes. Para poder garantizar la sustentabilidad de los programas y su impacto, es necesario discutir los temas de escala, traza y derechos de manera conjunta.
Efectos de los programas de regularización en el tiempo
Concluidos los programas de mejoramiento y legalización, las autoridades suelen retirarse de los asentamientos, aun cuando podrían realizar una diversidad de funciones que van desde el monitoreo y evaluación del mantenimiento de la infraestructura provista (por ejemplo, de los sistemas de agua potable y drenaje), hasta el desarrollo de lineamientos y reglas para la incorporación de población nueva.
Los asentamientos tienden a deteriorarse muy rápidamente por la falta de presencia e intervenciones oficiales, al grado que la legitimidad provista por los programas de regularización puede “contaminar” a barrios de origen formal, promoviendo prácticas informales de usos del suelo.
En términos generales los programas de regularización no han logrado la integración urbana, social y cultural de las áreas mejoradas que se había anticipado. De manera tal que las áreas regularizadas siguen siendo consideradas como “de segunda”, mucho tiempo después de concluidos los programas. La idea de que los asentamientos regularizados experimentarán una trayectoria virtuosa, escasamente sobrevive a las justificaciones que dieron origen a los programas.
El equilibrio entre las libertades individuales y las funciones públicas
A pesar de la preocupación por garantizar que los beneficiarios de las intervenciones públicas sean efectivamente residentes de los asentamientos informales en los programas de regularización, no se ha logrado un equilibrio adecuado entre el respeto por los derechos y libertades individuales y las funciones públicas de los programas (los derechos sociales a la vivienda y la necesidad de generar áreas para tal efecto). Frecuentemente las soluciones legales propuestas implican restricciones que, en la práctica, congelan los procesos de movilidad que caracterizan a este tipo de asentamientos (afectando, por ejemplo, los términos de venta, compra y renta), lo cual tiende a reforzar la informalidad.
La estrategia de centrarse en un área o un grupo social parece ignorar la esencia y el origen de la informalidad, lo que representa una situación en sí misma tramposa. Por un lado, la falta de recursos de los programas, les dificulta a las familias capitalizar el beneficio obtenido, para reubicarse en otro asentamiento informal, esperando ser sujeto de un siguiente proceso de regularización en el futuro. Por otro lado, el costo de monitorear y controlar este tipo de prácticas puede ser muy alto y hasta inviable. Como se mencionó, la imposición de restricciones a las transacciones simplemente generará nuevos arreglos informales.
Es interesante observar que son muy pocos los programas que han reconocido y logrado responder a la movilidad (ascendente o descendente) de los residentes de los asentamientos regularizados. Los programas se diseñan pensando en una comunidad estática. La movilidad interurbana, particularmente entre residentes de asentamientos informales y entre áreas formales e informales, no es un proceso bien entendido y por ello, mejor se ignora. Una posible salida a este acertijo podría encontrarse en mecanismos para la recuperación de costos o para la recuperación de plusvalías, que operen desde de la fase de planeación de los nuevos programas de regularización.
Conclusiones
Generalmente en la formulación de los programas de regularización no se parte de metas y cronogramas de trabajo claramente establecidos, problema que se agudiza por la falta de indicadores de evaluación adecuados.
En suma, los objetivos formales de los programas de regularización en Latinoamérica (promoción de la seguridad de la tenencia y la integración socio-espacial de los asentamientos y su población) no se han logrado traducir en diagnósticos integrales, instrumentos efectivos y estrategias claras para su ejecución, como tampoco han podido incidir en las deficiencias en la capacidad administrativa de los ejecutores. Como resultado, a la fecha no se puede considerar que las experiencias latinoamericanas en materia de regularización sean exitosas.
Se puede decir, sin embargo, que los programas de regularización han tenido la virtud de despertar y sensibilizar la conciencia pública con respecto a la legitimidad de las demandas de un grupo significativo y creciente de ciudadanos, que al estar excluido del sistema socioeconómico formal, requiere respuestas integrales y efectivas.
Incluso con las limitaciones señaladas, estos programas han permitido que grupos de pobres urbanos puedan permanecer en zonas servidas ubicadas en áreas centrales de muchas ciudades latinoamericanas y han contribuido a mejorar las condiciones de vida de familias residentes de asentamientos regularizados. Estos logros son de gran importancia, sobre todo a la luz de la cruel dinámica de segregación socio-espacial que prevalece en la región.
Edésio Fernandes es profesor de medio tiempo en la Unidad de Planeación del Desarrollo (Development Planning Unit) del Colegio Universitario de Londres (University College, London). Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa de América Latina y el Caribe, del Instituto Lincoln.
Artículos relacionados, publicados en Land Lines
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in a global perspective. Abril: 8-11
Calderón, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit, April: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto´s The Mystery of Capital. Enero: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. Faculty profile, Julio: 12-13
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Enero: 4-7
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective on the Latin America program. Octubre: 8-12
Figura 1: Aciertos y Desaciertos de los Programas de Regularización
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In the past decade, nearly 50 mansions have been demolished and replaced in the historic Chicago suburb of Kenilworth. Four demolition permits are currently pending review, while permits have been approved for two other historically significant houses. To slow the teardown trend, Kenilworth has enacted a nine-month waiting period between issuance of a demolition permit and initiation of the teardown process. However, the village does not have a historic preservation ordinance, and local officials generally support the rights of property owners to demolish and replace their houses. The National Trust for Historic Preservation included Kenilworth on its 2006 list of the 11 most endangered places nationwide (Black 2006).
The practice of demolishing and replacing houses in high-priced areas generates passionate controversy. The fight to save the Skiff House in Kenilworth is illustrative (Nance 2005). That property at 157 Kenilworth Avenue is one of the premier locations in one of Chicago’s most expensive suburbs, three blocks west of Lake Michigan and five blocks from the commuter train station in the village center.
The house was built in 1908 for Frederick Skiff, the first director of Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History. This beautiful and historically significant house was designed by the architectural firm of Daniel H. Burnham, who was considered the preeminent architect in America at the turn of the twentieth century. He oversaw the construction of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition and helped design a series of lakefront parks as part of the 1909 Plan of Chicago.
Plans to demolish the Skiff House shortly after it was purchased in 2004 for $1.875 million created an uproar. While many neighbors supported the owner’s right to tear down the property—after all, they might want to do the same—others saw it as an assault on the community’s character. “Save 157 Kenilworth” signs began to appear in front yards throughout the village, and a neighborhood group, Citizens for Kenilworth, led a campaign to save the house. After months of controversy, and only days after an auction to sell off valuable parts of the house before demolition, a neighbor purchased the house for $2.35 million in order to save it.
Historic houses continue to be torn down in Kenilworth and elsewhere, but not all teardowns generate controversy. Residents of many Chicago suburbs have been supportive of the teardown trend. Naperville is a representative case. Founded in 1831 and incorporated in 1857, Naperville grew slowly until plans for the East-West Tollway (I-88) were announced in 1954. The population grew from 7,013 in 1950, to 21,675 in 1960, to 140,106 today.
Naperville’s downtown has undergone a renaissance over the last decade, attracting new restaurants, shops, and residences. Although the city has a historic district just to the east of the downtown area, teardown activity has been concentrated in what were formerly more humble areas. Small, older houses are being purchased for about $400,000 and replaced by much larger houses that may sell for $1 million.
The teardown trend in Naperville is illustrated by one small house being sold as a teardown, with an announcement of an upcoming public hearing posted in the yard. It is likely to be replaced by a house that is similar to the recently constructed house next door (see pages 6 and 7). Though teardown activity is not entirely without controversy in Naperville, it does not generate the same passion as the Skiff House did.
How Widespread is the Teardown Phenomenon?
Nationwide the teardown phenomenon has attracted much media and public attention. The decennial Census of Population and Housing offers a way to quantify the practice using the “net replacement method.” For example, suppose the Census lists 10,000 housing units in an area for 1990 and 10,500 units in 2000—an increase of 500 units. Now suppose the Census shows that 800 housing units were built during the decade. Then 300 of the newly built units must have simply replaced existing units. The 300 replacement units are a crude but nonetheless enlightening measure of teardown activity in that community.
Figure 1 shows counties where at least one census tract had a net replacement rate in excess of 4 percent. Teardown activity is clustered in older urban areas in the Northeast, Midwest, and California. In fact, the map does not look substantially different from a map of population density in the United States. This simple analysis shows that replacement of the preexisting housing stock is an extensive phenomenon that is national in scope.
Nevertheless, it is surprisingly difficult to track teardown activity on a case-by-case basis. The classic teardown is a house whose sale is followed by the issuance of both demolition and building permits, but timing is a key factor in tracking these permits. If a demolition permit is issued four years after a sale, was the house really sold as a teardown? Similarly, a building permit may be issued long after a dilapidated house was demolished, yet this situation is not what most people have in mind when they think of teardowns.
Some teardowns are carried out by the current owner without a sale. Other houses are so extensively remodeled that they are effectively teardowns, even though no demolition permit is issued. Even when data on sales, demolition permits, and building permits are available, it is difficult to merge the different sources of information since they frequently come from different agencies that vary in the quality of their database management.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation has described the Chicago metropolitan area as the “epicenter of teardowns.” Aside from Kenilworth, teardowns are common in both the city of Chicago and its suburbs. The Village of Skokie (2005) surveyed 20 of its neighbors in Chicago’s near north suburbs and compared the number of detached single-family housing unit demolition permits from 2000 to 2003 to the total number of such units as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census. Thirteen of the 20 communities reported demolition permits representing more than 1 percent of the housing stock over the four-year period.
Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) have used data from Chicago and six suburban communities to document the degree of teardown activity in the region. We were able to obtain data on house sales and demolition permits for Chicago; one of its suburbs to the west, Western Springs; the northwest suburb of Park Ridge; and four suburbs on the North Shore—Glencoe, Kenilworth, Wilmette, and Winnetka.
Between 1996 and 2003, the number of demolition permits ranged from 29 in Kenilworth to 273 in Winnetka and 12,236 in Chicago. Of course, Kenilworth has only 2,494 residents, whereas Winnetka’s population is 12,419, and Chicago has 2.9 million residents. Figure 2 shows the number of demolition permits as a percentage of total housing units for each community. More than 9 percent of Winnetka’s housing stock was torn down between 1996 and 2003, and teardown rates were also quite high in Winnetka and Kenilworth. Even Chicago, with more than 400,000 housing units, had a demolition rate near 3 percent.
These six suburbs were not chosen randomly. All had high median incomes in 2000, ranging from $73,154 in Park Ridge to more than $200,000 in Kenilworth. All of these suburbs have stations on commuter train lines to downtown Chicago, little or no vacant land on which to build, and good schools and other local public services. In other words, demand to live in these suburbs is high. Teardown activity in Chicago is concentrated in comparable neighborhoods within the city, such as Lincoln Park, West Town, and Lakeview on the near north side.
The Costs and Benefits of Teardowns
Teardowns can impose significant social costs. Local residents often complain that new houses destroy the character of a neighborhood. Those houses may be built to the limits of the zoning code, tower above their neighbors, and reach to the edge of the property line. Sometimes neighbors simply dislike the design of new buildings, particularly those that replace historic houses. When tall apartment buildings replace single-family houses or two-family houses in the city, neighbors complain of the loss of sunlight, lack of parking spaces, and increased traffic congestion. The construction process itself can be noisy and disruptive. New, expensive houses may cause assessments to increase in the neighborhood. And, teardowns may reduce the stock of affordable housing.
Teardowns also carry some benefits, however. In places that rely on the property tax to fund local services, the additional revenue from high-priced replacement houses is often quite welcome. Not all teardown buildings are historic, architecturally significant, or mourned when they are demolished. Some teardowns are simply eyesores.
Some of the new houses being built today will eventually be viewed as historically significant properties in their own right. Once entire blocks are rebuilt, the new housing no longer looks out of place. It is surprising to discover how stark and incompatible some properties built in the early 1900s appear in historic photographs taken before trees grew and the neighborhood filled in with similar houses.
It also is important to recognize that teardowns may help to curb sprawl. One reason people move to the urban fringe is to build a new house in a contemporary construction style. Allowing people to tear down a small, outdated house and replace it with a modern house may induce them to stay in centrally located areas. In general, encouraging housing and economic growth helps maintain the vitality of previously developed areas, which is a strategic complement to anti-sprawl policies designed to limit growth at the fringe.
Policy Responses
Local jurisdictions have been creative in responding to teardowns. Some policies are designed to the slow the amount of teardown activity by making it more costly, through demolition fees and fines for illegal demolitions. Others, such as a moratorium on new demolition permits or an enforced waiting period between permit issuance and the time when demolition can start, are simply designed to cool a potential teardown fever. Such policies also raise the cost of teardowns by making developers wait for some time after purchasing a property before being able to recoup their costs. Complementary policies include landmark designation and historic district designation, which make it more difficult or even impossible to tear down existing structures.
Policies on the other side of the balance sheet may give developers an incentive not to demolish existing structures. Communities may offer tax breaks to owners who rehabilitate existing houses rather than demolish them to build new ones. Or, owners may be granted variances from restrictive zoning provisions in order to enlarge rather than demolish an existing house.
At the same time, jurisdictions often use zoning to influence the type of new housing that is built in their community. Lot-coverage and floor-area restrictions are used to ensure that new structures do not dwarf their neighbors. Other policies include maximum building sizes; set-back and open space requirements; and restrictions on such design elements as garage and driveway locations, roof pitch, bulk limits, solar access, and the alignment of the new house with neighboring structures. Many communities have design review boards that can revoke building permits for structures that are not in compliance. These standards are not always clear beforehand, however, and they can increase the level of uncertainty for developers, delay construction, and raise costs.
Even if communities do not attempt to curb teardown activity, they often adopt policies designed to reduce the disruption caused by new construction. The builder may be required to notify neighbors when construction is about to begin, and a time window may be imposed for completion of the building. Construction activity may be limited to certain hours of day, the site may need to be fenced, and work vehicle and dumpster location requirements are often imposed. Communities also may require that contractors be bonded and certified.
How successful are these policies in slowing the rate of teardown activity? As we have seen, the Skiff House was saved because Kenilworth’s nine-month waiting period between permit issuance and the start of demolition provided enough time for a buyer to step forward before the house was razed. However, the potential for profits in such transactions make it difficult to stop teardowns completely. If a developer can purchase an existing property for $300,000, demolish it for $20,000, and spend $400,000 to build a new house according to current construction standards, then he has incurred $720,000 in costs. With new upscale houses routinely selling in excess of $1 million in communities with many teardowns, it should not be surprising that developers continue this practice.
Implications for Land Values
Assessors encounter enormous difficulties in placing a value on land in built-up areas. When few vacant lots exist, it is nearly impossible to find enough sales of vacant land to assess the value of land accurately. In the absence of direct land sales data, land values can be estimated by subtracting construction costs less depreciation from the sale price of improved properties in the area.
Statistical analysis of mass appraisal data can account for such structural characteristics as square footage in order to control for the contribution of the building to total property value. With a complete set of these characteristics, the residual from the regression reflects the contribution of location to property value—in other words, land value. Unfortunately, any unobserved structural characteristic will also be part of the residual.
Teardowns can help estimate the value of land in developed areas. Consider the earlier example of a property that is purchased for $300,000, demolished for $20,000, and replaced by a million-dollar house. If the developer could purchase a vacant lot of the identical size next door for $290,000, which property would he prefer? If there is no salvage value for parts of the existing house, it will cost the developer $320,000 before it is possible to build on the lot with the existing house. Yet the vacant lot is available in the same general location for $30,000 less. The vacant lot is preferable even though it does not include a house—in fact, it is preferable precisely because it does not include an existing structure.
If the price of the vacant lot rises to $310,000, the developer still obtains a lot that is ready to build upon for $10,000 less than the cost of building on the neighboring lot. Only at $320,000 will the developer be indifferent between the two lots. It follows that the value of land in this case is $320,000. This key insight leads to an extremely useful method of valuing land in areas experiencing teardowns. The value of land is simply the sales price of a teardown property plus any demolition cost.
An important implication of this line of reasoning is that only location determines the value of a teardown property; characteristics of the structure are irrelevant except insofar as they influence demolitions costs or salvage value. This implication is somewhat surprising to people who think that a historic house has intrinsic value. Though it is tempting to think that the Skiff House in Kenilworth is worth approximately $2 million because of its historic and architectural value, a vacant lot next door would sell for nearly the same price. Any house near Lake Michigan in Kenilworth will sell for well more than $1 million. The conclusion to be drawn is simply that land is expensive along Chicago’s North Shore.
Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) test the prediction that only location characteristics influence sales prices in our sample of seven communities in the Chicago area. Our measures of location include such variables as lot size, distance from the nearest commuter train station, and proximity to Lake Michigan. Structural characteristics include such variables as building size, age, and whether the house is built of brick and has a basement, garage, or fireplace. We identify teardowns as houses for which a demolition permit was issued within two years of a sale. As predicted, structural characteristics do not significantly influence the sales price of teardown properties. Teardowns are purchased for the land underneath.
Final Thoughts
The teardown phenomenon is not new. Houses have been demolished and replaced for as long as they have been built. American cities grew rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and again in the years just after World War II. Tastes now appear to be changing toward larger houses with spacious rooms and high ceilings. Many people find the existing housing stock less desirable than new construction. In this situation, it is not surprising that buyers purchase, demolish, and build new houses, especially in high-demand areas. The trick for local governments is to keep the costs of teardown activity from overwhelming the less obvious benefits.
Daniel P. McMillen is professor in the Department of Economics and the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at University of Illinois at Chicago. He has published widely in urban economics, real estate, and applied econometrics. He is a visiting fellow in 2006–2007 at the Lincoln Institute.
References
Black, Lisa. 2006. Kenilworth added to list of endangered historic towns. Chicago Tribune, May 20.
Dye, Richard, and Daniel P. McMillen. Forthcoming. Teardowns and land values in the Chicago metropolitan area. Journal of Urban Economics.
Nance, Kevin. 2005. Teardown ‘madness has to stop’: Developer rescues historic Burnham house, but says it’s just a start. Chicago Sun-Times, November 6.
Village of Skokie. 2005. Comprehensive Plan Appendix C: Near north suburban housing activity study. http://www.skokie.org/comm/Appendix%20C.pdf.
