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The Lincoln Institute has supported the authors’ work on property taxation in South Africa for several years, and in February 2002 the Institute published Property Taxes in South Africa: Challenges in the Post-Apartheid Era. Edited by Bell and Bowman, the book presents major portions of their own work, together with chapters by several of their colleagues in the U.S. and in South Africa. This article provides an overview of seminars on property tax issues conducted by Bell and Bowman in South Africa in March 2002.
The end of apartheid in South Africa nearly a decade ago presented new opportunities and challenges to every aspect of national life, including fiscal issues. The government faced the task of extending the property tax to previously untaxed areas and adapting it to provide services through a set of radically restructured local governments. The final reorganization of local government took effect in December 2000, and the new governments now must develop comprehensive property tax (rates) policies.
Several key pieces of apartheid-era legislation had established the spatial basis for racial separation:
These policies greatly complicated efforts to amalgamate former white and black local authorities (WLAs and BLAs), with important implications for property taxation. Specifically, for local governments, the legacy of apartheid includes:
Post-Apartheid Local Government Structure
The dismantling of apartheid began in the mid-1980s and was essentially complete by the early 1990s. At the end of 1993, the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) was signed by then-President de Klerk and, symbolically, by Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress (ANC). The LGTA provided for short-, medium- and long-term transformation of local governments to create nonracial self-government. It created two-tier local governments in metropolitan areas, with powers and responsibilities shared between a geographically larger unit and two or more smaller units within the same area. The Municipal Structures Act of 1998, providing for single-tier metropolitan government, was implemented after the local elections of December 2000 as part of a general and final redemarcation of local governments that reduced the number of authorities from approximately 845 to less than 300.
Amalgamation of municipalities brought new areas into the property tax base, including former BLAs, bantustans and their associated rural R293 towns, but the residents of these newly incorporated areas had never before paid property taxes. Thus, it was necessary to develop the information and administrative infrastructure needed to value properties, determine tax liabilities, distribute tax bills to those responsible, and collect the taxes due, all in an equitable manner. Moreover, the new tax system had to overcome the psychology of payment boycotts, sometimes characterized as a “culture of nonpayment,” an important resistance technique used against the apartheid government.
Combining formerly taxed areas with different valuation rates or systems into a single municipality produces inconsistencies within the property tax roll of the amalgamated area, multiplying inequities among property owners with different effective tax rates. Both those new to the tax and those who historically have paid property taxes often question whether their tax shares are equitable and how the resulting revenue is being spent. In some instances, tax boycotts have occurred in former WLAs.
National Property Tax Policy
Although property taxation remains a local tax in South Africa, the 1996 Constitution authorizes central government regulation of property taxation. A national Property Rates Bill, scheduled for adoption in 2002, will replace current provincial property tax laws. Each locality now must adopt an explicit and comprehensive property rates policy.
Our seminars took place in this context of national legislation, municipal consolidation and municipal property rates policies. We collaborated with local institutions of higher education: Port Elizabeth Technikon in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and the University of North West in Mafikeng Local Municipality. Seminar participants included current and former elected city councilors, newly enfranchised and long-time non-elected officials, and students and faculty of the educational institutions.
Nelson Mandela Municipality is one of South Africa’s six metropolitan municipal governments, the only local government within its geographic area. Its population and business center is the former city of Port Elizabeth. Principal property tax concerns raised at the seminar included: (1) unifying the tax rolls of the various jurisdictions making up the metropolitan area, since their valuation dates range over a number of years; (2) bringing former black local authority (BLA) areas into the property tax base; (3) deciding on the appropriate way to deal with rural (agricultural) land, previously not taxed but now part of the municipal area; and (4) accomplishing these things in a manner that is sensitive to the special circumstances of those with very low incomes.
Mafikeng, the capital of the North West Province, lies within the Mmbatho District Municipality in the former Bophuthatswana homeland near the Botswana border. Some property tax concerns raised at the Mafikeng seminar were the same as in Nelson Mandela Municipality. In addition, Mafikeng is wrestling with incorporating tribal (traditional authority) areas and the black urban agglomerations (R293 towns) of the former bantustan. Tribal areas present two special problems: property ownership is communal, not private; and the traditional authority structure remains in place, even though these areas now are included within municipal borders, creating a dual authority structure that further complicates amalgamation.
Key Property Taxation Themes
Policy Framework
New national legislation requires each local government to produce a property rates policy to address such issues as whether to include all real properties in the tax base; whether to apply uniform or differential rates to the many categories of property included in the tax base; and what form of property relief should be given, and to whom. If the property tax is to be a viable local revenue source, local rates policies must be guided by the following principles:
These fundamental characteristics of a property tax system provide a framework for restructuring property taxes in South Africa, with tradeoffs made through an open and transparent political process at the local level.
Monitoring
The property tax base is fair market value. Because most properties do not sell in a market transaction each year, however, estimating market value is the task of trained assessment professionals. Differences in location, depreciation and other characteristics make valuation partly an art, not strictly a scientific or technical endeavor. Uniformity relative to market value may not always result, even though it is required and the assessors follow the procedures intended to achieve that result. Thus, a system for monitoring valuation outcomes is needed, which may include three dimensions of assessment quality:
Formal assessment/sales ratio studies have not been done in South Africa, but we calculated simple ratios for several cities. The results in Table 1 indicate that assessment uniformity generally needs to be improved, since coefficients of dispersion across the case study cities are typically high and the price-related differentials are generally substantially above one.
Targeting Tax Relief
Although property taxation is a tax on value, it is paid out of current income, and thus may place an unacceptable burden on property owners with low incomes. Property tax relief is any reduction in tax liability. Indirect relief results from changes that take pressure off the property tax: reduced expenditures or increased revenue from alternative sources. Alternatively, direct relief comes from a change in the calculation of property tax liability.
Direct relief was the focus of our studies and the seminar discussions. In South Africa direct residential property tax relief typically is a uniform percentage credit, termed a rebate, which generally is 20 percent or 25 percent of gross property tax liability. The rebate approach has two limitations. First, most of the tax relief goes to those with the most expensive properties. Second, low-income property owners are still required to pay most of their property tax liability, which still could be burdensome relative to income.
While an income-based circuit breaker is our preferred approach for targeting tax relief to those in need, it would be extremely difficult to administer in South Africa because income information is not readily available, in part because of the extensive informal economy. An alternative way to target property tax relief to those most in need is to exempt a fixed amount of the base from taxation.
Table 2 illustrates the effects of moving from a 25 percent rebate to a R20,000 exemption (US$1,740). Under the partial exemption alternative, the lowest valued properties, including those hardest to value at this time, are removed from paying taxes, and net taxes are reduced on all properties up to about R100,000 (US$8,700). The aggregate cost of property tax relief under this approach is substantially reduced because each property receives the same exemption. Durban and Johannesburg now are experimenting with the partial exemption approach to property tax relief.
Dealing with Previously Untaxed Areas
As a result of the local government restructuring in December 2000, South Africa now has local governments throughout country. Three types of areas previously outside the property tax now are to be brought into the tax: former BLAs and R293 townships, agricultural areas and tribal areas. In the former BLAs and R293 townships property is being transferred to private ownership and these areas must be surveyed by the national Surveyor General to establish individual property boundaries and identifications necessary to administer the property tax. Different localities are at different stages in this process.
Property taxes were levied on rural agricultural lands in the past, but these lands have not been in the property tax base since the late 1980s. Bringing them into the tax base now poses two problems. The first is developing the property record information necessary for tax administration. The second is the question of how taxes on such properties should relate to taxes levied in the urban portions of a municipality, as farmers often provide themselves and their workers with services typically associated with local government. One possibility is use-value assessment of agricultural land, an approach endorsed by a national commission that reviewed the taxation of rural lands. Alternatively, differential rates for different categories of property are allowed under current provincial property tax laws and the draft national Property Rates Bill. If there is to be differentiation in effective tax rates, imposing a lower rate on market value assessments provides greater transparency and understanding of the tax and should be part of the local government rates policy.
Bringing tribal areas into the tax base presents another set of issues. First, given communal land tenure systems existing in these traditional authority areas, how does one establish ownership, a necessary condition for the application of property tax based on the principle of private property? Second, because there is no land market per se, how are estimates of market value to be made? Finally, given the two competing governance structures that now exist in tribal areas, how does one make the payment of a property tax acceptable to residents who did not previously pay the tax? These issues are clearly the most intractable ones that must be addressed in the newest round of local government reform in South Africa.
Conclusion
The property tax has been an important part of local finance in South Africa for centuries and is likely to play an increasingly important role in the future, as newly amalgamated local governments wrestle with addressing the legacies of apartheid and the requirements of new national property tax legislation. There is no single right answer to many of the perplexing questions surrounding the design and implementation of a local property tax, but it will continue to evolve to meet changing circumstances and needs.
Michael E. Bell is president of MEB Associates, Inc., in McHenry, Maryland. John H. Bowman is professor of economics at Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond.
References
Bell, Michael E. and John H. Bowman. 2002. Property Taxes in South Africa: Challenges in the Post-Apartheid Era. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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Proposition 13, adopted by a referendum in California in 1978, was the most notable in a series of relatively recent actions to limit the property tax in the United States, and many experts view it as a watershed in state and local public finance. The property tax in virtually every state is now limited to some degree by statutorily or constitutionally imposed base restrictions, rate limits or revenue limits. These limits have influenced the use of the property tax, and there is substantial evidence that the rate of growth of the property tax has declined. The mix of funding for local expenditures also has changed, as cities, towns, counties, school districts and special districts are relying more and more on user charges, special fees, franchise fees and local option sales and use taxes.
The limits on the property tax also have many policy and expenditure implications. There is evidence, significant in some cases and simply indicative in others, that the property tax restrictions have fostered a variety of policy outcomes in the delivery of services to citizens. Some of these tax limits have affected educational outcomes: reduced the number of teachers in classrooms, reduced the qualifications of individuals entering the teaching profession, and reduced student performance in math, reading and science.
The literature detailing the possible effects of property tax limits on local government also reports the following changes: reduced infrastructure investment by local governments, reduction in the rate of salary increases for public employees, and a shift to state-controlled revenue sources that has led to the centralization of power toward state governments (Sokolow 2000). In this context, property tax limits may reduce intergovernmental competition and the discipline on the growth in government that results. Few observers would disagree that Proposition 13 and its imitators in other states have resulted in substantial nonuniformity in the property tax system (O’Sullivan, Sexton and Sheffrin 1995).
These outcomes illustrate the competing tradeoffs that accompany property tax limits. Depending on individual perspectives these consequences could be considered a plus or a minus. Supporters of Prop 13 and its derivatives want lower property taxes and less government (at least for others), but it is unlikely they also want less government for themselves. David Sears and Jack Citrin (1982) have labeled this behavior the “something for nothing” syndrome.
Therese McGuire (1999) notes that among public finance economists the advantages of the property tax for funding local governments approach “dogma.” In an opinion survey of more than 1300 Canadian and U.S. members of the National Tax Association, 93 percent of the respondents with training in economics favored the property tax as a major source of revenue for local governments (Slemrod 1995). This result probably explains why the World Bank and other international advisory groups are spending significant sums of money and offering assistance to improve and implement the property tax in developing and transitional countries. However, it also presents an interesting dilemma: experts support the property tax but voters want to limit it. Why the conflict?
Advantages of the Property Tax
The property tax provides local governments with a revenue source that they can control and avoids the strings that normally accompany fiscal transfers from a regional, state or national government. The result is local autonomy that allows local governments to select the level and quality of services demanded by local citizens. The property tax is relatively stable over the normal business cycle and provides a dependable funding source to local governments that must balance their budgets. Stability is important for certainty in operating budgets and is critical in the financing of long-term debt obligations.
The importance of a stable revenue source has been painfully exposed during the recent economic downturn in the U.S. State governments that are funded by less stable revenue sources are scrambling to balance their current and future budgets by cutting services and increasing taxes and fees. The fact that the property tax is imposed on an immobile base and is difficult to evade also makes it an attractive source of revenue for smaller governments.
Political accountability is another important element of the property tax. A noted function of a responsive tax system is one that provides price signals, or political accountability, on the cost of government to citizens. Compared to almost all other taxes, the direct and visible nature of the property tax suggests that it scores relatively high in this regard. The case for political accountability becomes even stronger when zoning for land use is included in the discussion. Bruce Hamilton (1975) has demonstrated that the property tax, when coupled with local zoning, becomes a benefit tax that leads to efficient outcomes. The combination of property taxation and zoning is the way many public finance scholars describe the characteristics of local finance in the U.S.
Disadvantages of the Property Tax
On the other hand, the property tax is difficult to administer. It requires substantial administrative effort on the part of public officials to discover and maintain the property records of every land parcel. Even with effective methods to discover property, determining its taxable value has always been a challenge to public assessors. Unlike other sales taxes and income taxes, there is no annually occurring event to place a market value on unsold properties. Assessors must value property as if it had sold. Assessors also confront limited budgets and a finite number of trained experts.
Nevertheless, we want public assessors to value property, land and the improvements to land accurately, and to do so as inexpensively as possible. Fortunately, progress has been made in the technical area of property valuation. It is now common to find large and small taxing jurisdictions using statistically driven valuation processes to estimate property values based on carefully designed hedonic models. The technical advantages of statistically driven appraisal systems in terms of efficiency and effectiveness are substantial.
However, the advantage of accurate and timely property appraisals highlights what I believe is a fundamental problem with the property tax and why it receives such low marks from taxpayers and elected officials. When an assessor conducts a reappraisal, the outcome is likely to increase assessed property values. If there is no reduction in the tax rate that was applied to the old tax base, the local government that relies on the property tax receives a potential windfall. It is not surprising, then, that in such situations the assessor and the assessor’s office are quickly identified as the villains of the tax increase. More importantly, these circumstances are powerful incentives to not reassess property regularly and thus avoid the angry backlash of property owners and voters.
Public finance experts have an expectation that the assessor will follow the legal and professional requirements and value property according to state law and professional practice. But, because of the uncertain political outcome when property is revalued, the assessor may act in self-interest, understandably being more concerned about reelection or reappointment than in ensuring that property is revalued properly. A system has been created that requires a reappraisal process and penalizes any assessor foolish enough to ignore it, but over time such avoidance behavior can foster nonuniformity in the property tax.
Political Challenges and Full Disclosure
We have solved many of the technical problems of property appraisal but not the political problems. Nevertheless, I believe there is at least one viable response to the political challenges: states and assessors can adopt a process of truth-in-taxation or full disclosure. The logic of full disclosure design is simple. A chilling effect on property tax growth is posited to occur when the “real” causes of increased property taxes are exposed to property owners. Helen Ladd (1991) states that full disclosure laws “tighten the link between taxpayer voter demand and local budgetary decisions.”
The standard annual tax notice, common in thousands of local tax jurisdictions, does not create a similar chilling effect. A typical tax notice informs property owners about the assessed value of the property, often a modest percentage of market value, tax rates listed in mills, and the total taxes due. If any increases in the assessed value of properties are not offset by reduced tax rates, the new assessed values create additional revenue for the taxing authority. In fact, elected officials can honestly boast that property tax rates have not changed and thus avoid most of the responsibility for any tax increase. An analysis of the behavior of elected officials in Massachusetts found precisely this type of behavior following several cycles of increases in assessed value due to revaluations (Bloom and Ladd 1982).
A property tax full disclosure law generally proceeds in the following manner. Local taxing districts are required to calculate a rate that, when applied to the tax base, produces property tax revenue that is identical in amount to the property tax revenue generated during the previous year. The rate to accomplish this is often referred to as the certified rate; it is calculated by dividing the new assessed value into the property tax revenue from the previous year. The resulting rate is the rate that, when applied to the taxable value of the taxing jurisdiction, will generate the same amount of revenue as the previous year.
This process forces elected officials to reduce the property tax rate—or at least acknowledge that any increase is their choice. If the elected officials choose not to reduce the rate, a public notice must be given that a tax rate increase is anticipated. The public notice is generally carried in a newspaper with specific requirements about the size, placement and language of the notice. In some states a preliminary tax notice is also sent to the taxpayers before that actual budget is adopted, to announce when and where the particular budget hearings on the issue will be held.
Full disclosure laws are intended to create a system with opportunities for input on property tax rate changes and the subsequent size and mix of government, but not at the expense of informed outcomes (Council of State Governments 1977). Full disclosure laws have the aim of a process to inform citizens and limit the rate of growth in property taxes. Nevertheless, like the property tax, full disclosure laws have not enjoyed universal or even modest acclaim. Researchers hold full disclosure laws in such subdued regard that when studying the implications of property tax limitations they commonly classify states having full disclosure laws among the states having no property tax limits.
It is not surprising that many observers suspect that full disclosure laws have little influence on policy outcomes. In states with full disclosure laws, the property tax increases more rapidly than in states with legally binding limits. This suggests that, because full disclosure laws cannot prevent all growth in the property tax, the strongest antagonists of the property tax and the often single-minded opponents to any growth in government will never find the approach acceptable.
However, I believe that full disclosure laws, like property tax limits, have other positive unintended outcomes. They may facilitate improvements in the administration of the property tax because they create a climate that fosters more frequent property tax appraisals by elected county assessors and more thorough and rigorous intervention on property tax matters by state revenue departments. If I am correct, the result is improvement in property tax uniformity. If this posited outcome is validated, then full disclosure laws can and should be judged beyond their immediate role in controlling the rate of increase in the property tax.
Gary C. Cornia is a visiting senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute this year and a member of the Institute’s board of directors. He is also professor in the Romney Institute of Public Management at Brigham Young University and president of the National Tax Association.
References
Bloom, H.S. and Helen F. Ladd. 1982. Property tax revaluation and tax levy growth. Journal of Urban Economics 11: 73-84.
Council of State Governments. 1977. 1978 Suggested State Legislation 37. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments, 125-28.
Hamilton, Bruce. 1975. Zoning and property taxation in a system of local governments. Urban Studies 12 (June): 205-211.
Ladd, Helen F. 1991. Property tax revaluation and the tax levy growth revisited. Journal of Urban Economics 30: 83-99.
McGuire, Therese J. 1999. Proposition 13 and its offspring: For good or evil. National Tax Journal 52 (March): 129-138.
O’Sullivan, Arthur, Terri A. Sexton, and Steven M. Sheffrin. 1995. Property taxes and tax revolts: The legacy of Proposition 13. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sears, David O. and Jack Citrin. 1982. Tax revolt: Something for nothing in California. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Slemrod, Joel. 1995. Professional opinions about tax policy. National Tax Journal 48: 121-148.
Sokolow, Alvin D. 2000. The changing property tax in the West: State centralization of local finances. Public Budgeting and Finance 20 (Spring): 85-102.
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The Institute’s June 2007 Land Policy Conference focused on decentralization—the degree to which local and provincial governments exercise power, make decisions about their revenues and expenditures, and are held accountable for outcomes. Because the services,regulatory constraints, and institutional environments provided by local governments are major factors in the location decisions of households and firms in urban areas, decentralization is a key determinant of policies that affect land and property taxation.
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The recent recession has been recognized as the worst in memory, and its effects are still being felt. Less well understood is the fact that this recession has been far worse for state governments than the drop in gross domestic product (GDP) would suggest. While state government finances have stopped falling off a cliff, they are closer to the bottom of that cliff than the top. Tax receipts have not returned to their pre-recession levels, and new revenue demands may overwhelm any interim improvements in collections. Even if states can avoid these challenges, it will be a long, slow road to fiscal recovery, with several large risks along the way.
State and local governments play a major role in the economy and in our daily lives. They finance more than 90 percent of K-12 education and deliver virtually all of it. Public colleges and universities educate three-quarters of students enrolled in degree-granting institutions. State and local governments oversee, design, and build more than 90 percent of the nation’s public infrastructure. They finance much of the nation’s social safety net and implement much of it as well. In fact, state and local governments spend more on direct implementation of domestic policy than does the federal government.
The services financed and delivered by state and local governments tend to have stable and generally rising demand. When a recession hits, there is no reduction in the numbers of children in school or elderly people in nursing homes—two of the most important spending areas for state and local governments—or in the numbers of fires or crimes. For programs such as Medicaid and higher education, for example, demand for the kinds of services that state and local governments provide typically rises during recessions. Unless and until states can fix their revenue structures or develop adequate reserves, public policy will continue to gyrate with every turn in the economy.
Decline in State Tax Collections
The Great Recession that started in December 2007 was the deepest and longest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The unemployment rate rose to 10.1 percent and has remained stubbornly high, falling only to 9.1 percent after two years of recovery. State tax collections plummeted, falling for five consecutive quarters beginning in the fourth quarter of 2008 and continuing through 2009. Tax revenue fell by a dizzying 16.8 percent in the second quarter of 2009, and over the next several years it declined further and more sharply than it had in any other recession since World War II (figure 1).
The recent drop in GDP has been significant in comparison to past recessions, but the declines in taxable consumption and personal income, two components that typically constitute the tax bases of state and local government, have been far worse. Taxable consumption fell by about 11 percent, while GDP fell by about 5 percent. Taxable components of personal income also fell much more sharply than the overall economy and still languish more than 5 percent below the pre-recession peak, reflecting the jobless recovery.
Even though this has been the worst post-war recession by traditional economic measures, these measures do not tell the whole story. Capital gains, an important component of state tax bases, are not included in personal income as measured in the nation’s economic accounts. These gains have increased in importance and are a major cause of increased volatility in state finances. Capital gains fell by more than 55 percent, driving down tax collections in the final quarter of the 2009 fiscal year, when tax returns reflecting the 2008 stock market collapse were filed.
The net result of these and other forces was huge declines in state income, sales, and corporate taxes. Figure 2 shows that annual income taxes fell by more than 15 percent in inflation-adjusted terms, sales taxes fell by more than 10 percent, and corporate income taxes fell by more than 25 percent. Property taxes, which are crucial to local governments but generally not a significant revenue source for states, remained quite stable through much of the period, although they are beginning to weaken and in some parts of the country have fallen significantly.
A Slow Recovery
The recession ended in June 2009 and the economy has been recovering slowly. State tax collections grew in each quarter of calendar year 2010, and the character of that growth has improved over time. In the first two quarters of 2010, increased tax rates more than offset declines caused by the weak underlying economy, but in the last two quarters tax revenue growth was driven primarily by the improving economy. By the fourth quarter, tax revenue grew by 7.8 percent, but even with-out tax rate increases it would have grown by 7.0 percent. Tax revenue in the January–March 2011 quarter grew 9.3 percent compared to the previous year, and 21 states had double-digit growth. Preliminary data for the April–June quarter show tax revenue up 11.4 percent.
Inflation-adjusted state tax revenue for the nation as a whole in the latest four quarters (ending in the first quarter of calendar year 2011) was 7.7 percent below the peak attained in 2007. The heady growth in the first two quarters of 2011 probably cannot be sustained because much of it appears to have been driven by stock market gains in tax year 2010, boosting income tax returns in the second quarter. Those gains almost certainly will not be repeated in 2011.
In addition, turmoil in European debt markets and the recent Standard & Poor’s downgrade of U.S. long-term debt have contributed to fears of a double-dip recession. There are indications that economic growth will be slower than most states have assumed in their current budgets. States are closer to the bottom of the cliff than the top, and are at risk of falling back down. Meanwhile, there are some signs that local government tax revenue also is beginning to weaken.
While tax revenues are now growing in most states compared to the last year’s low collection rates, they have not reached the levels prior to the recession. After adjusting for inflation, tax revenues for the latest four quarters are below the calendar year 2007 level in 43 states, and revenues are 10 percent or more below that level in 20 of those states. Among the seven states showing a positive shift in revenue collection, only Oregon (8.9 percent), Delaware (13 percent), and North Dakota (62.9 percent) are at levels above 2 percent.
State and Local Government Responses
States hit by falling revenue also face rising entitlement costs driven in large part by Medicaid enrollment, which typically increases after unemployed workers exhaust health insurance benefits. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers (2011, ix), Medicaid enrollment rose by 8.1 percent in fiscal year 2010, and by an estimated 5.4 percent in fiscal year 2011; states project a further increase of 3.8 percent in fiscal year 2012. These and other types of required expenditures cause further stress in the day-to-day operations of state and local governments.
It is difficult to measure the impact of spending cuts on state and local programs, but changes in state and local government employment can be tracked. Although private sector employment fell sharply from the beginning of the recession, state and local government employment continued to rise modestly for about a year and a half. Shortly before private sector employment reached its nadir, state and local government employment began to decline, and states and localities have been cutting employment aggressively. Local government employment is now about 3 percent below its peak, and state government employment is about 2 percent below its peak.
Education employment in most states is related primarily to higher education—community colleges, four-year colleges, and universities—although some is related to the administrative bureaucracy for elementary and secondary education, and in some states it includes part of the K-12 workforce. State government education employment has continued to rise significantly throughout the recession and recovery, reflecting in part the increased demand for higher education that usually comes with recessions (figure 3). When jobs are hard to find, many people choose to build skills and knowledge by entering an education program or extending their time in school (Betts and McFarland 1995).
Meanwhile, state governments have been cutting noneducation employment at an accelerating pace, so that it is now down almost 5 percent from its mid-2008 peak, nearly comparable to the current, slightly recovered condition for private sector employment. In each of the nine previous recessions, state government noneducation employment either did not decline at all or it declined by much less, as was the case in the 2001 recession.
Figure 4 shows the same employment data for local governments, which are being hit increasingly hard by slowing property taxes and cuts in state aid. Education employment is now down about 3.5 percent from its late-2008 peak, and the noneducation sector is down about the same percentage from its peak. There are no signs that these cuts are slowing, and little reason to believe they will abate in the near term.
Continuing Fiscal Pressures
The recent improvement in state tax revenue is welcome, but many challenges remain. States still face fiscal trouble for four main reasons. First, total revenue remains well below its peak. Second, the recession has had lagged fiscal effects, driving up the demand for many government services, especially Medicaid, other safety net programs, and higher education. The recession also has created other pressures and problems for states by depleting unemployment insurance trust funds, which may lead to higher unemployment insurances taxes in order to repay federal loans.
Third, state cyclical adjustments are not yet complete because they must contend with losses in both federal stimulus aid of more than $50 billion in fiscal year 2011–12 and the fact that temporary revenue measures put in place in response to the recession will expire soon. Fourth, even after this cycle is fully stabilized, states will have to contend with large increases in pension contributions and payments for retiree health care—a pressure that is likely to build for years to come for several reasons, including: increasing numbers of retirements by an aging workforce; the likelihood that health care costs will continue to rise more quickly than the overall rate of economic growth (Keehan et al. 2011); and, in the case of some pension systems and most retiree health plans, years of chronic underfunding.
States finance these services with unstable revenue sources, and tax revenue has become much less dependable over the last two decades, reflecting in large part the increasing role of volatile capital gains taxes. Unless and until states broaden their tax bases to make their revenue structures less volatile, or develop adequate reserves, public policy will continue to gyrate with every turn in the economy.
About the Author
Donald Boyd is the executive director of the national Task Force on the State Budget Crisis, co-chaired by former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker and former New York lieutenant governor Richard Ravitch. Boyd is currently on leave from his responsibilities as senior fellow at the Rockefeller Institute of Government, where he conducts research on state and local government fiscal issues.
References
Betts, Julian R., and Laurel L. McFarland. 1995. Safe port in a storm: The impact of labor market conditions on community college enrollments. Journal of Human Resources 30(4):741–765.
Boyd, Donald. 2011. Recession, recovery, and state and local finances. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Keehan, Sean P., Andrea M. Sisko, Christopher J. Truffer, John A. Poisal, Gigi A. Cuckler, Andrew J. Madison, Joseph M. Lizonitz, and Sheila D. Smith. 2011. National health spending projections through 2020: Economic recovery and reform drive faster spending growth. Health Affairs 30(8): 1594–1605.
National Association of State Budget Officers. 2011. The fiscal survey of states. Washington, DC. http://nasbo.org/Publications/FiscalSurvey/tabid/65/Default.aspx
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the financing of U.S. public elementary and secondary education has become particularly challenging, given the close link between school finance and property taxation. Across the nation, the sharp drop in housing prices that triggered the recession led to reductions in property tax revenues. Public schools derive more than 80 percent of their local own-source revenue from the property tax (McGuire, Papke, and Reschovsky 2015), and nearly half of total property tax dollars collected in the United States are used to finance public elementary and secondary education (U.S. Census Bureau 2014, U.S. Census Bureau 2013).
As a means of encouraging new research on these issues, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy organized a conference on “Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education” in Cambridge, MA, in October 2013. The Fall 2014 issue of Education Finance and Policy features five of the conference papers along with two additional works submitted as part of the journal’s call for papers for the special issue, which underwent the journal’s peer review process. We served as guest editors, working closely with the journal’s editors, Thomas A. Downes and Dan Goldhaber. Thanks to funding from the Lincoln Institute, the special issue is available for free downloading until January 2016 from the website of the Association of Education Finance and Policy (www.aefpweb.org/journal/free-fall-2014).
Challenges for Funding K-12 Education
Using revenue data from the National Center for Education Statistics (2014), we determined that in real per pupil terms, total revenues devoted to public education fell by 6.2 percent from September 2008 to June 2012. Although comprehensive figures are not yet available for the most recent years, existing evidence points to a continued decline in financial support for public education. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Quarterly Summary of State and Local Tax Revenue indicate that per capita real local government property tax revenues (for school and nonschool purposes) were 2.7 percent lower at the end of fiscal year 2014 than they were at the end of fiscal year 2011. And a survey conducted by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that, in at least 35 states, real per-student state education aid was lower in fiscal year 2014 than in fiscal year 2008 (Leachman and Mai 2014).
Many school districts around the country responded to reduced revenues by laying off employees. In fact, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) reports that between the employment peak in June 2009 and the trough in October 2012, education employment by local governments fell by 357,400—a decline of 4.4 percent. During this same period, public school enrollment grew by 0.9 percent (National Center for Education Statistics 2013).
Current projections signal significant increases in both K–12 enrollment and cost per pupil. The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES 2013) projects that per pupil expenditures will increase from an average of $10,518 in the 2009–10 school year to $12,530 in 2021–22. The NCES also projects substantial increases in public school enrollment, although growth projections for specific states vary and are generally much higher for the southern and western states (8.9 percent and 12.7 percent from 2010 to 2021) than for the Northeast and Midwest (2.2 percent and 2.4 percent). Although public policies and priorities can change, based on current policies and revenue projections, it is unlikely that revenues in support of public education will grow fast enough to match the projected growth in student enrollment and in costs.
National data indicate that in 2011–12, 10 percent of total public education revenue came from the federal government, with the rest split fairly evenly between state and local government sources (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Federal government programs in support of education are classified as domestic discretionary expenditures. While to date Congress has done little to rein in the growth of spending on entitlement programs, it has mandated strict limits on the growth of domestic discretionary expenditures through the Budget Control Act of 2011 and the fiscal year 2014 Congressional budget agreement. The Congressional Budget Office (2013) predicts that, relative to GDP, domestic discretionary spending will decline through at least 2023. Given these overall spending caps, along with competition from other pressing domestic needs, reductions in real per pupil federal education support appear likely.
School funding systems vary tremendously across states, and future trends in state support for public education will differ greatly across states as well. However, many state governments face several long-run structural problems that are likely to constrain future state funding for public education. On the revenue side, many states have narrow sales tax bases that exclude many services and, as a result, fail to grow proportionally to their economies. The revenue problems are exacerbated by the inability of states to collect sales taxes on many Internet and mail order purchases. In the past few years, a number of states have adopted individual income tax cuts. These tax cuts have generally been enacted with no offsetting revenue increases, or they have been funded using revenue from one-time state budget surpluses.
On the spending side, funding for K–12 education must compete with other priorities. In many states, spending on Medicaid will grow faster than state tax revenues, a trend influenced in part by the aging of the population. Many states are also facing large and growing unfunded pension liabilities. Addressing these unfunded liabilities will undoubtedly require substantial increases in state government pension contributions. Although polls indicate that voters favor increased spending on education over spending in other areas, unless state governments make politically difficult decisions to increase taxes, states’ growing Medicaid and pension obligations may crowd out spending on K–12 education (Pew Research 2011).
With diminished prospects for growth in funding from federal and state governments, local school districts will likely play an increasingly important role in funding public education. Increasing local government funding for public education will require the politically difficult step of increasing property taxes, or, if that proves impossible, the development and widespread adoption of alternative sources of local government revenue. Neither strategy will be easy to implement.
This rather bleak picture of the prospects for public education funding raises a number of research questions. For example, can state governments adopt policies that would make the property tax more publicly acceptable? What role do alternative local sources of revenue play in funding public education? Can their role be increased? Is it possible to design state education aid systems that result in a more steady flow of state aid during economic downturns? Can state policies aimed at providing property tax relief be made more effective? Can state aid systems be reformed in ways that increase the educational opportunities of all students? The Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education considers these and other questions.
Conclusion
Three central themes emerge from this special issue. The first is the potential for unintended consequences to arise from state legislation. Eom et al. find that New York’s prominent property tax relief program, STAR, induces voters to increase school spending and raise property taxes, thereby undercutting much of the intended property tax relief. Jeffrey Zabel finds that property tax overrides in Massachusetts have led to increased racial segregation. And Phuong Nguyen-Hoang finds that the use of TIFs in Iowa has led to modest reductions in education spending.
A second theme is the potential for state school finance and property tax policies to provide greater advantages for high-wealth or high-income school districts than for low-wealth or low-income districts. In some cases, this pro-wealthy tilt is an explicit program feature. For example, the sales price differential adjustment factor in STAR channels a disproportionate amount of property tax relief to the wealthiest school districts. Likewise, Michigan’s state aid system sends about 7 percent more state aid per pupil to the wealthiest districts. In other cases, the tilt toward wealthier districts arises in more indirect ways. Chakrabarti et al. find that high-wealth school districts are likelier to increase property tax revenues in response to cuts in state aid. Zabel notes that higher income towns are more likely to pass property tax overrides. Nguyen-Hoang finds that TIFs have a greater negative effect on school spending in low-income or low-wealth districts than in high-income or high-wealth districts. Finally, Nelson and Gazley find that well-off districts are more likely to receive revenue from school-supporting nonprofits, and their per-pupil contributions tend to be higher.
A third theme is the enduring importance of the property tax as a funding source for public education in the United States. Papers by both Nelson and Gazley and by Downes and Killeen demonstrate that non-tax revenue plays a relative minor role in the funding of public schools. And no evidence suggests that the share of revenue from student fees and charges, school-supporting nonprofits, or from miscellaneous non-tax revenues has increased during or after the Great Recession.
These findings suggest that in order to ensure sufficient funding for public education into the future, efforts should be made to make the property tax a more appealing source of revenue. These property tax improvements might include the expansion of well-designed targeted property tax relief programs, such as circuit breakers, the adoption of property tax deferral programs for taxpayers facing high property tax burdens or rapid increases in their property tax bills, and improvements in tax administration that focus on increased transparency.
Given the great diversity in school finance and property tax systems across the U.S. and the fiscal challenges ahead, the papers in this special issue cannot possibly provide insights into the full range of policies needed to assure adequate and equitable funding for public education. However, it is our hope that these papers will be thought-provoking for both policy makers and researchers, and also inspire additional research on property taxation and school funding.
Contents
Introduction to Special Issue on the Property Tax and the Financing of K–12 Education
Daphne A. Kenyon and Andrew Reschovsky
Did Cuts in State Aid During the Great Recession Lead to Changes in Local Property Taxes?
Rajashri Chakrabarti, Max Livingston, and Joydeep Roy
Michigan and Ohio K–12 Educational Finance Systems: Equality and Efficiency
Michael Conlin and Paul Thompson
The Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program
Tae Ho Eom, William Duncombe, Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, and John Yinger
Unintended Consequences: The Impact of Proposition 2½ Overrides on School Segregation in Massachusetts
Jeffrey Zabel
Tax Increment Finance and Education Expenditures: The Case of Iowa
Phuong Nguyen-Hoang
The Rise of School-Supporting Nonprofits
Ashlyn Aiko Nelson and Beth Gazley
So Slow to Change: The Limited Growth of Non-Tax Revenues in Public Education Finance, 1991–2010
Thomas Downes and Kieran M. Killeen
About the Authors
Daphne A. Kenyon, Ph.D., is an economist who is a fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates.
Andrew Reschovsky, Ph.D., is a fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and a professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
References
Congressional Budget Office. 2013. Updated Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023. Washington, DC (May). www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44172-Baseline2.pdf.
Leachman, Michael and Chris Mai. 2014. “Most States Funding Schools Less Than Before the Recession,” Washington, DC: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Updated September 12. www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4011.
McGuire, Therese J., Leslie E. Papke, and Andrew Reschovsky. 2015. “Local Funding of Schools: The Property Tax and Its Alternatives,” chapter 22 in Handbook of Research on Education Finance and Policy, revised edition, edited by Helen F. Ladd and Margaret Goertz, Routledge, 376–391.
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2014. “National Public Education Financial Survey Data,” School Year 2010–11. http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/stfis.asp.
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2013. “Projections of Education Statistics to 2021.” http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/index.asp.
Pew Research. 2011. “Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular.” Center for People and the Press. February 10. www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewer-want-spending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular.
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013. Table B-1a: Employees on Non-Farm Payrolls by Industry Sector and Selected Industry Detail, Seasonally Adjusted. Current Employment Statistics, Establishment Data. www.bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2013. 2011 Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finance, State and Local Government Data. www.census.gov/govs/local/.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. 2012 Data, Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data. www.census.gov/govs/school/.
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This article reviews the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, in which state planners from 13 western states have participated. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for land use planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to land use planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of land use planning strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.
Forces and trends of land use planning. The West is changing and there are many differences in the states’ approach to land use planning. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities, and landscapes—directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning, and changing the way development occurs.
Major themes related to land use planning and growth in the West;
Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, land use planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support.
What is the role of state government? State programs should support local land use planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions and maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.
How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges.
Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use planning decisions to drive the decisions.
How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local land use planning. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?
The Three Cs of Planning—three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country. First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community; second, rely on collaborative approaches; third, foster regional connections.
“This [the West] is the native home of hope. When it fully learns that cooperation, not rugged individualism, is the quality that most characterizes and preserves it, then it will have achieved itself and outlived its origins. Then it has a chance to create a society to match its scenery.”
Wallace Stegner, The Sound of Mountain Water (Penguin Books 1980, 38)
During the past two years, state planners in 13 western states have met in the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, an annual event sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Western Consensus Council. Cosponsors include the Western Governors’ Association, the Council of State Governments–WEST, and the Western Planners’ Association. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we have learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.
Forces and Trends
The West is changing. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities and landscapes, directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. One force that sets the West apart from other regions of the country is the overwhelming presence of the landscape. The West has more land and fewer people than any other region, yet is also very urbanized. More people live in urban centers than in rural communities.
The dominance of land in the politics and public policy of the West is due in part to the large amount of land governed by federal and tribal entities (see Figure 1). More than 90 percent of all federal land in the U.S. lies in Alaska and the 11 westernmost contiguous states. The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manage most of the West’s geography and significantly influence the politics of land use decisions. Indian tribes govern one-fifth of the interior West and are key players in managing water, fish and wildlife.
The West is also the fastest growing region of the country (see Figure 2). The five fastest-growing states of the 1990s were Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah and Idaho. Between 1990 and 1998, the region’s cities grew by 25 percent and its rural areas by 18 percent, both significantly higher rates than elsewhere in the U.S. As western demographics diversify, the political geography has grown remarkably homogeneous. Following the 2000 elections, Republicans held three-quarters of the congressional districts in the interior West (see Figure 3) and all governorships except the coastal states of California, Oregon and Washington.
Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning and changing the way development occurs in the West. They also point out many differences in their states’ approaches to planning. Oregon and Hawaii have long-standing statewide land use planning efforts, but planning in Nevada is a recent phenomenon, limited mainly to the Las Vegas and Reno areas. Vast federal holdings in Nevada, Idaho and Utah dictate land use management more than in other states, and Arizona and New Mexico share planning responsibilities with many sovereign tribal governments. Alaska and Wyoming—with small populations and little or no growth—do very little planning.
Major Themes
Based on the first two retreats, we have identified six major themes related to planning and growth in the West.
Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support. Particularly during economic recession, planning takes a back seat—the public can focus on only so many problems at once. Today, the most compelling argument for planning is that it can be a vehicle to promote economic development and sustain the quality of life. People move to the West and create jobs because they like the quality of life in the region, and planners need to tap into this motivation.
In Utah, for example, quality of life is an economic imperative, so state planners tie their work to enhancing quality of life rather than to limiting or directing growth. It is used to integrate economic vitality and environmental protection. Several years ago, business leaders and others created Envision Utah, a private-public partnership. Participants use visualization techniques and aerial photos, mapping growth as it might occur without planning, and then again under planned cluster developments with greenbelts and community centers. These “alternative futures” scenarios help citizens picture the changes that are coming and the alternatives for guiding those changes in their communities. As Utah’s state planner says, “Growth will happen, and our job is to preserve quality. That way, when growth slows, we will still have a high quality of life.”
Kent Briggs, executive director for the Council of State Governments–WEST (a regional association for state legislators), and Jim Souby, executive director of the Western Governors’ Association, acknowledge the difficulty of nurturing public and political support for growth management in the West. They agree that political power shifts quickly from one party to the other, and yet is a lagging indicator of cultural, demographic and economic change. Governors and legislators might be more convinced to support land use planning, they say, by using visualization techniques to help them understand the costs of existing patterns of development, and to picture the desired future of our communities and landscapes.
How much planning is enough, and who should be in the driver’s seat? Arizona and Colorado have smart growth programs designed to help communities plan for growth and preserve open space. In the November 2000 elections, citizen initiatives in both states introduced some of the nation’s most stringent planning requirements, but both initiatives failed by a 70 to 30 percent vote, suggesting that citizens want to maintain flexibility and freedom—and local control—when it comes to planning and growth management. The story is similar in Hawaii, where business profitability—not zoning maps—directs land use. In May 2001, Hawaii’s governor vetoed a smart growth initiative because it was perceived as being too environmental and would limit developers’ ability to convert agricultural lands.
This emphasis on home rule or local control is supported by a recent survey of citizens in Montana, conducted by the Montana Association of Realtors. In the survey, 67 percent of respondents said that city or county governments should have the power to make land use decisions, while 60 percent opposed increasing state involvement in managing growth-related problems.
In Oregon, citizens narrowly passed Measure 7, an initiative requiring state and local governments to pay private property owners for any regulations that restrict the use or reduce the value of real property. While the impacts and constitutionality of this initiative are still being debated, it sends a strong message to planners in a state that has had one of the most progressive land use and growth management programs for 25 years. The message, according to Oregon’s state planner, is to not rest on your successes, and to keep citizens and communities engaged in an ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of land use planning. He also stressed the need to balance preservation with appropriate development, emphasizing that “good planning doesn’t just place limits on growth and development.”
What is the role of state government? Douglas Porter, keynote speaker at the first retreat and a nationally known consultant on land use and growth policy, says that one of the most important state roles is to offset the lack of will to plan at the local level. He says that state programs should support local planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions. Porter also suggests that state governments can maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.
Oregon’s state government attracted $20 million in federal funding to help communities overhaul zoning ordinances and remove obstacles to mixed uses. Colorado created an Office of Smart Growth to provide technical assistance on comprehensive planning; document best practices for planning and development; maintain a list of qualified mediators for land use disputes; and provide grants for regional efforts in high growth areas. In Arizona, Montana and New Mexico, state planning offices provide a range of technical services to assist communities, such as clarifying state laws, promoting public participation, and fostering intergovernmental coordination.
Jim Souby suggests that one of the most effective roles of state government is to promote market-based strategies and tax incentives. “Tax what you don’t like, subsidize what you do like,” Souby says. Other incentives might include cost sharing and state investment strategies—similar to Maryland and Oregon—to drive development in a positive direction.
How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. In Washington, citizens recently rejected the top-down smart growth model popularized in Florida due to concerns over home rule and private property rights. In response, the state legislature approved a system of regional planning boards that instill some statewide consistency while allowing for regional and local differences.
Nevada, despite double-digit growth in the Las Vegas and Reno areas, does not have a state planning office. However, the legislature mandated Washoe County (home of Reno and Sparks) to create a regional planning commission to address growth issues jointly rather than in a piecemeal manner. Key municipal and county officials in Clark County (Las Vegas) formed their planning coalition voluntarily—compelled to cooperate by the highest growth rate in the nation. This coalition recently presented the state legislature with a regional plan that emphasizes resolving growth issues locally rather than at the state level.
In New Mexico, the city and county of Santa Fe each recently updated their comprehensive land use plans. The plans were fine, except that they were stand-alones prepared with no coordination. Citizens demanded better integration of planning efforts and pushed for a new regional planning authority. Within 18 months, citizens and officials developed a joint land use plan for the five-mile zone around the city, and the regional authority is now developing zoning districts and an annexation plan. In Idaho, city and county officials in Boise voluntarily created the Treasure Valley Partnership as a forum to discuss policies for controlling sprawl, and to coordinate the delivery of services. They are also reviewing the possibility of light rail development.
Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges. For example, the city of Reno has been reluctant to join the neighboring city of Sparks and Washoe County in revising their regional plan. With no enforcement or penalty at the state level, the other jurisdictions can do little to encourage Reno’s involvement. Likewise, New Mexico has no policy framework for regional planning and thus no guidelines on how to share taxing authority, land use decision making and enforcement responsibilities.
Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaborative forums allow local officials to weigh and balance competing viewpoints, and to learn more about the issues at hand. According to Jim Souby, local efforts should incorporate federal land managers because they play such a dominant role in the region’s political geography. Kent Briggs agrees that collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use decisions to drive the decisions. Collaborative processes, when they include all affected interests, can generate enormous political power, even when such efforts do not have any formal authority. While it may be appropriate in some cases to have national or state goals, it is ultimately up to the people who live in the communities and watersheds of the West to determine their future, according to Briggs.
How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local planning. The commission recommended that the state should monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning on an ongoing basis. The governor recently appointed an oversight council to continue this work, but council members say that clear benchmarks are needed against which to evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning—a percentage of open space preserved, for example, or a threshold on new development that triggers tighter growth restrictions. Arizona law, however, simply identifies the issues that must be addressed in comprehensive land use plans. It does not set specific standards or expectations, making meaningful evaluation impossible. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?
The Three Cs of Planning
Three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country.
First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community. What are you trying to promote, or prevent? Be explicit about the values driving the planning process. Emphasize the link between quality of life, economic development and land use planning as a way to sustain the economy and the environment. Remember that people must have meaningful reasons to participate constructively in the planning process.
Second, rely on collaborative approaches. Engage the full range of stakeholders, and do it in a meaningful way. A good collaborative process generates a broader understanding of the issues—since more people are sharing information and ideas—and also leads to more durable, widely supported decisions. Collaboration may also be the most effective way to accommodate the needs and interests of local citizens within a regional approach and when the state’s role is limited.
Third, foster regional connections. Recognize that planning is an ongoing process, not a product to be produced and placed on a shelf. Link the present to the future using visualization and alternative futures techniques. Build monitoring and evaluation strategies into plan implementation. Encourage regional approaches that build on a common sense of place and address transboundary issues. Emphasize that regionalism can lead to greater efficiencies and economies of scale by coordinating efforts and sharing resources.
Matthew McKinney is executive director of the Western Consensus Council in Helena, Montana, a nonprofit organization that helps citizens and officials shape effective natural resource and other public policy through inclusive, informed and deliberative public processes. Will Harmon is the communications coordinator for the Western Consensus Council and a freelance writer based in Helena.
References
Center for Resource Management. 1999. The Western Charter: Initiating a Regional Conversation. Boulder, CO: Center for Resource Management.
Kwartler, Michael. 1998. Regulating the good you can’t think of. Urban Design International 3(1):13-21.
Steinitz, Carl and Susan McDowell. 2001. Alternative futures for Monroe County, Pennsylvania: A case study in applying ecological principles, in Applying Ecological Principles to Land Management, edited by Virginia H. Dale and Richard A. Haeuber. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 165-189.
Swanson, Larry. 1999. The emerging ‘new economy’ of the Rocky Mountain West: Recent change and future expectation. The Rocky Mountain West’s Changing Landscape 1(1):16-27.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. Environmental Planning for Communities: A Guide to the Environmental Visioning Process Utilizing a Geographic Information System (GIS). (September).
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Claudia De Cesare es asesora en materia de impuesto predial para la Secretaría de Finanzas del municipio brasileño de Porto Alegre y se desempeña como docente del área de valoración y tributación predial en el programa de posgrado de la Universidad Federal de Río Grande do Sul en Puerto Alegre. Lleva más de cinco años participando en el diseño de cursos y desempeñándose como instructora en el Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln. Además pertenece al consejo asesor del Instituto Internacional de Impuesto predial (IPTI) y se desempeñó como directora técnica del Instituto Brasileño de Avalúos y Peritaje (IBAPE).
Land Lines: Porto Alegre goza de renombre internacional por su innovadora administración local democrática. ¿Qué hace única a esta ciudad en comparación con otras en Brasil o América Latina?
Claudia De Cesare: En efecto, Porto Alegre ha sido pionera en muchas acciones de la administración pública, entre las que se encuentran: el uso del impuesto predial como instrumento para la recuperación de plusvalías, la venta de los derechos de construcción (solo criado), el uso de los derechos de construcción en lugar de dinero en efectivo para pagar las expropiaciones de bienes raíces y la recaudación de rentas a cambio del uso de espacio público para redes de infraestructura, como son las de telecomunicaciones, de televisión por cable y de gas. Por ejemplo, cinco años antes de la aprobación de la legislación nacional del Estatuto de la Ciudad que reglamentaba el uso de tasas progresivas para el impuesto predial, Porto Alegre había aprobado una legislación local en esa materia. Si bien la Corte Suprema posteriormente falló en contra de esta medida local y a favor de la necesidad de una legislación nacional, la ciudad ha jugado un papel protagónico en la promoción del debate sobre muchos temas controvertidos, como son los derechos privados, los derechos de propiedad y los intereses públicos.
Creo que entre las razones que han hecho posibles estas innovaciones en Porto Alegre están una clara definición de las políticas y los objetivos por lograr, así como las “agallas” de los dirigentes locales para afrontar los problemas, incluso cuando ello pueda provocar conflictos. En los funcionarios públicos ha prevalecido la visión de que la ciudad debe planearse de forma democrática para beneficio de la comunidad en general y la convicción de que los bienes públicos deben tomarse con seriedad. No todas las iniciativas han tenido éxito, pero los ciudadanos ahora entienden mejor las responsabilidades y limitaciones del gobierno local. El hecho de que un partido político, en este caso el Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), resultara elegido para conducir el gobierno de la ciudad durante más de 15 años consecutivos también contribuyó a la continuidad y coherencia de estas medidas públicas. Este tipo de legado político es bastante inusual en Brasil y en América Latina en general.
LL: ¿Cómo ha afectado esta atmósfera proactiva la administración del impuesto predial?
CD: Podemos identificar dos períodos en lo que respecta al comportamiento del impuesto predial en Porto Alegre. Antes de 1989, los ingresos locales provenientes del impuesto predial seguían el mismo patrón que en el resto de América Latina. Era más bien simbólico, caracterizado por un bajo grado de esfuerzo en la administración, negligencia en la recaudación de los impuestos locales y dependencia extrema de las transferencias de ingresos desde la instancia nacional y estatal. Luego de reformas radicales en el impuesto predial que modificaron las políticas de exención, introdujeron tasas progresivas y estipularon una nueva lista de avalúo, la tasa de recaudación del impuesto predial aumentó en más del 300% en los primeros dos años. Una amplia campaña educativa pública hacía hincapié en los argumentos para pagar regularmente el impuesto predial, la importancia de dicho impuesto para la dotación de servicios públicos y las razones por las que las autoridades locales no tolerarían la evasión fiscal.
Un cambio en la actitud por parte del gobierno de la ciudad condujo asimismo a una aplicación más eficaz de la ley en lo que respecta a los pagos del impuesto predial y las medidas jurídicas para abordar el problema de la evasión fiscal o las disputas sobre los avalúos. Se dejó claro que no habría amnistía para las deudas por concepto de impuesto predial. El proceso de presupuesto participativo igualmente contribuyó a la rehabilitación del impuesto predial en Porto Alegre, ya que aumentó la confianza general en la administración pública (véase el artículo de Goldsmith y Vainer, de 2001). Desde principios de los años 1990, las rentas anuales recaudadas por concepto de impuesto predial se han mantenido estables y representan casi el 0,95% del PIB local. En comparación, en la esfera nacional, el impuesto predial apenas representa aproximadamente el 0,5% del PIB. No se han realizado mejoras subsecuentes en el impuesto predial, básicamente porque el poder legislativo ha rechazado varias propuestas tanto para reformas como para revisiones drásticas.
LL: ¿Qué importancia tiene el impuesto predial para América Latina?
CD: Aunque la respuesta sencilla a esa pregunta es “depende de cada país”, este impuesto no es una fuente significativa de ingresos en ningún país latinoamericano, si bien en la mayoría de los países los sistemas de impuesto predial llevan tiempo establecidos. Sólo en Argentina y Uruguay las rentas provenientes del impuesto predial representan más del 1% del PIB. En Brasil el resultado promedio se acerca al 0,5% y en México y Costa Rica se ubica alrededor del 0,3% del PIB. Más aún, en cifras relativas, existe una gran variabilidad en la importancia del impuesto predial en los países y ciudades que no se explica directamente por el PIB local ni el tamaño de la población. Parte de los resultados depende de la voluntad política, la cual varía enormemente de una ciudad a otra.
LL: En su opinión, ¿cuáles son los principales puntos controvertidos en lo que refiere a la recaudación del impuesto predial?
CD: Diría que entre los puntos controvertidos se encuentran los objetivos reales por lograr con este impuesto, el grado de universalidad en su implementación, los cambios que se necesitan para tomar en cuenta las inquietudes sociales, económicas y culturales, y la distribución de la carga tributaria para reglamentar el impuesto según la capacidad de pago. Con respecto a la capacidad de pago, sobre todo en Brasil, hay mucha discusión sobre la aplicación de tasas progresivas que varían según la cuantía de los avalúos. La cuestión subyacente pudiera estar en lo simple que debiera ser el sistema.
Otras cuestiones tienen que ver con la falta de consenso acerca de la transparencia del sistema, la autonomía local frente al sistema nacional de recaudación de impuestos y la inestabilidad política y económica en general que afecta los mapas del valor de las propiedades y otros datos. Más aún, la divulgación pública de información sobre el impuesto predial, como son las características de las propiedades individuales, los valores estimados en los avalúos y los pagos anuales del impuesto, no siempre se considera segura.
LL: ¿Qué se necesitaría para mejorar la recaudación del impuesto predial?
CD: Según mi experiencia, el éxito en la aplicación del impuesto predial depende de una combinación de políticas fiscales adecuadas, un marco jurídico coherente para la recaudación de los impuestos y una estructura administrativa eficaz. Por ejemplo, es probable que la aplicación de (altas) tasas confiscatorias en predios vacantes para promover el desarrollo urbanístico más bien estimule la evasión de impuestos. Por otra parte, son indispensables la voluntad política y la capacidad de negociación con los actores para introducir reformas o revisiones en la administración tributaria. Probablemente el índice de recaudación mejorará cuando los contribuyentes vean más claramente la conexión entre los servicios públicos y las rentas recaudadas por concepto de impuesto predial. En otras palabras, la función del impuesto predial mejoraría si la comunidad está acostumbrada a pagar dicho impuesto y entiende su efecto en la mejora de los servicios públicos. Finalmente, con una tendencia hacia una cultura fiscal participativa –en la cual la comunidad se involucra en las decisiones sobre la recaudación de impuestos y los gastos públicos– se podría aumentar la aceptación del impuesto, lo que facilitaría la recaudación.
LL: ¿Qué está cambiando en la región que ejerza influencia sobre las posibilidades de reforma fiscal?
CD: Creo que actualmente los administradores tributarios entienden y se interesan más en el impuesto predial. Están conscientes de la necesidad apremiante de aumentar las rentas a través de una mejor aplicación del impuesto, a pesar de los desafíos que plantean su alta visibilidad y sus antecedentes históricos de funcionamiento deficiente. Asimismo saben de la necesidad de romper este paradigma, en relación tanto con las expectativas de los contribuyentes como con el papel que juega el impuesto predial dentro del sistema tributario nacional. Varias experiencias aisladas, pero prometedoras, han dejado en claro que la reforma del impuesto predial en América Latina es viable, si bien requiere voluntad política, innovación y disposición para superar las barreras s vislumbradas en su implementación.
LL: ¿Cuáles son las principales diferencias en el entorno del impuesto predial de América Latina en comparación con Norteamérica?
CD: Los sistemas de Estados Unidos y Canadá ciertamente son más maduros y transparentes que la mayoría de los sistemas latinoamericanos, más que todo porque la información está disponible y es de dominio público y porque existe fácil acceso a la tecnología. Algunas de las diferencias más importantes observadas en América Latina son los patrones de ocupación ilegal, la falta de información confiable sobre la tenencia de la tierra, el gran número de transacciones inmobiliarias informales y el predominio de la construcción progresiva de viviendas. Todas estas características del uso del suelo en América Latina plantean desafíos distintos para diseñar procedimientos para hacer los avalúos inmobiliarios y administrar una política tributaria justa y coherente. En cuanto al uso de la tecnología en la administración del impuesto predial, el año pasado supe de un sistema catastral en México que es tan eficaz como los mejores sistemas usados en Estados Unidos. No obstante, es un caso atípico; existe gran variación en el uso de tecnología entre las distintas autoridades locales en América Latina.
LL: Con base en su investigación, ¿cuáles son algunos de los efectos positivos y negativos de cambiar a un sistema tributario basado en el valor del suelo para las propiedades residenciales?
CD: La conclusión de mi estudio fue bastante inesperada, ya que la hipótesis respaldaba el argumento opuesto. A partir de una base de datos de Porto Alegre, descubrí que el resultado principal de usar el valor del suelo como base del impuesto era la tendencia hacia mayor regresión en la distribución de la carga tributaria, por lo que las viviendas de menor precio quedaban claramente identificadas como los posibles perdedores. El hecho de que parte de la carga tributaria fuera transferida de las propiedades de precio alto a las de precio más bajo es un verdadero motivo de preocupación. No obstante, es necesario profundizar la investigación para solucionar las imperfecciones en el modelo de avalúo usado para estimar el valor del suelo y examinar otras bases de datos. En todo caso, se identificó la falta de conocimientos sobre el uso del valor del suelo como base del impuesto y sus ventajas predecibles como principal obstáculo para su aplicación en Brasil.
LL: ¿Cómo usa usted diversos instrumentos y técnicas de valoración para determinar el valor del suelo?
CD: Uno de los argumentos en contra del uso del valor del suelo como base del impuesto es la gran dificultad para estimar el valor de los predios con mejoras. En mi estudio, se descubrió que era viable usar modelos hedonistas (MRA) para estimar el valor del suelo. Para compensar la falta de datos sobre los predios no urbanizados en áreas sumamente desarrolladas (áreas centrales y distritos comerciales), utilicé un número razonable de viviendas que fueron vendidas para nuevos desarrollos urbanísticos. El valor de mercado de estas viviendas se determinó enteramente a través del potencial que tenía el predio para desarrollo futuro, así como de las características del vecindario. En consecuencia, los hallazgos respaldan la hipótesis de que posibles dificultades en el avalúo no impiden usar el valor del suelo como base para el impuesto predial, por lo menos en el caso de Porto Alegre. No obstante, se observó un grado menor de uniformidad en los avalúos de predios no desarrollados, puesto que los precios de los predios tienden a sufrir fuertes variaciones fortuitas y están muy influenciados por las características particulares del comprador y el vendedor involucrados en cada transacción.
LL: ¿Cuáles son, en su opinión, los mayores desafíos que enfrenta América Latina en los próximos cinco años?
CD: Como dije antes, uno de los mayores desafíos es lograr sistemas de impuestos prediales más eficaces. Creo que la promoción e implementación de programas nacionales de mejoramiento del impuesto predial es indispensable para fortalecer dicho impuesto en la esfera local. En un tono más personal, mi objetivo es crear un sistema basado en Internet para recabar y difundir información sobre el impuesto predial en América Latina, lo que permitiría hacer análisis comparativos entre las municipalidades según criterios predefinidos. Con este sistema los administradores del impuesto predial llenarían los datos sobre el funcionamiento de dicho impuesto de manera regular, lo que haría posible tener evaluaciones constantes. Sería un gran avance para el proyecto, ahora con respaldo del Instituto Lincoln, el cual utiliza actualmente cuestionarios convencionales para monitorear la información sobre el impuesto predial en la región.
Referencia
Goldsmith, William W. y Carlos B. Vainer. 2001. Presupuesto participativo y políticas de poderes en Porto Alegre. Publicado en el volumen 13 (1) de la revista Land Lines: 7–9.
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Daphne Kenyon, a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, heads D. A. Kenyon & Associates, a public policy consulting firm in Windham, New Hampshire. She also serves on the New Hampshire State Board of Education, to which she was appointed by Governor John Lynch (D) in 2006. Kenyon is writing a policy focus report for the Institute, titled Untying the Property Tax–School Funding Knot, which will be available in the fall of 2007.
