Local governments exercise greater land use authority in the United States than in any other advanced democracy. Yet local governments have themselves evolved piecemeal in the typical U.S. metropolitan area, producing a pattern of fragmented authority. Most notably, as metropolitan areas have exploded outward, the local government system has adapted mainly by creating new suburbs and single-function districts rather than by expanding the boundaries of existing central cities.

Illustratively, when Robert Wood studied the New York metropolitan region in the late 1950s, he counted roughly 1,400 local governments. When Jameson Doig and Michael Danielson examined the same region in the early 1980s, the number had grown to 2,200, of which more than 800 exercised land use regulatory authority.

Critics levy numerous charges against this system. Above all, they contend it invites parochialism and, in dealing with issues of regional scale, gridlock. These failings are particularly apparent when the potential ends of land use policy are controversial. But they are visible in many other circumstances as well—wherever, for example, there is substantial risk that the instruments of policy (from regional overrides of local zoning to the siting of new incinerators) will be highly controversial and no consensus has yet emerged about the severity of a crisis that might justify accepting such risk.

In other respects, however, the system is both adaptive and finely tuned to citizen desires. Numerous functions have been shifted from localities to regional authorities and higher levels of government in recent decades, yet the changes have been highly selective and incremental.

When broad agreement has emerged that a particular function—such as mass transit or environmental protection—requires decisionmaking and management at supra-local scale, the political leaders in many metropolitan areas have frequently crafted new institutional arrangements. They have typically defined the new institutions quite precisely, however, so as to avoid sapping local authority any more than necessary to deal with the specific problems that gave rise to the consensus for change. Where large numbers of voters still favor local control, moreover—as, preeminently, in the field of land use regulation—metropolitan-area political leaders have taken great care to avoid disturbing it.

To be sure, certain objectives are all but impossible to realize through this piecemeal, consensus-dependent mode of institutional adaptation (most notably, greater class and racial integration at regional scale, and prevention of urban sprawl). But others (e.g., the preservation of neighborhood character and vigorous grassroots democracy) are accomplished much more reliably than would be likely in a more “rationalized” system.

Balancing Communal and Individualistic Values

Controversies about this system invariably reflect a mix of conflicting interests and values. Since a considerable body of scholarship exists on the interests most commonly in dispute, let us concentrate here on the values.

Americans consider land use issues within the framework of two disparate ideologies: one communal and egalitarian, the other individualistic and disposed to leave distributional outcomes to the marketplace. In any given controversy, self-interested groups organize their briefs around aspects of one or the other of these ideologies. So it is easy to miss the crucial fact that both enjoy near-consensual support. Americans favor both private capitalism and government action to further collective values–each in its place. The disputes typically arise in situations where parties disagree about which ideology ought to take precedence or about how the differing ideological claims should be balanced.

The land use arena is chock full of such points. Ownership is private. Most development initiative is private. And tradition favors viewing land as a market commodity. But most human activities take place on land; the byproducts of land use profoundly affect every aspect of the human environment; and no one is an owner every place he or she goes. So everyone has a powerful stake in the preservation of some common spaces, in society’s rules for behavior in such spaces, and in some regulation of land use “overspill” effects.

Owners themselves, moreover, are eager for collective services. The value of urban real estate hinges critically on the availability and quality of such services, from highway access to public safety to education. In addition, neighborhood characteristics and the level of investor confidence in the neighborhood’s future profoundly affect real estate values. As a result, whether their aim is development or simply enjoyment of what they already have, property owners are drawn inevitably to the public realm.

Within the public realm, however, communal values–including the presumption of equal access to collective services regardless of income or wealth–predominate. This poses a severe problem for relatively affluent property owners who are reluctant to trigger wide egalitarian claims.

The fragmentation of metropolitan areas into independent suburbs, a problem for some, is for these voters a solution. It provides a means of confining the application of communal norms within relatively small population groups. And it makes available to such groups an instrument of extraordinary power for the pursuit and preservation of homogeneity: land use regulation.

Public Regulation vs Market Forces

Pressures have built in recent decades, nonetheless, for public land use action on a wider scale. Some of these pressures (e.g., for major infrastructure investments and for environmental protection) come largely from property owners themselves and do not pose much redistributive threat even when higher-level governments assume responsibility for action. Nearly all of the centralization that has occurred has been in response to pressures of this sort.

A second set of pressures for supra-local action has come primarily from less favored groups and their political representatives, seeking fiscal equalization and residential integration. There have been considerable shifts of money in response to these pressures. But resistance has been fierce to reforms that might force racial or class integration at the neighborhood level. With rare exceptions it has been successful.

The reform idea with the greatest apparent potential to override local land use parochialism would be a shift of some land use regulatory authority to the state level. Movement in this direction occurred in about one-quarter of the states during the 1970s and 1980s. Except in the notable cases of Oregon and Florida, however, the changes were slight, and the historic pattern of local land use autonomy remained firmly entrenched. Concerns about growth, moreover, rather than concerns about equality or integration drove these state land use reforms. Consequently, with weak real estate markets in the early 1990s interest in them has waned.

The question remains whether shifting land use authority from the local to the state level, if it does occur, will be likely to produce more egalitarian and integrationist outcomes than would the existing pattern of fragmented land use governance. One can plausibly argue that it will, stressing that egalitarian norms tend to prevail within (even if not between) U.S. public jurisdictions. Thinking of the immediate future, however, the likelihood is that such shifts will be rare and that, even when they occur, their egalitarian impacts will be meager.

For better or worse, the overwhelming trend of the 1990s, at all levels of government, is toward greater market deference rather than more vigorous public action to achieve redistributive objectives.

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Alan Altshuler is professor in urban policy and planning and director of the Taubman Center for State and Local Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is also a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute, which distributes several of his publications. This article is reprinted with permission from the 1995-96 Annual Report of the Taubman Center.

In the past decade, nearly 50 mansions have been demolished and replaced in the historic Chicago suburb of Kenilworth. Four demolition permits are currently pending review, while permits have been approved for two other historically significant houses. To slow the teardown trend, Kenilworth has enacted a nine-month waiting period between issuance of a demolition permit and initiation of the teardown process. However, the village does not have a historic preservation ordinance, and local officials generally support the rights of property owners to demolish and replace their houses. The National Trust for Historic Preservation included Kenilworth on its 2006 list of the 11 most endangered places nationwide (Black 2006).

The practice of demolishing and replacing houses in high-priced areas generates passionate controversy. The fight to save the Skiff House in Kenilworth is illustrative (Nance 2005). That property at 157 Kenilworth Avenue is one of the premier locations in one of Chicago’s most expensive suburbs, three blocks west of Lake Michigan and five blocks from the commuter train station in the village center.

The house was built in 1908 for Frederick Skiff, the first director of Chicago’s Field Museum of Natural History. This beautiful and historically significant house was designed by the architectural firm of Daniel H. Burnham, who was considered the preeminent architect in America at the turn of the twentieth century. He oversaw the construction of the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition and helped design a series of lakefront parks as part of the 1909 Plan of Chicago.

Plans to demolish the Skiff House shortly after it was purchased in 2004 for $1.875 million created an uproar. While many neighbors supported the owner’s right to tear down the property—after all, they might want to do the same—others saw it as an assault on the community’s character. “Save 157 Kenilworth” signs began to appear in front yards throughout the village, and a neighborhood group, Citizens for Kenilworth, led a campaign to save the house. After months of controversy, and only days after an auction to sell off valuable parts of the house before demolition, a neighbor purchased the house for $2.35 million in order to save it.

Historic houses continue to be torn down in Kenilworth and elsewhere, but not all teardowns generate controversy. Residents of many Chicago suburbs have been supportive of the teardown trend. Naperville is a representative case. Founded in 1831 and incorporated in 1857, Naperville grew slowly until plans for the East-West Tollway (I-88) were announced in 1954. The population grew from 7,013 in 1950, to 21,675 in 1960, to 140,106 today.

Naperville’s downtown has undergone a renaissance over the last decade, attracting new restaurants, shops, and residences. Although the city has a historic district just to the east of the downtown area, teardown activity has been concentrated in what were formerly more humble areas. Small, older houses are being purchased for about $400,000 and replaced by much larger houses that may sell for $1 million.

The teardown trend in Naperville is illustrated by one small house being sold as a teardown, with an announcement of an upcoming public hearing posted in the yard. It is likely to be replaced by a house that is similar to the recently constructed house next door (see pages 6 and 7). Though teardown activity is not entirely without controversy in Naperville, it does not generate the same passion as the Skiff House did.

How Widespread is the Teardown Phenomenon?

Nationwide the teardown phenomenon has attracted much media and public attention. The decennial Census of Population and Housing offers a way to quantify the practice using the “net replacement method.” For example, suppose the Census lists 10,000 housing units in an area for 1990 and 10,500 units in 2000—an increase of 500 units. Now suppose the Census shows that 800 housing units were built during the decade. Then 300 of the newly built units must have simply replaced existing units. The 300 replacement units are a crude but nonetheless enlightening measure of teardown activity in that community.

Figure 1 shows counties where at least one census tract had a net replacement rate in excess of 4 percent. Teardown activity is clustered in older urban areas in the Northeast, Midwest, and California. In fact, the map does not look substantially different from a map of population density in the United States. This simple analysis shows that replacement of the preexisting housing stock is an extensive phenomenon that is national in scope.

Nevertheless, it is surprisingly difficult to track teardown activity on a case-by-case basis. The classic teardown is a house whose sale is followed by the issuance of both demolition and building permits, but timing is a key factor in tracking these permits. If a demolition permit is issued four years after a sale, was the house really sold as a teardown? Similarly, a building permit may be issued long after a dilapidated house was demolished, yet this situation is not what most people have in mind when they think of teardowns.

Some teardowns are carried out by the current owner without a sale. Other houses are so extensively remodeled that they are effectively teardowns, even though no demolition permit is issued. Even when data on sales, demolition permits, and building permits are available, it is difficult to merge the different sources of information since they frequently come from different agencies that vary in the quality of their database management.

The National Trust for Historic Preservation has described the Chicago metropolitan area as the “epicenter of teardowns.” Aside from Kenilworth, teardowns are common in both the city of Chicago and its suburbs. The Village of Skokie (2005) surveyed 20 of its neighbors in Chicago’s near north suburbs and compared the number of detached single-family housing unit demolition permits from 2000 to 2003 to the total number of such units as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census. Thirteen of the 20 communities reported demolition permits representing more than 1 percent of the housing stock over the four-year period.

Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) have used data from Chicago and six suburban communities to document the degree of teardown activity in the region. We were able to obtain data on house sales and demolition permits for Chicago; one of its suburbs to the west, Western Springs; the northwest suburb of Park Ridge; and four suburbs on the North Shore—Glencoe, Kenilworth, Wilmette, and Winnetka.

Between 1996 and 2003, the number of demolition permits ranged from 29 in Kenilworth to 273 in Winnetka and 12,236 in Chicago. Of course, Kenilworth has only 2,494 residents, whereas Winnetka’s population is 12,419, and Chicago has 2.9 million residents. Figure 2 shows the number of demolition permits as a percentage of total housing units for each community. More than 9 percent of Winnetka’s housing stock was torn down between 1996 and 2003, and teardown rates were also quite high in Winnetka and Kenilworth. Even Chicago, with more than 400,000 housing units, had a demolition rate near 3 percent.

These six suburbs were not chosen randomly. All had high median incomes in 2000, ranging from $73,154 in Park Ridge to more than $200,000 in Kenilworth. All of these suburbs have stations on commuter train lines to downtown Chicago, little or no vacant land on which to build, and good schools and other local public services. In other words, demand to live in these suburbs is high. Teardown activity in Chicago is concentrated in comparable neighborhoods within the city, such as Lincoln Park, West Town, and Lakeview on the near north side.

The Costs and Benefits of Teardowns

Teardowns can impose significant social costs. Local residents often complain that new houses destroy the character of a neighborhood. Those houses may be built to the limits of the zoning code, tower above their neighbors, and reach to the edge of the property line. Sometimes neighbors simply dislike the design of new buildings, particularly those that replace historic houses. When tall apartment buildings replace single-family houses or two-family houses in the city, neighbors complain of the loss of sunlight, lack of parking spaces, and increased traffic congestion. The construction process itself can be noisy and disruptive. New, expensive houses may cause assessments to increase in the neighborhood. And, teardowns may reduce the stock of affordable housing.

Teardowns also carry some benefits, however. In places that rely on the property tax to fund local services, the additional revenue from high-priced replacement houses is often quite welcome. Not all teardown buildings are historic, architecturally significant, or mourned when they are demolished. Some teardowns are simply eyesores.

Some of the new houses being built today will eventually be viewed as historically significant properties in their own right. Once entire blocks are rebuilt, the new housing no longer looks out of place. It is surprising to discover how stark and incompatible some properties built in the early 1900s appear in historic photographs taken before trees grew and the neighborhood filled in with similar houses.

It also is important to recognize that teardowns may help to curb sprawl. One reason people move to the urban fringe is to build a new house in a contemporary construction style. Allowing people to tear down a small, outdated house and replace it with a modern house may induce them to stay in centrally located areas. In general, encouraging housing and economic growth helps maintain the vitality of previously developed areas, which is a strategic complement to anti-sprawl policies designed to limit growth at the fringe.

Policy Responses

Local jurisdictions have been creative in responding to teardowns. Some policies are designed to the slow the amount of teardown activity by making it more costly, through demolition fees and fines for illegal demolitions. Others, such as a moratorium on new demolition permits or an enforced waiting period between permit issuance and the time when demolition can start, are simply designed to cool a potential teardown fever. Such policies also raise the cost of teardowns by making developers wait for some time after purchasing a property before being able to recoup their costs. Complementary policies include landmark designation and historic district designation, which make it more difficult or even impossible to tear down existing structures.

Policies on the other side of the balance sheet may give developers an incentive not to demolish existing structures. Communities may offer tax breaks to owners who rehabilitate existing houses rather than demolish them to build new ones. Or, owners may be granted variances from restrictive zoning provisions in order to enlarge rather than demolish an existing house.

At the same time, jurisdictions often use zoning to influence the type of new housing that is built in their community. Lot-coverage and floor-area restrictions are used to ensure that new structures do not dwarf their neighbors. Other policies include maximum building sizes; set-back and open space requirements; and restrictions on such design elements as garage and driveway locations, roof pitch, bulk limits, solar access, and the alignment of the new house with neighboring structures. Many communities have design review boards that can revoke building permits for structures that are not in compliance. These standards are not always clear beforehand, however, and they can increase the level of uncertainty for developers, delay construction, and raise costs.

Even if communities do not attempt to curb teardown activity, they often adopt policies designed to reduce the disruption caused by new construction. The builder may be required to notify neighbors when construction is about to begin, and a time window may be imposed for completion of the building. Construction activity may be limited to certain hours of day, the site may need to be fenced, and work vehicle and dumpster location requirements are often imposed. Communities also may require that contractors be bonded and certified.

How successful are these policies in slowing the rate of teardown activity? As we have seen, the Skiff House was saved because Kenilworth’s nine-month waiting period between permit issuance and the start of demolition provided enough time for a buyer to step forward before the house was razed. However, the potential for profits in such transactions make it difficult to stop teardowns completely. If a developer can purchase an existing property for $300,000, demolish it for $20,000, and spend $400,000 to build a new house according to current construction standards, then he has incurred $720,000 in costs. With new upscale houses routinely selling in excess of $1 million in communities with many teardowns, it should not be surprising that developers continue this practice.

Implications for Land Values

Assessors encounter enormous difficulties in placing a value on land in built-up areas. When few vacant lots exist, it is nearly impossible to find enough sales of vacant land to assess the value of land accurately. In the absence of direct land sales data, land values can be estimated by subtracting construction costs less depreciation from the sale price of improved properties in the area.

Statistical analysis of mass appraisal data can account for such structural characteristics as square footage in order to control for the contribution of the building to total property value. With a complete set of these characteristics, the residual from the regression reflects the contribution of location to property value—in other words, land value. Unfortunately, any unobserved structural characteristic will also be part of the residual.

Teardowns can help estimate the value of land in developed areas. Consider the earlier example of a property that is purchased for $300,000, demolished for $20,000, and replaced by a million-dollar house. If the developer could purchase a vacant lot of the identical size next door for $290,000, which property would he prefer? If there is no salvage value for parts of the existing house, it will cost the developer $320,000 before it is possible to build on the lot with the existing house. Yet the vacant lot is available in the same general location for $30,000 less. The vacant lot is preferable even though it does not include a house—in fact, it is preferable precisely because it does not include an existing structure.

If the price of the vacant lot rises to $310,000, the developer still obtains a lot that is ready to build upon for $10,000 less than the cost of building on the neighboring lot. Only at $320,000 will the developer be indifferent between the two lots. It follows that the value of land in this case is $320,000. This key insight leads to an extremely useful method of valuing land in areas experiencing teardowns. The value of land is simply the sales price of a teardown property plus any demolition cost.

An important implication of this line of reasoning is that only location determines the value of a teardown property; characteristics of the structure are irrelevant except insofar as they influence demolitions costs or salvage value. This implication is somewhat surprising to people who think that a historic house has intrinsic value. Though it is tempting to think that the Skiff House in Kenilworth is worth approximately $2 million because of its historic and architectural value, a vacant lot next door would sell for nearly the same price. Any house near Lake Michigan in Kenilworth will sell for well more than $1 million. The conclusion to be drawn is simply that land is expensive along Chicago’s North Shore.

Richard Dye and I (forthcoming) test the prediction that only location characteristics influence sales prices in our sample of seven communities in the Chicago area. Our measures of location include such variables as lot size, distance from the nearest commuter train station, and proximity to Lake Michigan. Structural characteristics include such variables as building size, age, and whether the house is built of brick and has a basement, garage, or fireplace. We identify teardowns as houses for which a demolition permit was issued within two years of a sale. As predicted, structural characteristics do not significantly influence the sales price of teardown properties. Teardowns are purchased for the land underneath.

Final Thoughts

The teardown phenomenon is not new. Houses have been demolished and replaced for as long as they have been built. American cities grew rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and again in the years just after World War II. Tastes now appear to be changing toward larger houses with spacious rooms and high ceilings. Many people find the existing housing stock less desirable than new construction. In this situation, it is not surprising that buyers purchase, demolish, and build new houses, especially in high-demand areas. The trick for local governments is to keep the costs of teardown activity from overwhelming the less obvious benefits.

Daniel P. McMillen is professor in the Department of Economics and the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at University of Illinois at Chicago. He has published widely in urban economics, real estate, and applied econometrics. He is a visiting fellow in 2006–2007 at the Lincoln Institute.

References

Black, Lisa. 2006. Kenilworth added to list of endangered historic towns. Chicago Tribune, May 20.

Dye, Richard, and Daniel P. McMillen. Forthcoming. Teardowns and land values in the Chicago metropolitan area. Journal of Urban Economics.

Nance, Kevin. 2005. Teardown ‘madness has to stop’: Developer rescues historic Burnham house, but says it’s just a start. Chicago Sun-Times, November 6.

Village of Skokie. 2005. Comprehensive Plan Appendix C: Near north suburban housing activity study. http://www.skokie.org/comm/Appendix%20C.pdf.

Municipalities around the country face a daunting fiscal crisis. Federal stimulus assistance has expired, and many states have made significant cuts in aid to municipalities. Meanwhile property values have declined 31 percent since their 2006 peak according to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home price index.

It will take several years to know how this historic decline will affect property tax revenues, because changes in property tax bills significantly lag changes in market values. However, cities faced declines in general fund revenues of 2.5 percent in 2009, and approximately 3.2 percent declines in 2010 (Hoene 2009; Hoene and Pagano 2010). Municipal responses to revenue shortfalls have included making cuts to personnel (71 percent of cities), delaying or cancelling capital projects (68 percent), and making across the board cuts (35 percent) (McFarland 2010).

To avoid further cuts, municipalities will need to raise additional revenues. But with anti-tax sentiment running high, many cities and towns may try to avoid raising tax rates and look instead to increased reliance on fees and other alternative revenue sources. One alternative that has attracted the attention of many local officials recently is payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) by nonprofit organizations.

PILOTs are voluntary payments made by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes. These payments typically result from negotiations between local government officials and individual nonprofits, but the exact arrangements vary widely. PILOTs can be formal, long-term contracts, routine annual payments, or irregular one-time payments. The payments can go into a municipality’s general fund, or be directed to a specific project or program. PILOTs are most frequently made by hospitals, colleges, and universities, but also by nonprofit retirement homes, low-income housing facilities, cultural institutions, fitness centers, and churches. Some such payments are not even called PILOTs, but are know as “voluntary contributions” or “service fees.”

Since 2000, PILOTs have been used in at least 117 municipalities in at least 18 states (Kenyon and Langley 2010). These payments are concentrated in the Northeast, and especially in Massachusetts where they have been made in 82 out of 351 municipalities (figure 1). It is hard to make definitive statements about trends in the use of PILOTs, because there is no comprehensive source that tracks them, but press accounts suggest growing interest in PILOTs since the early 1990s, with a noticeable uptick in recent years. Major multiyear agreements have recently been reached in Pittsburgh and Baltimore; commissions have studied PILOTs in Boston, New Orleans, and Providence; and many smaller municipalities have reached new agreements with local charities.

The Revenue Potential of PILOTs

The revenue potential of PILOTs varies across municipalities because of large differences in the impact of the charitable property tax exemption on their tax bases. Figure 2 shows that in 23 large U.S. cities the value of tax-exempt nonprofit property as a share of total property value ranged from 10.8 percent in Philadelphia to 1.9 percent in Memphis and El Paso. Similarly, a fiscal year 2003 study of 351 municipalities in Massachusetts found that if the tax exemption for charitable and educational nonprofits were removed, these organizations would account for more than 10 percent of the property tax levy in 18 municipalities and between 2.5 and 10 percent in another 68, but less than 1 percent of the tax levy in 179 municipalities (McArdle and Demirai 2004).

Since nonprofit property tends to be highly concentrated in a relatively small number of municipalities, especially central cities and college towns, PILOTs have the potential to be a very important revenue source for some municipalities, even if they are unlikely to play a significant role in financing local government in the majority of cities and towns. Table 1 looks at PILOTs in ten municipalities where they rarely account for more than 1 percent of total revenues, but the dollar figures are often significant.

The impact of the charitable property tax exemption on municipal budgets also depends on the degree of reliance on property taxes as a revenue source. Local governments with a heavier reliance on sales and excise taxes, user fees, or state aid are in a better position to deal with forgone property tax revenues through those other sources.

Collaboration on PILOT Agreements

In seeking PILOT agreements, local officials sometimes resort to adversarial pressure tactics, which can backfire and jeopardize important relationships between municipalities and nonprofits. A more collaborative approach is usually more successful when local officials work to build genuine support among nonprofits for a PILOT program that is rooted in shared interests and mutual dependence for each other’s long-term success.

Many large nonprofits like hospitals and universities are quite immobile, and other smaller nonprofits may be committed to serving their local communities even if they could relocate with relative ease. The long-term success of these organizations depends on the municipality’s success. Because population loss, crime, and crumbling infrastructure can imperil a nonprofit’s future, having a local government with the capacity to provide quality public services is in its own self-interest.

Similarly, nonprofits are often major employers and provide services and activities that attract people to a city and improve the quality of life for local residents. Thus, the success of these organizations is also crucial for a municipality’s future. Even if the nonprofits are tax-exempt, their presence can significantly expand the local tax base by attracting businesses and homeowners.

Recognition of these shared interests by both sides is crucial to reaching sustainable PILOT agreements. Private conversations between high-ranking municipal and nonprofit officials can help break down barriers that sometimes block PILOTs. To make the case for PILOTs, municipalities often appeal to the nonprofits’ sense of fairness and community responsibility—arguing that it is fair for nonprofits to pay for the cost of public services they consume, and that a contribution will directly benefit the community.

These conversations should also touch on what the nonprofits need for their future success. In practice, municipalities are often most successful in obtaining PILOTs when nonprofits need something from the local government, such as building permits or zoning changes. The quid pro quo nature of these agreements is often viewed negatively—as a form of extortion or special treatment. However, accommodating these requests is often in a municipality’s own interest.

For major nonprofit development projects, a shortened approval process with less red tape can cut overall costs significantly, and such discussions can result in more creative arrangements. For example, as part of a 20-year PILOT agreement with Clark University, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts agreed to work with the university to convert a short section of a street into a pedestrian area.

When local officials use more aggressive tactics to obtain PILOTs, such as trying to shame nonprofits into making payments or threatening to challenge their tax-exempt status in court, the organizations may become defensive and less willing to cooperate. Charitable nonprofits have a strong record of defending their property tax exemptions, so such divisive tactics are likely to leave a municipality with no PILOT, potentially significant legal fees, and a damaged reputation.

Problems with PILOTs

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities with large nonprofit sectors, but there are many problems with these payments compared to more conventional taxes and fees.

First, at the same time that municipalities face a fiscal crisis caused by the recession, nonprofits face their own fiscal crisis due to declining endowment values and donations. In addition, government contracts—a major funding source for health and human service nonprofits—were cut, and some government entities are delaying contracts or payments. A 2009 survey found that 80 percent of nonprofit organizations were experiencing fiscal stress in the wake of the recession (Center for Civil Society Studies 2009). To nonprofits facing uncertain financial futures, it appears unfair for local governments to begin requesting PILOTs at this time (National Council of Nonprofits 2010).

Second, some degree of horizontal and vertical inequity in PILOT programs is almost inevitable, because their voluntary nature means there is no way to ensure that nonprofits with similar property values make comparable PILOTs. For example, even with Boston’s long-standing PILOT program, the four largest universities in the city made very different contributions in fiscal year 2009. Boston University paid $4,892,138 (8.53 percent of what it would pay in property taxes if taxable); Harvard University paid $1,996,977 (4.99 percent); Boston College paid $293,251 (1.92 percent); and Northeastern University paid only $30,571 (0.08 percent).

Third, PILOTs are a limited and frequently unreliable revenue source, rarely accounting for more than 1 percent of total revenues. This limited revenue potential must be weighed against some potentially significant costs associated with reaching PILOT agreements, such as upfront administrative costs, time spent by high-ranking officials negotiating agreements, or costs to obtain accurate assessments of exempt properties. PILOTs can also be an unreliable revenue source from one year to the next if they rely on short-term agreements.

Finally, the process used to reach PILOT agreements is often contentious and secretive, with contributions determined in an ad hoc manner lacking objective criteria. A collaborative approach can make PILOT requests less controversial, but reliance on private conversations also makes the process less transparent.

Systematic Programs to Mitigate Problems

Many of these problems with PILOTs can be mitigated if municipalities set up a systematic program that does not rely solely on case-by-case negotiation, especially for municipalities with a large number of nonprofits. A framework that applies to all organizations can provide guidance and bring consistency to the negotiations with individual nonprofits. The recommendations of Boston’s PILOT Task Force provide a concrete example (box 1).

Baltimore, Maryland: The city reached a $20 million six-year PILOT agreement with hospitals and universities in June 2010, with $5.4 million to be paid in each of the first two years. In return, the city dropped a proposed $350 fee per dorm and hospital bed, and protected hospitals and universities from increases in telecommunications and energy tax rates over the next six years (Walker and Scharper 2010).

Boston, Massachusetts: Beginning in January 2009, a task force of representatives from nonprofits, city government, business, labor, and the community met with a goal of making the city’s existing PILOT program more consistent. The final report has recommendations on key features of a systematic PILOT program: only nonprofits with property values exceeding a $15 million threshold are included in the program; the target PILOT for each institution is equal to 25 percent of what it would pay in property taxes, because roughly one-quarter of the city’s budget is devoted to core public services that benefit nonprofits; assessed value is used as a basis for the payments; and guidelines determine which types of services will count for community benefit offsets (City of Boston 2010).

New Orleans, Louisiana: A Tax Fairness Commission has been tasked with recommending changes to make the city’s tax system fairer and to broaden the tax base. While the commission may consider PILOTs, it is particularly interested in narrowing the nonprofit property tax exemption (Nolan 2011). Louisiana has a very broad charitable exemption compared to most states, with all properties owned by eligible institutions exempt from taxation regardless of use, including those not typically tax-exempt such as fraternal organizations, labor unions, and trade associations (Bureau of Government Research 1999).

Providence, Rhode Island: The mayor and city council members sought to increase the amount of PILOTs from the city’s four colleges and universities, but the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions (2010) recommended against renegotiating the 20-year $48 million PILOT agreement reached in 2003. Instead the commission recommended that the city should focus on forming partnerships with local nonprofits to foster economic growth, and the state should provide full funding of its PILOT program and provide Providence with a share of new income and sales tax revenues that result from nonprofit expansion.

Municipalities interested in establishing a systematic PILOT program should consider the following features.

Use a threshold level of property value or annual revenues to determine which nonprofits to include in the PILOT program. Excluding from PILOT requests certain types of nonprofits, such as religious organizations or small social service providers, may be a popular notion, but it can result in arbitrarily targeting some nonprofits while ignoring others. A more systematic policy with a threshold approach is easy to administer and will exclude only those nonprofits that do not meet the financial threshold to make significant contributions, rather than favor some organizations based on the nature of their activities.

Set a target for contributions that is justified. Instead of reaching an arbitrary dollar figure in negotiations, a target that applies to all nonprofits in the program can reduce horizontal inequities and may raise more revenue by creating the expectation for a certain contribution. For example, the target can be justified by estimating the cost of local public services that directly benefit nonprofits, such as police and fire protection and street maintenance.

Use a basis to calculate suggested payments. Using a basis with the rate set to reach the target contribution will also promote consistency. The fairest basis is the assessed value of exempt property, because the PILOT request will be proportional to the tax savings each organization receives from the property tax exemption. However, municipalities that want to avoid having to accurately assess tax-exempt properties can use another basis, such as the square footage of property or the organization’s annual revenues.

Include community benefit offsets, so nonprofits can reduce their target cash PILOTs in return for providing certain public services for local residents. Charitable nonprofits are typically more willing to provide in-kind services than to make PILOTs, and are well positioned to leverage their existing expertise and resources to provide needed services. For example, nonprofit hospitals can set up free health clinics, and universities can establish after-school tutoring programs. Local officials should be clear and consistent about which services are most needed by local residents and will count for community benefit offsets, and should rely on nonprofits to estimate the cash value of these donated in-kind services.

Reach long-term PILOT agreements. Both municipalities and nonprofits are better off with a long-term approach that allows them to build predictable payments into their respective budgets. Additionally, because PILOT requests can require considerable time to negotiate, both parties will benefit from reaching an agreement and then moving on to focus on their primary missions and perhaps other partnerships to serve the community. Several municipalities have 20- or 30-year PILOT agreements in place.

Alternatives to PILOTs

Given some of the common problems with PILOTs, municipalities with large nonprofit sectors that face revenue shortfalls may want to consider alternative revenue-raising measures.

Increase reliance on traditional user fees or special assessments. This alternative may be the most palatable in the current anti-tax climate. One consideration favoring this option is that nonprofits are typically not exempt from these charges, so increasing reliance on such sources will obtain revenue from a broad group of entities, including tax-exempt nonprofits. For example, a municipality could finance garbage collection through a fee instead of the property tax, or use special assessments to pay for sewer hookups in new subdivisions.

Establish municipal service fees. Some municipalities have carved out specific services that are normally funded through property taxes and instead charged nonprofits a fee for the service. These fees may or may not be assessed solely against tax-exempt nonprofits, and they often use a basis for the payments related to the size of the property rather than the assessed value. For example, Rochester, New York, has a local works charge to fund snowplowing and street repair. It is applied to both taxable and tax-exempt organizations using the property’s street frontage as the basis. Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a street maintenance fee that also uses square footage as the basis, but is only charged to nongovernmental tax-exempt properties.

Develop agreements for needed services. Local officials can decide not to pursue cash PILOTs, but instead develop formal partnerships with nonprofits to provide specific services for local residents or work together to foster economic development. Direct provision of needed services, sometimes known as services in lieu of taxes or SILOTs, will help the fiscal situation of the municipality in the short run, while joint efforts to foster economic development can have significant long-run benefits.

Expand the tax options for municipalities. This final alternative would require a change in state law in many instances. Some municipalities across the country have the ability to levy sales taxes, special excise taxes such as hotel taxes, income taxes, or payroll taxes. But most cities in the Northeast do not have these alternative tax sources, and are especially reliant on the property tax, which can be problematic if the tax-exempt sector is large or growing rapidly.

Conclusion

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities that have a significant share of total property value owned by tax-exempt nonprofits, both as a stop-gap in the current municipal fiscal crisis and in the future. However, PILOTs rarely account for more than 1 or 2 percent of municipal revenues, so expecting these payments to eliminate local government deficits is unrealistic. Furthermore, singling out nonprofits to help address a municipal fiscal crisis is unfair since they face their own challenges due to the recent recession.

Local officials who do want to pursue PILOT agreements must tread carefully if they want to avoid some common pitfalls. First, PILOT requests can be highly contentious when local officials resort to heavy-handed pressure tactics to reach agreements. It is preferable for local officials to work collaboratively with nonprofit leaders to craft PILOT agreements that serve their mutual interests. Second, the voluntary nature of PILOTs limits the revenue potential of these agreements, results in inconsistent treatment of nonprofits, and leads to other problems. Municipalities with a large number of nonprofits can mitigate these problems by establishing a systematic PILOT program to provide guidance and bring consistency to their negotiations with individual nonprofits.

About the Authors

Daphne A. Kenyon is a visiting fellow in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates, Windham, New Hampshire.

Adam H. Langley is a research analyst in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and a master’s student in economics at Boston University.

References

Bureau of Government Research. 1999. Property tax exemption and assessment administration in Orleans parish. New Orleans, LA.

Center for Civil Society Studies. 2009. Impact of the 2007-09 Economic Recession on Nonprofit Organizations. Communique No. 14. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University for Policy Studies. June 29.

City of Boston. 2010. Mayor’s PILOT task force: Final report and recommendations. December.

Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. 2010. A call to build the capital city partnership for economic growth: Report to the Providence City Council from the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. Providence, RI. November.

Hoene, Christopher W. 2009. City budget shortfalls and responses: projections for 2010-2012. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Hoene, Christopher W. and Michael A. Pagano. 2010. Research brief: City fiscal conditions in 2010. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Kenyon, Daphne A. and Adam H. Langley. 2010. Payments in lieu of taxes: Balancing municipal and nonprofit interests. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lipman, Harvy. 2006. The value of a tax break. The Chronicle of Philanthropy 19(4): 13.

McArdle, Regina, and Donna Demirai. 2004. A study of charitable and educational property tax exemptions. City and Town, January. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services.

McFarland, Christiana. 2010. State of America’s cities survey on jobs and the economy. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

National Council of Nonprofits. 2010. State budget crises: Ripping the safety net held by nonprofits. Washington DC. March 16.

Nolan, Bruce. 2011. N.O. Tax Fairness Commission begins rethinking property taxes. The Times-Picayune. February 3.

Walker, Andrea K., and Julie Scharper. 2010. Baltimore City Council committee backs $15 million in new taxes; deal with hospitals and universities announced for $20 million more. Baltimore Sun. June 10.

Twenty-three states offer an incentive to preserve open space by providing preferential property tax assessment of qualifying parcels (table 1, p. 15). These property tax reductions can be considered expenditures in that they reduce revenue available for other uses in the interest of protecting the many amenities and environmental benefits of undeveloped land.

Programs vary widely from state to state, but all preferential assessment programs for open space must define the type and size of qualified parcels; permissible uses; certification requirements; assessment methods; enrollment term lengths; and penalties, if any, for removing a parcel from preferential status. Several states offer more than one program, each with its own qualification requirements. This article considers these differences, offers examples of how the tax expenditure is calculated, and describes potential societal benefits and costs of such programs.

Determining Eligibility for Preferential Assessment

States define eligibility in many different ways, but the requirements are usually relatively easy to meet. A parcel might qualify simply by being undeveloped. Several states allow landscaped land to qualify provided the building density doesn’t exceed established limits. Washington, for example, allows land to qualify if it meets at least one of eleven very general requirements, including the protection of streams or water supplies, conservation or enhancement of natural or scenic resources, preservation of visual quality along roads, or enhancement of recreational opportunities.

While these criteria are very general, states may raise the bar by placing additional requirements on landowners. Some states require landowners to create and seek state approval for a property management plan that improves benefits for local wildlife. Vermont stipulates that a qualified conservation organization must own and manage the open space. One of two Texas programs requires landowners to provide land and wildlife management to propagate a breeding, migrating, or wintering population of indigenous wild animals for human use, including food, medicine, or recreation.

Several states offer preferential assessment to properties that have attained federal status as open space. For example, parcels restricted by a conservation easement that meets the IRS requirements for a charitable donation automatically qualify for preferential assessment in Illinois and Oregon. Ohio will qualify only parcels under contract to one of four USDA programs (Conservation Reserve Program, Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, Wetlands Reserve Program, and Grassland Preserve Program).

Parcels may have to meet minimum size requirements as well. The most common minimum is ten contiguous acres, though some programs allow properties as small as two acres, and several have no stated requirements. A few states limit the total acreage that any individual landowner may enroll. Tennessee, for example, limits eligibility to 1,500 acres per owner per county, including agricultural land, forest, and open space combined. The stated use of the property may influence its acceptability; several states specifically prohibit commercial property, including golf courses. At least two states, however, have programs specifically designed for golf courses and other commercial properties that provide outdoor recreational opportunities.

State Versus Local Criteria

State governments typically authorize preferential assessment programs and the criteria for inclusion. Six states allow local or county government officials to determine criteria by authorizing a program and requiring only that parcels be “included within a plan for preservation approved by state or local planning agencies” (Chervin, Gibson, and Green 2009, 8), for example, or by requiring that the appropriate governing body accepts the property via resolution. States with this requirement include California, Connecticut, Florida, Nevada, Tennessee, and Oregon. It is then up to local or county officials to choose the criteria for qualification, in some cases naming specific parcels. In other cases, the assessor’s office determines the eligibility, based on the characteristics of the property and whether it meets the criteria.

This approach allows local governments to control the amount of the expenditure in their jurisdiction and tailor the program to protect the specific qualities most important to the area. For example, officials in a predominantly agricultural environment may prefer to use tax expenditures on forests or wetlands, while open fields might prove most valuable in a more urban setting.

Calculating the Value of the Tax Expenditure

Open space preferential assessment programs typically use one of three methods to determine the property’s assessed value. Nine states value open space as if it were enrolled in the state’s program for agriculture or forestry, even though the land isn’t used for either activity. Nine other states instruct assessors to value the property considering only its current use, excluding the value of development rights (i.e., the market value as if its future use were permanently restricted to its current use). Four states instruct the assessor to determine the fair market value as if it were not in the program and then apply a statutory formula to determine the preferential assessed value. Illinois has three programs for preferential assessment of open space, which vary by the criteria for eligibility; all offer statutory reductions that range between 75 percent and 85 percent. Nevada applies a lower statutory reduction of 26 percent.

States occasionally choose to define maximum or minimum values per acre for open space parcels. For example, Maryland set a statewide value of $187.50 per acre for 2009. Washington allows local governments to determine a use value for their region, depending on a public benefit rating system; if no such system exists, open space land may receive an assessment no lower than the lowest agricultural valuation in the county. Massachusetts calculates the preferential value as use value, not to exceed 25 percent of fair market value.

Program Duration and Penalties for Early Withdrawal

Many programs provide for automatic annual renewal unless the landowner chooses to withdraw from the program. In some cases, length of contract is predetermined, most frequently for ten years, which generally carries forward upon the sale of the property unless the new property owner alters the use and violates the terms of the program. Landowners pay a penalty for withdrawing from the program in order to alter land use, or for altering it without notification. Such penalties tend to equal the value of the tax expenditure received for a specified number of years prior to the current year, plus interest on that expenditure. Several states either charge 10 percent of the fair market value when use of the parcel changes, or charge a conveyance or transfer tax when a parcel in the program is sold.

If an owner withdraws a parcel from the program after a minimum number of years, however, the state may reduce or even eliminate penalties. For example, Vermont charges owners 20 percent of fair market value for withdrawing the property in the first decade and 10 percent for withdrawing after more than 10 years. Rhode Island exacts 10 percent of the new fair market value for removing a property after 6 years, but that penalty declines until it terminates, 16 years after enrollment.

Economic Benefits of Open Space Preservation

The large literature discussing the effect of environmental amenities on surrounding property values suggests that preventing development on a parcel will raise the value of neighboring parcels. The studies find complicating factors, however, that make it difficult to predict changes in value for specific regions. One study in Maryland, for example, finds that open space programs have very different effects on the value of property in three different counties, probably due at least in part to variations in the amount of open space present (Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 2003). Numerous other studies indicate that the value of open space for individual homeowners declines with distance from the protected parcel (Chamblee, et al. 2011). The type of habitat or green space is also likely to be influential; one analysis finds that the presence of broad-leaved trees in a neighborhood is associated with positive values, but the presence of spruce trees has a negative effect on property values (Garrod and Willis 1992). An analysis of home prices in Tucson, Arizona, finds a preference for homes in areas with green space including native riparian habitat (Bark, et al. 2009; 2011).

Public access to privately owned open space for recreation or educational purposes would also be likely to provide substantial local benefits in many cases. States rarely require public access as a condition for the tax expenditure, but Maine and New Hampshire both encourage it by offering an additional reduction in assessed value of 25 percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Protected open space can also reduce growth in the demand for municipally provided services and forestall negative effects of development, such as heavy traffic or overcrowded schools, which would likely impose a heavier tax liability on current residents. A growing literature on cost of community services indicates that the property taxes paid on developed land are often insufficient to cover the cost of services created to support that development, while open space frequently generates tax revenues well in excess of the cost of services expended on the property. The American Farmland Trust, reporting results from 151 studies covering counties and municipalities in 25 states, finds that the owners of working and open land frequently pay taxes above or even twice the cost of services received on those properties, while residential property owners typically pay less than the cost of services received (Farmland Information Center 2010).

Findings like these suggest that preferential assessment can be justified on the grounds of fairness, because the owners of open space may be subsidizing services sent to owners of developed property. However, the fact that most programs require a long-term agreement and include penalties for early conversion indicates that the goal is not fairness, but preventing development for a specified period.

Unfortunately, there is very little literature evaluating whether preferential assessment programs prevent future development on parcels that aren’t under permanent protection such as an easement. Much of the existing evidence is based on studies of farmland protection programs rather than evaluations of the impact of property tax expenditures on open space. Two studies of Tennessee’s Greenbelt Program evaluated a survey of woodland owners enrolled in the program and found little support for the hypothesis that preferential assessment reduced the likelihood of development on these parcels (Brockett, Gottfried, and Evans 2003; Williams, et al. 2004).

It’s easier to evaluate land under long-term or permanent protection of either a perpetual conservation easement or a long-term preferential assessment contract with substantial penalties for withdrawal. In those cases, it’s possible to reliably predict the continued presence of open space; unfortunately, these protection agreements may predate the preferential assessment or be otherwise uninfluenced by it.

Costs of Preferential Assessment for Open Space

In addition to the tax expenditure itself, these programs may incur several other potential costs. Programs that require an approved conservation plan, for example, might generate a particularly challenging expense. While a state agency could develop and approve such a plan, it will be costly to ensure that conditions of the plan are met.

Program enforcement requires evaluating not only changes in a property’s market value but also changes in its use. If open space is used to graze livestock, for example, this new use might protect the undeveloped condition of the property but still reduce the environmental benefits.

Additionally, evidence suggests that in some instances open space preservation can lower property values by shifting development patterns, typically by resulting in the development of nearby properties (Irwin and Bockstael 2004; McDonald, et al. 2007). If preferential assessment prevents development on particular parcels, that development may shift to other parcels in ways that increase sprawl. If a leapfrog pattern of development occurs because a program prevented development on a parcel-by-parcel basis, the negative effects, such as higher infrastructure costs, could overwhelm any public benefits from the program.

Given the voluntary nature of these programs and resulting changes in development patterns, a worst-case scenario is that lower-quality parcels might receive the preferential assessment, increasing development pressure on parcels that generate greater public benefits. On the one hand, local government approval might reduce this problem by allowing individuals who know the area best to choose the parcels that most deserve protection. On the other hand, it might inspire local officials to protect open space in their jurisdiction, pushing development into other communities and creating undesirable development patterns at the regional level. It is also important to mention that preferential assessment of open space to some degree creates a split-rate system with a higher rate on developed land, particularly on improvements to the land—an issue that concerns many property tax scholars and may also significantly affect land use patterns.

Finally, the value of the public benefits is not static; it may increase or decrease depending on the condition of the property and surrounding area. The changes may be uncorrelated, or even negatively correlated, with future changes in assessed value. For example, more intense development pressure might increase the benefit of preserving a large parcel as open space; or it might decrease the benefit of preserving a small “island” parcel. Twenty-five acres of open space in the middle of a town can greatly benefit a community, but, if 24 of those acres are developed, it will likely diminish the environmental benefits of the remaining acre. Both scenarios, however, are likely to increase tax savings from preferential assessment, as development pressure drives up local property values.

These factors indicate that, while preferential assessment does offer landowners an incentive to preserve public benefits, the amount of the incentive may under-correct or even over-correct for the benefit being created. This will result in an inherently inefficient program, though such programs may still result in significant net benefits compared to having no program at all.

Distributional Consequences

Property tax expenditures to protect open space will have distributional consequences. Most immediately, the program would redistribute the tax burden onto other property owners in the same tax districts, as governments change the mill rate in order to maintain budgeted revenue. Owners of developed properties will now constitute a larger share of the tax base and will need to pay a greater fraction of the total tax bill as a result.

Since preferential assessment programs are primarily designed to maintain existing open space, enrolled parcels continue to generate benefits, but those benefits don’t necessarily increase. Thus the public benefits should be expected to continue to accrue as before. Local residents alone will benefit from scenic views and the foregone external costs of development, while residents and nonresidents alike may benefit from protecting watersheds or habitat for endangered species (Anderson and West 2006). Benefits may be expected to increase, however, if the program requires owners to improve the value of the open space by activity such as habitat restoration.

Several studies indicate that the effects of open space on surrounding property values depend critically on the type of protection and its ability to prevent development in the future. For example, land acquired as a park or forest preserve, or land placed under a conservation easement, has a much more positive effect on neighboring property values than open space that is not permanently protected (Geoghegan 2002). Enrollment in a preferential assessment program might have little or no effect on surrounding property values if the protection is perceived to be temporary, resulting in either permanent reductions in revenue or permanently higher tax rates on the non-enrolled parcels.

Calculating the Fiscal Cost of Preferential Assessment Expenditures

The methodology for calculating the tax expenditure resulting from the preferential assessment of open space is straightforward. The property owner will see a reduced tax burden based on the difference between the assessment without the program and the preferential assessment. This reduction in assessed value can lower tax revenue due to a reduced base. Alternatively, the lost revenue could be recouped by shifting the burden onto other property owners by increasing the tax rate. A combination of both outcomes is also possible. Oregon reports both the loss and the shift in their tax expenditure report (table 2), which listed exemption values of $126 million in fiscal year 2009–10 for the three open space programs. The estimated revenue loss over two fiscal years is $3.2 million, while the estimated revenue shift during that period is $0.7 million.

Data is inconsistent from state to state, which makes it difficult to estimate the revenue effects of preferential assessment. The aggregate data presented for Oregon is much more useful than what many other states present. States that do not calculate property tax expenditures frequently do not make such data available; at best, they usually offer aggregate figures that combine the programs for agriculture, forestry, and open space. Table 2 also indicates the relative scope of open space in that context. The exemption values for private forestry were over $5 billion, and the exemption values for farmland and farm home sites were $14.1 billion. The three conservation programs combined represent approximately one-half of one percent of the total exemption value, and less than one percent of the revenue lost or shifted.

Such calculations also depend on other effects that may be very difficult to observe. It will be impossible to determine the extent to which revenue shifted, without detailed information about local government’s ability to respond by changing the mill rate. In that case, the estimate will account for only foregone revenue. It will also be necessary to ignore the program’s possible positive property value effects on neighboring parcels.

Conclusion

Designing a preferential assessment program for open space requires careful consideration. While land with limited development does provide amenities and environmental benefits under many circumstances, the value of those benefits may vary dramatically according to local conditions. If the program’s goal is primarily to provide local, rather than regional, benefits, one set of criteria for the entire state is unlikely to maximize benefits. Local determination of the enrollment criteria may provide the flexibility necessary to react to those varying conditions, whereas state-level criteria are probably necessary to protect regional resources such as watersheds.

The shortage of empirical work in this area makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of existing programs. If the goal is genuinely to forestall development on certain parcels, program design should consider the length of contract and penalty for early conversion. Short-term delays in development will primarily benefit the owners of open space. For a program to succeed, the open space must generate significant community benefits in the form of either long-term environmental protection or higher property values for other residents of the area. Higher eligibility requirements for inclusion in the program should reduce the amount of acreage enrolled; however, the number of acres should not be the program’s primary goal unless legislators intend it solely as a means to reduce local development. Significant enrollment in the program could have substantial fiscal implications for local jurisdictions, especially if broad criteria and low conversion penalties make it easy for landowners to enroll and then develop the property later. Program design must ensure a maximum of public benefit in exchange for the fiscal effects.

This article was adapted from the Lincoln Institute working paper, “Preferential Assessment for Open Space”: https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2281_1620_Sundberg_WP13JS1.pdf.

About the Author

Jeffrey O. Sundberg is the James S. Kemper Foundation Professor of Liberal Arts and Business and Professor of Economics at Lake Forest College. He received a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University. His recent research interests include the efficiency of state and federal tax incentives for conservation easement donations and preferential assessment programs for open space. He has also served on the board of a land trust in Lake County, Illinois, serving as board president for four years. Contact: jsundber@mx.lakeforest.edu.

Resources

Anderson, Soren and Sarah West. 2006. Open space, residential property values, and spatial context. Regional Science and Urban Economics 36: 773–789.

Bark, R. H., D. E. Osgood, B. G Colby, and E. Halper. 2011. How Do Homebuyers Value Different Types of Green Space? Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 36(3): 395–415.

Bark, R. H., D. E. Osgood, B. G. Colby, G. Katz, and J. Stromberg. 2009. Habitat preservation and restoration: Do homebuyers have preferences for quality habitat? Ecological Economics 68(5): 1465–1475.

Brockett, C. D., R. R. Gottfried, and J. P. Evans. 2003. The Use of State Tax Incentives to Promote Forest Preservation on Private Lands in Tennessee: An Evaluation of Their Equity and Effectiveness Impacts. Politics and Policy 31(2): 252–281.

Chamblee, John F., Peter F. Colwell, Carolyn A. Dehring, and Craig A. Depken. 2011. The Effect of Conservation Activity on Surrounding Land Prices. Land Economics 87(3): 453–472.

Chervin, Stan, Teresa Gibson, and Harry Green. 2009. Greenbelt Revisited. Tennessee Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. http://www.tn.gov/tacir/PDF_FILES/Taxes/greenbeltrevisited.pdf.

Farmland Information Center, American Farmland Trust. 2010. Fact Sheet: Cost of Community Services Studies. http://www.farmland.org/documents/Cost-of-Community-Services-08-2010.pdf.

Garrod, Guy, and Ken Willis. 1992. The environmental economic impact of woodland: a two-stage hedonic price model of the amenity value of forestry in Britain. Applied Economics 24: 715–728.

Geoghegan, Jacqueline, Lori Lynch, and Shawn Bucholtz. 2003. Capitalization of Open Spaces into Housing Values and the Residential Property Tax Revenue Impacts of Agricultural Easement Programs. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 32(1): 33–45.

Geoghegan, Jacqueline. 2002. The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land Use. Land Use Policy 19(1): 91–98.

Irwin, Elana G. and Nancy E. Bockstael. 2004. Land Use Externalities, Open Space Preservation, and Urban Sprawl. Regional Science and Urban Economics 34:705–725.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

El proceso de globalización de las inversiones, las nuevas tecnologías de comunicación y la generalizada movilidad corporativa y personal están provocando una verdadera transformación de las “ciudades-región” del mundo entero. Desde hace muchos años los estudiosos de asuntos urbanos han advertido sobre la emergencia de una nueva clase de asentamiento humano, con estructuras económicas y sociales particulares y sus formas físicas asociadas.

Estas fuerzas globales fueron el tema central de la Conferencia realizada en el Instituto Lincoln, Cambridge, en septiembre de 1995. Este consorcio estuvo organizado por los investigadores David Barkin, Gary Hack y Roger Simmonds, quienes estudiaron doce grandes ciudades-región de Europa, Asia y las Américas. Si bien cada una de las ciudades del estudio exhibe sus propias características y patrones exclusivos, todas cumplen con los siguientes criterios:

• Una gran población, pero no necesariamente de la categoría de mega ciudad;
• Una economía de mercado diversificada, más que una economía planificada
• Una dominada por una sola industria;
• Patrones particulares de crecimiento y cambio desde 1960; y
• Antecedentes de intentos gubernamentales (exitosos o no) de moldear la forma regional.

Las doce ciudades del estudio son:

Ankara, Turquía
Bangkok, Tailandia
Yakarta, Indonesia
Lyon, Francia
Madrid, España
Randstad, Países Bajos
San Diego, Estados Unidos
Santiago, Chile
São Paulo, Brasil
Taipei, Taiwan
Tokio, Japón
Toronto, Canadá

Tomando las doce ciudades anteriores como casos de estudio, se diseño una investigación en varios niveles a fin de construir un modelo que representara a las ciudades-región y los motivos de sus características. El primer objetivo fue examinar los efectos de la economía política global en el crecimiento y desarrollo de las ciudades a lo largo del tiempo. ¿Qué efecto ha tenido la pérdida de la agricultura tradicional o han tenido las economías industriales y la introducción de nuevos capitales de inversión en el funcionamiento de las ciudades? ¿Cómo han respondido las ciudades ante estas poderosas fuerzas externas?

Un segundo objetivo de la investigación fue entender las relaciones entre la cambiante forma urbana y las inversiones en infraestructuras regionales tales como sistemas de transporte y nuevos centros tecnológicos. ¿Cómo se ha distribuido la población en torno a los nuevos centros económicos y redes de transporte? ¿Qué influencia tienen las labores de planificación regional en los cambios de la forma espacial y en el efecto sobre el medio ambiente?

En tercer lugar se exploraron las consecuencias de la dinámica de la globalización sobre la calidad de la vida urbana. ¿Qué problemas sociales y económicos enfrenta hoy la población urbana? ¿Qué están haciendo los gobiernos municipales y nacionales para resolverlos?

Previo a la conferencia, los equipos de investigación de todas las ciudades-región recopilaron datos para mapear el crecimiento y el movimiento de la población, los cambios en la infraestructura y el desarrollo económico e industrial a lo largo de las últimas tres décadas. A fin de que los datos fueran comparables más alláa de las fronteras nacionales, elaboraron planos de la evolución física de las doce ciudades-región en 1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990, y correlacionaron estos planos con cambios en los indicadores económicos y sociales fundamentales durante el mismo período. Asimismo, cada grupo elaboró un informe sobre los problemas especiales que enfrentan sus gobiernos y las acciones de los legisladores para conformar la forma espacial cambiante de la región.

Un retrato de las ciudades-región

Si bien las doce ciudades-región estudiadas presentan variaciones sustanciales, también tienen muchos patrones comunes en cuanto a crecimiento y cambio. Sus poblaciones oscilan entre unos 2 millones de habitantes, en Lyon, más de 32 millones en Tokio, la ciudad más grande del mundo y también una de las más ricas.

En todas estas ciudades el modelo predominante de crecimiento físico ha sido la dispersión desde el centro histórico y los anillos interiores adyacentes hacia espacios abiertos distantes y tierra agrícola. Esta dispersión implica desarrollo residencial y comercial —aunque a veces en direcciones diferentes— y se ha facilitado gracias al vertiginoso aumento en el uso y la disponibilidad del automóvil en todo el mundo. El ejemplo más notable es el de Taipei, en donde el número de automóviles aumentó desde aproximadamente 11 mil en 1960 a más de 1 millón en 1990; en ese mismo periodo, el número de personas por automóvil disminuyó de 127 a 5. Por otra parte, las ciudades de Ankara y Santiago, con 13 personas por automóvil en 1990, han sido las menos afectadas por el “síndrome automotor” hasta la fecha.

Incluso al mismo tiempo en que la mayoría de las ciudades se están dispersando hacia las afueras, ciertos núcleos interiores han visto aumentar su población gracias a la migración de clases adineradas y de empleos del sector de servicios hacia los centros nuevamente pujantes. La construcción de obras monumentales como estadios deportivos, centros de convenciones, hoteles de lujo y condominios residenciales han contribuido a avivar el turismo y la vida cultural de estos núcleos urbanos. La otra cara de la moneda, sin embargo, es el creciente deterioro que se observa fuera de los centros debido al desplazamiento de grandes números de pobres urbanos a zonas carentes de servicios.

Excepciones notables de este patrón son los centros urbanos deprimidos y los opulentos suburbios de baja densidad poblacional de los Estados Unidos. Ciudades como Bangkok y Taipei exhiben mayor integración vecinal de ricos y pobres que otras, pero su patrón predominante continúa mostrando zonas opulentas segmentadas y mayor definición de pobreza con el paso del tiempo.

Irónicamente, en esta nueva era de globalización los patrones residenciales están perdiendo importancia frente a los patrones de interacción, conforme los participantes de la economía global se comunican más a menudo con sus semejantes de otras ciudades u otros países —bien sea electrónicamente o en persona— que con sus propios vecinos.

Los cambiantes patrones demográficos han disminuido las tasas de crecimiento urbano a un 3 por ciento, en comparación con 6 a 8 por ciento en la década de 1960. La mayoría de las ciudades han experimentado una reducción en sus tasas de natalidad y de migración desde zonas rurales del interior del país o de las regiones inmediatas. No obstante, la turbulencia política y las cambiantes oportunidades laborales también están dando pie a nuevas olas de migración transnacional. Muchos nuevos inmigrantes se asientan en áreas de la ciudad separadas del sector pobre indígena, y presentan un nuevo grupo de problemas sociales y económicos para los gobiernos nacionales y municipales. En San Diego, por ejemplo, inmigrantes de México y Centroamérica contribuyen al crecimiento poblacional y a la mayor segmentación dentro de la región. Por otra parte, São Paulo ha experimentado una emigración neta, dado que las nuevas políticas y programas brasileños fomentan la descentralización hacia nuevas comunidades de ese vasto país.

Según los datos de 1990, los sectores económicos tienen una composición similar entre países. Por lo general, menos del 5 por ciento de la fuerza laboral se dedica a la agricultura y a la extracción de recursos, mientras que el 20 al 30 por ciento trabaja en el sector manufacturero y el 65 al 75 por ciento en el sector de servicios. Como interesantes excepciones en estas tendencias laborales son los casos de Yakarta, con una tasa de participación en el sector agrícola de casi el 16 por ciento en 1990, y San Diego, con un 83 por ciento de tasa actual en el sector de servicios. Bangkok y Taipei muestran los mayores declives en agricultura, desde un 20 por ciento en 1960 a menos del 2 por ciento en 1990. En ese mismo año, ambas ciudades mantenían tasas relativamente altas en el sector manufacturero; 32 y 36 por ciento respectivamente.

En cuanto a la distribución del ingreso en las regiones, se observan patrones similares: el 20 por ciento más pobre de la población suele recibir apenas un 5 a 7 por ciento de los ingresos totales, en comparación con un 40 a 50 por ciento de dichos ingresos que llega al 20 por ciento más rico de la población. Santiago, São Paulo y Yakarta exhiben las mayores concentraciones de riqueza en los niveles superiores, mientras que Tokio y Taipei, seguidos cercanamente por Randstad y Madrid, exhiben la menor desigualdad entre los niveles de ingresos. San Diego, a pesar de su ingreso per cápita relativamente alto, muestra una distribución de ingreso de rango medio del 44 por ciento para el extremo superior, pero apenas un 4 por ciento del ingreso ganado para el 20 por ciento más pobre de su población.

Una economía mundial llena de cambios y contradicciones

Durante la conferencia se revelaron varias realidades nuevas sobre el mundo en que vivimos. Quizás la más importante sea la dificultad que enfrentan las autoridades municipales y nacionales para diseñar políticas eficaces que modifiquen las poderosas fuerzas económicas que moldean las nuevas estructuras productivas de sus regiones.

Un tema recurrente en los análisis regionales fue la contradicción existente entre las inversiones privadas altamente centralizadas y los cambios arrolladores que surgen con la inserción de la ciudad-región en la economía internacional. En la mayoría de las regiones, los “corredores de élite” de la globalización presentan un agudo contraste con la precaria “ciudad residual”. Dichos enclaves adinerados, receptores de las inversiones de corporaciones transnacionales productoras para mercados mundiales, están redicadas cerca de las zonas donde viven y compran los participantes de esta economía. En estos centros financieros y comerciales, prósperas empresas de profesionales capacitados realizan operaciones de producción y marketing mundial para garantizar retornos atractivos a los inversionistas internacionales, casi siempre haciendo caso omiso de la economía local.

Paralelamente con el declive poblacional, las oportunidades de empleo también se han estancado. En cada una de las ciudades-región se observa el desplazamiento acelerado de la fuerza laboral hacia empleos a tiempo parcial de baja paga en el sector de servicios, con un concomitante desequilibrio de oportunidades económicas que condena a un segmento creciente de la población a la pobreza.

Esta amenaza está acompañada por cambios en el sector agrícola. Gran parte de los productores rurales de pequeña escala no pueden competir en los mercados internacionales con productores agrícolas de gran escala, quienes tienen acceso a un capital que les permite equiparse con las más modernas maquinarias para aumentar su producción. El proceso inexorable de expansión global también está provocando la salida del mercado de plantas manufactureras de pequeña y mediana escala.

La mayoría de los participantes de la conferencia aceptaron y adoptaron de buena gana la nueva dinámica de la globalización. Sus gobiernos trabajan activamente para reposicionar sus regiones a fin de atraer inversionistas extranjeros y promotores de bienes raíces que prometen la modernización, esperando poder convertir sus ciudades en guías que conduzcan a sus naciones hacia el proceso de integración mundial. Casi todos consideran que su tarea principal será la de desenmarañar los obstáculos —normativos y otros— de las épocas anteriores, y facilitar la iniciativa privada mediante el ofrecimiento, a veces gratuito, del suelo y de la infraestructura requeridos para las nuevas instalaciones.

Muchas de las ciudades están específicamente orientando sus estrategias de inversión en infraestructura para expandir la economía de servicios. Bangkok, Taipei y Tokio están esforzándose para convertirse en los centros financieros de Asia, esperando la caída de Hong Kong como primer competidor. Bangkok, en particular, está invirtiendo en redes sustanciales de transporte y comunicaciones y en la capacitación de su fuerza laboral. En Europa, Madrid está aprovechando su papel como centro mundial de la cultura española para mejorar sus servicios de comunicación; Randstad está promoviendo sus instalaciones de soporte aeroportuario; y Lyon se está convirtiendo en un novedoso centro de industrias tecnológicas emergentes.

Impactos en el desarrollo regional

Los casos estudiados y las discusiones durante la conferencia pusieron en evidencia numerosos problemas de ese entusiasmo por la globalización. El complejo y preocupante fenómeno de la expansión urbana se está generalizando en el mundo entero conforme el automóvil facilita la distribución de la población a centros de empleo satélites y suele reducir la densidad de las ciudades regionales. Dos excepciones interesantes de este patrón son Tokio, cuyo sistema de tránsito masivo contribuye a mantener centralizada la actividad económica, y Taipei, donde la geografía montañosa restringe el desarrollo hacia las afueras. Por otra parte, en Randstad se está observando el desarrollo acelerado de espacios vacantes que existían entre antiguos asentamientos, aun cuando la tasa de crecimiento general ha sido bastante lenta.

Parte de esta descentralización proviene de los esfuerzos gubernamentales para hacer frente a asuntos como el alto precio del suelo, el congestionamiento vehicular o la protección ambiental. En las afueras de Santiago, Lyon, Randstad, Taipei, Tokio y Yakarta se están construyendo nuevos pueblos o “tecnópolis”, mientras que en Bangkok se está construyendo un nuevo puerto a unos cuantos kilómetros del centro de la ciudad. En São Paulo, estrictos reglamentos de protección de las zonas de cuenca están forzando el desplazamiento de nuevos desarrollos a sitios distantes.

Más que moldear el desarrollo, la infraestructura suele seguirle los pasos a éste. Los inversionistas privados tienen capacidad de responder con mayor rapidez a planes de crecimiento dentro de sus regiones, de lo que pueden las agencias públicas responsabilizarse por implementar grandes proyectos de infraestructura. De esa manera el desarrollo privado presiona al sector público para que dote de servicios a zonas que ya están siendo urbanizadas. Este proceso tiene serias implicaciones para la planificación regional a largo plazo, si ésta continúa siendo impulsada por el desarrollo mientras que el gobierno le sigue los pasos para no quedarse atrás.

Otro tema que emergió durante la conferencia fue el de una mayor conciencia sobre los problemas ambientales. En la mayoría de las ciudades-región, la acumulación de riqueza y el consiguiente aumento de consumo están imponiendo enormes presiones sobre el medio ambiente. Con el paso acelerado de la integración regional y la desregulación de la economía, las corporaciones transnacionales pueden funcionar como les plazca en la economía internacional. Los participantes señalaron repetidamente las dificultades de controlar estos retos de manera constructiva en cada una de sus ciudades-región. Así y todo, la preocupación por el ambiente fue vista también como el principal factor de motivación de la planificación regional estratégica considerada.

Calidad de vida

La globalización promete un mundo de mayor prosperidad. La mayoría de las ciudades representadas en la conferencia experimentaron aumentos relativos en varios índices promedio de calidad de vida entre 1960 y 1990: ingreso per cápita, esperanza de vida y nivel de educación. Estas entradas crecientes, junto con los avances tecnológicos que incrementan la productividad y la mayor diseminación de información sobre bienes disponibles en los mercados mundiales, han permitido que habitantes urbanos de todas partes satisfagan sus necesidades con nuevos productos. No obstante, modelos globales poderosos de organización y producción están también imponiendo nuevos patrones homogéneos de consumo que amenazan con acabar la extraordinaria variedad de estilos de vida que caracteriza a la mayoría de las regiones urbanas.

El aumento en movilidad física resultante del automóvil particular ha abierto las puertas a un mundo de lugares donde vivir, comprar y trabajar. Al mismo tiempo, los viajes diarios entre la casa y el trabajo duran unos 45 minutos en promedio, desde menos de 30 minutos en San Diego a más de hora y media en Bangkok.

Los participantes de la conferencia estuvieron de acuerdo en que este aumento de movilidad ha minado el sentido de comunidad del pasado, conforme los seres humanos comienzan a identificarse con lugares urbanos más dispersos o a desarrollar identidades “sin tierra”. Prácticamente todos los representantes de las ciudades hicieron mención de la “McDonaldnización” de la cultura mundial, que abarca expresiones como la música, la ropa, la arquitectura y la comida. Igualmente, a medida que los mercados de bienes de consumo se globalizan, los habitantes de muchas ciudades-región están comenzando a depender de esos mercados para que suministren servicios que solían ser semipúblicos, tales como educación y recreación.

Los cambios en la función económica de grandes ciudades —de manufactura y transporte a finanzas y turismo— han causado también pérdidas importantes. Muchos centros históricos han sido modificados para fines de turismo cultural. Edificios o ciudades que en el pasado fueron fábricas o almacenes son ahora tiendas o museos. Los trabajadores u obreros portuarios de antaño que solían vivir cerca de sus trabajos, han desaparecido para dar lugar a visitantes que se desplazan por automóvil o avión desde otras ciudades o incluso otros países para admirar edificios que han sido restaurados en forma, pero cuya función ha sido completamente transformada. Nuevos rascacielos, centros de convención, estadios y hoteles de lujo son impuestos sobre el paisaje urbano, generalmente sin tomar en cuenta el contexto espacial y social.

Ciertos puntos del proceso de globalización son alentadores, especialmente si se consideran las contribuciones de la ciencia médica y aspectos básicos de educación y sanidad que pueden ofrecerse con inversiones públicas de relativo bajo costo. Sin embargo, el estándar de vida y las oportunidades de empleo se están deteriorando para números crecientes de la población mundial.

La mayoría de los nuevos trabajadores urbanos viven en un mundo de mercados laborales más flexibles y menos seguridad laboral, diferente al mundo en que laboraron sus padres como granjeros u obreros de plantaciones. Las nuevas tecnologías informáticas y financieras globales facilitan a las empresas buscar los sitios y mano de obra más baratos del mundo y cambiar los empleos de un país a otro en cuestión de semanas, de ser necesario.

Los mismos nuevos medios de información y de transporte, que permiten a consumidores y trabajadores elegir entre una amplia variedad de artículos o empleos, también permiten que los criminales elijan de entre una amplia variedad de potenciales blancos. Algunos participantes de la conferencia argumentaron que la actual percepción de menor seguridad física es algo más imaginario que real, especialmente en los Estados Unidos. Lo cierto es que la percepción de por sí está claramente alentando la demanda mundial de urbanizaciones enrejadas o viviendas más seguras.

Los efectos positivos y negativos de la globalización en la calidad de vida, más que concesiones, son las dos caras de la moneda. Las mismas tecnologías de información y organización de mercados que difunden nuevos bienes de consumo alrededor del mundo en cuestión de semanas, también transmiten malas noticias, como el sida. Los mismos automóviles que facilitan el acceso a oportunidades de recreación en el campo para los habitantes urbanos, también dan lugar a ciudades que se expanden y ocupan tierras de la periferia que se convierten en patios privados en vez de vistas escénicas de granjas o bosques.

Debido a estas contradicciones, es de menester buscar otros modelos de producción y consumo, modelos que permitan a los habitantes fortalecer sus comunidades y proteger sus ambientes, que ofrezcan la posibilidad de crear empleos productivos para toda la población, y que restrinja el acelerado proceso de polarización.

El papel del gobierno

¿Hasta qué punto los ciudadanos de las ciudades-región piden a sus gobiernos municipales, metropolitanos o nacionales encontrar formas de eliminar los efectos negativos de la globalización? Como un ejemplo, los representantes de San Diego, Ankara y Tokio apuntaron al hecho de que las elecciones municipales se centran ahora en torno a quién se beneficia de la globalización. Los ciudadanos que se identifican más con la economía global que con la municipal exigen que los gobiernos inviertan en infraestructura de alta tecnología, construyan centros de convención o estadios y fomenten las oportunidades de educación con el fin de atraer empleos futuros.

En contraste, la mayoría de los peones y trabajadores de poca formación educativa ven la globalización como una amenaza más que una oportunidad, y les interesa más invertir los limitados recursos municipales en servicios públicos como escuelas y clínicas comunitarias. En cualquier caso, es posible que aquellos gobiernos que se concentran en los servicios municipales para no tener que tomar decisiones políticas impopulares, están únicamente postergando los impactos inevitables de la globalización, entre ellos sus efectos potencialmente beneficiosos a largo plazo.

A la larga, quizás la capacidad de gobiernos de cualquier nivel para manejar las fuerzas globales sea limitada. Existe una discrepancia inherente entre la economía global y el gobierno, no sólo en el sentido espacial de gobiernos municipales o fragmentados que están luchando para dominar las fuerzas económicas regionales o globales, sino en los modos operativos contrastantes de los mercados y los gobiernos.

La globalización ha dificultado cada vez más definir tanto “la región” que debería planificarse como “la comunidad” que debería participar en dichos planes. Los gobiernos municipales —e incluso la mayoría de los gobiernos nacionales— no tienen muchos recursos para proteger los negocios locales contra la competencia global. En casi todas las ciudades-región representadas en la conferencia se han multiplicado los grupos de interés especializados y las organizaciones no gubernamentales, al mismo tiempo que los gobiernos omnipresentes han comenzado a dar pasos hacia la fragmentación y descentralización. La devolución política, bastante avanzada en los Estados Unidos, está comenzando a sonar fuerte en otras partes.

La tendencia actual de los gobiernos de las ciudades-región es prescindir de técnicas de planificación espacial complicadas, y en cambio ajustarse a lo que uno de los planificadores de la conferencia denominó como “las nuevas reglas de la propiedad y la política”. Sin embargo, esta filosofía deja una herencia de muchas contradicciones: entre las oportunidades para las élites y los pobres; entre los defensores de una mayor autonomía municipal y aquellos comprometidos a patrones regionales emergentes de interdependencia; y entre políticas que favorecen el crecimiento en vez de la redistribución de recursos. Sin un sistema gubernamental eficaz, todas estas dicotomías tienen gran potencial para la confrontación.