The confusing and contradictory responses by Latin America experts who participated in our survey call attention to potentially misleading policies that might be fomented by erroneous perceptions and weak indicators.
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Almost 30 years ago, Amalia Reátegui and her husband, Eusebio, packed up their possessions, wrestled together their eight children, and moved to their new home: a dusty plot of land on the barren outskirts of the Peruvian capital, Lima. At first, life wasn’t easy there. Basic services, like running water and electricity, weren’t available. Roads were unpaved, and public transportation was nonexistent. Quality schools and health clinics were far away, in the more established and wealthier neighborhoods.
But even though conditions were tough, moving to San Juan de Lurigancho, one of Lima’s earliest informal settlements, offered the couple a rare chance to become homeowners, which would have been out of their reach in the city’s traditional districts.
Little by little, things improved. They built a sturdy house made of concrete, got electricity and, years later, running water and sewage. Buses arrived, and even a metro connecting San Juan de Lurigancho to the rest of the city. Their children went off to postsecondary education, and later landed jobs in hospitals, the municipality, and the navy.
Just as important for Amalia and Eusebio was a piece of paper from the government—the title recognizing their formal ownership of the 120-square-meter plot of land where they lived.
Today, the couple still lives in the same peach-colored house, but their family home, like their neighborhood, has been transformed over the years. The one-story house is now a four-story building with eight two-bedroom apartments, one for each of their adult children.
For Amalia, a 71-year-old soft-spoken grandmother with shoulder-length black hair, this was all part of the plan. “When we first built our home, I always thought it would be for my children,” she said. “It is my house, and it is for them.”
But for her children, who spent the equivalent of tens-of-thousands of dollars to build the upper floors, the current living situation leaves them in a legal limbo, where the ownership of their apartments is based solely on a verbal agreement with their parents rather than legal paperwork.
Reverting to Informality
The case highlights a new trend that is puzzling experts of urban development and property rights in Peru. After years of demanding legal titles for their homes, residents are allowing their properties to become deregularized by failing to use the national registry, known as Sunarp, to document property transactions such as real estate sales, change of ownership within families, or the construction of additional floors subdivided into apartments. As a result, properties revert to informality, and the government registry does not accurately reflect the actual owners.
The issue is a growing concern for policy experts, who say it could have major social, economic, and legal costs. Without legal registration, disputes can quickly arise among siblings over ownership of a family home after the parents die. Resolving the dispute can lead to high legal costs in Peru’s already overburdened and slow courts. Informal owners can’t use their property as collateral for formal bank financing, and they face lower resale value if they decide to put their home on the market. It also risks undermining the sustainability of Peru’s pioneering titling program, a popular tool aimed at promoting economic development that was later emulated around the world.
“The children are now living in the same situation that their parents were living in 40 years ago. They’ve become informal again,” said Julio Calderón, a Peruvian sociologist, Lincoln Institute researcher, and expert on property rights. “Urbanistically, this is a time bomb.”
The Rise of Informal Settlements in Peru
Like other Latin American capitals, Lima experienced a population explosion during the second half of the last century, as migrants from across Peru flooded into the arid coastal city seeking a better life.
In 1950, fewer than a million people lived in Lima. By 2000, that number had ballooned to 7.4 million, according to the United Nations Population Division. Today, the Peruvian capital is home to more than 9 million people, representing almost a third of the country’s total population. The drivers of Peru’s internal migration are varied, but it’s mainly a result of political and economic hardships in the countryside. In the 1970s, the rural economy crashed following a failed agrarian reform by General Juan Velasco, a leftwing military dictator.
The economy was battered again in the early 1980s during one of the worst El Niño weather events on record, causing damaging floods and collapse of the fisheries. At around the same time, the leftist Shining Path rebels launched a violent insurgency in the southern highlands, forcing many residents there to flee to Lima to escape a bloody conflict that would claim about 70,000 lives.
In Lima, the government wasn’t prepared for the wave of migrants. With nowhere to live, new residents began to take over vacant land on the city’s outskirts, sometimes clashing with police. One of those informal developments eventually became San Juan de Lurigancho. Hector Nicho, a community leader there, remembers the authorities as being powerless to stop the flood of people who seized land, hoping to make it their own.
“The first day of the invasion, there were 15 or 20 people. The following day, we were 500. The day after that, we were 1,500. It just kept growing. They couldn’t stop it, even though the state had sent police,” said Nicho, who was just a boy when he participated in the land invasion some four decades ago.
Land grabs occurred throughout Lima, eventually leading to the creation of districts like Villa El Salvador on the city’s southern edge and San Martin de Porres in the north. The squatters were some of the city’s most impoverished residents, living in areas noticeable for the lack of state presence and vast informal economy.
By the late 1980s, things were only getting worse. Peru’s economy had spiraled into hyperinflation. The Shining Path, once confined to the rural highlands, was fast encroaching on Lima, threatening to overthrow the government and install a Maoist-inspired regime.
De Soto’s Titling Program
Around this time, Hernando de Soto, a Peruvian economist, proposed a way out of the mess. De Soto argued that providing legal ownership to property would trigger development by allowing the poor to leverage their individual assets in the formal economy and access financing. But complex and expensive bureaucratic barriers were preventing that from happening, De Soto said.
“They realized that one of the biggest obstacles to registering property in Peru was their own public registry,” said Angel Ayala, a lawyer and expert on property registration. “The problem wasn’t the informality. The problem was that the formal sector wouldn’t allow you to enter it,” he said, referring to the government’s then-complex and costly regulations for property registration.
De Soto’s ideas were embraced by Peru, which created a new legal framework to provide property titles for people like the Reáteguis, living in informal settlements in places like San Juan de Lurigancho.
In 1996, the government created the Commission for the Official Registration of Informal Property (COFOPRI) to lead a nationwide urban titling program. It also created a parallel registry, known in Spanish as the Registro Predial Urbano. The registry, which focused only on Lima’s informal settlements, slashed the requirements for property registration, making it faster and cheaper for poor land owners to get titles.
The results were impressive. According to Regularization of Informal Settlements in Latin America, a Lincoln Institute report by Brazilian lawyer Edésio Fernandes, COFOPRI reduced the time to obtain a title from 7 years to 45 days. It cut the number of steps from 2,007 to 4. The cost of registering declined from US$2,156 to almost nothing.
Since its creation, COFOPRI has issued about two million property titles, making it one of the largest programs of its kind in the world.
“The people who worked there worked 24 hours a day,” said Jorge Ortiz, a former COFOPRI employee who later became the superintendent of Peru’s traditional public registry, known as Sunarp. “They really identified with what they were doing.”
De Soto’s titling policy became the preeminent approach for land regularization around the world. It won praise from development organizations like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, and from politicians like former U.S. President Bill Clinton. Peru, as a pioneer of the program, became a model for other countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia that were also grappling with widespread informality and poverty.
Almost 20 years since the creation of COFOPRI, academics have identified several social and economic benefits from titling. Families with formal title, for example, invest more in their homes and their children’s education, studies show. They also have fewer children.
Critics of the program, however, argue that De Soto’s main hypothesis—that titles will increase the poor’s access to formal credit—has simply not materialized as he envisioned.
They also point to unintended consequences of large land-titling programs, such as political manipulation and incentive for squatters to continue invading land, creating new informal developments without services, in the hope of being registered one day.
The Risks of Deregularization
In Peru, one of the main concerns is the sustainability of the titling, as more and more properties are becoming deregularized. Years after they seized land, the original property owners are retiring or passing away. Their property, often given to their children, is slipping back into informality.
“What we have seen happening is that the second and third property transactions are no longer registered. For a number of reasons, people simply fail to keep their properties fully legal,” said Fernandes. “So in a few years’ time, you are back to square one in terms of the legalities of the area.”
Unless the trend changes, policy experts say, the government’s aggressive titling program could unravel, along with its benefits.
Informal property owners risk losing the most basic benefit of titling: tenure security and legal protection against eviction and fraud. They could face other costs, like legal expenditures to resolve disputes over ownership.
There are also opportunity costs. Informal homeowners can’t use their property to access formal credit. They’d also miss out on receiving fair market compensation if they decided to sell their home.
The extent of the deregularization is difficult to gauge, but a recent Lincoln Institute study by Oswaldo Molina, an Oxford-trained economist, found that just 21 percent of second property transactions in Peru’s recently titled areas were being formally registered (Molina 2014).
“When the reform started, it wasn’t just an issue of providing titles to the people, but maintaining them formal,” said Molina. “So what happened with the other 79 percent?”
“We are now going to have numerous properties with titles, but in the name of someone else,” he added.
Causes for the Failure to Register
During his time as the head of Sunarp, Ortiz said it was extremely rare to see individuals registering second property transactions. For Ortiz, this has been a disappointment.
“I believed in the model from the 1990s,” said Ortiz, who was the head of Sunarp during the start of President Ollanta Humala’s administration in 2011. “And now, some 30 years later, I’m seeing that it could go to waste.”
The causes of deregularization are obscure, but experts point to cultural issues and changes in public policy as important drivers.
In many places in Peru, there is a strong respect for the verbal decisions of parents, even concerning important legal issues like property registration. In cases where a family home is subdivided, children rely on their parents, the property owners, to sign off on the transaction in order to provide them with a formal title.
Experts say that many parents are happy to let their children pay for the subdivision, but they don’t consider providing formal title, believing that a verbal agreement is sufficient to split up the property. In other cases, parents refuse to provide title over concerns that they could lose control over their home.
“There is still a culture where you respect the decision and the word of the parents,” said Jesus Quispe, the director of Cenca, a Lima-based urban development institute, which works in San Juan de Lurigancho. “Few transactions go through the legal system. There is a culture of informality.”
Ramiro García, the head of the urban program at the Peruvian development organization Desco, says many families ignore the public registry until they confront a problem, like a legal dispute over ownership.
“It is bureaucratic, expensive, and families don’t consider it necessary,” he said from his office in Villa El Salvador.
Before Lima’s population boom, families that couldn’t afford to buy a home could move to the outskirts, grab a piece of land, and build a house. Today, most of the vacant land is gone. What remains is located on the edge of mountains, often unstable for living.
As land has become scarcer, demand for housing has remained robust. As a result, the city has started to expand upward, with apartment buildings replacing houses.
Real estate prices have also skyrocketed, driven by Peru’s strong economic growth over the past decade. For young families from lower-middle class backgrounds, escalating costs have made it increasingly difficult to acquire their first home.
To help their children, parents who settled Lima’s outskirts a few decades ago are now adding two or three floors to their homes, and subdividing them into apartments.
In San Juan de Lurigancho, Melly Rosas, a 53-year-old secretary at a church, decided to add three more floors to her house after watching her married children struggle to save up enough money to buy a property.
“At first, this wasn’t our plan,” she said. “But it was too expensive for them to buy land while paying rent.”
“We are growing upward because there isn’t any more space,” Rosas added, referring to the increasing number of buildings in her neighborhood.
Rosas and her husband, Ricardo, haven’t looked into providing titles for their children’s apartments, but they plan to. “We know we have to do so, because it will reduce a lot of problems they could have,” she said. “Right now, everything is verbal.”
A short drive away, on a quiet, residential street, Marcelo Nuñez, a 52-year-old shoemaker, lives in a spacious house with high ceilings that help to keep it cool during Lima’s hot summer days. Attached to the house is a small store, where his wife sells soft drinks and potato chips.
Like their neighbors, Nuñez and his family slowly built their home over the last 30 years, one wall at a time. Now his 28-year-old daughter is building a second floor, where she plans to live with her baby boy. Nuñez’s son, 25, will likely live on the third floor.
Nuñez said he hadn’t planned to register the upper floors, even though they will be owned by his children. “For my part, I hadn’t thought about doing it legally, because we are family,” he said. “It’s pretty strange to do a subdivision legally. Normally it is just by word.”
But, like Rosas, Nuñez agrees that leaving his children without formal titles could create future problems. “If they’re in agreement, I wouldn’t have a problem with doing it legally,” he said.
But cultural factors aren’t the only impediment to property registration. Policy experts say that people like Rosas and Nuñez will run into several costly regulatory requirements if they eventually decide to formalize their properties.
The obstacles arose, experts say, due to the government’s decision to eliminate the Registro Predial Urbano, the parallel registry created to speed up formal registration in Lima’s informal settlements.
In 2004, Peru merged the Registro Predial Urbano into Sunarp, the traditional public registry that was seen as too costly and bureaucratic. The Registro’s simpler procedures for second and third property transactions were replaced by Sunarp’s more complicated and costly requirements.
Critics of the decision say the government made the change due to lobbying from powerful groups representing public notaries, who were concerned about losing lucrative business due to the Registro Predial Urbano. Unlike the traditional registry, the Registro allowed property owners to hire any lawyer, not just notaries, to legalize their transactions.
“By returning to the previous system, the costs multiplied by five. People said, ‘No, I’m not going to do that,’” said Ayala, the lawyer and expert on titling. “The issue isn’t cultural. It is about how to maintain the titling process in the formal system.”
Deregularization in Peru has far-reaching consequences for other countries that established their own titling programs based on the Peruvian model.
Argentine economists and Lincoln Institute researchers Sebastian Galiani, of the University of Maryland, and Ernesto Schargrodsky, of the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, found that in a recently titled suburb of Buenos Aires a significant portion of households were falling back into informality. In a 2013 study, the authors concluded that deregularization was likely due to the unaffordable cost of keeping the properties formal (Galiani and Schargrodsky 2013).
“This isn’t just a Peruvian issue, but something that is much larger in the region,” said Molina, the economist who studied deregularization in Peru. “It is a problem with the short-term view of the reform.”
Potential Solutions
To stem the tide of deregularization, policy experts say authorities will need to intervene now to prevent the need for costly retitling programs in the future.
Some small steps have been taken. In 2007, the government issued legislation to provide lower-income title holders with funds to formalize subdivisions, a process that first requires them to register construction of the house. (Peru’s registration program gave residents titles to the land, but not the house built on top.) However, registration experts say the 2007 program was never fully implemented.
More importantly, experts say the government should reinstate simpler procedures, like those that were discarded when the Registro Predial Urbano was integrated into Sunarp. “The concrete thing to do would be to reconsider mechanisms that were used before,” said Molina. “The Registro was created so that the poor could correctly receive titles.”
Regulatory changes may not be enough on their own. Many experts insist that the problem requires authorities to tackle Peru’s broader culture of informality as well. To do so, they say, the government should launch a campaign to educate residents about the importance of maintaining their properties formal.
“This is a problem that the government has to address,” said Gustavo Riofrio, a sociologist and Lincoln Institute researcher who has spent his career studying property rights. “You have an entire city that was made by these people who are facing the same problem. It is now a social problem, not an individual one.”
Officials at Sunarp say they are working to simplify procedures for property transactions, without jeopardizing the legal security that the current system provides. Sunarp says it is also working to educate people about the importance of using the registry, but acknowledges that the government “hasn’t been able to instill in the population the importance of formalization.”
Until there is a greater acceptance of the regulatory system, some lawyers say Peru should make registration compulsory. Unlike many other countries, Peru does not require registration of property transactions; it’s voluntary.
“We have to educate people so they understand that registration doesn’t just provide security. It’s important to create value as well,” said Ortiz. “But until we have a new culture, we need to require people to register by modifying the civil code.”
At the home of Amalia and Eusebio, in San Juan de Lurigancho, their 40-year-old daughter Emma is eager to discuss property titles.
Emma, who lives in a third-floor apartment with her son, says the subdivision of her childhood home is working out nicely so far. The family members respect each other’s space, but they still get together for a lunch on Sunday. The children also help their aging parents with expenses such as food.
But Emma says she knows it’s important to define ownership legally, especially after seeing cases where other families get mired in legal conflicts over their home. She thinks her parents will eventually start the process to provide their children with titles.
“My mom and dad still feel physically well. When that changes, I think they’ll let it go,” she said. “But for the moment, they are still keeping it tied up. For me, that’s OK.”
Ryan Dubé is a Canadian journalist based in Lima, Peru. His articles have been published in The Wall Street Journal, The Globe & Mail, and Latin Trade. He has also worked on projects for the Economist Intelligence Unit.
References
Fernandes, Edesio. 2011. Regularization of Informal Settlements in Latin America. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1906_1225_Regularization%20PFR%20Rev%202012.pdf
Galiani, Sebastian and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2013. “Land De-Regularization.” Working paper. www.utdt.edu/ver_contenido.php?id_contenido=2674&id_item_menu=4526
Molina, Oswaldo. 2014. “Loss of Plot Formality through Unregistered Transactions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Peru.” Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/2447_Loss-of-plot-formality-through-unregistered-transactions
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Few low-income urban settlements in Venezuela are located on land owned by their occupants. As a result, the occupants cannot register the structures they have built and are entitled to only a substitute title (“título supletorio”) granting them limited rights. A legal interpretation handed down by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s has been upheld by repeated court decisions: transactions involving structures on land not owned by the builder cannot be registered without the landowner’s express consent (Pérez Perdomo and Nikken 1979, 38). This is a general legal principle, applicable not only to urban shacks but to all structures.
It could be said, however, that the inhabitants of houses built in the country’s squatter settlements enjoy possession of the land they occupy, though strictly speaking it is what former Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera and others have called a “precarious possession.” These settlements have considerable stability in some cases, less stability in others, and in certain cases there is no stability at all; occupants are evicted and their structures are demolished.
Peaceful occupations of land, and occasionally more aggressive invasions, are by no means a new development in Venezuela; such settlements have been prevalent since the 19th century. As a result, Venezuelan cities are characterized by their physical and social diversity:
Changing Conditions
Many observers wonder, when considering the legal status of the squatter settlements, why it has become “normal,” and to a substantial extent accepted, for Venezuelans to build houses or take up residence on lands assumed to be owned by others. Reactions to this complex situation can vary. It is striking that, in many instances, neither the presumed landowners nor the occupiers of these lands have taken the extreme responses available to each party-demands for eviction or expropriation by the owners or purchase of the land and legalization of its ownership by the occupiers. The presence of a parallel official law has permitted the establishment of settlements and improvement of housing conditions on “invaded” lands (Ontiveros & Bolívar 2000, 128-139). Furthermore, this pattern has become a chronic condition whose end is not demanded by any of the parties involved.
However, this tacit understanding has broken down in recent years, chiefly due to new requirements by banks, which refuse to lend to anyone who does not have registered ownership of the land. The World Bank’s involvement as a co-financier of urban renewal projects has also changed the status of the urban squatter settlements. The national Housing Policy Act (Article 14) now provides for the legalization of land holdings in the squatter settlements, and a team of specialists, mainly lawyers, is drafting a bill that would help make it possible to end the illegal status of Venezuelan urban squatter settlements. Some lower-income neighborhoods with commercially built housing would also be legalized by this action.
Obstacles to Legalization
In spite of these recent developments, procedures and mechanisms relating to urban squatter settlements have been created and modified over many years. The state’s inability to legalize these entrenched settlements can be attributed to a number of interacting factors.
Unclear Land Ownership
Former President Caldera has argued that the main reason for the continuing illegal status of squatter settlements is a lack of clarity as to who actually owns the invaded lands. He argues that, given this prevailing doubt and uncertainty about land ownership, the most important and urgent need is to provide public utilities and other basic public services to the occupiers. Legalization has not been a top priority in the process of consolidating squatter settlements. Nevertheless, there are other causes for the continuing absence of legalization, causes that are deeper and less visible.
Acceptance of the Status Quo
Since the expansion of urban squatter settlements in the 1940s and 1950s, it has been commonly assumed that eventually they would be controlled and demolished, though that has not occurred; they have simply been banished from city maps. The replacement of self-built settlements with standard housing developments has not gone beyond political rhetoric or electoral promises. Proof of this assertion is that half the residents of Venezuelan cities continue to live in these informal settlements.
A kind of official but informal law has emerged for the squatter settlements. Pérez Perdomo & Nikken explain “… how the State itself has contributed to the creation of a kind of informal legal order to meet the squatter settlements’ legal needs in relation to the ownership of housing” (1979, 2). This is a de facto, but not a de jure, acceptance of squatter settlements.
Does this mean that the residents of these settlements do not want legalization of ownership? We know that is not entirely true because they treat the land they possess as if it were their own. When the owner appears and wants to evict them, they fight back until the eviction order is stopped. As long as mere possession poses no risk of eviction, the residents remain satisfied and make no effective distinction between ownership and possession in their settlements. Furthermore, some are afraid of having to pay taxes and accept other obligations that would come with legalization of their status.
Provision of Services and Infrastructure
Further evidence of this acceptance of squatter settlements is the provision of public utilities, services and infrastructure by state agencies, though in most cases the services are considered “precarious” investments. This official attention to the settlements is convincingly illustrated in the work of Josefina Baldó (1996), although it is well known that such attention is provided only to a minimal degree and only in exchange for votes.
Researchers and policy makers from other countries, especially in Latin America, express surprise at the range of public services provided in Venezuelan urban squatter settlements that do not have legal recognition. Even more surprising is the progressive improvement of housing units as they are transformed from shacks into solid houses and even multistory buildings made of appropriate materials (Bolívar et al. 1994). This pattern is not unique to Venezuela, but it reflects the path chosen by the country’s leadership decades ago: a consistent policy of providing “precarious” public services for settlements whose occupation has been accepted, rather than first settling the issue of ownership. This policy has prevented, or at least slowed down, the legalization of the squatter settlements. In addition, improvements built by the residents are paid for by the government if the land is ever expropriated.
Bureaucratic and Legal Procedures
Venezuela is a country characterized by unequal access to the legal and administrative systems. Bureaucratic procedures consume a great deal of energy and are very costly. Accordingly, until a legal deed to property is required of them, most occupants appear content without it, and may even forget that such an option exists. It should also be noted that technical experts are not always available to determine ownership status and that incorrect diagnoses are not unusual.
Furthermore, legalization initiatives run up against the need to identify the true owners. It is necessary to specify the legal tradition of ownership and resolve questions of legally undivided plots (“tierras indivisas”), which traditionally have been dispersed among multiple owners by inheritance. However, there is a prevailing lack of sensitivity and ignorance of the law among court employees and the professionals retained resolve these cases. The laws are very strict, and hence very difficult to apply. The situation is further complicated by unprepared and sometimes corrupt bureaucrats, who may be prejudiced against and resent the “beneficiaries” of land cases, especially when they are illegal occupants of self-built neighborhoods.
Still another obstacle expressed by government officials has to do with the diverse sizes and shapes of land plots in the squatter settlements (Bolívar et al. 1994, 53-100). Some plots may be only 20 m2 in size, while others may cover thousands of square meters, making legalization extremely complicated. A land survey of each settlement would have to be taken, and in many cases their maps would have to be redrawn, implying a highly detailed and difficult challenge to city or state agencies.
Conclusions
Peaceful struggles by settlement residents to occupy land are seldom publicized, although some fights have resulted in the loss of human lives. Most of these battles are not recorded officially, but for those who work in this field they comprise indispensable documentation for the study of the legalization issue.
Given these obstacles and other factors, the political will to launch a legalization process is also lacking in many Venezuelan cities. The politicians who depend on patronage to remain in office have no interest in “resolving” the problem, since that would “kill the goose that lays the golden egg.” To date the occupation of land and subsequent acceptance of possession has been the prevailing pattern, but many observers believe it is imperative to overcome that pattern. To continue relying on the ambiguous position that only possession counts and that ownership is irrelevant is to condemn both the possessors and the owners to a permanent legal vacuum. In time this posture leads to urban chaos and a daily life for the inhabitants characterized by uncertainty, fear and violence.
REFERENCES
Baldó, J. 1996. “Urbanizar los barrios de Caracas.” En: Bolívar, T. y Baldó, J. (comps.), La cuestión de los barrios. Homenaje a Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe. Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores Latinoamericana, Fundación Polar y Universidad Central de Venezuela.
Bolívar, T., Guerrero, M., Rosas, I., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 1994. Densificación y vivienda en los barrios caraqueños. Contribución a la determinación de problemas y soluciones. Caracas: Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano/Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda.
Bolívar, T., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 2000. Sobre la cuestión de la regularización jurídica de los barrios urbanos. Caracas: SEU/FAU/UCV e Instituto Lincoln (mimeo).
Ontiveros, T., y Bolívar, T. 2000. Vivienda y acceso al suelo urbano. ¿Institucionalización de un derecho oficial paralelo. En: Edesio Fernandes (coordinador), Derecho, espacio urbano y medio ambiente. Madrid: Instituto Internacional de Sociología.
Pérez Perdomo, R., y Nikken, P. 1979. Derecho y propiedad de la vivienda en los barrios de Caracas. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela y Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Teolinda Bolívar Barreto is an architect and professor in the Department of Architecture, Central University of Venezuela, Caracas. The Lincoln Institute is supporting her research and educational programs on this topic. Translator Richard Melman contributed to this article.
Public policies and actions regarding social housing in Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, have concentrated on regularization and upgrading programs, which in many cases are linked to the need for infrastructure funding. These programs also are seen as the only palliative instrument for addressing an apparently insoluble problem—illegal (pirate) urban development—although they have been found to be quite limited and even counterproductive. Here we present an alternative policy: the application of principles and instruments for land management and participación en plusvalías (public participation in land value increments resulting from administrative actions). This policy was established in the Colombian Constitution and in Law 388 of 1997, which prescribes that the revenues generated from land value increments are to be used for social investments.
Operación Urbanística Nuevo Usme is one of the strategic projects promoted by Bogotá Mayor Antanas Mockus to solve the problem of illegal developments. Located in the southeastern sector of the city, Usme is one of the areas most vulnerable to the pressures of illegal urbanization; powerful pirate subdividers have developed more than half of the 1,000 hectares already set aside for urban use. The predominant mechanism for this kind of extra-legal development, besides invasions or squatter settlements, has been the sale of plots by subdividers who buy large areas of land at rural prices and sell them without providing any services or infrastructure and without approval from the public administration. The negative consequences of this kind of development include relatively high land prices and inequitable land occupation patterns.
Usme is expected to expand into another 600 hectares of steeply sloped, ecologically fragile and still predominantly rural land, according to the city’s master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial or POT), which was approved in June 2000. Bogotá’s administration already has invested in water and sewage systems for the area and is executing other projects, including the extension of the Transmilenio public transport system and construction of 6,200 low-income housing units. In addition, under the initiative of citizens organizations, two large areas, the Parque entre Nubes and the Agroparque los Soches, have been designated by the POT as both meaningful and symbolic local landmarks. The first is a large park marking the transition area between urban and rural, which is constantly threatened with illegal development and exploitation. The second area, a type of agricultural buffer zone, was created by a peasant organization that consciously assumed an important reduction of its land price by changing the land classification from suburban to rural, in order to preserve its agrarian character. This organization is now developing innovative alternative means of land management through ecological conservation projects to benefit the city as a whole and to block the threat of illegal urban growth.
How can this diversity of elements, ranging from social housing to public transportation and agricultural land conservation, create an opportunity for sustainable living conditions for the poorest people of the city? How does one reconcile the objectives of urban policy with social justice? How can the city prevent pirate subdividers from taking undeserved advantage of Usme’s new development area? This is the challenge for the city’s administration, for popular housing organizations and for the residents living south of the city.
Alternative Mechanisms for Value Capture
One of the topics under debate with regard to Law 388 is the precedent of recovering land value increments for areas designated for social housing. Housing organizations have sought to exempt such lands from participation in plusvalías, based on a common misunderstanding about the nature of the instrument, which views the value captured as being transferred to the final price of housing (see Smolka and Furtado, page 12). Taking a different approach, the Usme project is structured around several alternative mechanisms for value capture that go beyond its restricted and misconceived role as a tax.
The first mechanism is simply the announcement of the Usme project, since Law 388 provides that in the case of public land acquisition the land’s commercial value (for compensatory purposes) cannot include the amount corresponding to the plusvalías generated by the project. This provision freezes the land price to its level prior to the announcement of the project, and therefore is an expedient instrument to reduce the cost that the local administration would otherwise pay for land for its own urban development projects.
The second mechanism is the Plan Parcial, a plan for local development parcels, which applies the principle of equitable distribution of costs and benefits that Colombian law has adopted from the Spanish law. This mode of reparcelación (or equitable land readjustment) includes the distribution of infrastructure costs as well as development rights, and allows the public administration to obtain a portion of the developed lands as a return payment for its investment in the development. Through this mechanism, the Municipality of Bogotá can obtain free or low-cost land for infrastructure or public facilities, or for social housing.
A third mechanism is the recovery of plusvalías as established by Law 388, which requires the prior approval of a specific agreement by the City Council. If the recovery plan is approved, the municipality could regain between 30 and 50 percent of the land’s price increment derived from the land’s change in classification from rural to urban, the authorization for more profitable uses, or the increment of development rights. The plusvalías could be paid in land, as a percentage of participation in the project, in infrastructure or in cash. Again, the effect is to reduce the price of land obtained by the local administration for the fulfillment of its social objectives.
A more innovative alternative is for the local administration or municipality to assign land development rights directly to the low-income beneficiaries of the housing program. This ingenious mechanism, based on the separation of building rights from ownership rights, in effect shifts the balance of power from the land subdividers to the low-income families who move to the area and subsequently share in the land value increment generated by the development. These new residents now hold the land rights that would otherwise have been sold to them by pirate subdividers who no longer have a captive market for selling irregular plots at high prices in anticipation of future upgrading programs
Taking an active role in regulating the occupation of the area through the distribution of such building rights, the municipality finds itself in a better position to negotiate directly with pirate subdividers, and to emulate in some way their actions by providing serviced land (“sites and services”) at affordable prices. This legal approach by the municipality ensures the provision of roads, public services networks, green spaces and recreational and public facilities that usually are not provided by pirate subdividers or that the original rural landowners are unable to support. In sum, the procedure assigns the building rights to the low-income inhabitants who will construct housing by their own efforts over time. Once the original owner’s development rights are reduced through the Plan Parcial, the land price is also reduced.
Broadening the Participation in Plusvalías
The plusvalías policy of capturing private land value increments for public benefit has been accepted in high-income areas, where revenues are used to subsidize social investments elsewhere. However, pirate subdividers often find ways to expropriate these investments in low-income areas through the prevailing illegal and clandestine activities used to access and occupy land. The Usme project represents an attempt to shift the bargaining power of the public vis-a-vis pirate subdividers by designing alternative urbanization processes.
The mayor’s office has already made a de facto commitment to apply value capture instruments, but they are still being explained and discussed within the broader debate over the policy of participation in plusvalías. As we have seen, the practical principle on which this policy is based is the separation of property rights from building rights. However, the policy faces enormous resistance because of the civil law tradition that unitary and absolute rights are associated with private land ownership.
The novelty of the program is its potential to directly address the challenges of low-income urbanization. Expectations have driven up the price of illegally subdivided lands in Usme and have stimulated pirate developers to “produce commercial land” by destroying peasant communities, degrading areas with environmental importance, and occupying risky zones. The tolerance of such practices reached such an extreme level that the prevailing inflated prices in these mostly informal market arrangements have been used by the local administration as the benchmark to determine just compensation for land acquisition.
In the absence of public mechanisms to intervene in the land market, such as through participation in plusvalías, landowners, particularly pirate subdividers, not only have captured all the price increments generated by the urban development but actually have taken control of the process. The resulting illegal urbanization is costly to the individual occupants of such settlements and to society as a whole, as it raises the cost of subsequent upgrading programs three to five times the cost of urbanizing unoccupied land.
Through the alternative mechanisms listed above, it is expected that more land use conversions, such as in the urbanization of Usme, will be managed in an alternative political economic environment whereby the municipality participates as an active and socially responsible regulator of the process. These projects will establish close ties between regulatory land policies and the rules under which land is publicly purchased or auctioned, the costs of infrastructure and public facilities provision are distributed, and development rights are exercised. The return to the community of the plusvalías derived from these changes in development regulations and public investments constitutes the most efficient way to construct more democratic relations based on the exercise of a renewed demand for urban reform and the right to access the city.
María Mercedes Maldonado Copello is professor and researcher at the Interdisciplinary Center for Regional Studies (Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales, CIDER) at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
La rápida e intensa urbanización que se produjo en América Latina en los últimos 50 años se contrasta frecuentemente en la literatura con un sistema de planeamiento urbanístico inadecuado para explicar los múltiples problemas sociales resultantes: alto precio del suelo y especulación en propiedades, informalidad rampante, segregación socioespacial extrema, infraestructura y servicios urbanos inadecuados, degradación ambiental, etc. Sin embargo, la literatura omite, en gran medida, el rol de los sistemas legales nacionales, que han contribuido a esta situación a la vez que también han reaccionado en su contra. El rol central cumplido por el régimen legal no se puede subestimar.
Los sistemas legales también han contribuido al desarrollo informal por dos mecanismos principales: disposiciones legales de exclusión del suelo, derechos de propiedad y normas de registro; y los sistemas de planeamiento deficientes adoptados en muchas grandes ciudades. Tanto la falta de regulación del suelo como la aprobación de leyes de planeamiento elitistas que se niegan a reflejar las realidades socioeconómicas, que limitan el acceso al suelo y viviendas a los pobres, han jugado un rol perverso, agravando, y a veces hasta determinando, la segregación socioespacial. Las disputas institucionales entre gobiernos locales y nacionales sobre el poder para regular el desarrollo urbano también han producido problemas legales adicionales.
La jurisprudencia progresiva, las demandas de varios movimientos sociales y un creciente debate legislativo desatado por los intereses divergentes de las diversas partes interesadas han dado lugar a perspectivas legales en conflicto. Como consecuencia, los debates legales en América Latina oscilan entre las interpretaciones anacrónicas de las cláusulas legales existentes y un llamado a la construcción de un sistema legal más legitimado y socialmente receptivo. Este artículo intenta exponer estas tensiones y ofrecer algunas nuevas direcciones de debate.
La búsqueda de un paradigma legal coherente
En muchas ciudades, los sistemas legales que regulan el desarrollo urbano son significativamente obsoletos e incoherentes, generando un incumplimiento generalizado y una creciente desconexión entre la ciudad legal y la ciudad real. Importantes avances en la gestión urbana, promovidos por administraciones locales progresivas, han sido socavados frecuentemente por los obstáculos creados por regímenes legal-urbanísticos nacionales caducos. En el contexto más amplio de los procesos volátiles de democratización en la región, se ha puesto un énfasis más grande en la posibilidad de que un ordenamiento legal-urbanístico renovado podría avanzar la reforma urbana. Muchos académicos, políticos, funcionarios públicos y organizaciones comunitarias comprenden que la promoción de mercados de suelo eficientes, inclusión socioespacial y sustentabilidad ambiental sólo será posible por medio de la adopción de nuevo paradigmas legales claramente definidos y coherentes.
Los principios legales en general, y en particular los que regulan los derechos de desarrollo del suelo y las relaciones inmobiliarias, se determinan políticamente y se asimilan culturalmente. Los sistemas legales tienden a ser complejos, ya que incluyen disposiciones distintas, contradictorias y hasta en conflicto, adoptadas en el transcurso del tiempo como consecuencia de procesos sociopolíticos en evolución. El mantenimiento de un sistema legal que no exprese de manera fundamental las realidades de los procesos socioeconómicos y político-institucionales que se propone regular genera distorsiones de todo tipo.
La racionalización de un sistema legal es una tarea exigente pero crucial, que requiere la aprobación de nuevas leyes y también un esfuerzo continuo para (re)interpretar los principios y cláusulas en vigencia. No obstante, dicha interpretación puede variar significativamente según el paradigma legal adoptado por el intérprete. Distintos paradigmas pueden coexistir en la misma cultura legal, causando ambigüedades legales y conflictos judiciales potenciales, sobre todo en países donde la división tradicional entre el derecho público y el derecho privado todavía no está claramente delineada.
En América Latina existen tres paradigmas legales en competencia: el derecho civil, el derecho administrativo y el derecho urbanístico. Históricamente, el paradigma civilista hegemónico, que se basa en lecturas altamente parciales de los códigos civiles y expresa los valores del legalismo liberal clásico, ha sido reformado gradualmente por el paradigma más intervencionista provisto por el derecho administrativo. Un movimiento incipiente reciente ha avanzado un paso más, reclamando que sólo el marco más progresivo del derecho urbanístico podría proporcionar un paradigma legal comprensivo para la era contemporánea.
Los códigos civiles y el laissez faire en el desarrollo urbano
La interpretación dominante de los códigos civiles, provista por la doctrina y la jurisprudencia, y arraigada en la imaginación popular a lo largo del siglo veinte, sigue tendiendo a realzar los derechos de los propietarios en detrimento de sus responsabilidades, y no considera otros intereses sociales, ambientales y culturales que derivan de la tenencia de la propiedad. Esta interpretación brinda poca consideración a los valores de uso, ya que la tenencia del suelo y la propiedad se concibe mayormente como una mercancía cuyo valor económico queda determinado principalmente por los intereses del dueño. Los principios tradicionales del derecho privado, como la condena de toda forma de abuso de poder y el requisito de justa causa para justificar el enriquecimiento legítimo, han sido poco menos que ignorados en esta definición poco equilibrada de los derechos de propiedad.
Desde esta perspectiva, el accionar del Estado en la gestión del suelo y políticas urbanísticas está seriamente restringido, y las iniciativas significativas de planeamiento urbano han generado frecuentes conflictos judiciales. Los grandes proyectos públicos generalmente requieren expropiaciones onerosas de suelo, y el pago de compensación se calcula sobre los valores plenos de mercado. Las obligaciones de los emprendedores son pocas y la carga de la construcción de infraestructura y provisión de servicios recae mayormente sobre el Estado. Si bien los derechos de desarrollo y construcción se suponen expresiones intrínsecas de los derechos individuales de propiedad del suelo, no hay un ámbito establecido para la noción de que la administración pública debería recuperar el valor incremental del suelo generado por las obras y servicios públicos. Esta tradición legal ha sido agravada más aún por la burocratización de las transacciones contractuales y comerciales, y también por las exigencias excesivas del registro de propiedades y el acceso al crédito.
Dentro de esta tradición legal individualista, el derecho a usar y disponer de la propiedad se malinterpreta frecuentemente como el derecho a no usar o disponer de la propiedad. Casi no hay obligaciones legales ni órdenes compulsivas más sustanciales. La preponderancia de este paradigma en Brasil, por ejemplo, ha significado que mientras el déficit de viviendas se ha estimado en 7,9 millones de unidades y el pueblo vive en 12 millones de construcciones precarias, otras 5,5 millones de unidades están vacías o subutilizadas. En algunas ciudades se estima que del 20 al 25 por ciento del suelo con acceso a servicios se encuentra vacante.
También es típico de este paradigma del derecho civil el absolutismo de la libertad individual en detrimento de las formas colectivas o restrictivas de los derechos de propiedad, como los derechos de arrendamiento o comunales, de área y posesión. Muchos códigos civiles contienen estos derechos, pero en general se los ignora o subestima. Si bien los derechos de adquisición por prescripción exigen períodos prolongados de ocupación del suelo, hay un arsenal de instrumentos legales disponibles para desalojar a sus ocupantes e inquilinos.
Como resultado de este enfoque laissez faire en el desarrollo del suelo, el ordenamiento urbanístico-legal en las ciudades de América Latina no se puede considerar como plenamente democrático. El proceso de desarrollo informal refleja la realidad de que cada vez más personas han tenido que violar la ley para obtener acceso al suelo y la vivienda urbana.
Derecho administrativo e intervención del Estado
El planeamiento urbano en algunas grandes ciudades ha sido respaldado por los principios legales del derecho administrativo. Este paradigma de derecho público ha intentado reformar la tradición del derecho privado, pero ha limitado el alcance de la noción de la “función social de la propiedad”. Este concepto ha existido en la mayoría de las constituciones nacionales como principio nominal desde la década de 1930. Este paradigma más intervencionista reconoce el “poder de policía” del Estado para imponer restricciones y limitaciones externas sobre los derechos de propiedad individual en el nombre del interés público, respaldando así formas tradicionales de planeamiento regulador.
Éstos han sido intentos tímidos, sin embargo, porque la imposición de obligaciones legales, órdenes compulsivas y requisitos de reservación del suelo siguen encontrando fuerte resistencia popular y judicial. En la mayoría de los países, los tribunales han dictaminado que el Estado puede imponer ciertas limitaciones sobre los derechos de propiedad, pero la imposición de obligaciones sobre los terratenientes y emprendedores ha sido más difícil. Esto es particularmente cierto con las leyes locales que han intentando imponer la obligación de asignar suelos o unidades para vivienda social como condición previa para la aprobación de un proyecto inmobiliario, pero han sido declaradas inconstitucionales.
Muchas ciudades siguen aprobando nuevas subdivisiones del suelo, si bien ya existe un inventario considerable de lotes vacantes. El problema es que no cuentan con instrumentos legales para imponer un uso acorde con la función social. Si bien los emprendedores han sido obligados a asumir una creciente responsabilidad por la construcción de infraestructura, algunos desarrollos significativos, incluyendo comunidades cerradas de altos ingresos, han sido aprobados sin condiciones de reserva del suelo o unidades de viviendas para trabajadores domésticos o de servicio. Ello ha causado la aparición de nuevos proyectos inmobiliarios informales y una mayor densidad de edificación en asentamientos existentes para dar cabida al sector de bajos ingresos.
En algunas ciudades que han intentado imponer códigos de zonificación, planes maestros y otras leyes urbanas complejas, ha emergido una tradición de planeamiento burocrático que refleja una incomprensión de cómo las regulaciones urbanas y ambientales afectan la formación y el movimiento de los precios del suelo. Los urbanistas siguen teniendo dificultades para contradecir la noción establecida de que los dueños del suelo y la propiedad tienen el derecho automático a las ganancias resultantes del planeamiento y desarrollo urbano. En la mayoría de los casos, las administraciones públicas no han recuperado el generoso incremento del valor del suelo producido por las obras y los servicios públicos, como también por los cambios en la legislación urbana que gobierna los derechos de uso y desarrollo de los suelos.
La mayoría de los sistemas de planeamiento no han reconocido la capacidad limitada del Estado para garantizar el cumplimiento de la legislación urbana. Como consecuencia, no se han puesto en práctica dichos planes apropiadamente y muchas violaciones del orden legal han sido ignoradas. En algunas ciudades se tarda años en obtener la licencia para ciertos procesos de desarrollo importantes, como la subdivisión del suelo, lo cual afecta también el proceso de desarrollo informal.
Otro problema recurrente es el desarrollo paralelo y a veces antagonista de regímenes legales urbanísticos y ambientales separados. Las cláusulas ambientales se usan frecuentemente para oponerse a las políticas de viviendas con orientación social. En términos sociopolíticos, la mayoría de las leyes de planeamiento no cuentan con una participación popular sustancial, ya sea en su formulación o ejecución.
Al no cambiar la dinámica de los mercados de suelo, las políticas de planeamiento supuestamente contemporáneas frecuentemente terminan reforzando los procesos tradicionales de especulación del suelo y la propiedad, y la segregación socioespacial. A menudo El planeamiento urbano ha sido ineficiente para promover un desarrollo equilibrado del suelo, y en cambio ha beneficiado a los emprendedores del suelo, inversores en propiedad y especuladores. Estas ganancias se han potenciado por el crecimiento significativo de precios causado por las regulaciones que establecen los límites del desarrollo urbano. Las áreas que han quedado para los sectores urbanos pobres, como los suelos públicos y las áreas ecológicamente sensibles, no son reguladas por el mercado.
Esta tensión entre la interpretación de los códigos civiles y las leyes de planeamiento burocrático ha promovido en la práctica el desarrollo informal y la segregación socioespacial: la ley ha sido uno de los factores determinantes de la ilegalidad urbana. En los casos en que se hicieron intentos significativos para promover la inclusión socioespacial y la sustentación ambiental, el régimen urbanístico-legal sigue sin respaldar por completo la práctica preponderante de gestión urbana.
Por ejemplo, unos aspectos de las sociedades público-privadas y la participación de ONGs en la provisión de servicios públicos han sido cuestionados debido a la confusión entre los valores privados y públicos. Los derechos sociales reconocidos nominalmente, como el derecho a la vivienda, no se han hecho cumplir plenamente debido a la carencia de procesos, mecanismos e instrumentos necesarios.
Derecho urbanístico y principios de la reforma legal
A partir de la década de 1980, un importante movimiento de reforma legal comenzó a cuestionar este ordenamiento legal exclusionista, y un nuevo paradigma ha emergido en algunos países. Los proponentes del derecho urbanístico han argumentado que es posible, y de hecho necesario, analizar los códigos civiles para encontrar principios legales que respalden una intervención decidida por parte del Estado en la regulación y el control social de los procesos relacionados con el suelo y la propiedad. La reinterpretación de principios legales tradicionales, como también el énfasis en principios ignorados previamente (como la noción de que ningún enriquecimiento es legítimo sin una justa causa) pueden coadyuvar a un progreso significativo en la formulación de la política urbanística de suelos.
Este esfuerzo exige conocimientos legales complejos, ya que potencialmente involucra debates legales y disputas judiciales cuyos resultados no son para nada ciertos. Desde el punto de vista de las comunidades urbanas y las administraciones públicas comprometidas a promover políticas de inclusión, este enfoque trata de organizar el marco regulador general, en parte por medio de la promulgación de nuevas leyes que expresen más claramente los principios del derecho urbanístico.
Si bien este proceso está más avanzado en Brasil (principalmente a través de la Constitución Federal de 1988 y la ley municipal de 2001) y Colombia (principalmente a través de la Constitución de 1991 y la Ley 388/1997), se ha incorporado una serie de principios comunes en los ordenamientos legales de otros países de América Latina (Fernandes 2007a; 2007b; Maldonado Copello 2003; 2007).
El principio estructural más importante es la noción de la función social de la propiedad, incluyendo la propiedad pública y el registro de la propiedad. Las ciudades son el producto de un proceso colectivo, y la promoción de un régimen territorial equilibrado es al mismo tiempo un derecho colectivo y una obligación del Estado. El ordenamiento urbanístico no se puede determinar exclusivamente por los derechos individuales y los intereses de los propietarios del suelo, ni tampoco por los derechos del estado únicamente. Se debería promover la intervención pública imponiendo limitaciones administrativas sobre los derechos de propiedad, responsabilidades legales y requisitos de desarrollo.
Otros principios legales similares se pueden usar para establecer una distribución justa de los costos y oportunidades del desarrollo urbano entre dueños, emprendedores, el Estado y la sociedad; afirmar el rol central del Estado para establecer un ordenamiento territorial adecuado por medio de un sistema de planeamiento y gestión; establecer una clara separación entre los derechos de propiedad y de desarrollo/construcción; establecer criterios distintos para calcular la compensación de expropiaciones y otros contextos; reducir el plazo requerido para legalizar la posesión de hecho con el fin de materializar viviendas sociales; y reconocer más firmemente los derechos de los ocupantes e inquilinos.
El uso y desarrollo del suelo es guiado por una amplia gama de derechos colectivos, como el derecho al planeamiento urbano, una vivienda adecuada y un medio ambiente equilibrado; el derecho de la comunidad y la obligación del Estado de recuperar el incremento en el valor del suelo generado por la acción del Estado y la legislación urbanística; y el derecho a la regularización de asentamientos informales consolidados.
Algunas ciudades colombianas han amasado recursos financieros significativos por medio de mecanismos de recuperación de plusvalías del suelo, haciendo posible (si bien no siembre practicable) formular un proceso más sustentable de acceso legal al suelo con acceso a servicios por parte de los sectores urbanos pobres. En Brasil, algunas municipalidades también han podido generar recursos financieros significativos como resultado de sus “operaciones urbanísticas”, donde se negocian derechos de desarrollo y construcción dentro del marco de un plan maestro. También se han promovido en varios países programas de regularización para modernizar y legalizar asentamientos consolidados.
No obstante, la disputa entre estos paradigmas legales continúa, y todos estos nuevos principios y derechos siguen siendo objeto de un debate feroz. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia ha adoptado en forma consistente una interpretación progresiva, respaldando la noción de la función social de la propiedad y el derecho social a la vivienda. Un estudio reciente de decisiones judiciales dictadas por las cortes superiores de varios estados brasileños demuestra que el nuevo paradigma legal ha sido asimilado en aproximadamente el 50 por ciento de sus decisiones, mientras que las restantes siguen siendo orientadas por el paradigma conservador del Código Civil (Mattos 2006).
En muchos países, la jurisprudencia progresiva ha sido restringida por la fuerte tradición del positivismo y legalismo formal, que sigue viendo el derecho meramente como una herramienta técnica para resolver conflictos, como si estuviera completamente divorciado de los procesos sociopolíticos y económicos. La mayoría de los jueces observa el paradigma civilista que se enseña en los programas de estudio anacrónicos de las facultades de derecho. Las decisiones progresivas de jueces locales son revocadas con frecuencia por las cortes superiores más tradicionales.
El segundo principio estructural importante de este régimen urbanístico-legal emergente es la integración del derecho y la gestión en el marco de tres cambios legales-políticos interrelacionados:
Independientemente de las deficiencias que existen en este proceso, el enorme desafío que tienen los países y ciudades al promover la reforma del derecho urbanístico es garantizar el pleno cumplimiento de las nuevas leyes aprobadas.
El derecho a la ciudad
Además de reinterpretar y reformar sus sistemas legales nacionales, los juristas, políticos y activistas sociales de América Latina han promovido un debate internacional sobre un Estatuto del Derecho a la Ciudad, que reconozca plenamente los derechos colectivos. Al mismo tiempo, estos conceptos progresivos acerca de los derechos de propiedad y la naturaleza del accionar del Estado con respecto al uso del suelo y el control del desarrollo han sido enfrentados combativamente por aquéllos que siguen favoreciendo un enfoque incondicional de los derechos de propiedad y la homogenización de los regímenes de suelo y de propiedad.
En este contexto de incertidumbre conceptual, se debe ir construyendo un marco de regulación sobre el desarrollo y la gestión del suelo urbano. El planeamiento espacial es un proceso poderoso; si las leyes urbanísticas han beneficiado por mucho tiempo a ciertos grupos económicos, contribuyendo así al proceso de segregación socioespacial, la promoción de la reforma del derecho urbanístico debería contribuir a crear las condiciones para ciudades más inclusivas y equitativas.
La participación continua de juristas y políticos − como también de agencias nacionales e internacionales, universidades y organizaciones de investigación − es crucial, y puede tomar muchas formas:
La construcción de un nuevo orden urbanístico-legal en América Latina y otras regiones es un debate cambiante, lleno de contradicciones y desafíos, y ninguno de los acontecimientos recientes se puede dar por hecho. Si la mayor politización de la legislación urbanística ha creado un marco más amplio para la participación popular en el proceso de defensa de sus derechos colectivos e intereses sociales, por la misma razón las nuevas leyes han generado una mayor resistencia en los sectores conservadores.
La plena concreción de las posibilidades introducidas por el nuevo ordenamiento urbanístico-legal en Brasil, Colombia y otros países dependerá de varios factores, pero sobre todo de la renovación de los procesos de movilización sociopolítica, el cambio institucional y la reforma legal.
Referencias
Fernandes, Edésio. 2007a. Implementing the urban reform agenda in Brazil. Environment and Urbanization 19(1): 177–189.
———. 2007b. Constructing the “right to the city” in Brazil. Social and Legal Studies 16(2):201–219.
Maldonado Copello, María Mercedes. 2003. Reforma territorial y desarrollo urbano – Experiencias y perspectivas de aplicación de las leyes 9 de 1989 y 388 de 1997. Bogotá: CIDER-Universidad de los Andes/LILP/FEDEVIVIENDA.
———. 2007. El proceso de construcción del sistema urbanístico colombiano: entre reforma urbana y desarrollo territorial. En Fernandes, Edésio y Betânia Alfonsin, Direito Urbanístico: Estudos brasileiros e internacionais. Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Del Rey.
Mattos, Liana Portilho. 2006. Função social da propriedade na prática dos tribunais. Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris.
Sobre los autores
Edésio Fernandes es abogado, urbanista y profesor asociado en la Unidad de Planeamiento de Desarrollo de University College, Londres, el Instituto de Estudios de la Vivienda y el Desarrollo Urbano de Rotterdam y varias universidades brasileñas. Ha sido Visiting Fellow del Instituto Lincoln en el año académico 2008–2009.
María Mercedes Maldonado, abogada y urbanista, es profesora de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá e investigadora del Instituto de Estudios Urbanos de dicha universidad. Sus áreas de interés incluyen el significado legal de los derechos urbanos, los derechos de propiedad y la recuperación de plusvalías.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
En los últimos años América Latina ha sufrido muchos desastres naturales que han tenido impactos particularmente graves en asentamientos irregulares de áreas densamente urbanizadas. Con base en las conclusiones de investigaciones que el Banco Mundial y otras instituciones financiaron en México en noviembre de 2000, el Instituto Lincoln copatrocinó un seminario en las ciudad porteña de Veracruz, enfocado en las vías para atenuar los riesgos y resultados de los desastres naturales. El seminario exploró problemas como:
Representantes de autoridades municipales y organizaciones comunitarias compartieron sus experiencias, así como metodologías técnicas y prácticas aprendidas para identificar zonas de alto riesgo, implementar políticas para reducir asentamientos ilegales en esas zonas y establecer medidas de prevención y alivio. Los participantes también identificaron la importancia de la participación social en el proceso. Las principales conclusiones se resumen a continuación:
El Instituto Lincoln ha estado trabajando este problema con Servicios Urbanos Municipales y Estatales (SUME), una institución establecida a finales de 1999 para elevar la calidad y eficiencia de los niveles de administración y de gobierno a nivel local y estatal en México. SUME busca lograr estos objetivos a través de la asesoría, asistencia técnica y entrenamiento de funcionarios de gobierno. Sus actividades han sido respaldadas por el Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (Hábitat), que copatrocinó este seminario, y por el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.
Douglas Keare es miembro del Instituto Lincoln y Luis Javier Castro es el director general de Servicios Urbanos Municipales y Estatales (SUME) en la Ciudad de México.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Durante las dos décadas pasadas, y en particular en años recientes, en varios países latinoamericanos los gobiernos centrales, regionales y locales han instrumentado programas de regularización de la tierra y de mejoramiento en asentamientos irregulares. Aunque incipiente, esta política urbana está teniendo resultados que merecen no sólo ser estudiados para fortalecer las prácticas vigentes sino, también, para promoverlos como directrices para los gobiernos que experimentan este tipo fenómenos por primera vez y que enfrentan la necesidad de desarrollar políticas para responder a la cada vez más intensa dinámica de los procesos informales de desarrollo urbano.
Para responder a esta necesidad, el Instituto Lincoln patrocinó la tercera edición del curso de “Mercados Informales y Programas de Regularización de la Tierra en Áreas Urbanas”. El curso se celebró en noviembre de 2003 en Recife, Brasil, ciudad que se seleccionó por su tradición en planeación urbana, que comprende entre otras experiencias, un programa pionero de regularización (PREZEIS) que, aún con limitaciones, ha operado durante 20 años. El curso se desarrolló con la participación de 35 personas de 10 países de América Latina , representantes de una variedad de profesiones y posiciones institucionales.
A continuación se analiza un conjunto de 13 lecciones interrelacionadas entre sí, que derivan de los trabajos presentados en Recife de las experiencias discutidas en los dos cursos previos, celebrados en 2001 y 2002, y de los resultados de la reunión de la Red Latinoamericana sobre Regularización del Instituto Lincoln, que se llevó a cabo en Brasilia, Brasil en junio de 2003.
Los autores se hacen responsables de cualquier interpretación que resulte de una síntesis general, como la presente; aún cuando este breve y crítico análisis sobre los programas de regularización de la tierra incorpora contribuciones de múltiples personas, (ver Figura 1).
El proceso de favelización
En América Latina se ha incrementado de manera significativa el ritmo del proceso informal de generación de espacio urbano, a pesar de que a diferencia de África o Asia, la región ha experimentado un ritmo persistente de urbanización durante varias décadas.
Las áreas ocupadas se están densificando y diariamente se forman nuevos asentamientos. Estos últimos, se constituyen de manera cada vez más frecuente en zonas de alta sensibilidad medioambiental: cercanos a depósitos protegidos de agua, terrenos públicos y otro tipo de áreas no aptas para la ocupación humana o económicamente poco viables en el mercado formal de suelo.
Este proceso ha generado repercusiones negativas de todo tipo (sociales, medioambientales, legales, económicas y políticas) no sólo para los millones de personas que residen en los asentamientos informales, sino también para los gobiernos de las ciudades y la población urbana en general.
A pesar de los innumerables programas de regularización y mejoramiento que se han instrumentado en décadas recientes, la tasa de desarrollo de los nuevos asentamientos informales ha sido de dos a tres veces superior a la del crecimiento de la población urbana. Por ello, el incremento en la informalidad no se puede atribuir de forma exclusiva a los cambios demográficos, ni al incremento en la pobreza urbana, que si bien ha aumentado, lo ha hecho en tasas menores.
El círculo vicioso de la informalidad
El establecimiento de asentamientos informales es producto de una multiplicidad de factores. En un balance, se observa que las variables locales resultan de mayor peso en la conformación de las “discrepancias inexplicables”, que los factores demográficos y macroeconómicos que afectan la pobreza urbana (políticas de empleo e ingresos). Al actuar o dejar de actuar, las autoridades locales han fomentado el desarrollo del fenómeno con mecanismos excluyentes de regulación de usos del suelo, privilegiando la asignación de la inversión publica en zonas residenciales de altos ingresos; actuando en complicidad con los fraccionadores ilegales de terrenos, y con la aplicación de inadecuadas políticas fiscales de orden local.
El corolario de esta tolerancia de la informalidad es un factor clave en la política de valorización del suelo. Los valores en el mercado informal se benefician de una mayor libertad regulatoria y de los valores sociales vinculados a las redes entre los residentes de los asentamientos. Los precios del mercado informal se ven afectados por ambas dinámicas hasta puntos absurdos. Por ejemplo, una casucha de madera de 60 metros cuadrados (60 pies cuadrados) ubicada en una zona pantanosa de Recife, se valúa en US $1.300,00.
Las variaciones extremas en los precios son el reflejo de la diversidad de procesos informales que inciden en el acceso al suelo urbano y la vivienda, tanto en el interior de un mismo asentamiento como entre asentamientos. Por lo tanto, un ingrediente indispensable de cualquier política que pretenda mitigar las consecuencias de la informalidad deberá ser la lucha contra los factores que perpetúan el círculo vicioso en la formación de los precios.
El mundo de la diversidad
Lejos de ser un fenómeno homogéneo, la informalidad se manifiesta en una diversidad de formas, contextos y lugares. Es posible hallar enormes diferencias en el interior y entre asentamientos de una misma cuidad, que se acrecientan al comparar ciudades de un país y ciudades de distintos países.
Cada área informal tiene barrios buenos y malos; unas zonas de alto valor y otras de valor bajo; una distribución desigual de cualquiera de los servicios con que cuenta y propiedades con distintas modalidades de tenencia. Asimismo, se observan variaciones en los niveles de ingreso, con familias que perciben mayores ingresos que aquéllas que residen en asentamientos formales que, en general, pagan por algunos de los servicios públicos.
Al comparar la diversidad de asentamientos informales que se encuentran distribuidos entre los barrios formales en muchas ciudades latinoamericanas, no se ha logrado establecer una correlación entre los gradientes de precio de las propiedades, lo que revela la presencia de distintas fuerzas de mercado. Si bien los mercados del suelo en las áreas formales e informales son muy vigorosos, los factores determinantes del precio tienen órdenes distintos de magnitud para cada mercado. Como se mencionó, la mayor libertad regulatoria, así como las redes informales de intercambio de beneficios intangibles, afectan los valores de la propiedad. Estos factores son una realidad ineludible, que debe tomarse en cuenta en el diseño de programas de regularización para que éstos puedan conducir a una reforma positiva en la práctica tradicional.
Es necesario, también, adecuar los programas a las distintas condiciones de los asentamientos; diferenciado entre los de reciente creación y aquéllos con varios años de existencia, ubicados en zonas consolidadas. Se pueden rastrear con mayor claridad las cadenas de transacciones con el suelo en los asentamientos recientes, mientras que en las zonas con mayor antigüedad no se observan sucesiones lineales de transacciones. De hecho, en los asentamientos más consolidados se observa una compleja sobreposición de derechos y transacciones informalmente definidos, por ejemplo, la venta a terceros de techos como “terreno”, que potencialmente contribuirían a la ampliación de espacios habitables.
Aún no está claro si los programas de regularización debieran iniciarse en asentamientos recientes, donde los costos de mejoramiento son menores y se cuenta con mayores grados de libertad; o bien, en zonas más antiguas y consolidadas, en las que las acciones pueden conducir a consecuencias sociales más inmediatas y donde, sin embargo, puede haber algunos derechos legales establecidos.
Tolerancia de la informalidad
A pesar de todas las implicaciones negativas asociadas al desarrollo urbano informal, las autoridades han tolerado los procesos: siendo negligentes, aprovechándolos políticamente, realizando acciones ambiguas o promoviendo directamente las ocupaciones.
Sin embargo, hay una falta de conocimiento en relación con los derechos que en el tiempo se generan por la propia tolerancia, y de información respecto a los altos costos, absolutos y relativos, de los programas de mejoramiento.
Paralelamente, la tolerancia frente a la ocupación informal se acompaña de una creciente convicción tanto de las autoridades como de la opinión pública, de que los asentamientos consolidados deben mejorarse a través de la introducción de infraestructura, provisión de servicios urbanos básicos y de equipamiento. Un estudio reciente, desarrollado por la Alianza de Ciudades en Brasil, demostró que la decisión de regularizar un asentamiento irregular se toma, con frecuencia, más rápido que la decisión de aprobar un asentamiento regular (seis meses, comparada con dos o tres años).
Esta tolerancia oficial también se aplica a la aceptación de “soluciones de segunda clase” para “ciudadanos de segunda clase”, que frecuentemente resultan en un rápido deterioro de las zonas mejoradas. La combinación de materiales de baja calidad y costo, y la utilización de técnicas no convencionales conlleva a procesos de rápida obsolescencia de la infraestructura y consecuentemente a altos costos de mantenimiento. Adicionalmente, es frecuente que las zonas mejoradas no estén integradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales. La irresponsabilidad fiscal de las autoridades municipales, que es característica de la región, se agrava por una falta de responsabilidad sobre el desarrollo territorial de las localidades, así como por su negligencia, o en el mejor de los casos actitudes paternalistas respecto a estos asentamientos.
Expectativas y valores del suelo
Hasta la fecha los programas de regularización se han instrumentado en un porcentaje muy reducido de asentamientos informales, y como resultado la gran mayoría de las personas que viven de manera informal no han sido beneficiarias de ninguna intervención pública. En la práctica, muchos de los programas de regularización se han desarrollado sin considerar las causas de la informalidad, generando resultados contraproducentes que tienden a acentuar los procesos de segregación socio-espacial.
La mera expectativa de regularización conduce a incrementos en la cotización de la tierra que se prevé será sujeta al mejoramiento, lo cual impacta de manera significativa los precios en el mercado informal. Mientras más alta sea la expectativa de regularización a futuro de un área, más alto será el sobreprecio del suelo en cuestión, y en consecuencia aumentará la demanda de terrenos más baratos en otros lugares.
Lo anterior plantea dos formas de abordar el mejoramiento: programas integrales, aplicados en pocos lugares, con políticas destinadas a incidir en las expectativas futuras de mecanismos de recuperación de costos. O bien, programas de mejoramiento parcial, instrumentados en todas las áreas informales de la ciudad, destinados a promover un balance y mayor consistencia en la actividad futura del mercado. Sigue sin comprenderse la importancia e implicaciones de integrar las áreas mejoradas a los sistemas fiscales municipales.
Políticas aisladas y fragmentadas
Las intervenciones públicas a través de programas de regularización de asentamientos irregulares han sido de carácter sectorial, aisladas, y en consecuencia no se integran con el contexto urbano más amplio, donde operan las políticas generales de administración del suelo que impactan directamente tales asentamientos. Estas políticas comprenden, entre otros temas, los de la construcción de vivienda social; la rehabilitación de centros urbanos deteriorados; la ocupación de baldíos e inmuebles vacantes; la asignación más amplia de inversión pública para infraestructura y servicios urbanos; la modernización de catastros y de sistemas de recaudación de impuestos, así como la promoción de asociaciones entre los sectores público y privado.
La mayoría de los programas de regularización se ha aplicado en zonas habitacionales y poco se ha hecho en áreas informales de industria y comercio, en edificios públicos desocupados; terrenos en zonas centrales o en asentamientos irregulares en zonas rurales.
En todos los niveles de gobierno, los programas de regularización se identifican por su fragmentación estructural (dentro de los programas, entre las diferentes secretarías y ministerios, y entre los distintos niveles de gobierno nacional, estatal y municipal), y como resultado los recursos son malgastados o bien no llegan a la población a la cual se dirigen.
Los programas también han adolecido de una falta de continuidad administrativa, generalmente producto de cambios en los contextos políticos locales. En lugar de apoyar a otras iniciativas, los programas de regularización frecuentemente consumen los limitados recursos de los gobiernos locales, en detrimento de otros tipos de programas de vivienda que se restringen o sacrifican.
Este problema tiene su origen tanto en las amplias líneas de crédito proporcionadas por organismos nacionales y agencias internacionales y multilaterales, como en la falta de mecanismos para operar con aportaciones de las autoridades locales, como vía para compartir la carga de los programas y promover esfuerzos para que los gobiernos municipales aumenten sus fuentes propias de ingresos. En términos generales, las líneas de crédito para los programas de regularización se han establecido sin un análisis adecuado de la capacidad financiera de los gobiernos municipales.
La falta de recursos financieros
Como si los problemas señalados fueran pocos, hay que agregar la falta de recursos financieros suficientes para los programas de regularización. Las provisiones presupuestarias no son compatibles con las aspiraciones de los objetivos propuestos, y frecuentemente no se cuenta con recursos específicos para los programas. Los ingresos obtenidos de operaciones relacionadas con el desarrollo urbano (cobros por derechos de construcción en áreas formales y de altos ingresos) no han sido adecuadamente canalizados hacia los programas de mejoramiento. Los recursos obtenidos a través de agencias internacionales no se han utilizado de la mejor manera. Ha habido una falta de seguimiento en el cumplimiento de objetivos y metas, y de evaluación de los propios programas. Adicionalmente, destaca la ausencia de políticas de microcréditos que pudieran utilizarse para incentivar y apoyar las organizaciones comunitarias.
Disociación del mejoramiento y la legalización
Se podrá argumentar que la ilegalidad es producto de la oferta insuficiente de suelo servido a costos accesibles. Sin embargo, en la práctica, se observa que a pesar del énfasis en el concepto de mejoramiento, una gran mayoría de los programas de regularización opera al margen de los programas de mejoramiento de vivienda y de apoyo socioeconómico con los cuales se busca la integración de las comunidades, y no están vinculados a las políticas destinadas a la legalización de terrenos y lotes individuales.
El mejoramiento y la legalización se han concebido como procesos independientes, e incluso se ha llegado a sostener que la legalización es producto de los procesos de mejoramiento. Lo cierto es que la mayoría de los programas de mejoramiento no conduce al cumplimiento de las condiciones requeridas para poner en marcha los procesos de legalización en áreas informales. En los pocos programas en los que se ha logrado dar inicio al proceso de legalización, se han desarrollado soluciones legales y políticas ad-hoc, que con frecuencia son ajenas a las condiciones urbanas y fuerzas que operan en el entorno.
A pesar de la publicidad que se ha realizado en torno a los programas de regularización, el número de títulos de propiedad expedidos por las dependencias responsables es sorprendentemente bajo. Entre las explicaciones dadas se destacan la complejidad de las leyes y las actitudes conservadoras y de resistencia de parte de los notarios y de las autoridades responsables de los registros de la propiedad. Es importante agregar, también, que la mayoría de las familias, al recibir un título que reconoce su legítimo derecho sobre la propiedad, no concluye los procesos de registro, muchas veces por no entender el trasfondo legal, o por su complejidad y por los costos que significan.
En respuesta se ha propuesto, por un lado, la simplificación de los requisitos y procesos de titulación y registro y, por otro, la necesidad de restarle poder a las estructuras burocráticas responsables de los citados procesos.
La importancia de la titulación
Como resultado de los problemas mencionados, son pocos los programas en que se alcanza la etapa de legalización, y son menos aún en los que se concluye el registro de los lotes legalizados. Por ello, muchos analistas han concluido que los títulos no son importantes y que lo realmente significativo es la percepción de seguridad en la tenencia de la tierra que tengan los pobladores.
No se puede negar que la percepción de la seguridad es un elemento que promueve la inversión de las familias para consolidar sus viviendas, sin embargo la titulación es importante por dos razones: el interés personal de los residentes (por la seguridad de tenencia de la tierra, la protección contra desalojos, los conflictos domésticos, las separaciones maritales, las herencias, los conflictos vecinales y el acceso a formas diversas de crédito); y el interés de la ciudad en su conjunto, ya que la legalización puede contribuir a la estabilización de los mercados del suelo, y con ello permitir formas más racionales y articuladas de intervención pública.
Hoy todavía hay grandes resistencias del sistema judicial y del público en general, con respecto a los programas de titulación. Es importante señalar, también, que los beneficiarios individuales de estos programas con frecuencia desconocen la protección y las limitaciones que derivan de la titulación. Las preguntas ¿para qué sirve un título? y ¿por qué se tienen que registrar los títulos?, entre otras, apuntan a la necesidad de acompañar los programas de regularización con programas educativos tanto para los administradores de las ciudades como para los residentes de los asentamientos informales.
Otro punto a considerar es la falta de análisis sobre el impacto de los instrumentos que se emplean en la legalización de lotes. Como resultado del énfasis en la titulación individual, se ha tendido a ignorar la necesidad de generar soluciones legales colectivas, para responder a problemas sociales comunes. De hecho, cuando se han empleado estos nuevos instrumentos legales, no se ha logrado compatibilizarlos con la normatividad urbana existente y no han previsto sus implicaciones legales.
El análisis de alternativas legales ha sido insuficiente y carente de creatividad. Se requiere realizar mayores y más consistentes esfuerzos para desarrollar nuevos instrumentos y para lograr acreditarlos, no sólo ante los distintos organismos financieros, sino también ante la sociedad en su conjunto.
La falacia de la participación popular
Aun cuando los contextos políticos de los programas de regularización han variado inmensamente en el tiempo, en términos generales, la participación popular ha sido poco significativa en su formulación e instrumentación. Esta situación se ha agravado debido a la creación de formas de participación artificiales, para cumplir con los requisitos de los organismos financieros. Los mecanismos de participación popular diseñados han sido, en el mejor de los casos, una formalidad, y en el peor, una farsa.
Son muy pocos los programas en los que se ha logrado incorporar propuestas de soluciones generadas por las comunidades afectadas. El marco político-institucional y cultural en el que se ha desarrollado la mayoría de los programas de regularización, junto con las limitaciones que derivan de las formas de financiamiento, prácticamente eliminan las posibilidades de una participación pública efectiva, dado que la participación pública normalmente trae consigo cuestionamientos severos al status quo. Por ello, los programas de regularización tienden a percibirse como soluciones destinadas a promover o proteger la institucionalidad, más que como respuestas a las demandas de la mayoría de la población de menores ingresos.
Compatibilidad entre escala, traza y derechos
Quizás el problema central de los programas de regularización sea la dificultad de compatibilizar la escala de las intervenciones, con las patrones técnicos, urbanos y medioambientales propuestos para los asentamientos, y la naturaleza de los derechos que les serán reconocidos a los residentes. Para poder garantizar la sustentabilidad de los programas y su impacto, es necesario discutir los temas de escala, traza y derechos de manera conjunta.
Efectos de los programas de regularización en el tiempo
Concluidos los programas de mejoramiento y legalización, las autoridades suelen retirarse de los asentamientos, aun cuando podrían realizar una diversidad de funciones que van desde el monitoreo y evaluación del mantenimiento de la infraestructura provista (por ejemplo, de los sistemas de agua potable y drenaje), hasta el desarrollo de lineamientos y reglas para la incorporación de población nueva.
Los asentamientos tienden a deteriorarse muy rápidamente por la falta de presencia e intervenciones oficiales, al grado que la legitimidad provista por los programas de regularización puede “contaminar” a barrios de origen formal, promoviendo prácticas informales de usos del suelo.
En términos generales los programas de regularización no han logrado la integración urbana, social y cultural de las áreas mejoradas que se había anticipado. De manera tal que las áreas regularizadas siguen siendo consideradas como “de segunda”, mucho tiempo después de concluidos los programas. La idea de que los asentamientos regularizados experimentarán una trayectoria virtuosa, escasamente sobrevive a las justificaciones que dieron origen a los programas.
El equilibrio entre las libertades individuales y las funciones públicas
A pesar de la preocupación por garantizar que los beneficiarios de las intervenciones públicas sean efectivamente residentes de los asentamientos informales en los programas de regularización, no se ha logrado un equilibrio adecuado entre el respeto por los derechos y libertades individuales y las funciones públicas de los programas (los derechos sociales a la vivienda y la necesidad de generar áreas para tal efecto). Frecuentemente las soluciones legales propuestas implican restricciones que, en la práctica, congelan los procesos de movilidad que caracterizan a este tipo de asentamientos (afectando, por ejemplo, los términos de venta, compra y renta), lo cual tiende a reforzar la informalidad.
La estrategia de centrarse en un área o un grupo social parece ignorar la esencia y el origen de la informalidad, lo que representa una situación en sí misma tramposa. Por un lado, la falta de recursos de los programas, les dificulta a las familias capitalizar el beneficio obtenido, para reubicarse en otro asentamiento informal, esperando ser sujeto de un siguiente proceso de regularización en el futuro. Por otro lado, el costo de monitorear y controlar este tipo de prácticas puede ser muy alto y hasta inviable. Como se mencionó, la imposición de restricciones a las transacciones simplemente generará nuevos arreglos informales.
Es interesante observar que son muy pocos los programas que han reconocido y logrado responder a la movilidad (ascendente o descendente) de los residentes de los asentamientos regularizados. Los programas se diseñan pensando en una comunidad estática. La movilidad interurbana, particularmente entre residentes de asentamientos informales y entre áreas formales e informales, no es un proceso bien entendido y por ello, mejor se ignora. Una posible salida a este acertijo podría encontrarse en mecanismos para la recuperación de costos o para la recuperación de plusvalías, que operen desde de la fase de planeación de los nuevos programas de regularización.
Conclusiones
Generalmente en la formulación de los programas de regularización no se parte de metas y cronogramas de trabajo claramente establecidos, problema que se agudiza por la falta de indicadores de evaluación adecuados.
En suma, los objetivos formales de los programas de regularización en Latinoamérica (promoción de la seguridad de la tenencia y la integración socio-espacial de los asentamientos y su población) no se han logrado traducir en diagnósticos integrales, instrumentos efectivos y estrategias claras para su ejecución, como tampoco han podido incidir en las deficiencias en la capacidad administrativa de los ejecutores. Como resultado, a la fecha no se puede considerar que las experiencias latinoamericanas en materia de regularización sean exitosas.
Se puede decir, sin embargo, que los programas de regularización han tenido la virtud de despertar y sensibilizar la conciencia pública con respecto a la legitimidad de las demandas de un grupo significativo y creciente de ciudadanos, que al estar excluido del sistema socioeconómico formal, requiere respuestas integrales y efectivas.
Incluso con las limitaciones señaladas, estos programas han permitido que grupos de pobres urbanos puedan permanecer en zonas servidas ubicadas en áreas centrales de muchas ciudades latinoamericanas y han contribuido a mejorar las condiciones de vida de familias residentes de asentamientos regularizados. Estos logros son de gran importancia, sobre todo a la luz de la cruel dinámica de segregación socio-espacial que prevalece en la región.
Edésio Fernandes es profesor de medio tiempo en la Unidad de Planeación del Desarrollo (Development Planning Unit) del Colegio Universitario de Londres (University College, London). Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa de América Latina y el Caribe, del Instituto Lincoln.
Artículos relacionados, publicados en Land Lines
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in a global perspective. Abril: 8-11
Calderón, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit, April: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto´s The Mystery of Capital. Enero: 5-8
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. Faculty profile, Julio: 12-13
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Enero: 4-7
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective on the Latin America program. Octubre: 8-12
Figura 1: Aciertos y Desaciertos de los Programas de Regularización
The rapid and intense urbanization in Latin America over the last 50 years is often contrasted in the literature with an inadequate urban planning system as a way to explain many resulting social problems: high land prices and property speculation, rampant informality, extreme sociospatial segregation, inadequate urban infrastructure and services, environmental degradation, and the like. The literature is largely silent, however, on the role played by national legal systems, which have both contributed to this situation and reacted against it. The pivotal role of the legal order cannot be underestimated.
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In recent years, Latin America has suffered from many natural disasters that have had especially serious impacts on irregular settlements in densely urbanized areas. Drawing on the findings of research in Mexico funded by the World Bank and other institutions, the Lincoln Institute cosponsored a seminar in November 2000 in the port city of Veracruz, focusing on ways to mitigate the risks and results of natural disasters. The seminar explored such issues as:
Representatives from municipal authorities and community organizations shared experiences and learned technical and practical methodologies to identify high-risk zones, implement policies to reduce illegal settlements in those zones, and establish prevention and mitigation measures. Participants also identified the importance of social participation in the process. The principal findings are summarized below:
The Institute has been working on this issue with State, Urban and Municipal Services (SUME), an institution established in late 1999 to raise the quality and efficiency of governance and management at state and local levels in Mexico. SUME aims to accomplish these objectives through consulting, technical assistance and training of government officials. Its activities have been supported by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), which cosponsored this seminar, and by the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank.
Douglas Keare is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute and Luis Javier Castro Castro is director general of State, Urban and Municipal Services (SUME) in Mexico City.
Over the last two decades, and especially in the last few years, land regularization and upgrading programs have been implemented in informal settlements by central, regional and local governments in several Latin American countries. Important lessons must be learned from this incipient practice of urban policy making, not only to contribute toward improving existing experiences, but also to guide those governments that are confronting the phenomenon for the first time, or more likely are confronting the need to design policies to deal with significant increases in informal urban development.
To address this need, the Lincoln Institute sponsored its third offering of the course Informal Markets and Land Regularization Programs in Urban Areas, in November 2003. It was held in Recife, Brazil because of the city’s historic tradition of urban policy making, including its regularization program (PREZEIS), which for the past 20 years has been a pioneering instrument, despite its many shortcomings. The course brought together about 35 people with varied academic backgrounds and institutional positions representing 10 Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The 13 intertwined lessons offered here draw on the papers presented in Recife and on experiences discussed in the two previous courses in 2001 and 2002, as well as ideas generated in the meeting of the Institute’s Latin American Network on Land Regularization in Brasília, Brazil, in July 2003. This brief, critical analysis of land regularization programs reflects contributions from many people, but the authors take full responsibility for any misrepresentations that a general synthesis like this one may produce (see Figure 1).
1. The Process of Favelización
The process of informal production of urban space is increasing at a significant pace in Latin America, despite the fact that, unlike Africa and Asia, the region has been solidly urbanized for many decades. Occupied areas are becoming denser, and new settlements are being formed daily. Increasingly, these occupations encroach on environmentally sensitive areas, near protected water reservoirs, on public land, and in other areas not suitable for human occupation or economically feasible in the formal land market. This process has created all sorts of harmful repercussions—socio-environmental, legal, economic, political and cultural—not only for the millions of residents living in informal settlements, but also for city governments and the entire urban population. Despite the many regularization and upgrading programs implemented in the last few decades, the development rate of new informal settlements has been twice and even three times that of urban population growth. Thus, increasing informality is not exclusively the result of demographic change or even the increase in urban poverty, which also has been growing but at a much lower rate.
2. The Vicious Cycle of Informality
Multiple factors are responsible for the establishment of informal settlements. Over and above demographics and macroeconomic factors affecting urban poverty (employment and income policies), local variables contribute to the “unexplained variance” of increasing informality. By acting or failing to act, local authorities have fomented the growth of the phenomenon through exclusionary land use regulation, favoring wealthy neighborhoods in the spatial allocation of public investments, outright complicity with the delinquent practices of land subdividers, and inadequate local fiscal policies.
The corollary of this tolerance of informality is of great importance for land pricing policy. The informal market values and benefits from greater regulatory freedom and from the social values associated with traditional networks among residents within the settlements. Both of these dynamics affect prices in the informal market, which are reaching absurd levels. For example, a 6-square-meter (60-square-foot) wooden shack on a mangrove swamp in Recife has been valued at US$1,300. Such extremes and variations in prices reflect the diversity of informal processes at work in the access to urban land and housing, both among different settlements and within each settlement. Attacking the factors responsible for the vicious cycle of price formation should be an indispensable ingredient of any policy seeking to mitigate the consequences of informality.
3. A World of Diversity
Far from being a homogeneous phenomenon, informality manifests itself in many forms, contexts and places. Enormous differences may be found within and between settlements in the same city, not to mention among cities within a country and among cities in different countries. Each informal area has good and bad neighborhoods; relatively high-valued and low-valued areas; an uneven distribution of whatever services are available; and properties with different types of tenure rights. The income levels of many families in informal areas also are variable and in some cases are well above those of families in formal areas who are typically expected to pay for certain publicly provided services and benefits.
In comparing the archipelago of informal settlements distributed within formal neighborhoods in Latin America, property price gradients have been found to be uncorrelated, revealing altogether different market forces. Although both formal and informal areas are subject to vigorous land markets, the intervening price determinants are of different orders of magnitude. As mentioned above, regulatory freedoms, as well as longstanding informal networks that support the exchange of intangible benefits, affect property values. These realities must be taken into account when designing regularization programs that can offer positive reform of traditional practices.
There is also a need to adjust the programs to the different conditions of newly occupied areas and long-established settlements in consolidated areas. A clearer chain of market transactions can be traced in the newer occupations, whereas there is usually no linear succession of transactions in older areas. Furthermore, established settlements reflect a complex overlay of informally defined rights and transactions, such as rooftops sold to a third party as buildable “land,” which in turn may give rise to an additional living space. It is by no means clear whether regularization programs should start with recent occupations, where the costs of upgrading are lower and degrees of freedom are greater, or with older, consolidated areas that present more pressing social consequences, but where some legal rights may already exist.
4. Tolerance of Informality
Despite all the negative implications, public authorities have tolerated informal urban development processes, whether because of neglect, political convenience, ambiguous actions or even direct promotion of informal occupations. There is, however, little understanding that such tolerance generates rights over time and little information about the extremely high costs, both absolute and relative, of what is involved in upgrading programs. At the same time, tolerance of informal occupations is accompanied by a growing acceptance by both public authorities and public opinion that consolidated settlements should be upgraded with services, equipment and infrastructure. A recent study conducted by Cities Alliance in Brazil shows that the decision to regularize an irregular settlement is often made more quickly than the decision to approve a new regular settlement (six months versus two or three years).
This official tolerance also applies to the acceptance of “second-class solutions” for “second-class citizens” and often results in the early deterioration of upgraded areas. The combination of poor-quality materials and low-cost, unconventional techniques used in upgraded areas, as well as greater pressure on the existing infrastructure because of increased densification, renders the infrastructure obsolete and incurs high maintenance costs. Moreover, upgraded areas usually are not properly integrated into the municipal fiscal system. Throughout the region, the fiscal irresponsibility of municipal administrators is aggravated further by their failure to take responsibility for the broader scope of territorial development, as well as for their negligence or at best paternalistic attitude toward these regularized settlements.
5. Expectations and Land Values
Regularization programs to date have addressed a very small percentage of existing informal settlements, and as a result the vast majority of people living informally have not benefited from any type of public intervention. Furthermore, many regularization programs have been formulated without a proper understanding of the causes of informality, and they often deliver counterproductive results that contribute to the process of increasing socio-spatial segregation.
The mere expectation of upgrading puts a premium value on the land designated for improvements, thus significantly impacting prices in the informal market. The higher the expectation that an area will be regularized in the future, the higher the premium on that land and the higher the market demand for lower-priced subdivisions elsewhere. This suggests two approaches to upgrading: comprehensive programs for everyone in a few places coordinated with policies to change future expectations about cost recovery schemes; or partial upgrading in all informal areas of the city so expectations about market activity will be more balanced and consistent. The importance of integrating upgraded areas into municipal fiscal systems is not yet properly understood.
6. Isolated and Fragmented Policies
Public intervention in informal settlements through regularization programs has been promoted in an isolated, sectoral way without the necessary integration between such programs and the wider context of urban land management policies that have a direct bearing on such settlements. These policies include construction of social housing; rehabilitation of dilapidated urban centers; occupation of vacant areas and buildings; broader spatial allocation of public investments in urban infrastructure and services; modernization of tax collections and cadastres; and public-private partnerships. Moreover, most regularization programs have been limited to residential areas and have rarely been extended to informal industrial and commercial businesses, vacant public buildings and land in central areas, or informal settlements in rural areas.
At all levels of government, regularization programs have been marked by structural fragmentation— within programs, between secretariats and ministries, and among national, state and local levels—and as a result existing resources are often misspent or fail to reach all intended beneficiaries. The programs also have suffered from a lack of administrative continuity due mostly to changes in local political contexts. Rather than supplementing other initiatives, regularization programs often absorb much of the (limited) financial capacity of local municipalities, causing other social housing programs to be sacrificed or neglected. This problem has its origins in both the broad credit lines opened by national and international multilateral agencies and the absence of a requirement that local administrations match the financial burden of the program with efforts to expand their own revenue sources. In general, credit lines for regularization programs have been established without careful consideration of the financial capabilities of municipalities.
7. Lack of Financial Resources
As if the above problems were not enough, regularization programs have not been supported by adequate financial resources. The budgetary provisions are not compatible with the proposed and sometimes ambitious objectives, and often there are no specific funds for the programs. Revenues resulting from urban planning operations (such as earmarking resources from the sale of building rights in formal and high-income areas) have not been properly used to support upgrading. Resources from international agencies have been poorly spent, especially because there has not been a rigorous evaluation of the programs, nor a firm demand that their targets or objectives are fully accomplished. In addition, there are no adequate micro-credit policies in place to support or encourage community organizations.
8. Dissociation Between Upgrading and Legalization
Although it could be argued that illegality is a consequence of the insufficient supply of serviced land at affordable prices, in the vast majority of regularization programs the greater emphasis on upgrading has been dissociated from housing improvement and socioeconomic programs aimed at integrating communities, as well as from specific policies to legalize areas and plots. The components of upgrading and legalization have been conceived as if they were separate processes, or, frequently, as if legalization were an automatic result of the upgrading process. Most upgrading programs seem to fall short of what is required for land occupations to be legalized in the first place. As a result, those few programs that have reached the legalization stage have had to invent legal-political solutions, which often do not reflect the urban conditions actually in force in the area.
Despite the publicity given to regularization programs, the number of titles that actually result in a document issued by the property registration office is disappointingly low. The complexities imposed by law and the resistance and conservative attitudes of notaries and registration offices have been identified as some of the most critical bottlenecks to overcome. It should be added that most families, once they receive a title recognizing their legitimate right to their property, simply do not bother to complete the registration process, often because they do not understand its legal overtones or because it is too expensive or cumbersome. This situation has led to an outcry for the simplification of titling and registration systems and an associated need to disempower the existing bureaucratic entities.
9.The Importance of Titling
Given these problems, few programs have reached the legalization stage, and even fewer have achieved the registration of legalized plots. Perhaps because of that failure, many analysts have come to believe that titles are not important, that the mere perception of security of tenure would suffice. Although it is true that such a perception is indeed the main factor that encourages people to start investing in their houses, titling is important for two reasons: the personal interests of the occupiers (security of tenure, protection against forced eviction, domestic conflicts, marital separation, inheritance, problems with neighbors, access to an address and to forms of credit); and the interest of the city as a whole, since legal titling can contribute to the stabilization of land markets and allow for more rational and better articulated forms of public intervention.
There is still great resistance to land titling programs, especially on the part of the judiciary and the general public. However, it is important to note that individual beneficiaries of titling programs often do not have a full understanding of the protections and limitations of their title—What is it good for? Why does one need to actually register the title? All this suggests that educational programs for both city officials and residents should accompany the introduction of any regularization programs.
In addition, there has been little reflection on the implications of the kinds of instruments used to legalize plots. The emphasis placed on individual freehold titles has ignored the need for collective legal solutions for collective social problems; whenever such legal instruments have been used, they have not been introduced in a way that renders the new legal order compatible with the existing urban order and with the legal implications of the instruments. Most existing legal options have not been fully explored and generally lack creativity. Moreover, a consistent effort has yet to be made to have the new legal instruments fully validated by credit agencies, and by society at large.
10. The Fallacy of Popular Participation
The political quality of regularization programs has varied enormously, but in general the processes of popular participation in formulating and implementing the programs have been of little significance. This situation has been further aggravated by the creation of artificial forms of participation as a result of demands from financing agencies. The designed mechanisms for popular participation are in general a sheer formality, if not a farce from the outset. Very few programs have assimilated solutions proposed by the affected community. The political-institutional and cultural framework within which most regularization programs have been formed, along with the constraints imposed by the way these programs are financed, virtually eliminates any room for a truly effective public role, since public participation normally implies major challenges to the status quo. Regularization programs are more often perceived as solutions from or for the establishment than as a response to the real needs of the majority of the low-income population.
11. Compatible Scale, Patterns and Rights
Perhaps the main problem with regularization programs is the difficulty in making the scale of the interventions compatible with the technical, urban and environmental patterns proposed for the settlements, as well as with the nature of the rights to be recognized for the occupiers. These factors of scale, patterns and rights have to be discussed together to guarantee the sustainability of the programs and their impact on reality.
12. The After-effects of Regularization Programs
After an area is upgraded or a settlement is legalized, the public authorities normally do not maintain their presence in the areas. They should perform many important functions, from monitoring and evaluating the maintenance of installed equipment (notably water and sewage systems) to creating new guidelines or rules governing new occupations. As a result of the absence of official oversight and intervention, many areas rapidly begin to deteriorate. Moreover, the legitimization provided by the regularization program may make neighboring (originally formal) areas more prone to being “contaminated” by new informal land use practices. In general, regularization programs have not led to the promised urban, social and cultural integration of upgraded areas, and the informal areas remain stigmatized as second-rate long after they have been upgraded. The idea that regularized areas are placed in a new, virtuous trajectory rarely survives beyond the original documents setting the justifications for the program.
13. Balancing Individual Freedoms and Public Functions
In spite of their concern with the need to guarantee that the beneficiaries of public intervention are indeed the occupiers of informal settlements, regularization programs have not met a proper balance between respect for individual rights and freedoms and the programs’ public functions (the recognition of the social right to housing and the need to set aside urban areas for that purpose). Frequently the adopted legal solutions embed restrictions intending to freeze the mobility process within the areas (affecting terms of sale, acquisition, rent and so forth), which only helps to generate more informality.
The strategy of focusing on an area or social group seems to ignore the very nature and origins of informality, which is in fact a Catch-22 situation. The lack of sufficient finances in most programs would, on one hand, suggest that beneficiaries should not be able to cash in their benefits and move on to a new informal occupation to be similarly regularized in the future. On the other hand, the cost of monitoring and controlling such practices may be too high, if not unfeasible. Restrictions on transactions would simply generate new kinds of informal arrangements.
Interestingly, very few regularization programs actually accommodate or adjust to the potential upward and downward mobility of the affected occupants. They are formulated with a static community in mind. Intra-urban mobility, particularly among informal settlements and between formal and informal areas, is not well understood and thus is largely ignored. A possible way out of this conundrum would be to establish a cost-recovery scheme or value capture mechanism at the very beginning of planning for a new regularization program.
Conclusion
Regularization programs are typically not formulated with well-defined goals and timetables, and the problem is made worse by the lack of suitable evaluation indicators. In short, the declared objectives of regularization programs in Latin America (promotion of security of tenure and socio-spatial integration) have not been translated into an adequate combination of a comprehensive diagnosis, effective instruments and a clear implementation strategy, not to mention deficiencies in management capacity. As a result, the Latin American experience with regularization so far can not be considered fully successful.
It may be said, however, that regularization programs have shown merit in raising public awareness about the legitimacy of claims for more effective and comprehensive responses to the needs of a significant and growing group of citizens now excluded from the formal socioeconomic system. These programs have enabled some of the urban poor to remain in central, serviced areas of Latin American cities and have improved the livelihood and conditions of those living in regularized settlements, notwithstanding this discussion of their shortcomings. Given the cruel dynamics of socio-spatial segregation in the region, this fact is in itself of great importance.
Edésio Fernandes is a part-time lecturer in the Development Planning Unit of University College London.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
Related Land Lines Articles
Angel, Shlomo, and Douglas Keare. 2002. Housing policy reform in global perspective. April: 8–11.
Calderon, Julio. 2002. The mystery of credit. April: 5–8.
Fernandes, Edésio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. January: 5–8.
———. 2002. Faculty profile. July: 12–13.
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. January: 4–7.
Smolka, Martim O., and Laura Mullahy. 2003. A decade of changes: A retrospective of the Latin America program. October: 8–12.
Figure 1:
Dos and Don’ts of Regularization Programs
Dos
Don’ts
