Over the past decade of transition from communist to market economies, property taxation has taken on economic, political and legal importance as the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have developed new fiscal policies and new approaches to property rights. Taxes on land and buildings have served not only as revenue instruments but also as adjuncts to decentralization and privatization. In spite of the complex and varied national differences in this region, a number of common issues have emerged in regard to property-based taxes.

A period of transition places a premium on revenue sources that impose a minimum burden on the functioning of nascent market economies. Many of these postcommunist nations seek to strengthen local government, and all must adjust their tax systems to account for emerging markets for land and buildings at a time when state administrative capacity is challenged by the introduction of new income and consumption taxes. There is often strong support for retaining a public interest in land as a fixed, nonrenewable element of the common heritage which, once sold, cannot be reproduced. This sentiment coexists with an equally strong impetus for development of private business and private ownership of property. Each of these concerns raises special questions with regard to the role of land and building taxes in the transition.

Such taxes on land and buildings have already been designated as local revenue sources in many nations of Central and Eastern Europe. As a tax base that cannot relocate in response to taxation, real property permits an independent local revenue source. Times of fiscal stringency at national government levels dramatize the importance of such revenue for local governmental autonomy. Moreover, the goal of eventual international integration through the European Union and other trade arenas encourages development of taxes not subject to international competition.

Two primary difficulties confront efforts to implement land and building taxes in these countries. First, in the absence of developed property markets, the tax base requires a choice among formulary values, price approximations, and non-value means of allocating the tax burden. Second, times of financial hardship present special problems in imposing taxes on assets that do not produce income with which to pay the tax. This dilemma has left many property taxes at nominal levels.

These problems are closely related because the lack of reliable market prices, together with the legacy of officially determined price levels, can encourage legislation that assigns specific, sometimes arbitrary values to various classes of property for tax purposes. Given these difficulties, it is particularly significant that many of these nations have either adopted or are seriously considering some form of value-based taxation of immovable property as a source of local government finance.

The Case of Lithuania

Since declaring its independence from the USSR in 1991, the Republic of Lithuania has made rapid strides in economic reforms, privatization and government reorganization. Its plans for market value-based taxation of land and buildings reflect the country’s transition to a market economy and private ownership of property. Municipalities will receive the revenues from the new tax and will have the power to choose the tax rate, subject to an upper limit set by the national government. The Lithuanian Parliament has recently prepared draft legislation for this tax which assigns responsibility for developing a valuation system to the State Land Cadastre and Register (SLCR).

The SLCR was created in 1997 to consolidate a number of functions: registration of property rights, maintenance of a cadastre of property information, and valuation of real property for public purposes, including taxation. Since then the agency has organized a central data bank for legally registered property rights, land and building information, and Geographic Information System (GIS) maps. The data bank currently holds information on more than four million land parcels and structures, and it is linked to mortgage and other related registers and to branch offices throughout the country.

The proposed market value-based real property tax will replace two existing taxes on real property commonly found in post-Soviet systems: a land tax on privately owned land and a property tax on buildings and other property (not including land) owned by corporate entities, enterprises and organizations. Taxable values are currently set by the SLCR through application of varying “coefficients” that adjust base prices to reflect land use and location. The resulting values do not reflect current market prices. The tax rate of 1.5 percent of the taxable value for land and 1 percent of the taxable value of property yielded represent approximately 7 percent of local budgets and 2.5 percent of the national budget in 2000.

Lithuania’s growing demand for market-based property valuation data requires an increase in professional appraisal skills and experience with assessment administration. To address these needs, an Association of Property Valuers and a system of professional certification were established in the mid-1990s, in collaboration with other international valuation associations. Lithuania has also joined Estonia and Latvia in publishing periodic reviews of real estate markets in the Baltic states. Information regarding market activity is posted on the SLCR’s website www.kada.lt.

Lincoln Course

The Lincoln Institute has taught courses on property taxation in transition countries for nearly a decade, and in February the Institute collaborated with SLCR to develop a curriculum for seven senior public officials from Lithuania. The week-long program was based on the course that the Institute presented, in cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius in December 1997, for government officials from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Recognizing the importance of this year’s program to Lithuanian public policy, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided support for the delegation’s travel to Cambridge.

The program offered a policy-oriented analysis of issues relating to market-based tax systems. It included guidance in developing a strategic plan and a legal and administrative framework for a computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) system suitable to Lithuania. Technical subjects were presented in the context of larger economic and political issues in land and property taxation. The course combined lectures, discussions with experienced practitioners, case studies, and field visits to state and local agencies in Massachusetts. Lectures addressing introductory, policy-focused subjects were supplemented by more specialized presentations covering market value appraisal techniques, mass appraisal, CAMA and tax law.

The Lincoln Institute will offer similar courses to public officials from other transition countries, and is continuing to develop other educational programs with Lithuania and its Baltic neighbors.

Jane H. Malme is an attorney and a fellow of the Lincoln Institute in the Program on Taxation of Land and Buildings. She has developed and taught courses on property taxation and has been a legal advisor to public finance officials in Central and Eastern Europe. She is co-editor with Joan Youngman of The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition: Case Studies, a book being published in 2001 by the World Bank.

Public officials from Lithuania and Lincoln Institute faculty members met at Lincoln House in February to learn from each other about market value-based taxation policy and plans for introducing property taxation in Lithuania.

Delegates from Lithuania: Arturas Baksinskas, Vice-Minister of Finance; Dalia Bardauskiene, Advisor to the Prime Minister on Rural and Urban Development and Planning; Algirdas Butkevicius, Member of Parliament on Budget and Finance Committee; Rimantas Ramanauskas, First Deputy Director, SLCR; Albina Aleksiene, Advisor to the General Director on Property Valuation, SLCR; Arvydas Bagdonavicius, Deputy Director, SLCR; Algimantas Mikenas, Deputy Head of Property Valuation and Market Research Department, SLCR.

Lincoln Institute Faculty: Joan Youngman, Senior Fellow and Director, Lincoln Institute Tax Program; Jane Malme, Fellow, Lincoln Institute Tax Program; Dennis Robinson, Vice President, Lincoln Institute; Richard Almy and Robert Gloudemans, partners, Almy, Gloudemans, Jacobs and Denne , LaGrange, Illinois; John Charman, Consultant Valuation Surveyor, London; David Davies, Director of Information Technology, Massachusetts Department of Revenue; Jeffrey Epstein, Consultant, Quincy, Massachusetts; Sally Powers, Former Director of Assessment, City of Cambridge.

Access to urban land by the popular sectors in metropolitan Lima has a troubled history resulting from the combination of spontaneous, unregulated land occupation and short-sighted policies to regularize land tenancy. Policies that were designed to resolve or mitigate irregular occupations have instead exacerbated the problem.

A workshop on “Local Governments and the Management of Urban Land: Peru and Latin America” in Lima in February brought together municipal officials, Latin American experts and community leaders to address the question, “Does the current regulatory framework guarantee the orderly and fair growth of Lima and other Peruvian cities?” The program was organized by the Lincoln Institute; the Institute of Urban Development CENCA, a community-based nongovernmental organization; the Local Governments Association of Peru; and Red Suelo, the land policy network of the Habitat International Coalition.

Regularization Policies

Land regularization is generally understood as the process of public intervention in illegally occupied zones to provide urban infrastructure improvements and to recognize ownership titles or other occupancy rights. Regularization policies are needed in many developing countries to reverse irregular and sometimes illegal development patterns, such as when land is occupied and housing is built before infrastructure improvements and legal documentation are put in place.

Since 1961, the central government of Peru has supported tolerant policies that have permitted the poor to occupy vacant public land, which was seen as a natural “land bank” resource. Most of this land consisted of sandy, almost desert terrain surrounding Lima which had little commercial value and was considered unsuitable for other market uses. Some 34 percent of Lima’s population lived in irregular “barriadas” or new towns in 1993.

In the absence of policies to effectively provide for organized and legal access to land, the permissiveness that allowed irregular development of these outlying areas has led to a crisis that now dominates the urban land policy agenda (see Figure 1). Many officials and other observers acknowledge that the system itself encourages and permits informal and unregulated growth, and that some of the policies designed to regularize land have actually created more irregularities.

Urban Land Management Problems

Management of urban land policies in Peru is presently being reevaluated because of tensions between central and local government control. Between 1981 and 1995, the municipalities managed land regularization procedures, authorizations and related policies. In 1996 the Peruvian government centralized the administration of economic resources relating to habitation and urban development, thereby denying local governments the ability to manage regularization problems. This political, administrative and fiscal centralization has created serious inefficiencies, however, since local government agencies must nevertheless respond to daily demands from the population regarding land and housing concerns.

Tensions also exist because of contradictions between the legal framework of formal regulations as promulgated by public officials and the informal market transactions that occur in the “real world” on a day-to-day basis. The mismatch between these formal and informal norms is reflected in the lack of understanding and distrust between the political authorities who determine land market policies and the urban practitioners and private agents who operate outside the formal policy framework.

In spite of attempts by commercial and nongovernmental organizations to improve the coordination and implementation of land policies that affect formal and informal market mechanisms, the political leaders still make the final decision. This situation exacerbates the politicization of public management (i.e., politics for politicians and not for the community). At the same time, it encourages a short-term perspective, since a governing authority is generally more interested in the immediate work to be accomplished than in a reliable follow-up of development plans requiring longer-term execution. As a result, Lima’s serious growth problems are not being adequately addressed by the current political, legal and regulatory framework.

Common Concerns

An important result of this workshop in Peru was the sharing of experiences from other Latin American and Asian cities where local governments can use public resources to promote more orderly cities. Even though the problems regarding land management are wide-ranging and complex, some common concerns emerged for discussion in future programs:

development of public policies and community-level initiatives to capture the value of “intermediate” land that is in the process of being developed and is often the most vulnerable to speculation;

municipal housing programs that use existing legal frameworks to encourage an orderly occupation of space. Specifically, there is a need to promote coordination among various public and private agents, as well as mechanisms to support financial credit for low-income people, housing construction, basic utility services and neighborhood participation strategies.

land regularization policies and a comprehensive articulation of land access policies to break the vicious cycle of irregularities that is causing the current urban growth and management problems.

better understanding of the dynamics of both formal and informal land markets, especially on the part of those who are charged with developing and implementing appropriate policies to address complex land market activities.

Some Definitions

Illegal – land occupation that expressly contradicts existing norms, civil codes and public authorization

Informal – economic activity that does not adhere to and is not protected by institutional rules, as opposed to formal activity that operates within established procedures

Irregular – subdivisions that are officially approved but are not executed in accordance with the law

Clandestine – subdivisions that are established without any official recognition

Figure 1: Regularization Policies on Land Tenancy in Lima

February 1961-1980: Law 13517 was established to make various central government agencies responsible for regularizing land tenancy procedures, but only 20,000 titles were issued.

1981-1995: The titling function was transferred to the Municipality of Lima and the delivery of land titles increased to some 200,000. In the 1990s the delivery capacity gradually decreased until it generated a land market crisis.

April 1996: The State Commission to Formalize Informal Property (COFROPI) was given responsibilities that were formerly assigned to the municipality.

Following a presidential promise to incorporate the poor into the land market process, some 170,000 property titles were delivered between July 1996 and July 1997. An additional 300,000 titles are expected to be delivered by the year 2000. However, COFROPI states that 90 percent or 180,000 of the titles delivered prior to 1995 have recordkeeping problems, so that many of the 170,000 titles delivered since July 1996 may be redundant. Hence, it is difficult to reconstruct how many titles were properly delivered under each administration.

Julio Calderon, an urban researcher and consultant on social development programs, is affiliated with Red Suelo, the land policy network of the Habitat International Coalition.

Between 1970 and 1989, 17 progressive urban reform projects were submitted to the Colombian Congress, but all failed due to opposition from the conservative party supported by the influential private sector including the construction industry and real estate developers. In 1989, after three years of parliamentary debates, Law 9a (for urban reform) was approved, despite opposition from FEDELONJAS, the entity representing the real estate and development groups. After the law was approved, FEDELONJAS brought a lawsuit before the Constitutional Court with reference to the owners’ loss of rights of those lands that were not developed during the time defined by the master plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial or POT). The court ratified Law 9a, and the real estate sector protested throughout the country for what was deemed unfair expropriation without compensation. The law was considered “communist” and dangerous for the private capital linked to construction and real estate.

The city of Cali, with 2.5 million inhabitants and a large housing deficit in the early 1990s, applied Law 9a with its threat of a property taking to a large area of the city whose lands were held by a small number of owners. In anticipation, developers and builders in Cali suggested that these landowners join together in an association to develop a large amount of social housing on their properties.

As a result of this positive experience, the Cámara Nacional de la Construcción (CAMACOL, the national union of the construction industry, including developers, constructors and promoters of urban projects) supported these development processes in other cities, especially Bogotá and Medellín. The way was paved so that the private real estate sector accepted Law 388 in 1997, which was an enhancement of Law 9a, and that support has revolutionized urban land management in Colombia. The new law grants municipalities the authority to manage urban land, promotes the master plan (POT), allows urban value capture and generates instruments for land use regulation.

By 2000, discussions were no longer focused on lawsuits but rather on the advantages of obtaining land to develop projects at a lower price. The Colombian construction and real estate sectors have entered the twenty-first century with a proactive attitude toward the public capture of the land value increments (plusvalías) and other instruments of urban land management. They now understand that this legislation releases land for development, generates land sharing in large projects, and facilitates the production of social housing. Urban land prices have been moderated, and the financial capital is now used more efficiently for home building in Colombian cities. Opposition to the reforms remains, especially in intermediate-sized cities, but it is not as strong as in the 1970s and 1980s.

The change of attitude in the private real estate sector brings its interests closer to other social and collective concerns. It is clear that the proprietor owns the land, but that the right to develop land is owned by the public and may be granted through instruments such as the participation in plusvalías, transfer of development rights, or the sale of building rights. Profits from urban land development are now better distributed among all three stakeholders: the capital investor, the landowner and the municipality.

Oscar Borrera Ochoa is an economist and private urban consultant in Bogotá. He was president of FEDELONJAS from 1981 to 1990.

Lawrence Susskind is the Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and president of the Consensus Building Institute, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He graduated from Columbia University and received his Masters of City Planning and his Ph.D. in Urban Planning from MIT. As current head of the Environmental Policy Group in MIT’s School of Architecture and Planning, he teaches courses on international environmental treaty negotiation, public sector dispute resolution and environmental planning. He also holds a joint appointment at Harvard University as visiting professor of Law and director of the Public Disputes Program at the interuniversity Program on Negotiation, which he helped to found. Susskind has published many books and reports and held many visiting appointments and guest lectureships. He is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute.

Land Lines: How did you become interested in land use mediation?

Lawrence Susskind: Land use planners are supposed to ensure that the public is involved in all growth management decisions. Yet, most efforts to ensure such public participation lead to protracted political battles. Within the planning profession it is not clear how competing conceptions of appropriate land uses ought to be reconciled. Since the early 1970s I have been trying to introduce the concept of mediation as well as other conflict management tools into the lexicon of professional planners. In my view, in the absence of consensus building strategies of some kind, most communities are doomed to use resources inefficiently, unfairly and unwisely. I got interested in land use mediation as a way of helping the planning profession do a better job.

LL: What types of land use disputes are most difficult to resolve?

LS: Land use disputes that revolve around values or identity are the most difficult to resolve. When values (as opposed to economic interests) are at stake, people often feel that their identity is threatened and in such situations they are rarely open to considering the views of others. For example, proposed changes in land use that would eliminate agriculture as a way of life are not likely to be accepted, even if financial compensation is offered to the landowners involved.

LL: When did you start collaborating with the Lincoln Institute?

LS: My ties to the Lincoln Institute go back a long time. When Arlo Woolery was executive director in the late 1970s, we worked together on a multiyear effort to analyze the impacts of the Property Tax Limitation Law (Proposition 2 1/2) in Massachusetts and on the state’s Growth Policy Development Act. Two decades later, in 1997, I began working with Rosalind Greenstein and later Armando Carbonell, co-chairs of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development, on a series of research projects that evolved into the training programs on land use mediation that we (LILP and CBI) currently offer together.

LL: Explain a little more about CBI.

LS: The Consensus Building Institute is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1993 to provide consensus building services to clients involved in complex disputes. Building on the “mutual gains” approach to negotiation developed at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, CBI offers conflict management assistance, negotiation training, dispute system design services and evaluative research to public agencies, corporate clients and nongovernmental agencies on five continents.

Our staff now includes a dozen full-time professionals, mostly based in Cambridge, and a network of more than 30 experienced affiliates around the world. We have become known as expert public and environmental dispute mediators and have helped to resolve complex disputes related to the siting of controversial facilities, the setting of public health and safety standards, the formulation and implementation of development plans and projects, and conflicts among racial and ethnic groups.

LL: When did the joint Lincoln and CBI training programs begin?

LS: After several years of careful analysis of land use mediation efforts throughout the United States, CBI developed a curriculum with Lincoln Institute for public officials and planners, and that course has been offered since 1999 at a number of locations. During the first few years we offered only a basic course designed to familiarize participants with assisted negotiation as a method to resolve land use disputes, and then we expanded our offerings to include more detailed skill building for experienced mediators and practitioners. Today we offer a full range of courses at multiple locations around the country.

LL: Who are the primary participants in these introductory and advanced courses?

LS: We are trying to reach three different audiences. First, we have identified and invited local elected and appointed officials who preside over land development disputes and administer land use regulatory systems at the local, regional and state levels. They need to know that there are techniques they can use to help resolve land use disputes before they escalate.

Second, we are trying to attract real estate developers and their attorneys so they know how to participate effectively in dispute resolution efforts when they are offered or suggested by public officials. Third, we have a special interest in attracting professionals of all kinds who want to learn how to be better facilitators, particularly of multiparty land use dialogues that involve complex technical dilemmas.

LL: What are the key goals and lessons of these programs?

LS: The introductory course offers a quick overview of the reasons that land use disputes seem to escalate so quickly and often end up in court. We then introduce the basic principles and tools of dispute resolution and show how they can head off such escalation. They are presented in a very interactive way using gaming and simulations. Participants are given a number of hands-on opportunities to apply what they are learning in hypothetical situations and to bring their own cases before the group. We spend some time talking about techniques for overcoming resistance to the use of mediation and other consensus building strategies.

The advanced course is aimed at experienced mediators or planners and lawyers who think they might want to become mediators. It assumes that the participants have mastered the material presented in the introductory course and moves to a set of dilemmas at the next level, including methods of handling science-intensive disputes through the use of joint fact finding. We also review key theoretical debates, such as managing unequal power relationships in a mediation context.

LL: How do you incorporate both theory and practice into the curriculum?

LS: We expect many of the participants to bring their own stories about land use disputes in which they have been intimately involved. We model in real time how the theory we are teaching can be applied in their cases. We also try to ground all of our theoretical presentations in detailed case accounts of actual practice. Finally, as mentioned above, we use role playing simulations. Students can’t just sit back and take notes. They have to wrestle with the application of the ideas we are presenting.

LL: What other projects have you undertaken with the Institute?

LS: About a year ago, in May 2004, I joined Institute President Jim Brown at a Lincoln-sponsored seminar in Cuba on the problems of restoring and redeveloping Havana Harbor. Energy production and inadequate attention to pollution control have spoiled one of the most beautiful harbors in this hemisphere. Some of the many different committees and groups concerned with economic development, environmental cleanup, restoration of the harbor ecology, historic preservation of Old Havana, and enhanced tourism are seeking advice on strategies for balancing these (sometimes) competing objectives.

CBI is beginning to develop a new joint course with the Lincoln Institute and some of its partners involved in local economic development efforts around the country. We believe conflict resolution tools and negotiation skills can be of great use in neighborhood development disputes, not just growth management conflicts in the suburbs. With Roz Greenstein CBI is creating a new set of training programs for community-based organizations that we plan to offer for the first time next summer.

Another new initiative is a collaborative Web site that highlights recent research by the Lincoln Institute and CBI, as well as timely news articles, background material on consensus building, and links to related programs and publications. One section of the site will provide an interactive platform that will permit hundreds of alumni of our joint courses to remain in touch with each other and share their mediation experiences. This “virtual learning community” will be a valuable resource for public- and private-sector stakeholders involved in land use disputes (even if they haven’t taken the course).

LL: What is the outlook for future joint programs?

LS: I believe our ongoing CBI–Lincoln Institute partnership holds incredible promise. We have conducted an Institute-sponsored study on the use of consensus building to resolve land reform disputes in Latin America and hope to expand on that work, as well as to address land issues facing China and the newly independent states of Eastern Europe. The Institute is already involved in research and training programs in these regions, and land use disputes are at the core of many of the challenges facing national and local policy makers.

The Lincoln Institute is an ideal partner for CBI. We both care about applied research, theory building and sharing new knowledge through educational programs of all kinds. We both measure our success in terms of real improvements on the ground, and we share interests in both domestic and international arenas.

Faculty Profile of Fernanda Furtado

A medida que una ciudad crece, tanto en tamaño como en su densidad de edificación, una parte de este proceso de crecimiento consiste, por lo general, en las mejoras que se realizan en el suelo a raíz de los nuevos desarrollos. No obstante, la combinación de la demanda de sitios de construcción adicionales y de la cantidad limitada de espacio físico disponible para el desarrollo generalmente da como resultado un aumento en los precios de los terrenos.

Esta escasez de suelo se debe a tres factores principales: la capacidad de los propietarios de no poner a disposición del mercado sus terrenos con servicios (una causa que se atribuye a la concentración de la propiedad de terrenos y a otras limitaciones legales e institucionales); las dificultades para tener acceso a ciertas áreas que aún no están listas para ser ocupadas debido a la falta de infraestructura; y las restricciones impuestas por las normas de zonificación. Cada uno de estos factores presenta su propia dinámica, aunque no necesariamente aparecen al mismo tiempo. Este es el caso de las ciudades brasileñas, particularmente São Paulo, donde estos factores restrictivos no siempre se presentan de la misma manera en relación con el precio de los terrenos.

Por ejemplo, las normas de edificación pueden reducir el precio de los lotes individuales, pero pueden aumentar el precio general cuando dichas normas afectan a todos los lotes y, como consecuencia, restringen la oferta de viviendas. Una gran oferta de terrenos vacantes controlados por unos pocos propietarios puede ocasionar el aumento de los precios, mientras que la falta de accesibilidad puede dar como resultado la reducción de los precios.

El precio de los terrenos también depende de las características de las normas sobre el suelo. A medida que la ciudad crece, la mayor demanda de terrenos urbanos edificables por lo general genera valores más altos si la infraestructura existente tiene la capacidad de contener una ocupación de terrenos más intensa y si las normas sobre zonificación (o las modificaciones a dichas normas) permiten además una mayor densidad de edificación.

Con el fin de examinar estas cuestiones, debemos, en primer lugar, considerar de qué forma se financia la inversión en infraestructura que brinda o intensifica los medios para acceder a los terrenos y utilizarlos y, en segundo lugar, analizar cómo se distribuyen los beneficios y costos derivados de las mejoras al suelo. Por lo general, el costo de los servicios públicos (tales como calles, puentes, alcantarillado, alumbrado público, agua potable, etc.) se financia mediante los fondos públicos, mientras que las mejoras o el valor agregado a los terrenos como resultado de la inversión pública en infraestructura son aprovechados, salvo pocas excepciones, por los propietarios de los terrenos mejorados sin ningún tipo de costo.

El aumento en los valores de las propiedades también puede provenir de simples cambios en la utilización del suelo que ya se encuentra accesible, como por ejemplo cuando un terreno que anteriormente se consideraba rural ahora se redefine como urbano. Los cambios en las posibles densidades como consecuencia de nuevas normas de zonificación pueden generar grandes beneficios para las propiedades afectadas, aunque en este caso, como en el caso anterior, la presión futura en cuanto a la infraestructura requerirá una importante inversión pública.

Marco legal

Los propietarios de inmuebles mejorados en Brasil tradicionalmente se apropiaban, tal como ocurre en la mayoría de los países, del valor agregado que se derivaba de la inversión del sector público y de los cambios en la zonificación. El concepto de que los propietarios no deberían ser los únicos beneficiarios de dichas mejoras se introdujo en forma gradual en Brasil durante la década de 1970, y este principio se incorporó en los artículos 182 y 183 de la Constitución Federal de 1988. Con posterioridad, dichos artículos se regularon mediante la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 del año 2001, conocida también como la Ley de Desarrollo Urbano o Estatuto de la Ciudad (Estatuto da Cidade).

Desde 1988, el desarrollo urbano se ha convertido en una cuestión del derecho federal. En la práctica, la legislación federal ratificó el principio de la función social de la propiedad de terrenos urbanos y la separación del derecho a la propiedad del derecho de edificar. Sobre la base de la ley de 2001, la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó su Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial en el año 2002, así como también la Ley sobre la Utilización del Suelo Nº 13.885 en 2004. Las mencionadas leyes introdujeron el mecanismo de Compensación Monetaria por el Derecho de Edificación (Outorga Onerosa do Direito de Construir u OODC), establecieron coeficientes de utilización del suelo (o coeficientes de edificabilidad) mínimos, básicos y máximos, y limitaron la oferta de superficies edificables. La utilización de estas herramientas en conjunto permitió al municipio mejorar la eficiencia en la gestión del suelo, promover los resultados sociales deseados y aumentar los ingresos.

El coeficiente de edificabilidad (CE) mínimo se refiere a la utilización mínima que se espera de un lote para que cumpla con su función social; el CE básico se relaciona con la superficie edificable que todo propietario tiene el derecho de desarrollar en virtud de su propiedad; y el CE máximo es la cantidad de desarrollo permitida por la infraestructura existente y las normas de zonificación. Los cargos asociados con la OODC se aplican sobre la diferencia existente entre el CE máximo y el CE básico de un lote.

Administración de los derechos de edificación

La OODC es la compensación monetaria que pagan aquellos a quienes el gobierno les otorga nuevos derechos de edificación (superficie edificable). Esta concesión de desarrollo (establecida en los artículos 28, 29, 30 y 31 de la Ley Federal Nº 10.257 de 2001 y definida en los artículos 209 a 216 del Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002) es una de las herramientas normativas que se utilizan a los fines de administrar los derechos de edificación en la ciudad, con excepción de aquellas áreas destinadas a proyectos urbanos a gran escala en los que se utiliza una herramienta legal especial cuyo fin es fomentar las intervenciones públicas y privadas (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006).

El CE básico de utilización del suelo establecido en el año 2004 varía entre 1 y 2, dependiendo del área de la ciudad a considerar. El CE máximo puede ser 1, 2, 2,5 ó 4, dependiendo asimismo del área. En algunas áreas urbanas, estas nuevas normas redujeron los derechos de edificación, estableciendo un CE básico de 1 para aquellos terrenos que se habían clasificado como 2 o más según la legislación anterior. En forma paralela, el municipio de São Paulo utilizó la OODC para extender el potencial de edificación o el CE máximo hasta 4 en aquellos terrenos que, según la legislación anterior, solo podían desarrollarse hasta 1 ó 2.

Como resultado, en algunas áreas en las que se redujo el CE de 2 a 1, los emprendedores pudieron presentar proyectos utilizando el CE 2 anterior, o hasta el CE máximo de 3 ó 4, siempre y cuando pagaran al gobierno el monto relativo a la superficie edificable adicional correspondiente a la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE utilizado en el proyecto. Suponiendo que los cargos sean efectivos en cuanto al costo para los emprendedores, este instrumento los beneficia, ya que les permite edificar hasta un CE 4 en áreas en donde previamente el máximo era de CE 2. No obstante, el propietario promedio no siempre considera que esta herramienta sea una ventaja, debido a que el potencial de edificación de su terreno podría verse reducido y se le podría aplicar un cargo sobre lo que anteriormente percibía como un derecho de edificación libre de todo cargo.

Los propietarios de pequeños lotes y viviendas de baja densidad tal vez no se den cuenta de lo que podrían estar perdiendo cuando se modifica el CE, debido a que, por lo general, consideran su propiedad como una combinación del terreno, la edificación y otras mejoras. Resulta difícil separar el valor del terreno del valor de las mejoras, por lo que una futura reducción en el valor del terreno no se percibe en forma inmediata. Asimismo, la expansion del mercado inmobiliario en São Paulo coincidió con la aprobación de la nueva legislación en el año 2004, por lo que el aumento general en los precios de los terrenos puede haber compensado la futura reducción de los precios de los terrenos asociada con las modificaciones del CE. Debe destacarse además que la expansión del crédito gubernamental destinado a la financiación de la vivienda desde el año 2006 contribuyó a un aumento en la demanda de terrenos y, en consecuencia, a un aumento en los precios de los mismos.

Para los emprendedores, el aumento del CE a 4 en aquellas áreas en las que el máximo había sido 1 ó 2 constituyó una situación favorable, ya que pudieron invertir más capital en los terrenos y llevar a cabo proyectos más lucrativos que compensaron los pagos adicionales realizados en concepto de la diferencia entre el CE básico y el CE máximo. En forma gradual, los emprendedores se convencieron de que era mejor pagar este aumento en el valor del terreno al gobierno que a los propietarios privados, ya que el gobierno convertía dichos pagos en mejoras que, por lo general, generaban un beneficio para los proyectos de los emprendedores.

El Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 y la Ley 13.885 de 2004 también limitaron la oferta de potencial edificable, tanto residencial como no residencial, en todos los distritos municipales, estableciendo una superficie edificable adicional total de 9.769 millones m2: 6.919 millones m2 para uso residencial y 2.850 millones m2 para uso no residencial (ver tabla 1). Dicho potencial no incluyó las superficies edificables que se encontraban dentro del perímetro de los 13 proyectos urbanos de São Paulo. Las superficies adicionales se distribuyeron entre 91 de los 96 distritos municipales, exceptuando cinco áreas destinadas a la protección ambiental. Esta definición y delimitación de la oferta de edificación potencial introdujo un nuevo elemento en el mercado inmobiliario.

Una vez que los emprendedores supieron cuál era la superficie edificable máxima, previeron la escasez de terrenos en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta era baja y la dinámica inmobiliaria era alt y, así, desataron una tendencia hacia un aumento de los precios de terrenos. A su vez, la falta de superficie edificable originó presiones por parte de los emprendedores inmobiliarios para que el gobierno aumentara la oferta, es decir, modificara los límites de la superficie edificable en algunos distritos durante la revisión del Plan Estratégico que se llevó a cabo en el año 2007, aunque no tuvieron éxito. Hacia octubre de 2010, la oferta de terrenos se había agotado totalmente (o casi por completo) para la utilización residencial en 17 distritos, y para la utilización no residencial en 5 distritos (ver figura 1).

Factores de planificación e interés social

La fórmula para calcular la OODC, adoptada en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de São Paulo, tiene en cuenta factores de planificación e interés social, además de las características de la parcela en cuestión y del beneficio económico real que se le asigna a la propiedad como resultado de la OODC. El factor de la planificación es un instrumento cuyo fin es el de fomentar o desalentar densidades altas en ciertas áreas dependiendo de la infraestructura existente, en particular del transporte público y el tránsito masivo. El factor de la planificación también se utiliza con el fin de obtener una mayor compensación económica derivada de la venta de derechos de edificación para empresas ubicadas en áreas de la ciudad que han experimentado mejoras, ya que el coeficiente varía según los terrenos se utilicen con fines residenciales o no residenciales.

El factor del interés social establece exenciones o reducciones en los cargos financieros, dependiendo del tipo de actividad que se desarrollará en la parcela en cuestión. El coeficiente varía de 0 a 1 y se aplica sobre una variedad de actividades. A modo de ejemplo, el coeficiente correspondiente a viviendas económicas o de interés social es 0, lo que significa que los emprendedores de este tipo de viviendas nopagan compensación alguna por los derechos de edificación adicionales. De manera similar, las instituciones sin fines de lucro, tales como hospitales, escuelas, clínicas de salud y maternoinfantiles, centros culturales, instituciones deportivas y recreativas y centros religiosos, poseen un coeficiente 0.

Los mencionados factores actúan a modo de incentivos para lograr los resultados sociales deseados, ya que cuanto menor sea el coeficiente correspondiente al factor de planificación e interés social aplicable a un área determinada, menor será el cargo que se abonará, y mayor será el incentivo para llevar a cabo proyectos de desarrollo en dicha área.

Los efectos en los ingresos y la asignación de fondos

Los ingresos totales provenientes de los pagos de la OODC alcanzaron los R$650 millones (US$325 millones) en aproximadamente cinco años, a pesar de la crisis económica mundial que restringió el crédito hacia finales del período (ver tabla 2). Dichos fondos se depositan en el Fondo de Desarrollo Urbano (FUNDURB), creado con el fin de llevar a cabo planes y proyectos en áreas urbanas y de protección ambiental, u otros tipos de intervenciones contempladas en el Plan Estratégico de 2002.

Para septiembre de 2008, los proyectos aprobados para ser financiados por el FUNDURB fueron 15 parques lineales (R$42,5 millones), mejoras en las aceras y calles (R$21,2 millones), drenajes y obras sanitarias (R$108 millones), instalaciones comunitarias (R$21,1 millones), regularización de asentamientos informales (R$50 millones) y restauración de edificios del patrimonio cultural (R$37 millones).

Comentarios finales

Después de que la ciudad de São Paulo aprobó el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002, el principio de concesiones de desarrollo y terrenos edificables se aplicó en todo el territorio de la ciudad. Cuando un proyecto inmobiliario excede el CE básico y el emprendedor desea edificar hasta un máximo de 4, deberá abonar al gobierno ciertas compensaciones económicas. Desde que se introdujo la OODC, los ingresos han aumentado todos los años. Debe tenerse en cuenta que dichos ingresos son netos de los más de mil millones de dólares generados por 2 de los 13 proyectos urbanos de la ciudad (Faria Lima y Agua Espraiada) donde están ocurriendo los mayores cambios en cuanto a zonificación y densidad (Biderman, Sandroni y Smolka 2006). En dichas áreas, los nuevos derechos de edificación obtienen su precio a través de la subasta de Certificados de Potencial Adicional de Construcción (CEPAC), y los ingresos deben invertirse en el área correspondiente al proyecto urbano, en lugar de colocarse en el FUNDURB para el beneficio de toda la ciudad (Sandroni 2010).

El cargo correspondiente a derechos de edificación en São Paulo parece no haber afectado el rendimiento económico de los emprendedores. Por el contrario, el aumento del CE máximo hasta 4 en algunas áreas de la ciudad contribuyó a mejorar las tasas de rendimiento de los emprendedores. Sin embargo, el establecimiento de una reserva máxima para derechos de edificación parece haber generado una tendencia de aumentos en los precios de los terrenos, en particular en aquellos distritos en los que la oferta de superficies edificables es baja. En algunos distritos, los emprendedores agotaron rápidamente la oferta de derechos de edificación residencial. Este tipo de respuesta tal vez se intensifique en el futuro, lo que dará como resultado que el gobierno municipal se vea presionado para aumentar la oferta máxima de superficies edificables y/o el CE máximo. De ser así, existe el riesgo de que la motivación para aumentar los ingresos municipales tal vez llegue a tener más peso que los criterios de planificación urbana y las limitaciones de la infraestructura, en particular el transporte público y el tránsito masivo.

Por otro lado, el flujo de compensación económica no será continuo. A diferencia de los ingresos derivados de impuestos inmobiliarios, que se repiten en forma anual, los ingresos generados por la venta de derechos de edificación irán desapareciendo con el tiempo a medida que se agote el potencial de edificación adicional. En algunos sectores de la ciudad, la oferta de superficies edificables ya se encuentra agotada y la ciudad ya ha llegado al límite de densidad de edificación definido en la normativa. No obstante, las modificaciones que se realicen en un futuro al Plan Estratégico tal vez establezcan un mayor potencial de edificación para dichas áreas, dependiendo de las recomendaciones técnicas y las condiciones políticas para que ocurran dichos cambios.

En resumen, la aplicación del principio de la función social de la propiedad, incluido en el Plan Estratégico de Ordenamiento Territorial de 2002 de la ciudad de São Paulo, permitió la promulgación de una legislación municipal que separa claramente el derecho a la propiedad del derecho a edificar.

Como resultado, ya no se sostiene la noción tradicional de los derechos de propiedad globales, por lo que el hecho de poseer la propiedad de un terreno no puede invalidar el interés público ni estar por encima de la función social de la propiedad. En consecuencia, los derechos de edificación existents pueden reducirse sin que los propietarios tengan el derecho a recibir una compensación económica por el simple hecho de que se han frustrado sus sueños.

Sobre el Autor

Paulo Henrique Sandroni es economista y fue director de planificación urbana y transporte público de la ciudad de São Paulo desde 1988 hasta 1993 y, por un breve período, fue viceministro de administración del gobierno federal. Ha publicado artículos y libros sobre economía, entre los que se cuenta un diccionario considerado como referencia principal en temas de economía en Brasil. Sandroni es, además, profesor de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios en la Fundación Getulio Vargas de São Paulo, consultor independiente en temas de desarrollo urbano y transporte y conferencista en programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln.

Referencias

Biderman, Ciro, Paulo Sandroni y Martim O. Smolka. 2006. “Large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima in São Paulo”. En Land Lines 18(2): 8–13.

Ayuntamiento Municipal de São Paulo, Secretaría de Finanzas. www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/financas.

Sandroni, Paulo. 2010. “A new financial instrument of value capture in São Paulo: Certificates of additional construction potential”. En Municipal revenues and land policies, Gregory K. Ingram y Yu-Hung Hong, editores, 218–236. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

SECOVI. 2010. Estoque de Outorga Onerosa Residencial. Septiembre. www.geosecovi.com.br.