SHARE
Low-income, self-managed homestead subdivisions, called colonias in Texas, are a rapidly expanding form of land and housing production in the United States. In a recently completed Lincoln Institute-supported study, I have analyzed the dysfunctional aspects of these land markets as measured by a high level of absentee lot ownership, modest lot and property transactions and turnover, and a lack of significant valorization (value increment) as settlements are built through and improved.
Homestead Subdivisions
Colonias, the Spanish word for neighborhoods, were first identified in the poorest Texas counties along the border with Mexico. They comprise unserviced or poorly serviced settlements in which homesteaders have bought a lot upon which they place either a trailer-type dwelling, or its up-market and less mobile or portable form, the “manufactured home.” In some cases, families build their homes through self-help efforts, beginning residence in a shack, camper or second-hand trailer and later consolidating the home over time.
Colonias are not a small-scale phenomenon. According to the Texas Water Development Board, there are approximately 1,500 such settlements housing around 400,000 people, mostly in the border region. The Board’s data and my own survey results show that many similar types of homestead subdivisions exist elsewhere in Texas, so these population estimates are likely to increase as we learn more. Indeed, counties throughout Texas, and in other states as well, are beginning to recognize the problems of unregulated substandard subdivisions that offer one of the few affordable homestead options for low-income households.
Low income here refers to households earning between $12,000 and $25,000 a year, although many colonia households actually earn much less (see Table 1). These households are in poor labor market areas: either regions experiencing wage and labor polarization among workers, or where low-paid service sector jobs predominate. Housing costs in most cities place home ownership beyond the reach of households that seek accommodation within the lower end of the rental housing market, in apartments or in trailer parks. Yet, many of these households aspire to homeownership, recognizing the advantages of moving out of rental housing where they have no equity. Many of them favor homesteading in poorly serviced rural subdivisions where they can own and valorize property through mutual aid and self-help efforts.
Colonias are not homogeneous, however. They vary markedly in size, layout, mode of development, mix of housing types, lot dimensions, lot occupancy and residential turnover rates, level of servicing, ethnic composition, income levels, and levels of relative poverty. In Texas, there is no typical colonia, but rather a range of types that vary among counties.
These settlements are akin to so-called irregular settlements in less developed countries, and they have a similar rationality to explain their existence: a low-wage economy, a rising demand for housing, a lack of state housing supply systems capable of meeting demand, and a private sector uninterested or unable to produce housing at levels that people can afford. Like their counterparts in Mexico and Latin America, colonias offer low-cost unserviced land on the fringes of urbanized areas that is affordable and accessible to very low-income groups. Most residents must commute substantial distances into the adjacent cities for work.
While colonias in Texas are rarely illegal, many aspects of the development process are informal or quasi-formal, most notably:
Just over a decade ago, Texas became aware of the existence and proliferation of colonia-type subdivisions, and in biennial legislative sessions began to take action to stop their growth on the one hand, and to simulate upgrading on the other. Following are some examples of legislative action over the past decade:
An underlying weakness in all these initiatives is that they apply only in the border region and in specially designated counties that form part of the state’s Economically Depressed Areas Program (EDAP). Elsewhere, the process continues essentially unabated.
Vacant Lots and Absentee Ownership
A major indicator of land market dysfunction is the failure to occupy and develop a lot after it has been sold. The data show that between 15 and 80 percent of colonia lots may be vacant. Even in the largest and now often fully serviced settlements, as many as one-quarter to one-sixth of lots are held vacant by absentee lot owners. Moreover, relatively large lot sizes of one-eighth to one-half acre or more, together with prohibitions on lot subdivision and sharing, create very low densities of 10 to 12 persons per acre. This exacerbates the unit cost of providing services, reduces cost recovery, and weakens community cohesion and mutual aid. Weestimate that there are over 26,000 vacant lots in Texas comprising more than 7,000 acres of unoccupied residential land. If these lots were fully populated, even at the prevailing low densities generally found in colonias, an additional 100,000 people could be housed in existing settlements alone.
A key question, then, is why so many low-income households do not occupy their lots? Conventional wisdom argues that the lack of services discourages potential residents, and that providing basic utilities would be a catalyst to lot occupancy. However, this argument begs the question why many people do occupy their lots from the outset. They can be asked about their motives and decision-making process, but it is more problematic to question absentee lot owners who are difficult to trace. Who are they? Where are they? What do they want from their land?
In spite of the methodological conundrum caused by the lack of a clear paper trail from property conveyance records and lot titles, we were able to develop a research strategy using property appraisal and tax records to track down some of these absentee lot owners. However, an estimated 8 to 10 percent of these records were discovered to be “bad” addresses, with the probability that the actual number of untraceable lot owners may be twice as high. Having walked away from the land they bought, these lot owners are in effect locking their property out of future land market transactions.
Current Place of Residence of Absentee Owners
By using tax record data for some 2,713 absentee lot owners across 16 survey settlements (in border and non-border counties), it was possible to identify the current location of absentee owners.
Around three-quarters live locally, i.e., in the adjacent city or within 20 miles. The rest are non-local, split equally between those living elsewhere in Texas and those living out-of-state. While there was a broad spread of addresses across the state, most absentee lot owners lived in Houston (26 percent), Dallas (15 percent) and San Antonio (12 percent)-the three principal metropolitan areas of Texas. California, with 35 percent of all out-of-state absentee addresses, was the most frequently identified state, followed by New Mexico (14 percent), and the Chicago region (Illinois and Indiana with 12 percent).
Characteristics of Occupants and Absentee Owners
This research reveals that colonia occupants and absentee lot owners are substantially different populations (see Table 1). Absentee owners are more likely to be Mexican-American, and are more ethnically diverse. While poor, they are considerably better off than colonia residents. Generally, the absentee owners purchased their lots earlier, and therefore paid less in real terms.
The most dramatic differences between the groups emerge in their residential search behavior and their motives for purchase. Absentee lot owner households are not waiting in the wings to move onto their lots once servicing has been provided. Quite the opposite: most of them (81 percent) are homeowners already and appear to be quite comfortable in their current residence. Moreover, some 49 percent indicated they bought their lot not for themselves but as an investment, as security, or as a future gift or inheritance for their children. Less than one quarter stated that the lack of existing services was an issue. More than half expressed no future intention to move onto the lot, and of those who do intend to move, very few plan to do so in the next 5 to 10 years. In reality I anticipate that few will ever move. Some even said they would sell at any time if the price was right.
Land market performance for both populations during the past two decades is unlike other residential land markets. Land value trends in colonias have remained “flat” in real terms, and the rate of return has been low, especially compared with other sectors of the land and housing market. This suggests that the poor are not benefiting significantly either from their land purchase investment or from their sweat equity (in the case of residents). Although a modest level of market sales continues to take place (more than was anticipated), colonia land markets are not being valorized significantly.
Policies for Fixing the Market
Vacant lots are both a cause and an effect of this poor market performance. It is important to note that the “build-it-and-they-will come” notion is badly misconstrued. Policies to develop urban services in order to catalyze lot occupancy and densification may be helpful, but other land market interventions are also required to make land markets in colonias operate more efficiently. These might include revising legislation to facilitate urban productivity, such as allowing for some nonresidential land use for income production, or for subdivision and rental. Indeed, one reason why land is not being valorized is the restriction placed upon approved land uses. The 1995 moratorium on lot sales also limits development. Although the law is widely breached, doing so deflates prices, distorts turnover and drives sales underground. The prohibition upon internal lot subdivision (especially of large lots) inhibits rent-seeking and cost-sharing among kin.
Another need is to free up the land-locked areas that belong to owners who can no longer be traced. Sequestration of lots for nonpayment of taxes could be one approach, especially if tied to the creation of a public holding company or land trust that would subsequently promote the supply and redistribution of lots through mechanisms such as land pooling and land readjustment. In Texas, at least, tackling the “problem” of large-scale absentee lot ownership would offer a number of positive outcomes and solutions.
Understanding and widening our analysis of homestead subdivisions in Texas and elsewhere offers the potential that policy makers will be better informed, and that we may begin to develop more sensitive and appropriate land policies to address the issue. In so doing, we may substantially increase the supply of homesteading opportunities to the most disadvantaged income groups in U.S. society.
References
Peter M. Ward. 1999. Colonias and Public Policy in Texas and Mexico: Urbanization by Stealth. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
______. 2000. Residential Land Market Dynamics, Absentee Lot Owners and Densification Policies for Texas Colonias. Lincoln Institute Working Paper. WP00PW1. 160 pages. $18.
Peter M. Ward holds the C.B. Smith Sr. Centennial Chair in US-Mexico Relations at the University of Texas-Austin, where he also is a professor in the Department of Sociology and at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.
SHARE
The Lincoln Institute has been cosponsoring research and training programs with public officials in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for several years. The land policy experiment described in this article represents an innovation with much pedagogical potential because it brings attention to the importance of procedural factors (e.g., management, negotiation, transparency, public legitimacy) in the provision of serviced land for the poor, over and above the conventional attention given to funding and other resources.
Approximately one billion people around the world currently live in slums with precarious infrastructure and without basic services or secure land title, and this situation is expected to worsen in the future (UN-HABITAT 2003). From the perspectives of both the urban order and the environment, irregular land occupations often cause irreversible damage and impose high urbanization costs for the local government and the society as a whole.
Irregularity is a multidimensional phenomenon involving tenure issues (e.g., legal rights of occupation, title registration); compliance with urban norms and regulations (e.g., lot sizes, allowance for public spaces, street layouts); the number and quality of services provided; the type of area where settlement occurs (e.g., ecologically risky areas, hillsides, contaminated brownfields); and above all the occupation process itself, which is usually the opposite of formal development, whereby occupation is the culmination of a legal and regulated sequence from titling to planning to servicing.
Basic infrastructure is frequently available in irregular areas, but it is installed either by unregulated subdividers or after occupation by public agencies, often as an emergency measure. For example, sometimes the main trunk networks for water and sewer systems exist close to areas where irregular settlements are forming, so the subdivider or occupants simply improvise clandestine connections to tap into the main line. For small settlements this kind of intervention is not disastrous, yet it implies that services may be extended into areas that are unsuitable for occupation. Private or public utility companies also extend their services to new settlements irrespective of their legal status and often without consulting the local authorities.
Typical Occupation Processes
The most common current practice for creating irregular settlements involves the occupation of a parcel of land through a complex series of commercial transactions involving the landowner, the developer or land subdivider, and often the future occupants. Landowners seek a way to extract profits from the land; subdividers ignore the need to comply with municipal codes and produce a low-cost, high-profit subdivision; and the poor occupants purchase these illegal plots because they have no other option and may be unaware of the legal status. They usually lack a regular income source and savings to apply for credit and meet the stringent building codes and other conditions required for formal purchase and occupation.
Prospective occupants buy the “right to occupy” through a plot acquisition contract and proceed to organize plot boundaries, street layouts and the construction of simple houses. When an official inspection is made it’s already too late; houses have been built and the community is organized to resist. Public authorities cannot keep up with this cycle of complicity, and thus restrict their role to minimal inspection activities that both conceal a management model tolerant of informality and expose the absence of other housing options for that segment of the population.
High-cost curative actions to introduce urban improvements and title regularization programs are being established in many cities, but their effectiveness to date has been limited (Smolka 2003). More seriously and paradoxically, the expectation created by these programs has tended to increase the number of people resorting to irregularity. In sum, the typical process by which the urban poor access serviced land is inefficient and unfair, and ultimately feeds into a vicious cycle of irregularity by contributing to poverty rather than mitigating it. The problem is not so much what services are provided, by whom and at what scale, but how, when and where the process operates to provide those services in the first place.
The Case of Porto Alegre
Porto Alegre (population 1,360,590 in 2000) is the capital of the southernmost state in Brazil and the center of a metropolitan area of 31 municipalities (see Figure 1, page 12). The city’s quality of life improvements have gained worldwide recognition, largely as a result of its poverty reduction and social inclusion programs and its widely acclaimed participatory administration processes (Getúlio Vargas Foundation 2004; Jones Lang Lasalle 2003; UNDP 2003; UN/UMP 2003). For example, the level of infrastructure services is very high: 84 percent of the city’s houses are connected to the sewerage system; 99.5 percent receive treated water; 98 percent receive electricity; and 100 percent of suburbs are serviced by selective waste collection (Municipality of Porto Alegre 2003).
In spite of these impressive figures, 25.5 percent of the population lives in the city’s 727 irregular settlements (Green 2004). It is estimated that the annual population growth in these areas is 4 percent compared to 1.35 percent for the city as a whole. These facts present an apparent paradox and conundrum: How to reconcile widespread provision of basic services with the increase of irregularity in a period of successful, popular and participatory administration?
Since the introduction of decentralized participatory budgeting in 1989, public investment decision making in Porto Alegre has improved, but the process remains economically ineffective, technically inappropriate, environmentally disastrous, fiscally unfair (because land subdividers pocket monies that should benefit the public) and politically unsustainable. Many areas still have serious problems: poor quality streets without drainage or paving; geological instability and susceptibility to flooding; and a lack of legal titling, which means, for example, no address for postal delivery. Nevertheless, the Porto Alegre case is interesting because it vividly demonstrates that the problem of confronting irregularity is less one of providing services than of changing the process by which the services are provided. It’s a procedural process, a change in the rules of the game.
An Innovative Urban Policy Instrument
The Social Urbanizer concept was developed in Porto Alegre as an instrument, and more generally a program, to overcome the existing unsustainable process of providing urban services in spite of a long history of regulatory legislation (see Figure 2). Enacted in July 2003 shortly after approval of Brazil’s innovative City Statute Act, the Social Urbanizer Act was the result of significant dialogue involving the building industry unions, small land subdividers, housing cooperatives, financial agents and the City Council.
A Social Urbanizer is a real estate developer registered with the municipality who is interested in developing in areas identified by the government as suitable for low-income housing, and who agrees to operate according to certain negotiated terms, including the affordability of the serviced plots. The process contemplates a public-private partnership through which the municipality commits to make certain urban norms and regulations more flexible, to speed up the licensing process, reduce the legal requirements, and recognize progressive, step-by-step urbanization. It also anticipates using the transfer of development rights as a stimulating mechanism for private developers. Other incentives may take the form of access to specific lines of credit or certain direct public investments in urban infrastructure so the costs are not passed on to the final buyer. Eligible Social Urbanizer applicants include duly registered real estate developers, contractors already working in the informal market, landowners and self-managed cooperatives.
Porto Alegre’s Social Urbanizer program incorporates lessons learned from both real challenges and untapped opportunities for public action, and it is inspired by several specific ideas. First, land subdividers operating to provide access to urban land by the low-income sector (albeit through illegal activities) have an expertise and familiarity with that sector that public authorities do not have. Thus, rather than demonize or punish these agents, the Social Urbanizer approach takes a new attitude toward attracting them with appropriate incentives (and sanctions) so they can operate legally. Furthermore, while it is common knowledge that a subdivider can usually operate more profitably at the margin of the law, because of lower overhead costs, avoidance of legal approvals, and so forth, it is less well known that, given the option, many of these subdividers would rather operate legally, even if it means a lower profit margin.
Second, the land value increments generated by land transactions could be converted into a source of revenue for the development. In practice this share of value should be distributed both directly by the landowner (as an in-kind contribution of land beyond what is legally required in land subdivisions for low-income occupations) and indirectly by the subdivider through negotiated lower land prices for the low-income buyers. In most cases of irregular development the public is not able to capture and benefit from this increase in land value.
Third, by giving public transparency to the terms of direct negotiations and the resulting win-win agreement among all the interested parties (i.e., landowners, developers, public authorities, prospective buyers), the Social Urbanizer process creates adequate sanctions for compliance with the norms established for the development. Another component of the negotiation process has to do with the agreed investment schedule and its effect in diffusing speculative pricing.
Fourth, to have any chance of success this new mode of urbanization should be able to provide an adequate supply of serviced plots to meet social needs under competitive market conditions (i.e., more affordable than the conditions of otherwise informal subdividers). In effect an essential ingredient of the program’s rationale is that it establishes new rules for social urbanization in general. The signal should be clear to private agents that the Social Urbanizer process is the only way for the government to participate in the development of socially approved and affordable settlements.
The Social Urbanizer as a Third Path
For the public interest, the primary goal of this strategy is to establish the basis for development before occupation takes place, or at least according to a schedule allowing for significant reduction or control of urbanization costs (see Figure 3).
Public administrations in third-world cities typically respond to the inability of the poor to access formal land markets through two models or paradigms. Under the subsidy model the public intervenes to provide serviced land either directly through publicly developed settlements on an emergency basis, or indirectly through below-market interest for developers operating in that segment of the market. At the other extreme, the 100-percent tolerance model recognizes that the government does not have the capacity to provide all the serviced land needed, and thus tolerates irregular and informal arrangements that may eventually be improved with various regularization programs.
Both approaches keep land market conditions untouched and feed into the vicious cycle of informality. In the first case the subsidies are capitalized into higher land prices, and in the second case they allow land subdividers to charge a premium based on the expectation of future regularization: the higher the expectation, the higher the premium.
The Social Urbanizer represents a third path that recognizes both the role and expertise of informal land subdividers who operate in the low-income segment of the market and the indispensable role of public agents in supporting the poor to participate in otherwise inaccessible market conditions. In other words, this program represents an effort to “formalize the informal” and “informalize the formal” by facilitating and providing incentives for developers to operate with more flexibility in the normally unprofitable low-income market. It is an instrument designed to encourage both entrepreneurs operating in the clandestine real estate market and those operating in the formal, higher-income market segment to develop land under the existing regular standards.
The Social Urbanizer Act represents an attempt to change the rules on how low-income housing needs are to be addressed. It gives a clear signal to the private agents operating in the land market and protects the public from arbitrariness in private development actions. The Social Urbanizer has proven to be an indispensable tool for public management. As a break with current practices, however, the program still faces many challenges in implementation.
Early Stages of Implementation
Porto Alegre has five Social Urbanizer pilot projects at different stages of development. They involve different types of developers so they can function as true experiments: small developers, developers already established in the market, and housing cooperatives. One of these pilot areas has demonstrated that 125 square metres (m2) of fully serviced land can be produced at a price ranging from US$25 to US$28 per m2 in contrast with the formal market price of US$42 to US$57 per m2 for the same amount of land. The first price range represents how much a developer is actually willing to contract with the local administration to operate under the Social Urbanizer framework.
The municipality also attempted to gain financial support for social urbanization activities from Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), the federal organization responsible for financing housing and urban development. The agency is creating a new financial line within its partnership program in which credit is given to the buyer, who will knowingly use it to purchase a plot of land. Until now this financial option was only available for the acquisition of a housing unit before construction. Thus the idea of a credit line to ultimately finance the development of serviced land is a novelty. Another related improvement is the willingness of the local administration to void requirements on developers’ risk analysis, an essential ingredient to open the field to small developers.
The innovation of the Social Urbanizer instrument, as compared to traditional public methods of dealing with urban irregularity, has attracted the attention of many organizations and other municipalities. At a federal level the Social Urbanizer is considered fully integrated with the principles of the City Statute, which has brought support from Brazil’s Ministry for Cities. Another federal law that deals with the subdivision of urban land is now being discussed in the Brazilian National Congress, and the Social Urbanizer is part of that debate as well. If adopted, this subdivision legislation will be an important step toward changing the traditional and perverse process of providing access to land for the urban poor in other Brazilian cities.
Chronology of Urban Policies in Porto Alegre
1979 – Approval of the Federal Subdivision Law (6766/1979) and the First Development Master Plan for Porto Alegre
1990 – Establishment of the Urban Regularization Program
1996 – Creation of the Urban Regularization Center
1998 – Announcement of Land Title Regularization Year
1999 – Approval of the Environmental Development Master Plan
2001 – Implementation of a pilot plan of a differentiated taxation model, based on preventive action, operating in the region of the city that suffers the highest number of irregular settlements
2001 – Enactment of Brazil’s City Statute Act on Urban Development (Law 10.257/2001)
2003 – Enactment of the Social Urbanizer Act (Law 9162/2003)
2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects
2005 – Implementation of the Social Urbanizer pilot projects
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute, director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, and co-chairman of the Department of International Studies. Cláudia Damasio is an architect and former under-secretary of planning for the Municipality of Porto Alegre. She now serves as coordinator of the Social Urbanizer project. .
References
Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 2004. Revista Você S/A. Editora Abril. August 10. São Paulo, Brazil
Green, Eliane D’Arrigo, ed. 2004. Irregularidade fundiária em Porto Alegre por região de planejamento (Land irregularity in Porto Alegre by planning regions) Municipality of Porto Alegre, Secretary of Municipal Planning, http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/spm/
Jones Lang Lasalle. 2003. World Winning Cities II, http://www.joneslanglasalle.com/research/index.asp
Municipality of Porto Alegre. 2003. Informaçöes a cidade: Títulos e Conquistas (Information about the city: Titles and achievements), http://www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Land Lines 15(1): 4–7.
UN-HABITAT. 2003. The Challenge Of Slums: Global Report On Human Settlements. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/register/item.asp?ID=1156
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. Human Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press, http://www.undp.org/
United Nations Urban Management Program (UN/UMP). 2003. Report of the Urban Management Program of UN-HABITAT 2003. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT, http://hq.unhabitat.org/programmes/ump/publications.asp
