Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

La introducción de programas de adjudicación de títulos de propiedad al mercado informal del suelo parecía ser la solución mágica al problema de la pobreza en países del tercer mundo. Varios gobiernos suspiraron de alivio al pensar que la lucha contra la pobreza ya no requeriría las complejas y estresantes medidas de redistribución, eternas causantes de conflictos entre clases y grupos sociales. Según esta fórmula mágica, bastaría con que los habitantes urbanos informales (alrededor del 50 % de la población de las grandes ciudades) registraran sus propiedades formalmente para obtener los títulos de propiedad, para entonces poder obtener préstamos hipotecarios de bancos privados. Con sus títulos y su recién adquirido acceso a los préstamos, la población necesitada podría aumentar su capital inmobiliario, mejorar sus viviendas y establecer pequeños negocios (de Soto 1986; 2001).

Con objeto de someter esta hipótesis a prueba y a petición del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática del Perú (INEI), el autor realizó un estudio de la política de registro predial oficial del Perú, bajo la cual se otorgaron más de un millón de títulos de propiedad entre 1996 y 2000. Los encargados de ejecutar esta política fueron la Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) y el Registro Predial Urbano (RPU). Tal como se estableció en el Decreto de Ley 803 del Perú de marzo de 1996, la política de registro predial se propuso establecer una relación formal entre la distribución de títulos de propiedad, el acceso a mecanismos formales de crédito y el mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de la población. Basado en la información aportada por las Encuestas Nacionales de Hogares (ENAHO) de 1998 y 1999 realizadas por el INEI, en el estudio se analizaron datos de viviendas que habían sido adquiridas a través de invasiones u otros medios ilegales y que carecían de títulos de propiedad o bien se los había otorgado COFOPRI a través del proceso de regularización. La base de datos del estudio incluyó 913.335 unidades en 1998 y 1.033.480 en 1999, de un total de 3.572.091 unidades habitacionales urbanas para ambos años. El indicador utilizado para determinar el acceso al crédito fue el financiamiento obtenido para la ampliación de la vivienda u otros gastos para el hogar, mientras que para determinar las condiciones de vida se utilizaron como indicadores la estructura de la vivienda y la existencia de servicios básicos.

Los promotores de la regularización de la propiedad en Perú sostienen la necesidad de otorgar títulos de propiedad a gran escala reconociendo la ocupación informal (es decir, legalizando la tenencia del suelo) y adjudicando títulos de propiedad registrada, a fin de establecer los vínculos necesarios para abrir las puertas al crédito formal. El registro oficial es el procedimiento jurídico por el cual los derechos a la propiedad llevan a la tenencia legal. En forma particular, el registro formal establece vínculos entre la legalización de suelo y propiedades y el acceso a hipotecas a través de la banca privada. Tal como lo establece la Asociación Path to Property (una organización dedicada a promover estas políticas a nivel mundial), detrás del proceso de registro formal se esconde la filosofía de que la prosperidad de los países con economías de mercado se debe principalmente a sus adecuados sistemas de propiedad, que permiten operar sus mercados mediante derechos de propiedad intercambiables en un mercado amplio.

Los derechos de propiedad deben formalizarse y los instrumentos de intercambio de acceso universal deben registrarse en un sistema central regido por reglamentos y normas legales. Así, los tenedores pueden tener pruebas irrefutables de su propiedad y protegerse contra el fraude y la incertidumbre. Por consiguiente, el registro oficial de la propiedad facilita canalizar la “energía” del sector informal hacia economías de mercado organizadas y prósperas. Vista desde esta perspectiva, la informalidad no es otra cosa que la incapacidad de los gobiernos de hacer que sus leyes coincidan con las verdaderas circunstancias en que su gente vive y trabaja. No obstante, tal punto de vista no logra reducir un fenómeno complejo a su dimensión jurídica y descuida sus aspectos económicos.

Política y resultados de la titulación del suelo

Con el objeto de acelerar la distribución de los títulos de propiedad y evitar problemas burocráticos, se transfirió esta responsabilidad de las municipalidades a COFOPRI. El Banco Mundial apoyó esta política y otorgó a COFOPRI un préstamo de US$38 millones en diciembre de 1998. Entre 1996 y 2000 se otorgaron 1.134.000 títulos de propiedad debidamente inscritos, 645.165 de ellos en Lima, 112.631 en Arequipa y 74.180 en Trujillo (las tres ciudades más grandes del Perú, en ese orden). Si bien es innegable el éxito de la política de registro formal en términos de distribución y registro de títulos de propiedad, es cuestionable el haber eliminado la figura de las municipalidades en el proceso y mermado su función jurídica en el sistema urbano.

Una vez ejecutada la política, se observó una estrecha relación entre el registro oficial de propiedad y las condiciones de vida en Lima. Entre 1998 y 1999, las viviendas regularizadas (antiguamente ilegales o informales) de la ciudad capital mostraron mejoras de construcción en paredes, pisos y techos; sin embargo, también se observaron mejoras de paredes y pisos en las viviendas no regularizadas. En el resto del país, el número de viviendas informales de las áreas urbanas sobrepasa al de viviendas regularizadas.

Si bien entre 1998 y 1999 el número de viviendas regularizadas fuera de Lima aumentó (de 17.929 a 48.869), también aumentaron las carentes de títulos de propiedad (de 371.005 a 392.436), lo cual pone en evidencia la persistencia de los mecanismos de invasión. Entre 1998 y 1999 aumentó la disparidad entre los diferentes tipos de mejoras hechas a las viviendas regularizadas y las informales fuera de Lima para la mayoría de las categorías (véase la tabla 1).

Tabla 1: Mejoras de viviendas regularizadas e informales fuera de Lima, 1998-1999 (%)

1998 1999

Regularizadas Informales Diferencia Regularizadas Informales Diferencia

Mejoras de paredes 67,0 41,5 25,5 78,5 44,0 34,5

Mejoras de pisos 75,6 48,0 27,6 80,0 54,0 26,0

Mejoras de techos 61,0 21,0 40,0 78,0 23,0 55,0

Si se observa la relación entre los títulos de propiedad oficiales y el acceso al crédito, los resultados del estudio muestran que el 34 % de las viviendas de Lima a las que COFOPRI otorgó títulos de propiedad en 1998 (23.965 de un total de 70.725 viviendas) consiguieron varios tipos de financiamiento provenientes de bancos, agencias de préstamo o familiares, para efectos de hacer mejoras o renovaciones en sus hogares. En 1999, alrededor del 18,3 % de las viviendas tituladas (23.804 de un total de 129.588) obtuvieron tal financiamiento. Si bien no se dispone de información oficial sobre el número de solicitudes de crédito que fueron rechazadas, tal resultado demuestra que los hogares oficialmente registrados que adquieren acceso a los préstamos constituyen una minoría, y que de hecho, el número de ellos está en descenso. Varios factores complejos pueden explicar esta situación, entre ellos la recesión económica, la tasa de incumplimiento de pago del 10 % para los préstamos de la banca privada, la renuencia a otorgar préstamos al sector pobre de la población y los temores que tienen estos propietarios a hipotecar sus hogares y sus tierras.

De la misma manera, el número de préstamos bancarios otorgados en Lima a propietarios debidamente titulados disminuyó entre 1998 y 1999 (de 12.750 a 8.993). En cambio, en el mismo período aumentó el uso de recursos propios para financiar las mejoras a las viviendas (de 12.282 a 14.811). Como puede verse, no sólo una gran mayoría de los propietarios está gastando fondos propios en sus viviendas, sino también que se les está dificultando lograr el acceso a instituciones de crédito, todo esto a pesar de tener el registro formal de sus propiedades. Un estudio realizado por COFOPRI-DESCO (Riofrío 2001) identificó varias características que comparten las personas que están dispuestas a hipotecar sus propiedades:

• pertenecen a familias nucleares estables;
• marido y mujer son asalariados;
• tienen mentalidad empresarial y disposición a correr riesgos;
• manejan negocios propios (micronegocios, taxis, etc.); y
• están informadas sobre el Registro de Suelo Urbano.

De los 12.750 hogares oficialmente registrados y regularizados en Lima que también recibieron préstamos bancarios en 1998 para fines de renovaciones y mejoras, el 52,6 % los obtuvo a través del Banco de Materiales y el 47,4 % de la Empresa Nacional de Construcciones y Edificaciones (ENACE). En 1999, 8.993 hogares oficialmente registrados y regularizados recibieron préstamos para renovaciones y mejoras, el 84,43 % del Banco de Materiales y el 15,57 % de la ENACE. Puesto que ambas son entidades públicas que otorgan préstamos subsidiados (a la misma tasa de interés anual de 7 %), no hay conexión entre el registro proprietario oficial a través de los programas de regularización y el acceso a préstamos de la banca privada.

En cuanto al financiamiento para otras clases de gastos domésticos, en 1999 apenas el 8,7 % de los hogares registrados en Lima (11.323 de un total de 129.588) recurrieron a alguna clase de ayuda financiera. Dado que ninguna entidad pública otorga préstamos para este tipo de gastos, la mayoría de los hogares recibe el financiamiento por parte de amigos y parientes (47 %) u otras fuentes como agencias de préstamos (25 %). Sólo el 28 % de estos 11.323 hogares registrados obtuvieron préstamos de la banca privada para gastos del hogar.

En otras áreas urbanas, la situación de los hogares oficialmente registrados es diferente a la de Lima. En 1998 el uso de fondos propios superó a los préstamos bancarios para efectos de realizar mejoras a la vivienda (78,7 % en comparación con 21,2 %), mientras que lo contrario ocurrió en 1999 (51,3 % de préstamos bancarios en comparación con 42,9 % de fondos propios). En 1998, todos los préstamos fueron préstamos públicos otorgados por el Banco de Materiales, mientras que en 1999 el 93 % provino de dicha fuente. En cuanto a los préstamos para otros gastos domésticos, sólo el 13 % de los hogares oficialmente registrados (6.163 de un total de 47.302) recibieron en 1999 algún tipo de financiamiento. De este pequeño grupo, el 45 % recibió asistencia financiera de agencias de préstamos y otras fuentes; el 34 %, de amigos y parientes, y el 21 % de sus empleadores o centros de trabajo. Ninguno de ellos obtuvo fondos de la banca privada.

Conclusiones

El estudio arrojó las siguiente conclusiones en cuanto a la relación que hay entre el registro oficial de títulos y el acceso al crédito:

• En general, y pese al aumento de las propiedades regularizadas entre 1998 y 1999, el acceso a préstamos disminuyó durante ese período. Este hecho coincidió con la recesión económica y problemas afines que afectaron a los bancos privados.
• El uso de recursos personales supera al de los préstamos bancarios como fuente de financiamiento para la ampliación de las viviendas, tanto regularizadas como informales. Los préstamos para otros gastos domésticos provienen principalmente de parientes y amigos, seguido por bancos privados y sistemas prestamistas informales. Las familias de bajos recursos utilizan principalmente sus fondos propios o aquéllos provenientes de redes sociales para efectuar mejoras a sus viviendas (regularizadas e informales); los recursos de instituciones formales públicas o privadas son secundarios.
• Como hecho sorpresivo, los hogares informales gozan de más acceso a préstamos de la banca privada que los regularizados. En 1999, por ejemplo, el 100 % de los préstamos para mejoras a las viviendas regularizadas por COFOPRI en Lima fueron préstamos públicos (es decir, no hubo préstamos privados), mientras que el 28 % de las viviendas no regularizadas obtuvo préstamos privados. Estos números sugieren que los criterios de préstamos que usa la banca privada se basan en la estabilidad laboral y las entradas mensuales fijas, más que en la tenencia de suelo. La información obtenida de la ENAHO muestra que en 1998 el 25 % de las familias ocupantes de viviendas informales ganaron aproximadamente US$747,50 por mes, cifra equivalente a 6 a 7 salarios mínimos mensuales. En contraste, apenas el 12 % de las familias ocupantes de propiedades registradas oficialmente y regularizadas por COFOPRI recibieron un salario comparable. Esta paradójica situación, en la que los propietarios de títulos no tienen acceso a los bancos privados mientras que aquéllos sin títulos tienen mayores entradas económicas y mejor acceso a préstamos, quizás pueda explicarse por el hecho de que COFOPRI, en su empeño de otorgar rápidamente un gran número de títulos y de crear impacto político, concentró sus esfuerzos en barrios más recientes y fragmentados donde era fácil identificar a los propietarios, en desmedro de barrios más antiguos donde las familias conviven con varias generaciones bajo un mismo techo, dificultando la identificación de propietarios.
• Tanto para las propiedades regularizadas como las informales, las principales fuentes de préstamo fueron entidades públicas que otorgaron préstamos subsidiados (p. ej., el Banco de Materiales).

Como puede observarse, no existe una relación directa entre el número de títulos de propiedad otorgados a los ocupantes informales y su subsiguiente acceso a préstamos de la banca privada. Esta conclusión fue confirmada cuando el gobierno de transición, luego de la salida del expresidente Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), reveló en 2001 que se habían registrado apenas 12.388 hipotecas en el RPU en todo el país, lo cual equivale a apenas un 5 % de los beneficiarios potenciales. Si bien los centros de registro pueden ser útiles, ciertamente no hay suficientes para incrementar el acceso al crédito. Una política eficaz requiere el estudio profundo de un número de factores diferentes, entre ellos:

• Las políticas en que se basan los préstamos de la banca privada. Tanto en América Latina como en los Estados Unidos abundan las políticas discriminatorias (por ejemplo, los tratamientos negativos que se dan a las poblaciones de bajos recursos).
• La cultura popular del crédito, particularmente el miedo que siente el pobre de perder su propiedad (la cual es prácticamente su único activo), como también la falta de entendimiento de los conceptos de títulos de propiedad, crédito e incluso banca. Es importante estudiar los patrones de inercia cultural sometidos a prueba por este tipo de políticas y considerar las oportunidades educativas que podrían facilitar estos procesos.
• La renuencia de la gente a registrar sus propiedades y a utilizar los registros.

Este artículo y la investigación hecha para el mismo no pretenden menoscabar la importancia de las políticas diseñadas para facilitar el acceso al crédito de la población pobre mediante programas de regularización. Por el contrario, dichas políticas son importantes y deben incentivarse, aunque no podemos sugerir que constituyan el único medio para atacar la pobreza urbana. Para que el sistema pueda mejorar, es fundamental contar con un mejor entendimiento del sistema de crédito y de la cultura de crédito popular, así como también desarrollar programas de asistencia financiera que hagan frente a la resistencia que tienen los pobres y la banca a las hipotecas.

Julio Calderón Cockburn, sociólogo y estudiante de doctorado de la Universidad de San Marcos en Lima, Perú, es autor de muchos libros y artículos publicados en las Américas y Europa y actualmente se desempeña como asesor independiente y profesor universitario. Igualmente es investigador asociado al Instituto Lincoln, el cual apoyó el estudio aquí referido además de otros proyectos de investigación y enseñanza en el pasado.

Referencias

Calderón Cockburn, Julio A. 2001. Comparative Analysis of the Benefited and Non-benefited Population by the National Formalization Plan. In Has the Well-being of the Population Improved?: A Balance of the Main Social Policies and Programs. Lima: National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (INEI): 65-92.

de Soto, Hernando. 1986. The Other Path. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

_____. 2002. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.

Fernandes, Edesio. 2002. The Influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. Land Lines 14 (1): 5–8.

Riofrío, G., J. Calderón y M. Zolezzi. 2001. Estudio sobre cultura registral. Lima: COFOPRI-DESCO. Agosto.

Few places in Latin America, or in the rest of the world, have dared to implement such radical urban land policy reforms as Chile has over the last 20 years. In 1979, the government began initiating deregulation policies by releasing a document that stated that the scarcity of land was artificially produced by excessive regulation, which resulted in the virtual elimination of urban growth boundaries.

Since then much has changed in the morphology and internal structure of Chilean cities, but the assessment of these changes varies greatly according to one’s ideological position. Explicit socially oriented urban policies have allowed for significant improvements in access to housing by the poor, but some argue that the spatial segregation impacts of such policies have imposed a high toll on society by indirectly lowering quality of life, impeding access to jobs and aggravating social alienation.

Even before the 1973-1990 period of military government, Chile was recognized as a unitarian and centralist political system, characterized by the strong presence of the state in economics and politics. It is a society with a relatively homogenous culture and is unique among Latin American countries in its strong legalist tradition. Chilean cities also present a sharp contrast to their counterparts in Latin America. There are virtually no informal land markets; land tenure has been almost completely regularized by strong public programs; and the majority of the urban poor live in areas where the main streets are paved and sanitary services are provided. Urban violence, in spite of growing trends, is still minimal compared to the rest of the continent.

Deregulation Policies and Problems

Among the most innovative aspects of Chilean urban policy are the following:

• Elimination of urban growth boundaries while maintaining the planning designation of sensitive areas for environmental protection. This measure had two goals: to delegate a leadership role in urban development and land use to market forces and to reduce land prices.
• Establishment of a subsidy system aimed at reducing the housing deficit. Considered by many to be the pillar of Chile’s housing policy, the subsidy system is widely perceived as the original and most innovative synthesis of liberalization policies with Chile’s state-dominated tradition. The program channels substantial subsidies to families-based on income, family structure, demonstrated saving capacity, and current housing condition-in order to finance housing provided by the private sector according to certain pre-established standards. As a result, Chile has emerged as the only country in Latin America where, since 1992, new housing has been provided at a faster rate than the formation of new households, gradually eliminating the housing deficit.
• Eviction of poor settlements from well-to-do areas and other overt segregationist policies. Few other countries would dare to implement such policies today, as they would surely meet strong resistance in less autocratic societies where the rights of poor occupants are recognized as legitimate.

Although some of the achievements of these deregulation policies are widely recognized as positive-particularly in regard to legal and physical or urbanistic regularization and the quantity of social housing provided-many Chileans believe that the policies of the past 20 years have only caused new problems. Some of them are:

• Urban sprawl and its relation to increasing traffic congestion and dangerous levels of air pollution. For example, Santiago’s air pollution levels are matched only by cities three times its size, such as Mexico City and São Paulo, even though car use is relatively low.
• The formation of ill-equipped and socially segregated low-income neighborhoods. In a context of increasing economic and employment insecurity, these areas become a breeding ground for social problems such as drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, youth apathy and alienation.1 Even a casual visitor to the capital city, Santiago, is struck by the contrast between the flamboyance of wealthy, master-planned comunas2 such as Las Condes and the monotony of neighborhoods produced by private developers in fringe comunas such as Maipú and La Florida.
• Continued increases in land prices. Contrary to the predictions of those responsible for the deregulation policies, land prices in Chile have increased, absorbing an ever-larger share of the housing subsidy program.3 Some analysts have claimed that land prices already correspond to between 60 and 100 percent of the subsidy. This is seriously jeopardizing the sustainability of the voucher system, and is pushing the poorest sectors out of the program. These increases in land prices should come as no surprise, however; similar escalation has occurred in other countries where deregulation policies have influenced future demand expectations of ‘cheaper’ urban fringe development as an alternative to the congested centers.

It is unclear whether these urban changes can be attributed directly to the effectiveness of market-oriented land policies or to the strong overall performance of the Chilean economy. The steady growth in gross domestic product (GDP), averaging about seven percent a year since 1985, was interrupted only recently due to the Asian economic crisis.

Expanding the Debate

The liberalization of urban land markets in Chile represents an intriguing and innovative experience from an international perspective, yet internal public debate has been limited. Recently, the achievements and problems of liberalization have reached a point of such undeniable importance that they have stimulated broad concerns. Furthermore, the government has proposed modifying the current “Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones” (Law of Urban Planning and Construction), which would result in a number of significant changes. Among the most important are:

• broader responsibilities for urban planning, which would have to account for all local space (not only the urbanized areas within each municipality, as at present), and
• the application of a series of economic or market regulations, such as the issuance of special “construction certificates” designed to conserve the country’s architectural heritage, and the creation of “conditional urban development zones” to favor mixed-use schemes. Despite the importance of these potential modifications to future planning, they have not been debated widely, and the legislative proposal has not included theoretical considerations or an explanation that justifies the proposed changes.

To facilitate a focused discussion of these issues, Carlos Montes, President of the Chilean House of Representatives, invited the Lincoln Institute to participate in a seminar coordinated with the Institute of Urban Studies of the Catholic University of Chile. Titled “20 Years of Liberalization of Land Markets in Chile: Impacts on Social Housing Policy, Urban Growth and Land Prices,” the seminar was held in October 1999 in Santiago. It brought together members of the Chilean Congress, the business community (developers, financial leaders, etc.), officials of public agencies (ministries, municipalities, etc.), academics and representatives of NGOs to engage in a lively public debate. The discussion highlighted a clear ideological polarization between “liberal” and “progressive” approaches to understanding and solving deregulation issues (i.e., “more market” versus “more state”).

From a liberal point of view, these problems emerge and persist because land markets have never been sufficiently deregulated. Some liberals, in fact, insist that public intervention never disappeared; they believe that regulation actually increased after Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. For example, liberals cite various means, often indirect, by which the state restricts the free growth of cities, such as when it attempts to expand environmentally protected areas that are closed to urban uses or to impose an official and almost homogenous criterion of densification to all urban space. They also assert that citizens should be free to choose different lifestyles and that the authorities should limit themselves to informing citizens of the private and social costs of their options, with the implicit understanding that such costs are reflected in market prices when urban land markets are functioning efficiently (i.e., when they are fully liberalized).

The principal explanation offered by the liberals for the problems of equity and efficiency facing Chilean urban development today are insufficient advances in the application of criteria to “internalize the externalities,” particularly negative externalities, by those responsible for them. As passionately argued by some representatives of this group, private agents should be allowed to act freely, as long as they are willing to compensate society for the implied social costs incurred.

On the other hand, the progressives believe that liberalization has gone too far in its market approach and has left many problems unsolved: the increase in land prices; problems in the quality and durability of housing; the conditions under which land is serviced; social problems associated with urban poverty; and problems of efficiency and equity derived from the growth patterns of cities, such as the mismatch between areas where services are provided and the locations chosen for private developments.

These criticisms recognize the imperfect nature of urban markets and the need for greater levels of control and intervention. Among the forms of intervention recommended by many progressives are value capture instruments, which have rarely been used or even contemplated in financing programs for the public provision of new urban infrastructure and services. The creation of such mechanisms would be consistent with the idea of internalizing the externalities, a point of relative consensus between the progressives and the liberals. The main difference is that the liberals would restrict value capture to the public recovery of specific costs, whereas the progressives would consider the right to capture the full land value increment resulting from any public action, whether resulting from investment or regulation.

In more general terms, the progressives argue that not everything can be considered in strictly monetary terms. There are urban values and objectives related to public policy that cannot be achieved through the market, or for that matter by law, such as the sense of community. Although largely disregarded in the new housing options provided by private developers to low-income families, such as the voucher system, community solidarity is of tremendous importance to counteract the social problems that spatial segregation tends to exacerbate. Environmental conservation is another example of an urban policy objective for which “price tags” are seen to be of questionable effectiveness.

With regard to the free growth of cities and the idea of respecting the options of their citizens, the progressives react by noting that steep social and environmental costs tend to go hand-in-hand with sprawl. They also point out that the only group that can truly choose its way of life through the marketplace is the wealthy minority. While seeing benefits in concentration, progressives also voice concerns about extreme density. Some Chileans have expressed an interest in a metropolitan authority to deal with regional issues, and in the use of public infrastructure investment as a means of guiding growth.

Adequate responses to these issues and perspectives involve more than technical or fiscal solutions, such as the extent to which developers actually pay for the full cost of the changes they impose on society (let alone the problem of accurately assessing the costs) or the sustainability of the demand-driven voucher system which constitutes the core of Chile’s housing policy. The solutions also involve broader and more value-related concerns, such as the environmental costs of sprawl and the importance of maintaining local community identities and initiatives. Discussion in the Congress and other settings is still expanding, but is expected to take some time before the opposing perspectives reach consensus.

Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and the director of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program. Francisco Sabatini is assistant professor of the Institute of Urban Studies at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago. Laura Mullahy, research assistant, and Armando Carbonell, senior fellow, both of the Lincoln Institute, also contributed to this article.

Notes:

In contrast to the rest of the continent, drugs were not a major problem in Chile until recently.

2 Metropolitan Santiago is comprised of 35 independent political-administrative jurisdictions called comunas.

3 See Gareth A. Jones, “Comparative Policy Perspectives on Urban Land Market Reform,” Land Lines, November 1998.

4 Our use of the term “liberal” corresponds to its connotation in Chile, which refers to the strong influence of the economic principle of freeing market forces to their limits, as espoused by the “Chicago School.”

Sources: Francisco Sabatini, et.al., “Social Segregation in Santiago, Chile: Concepts, Methods and Urban Effects” (monograph, 1999) and Executive Secretariat of the Planning Commission for Investments in Transportation Infrastructure (SECTRA), “Survey of Origin and Destination of Trips in Santiago”(1991).

On July 18, 1997, the Congress of the Republic of Colombia passed an innovative new Law of Land Development with ambitious goals for permitting municipalities to recover socially created land values, known in Spanish as plusvalía. Specifically, Law 388 declares that the public has a right “to participate” in increases in land values created when land use regulations increase the potential for development. Three categories of public actions are covered:

(1) changing a designation of rural land (in which development is extremely limited) into land for urban or suburban development;

(2) modification of zoning or other land use regulations;

(3) modification of regulations that permit greater building density.

Briefly stated, the legislation provides that the square-meter value of the land shall be determined before any public action and then after the action. Any municipality, at the initiative of its mayor, may demand that it “participate” by being able to recapture 30 to 50 percent (as it chooses) of the increase in value. The value is determined by multiplying the two square-meter values by the area of the parcel concerned and subtracting the pre-action value from the post-action value. A maximum of 50 percent was established to ensure that developers would still be financially motivated.

With this legislation, Colombia has enacted into national policy the basic premise of Henry George’s writings: that the public has a moral right to recover socially created values, as manifested in this case by increases in land values released by the three categories of public decisions mentioned above. With the possible exception of Taiwan, few if any other countries have attempted to so directly incorporate Georgian principles into actual legislation at the national level.

Implementation Procedures

The current legislation is only the first step. Under Colombian practice, acts of Congress set general policies, but implementation depends on follow-up at the national executive level and at the municipal level. To make the critical before and after square meter evaluations as objective as possible, an independent organization known as the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute will carry out assessments according to guidelines established in the law for each of the three categories.

Fees (called participaciones in the law) must be paid when a landowner applies for permission to subdivide or to construct on the property, when the use of the property is changed, when the property is transferred, or when development rights (representing rights for additional construction) are acquired. These fees are to be recorded in the registry of titles to assure compliance, and land cannot be transferred in the registry until the fees are paid in one of various forms:

(1) by paying cash;

(2) by transferring to a public body a portion of the property that is of equivalent value;

(3) by exchanging urban land of equivalent value at other locations;

(4) by making the public body a partner in the execution of the project with an interest of equivalent value;

(5) by providing needed infrastructure or open space of equivalent value; or

(6) by giving back a portion of the development rights created by the public action that is equivalent in value.

It may be anticipated that most developers will prefer to partner with municipalities instead of paying cash. Indeed, the legislation provides an incentive to use method (6) since it carries a 10 percent discount on the fees, or methods (2) or (4), which have a 5 percent discount.

Municipalities must earmark the revenues produced from participation in socially created land values for specific purposes:

• buying land for “social interest” housing;
• providing infrastructure in areas where it is currently inadequate;
• expanding the network of open spaces;
• financing mass transit;
• carrying out large urban projects or urban renewal;
• covering costs of land expropriation for urban renewal; or
• undertaking historic preservation.

Potential Implications of the Law

This legislation touches on many land policy issues that have long been of concern to the Lincoln Institute. Martim Smolka, director of the Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program, and other Institute associates are holding seminars and training programs to share experiences in working out implementation procedures, possibly assist in pilot projects, and carefully monitor the Colombian experiment as it unfolds.

One such program was a three-day workshop cosponsored in March with the National University of Colombia and the Advanced School of Public Administration in Bogotá. The workshop consisted of both formal and informal commentaries from a broad range of interested parties from Colombia and other countries. Since Colombia has obviously taken a bold step and there are few precedents for guidance, the appropriate officials must be innovative as they proceed toward actual implementation. The workshop identified a number of potential issues that will have to be faced as further steps are taken.

Constitutional Issues: The new law is squarely based on Article 82 of the Colombian Constitution of 1991, itself a remarkably innovative document on many aspects of urban land reform. Article 82, in simplified terms, states that when public actions increase the development potential of land, the public has a right to participate in the increased value (plusvalía) produced by such actions, so that the costs of urban development will be defrayed and distributed equitably.

The legal/constitutional debate is twofold: 1) Can the municipalities act on the sole basis of the law, or should they wait until the national government issues “regulations” and remain subject to these regulations? and 2) Should the law be limited to establishing the common, general principles, since the 1991 Constitution attributes the responsibility of land taxation exclusively to municipalities?

Practical Effects of Municipal Discretion: The workshop also pointed out that the voluntary nature of the law may have negative and possibly unintended consequences. Since it is the mayor of each municipality who initiates the imposition of the “participation,” he or she may well come under considerable pressure, financial or otherwise. In rapidly developing areas, a 30 to 50 percent share of increasing property values might be a very large sum. One speaker, for example, asserted that in Cali 60 percent of the increases in land values caused by planning decisions would be equal to the entire municipal budget. On the other hand, the law may facilitate mutually useful negotiations and partnerships between municipalities and developers that do not occur now.

Maintaining a Political Constituency: The political environment that made this bold legislation possible included scandalous cases of overnight fortunes being made from a zoning change in Bogotá and a decision to expand the urban perimeter in Cali. In the latter case, land prices were said to have multiplied by more than one thousand times!

Beyond initial implementation there is the long-range question of maintaining a political constituency for the effective implementation of such a law in the face of powerful and well-financed resistance by landowners and developers. On the other hand, the ability of any national government to have passed such a law in the first place is an achievement of exceptional interest to those concerned about “value recapture” as an essential element in urban land policy.

Maintaining Objectivity in Assessments: In spite of very specific procedures in the law designed to make it as objective and transparent as possible, it will not be easy for the Codazzi Institute to make the required before and after assessments accurately under the time constraints defined in the statute. Moreover, the various transfer alternatives to cash payment of the fees, which are sure to be popular, are dependent on a local determination as to what constitutes “equivalent value.” A number of speakers pointed out that this process might be an invitation to corruption.

Technical Issues: Speakers also pointed out a number of technical assessment problems with the guidelines as set forth in the law. For example, if restrictive zoning causes one owner to lose value, which in turn increases value for an adjoining owner, what provision can be made for compensating the former while recovering the increased value from the latter? Moreover, since the market anticipates public action, will the “before” assessment already reflect increased values arising from the probability of the action? Or, if land use or building regulations increase values of low-income, small property owners, they may not have the cash to pay for development fees, nor would the other forms of payment be feasible at a very small scale. Forced sales or displacement of the poor could result. These matters raise the policy calculation: Is it better to stride ahead and work things out over time or attempt legislative correction of technical problems before proceeding further?

Economic Effects: Although legally described as public participation in the increased values that public actions have created, the legislation may also be seen as a form of capital gains tax. How often will it be used? Will implementation tend to push down the price of the land affected, or will changes in value be passed on to the ultimate consumer? If it is the latter, the law could have a negative effect on affordable housing. For this reason Article 83(4) exempts land to be used for “housing of social interest,” as defined by the national government. Will this become a loophole for widespread evasion? There is little international experience to answer such questions.

Master Planning: Law 388 of 1997 also requires all municipalities to prepare master plans (Planes de Ordenamiento) and contains fairly detailed descriptions of them in Articles 9 through 35. Obviously, planning alters expectations of owners, and therefore of land values. The administrative and economic interaction of the city’s planning process and its recapture of increased land values will surely be a complex one.

Conflicts in Objectives: As is often the case with fiscal tools, the new changes seek several objectives that are not always compatible: financing better urban development; reducing land speculation; introducing increased equity and progessivity into taxation; and closing some of the favorite avenues for corruption of municipal officials.

Learning from Innovation

In spite of these concerns, Colombia continues its tradition as one of the world’s most innovative nations in urban land planning, law and finance. Bogota was the first major city in the world to create a special zoning district that recognized the realities of low-income housing practices. Stimulated by the ideas and influence of the late Lachlin Currie, an economic advisor to the national government for some 30 years, the city used special assessment districts (contribuciones de valorización) to carry out a major physical transformation during the 1960s. Colombia’s laws on territorial development of 1989 and 1991, to which this 1997 law is a modification and supplement, are among the most comprehensive approaches to land planning since the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. Furthermore, the Colombian constitution is virtually alone in specifically mentioning the moral claim of the public to increases in land values caused by public action.

As might be expected, some of these innovations eventually fell short of initial expectations. Indeed, some participants at the workshop argued that the energies going into the recovery of plusvalía might be more usefully spent on increasing the efficiency of conventional property taxes. On the other hand, the new law is addressing and resolving some problems of earlier legislation and policies, and the country is learning from its experience. The conclusion of the workshop participants was that the process has been worthwhile, and that the new law must be understood and evaluated in its relationship to previously established instruments of value capture and fiscal policy in general.

William A. Doebele is professor of urban planning and design, emeritus, at Harvard University Graduate School of Design and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. This article was prepared with important contributions by Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America Programs, Fernando Rojas, visiting fellow of the Institute, and Fernanda Furtado, faculty and research associate of the Institute.

See also Fernando Rojas and Martim Smolka, “New Colombian Law Implements Value Capture,” Land Lines, March 1998.

In the context of entirely new fiscal policies and new approaches to property rights in central and eastern Europe over the past decade, taxes on land and buildings have taken on significant new roles—politically as adjuncts to privatization, restitution and decentralization, and fiscally as revenue-raising tools for local governments.

The Lincoln Institute is particularly interested in the complex debate over property-based taxes and in how different countries experience the transition from communism to democracy and from planned to market-driven economies. Over the past four years, the Institute has undertaken a series of educational programs to help public officials and business leaders in eastern Europe understand both underlying principles and practical examples of property taxation and valuation through offering varied perspectives and frameworks for decision making.

The Institute is also sponsoring a series of case studies to compare the implementation of ad valorem property tax systems in eastern European countries. These studies provide a unique perspective from which to review the initiation of land privatization, fiscal decentralization and land markets, as well as to compare the various legal and administrative features adopted for the respective tax systems.

Programs in Estonia

The Baltic country of Estonia was the first of the new independent states to recognize the benefits of land taxation and thus has been the focus of several Lincoln Institute programs. The Institute’s work in Estonia began in September 1993 when Fellow Jane Malme and Senior Fellow Joan Youngman participated in a conference with the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on the design of a property taxation system. Estonia had just instituted its land tax program, and since then the Institute has continued to support programs there relating to land reform and property taxation.

The most recent education program, on “Land and Tax Policies for Urban Markets in Estonia,” was presented in the capital of Tallinn in May to nearly 30 senior-level state and city officials interested in public finance, land reform and urban development. President H. James Brown, Jane Malme, Joan Youngman and a faculty of international experts explored current issues concerning land reform, valuation and taxation. They also discussed methods of urban planning, land management and taxation to both encourage development of urban land markets and finance local governments.

Estonia is also serving as the pilot case study for a survey instrument to gather and analyze information from countries adopting new fiscal instruments for market-based economies. Malme and Youngman are working closely with Tambet Tiits, director of a private real estate research and consulting firm in Tallinn, to draft the survey, research and collect data, and analyze the results.

Other Case Studies and Conferences

A second case study examines Poland, where an ad valorem property tax law is under legislative consideration. Dr. Jan Brzeski, director of the Cracow Real Estate Institute, serves as the country research director and liaison with the Institute. Subsequent studies will survey Latvia, Lithuania and Russia. In addition, Professors Gary Cornia and Phil Bryson of the Marriott School of Management at Brigham Young University in Utah are using the Lincoln Institute survey instrument to study property tax systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics.

The Lincoln Institute was a sponsor of the fourth international conference on local taxation and property valuation of the London-based Institute of Revenues, Rating and Valuation (IRRV) in Rome in early June. The conference attracts about 300 senior level officials from central as well as local governments throughout Europe. Dennis Robinson, Lincoln Institute vice president for programs and operations, was on the conference advisory committee and chaired a session on “Case Studies in Local Taxation in the New Democracies,” at which Jane Malme and Joan Youngman discussed the Institute’s case studies on land and building taxation in transitional economies. Other participants in that session were Institute associates Tambit Tiits of Estonia and Jan Brzeski of Poland. Board member Gary Cornia spoke about his research on property taxation in the Czech Republic. Martim Smolka, senior fellow for Latin America and the Caribbean, presented a paper on “Urban Land Management and Value Capture” at another session chaired by Joan Youngman. Jane Malme also was a discussion leader for a session on “Tax Collection and Administration.”

The Institute is planning another program with OECD in December 1997 for public officials and practitioners in the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to examine policy aspects of land valuation and mass appraisal concepts for ad valorem taxation.

Gated communities are residential areas with restricted access designed to privatize normally public spaces. These developments occur in both new suburban developments and older inner city areas retrofitted to provide security. We estimate that at least three or four million and potentially many more Americans are seeking this new form of refuge from the problems of urbanization.

This rapidly growing phenomenon has become ubiquitous in many areas of the country since the late 1980s. While early gated communities were restricted to retirement villages and the compounds of the super rich, the majority found today are middle to upper-middle class. Along with the trend toward “forting up” in new developments, existing neighborhoods of both rich and poor are using barricades and gates with increasing frequency to isolate themselves.

Gated communities can be classified in three main categories based on the primary motivation of their residents. Two types of “lifestyle” communities provide security and separation for the leisure activities and amenities within. These include retirement communities and golf or country club leisure developments as one subgroup and suburban new towns as another.

In “elite” communities the gates symbolize distinction and prestige. Through both creating and protecting a secure place on the social ladder, these communities become enclaves of the rich and famous, developments for the very affluent, and executive home developments for the middle class.

The third type is the “security zone,” where fear of crime and outsiders is the key motivation for defensive fortifications. This category includes middle-class areas where residents attempt to protect property and property values; working-class neighborhoods, often in deteriorating sections of the city; and low-income areas, including public housing complexes, where crime is acute.

Urban Problems Stimulate Trend to Gating

High levels of foreign immigration, a growing underclass and a restructured economy are changing the face of many metropolitan areas and fueling the drive for separation, distinction, exclusion and protection. Gated communities are themselves a microcosm of America’s larger spatial pattern of segmentation and separation by income, race and economic opportunity. Suburbanization has not meant a lessening of segregation, but only a redistribution of the old urban patterns. Minority and immigrant suburbanization is concentrated in the inner ring and old manufacturing suburbs. At the same time, poverty is no longer concentrated in the central city, but is suburbanizing rapidly.

Gated communities are not yet the normal pattern in the nation. They are primarily a metropolitan and coastal phenomenon, with the largest aggregations being in California, Texas and Florida. However, gates are being erected in almost every state. Real estate developers suggest that the demand for homes in gated communities is increasing, and there is evidence that housing appreciation in such developments is higher than outside the gates.

Fear of crime is the strongest rationale for this new form of community. According to recent reports in Miami and other areas where gates and barricades have become the norm, some forms of crime, such as car theft, are reduced. On the other hand, some data indicate that the crime rate inside the gates is only marginally altered by barricades. Nevertheless, residents report less fear of crime in such settings. This reduction in fear is important in itself, since it can lead to increased neighborly contact, which can reduce crime in the long run.

Policy Issues for Community Life

The development of gated areas is related to the uncoupling of industry from cities and of professionals from the industrial core. Geography compounds current trends toward fragmentation and privatization by undercutting the old foundation of community and providing a new rationale for the lifestyle enclave or gated community based on shared socioeconomic status. This narrowing of social contact is likewise narrowing the social contract.

Privatization- the replacement of public government and its functions by private organizations which purchase services from the market- is promoted as a “benefit” of gated communities, but it may have serious impacts on the broader community. Private communities provide their own security, street maintenance, parks, recreation, garbage collection and other services, thus relieving taxpayers of additional burdens. However, they may also have the unintended consequence of reducing voter interest in participating in tax programs or voluntary efforts to deal with community problems or additional public services such as schools, streets, police or other city and county government programs.

The resulting loss of connection between citizens in privatized and traditional communities loosens social contact and weakens the bonds of mutual responsibility that are a normal part of community living. As a result, there is less and less talk of citizenship. The new lexicon of civic responsibility is that of the taxpayers who take no active role in governance but merely exchange money for services. Residents of privatized gated communities say they are taking care of themselves and lessening the public burden, but this perspective has the potential for redistributing public costs and benefits.

Walled and gated communities are a dramatic manifestation of the fortress mentality growing in America. As citizens divide themselves into homogenous, independent cells, their place in the greater polity and society becomes attenuated, increasing resistance to efforts to resolve municipal, let alone regional, problems.

The forting-up phenomenon has enormous policy consequences.What is the measure of nationhood when neighborhoods require armed patrols and electric fencing to keep out other citizens? When public services and even local governments are privatized and when the community of responsibility stops at the subdivision gates, what happens to the function and the very idea of democracy? In short, can this nation fulfill its social contract in the absence of social contact?

Edward J. Blakely, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is dean and Lusk Professor of Planning and Development for the School of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Southern California. Mary Gail Snyder is a doctoral student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley.

Additional information in printed newsletter:

1. Map of the United States showing concentrations of Gated Communities.

2. Table showing Social Dimensions of Gated Communities.

For the past six years, the Lincoln Institute has been collaborating with the Loeb Fellowship Program at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. Established in 1970 through the generosity of alumnus John L. Loeb, the Loeb Fellowship invites about 10 mid-career professionals each year to study independently and develop insights and connections that can advance their work revitalizing the built and natural environments. The 2002–2003 fellows took their class study trip to Cape Town, South Africa, in May, focusing their inquiry on urban renewal efforts in the township of Khayelitsha.

Cape Town is as glistening a first world city as one could ever expect to see. It’s also among the most deceptive. The come-on begins with one’s first view of Table Mountain, rising behind the city’s modernist skyline. It literally peaks when you ride the sleek, blue funicular to the top and behold, along with the wondrous natural landscape, abundant evidence of apparent prosperity and cosmopolitanism. The seaport of this early outpost of globalization continues to bustle with levels of trade befitting an intercontinental crossroads. The gleaming Victoria and Alfred Waterfront is an upscale tourist vortex, and the massive new convention center with its adjoining international hotel help make Cape Town a glorious modern city.

One feels a twinge of betrayal, however, with the first visit to Khayelitsha, 26 kilometers (16 miles) out the N2 highway amid the sandy Cape Flats, a black African township of over a million residents and the sort of place where the majority of Cape Town residents live. Miles before any apparent settlement, one sees dozens of men and women walking along the shoulder of the freeway, making an hours-long commute to work, or in search of it. Closer to Khayelitsha, hordes of children are playing soccer in the road reserve, occasionally streaming across the multilane highway. Soon the shacks come into view, emerging from a smoky-dusty haze. There are thousands of them, amazingly resourceful assemblages of corrugated tin, recovered shipping palettes, found scraps of anything. Some are drab but most are swathed in vibrant hues.

In the township itself there are more shacks, then row after row of cinder block huts. Apart from a gas station there are almost no formal stores or other nonresidential buildings. But informal traders abound at most intersections: hair stylists operating in overturned shipping containers; meat purveyors with raw animal parts lying on dusty tables or sizzling on oil-drum grills fired by salvaged wood; fruit stands; a house store selling cigarettes, drinks and not much else. Even at noon on a workday the streets are teeming with pedestrians.

If it is an overstatement to call this the “real” Cape Town, it is also true that this condition is far more prevalent than the patina of affluence in the white, Euro-centric center. Certainly it is no exaggeration to call townships like this, with their high unemployment and AIDS rates, the greatest challenge to the still young post-apartheid government of South Africa. Recognizing this, the administration of President Thabo Mbeki is pouring resources into a program, dubbed “urban renewal” in an eerie echo of the earlier American episode, aimed at remaking these troubling legacies of apartheid into more livable places. It is this effort that the 2003 class of Loeb fellows has come to study.

Staggering Quality-of-Life Challenges

The urban renewal program was begun in 2001 to combat unemployment and crime and improve quality of life for township residents. Each of the nine provinces has identified several nodes of focus, with more than 30 nodes nationwide. The Western Cape province selected Khayelitsha and the neighboring “colored” township of Mitchell’s Plain because of the huge challenges they present. Both are large—Khayelitsha is second only to Soweto in size—and distant from the urban core and economic opportunities; together they account for one-third of the Cape Town region’s population.

The magnitude of the project is stunning. Not yet 20 years old, Khayelitsha is believed to have over one million residents and an annual growth rate of 5 percent. The township, whose name means “our new home” in the Xhosa language of its dominant population, began life in the early 1980s as a planned dormitory settlement for rural African men who migrated to Cape Town for industrial jobs. Initially, wives and children were not allowed to join the men. When the dying apartheid regime lifted its pass law restrictions in the late 1980s, families came flooding into the township.

Today, unemployment officially stands at around 46 percent, but that apparently counts only those who still are actively looking. The HIV infection rate is thought to be around 25 percent. As much as one-third of township residents are living in informal housing, either in squatter shacks built illegally on city-owned land, in officially sanctioned shacks on plotted and serviced lots, or in backyard shacks behind the cinderblock huts that comprise the lion’s share of formal housing.

Khayelitsha has almost no jobs of its own apart from informal trade, such as unlicensed taverns known as shebeens, hair stylists and house shops, and scant tourism jobs. The commute to Cape Town is a grueling journey by overcrowded trains, and the trip is made longer by the fact that the Khayelitsha line is not direct, but a branch from the line to Mitchell’s Plain. And increasingly the jobs are not in central Cape Town but in the booming edge city of Bellville, which is unreachable for carless commuters except by jitney taxi. As it happens, access to and from Khayelitsha is intentionally poor. Emerging at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle, the township was designed so that its two entrance points could be closed in the event of any disturbance.

Given the paucity of jobs in the township and the difficult commute to existing employment centers, the most appropriate urban renewal strategy might be to relocate residents to new housing near jobs and adequate transportation networks. But that task is so monumental and fraught with thorny considerations that the government has settled for now on trying to make the existing township as livable as possible.

“The question of relocation versus redevelopment of Khayelitsha is a political hot potato,” says Pieter Terblanche, principal planner in Cape Town’s Planning and Environmental Directorate. White residents in Cape Town and its close-in suburbs aren’t eager for new neighbors, and the township residents themselves want to cling to whatever patch of ground they’ve been able to secure for themselves in the (probably legitimate) fear that they’ll never get as much anywhere else.

Addressing the housing needs within Khayelitsha itself then becomes a top priority. About 20,000 households now live in areas with only communal toilets and water taps, though most have electricity. Most of these families need to be relocated to so-called serviced sites, with water, sewer and access to a bona fide street. Several thousand others are doubled up on serviced sites intended for only one house; these too will be relocated. To reduce the risk of the devastating fires that sometimes sweep through the shack lands, the city wants to de-densify informal areas, adding to the relocation challenge.

The rehousing program is complicated by other factors. For the vast majority of residents, the only acceptable housing is a detached hut on a privately owned lot. Multifamily rental housing is seen as a despised relic of apartheid, and mid- or high-rise apartments are anathema to these recently rural denizens. Government rental housing is being phased out as it is converted to private ownership. Most residents are waiting their turn to secure an individual lot where they can use their 17,900 rand (US$2,400) housing subsidy toward building the standard-issue, 36-square meter, cinder block hut. With enough hands, a hut can be erected in a weekend.

Naturally, this land-intensive approach leads to what we in the U.S. would call sprawl, exacerbating transportation problems and dramatically increasing the cost of extending water, sewer and other infrastructure. The effect, taken together with the wide arterial roads that are the primary street network, is a kind of American-style, automobile-oriented design, but without the automobiles.

Other issues are emerging, as well. “Ownership brings financial responsibilities and requirements that people aren’t necessarily prepared for,” said Terblanche. Many residents also were unprepared for the reality of being forced to pay rising water and electricity rates. Most had become accustomed to paying little or nothing during the late apartheid era, when the government could do little to counter the mass civil disobedience. In an echo of that era, angry poor residents today regularly participate in street protests against utility rates and collections.

Remaking the Township into a Town

With residents largely staying put in Khayelitsha, the question for the urban renewal program becomes how to make the township into something more closely resembling a real town. Step one has been to lay the groundwork for a central business district (CBD) that will allow residents to do their shopping and government business closer to home; now they must take a costly cab ride to Mitchell’s Plain to buy anything beyond convenience items.

The CBD is being developed as a joint venture between the city of Cape Town, private interests and the Khayelitsha community. It spans 73 hectares (182.5 acres) adjacent to the commuter rail station. While retailers and developers know Khayelitsha is a huge, untapped market, it is also seen as an enormous risk by financial institutions, who redline African townships. In Khayelitsha, 60 percent equity has been required of any developer or institution seeking financing. In late July, however, a tentative agreement was reached, and the Cape Town council gave approval to what will be one of the largest private-public investments yet undertaken in a South African township. A grocery chain and discount department store have signed on, but planners want to get a mix of tenants that also includes local merchants. That has required an elaborate financing scheme that allows for keeping rents affordable. Some informal traders also will be allowed in an enclosed square that planners consider the focal point of the district.

Several other planned projects aim to formalize and dignify the public realm. While the city’s transport officials are resistant, one of the most urgent needs is to provide safer, cleaner and more attractive pedestrian ways, says Barbara Southworth, manager of urban design in the city’s division of development services.

In addition to building walkways and plazas at key intersections and at taxi-bus nodes, Southworth’s office is working to provide some order to the informal trade areas by introducing rows of concrete, post-and-beam arches that can serve as storefronts for the trading stalls. Most of these are improvised from sideways shipping containers, and tend to lie in haphazard clusters. By leasing the favored storefront positions the city hopes to introduce a modest level of control over an otherwise unregulated environment.

The government’s attention to Khayelitsha has delivered other amenities as well, though not necessarily under the rubric of urban renewal. The magistrate court building that opened in early May is the most expensive government building ever built in a black township, which is taken as an important sign of progress. The national and provincial governments also contributed to the first national tourist site in a township, a cultural center at Lookout Hill. Built at the highest point in the Cape Flats, next to a fragile dune that offers a panoramic view of Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain, the center is expected to be the entry point for the increasingly popular township tours, estimated at 30,000 mostly foreign tourists annually. The center will feature exhibits on the origins of Khayelitsha and on the Sangoma healers of Xhosa culture and a marketplace selling the wares of local cottage industries.

Vexing Consequences

It is unsettling to think that, at the moment, the most promising economic path for Khayelitsha is to offer tourists a glimpse of the provisional landscape necessitated by crushing poverty, mass relocation and government-enforced segregation. It is equally disquieting to realize that urban renewal efforts at normalizing the township’s environment could reduce some of the appeal to those tourists.

While American urban renewal often meant displacing many African-American and immigrant populations by eliminating central city ghettoes, the South African variant aims to improve conditions for millions of residents who will be allowed to remain in far larger ghettoes many miles from the urban core. This immediately raises some vexing questions: Should the government work to preserve these intensely segregated artifacts of an oppressive regime? There are powerful arguments for doing so, not least the extreme difficulty and unpopularity of relocating a population that has had its fill of such government-driven exercises. But by investing in making townships more permanent, are current residents and future generations consigned to economic isolation? These questions linger even as the government proceeds with the program.

David Goldberg was a Loeb Fellow at Harvard in 2002–2003. He is communications director at Smart Growth America, a nationwide coalition based in Washington, DC.

Loeb Fellows, 2002–2003

Gabriel Abraham, Senior Consultant, Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina

Arnd Bruninghaus, Architect, A/haus Group, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Kathleen A. Bullard, Chief of Watershed Planning Division, Mountains Recreation and Conservation Authority, Los Angeles, California

Deborah J. Goddard, Director of Community Development Planning, Urban Edge, Boston, Massachusetts

David A. Goldberg, Communications Director, Smart Growth America, Decatur, Georgia

Linda Haar, Director, Boston Planning Institute, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Susan L. Hamilton, Assistant Director of Industrial Development, Metro Development Authority, Louisville, Kentucky

Robert L. Liberty, Smart Growth Consultant, Portland, Oregon

Josephine Ramirez, Program Officer, Getty Grant Program, J. Paul Getty Trust, Los Angeles, California

Jennifer Siegal, Principal, Office of Mobile Design, Venice, California

Jennifer Yoos, Architect and Partner, Vincent James Associates, Minneapolis, Minnesota

When Jim Brown joined the Lincoln Institute as president and CEO in May 1996, he had served on the faculty of Harvard University for 26 years and headed the Joint Center for Housing Studies at the Kennedy School, considered the most prestigious research center on U.S. housing issues. As he prepares for retirement from the Institute after nearly nine years, he says that the most surprising aspect of his tenure has been his role in expanding the organization’s international programs, especially in Latin America and China.

“The Institute’s programs on U.S. land use and tax policy were well-established and ably directed by senior fellows on the staff,” Brown noted, “but the need and demand for training and research on these topics remain critical in the new market economies that have emerged over the past few decades. Public officials, policy makers, academics and stakeholders in the private sector all have been very receptive to and eager for our educational programs, and we have developed a lively exchange of knowledge and mutual respect.”

Brown expanded and reorganized the Institute’s academic agenda by integrating research and educational programs into three academic departments: Planning and Development; Valuation and Taxation; and International Studies. This structure encouraged each department chair to develop a curriculum, sponsor research, offer educational programs and disseminate information to fit the needs of various constituencies.

“I wanted to empower others to do their work in their own program areas, and I think the results have been very positive,” Brown commented. “The Institute is more widely known today because of our enhanced commitment to curriculum development and special demonstration projects, as well as varied outreach efforts to share the results of our work. We are fortunate to have the financial resources to be able to develop programs and offer them to those who need and can benefit from this information.”

The Institute offers more than 75 courses, conferences and seminars annually at Lincoln House and at locations around the globe to public officials, practitioners and private citizens. In addition, the Institute’s research and graduate student fellowship programs have been greatly expanded over the past five years.

“I’m very pleased with how the staff has developed numerous ways to disseminate our sponsored research and information about our programs,” Brown added. “These include the Land Lines newsletter; books, working papers and other academic publications; our annual catalog; and our Web site. Advances in online communication have challenged us to continue to find ways to reach new audiences.”

As the Institute board, staff and faculty prepare for the next generation of presidential leadership, we offer our sincere thanks to Jim Brown for reinvigorating the organization’s academic mission, the scope of research and educational programs, and approaches to learning and communicating information about the many facets of land policy.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Los proyectos de reurbanización a gran escala (denominados grandes proyectos urbanos o GPU) plantean muchas dudas sobre las consecuencias de la urbanización subsiguiente provocada por la intervención. Los GPU se caracterizan por el impacto que tienen en una parte significativa de la ciudad, a menudo con el uso de algunos nuevos instrumentos fiscales o reguladores y la participación de una amplia red de agentes e instituciones. Se espera que estos proyectos afecten los precios del suelo, reciclen la infraestructura y las instalaciones existentes o creen otras nuevas, y atraigan otras construcciones nuevas.

Los GPU como instrumento de política urbana han sido objeto de controversia y debate considerable en toda América Latina. Se argumenta a menudo que promueven la exclusión social y la renovación de edificios para aspiraciones de la clase media, tiene efectos limitados en la estimulación de actividades inmobiliarias y requieren grandes subsidios públicos (a veces ocultos) que a menudo quitan recursos fiscales de otras necesidades urbanas. A pesar de su creciente popularidad en América Latina, existe poca evidencia empírica para apoyar estas críticas.

Este artículo presenta el caso de un GPU introducido en São Paulo, Brasil, en 1996 como una “operación urbana” para reurbanizar un área de ingresos medios que constaba en su mayor parte de hogares unifamiliares que iba a ser atravesada por la prolongación de la Avenida Faria Lima. El proyecto es conocido como el Consorcio de Operaciones Urbanas de Faria Lima (OUCFL). Examinamos los principios económicos que afectan el rendimiento fiscal del proyecto y su oportunidad para recuperar plusvalías, evaluamos los cambios en densidad residencial y analizamos los cambios en la distribución de ingresos y la estructura de la propiedad. Por último, ofrecemos algunas sugerencias de políticas sobre cómo y cuándo usar esta clase de instrumento en función de estas evaluaciones.

¿Qué es una operación urbana?

Una operación urbana es un instrumento legal que trata de proporcionar a los gobiernos locales el poder de llevar a cabo intervenciones relacionadas con mejoras urbanísticas y de planificación municipal en asociación con el sector privado. Identifica un área particular dentro de la ciudad que tenga el potencial de atraer inversiones inmobiliarias privadas para beneficiar a la ciudad en su totalidad. Los índices de planificación municipal apropiados (es decir, zonificación y otros reglamentos sobre coeficientes de construcción, índices de ocupación y usos del suelo) se redefinen según un plan maestro, y las inversiones se hacen en infraestructura nueva o reciclada.

Una operación urbana permite a la municipalidad recuperar (a través de medios negociados u obligatorios) los incrementos del valor del suelo relacionados con los subsiguientes cambios de uso del suelo. En comparación con otros instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, estos fondos están destinados o justificados dentro del perímetro del proyecto y serán compartidos entre el gobierno y el sector privado para inversiones en infraestructura urbana y subsidios de las inversiones inmobiliarias privadas para apoyar el proyecto mismo.

Cada operación urbana en Brasil es propuesta por el poder ejecutivo y aprobada por el poder legislativo de la jurisdicción. En el caso de São Paulo, esta autoridad fue creada en la Ley Orgánica Municipal (Constitución de la Ciudad) en 1990, que se incluyó más adelante en la nueva ley de urbanización brasileña (Estatuto de la Ciudad de 2001). Los primeros proyectos propuestos fueron la Operación Anhangabaú (más tarde ampliada como parte de la Operación Centro de la Ciudad y denominada Operación del Centro) y Água Branca, seguida por las operaciones de Água Espraiada y Faria Lima. Después de aprobar el nuevo Plan Maestro de la ciudad en 2001, se generaron otras nueve operaciones urbanas. Se espera que estos trece proyectos afecten del 30 al 40 por ciento del área edificable de la ciudad de São Paulo.

Financiación de Faria Lima

La operación urbana de Faria Lima (OUCFL) fue propuesta y aprobada en 1995 con el objetivo de obtener recursos privados para financiar las inversiones públicas necesarias para comprar suelo e instalar infraestructura con el fin de ampliar la Avenida Faria Lima. Se estimó que estos costos ascendían a aproximadamente US$150 millones, dos tercios para adquisición de suelo y un tercio para la avenida en sí. Al proyecto se opusieron muchos interesados por motivos que iban desde el origen de los fondos (es decir, avanzados del presupuesto local a través de una deuda nueva) hasta preocupaciones del vecindario (una de las cuales pudo mantener sin cambios los coeficientes de edificabilidad [floor area ratio o FAR] y excluirlos legalmente de la zonificación de OUCFL) y problemas de diseño técnico.

Los estudios técnicos realizados en su momento indicaban que sería posible aprovechar 2.250.000 metros cuadrados potenciales más de los ya permitidos por la legislación de zonificación de la ciudad y consecuentemente se modificaron los FAR. Estos derechos de construcción adicionales fueron garantizados contra un pago mínimo del 50 por ciento de su valor de mercado usando el instrumento existente Solo-Criado (venta de derechos de construcción). La OUCFL despertó gran interés por parte de empresarios inmobiliarios. No obstante, este instrumento también fue cuestionado por su falta de transparencia, su enfoque de “proyecto a proyecto”, y la arbitrariedad en la forma en que se establecieron precios relevantes que después se usaron para calcular el valor de los derechos de construcción adicionales.

En agosto de 2003 ya se había autorizado un total de 939.592 metros cuadrados, o casi el 42 por ciento de los 2.250.000 metros cuadrados totales posibles. Se aprobaron más de 115 proyectos inmobiliarios, incluidos casi el 40 por ciento de edificios comerciales y el 60 por ciento de edificios residenciales de alta calidad. No obstante, los recursos (aproximadamente US$280 millones) obtenidos de estos proyectos aprobados no habían compensado completamente los gastos (US$350 millones, incluidos el capital más los intereses) relacionados con la ampliación de la avenida, teniendo en cuenta los elevados intereses reinantes en Brasil durante los casi ocho años desde la ejecución de los gastos. Así, aproximadamente el 80 por ciento del costo (aunque mayor que el anticipado) se ha recuperado mediante el proceso de Venta de Derechos de Construcción. Desde julio de 2004, la compensación de estos fondos de avance se obtuvo mediante el ingenioso y nuevo mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías conocido como CEPAC, siglas que significan Certificado de Potencial Adicional de Construcción. Un CEPAC representa un metro cuadrado.

La introducción de CEPAC

Aunque los CEPAC se definieron en el Estatuto de la Ciudad de 2001 de Brasil, no fueron aprobados por el CVM (equivalente brasileño de la Comisión de Bolsa y Valores de EE. UU.) como libremente comerciables en la Bolsa de Valores Brasileña hasta diciembre de 2003. El reglamento establece que el precio de cada certificado sea definido por una subasta pública y que puedan ejecutarse en cualquier momento los metros cuadrados correspondientes de derechos de construcción (que también incluyen cambios de uso e índices de ocupación) expresados en cada certificado. El reglamento indica también que se pueden emitir nuevos lotes de certificados (y venderse en subastas) sólo después de confirmarse que los recursos capturados por la venta previa han sido destinados de forma efectiva al proyecto. Para asegurar este uso designado, los ingresos se depositan en una cuenta especial, no en el tesoro municipal. Desde el punto de vista de los inversores privados, esta designación asegura la aceptabilidad de este instrumento de recuperación de plusvalías a su propia valorización. Al emitir un número menor de certificados que el número de derechos de construcción potenciales —es decir, al gestionar su escasez— el sector público puede beneficiarse de la valorización y poder así recuperar la plusvalía “ex-ante” (Afonso 2004, 39).

La aprobación final de los CEPAC para la OUCFL y todos los pasos necesarios para lanzarlos al mercado financiero se produjo a mediados de 2004, y la primera subasta a finales de diciembre de 2004 generó casi 10 millones de reales (unos US$4 millones), correspondientes a la venta de unos 9.000 CEPAC de un grupo autorizado de 650.000 metros cuadrados. Los certificados de OUCFL se vendieron a un valor nominal de 1.100 reales (unos US$450) por metro cuadrado sin un precio adicional como resultado del proceso de licitación.

Esta situación contrasta con la operación urbana de Água Espraiada, que se esperaba que fuera completamente financiada por CEPAC desde su inicio. En su tercera subasta, los certificados ya estaban alcanzando los 370 reales por certificado en vez del valor nominal de 300 reales fijado para esta operación. Una subasta más reciente en Água Espraiada vendió 56.000 CEPAC y alcanzó 21 millones de reales (US$9,5 millones), reflejando un precio por certificado de 371 reales. Este contraste de precios refleja los distintos valores nominales originales en los dos proyectos. En el caso de OUCFL los urbanizadores de compraron (y acumularon) derechos de construcción por adelantado, para beneficiarse de las reglas más flexibles antes de las aprobaciones de la CVM. El precio de los certificados en Faria Lima empezó siendo de más de 1.100 reales porque es un área más valorada. En Água Espraiada los urbanizadores estaban dispuestos a pagar un precio mayor que el valor nominal original, ya que los certificados eran menos caros y había una mayor demanda.

Implicaciones de los precios del suelo

Los precios del suelo sin ocupar y de las áreas urbanizadas experimentaron un aumento considerable en algunos bloques dentro del perímetro de OUCFL durante los años 90, pero disminuyó en otros bloques. No obstante, el precio promedio del metro cuadrado de nueva urbanización descendió en toda la región metropolitana de San Paulo (RMSP) en todas las franjas de precios, cuando se comparan los precios promedio de 1991 a 1996 con los de 1996 a 2000.

Después de controlar una serie de atributos relacionados con el carácter variable de las urbanizaciones y su ubicación, las estimaciones de precios mostraron un aumento relativo inequívoco después de haber dado comienzo a la operación. El precio promedio por metro cuadrado dentro del perímetro de OUCFL aumentó de 1.680 reales en el período de 1991–1996 a 1.920 reales en el período de 1996–2001, lo que representa un aumento del 14 por ciento, mientras que los precios en la RMSP disminuyeron de 1.210 a 1.060 reales, lo que representa un descenso del 12 por ciento en el mismo período (1,95 reales/1,00 dólares estadounidenses en diciembre de 2000). Así pues, el precio por metro cuadrado en OUCFL era aproximadamente un 26 por ciento mayor que el de RMSP. El precio por metro cuadrado en OUCFL fue un 38 por ciento mayor que el precio promedio en la RMSP en 1991–1996, y aumentó a un 81 por ciento en 1996–2001.

¿Fue este aumento capturado por la municipalidad el previsto? Considerando que el costo de la construcción es en promedio aproximadamente igual a 1.000 reales por metro cuadrado, la subasta de 2004 (la única hasta ahora) capturó casi todo el valor añadido a los precios actuales. El sistema previo anterior a CEPAC capturó aproximadamente el 50 por ciento o más, dependiendo de la capacidad y del éxito de los negociadores municipales, y de la exactitud del precio de referencia. CEPAC ahora cambia este porcentaje y el valor nominal del instrumento puede recuperar todo el incremento del valor o incluso más, dependiendo de la relación de este valor nominal con los precios del mercado, y de los resultados de futuras subastas. Al comparar un proyecto de reurbanización financiado completamente por bonos de construcción (como CEPAC) y otro financiado totalmente por tributos inmobiliarios generales, no existe ninguna duda de que el anterior es menos regresivo que este último. Incluso con un tributo inmobiliario progresivo, con tasas que aumenten según los valores, parte de los costos serían pagados por hogares más pobres.

Esta evidencia de que aproximadamente el 80 por ciento del costo del proyecto ya se ha recuperado, en combinación con la subasta de los derechos de construcción restantes mediante CEPAC y el impacto de la apreciación de la propiedad en los ingresos de tributos inmobiliarios actuales, indica que el proyecto no sólo debe pagarse por sí mismo sino que realmente genera una plusvalía fiscal para la ciudad en general en los siguientes cinco o siete años.

En efecto, los cambios causados al sustituir casas unifamiliares más antiguas por nuevos edificios residenciales y comerciales produjeron un cambio sustancial en la recaudación de tributos inmobiliarios en el área de la OUCFL. Muchas parcelas e incluso bloques enteros habían sido ocupados por casas de uno o dos pisos construidas en los años 50. Muchas de estas estructuras tenían derecho a un coeficiente de descuentos por obsolescencia de hasta un 30 por ciento del tributo inmobiliario. Fueron reemplazadas por edificios nuevos, más altos y de mayor calidad para los que el descuento era nulo. Nuestras estimaciones indican que las diferencias en recaudación de tributos inmobiliarios por metros cuadrados construidos puede haber aumentado al menos 2,7 veces y hasta 4,4 veces más. Es decir, el tributo inmobiliario promedio por metro cuadrado aumentó a un mínimo de 588,50 reales hasta un máximo de 802,50 reales desde 220,95 reales si la casa tenía más de 25 años, o desde 179,70 reales si la casa tenía más de 30 años.

Implicaciones sociales

El caso de la OUCFL ofrece una oportunidad única para cuantificar cambios en las características de residentes antes y después de la intervención, ya que hay datos disponibles a nivel de seguimiento del censo para 1991 y 2000, y la intervención empezó en 1996. Nuestro análisis de renovación y desplazamiento de residentes más pobres confirma principalmente las conclusiones de Ramalho y Meyer (2004) de que los ingresos promedio han aumentado relativamente en la mayoría de los bloques dentro del perímetro de la OUCFL. En lo que se refiere a las normas brasileñas, la clase media-alta fue desplazada de la región por el 5 por ciento más rico de hogares en el área metropolitana. Los datos del censo también mostraron que la densidad residencial descendió entre 1991 y 2000, de 27 a 22 residencias por hectárea, aunque estas cifras pueden estar distorsionadas porque reflejan la razón de residencias totales en todo el área, no un promedio de las razones por parcela donde se convirtió el uso del suelo.

Los datos de 1991 indicaron que la población ya estaba abandonando el área de la OUCFL antes de la aprobación de la operación urbana, pero este éxodo se intensificó después de 1996, generando parcelas desocupadas en el proceso de configuración del sitio para acomodar a las nuevas urbanizaciones de edificios altos. Al mismo tiempo, aumentó la densidad de construcción. El número promedio de pisos por nuevo edificio en el área aumentó de 12,6 en el período de 1985–1995 a 16,7 en el período de 1996–2001. El número de viviendas por edificio aumentó de 37,1 a 79,6 en los mismos períodos.

Esta contradicción aparente entre la menor densidad residencial y el mayor número de viviendas se explica en parte por la construcción de edificios comerciales que reemplazaron muchas residencias unifamiliares en parcelas pequeñas o de tamaño promedio. La OUCFL provocó una concentración inmobiliaria considerable, ya que los nuevos edificios comerciales y residenciales reemplazaron las casas y requirieron áreas de suelo más grandes para proyectos arquitectónicos de clase alta. Los 115 proyectos aprobados entre 1995 y agosto de 2003 que solicitaron aumentos en los coeficientes de utilización requerían un total de 657 parcelas, o un promedio de 5,7 parcelas por proyecto.

La combinación del aumento en nivel de ingresos y la reducción en densidad de hogares indican que el proceso de renovación avanzó dentro y fuera de la región de la OUCFL durante los años 90. No obstante, éste no es un caso clásico de renovación para la aspiración de clases medias, donde las familias pobres son expulsadas de un área debido a diversas presiones socioeconómicas. En este caso fueron mayormente las clases medias-altas quienes fueron desplazadas. Excepto en lo que se refiere al pequeño núcleo de favelados restantes (Favela Coliseu), la región estaba ya ocupada por personas que pertenecen a los sectores más ricos de la sociedad.

Algunas observaciones de política

Este artículo contribuye al debate sobre la gestión social de valoración del suelo proporcionando evaluaciones de datos reales y elementos económicos. Estos elementos faltaban en la mayoría de los análisis, y creemos que este vacío en las publicaciones ha contribuido a una interpretación incompleta de las implicaciones de una operación urbana y a recomendaciones de política pública equivocadas.

Nuestra conclusión es que el mecanismo de financiación de CEPAC por sí mismo no aumenta la característica regresiva de las operaciones urbanas, ya que sin esos bonos de derechos de construcción toda la inversión en reurbanizaciones sería financiada por impuestos generales. Si el proyecto de la OUCFL fuera inadecuado en términos de distribución de ingresos, hubiera sido aún peor sin el mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías. En vez de eso, CEPAC y el mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías usado previamente ofrecieron dos características deseables en cualquier inversión pública: cobrar a los nuevos terratenientes es al menos neutro en términos de distribución de ingresos; y los beneficiarios principales terminan por pagar el proyecto.

Además, el mecanismo de operación urbana ofrece incentivos para la reurbanización. Dado que la mayoría de los proyectos aumentan los precios del suelo y echan a los pobres de la región, sería mejor invertir todo el presupuesto municipal en proyectos a pequeña escala. Esto es lo opuesto a lo que ocurrió con la reurbanización de la rica área adyacente de Berrini donde los urbanizadores decidieron la forma de concentrar su inversión, resultando en una concentración aún mayor de ingresos que en el área de la OUCFL. Debido a la falta de acción de los gestores de política en ese caso, la municipalidad no capturó ningún valor de Berrini, pero pagó el costo completo de la infraestructura.

El uso de bonos de derechos de construcción puede disminuir el aspecto regresivo de la urbanización, pero hacer que un proyecto sea verdaderamente progresivo requiere atención en el lado de los gastos, financiando toda la inversión a través de instrumentos como CEPAC. La limitación principal sobre la distribución de beneficios a los pobres es que la ley establece que todos los fondos recogidos mediante la recuperación de plusvalías (CEPAC u otros instrumentos) deben invertirse dentro del perímetro de la intervención. Una forma de que estas intervenciones sean más progresivas es invertir en actividades que suministren extras a los pobres, como transporte público, educación y salud. Además, la legislación importante permite que la administración seleccione un área dentro del perímetro de una operación urbana y la declare zona especial de interés social (ZEIS) donde las parcelas se pueden usar exclusivamente para vivienda social de bajos ingresos.

Otra alternativa es establecer áreas de vivienda social dentro del perímetro de la operación urbana. Al subsidiar viviendas de bajos ingresos con dinero de urbanizadores y nuevos terratenientes, no habría una distorsión de precios fuera de la industria de la vivienda. El subsidio resulta de la segmentación del mercado y de la transferencia de la renta adicional a hogares pobres. Se trata de una gestión social real de valoración del suelo.

Ciro Biderman está afiliado al Centro de Estudios de Política y Economía del Sector Público (Cepesp) en la Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Fundación Getúlio Vargas de São Paulo, Brasil. Es profesor visitante de desarrollo internacional y planificación regional en el Departamento de Estudios y Planificación Urbanos del Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.

Paulo Sandroni es economista y profesor en la Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Fundación Getúlio Vargas.

Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y director del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.

Referencias

(Estas publicaciones sólo se encuentran en portugués).

Afonso, Luis Carlos Fernandes. 2004. Financiamento é desafio para governantes (La financiación es un desafío para los gobernantes). Teoria e Debate Nº 58, Mayo-Junio: 36–39.

Ramalho, T., e R.M.P. Meyer. 2004. O impacto da Operação Urbana Faria Lima no uso residencial: Dinâmicas de transformação (El impacto de la Operación Urbana Faria Lima en el uso residencial: dinámicas de transformación). Mimeo. São Paulo: Lume/FAUUSP.

Biderman, Ciro y Paulo Sandroni. 2005. Avaliação do impacto das grandes intervenções urbanas nos precos dos imoveis do entorno: O caso da Operação Urbana Consorciada Faria Lima (Evaluación del impacto de los precios en la propiedad cerca de intervenciones urbanas a gran escala: El caso del Consorcio de la Operación Urbana Faria Lima). Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Report (Abril).

During the last decade, bus rapid transit (BRT) has revolutionized regional transportation planning in much of the developing and developed world. BRT went from being a fringe transportation option used in a handful of Brazilian and Australian cities to becoming a prominent mass transportation alternative for local and national governments.

Arguably the BRT concept with highest recognition is the provision of an exclusive right-of-way for bus transit coupled with high-frequency service. In South America, BRT systems in Curitiba, Brazil, and Bogotá, Colombia, feature networks of dedicated lanes designated for exclusive use by large-capacity, articulated buses, with expedited boarding and alighting.

In June 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a much anticipated decision in the case of Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut (545 U.S. 469 [2005]). The close decision (5–4) galvanized the planning, development, redevelopment, and property rights communities, and continues to have national and international repercussions. What was at issue?

New London, Connecticut is an old, industrial, port city on America’s east coast. Its economic height in the 1920s was based on shipbuilding. Since that time the city has experienced substantial economic and population decline. As the property tax base dwindled, the city’s ability to provide basic public services also deteriorated. In the 1990s, New London developed a plan for economic revitalization, focused on a neighborhood with 115 separate properties. The plan required consolidation of these properties into a single parcel. The city further proposed to transfer ownership of some sections of the newly configured parcel to a multinational pharmaceutical company for a research and production facility.

The city approached landowners about their interest in the voluntary sale of their land, and 100 landowners agreed to sell. The city then proposed the use of eminent domain on the outstanding 15 properties (an action where the city would pay fair market value for each property). In so doing, the city did not assert that these properties were “blighted”—the legal and planning standard under which such eminent domain actions have existed since the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

Rather, under the authority of state enabling legislation and based on a comprehensive plan, both of which the court later acknowledged, the city asserted only that the outstanding parcels were required as part of the plan to accomplish a greater public good—increased jobs for the community, increased pubic revenues (taxes), and increased economic competitiveness.

The Kelo Case

Fighting to save her “little pink house,” Susette Kelo became the spokesperson for the opposition to New London’s proposed action on the remaining 15 parcels. Kelo and her co-litigants argued that the type of eminent domain proposed by the city was a misreading of the original intent of the U.S. Constitution’s takings clause (“nor shall private property by taken for public use, without just compensation”).

According to Kelo’s lawyers, the original constitutional clause was intended to allow for governmental actions that create public facilities (e.g., roads, parks, airports, hospitals), but not for government to take private land from one owner to give to another owner. They asserted that if the court found in favor of New London (and against Susette Kelo, which the court did) there would be no effective limit to any proposed physical taking of privately owned land by government. That is, government could always assert that a proposed new use of land was in the greater public interest.

The reasoning and final decision in Kelo was unsurprising. On a base of strong legal and historical analysis, the majority of the court showed why the action by the City of New London was acceptable. In so doing, it affirmed 50 years of similar actions by local and state governments throughout the country—actions which, while often clothed in a justification of blight, regularly had no more (or less) justification to them than that provided by New London.

The court itself provided the basis for much of the public policy controversy that followed when it stated that the decision was only about whether New London’s action was acceptable under the U.S. Constitution: Did it violate the terms of the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment? But, the court noted, “We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” (545 U.S. 469 [2005] at 489). That is, while New London’s and similar local and state governmental actions were legal under the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court invited state legislatures to decide whether such actions should be legal under state constitutions.

The negative reaction to the court’s decision was swift and strong. Within a week a proposal was floated that then-U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter’s home in Weare, New Hampshire should be condemned so it might be replaced by the Lost Liberty Hotel. Using the threat of unconstrained governmental action against ordinary homeowners, a national movement emerged to thwart the impact of Kelo.

Following the invitation of the court, 43 states adopted laws that appear to challenge Kelo (see figure 1). The explicit intent of most of these laws is to prohibit governmental eminent domain actions both for the sole purpose of economic development and in cases where privately owned land is taken from one owner to be transferred to another owner.

Analysis of State-based Kelo Laws

Beginning in 2007, we began a two-year research project on the impact of these state-based laws. Planners, public sector lawyers, and redevelopment officials were already expressing strong concern about the constraints these new state laws could have on normal planning practice. Our question was, Would these laws impact planning, and if so, how? To investigate these laws, we adopted a multilevel approach that:

• inventoried and cataloged Kelo laws that had been adopted since 2005;
• undertook exploratory interviews with key stakeholders in the post-Kelo debate (ranging from representatives of the American Planning Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures to the Castle Coalition, the organization actively promoting the state-based laws);
• conducted a Web-based survey about the impacts of the laws with groups including planners, municipal attorneys, and developers; and
• tracked the emerging literature, mostly from opponents of the Kelo decision (that is, those who supported the new state-based laws) about their perceptions of the impacts these laws were having.

State and local governments are now grappling with circumstances quite different from those of a decade ago, especially since the economic recession in 2008 and 2009. Declines in development activity, property values, and property tax revenues appear to be leading a public discussion less focused on rapacious government activity and more concerned about how to encourage development. This change in the economic climate has had a substantial impact on the reach of the adopted state-based Kelo laws.

Stakeholder interviews provided some interesting insights as to agreements and conflicts among those focused on these new laws. Both proponents and opponents are willing to acknowledge that there have been instances of abuse by local governments in the exercise of eminent domain; they differ in whether they see this as an occasional or a regular occurrence.

Both groups comment on how the public discussion about the appropriate response to state-based laws has brought together seemingly unusual and unexpected allies. For example, libertarians and property rights activists who are opposed to expropriation on philosophical grounds are finding themselves allied with community activists who see an historical pattern of eminent domain abuse against communities of color and the poor.

Proponents and opponents also note that much of the change to date is in the legal framework for takings actions, and they agree it is less clear what the impact has been on actual planning and governmental practice. Even opponents of these laws (many planners, for example) see some good coming from them. They argue that eminent domain is becoming more tied into the planning process, more open, and more participatory.

Our survey results reinforced some of these points and added others (Jacobs and Bassett 2010). Respondents reported mixed reactions to the assertion that state-based Kelo laws were negatively impacting urban revitalization efforts, economic development planning, or programs for affordable housing (see table 1). Despite these results, respondents did note a negative effect on the willingness of local governments to use eminent domain, though there appeared to be no impact on blight designations by these governments.

With regard to changes in the planning process toward becoming more open and transparent, the majority reported no changes to date, and nearly half of the respondents saw no impact on the extent of conflict within the process (see table 2). When respondents were asked to share exactly how their localities were grappling with new requirements regarding eminent domain, most identified what we characterize as soft or tacit approaches—building networks, enhancing communication, and linking eminent domain into citizen participation processes.

Despite these relatively mild responses to the passage of state-based laws, 76 percent of respondents suggested that the property rights movement (the proponents of these laws) remains strong or very strong in their areas, versus 19 percent neutral and 4 percent reporting a weak or very weak movement. Yet the respondents also suggested that it was their perception that neither the average citizen nor the majority of elected officials were focused on the issues raised by the property rights movement.

The recent writings of supporters and proponents of the state-based Kelo laws add further understanding of what is (and is not) happening with these laws (see Ely 2009; Morriss 2009; Somin 2009). There appears to be a broad consensus that there has been little substantive impact from the state-based laws. Overall, the laws are characterized as more symbolic than substantive in nature and content. In the words of Ely (2009, 4), they are “merely hortatory fluff.” Why this is true, however, is a subject of some disagreement. Some analysts suggest it is because of the way key interest groups shaped the legislation. Others argue that while citizens appear to be concerned about the Kelo decision, they are less motivated to focus on the particular solution crafted by state legislatures.

There appears to be little expectation of substantive follow-up action by Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court, so whatever occurs will continue to be a function of actions by state legislatures and state courts. Nevertheless, the public is more aware of the eminent domain issue after Kelo, and that may affect future citizen and landowner actions. Where there is a distinction between substantive and symbolic legislation, the more substantive laws appear to be a function of both strong economic growth conditions in states and the promotion of laws through the initiative process versus the legislative process.

Impacts and Implications

Immediately after the Kelo decision, commentaries and reports by property rights advocates warned of impending danger for the American homeowner and the fundamental threat to American democracy. However, little has changed in the decade since a Lincoln Institute report examined the first generation of property rights laws (Jacobs 1999). That study concluded that state-based laws were having little impact on actual policy and planning practice. It appears that the same is largely true now.

That there should be social conflict over the public’s efforts to manage privately owned land is, in and of itself, not surprising (Jacobs and Paulsen 2009). That the physical taking of land would be the source of this conflict is even less surprising. What is surprising is that, beyond the spirited focus of a set of dedicated activists, it is not clear that the American public or their elected representatives really see the issues raised by the state-based laws as requiring substantial attention, and especially not now. The impacts of the state-based Kelo laws can be viewed in three ways.

Changes in Eminent Domain Activity

Both supporters of state-based Kelo laws and independent researchers find little change in what local and state governments are actually doing, or anticipate doing, as a result of the laws. There are several possible explanations. One is that few Kelo-style takings actually occur (Kayden 2009). The New London, Connecticut action was intended for economic development and was not based on a declaration of blight.

Physical takings can be initiated for a wide range of activities, but for at least 50 years (since Berman v. Parker) eminent domain for inner-city redevelopment has usually been accompanied by a declaration of blight. Almost none of the recent state-based laws prohibit physical takings when blight is declared. A second explanation is that even in situations where some physical taking is required, many of the transactions are (or at least appear to be) voluntary. Even in the New London situation, 100 of 115 landowners sold their land voluntarily and did not require an eminent domain action by the city. It is possible that the state-based laws are a solution to a problem that does not really exist.

Changes in Planning Practice

The state-based laws have not been all bad for planning practice. In fact, they have helped sensitize a broad range of interests to a core set of planning issues. In so doing the laws have made the planning and decision-making process a more central focus of public discussion and debate. Where there are indications of change to planning practice, they appear to be welcomed by planners. State-based laws are leading to requirements that when eminent domain is exercised it needs to be tied more explicitly to a broader planning and development process, as was the case in New London.

This means that eminent domain will be more transparent, and planners (and the elected officials to whom they report) will become more accountable. All in all, these new laws suggest that planners need to further improve the communication techniques and processes they use for planning in general, and eminent domain proceedings in particular. Few planners find objection to this, and many embrace it.

Changes in Public Discourse

As argued by even the supporters and proponents of state-based legislation, the most significant impact of these laws seems to be in the area of public awareness. The wide-ranging media coverage of the Kelo decision, the apparent bottom-up backlash against the decision, and survey data about the common understanding and appropriateness of the decision all suggest significantly heightened attention to eminent domain, and to the role of governmental activity in physical takings. It is precisely this situation that provides the conditions for changes in planning practice.

Conclusions

This research was conceptualized and begun at a time when public discussion about land use, taxation, and takings was set within a very different frame than it is today. Now, local, state, and national discussion is focused on the aftermath of the subprime mortgage collapse, the recession, and their systemic impacts on the domestic economy. Communities and states nationwide are having uncomfortable discussions about the provision of local and state services as the property tax and income tax bases that support those services soften and frequently decline, sometimes significantly and precipitously.

The national media seems to have a constant stream of articles detailing this problem. What is particularly significant for our research is the interrelationship of these events. In years past when local governments found themselves in a fiscal crisis, they could and would turn to their states for assistance. And in turn, when states found themselves in a parallel fiscal crisis, they could and would turn to the national government. Today neither the states nor the national government are able to provide assistance as their own fiscal positions stagnate, if not decline.

It is in this context that it is necessary to understand the present and then project the likely future of eminent domain actions by state and local governments and planning authorities. Research by supporters and proponents suggests that substantive, state-based legislation could be explained in part by the level of economic activity in the different states. States with strong economies, especially in the homebuilding sector, were more likely to pass substantive legislation.

What happens when there is not a strong state or local economy or when they are in a downward spiral? For the foreseeable future, we believe it is likely that planning in general and eminent domain in particular will be reexamined, and perhaps even witness a resurgence in support. Communities severely affected by the credit, housing, and mortgage-finance crises are being forced to reexamine eminent domain and related powers as ways to address abandoned housing and facilitate economic and social redevelopment. It is not at all clear what, if any, resistance they will experience from a citizenry wanting and needing solutions to real and seemingly ever more complex problems.

Even though survey respondents spoke to the continued strength and presence of the property rights movement, the results also indicated that it was not clear that the core issues of importance to the property rights movement were important to citizens in general, or even to elected officials. Does this mean that the property rights activists will abandon their activism? No. Just as they have sought to continuously advance their agenda and learn from their policy experiments for more than a decade, they will again learn from their successes and failures with state-based Kelo legislation. These laws represent the latest, not the final, wave of policy activism on property rights issues in the United States.

The planning community should not ignore the property rights advocates who have succeeded in changing the way the American public thinks about the core issue in physical and regulatory takings—the appropriate balance of the government vis-a-vis the individual with regard to property rights. But at the same time, it is not clear that the institutional changes these advocates have brought forth through state-based Kelo laws have changed public administrative practice, or that the laws fundamentally matter to the public and its representatives.

Was Kelo decided properly? That is a different question than our research focus. Are the state-based Kelo laws warranted as a response to the Kelo decision? That is a question that individuals and interest groups need to answer for themselves. Is there anything about the state-based Kelo laws that most planners should worry about? No there is not, but this does not mean that these laws or their supporters should be ignored. It does mean that planners and their allies and what they do in the public interest are on much stronger ground than the passage of these laws would seem to indicate.

References

Castle Coalition. 2007. 50-state report card: Tracking eminent domain reform legislation since Kelo. Arlington, VA.

Ely, James W., Jr. 2009. Post-Kelo reform: Is the glass half full or half empty? Supreme Court Economic Review 17: 127–150.

Jacobs, Harvey M. 1999. State property rights laws: The impacts of those laws on my land. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Jacobs, Harvey M., and Kurt Paulsen. 2009. Property rights: The neglected theme of 20th century American planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 75(2): 135–143.

Jacobs, Harvey M. and Ellen M. Bassett. 2010. All sound, no fury? Assessing the impacts of state-based Kelo laws on planning practice. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Kayden, Jerold R. 2009. The myth and reality of eminent domain for economic development. In Property rights and land policies, Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, eds., 206–213. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Morriss, Andrew P. 2009. Symbol or substance? An empirical assessment of state responses to Kelo. Supreme Court Economic Review 17: 237–278.

Somin, Ilya. 2009. The limits of backlash: Assessing the political response to Kelo. Minnesota Law Review 93(6): 2100–2178.

About the Authors

Harvey M. Jacobs is a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he holds a joint appointment in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning and the Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies.

Ellen M. Bassett is an assistant professor in the School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University in Oregon.