During the last decade, bus rapid transit (BRT) has revolutionized regional transportation planning in much of the developing and developed world. BRT went from being a fringe transportation option used in a handful of Brazilian and Australian cities to becoming a prominent mass transportation alternative for local and national governments.

Arguably the BRT concept with highest recognition is the provision of an exclusive right-of-way for bus transit coupled with high-frequency service. In South America, BRT systems in Curitiba, Brazil, and Bogotá, Colombia, feature networks of dedicated lanes designated for exclusive use by large-capacity, articulated buses, with expedited boarding and alighting.

In June 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court issued a much anticipated decision in the case of Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut (545 U.S. 469 [2005]). The close decision (5–4) galvanized the planning, development, redevelopment, and property rights communities, and continues to have national and international repercussions. What was at issue?

New London, Connecticut is an old, industrial, port city on America’s east coast. Its economic height in the 1920s was based on shipbuilding. Since that time the city has experienced substantial economic and population decline. As the property tax base dwindled, the city’s ability to provide basic public services also deteriorated. In the 1990s, New London developed a plan for economic revitalization, focused on a neighborhood with 115 separate properties. The plan required consolidation of these properties into a single parcel. The city further proposed to transfer ownership of some sections of the newly configured parcel to a multinational pharmaceutical company for a research and production facility.

The city approached landowners about their interest in the voluntary sale of their land, and 100 landowners agreed to sell. The city then proposed the use of eminent domain on the outstanding 15 properties (an action where the city would pay fair market value for each property). In so doing, the city did not assert that these properties were “blighted”—the legal and planning standard under which such eminent domain actions have existed since the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

Rather, under the authority of state enabling legislation and based on a comprehensive plan, both of which the court later acknowledged, the city asserted only that the outstanding parcels were required as part of the plan to accomplish a greater public good—increased jobs for the community, increased pubic revenues (taxes), and increased economic competitiveness.

The Kelo Case

Fighting to save her “little pink house,” Susette Kelo became the spokesperson for the opposition to New London’s proposed action on the remaining 15 parcels. Kelo and her co-litigants argued that the type of eminent domain proposed by the city was a misreading of the original intent of the U.S. Constitution’s takings clause (“nor shall private property by taken for public use, without just compensation”).

According to Kelo’s lawyers, the original constitutional clause was intended to allow for governmental actions that create public facilities (e.g., roads, parks, airports, hospitals), but not for government to take private land from one owner to give to another owner. They asserted that if the court found in favor of New London (and against Susette Kelo, which the court did) there would be no effective limit to any proposed physical taking of privately owned land by government. That is, government could always assert that a proposed new use of land was in the greater public interest.

The reasoning and final decision in Kelo was unsurprising. On a base of strong legal and historical analysis, the majority of the court showed why the action by the City of New London was acceptable. In so doing, it affirmed 50 years of similar actions by local and state governments throughout the country—actions which, while often clothed in a justification of blight, regularly had no more (or less) justification to them than that provided by New London.

The court itself provided the basis for much of the public policy controversy that followed when it stated that the decision was only about whether New London’s action was acceptable under the U.S. Constitution: Did it violate the terms of the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment? But, the court noted, “We emphasize that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” (545 U.S. 469 [2005] at 489). That is, while New London’s and similar local and state governmental actions were legal under the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court invited state legislatures to decide whether such actions should be legal under state constitutions.

The negative reaction to the court’s decision was swift and strong. Within a week a proposal was floated that then-U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter’s home in Weare, New Hampshire should be condemned so it might be replaced by the Lost Liberty Hotel. Using the threat of unconstrained governmental action against ordinary homeowners, a national movement emerged to thwart the impact of Kelo.

Following the invitation of the court, 43 states adopted laws that appear to challenge Kelo (see figure 1). The explicit intent of most of these laws is to prohibit governmental eminent domain actions both for the sole purpose of economic development and in cases where privately owned land is taken from one owner to be transferred to another owner.

Analysis of State-based Kelo Laws

Beginning in 2007, we began a two-year research project on the impact of these state-based laws. Planners, public sector lawyers, and redevelopment officials were already expressing strong concern about the constraints these new state laws could have on normal planning practice. Our question was, Would these laws impact planning, and if so, how? To investigate these laws, we adopted a multilevel approach that:

• inventoried and cataloged Kelo laws that had been adopted since 2005;
• undertook exploratory interviews with key stakeholders in the post-Kelo debate (ranging from representatives of the American Planning Association and the National Conference of State Legislatures to the Castle Coalition, the organization actively promoting the state-based laws);
• conducted a Web-based survey about the impacts of the laws with groups including planners, municipal attorneys, and developers; and
• tracked the emerging literature, mostly from opponents of the Kelo decision (that is, those who supported the new state-based laws) about their perceptions of the impacts these laws were having.

State and local governments are now grappling with circumstances quite different from those of a decade ago, especially since the economic recession in 2008 and 2009. Declines in development activity, property values, and property tax revenues appear to be leading a public discussion less focused on rapacious government activity and more concerned about how to encourage development. This change in the economic climate has had a substantial impact on the reach of the adopted state-based Kelo laws.

Stakeholder interviews provided some interesting insights as to agreements and conflicts among those focused on these new laws. Both proponents and opponents are willing to acknowledge that there have been instances of abuse by local governments in the exercise of eminent domain; they differ in whether they see this as an occasional or a regular occurrence.

Both groups comment on how the public discussion about the appropriate response to state-based laws has brought together seemingly unusual and unexpected allies. For example, libertarians and property rights activists who are opposed to expropriation on philosophical grounds are finding themselves allied with community activists who see an historical pattern of eminent domain abuse against communities of color and the poor.

Proponents and opponents also note that much of the change to date is in the legal framework for takings actions, and they agree it is less clear what the impact has been on actual planning and governmental practice. Even opponents of these laws (many planners, for example) see some good coming from them. They argue that eminent domain is becoming more tied into the planning process, more open, and more participatory.

Our survey results reinforced some of these points and added others (Jacobs and Bassett 2010). Respondents reported mixed reactions to the assertion that state-based Kelo laws were negatively impacting urban revitalization efforts, economic development planning, or programs for affordable housing (see table 1). Despite these results, respondents did note a negative effect on the willingness of local governments to use eminent domain, though there appeared to be no impact on blight designations by these governments.

With regard to changes in the planning process toward becoming more open and transparent, the majority reported no changes to date, and nearly half of the respondents saw no impact on the extent of conflict within the process (see table 2). When respondents were asked to share exactly how their localities were grappling with new requirements regarding eminent domain, most identified what we characterize as soft or tacit approaches—building networks, enhancing communication, and linking eminent domain into citizen participation processes.

Despite these relatively mild responses to the passage of state-based laws, 76 percent of respondents suggested that the property rights movement (the proponents of these laws) remains strong or very strong in their areas, versus 19 percent neutral and 4 percent reporting a weak or very weak movement. Yet the respondents also suggested that it was their perception that neither the average citizen nor the majority of elected officials were focused on the issues raised by the property rights movement.

The recent writings of supporters and proponents of the state-based Kelo laws add further understanding of what is (and is not) happening with these laws (see Ely 2009; Morriss 2009; Somin 2009). There appears to be a broad consensus that there has been little substantive impact from the state-based laws. Overall, the laws are characterized as more symbolic than substantive in nature and content. In the words of Ely (2009, 4), they are “merely hortatory fluff.” Why this is true, however, is a subject of some disagreement. Some analysts suggest it is because of the way key interest groups shaped the legislation. Others argue that while citizens appear to be concerned about the Kelo decision, they are less motivated to focus on the particular solution crafted by state legislatures.

There appears to be little expectation of substantive follow-up action by Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court, so whatever occurs will continue to be a function of actions by state legislatures and state courts. Nevertheless, the public is more aware of the eminent domain issue after Kelo, and that may affect future citizen and landowner actions. Where there is a distinction between substantive and symbolic legislation, the more substantive laws appear to be a function of both strong economic growth conditions in states and the promotion of laws through the initiative process versus the legislative process.

Impacts and Implications

Immediately after the Kelo decision, commentaries and reports by property rights advocates warned of impending danger for the American homeowner and the fundamental threat to American democracy. However, little has changed in the decade since a Lincoln Institute report examined the first generation of property rights laws (Jacobs 1999). That study concluded that state-based laws were having little impact on actual policy and planning practice. It appears that the same is largely true now.

That there should be social conflict over the public’s efforts to manage privately owned land is, in and of itself, not surprising (Jacobs and Paulsen 2009). That the physical taking of land would be the source of this conflict is even less surprising. What is surprising is that, beyond the spirited focus of a set of dedicated activists, it is not clear that the American public or their elected representatives really see the issues raised by the state-based laws as requiring substantial attention, and especially not now. The impacts of the state-based Kelo laws can be viewed in three ways.

Changes in Eminent Domain Activity

Both supporters of state-based Kelo laws and independent researchers find little change in what local and state governments are actually doing, or anticipate doing, as a result of the laws. There are several possible explanations. One is that few Kelo-style takings actually occur (Kayden 2009). The New London, Connecticut action was intended for economic development and was not based on a declaration of blight.

Physical takings can be initiated for a wide range of activities, but for at least 50 years (since Berman v. Parker) eminent domain for inner-city redevelopment has usually been accompanied by a declaration of blight. Almost none of the recent state-based laws prohibit physical takings when blight is declared. A second explanation is that even in situations where some physical taking is required, many of the transactions are (or at least appear to be) voluntary. Even in the New London situation, 100 of 115 landowners sold their land voluntarily and did not require an eminent domain action by the city. It is possible that the state-based laws are a solution to a problem that does not really exist.

Changes in Planning Practice

The state-based laws have not been all bad for planning practice. In fact, they have helped sensitize a broad range of interests to a core set of planning issues. In so doing the laws have made the planning and decision-making process a more central focus of public discussion and debate. Where there are indications of change to planning practice, they appear to be welcomed by planners. State-based laws are leading to requirements that when eminent domain is exercised it needs to be tied more explicitly to a broader planning and development process, as was the case in New London.

This means that eminent domain will be more transparent, and planners (and the elected officials to whom they report) will become more accountable. All in all, these new laws suggest that planners need to further improve the communication techniques and processes they use for planning in general, and eminent domain proceedings in particular. Few planners find objection to this, and many embrace it.

Changes in Public Discourse

As argued by even the supporters and proponents of state-based legislation, the most significant impact of these laws seems to be in the area of public awareness. The wide-ranging media coverage of the Kelo decision, the apparent bottom-up backlash against the decision, and survey data about the common understanding and appropriateness of the decision all suggest significantly heightened attention to eminent domain, and to the role of governmental activity in physical takings. It is precisely this situation that provides the conditions for changes in planning practice.

Conclusions

This research was conceptualized and begun at a time when public discussion about land use, taxation, and takings was set within a very different frame than it is today. Now, local, state, and national discussion is focused on the aftermath of the subprime mortgage collapse, the recession, and their systemic impacts on the domestic economy. Communities and states nationwide are having uncomfortable discussions about the provision of local and state services as the property tax and income tax bases that support those services soften and frequently decline, sometimes significantly and precipitously.

The national media seems to have a constant stream of articles detailing this problem. What is particularly significant for our research is the interrelationship of these events. In years past when local governments found themselves in a fiscal crisis, they could and would turn to their states for assistance. And in turn, when states found themselves in a parallel fiscal crisis, they could and would turn to the national government. Today neither the states nor the national government are able to provide assistance as their own fiscal positions stagnate, if not decline.

It is in this context that it is necessary to understand the present and then project the likely future of eminent domain actions by state and local governments and planning authorities. Research by supporters and proponents suggests that substantive, state-based legislation could be explained in part by the level of economic activity in the different states. States with strong economies, especially in the homebuilding sector, were more likely to pass substantive legislation.

What happens when there is not a strong state or local economy or when they are in a downward spiral? For the foreseeable future, we believe it is likely that planning in general and eminent domain in particular will be reexamined, and perhaps even witness a resurgence in support. Communities severely affected by the credit, housing, and mortgage-finance crises are being forced to reexamine eminent domain and related powers as ways to address abandoned housing and facilitate economic and social redevelopment. It is not at all clear what, if any, resistance they will experience from a citizenry wanting and needing solutions to real and seemingly ever more complex problems.

Even though survey respondents spoke to the continued strength and presence of the property rights movement, the results also indicated that it was not clear that the core issues of importance to the property rights movement were important to citizens in general, or even to elected officials. Does this mean that the property rights activists will abandon their activism? No. Just as they have sought to continuously advance their agenda and learn from their policy experiments for more than a decade, they will again learn from their successes and failures with state-based Kelo legislation. These laws represent the latest, not the final, wave of policy activism on property rights issues in the United States.

The planning community should not ignore the property rights advocates who have succeeded in changing the way the American public thinks about the core issue in physical and regulatory takings—the appropriate balance of the government vis-a-vis the individual with regard to property rights. But at the same time, it is not clear that the institutional changes these advocates have brought forth through state-based Kelo laws have changed public administrative practice, or that the laws fundamentally matter to the public and its representatives.

Was Kelo decided properly? That is a different question than our research focus. Are the state-based Kelo laws warranted as a response to the Kelo decision? That is a question that individuals and interest groups need to answer for themselves. Is there anything about the state-based Kelo laws that most planners should worry about? No there is not, but this does not mean that these laws or their supporters should be ignored. It does mean that planners and their allies and what they do in the public interest are on much stronger ground than the passage of these laws would seem to indicate.

References

Castle Coalition. 2007. 50-state report card: Tracking eminent domain reform legislation since Kelo. Arlington, VA.

Ely, James W., Jr. 2009. Post-Kelo reform: Is the glass half full or half empty? Supreme Court Economic Review 17: 127–150.

Jacobs, Harvey M. 1999. State property rights laws: The impacts of those laws on my land. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Jacobs, Harvey M., and Kurt Paulsen. 2009. Property rights: The neglected theme of 20th century American planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 75(2): 135–143.

Jacobs, Harvey M. and Ellen M. Bassett. 2010. All sound, no fury? Assessing the impacts of state-based Kelo laws on planning practice. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Kayden, Jerold R. 2009. The myth and reality of eminent domain for economic development. In Property rights and land policies, Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, eds., 206–213. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Morriss, Andrew P. 2009. Symbol or substance? An empirical assessment of state responses to Kelo. Supreme Court Economic Review 17: 237–278.

Somin, Ilya. 2009. The limits of backlash: Assessing the political response to Kelo. Minnesota Law Review 93(6): 2100–2178.

About the Authors

Harvey M. Jacobs is a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he holds a joint appointment in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning and the Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies.

Ellen M. Bassett is an assistant professor in the School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University in Oregon.

El cambio climático está presentando una variedad de riesgos, incertidumbres y opciones difíciles que las comunidades deben aprender a analizar: ¿Cómo deben considerarse el riesgo y la incertidumbre sobre el futuro en los procesos de toma de decisiones actuales sobre el uso del suelo? ¿Cómo pueden involucrarse las partes interesadas en la toma de decisiones para ayudar a clarificar las ventajas y desventajas de cada opción y construir un consenso sobre la mejor manera de proceder?

Por medio de una iniciativa conjunta entre el Consensus Building Institute (CBI) y el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy estamos ayudando a responder a estas preguntas utilizando la teoría y práctica de resolución de conflictos propia de CBI y los conocimientos de otros socios en temas tales como la gestión de riesgo y la planificación de escenarios. Hemos desarrollado una serie de talleres sobre enfoques colaborativos para manejar el riesgo y la incertidumbre en la toma de decisiones. En este artículo describimos estas experiencias y las lecciones sobre la adaptación al cambio climático que se pueden extraer de las mismas.

Como organización neutral que ayuda a resolver conflictos sobre el uso de suelo de todo tipo, CBI ha extraído distintas lecciones y buenas prácticas para planificadores y otras personas que están en la posición de dirimir conflictos sobre el uso del suelo (Nolon, Ferguson, y Field 2013). Cada vez más, sin embargo, el cambio climático y los riesgos, incertidumbres y complejidades asociadas se consideran una parte importante de la “historia” del conflicto más amplio sobre el uso del suelo. Por ejemplo, los debates sobre la ubicación de una planta cerca de la costa generan cuestiones acerca del impacto de la misma sobre el área circundante y el medio ambiente, como también preocupación sobre la posibilidad de que el ascenso del nivel del mar pueda hacer que la planta sea inviable al cabo de varios años.

Cada parte interesada tendrá una percepción distinta de cuán certero, inminente y evitable será el cambio climático, y cuáles son los riesgos que presentará. Más aún, los problemas vinculados con el cambio climático son increíblemente complejos. Para comprender el impacto del cambio climático en el Río Colorado, por ejemplo, hay que considerar una red de factores hidrológicos, legales, sociales, económicos, históricos, y otros.

En resumen, para afrontar el cambio climático hay que reconciliar distintas percepciones de riesgo, avanzar a pesar de un alto grado de incertidumbre y encontrar maneras de dejar lugar para adaptarse y cambiar de curso en un entorno complejo. Nuestra serie de talleres se ha centrado en reunir todas estas corrientes de pensamiento por medio de investigaciones articuladas, gestión de riesgo conjunto y toma de decisiones colaborativas.

Talleres sobre la gestión de riesgo

En 2009, con el respaldo del Instituto Lincoln, CBI desarrolló su primer taller de dos días de duración sobre la adaptación al cambio climático, con el objetivo de reunir expertos en gestión de riesgo, planificación de escenarios y construcción de consenso. Nuestro objetivo fue compartir las mejores prácticas en estas áreas para ayudar a aquellos que toman decisiones sobre el uso del suelo a evaluar distintas maneras de considerar el clima como un elemento clave de incertidumbre en el proceso de planificación. Los capacitadores de CBI fueron Paul Kirshen, experto en gestión de riesgo, y Stephen Aldrich, presidente de Bio Economic Research Associates (bio-era), una empresa de investigación y consultoría independiente, y profesional en planificación de escenarios desde hace mucho tiempo.

Desarrollamos en conjunto un programa de estudio con presentaciones en cada área temática, junto con un ejercicio interactivo basado en las amenazas reales que el ascenso en el nivel del mar presentará a la zona de East Boston, Massachusetts. El curso fue revisado y repetido en 2010 y 2011. En paralelo, desarrollamos una versión en línea que está disponible ahora en el sitio web del Instituto Lincoln (ver la contratapa interna).

La premisa principal de esta serie de talleres es que el cambio climático se debería considerar a la luz de la gestión de riesgo, y se debería tratar por medio de un proceso que incluya la gama más amplia de opiniones de las partes interesadas sobre la probabilidad de un resultado o impacto en particular debido al cambio climático. Si las partes interesadas sienten que, durante el proceso, sus opiniones y creencias se consideran legítimas, es mucho más probable que participen y acepten el resultado.

Además, la planificación de escenarios puede ayudar a que las partes interesadas consideren el impacto potencial del cambio climático probando acciones alternativas en función de distintos pronósticos posibles, para identificar las acciones que mejor representen una decisión “de la que no haya que lamentarse posteriormente”. En este enfoque queda implícito que no sería sensato ignorar los posibles impactos del cambio climático, como también lo sería invertir fondos de manera exagerada para prepararse frente a amenazas que quizás no se produzcan en el futuro. De esta manera, la planificación de escenarios reconoce realmente la incertidumbre.

CBI comenzó a trabajar en 2011 con el Sonoran Institute en Phoenix, Arizona, para llevar el taller al oeste de los Estados Unidos, haciendo hincapié en la planificación de escenarios colaborativos. Con Jim Holway, director del Programa de Comunidades y Suelos del Oeste del Sonoran Institute (otro socio del Instituto Lincoln) y Stephen Aldrich desarrollamos un taller de un día y medio de duración, que se llevó a cabo en Phoenix en marzo de 2012. Se centró en los métodos de planificación de escenarios como una manera de avanzar en intereses diversos y contradictorios, a pesar de la incertidumbre y los desacuerdos y hasta la polarización política, en temas como el cambio climático, la planificación de recursos hídricos y la gestión del crecimiento.

El método de planificación de escenarios desarrollado por Aldrich consiste en formar un grupo de múltiples partes interesadas para generar de forma conjunta una serie de escenarios plausibles para el futuro de un lugar o de un problema en un horizonte de tiempo dado. Las opciones políticas se miden en función de cada uno de los escenarios usando una serie de criterios que también se generan conjuntamente. Dos características distintivas de este enfoque son la participación de las partes interesadas en todo el proceso y la suposición de que todos los escenarios se consideran igualmente probables.

Este enfoque de la planificación de escenarios no es simplemente un análisis de alternativas sino un esfuerzo por imaginar futuros distintos en función de lo que sabemos hoy, de cuáles son las mayores incertidumbres y cuáles son los factores de cambio que se consideran más importantes en el sistema analizado. El siguiente paso es considerar de qué manera se comportan las múltiples opciones políticas y otras medidas en estos distintos futuros, cuando se las mide en función de criterios clave, como costo, eficacia y adaptabilidad.

Durante el desarrollo del taller de Phoenix reforzamos estos conceptos y los pasos del proceso usando un ejercicio interactivo que considera las amenazas reales que el cambio climático podrá presentar para el suministro de agua en el sudoeste de los Estados Unidos. El ejercicio, llamado “Planificación en el condado de Robert”, presentó un condado ficticio del “Corredor del Sol” sometido a la presión del desarrollo inmobiliario aun cuando se proyecta que el suministro de agua se reducirá debido al cambio climático. Los participantes usaron este caso de estudio para identificar los factores más importantes para el condado, para después traducirlos a elementos de escenarios futuros clasificándolos como “elementos predeterminados”, “incertidumbres principales” o “factores de desarrollo gobernantes”.

En el ejercicio final, se asignó a los participantes roles que representaban a grupos e intereses comunes (por ejemplo, la Junta de Comisionados del condado de Robert, la Asociación Agrícola del condado de Robert, o la Organización Medioambiental del Río Andrés). También se les dio un marco de referencia de escenarios en función de dos incertidumbres principales: ¿Volvería el condado de Robert a tener un crecimiento económico rápido, y se producirían realmente las reducciones en el suministro de agua debido al cambio climático pronosticadas en el “Informe de Cambio Climático de NRL” ficticio (figura 1)? Los participantes tuvieron que evaluar una serie de políticas hídricas usando este marco de referencia de escenarios, teniendo en cuenta también los intereses y percepciones proporcionadas en la descripción de los roles asignados a cada uno ellos.

Los participantes, que provenían de entidades estatales y locales, el mundo académico, sectores privados y organizaciones no gubernamentales, reportaron que el taller fue extremadamente útil para comprender cómo funciona la planificación colaborativa de escenarios y cómo se podría aplicar esta metodología en sus contextos profesionales. La simulación paso a paso del proceso de planificación de escenarios les ayudó a comprender con claridad cómo es el proceso y los beneficios y desafíos de trabajar con múltiples partes interesadas.

Se pidió a muchos participantes que desempeñaran un papel con intereses y percepciones del cambio climático muy distintos a los de su situación personal o profesional. Esta experiencia les brindó una oportunidad de aprender cómo otras partes interesadas podrían encarar este tipo de problema. Varios participantes solicitaron más información sobre el aspecto del proceso que tenía que ver con la construcción de consenso como, por ejemplo, ponerse de acuerdo en el proceso desde el comienzo y efectuar una evaluación para comprender a qué partes interesadas hay que involucrar y qué temas hay que resolver. Muchos participantes reconocieron que la planificación colaborativa de escenarios era una herramienta potencialmente útil para la resolución de conflictos.

Lecciones aprendidas

La progresión y el desarrollo continuo de estos talleres nos han ayudado a extraer varias lecciones sobre cómo enseñar y utilizar las herramientas colaborativas para analizar el riesgo, la incertidumbre y la complejidad en la toma de decisiones.

Clarificar la terminología desde el principio

Términos como construcción de consenso y planificación de escenarios tienen distintos significados dependiendo de la persona que los escuche. Algunos interpretan la construcción de consenso como un compromiso. Escuchamos con frecuencia de las partes interesadas que si participan en un proceso de construcción de consenso se verán obligadas a renunciar a sus intereses más importantes. Cuando CBI habla de enfoques para construir consenso, sin embargo, se refiere a satisfacer los intereses clave de las partes interesadas como forma de llegar a un acuerdo que maximice los beneficios conjuntos (Susskind, McKearnan y Thomas-Larmer 1999).

Para algunas personas, la planificación de escenarios sugiere una manera de trabajar para un futuro preferencial u “oficial”, mientras que para otras es un método para hacer pronósticos. En contraste, la metodología de Aldrich pone el énfasis en formular una cartera de futuros posibles que se consideran como igualmente probables y, después, ensaya distintas medidas y/o estrategias políticas en cada escenario para descubrir cuáles rinden buenos resultados en la mayoría o todos los escenarios, y por lo tanto serían las más sólidas.

Aldrich remarca que este método es el mejor para problemas “perversos”, que se caracterizan por un alto grado tanto de incertidumbre como de complejidad. De forma similar, distingue entre el proceso de planificación experta de escenarios y los enfoques con múltiples partes interesadas. Mantenemos la hipótesis de que el hecho de hacer participar a un conjunto diverso de partes interesadas en el proceso de planificación de escenarios ayudará a aprovechar el conocimiento local, se representarán varios puntos de vista y en última instancia las decisiones que se tomen se verán como más legítimas y por lo tanto serán más fáciles de implementar.

Dar tiempo a sentirse cómodo con la complejidad

La mayoría de la gente no se pasa el día pensando en problemas muy complejos e inciertos en términos de múltiples futuros posibles. Por el contrario, nos sentimos más cómodos con la linealidad, y con decisiones racionales basadas en los hechos y en nuestras propias percepciones y preferencias. Por su naturaleza, no obstante, los métodos para abordar el complejo tema del cambio climático exigen un modo de pensar distinto y una cierta comodidad con lo desconocido. Para mucha gente, el pensar en distintos futuros igualmente plausibles, ya sea como participantes en un taller o en el proceso real de planificación de escenarios, es nuevo.

Esta dinámica se puso en evidencia en nuestro taller de Phoenix, por ejemplo, cuando se les pidió a los participantes en el ejercicio del condado de Robert que pensaran en de qué manera ciertas políticas hídricas específicas –como la transferencia de derechos de agua existentes y el aumento del precio del agua– influirían sobre un escenario esencialmente estático o sobre un escenario en que el suministro de agua se reducía significativamente mientras que el crecimiento económico seguía constante.

Los participantes encontraron dificultades para aplicar una política a distintos futuros, y para separar su propio análisis político de los intereses y prioridades del papel que se les pidió que desempeñaran. La persona cuyo papel requería que se opusiera vehementemente a la idea de pagar más por el agua, por ejemplo, tuvo problemas para reconocer que esta política podría funcionar muy bien en un escenario de escasez de agua y alto crecimiento económico. La dificultad de separar los intereses y percepciones de los escenarios “objetivos” también tiene su correlación en la vida real.

Para ayudar a manejar esta dinámica, es importante identificar el desplazamiento mental necesario para manejar complejidad e incertidumbre, reconociendo que este desplazamiento no es siempre fácil y por ello hay que darle a la gente tiempo suficiente para acostumbrarse. Para los propósitos del taller, fue útil considerar que el ejercicio era una manera de ayudar a los participantes a medir una cierta política basada en cuatro futuros plausibles, y que este era un objetivo legítimo e importante por sí mismo. En el contexto de una planificación de escenarios real, puede ser valioso que los expertos ayuden a las partes interesadas a trabajar con escenarios desde el comienzo mismo del proceso.

Invertir tiempo en “actividades interactivas”

En general es útil que un taller sea interactivo, tanto desde el punto de vista pedagógico como para mantener el interés de la audiencia. La interactividad es particularmente importante para enseñar en detalle enfoques conceptuales como la gestión de riesgo, incertidumbre y complejidad. Muchas personas trabajan mejor cuando los conceptos y la teoría se pueden ligar directamente con una realidad relevante. Si se le da a la gente un ejemplo o ejercicio concreto que les resulta familiar, pero que no refleja de forma directa su situación de vida, ello ayudará a dar forma concreta a los conceptos, dejando lugar al mismo tiempo para que los participantes experimenten con nuevas ideas y puntos de vista (Plumb, Fierman, y Schenk 2011).

Otra razón para realizar “actividades interactivas”, como las llamábamos en Phoenix, es ayudar a la gente a comprender tanto los desafíos como el valor de llevar a cabo un proceso de planificación colaborativa de escenarios. Por ejemplo, la lógica de usar incertidumbres mayores para estructurar escenarios futuros puede ser clara en principio, pero llegado el momento de seleccionar dichas incertidumbres, el proceso de toma de decisiones se hace más difícil de lo que uno imagina.

Cuando les pedimos a los participantes que identificaran las incertidumbres mayores del condado de Robert, se produjo un debate intenso. ¿Debería tratarse el cambio climático como una incertidumbre mayor o como un elemento predeterminado? ¿El crecimiento económico es un factor de desarrollo o una incertidumbre mayor? Los participantes comentaron después que la intensidad del debate les sorprendió, pero encontraron muy valioso ver cómo un grupo de personas podía llegar a conclusiones tan diferentes a partir del mismo modelo fáctico de tres páginas.

Es fundamental entonces dar tiempo para practicar estos conceptos, ya que ello refuerza las ideas, las vincula con problemas y temas reales, e ilustra el valor de exponer distintos intereses y percepciones. En el contexto de los talleres, recomendamos ejercicios interactivos ficticios pero realistas, como el de planificación en el condado de Robert, para proporcionar información relevante, reforzar conceptos y alentar a los participantes a adoptar perspectivas a las que pueden no estar acostumbrados.

Utilizar la construcción de consenso en casos de riesgo, incertidumbre y complejidad

El elemento común a lo largo de nuestra experiencia de desarrollo y revisión de estos talleres es la noción de que las técnicas de construcción de consenso ocupan un lugar importante en la adaptación al cambio climático y en otros procesos de toma de decisiones que involucran riesgo, incertidumbre y complejidad. La participación significativa de representantes de las partes afectadas ayuda a asegurar que se exprese todo el rango de perspectivas e intereses, se utilicen los conocimientos locales y que se genere un proceso sólido que se considere ampliamente legítimo y verosímil. Más aún; de ser apropiado, se puede hacer participar a grupos de partes interesadas en la implementación de políticas, particularmente si se establece un enfoque de gestión colaborativa adaptativa (Islam y Susskind 2012).

Las herramientas y técnicas particulares para construir consenso en la planificación colaborativa de escenarios y otros procesos incluyen las evaluaciones y la gestión de procesos. Al comienzo de un proceso se puede realizar una evaluación para identificar las partes interesadas y los temas a debatir, observar la capacidad de las partes interesadas para trabajar con escenarios y diseñar un proceso para avanzar en función de los resultados.

Estas evaluaciones frecuentemente son efectuadas por una parte neutral, comenzando con entrevistas confidenciales con una amplia gama de partes interesadas. Las entrevistas se consolidan en un informe de evaluación que resume los puntos de vista y temas principales expresados, sin atribuir ninguna declaración en particular a la parte que la emitió. Se debe dar oportunidad a las partes interesadas para confirmar que su perspectiva fue recogida correctamente. Utilizando los resultados de la evaluación, el facilitador y el organizador pueden decidir si vale la pena avanzar en el proceso con la participación de múltiples partes interesadas y, en ese caso, cómo hacerlo.

También se puede usar al facilitador, o a un grupo de facilitadores, para manejar el proceso colaborativo, en el caso de que se decida seguir adelante. Se pueden usar administradores de proceso neutrales para que la conversación sea productiva y colaborativa y para ayudar a que el grupo llegue a un acuerdo sobre los puntos claves, como la selección de los elementos de los escenarios y los criterios para evaluar opciones políticas.

Por ejemplo, CBI, con el respaldo del Instituto Lincoln, hizo posible recientemente una reunión sobre el ascenso del nivel del mar, diseñada para reforzar las zonas urbanas costeras en la Ciudad de Nueva York. Los facilitadores reunieron a representantes de entidades estatales y locales, grupos de interés y otras partes interesadas que no podían progresar en sus discusiones, y promovieron una interacción que generó pasos concretos para reforzar la zona costera y comprometerse a seguir trabajando juntos. Los facilitadores también pueden ayudar a los grupos a planificar la implementación de políticas o acuerdos que resulten del proceso, incluyendo esfuerzos de gestión colaborativa adaptativa.

Conclusión

Para poder tomar hoy decisiones relacionadas con el impacto del cambio climático en el futuro, el trabajo reciente de CBI ha reforzado la noción de que es necesario construir capacidad para gestionar el riesgo, la incertidumbre y la complejidad conectándola de cerca con los problemas y temáticas reales a los que se enfrentan las comunidades. Más aún, es importante participar en procesos de toma de decisiones que puedan resolver estos desafíos, en vez de tomar decisiones ignorándolos, utilizando para ello métodos como la planificación de escenarios y la gestión adaptativa. En muchas situaciones, sin embargo, no basta con que estas herramientas sean utilizadas solo por expertos, sin consultar a otras partes interesadas. Frecuentemente, las decisiones más robustas son aquellas tomadas con la participación de las partes que se verán afectadas por el cambio climático y por las decisiones tomadas para manejarlo.

Sobre los autores

Elizabeth Fierman es integrante del personal del Consensus Building Institute en Cambridge, Massachusetts, donde trabaja en facilitación y mediación, desarrolla y brinda capacitación, y realiza investigaciones.

Patrick Field es director gerente del Consensus Building Institute, subdirector del Programa de Debates Públicas de MIT-Harvard y senior fellow del Centro de Recursos Naturales y Política de la Universidad de Montana.

Steve Aldrich es el fundador de Bio Economic Research Associates LLC (bio-eraTM), una empresa independiente de investigación y consultoría con sede en Cambridge, Massachusetts, especializada en el análisis de temas complejos en la intersección de nuestra comprensión emergente de biología y economía.

Referencias

Islam, Shafiqul, and Lawrence Susskind. 2012 (forthcoming). Water diplomacy: A negotiated approach to managing complex water networks. New York: Resources for the Future.

Nolon, Sean, Ona Ferguson, and Patrick Field. 2013 (forthcoming). Land in conflict: Managing and resolving land use disputes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Plumb, David, Elizabeth Fierman, and Todd Schenk. Role-play simulations and managing climate change risks. Cambridge, MA: Consensus Building Institute. http://cbuilding.org/tools/bpcs/roleplay-simulations-and-managing-climate-change-risks

Susskind, Lawrence, Sarah McKearnan, and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, eds. 1999. The consensus building handbook: A comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

For every travel article featuring a Caribbean paradise with gentle waters lapping a sandy beach, there is an anxious news story about a brewing hurricane. The Lesser Antilles, an archipelago of small islands that form a crescent in the eastern Caribbean, have always been particularly vulnerable, thrust into the volatile waters of the Atlantic Ocean. In 1776, the Pointe-à-Pitre hurricane struck the French colony of Guadeloupe and killed 6,000, making it the deadliest Atlantic storm on record at that time. Four years later, the Great Hurricane of 1780 hit even harder, making landfall in Barbados, then ravaging nearby islands, killing at least 20,000 and wrecking British and French fleets maneuvering at the height of the American Revolution. Two centuries and dozens of storms later, even Hurricane Ivan wasn’t as deadly when it devastated Grenada in 2004, leaving the parliament in ruins and 85 percent of the structures on the island damaged.

In recent decades, climate change has heightened threats to the region. U.S. strategies employed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy are not especially relevant to the fragile, yet vibrant islands of the Lesser Antilles, from Puerto Rico in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south. With tourism-dependent economies and extremely limited amounts of developable land, especially on mountainous islands, this potpourri of independent countries, dependent territories, and overseas departments share a common land use challenge: how to grapple with development patterns oriented toward the coast while managing the growing threat of sea level rise.

One island in the region stands out for its exceptional capacity to recognize and prepare for the rising tide: Pear-shaped Barbados has become a Caribbean leader in integrated coastal zone management—the contemporary practice of integrating sectors, levels of government, and disciplines to address the coastal zone both in the water and on dry land. Coastal land use and environmental management are always contentious issues on a small island. But, as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once remarked, “Barbados consistently punches above its weight.” Almost 50 years since independence, the island nation has leveraged a combination of foresight, international support, and local capacity to develop planning institutions and prepare for an uncertain future.

From Sugar to Sun Worshippers

Today, Barbados is famous as a top international tourist destination, with trademark white-sand beaches, warm aquamarine water, and ample sunshine along its 60 miles of coastline. Nearly 300,000 people live on the 166 square-mile island; 44 percent of Barbadians are classified as living in urban areas, centered in Bridgetown and along the developed south and west coasts. With a per capita GDP of US$23,600 and near-universal literacy, Barbados ranks 38th in the world and first in the Caribbean according to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 Human Development Index. Relying on its sand and surf, Barbados derives 80 percent of its US$4.4 billion GDP from its tourism and service industries.

But this evolution is a recent one, part of a similar pattern of development across the Caribbean in light of independence movements and the advent of commercial aviation. Originally inhabited by a native Amerindian population, Barbados was first settled in 1627 by the English, who quickly turned it into one of the world’s leading sugar producers. Barbados’s colonial history is unusual for the region; unlike many other Caribbean islands that saw multiple changes of European powers, Barbados did not leave British rule until independence in 1966—earning it the nickname “Little England.”

The colonial economy was a classic model of trade to enrich the metropolis. The English imported African slaves to work sugarcane plantations, molasses refineries, and rum distilleries. As a result, 90 percent of modern-day Barbadians claim African descent. Following independence, the already-lagging sugar crop, which suffered fluctuations common to any monoculture, became even less reliable as the push for free trade led the U.K. and later the EU to slowly draw down subsidies and preferential pricing.

At the same time, Barbados invested heavily in its tourism services, which shifted the locus of development. Historically, the island was mostly rural, with sugarcane plantations carving up the interior of the country, home to slaves and, later, itinerant sharecroppers toting moveable wooden “chattel” houses, Barbados’s typical vernacular architecture. The coast was home to Bridgetown, the principal port, where a navigable river meets the ocean, and a few smaller towns and fishing villages. A deep-water port dredged in 1961 also laid the groundwork for the arrival of cruise ships. The growing number of tourists necessitated hotels, resorts, restaurants, shops, and bars, all within a stone’s throw of the ocean. This impulse led to strips of coastal development between the airport and Bridgetown, on the south coast, and along the west coast, home to the calmest water and charming Holetown and Speightstown. By the 1990s, Barbados’s Grantley Adams International Airport was receiving regularly scheduled British Airways flights from London on one of the few Concorde supersonic jets.

The Local Response to Rising Waters

Lying just east of the main arc of the other eastern Caribbean islands, outside the Atlantic hurricane belt, Barbados has a meteorological advantage. Although it’s still susceptible to major storms, it experiences far fewer hurricanes than its neighbors to the northwest. Yet any threat to the beach and coral lining Barbados would have devastating consequences, given the island’s economic dependence on the coast. Its well-being is endangered by creeping sea level rise, coupled with possible storm surge if the island suffers even a glancing blow from a major hurricane. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has strong evidence that following a period of almost no change for centuries, there was an increase in global sea level measures in the 20th century, and that trend is accelerating in the 21st century. In August, the IPCC said sea levels could rise more than three feet by 2100.

Never a major contributor of carbon emissions, small island states are disproportionately impacted by global climate change resulting from modern industrialization elsewhere in the world. Shifts in weather patterns have produced a greater number of major storm systems, increased global temperatures, melted polar ice caps, and contributed to sea level rise. While major industrialized countries such as the United States, China, and Western Europe also experience impacts from sea level rise, the vulnerable proportion of these countries is miniscule compared to the susceptible areas of Barbados. The developed world’s inability to understand the impacts and consequences of its behavior, as evidenced by political inaction on issues such as carbon cap-and-trade agreements, has forced countries in the developing world to act now or face a perilous future.

Paradoxically, Barbados’s imperial history—often a burden on postcolonial countries—has proved an advantage, in that the island has a long, uninterrupted history of British-style town and country planning. Like the United Kingdom, Barbados is administratively divided into parishes, and modern development law is based on the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. Once independent, Barbados established its own planning framework with the 1972 Town and Country Planning Development Order. Presently, the Town and Country Development Planning Office (TCDPO) oversees all construction on the island, with the chief town planner reporting directly to the prime minister.

The Physical Development Plan from 1988 guides development on the island. Since the document’s amendment in 2003, there has been a turn toward sustainable development, not just as a catch phrase, but as an inherent value for the government’s vision for the island. In a 2008 conference speech, the previous prime minister, David Thompson, outlined a few core ideas of the plan: protect natural, agricultural, and cultural resources; promote mixed-use centers and corridors to encourage a diversified economy; maintain central Bridgetown as the financial and commercial hub; and stimulate tourism by the modernization of older beachfront properties and development of new opportunities. Today, the current prime minister, Freundel Stuart, continues this push for sustainability, as shown by his participation in high-level panels at last year’s United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20.

By the late 1970s, individual property owners began to notice coastal erosion affecting their land. The media began to harp on this issue, as it was concurrent with the push for tourism, quickly becoming the country’s main source of foreign exchange reserve. Prompted by this coastal erosion—but also concerned about catastrophic events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanic eruptions, and oil spills—the Barbados government embarked on a diagnostic pre-feasibility study in 1981 with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as part of its Coastal Conservation Program. The study focused on the west and south coasts, as these areas of the island had the greatest potential for tourism infrastructure. At that time, the government set up the temporary Coastal Conservation Project Unit (CCPU), which oversaw the pre-feasibility study and came to a series of conclusions on the causes of coastal erosion and damage to beachfronts. For example, because inland Barbados had poor water quality, the runoff polluted the sea, damaging coral reefs. Natural phenomena, such as storm swells and the occasional erratic hurricane, also caused erosion. In turn, the sea defense structures in place were poorly designed. The IDB study mandated the CCPU to continue monitoring the shorelines, to provide advice to the public on coastal matters, and to serve as an advisor to the TCDPO on waterfront development.

Coastal Zone Management Unit is Born

As the Coastal Conservation Project Unit continued its mandate for a decade, the Government of Barbados, along with additional funding from the IDB, embarked on another study, which recommended the establishment of a permanent unit to oversee the coastal zone. This Coastal Zone Management Unit (CZMU) was created in 1996 to regulate, make recommendations, and educate the Barbadian population about coastal management. Still receiving a large amount of its funding from the IDB, the CZMU is currently housed in the Ministry of Environment, Water Resources, and Drainage. As its title suggests, the CZMU manages the coastal zone, which it defines as “the transition zone where the land meets water; the region that is directly influenced by marine hydrodynamic processes; extends offshore to the continental shelf break and onshore to the first major change in topography above the reach of major storm waves.” Therefore, the unit oversees the coral reefs around Barbados and all coastal engineering projects, while serving as an advisor to the TCDPO for onshore coastal development.

Land use issues are at the forefront of the relationship between the CZMU and TCDPO. When the TCDPO receives any application for development in the coastal zone, it forwards it automatically to the CZMU for review and comment. Since the tourism industry is based mainly in the coastal zone of the island, many of Barbados’s development applications go through the CZMU for review. The unit vets the application to make sure the setbacks are correct, 30 meters from the high water mark for developments along the beach and 10 meters for developments along cliffs, measured from the landward point of undercut. In addition to verifying setbacks, the CZMU looks at drainage requirements, buffer zones, fencing restrictions, and other regulations. The CZMU then makes recommendations to the TCDPO on the application.

CZMU Acting Director Dr. Lorna Inniss, who holds a Ph.D. in oceanography from Louisiana State University, praises this process. She says, “Our interministerial collaboration is extremely high. We have the ability to establish and improve government structure that’s inclusive and consultative by nature.” The government process is admirable for its cooperation and silo-breaking tendencies; unfortunately the CZMU’s recommendations are purely advisory and have no binding power for the TCDPO to enforce. Regulations in the coastal zone are not retroactive for the legions of properties built during the resort boom, and penalties for violations also remain very low. This process is the closest Barbados approaches to a formalized environmental impact assessment, per a U.S. model, but it’s a strong first step for the Caribbean. CZMU and TCDPO have been more successful in planning for low-impact future development—along the more rugged east coast, for example, where the Physical Development Plan envisions a national park.

The CZMU is most effective in implementing coastal engineering projects to protect the coastline and stop beach erosion. The most natural conservation technique is to restore sand dunes and mangroves. Planting vegetation in the coastal areas allows the dunes to form naturally and hold back inundations from storm surges, while mangroves absorb wave action. Beach nourishment is a popular quick fix but more of a Band-Aid approach that is more costly and less effective, as currents and storms can easily erode the nourished beach.

The CZMU safeguards the coast with various physical interventions as well, including breakwaters, groynes, and seawalls. Breakwaters are concrete structures, sunken close to the beach, that force waves to break farther from the coast so they don’t directly pummel the sand. Groynes are rock structures that jut out into the ocean to disrupt the movement of sediment. Seawalls are the CZMU’s largest type of intervention. Intended to protect more populated areas, these construction projects involve either a riprap design of large rocks or a flat, concrete seawall that can create public space attractive to both tourists and residents, such as the Richard Haynes Boardwalk, partially funded by an IDB loan. Because these techniques can sometimes exacerbate erosion and require more expensive maintenance than natural interventions, their long-term efficacy is up for debate, but, in the short term, they protect the coastline and the tourism industry.

Given the island’s vulnerability to storms, engineering projects can be costly. Inniss, however, explains, “We have a policy of rigorous stakeholder consultation, and it’s not just lip service. November through April is our high season; on a recent project in Holetown, we heard from merchants that it was vital to complete work by November, so we hustled to do so. In a spirit of mutual cooperation, we can get private sector buy-in.” Hopefully, the CZMU can leverage the political capital it earns from the private sector on such projects, in order to make more demanding regulations become binding down the road.

In order to build support, the CZMU maintains a major outreach campaign to educate the island’s population, to which Inniss herself attributes the success of the CZMU internally and externally: “It begins with a nationally high level of education and literacy—over 98 percent for decades.” Former Senator Henry Fraser echoes her, “People ask, ‘Why do things work in Barbados?’ It’s largely because of the emphasis on education since emancipation. And, because it’s a small, highly religious place with people living close together, respect, tolerance, and a work ethic are greater than elsewhere.”

To deepen the educational foundation of Barbados’s cooperative approach to coastal zone management, the CZMU distributes a newsletter, maintains a strong social media presence, and produces an educational television show that explains the geological history of the island and techniques to raise awareness about sea level rise and the importance of coastal management. It also hosts many activities such as International Coastal Clean-Up Day, Sundown Beach Walks, Summer Seminar Series, and a summer internship program for secondary- and tertiary-level students. It also provides lectures for schools and educational institutions, NGOs, private organizations, and the general public.

Next Steps and Global Cooperation

The IDB continues to be a major supporter of Barbados’s efforts. The development bank’s most recent aid to the country includes a 25-year, $30 million loan to pursue a Coastal Risk Assessment and Management Programme. Inniss is excited by the confidence that such support expresses, as it indicates the government’s belief that the CZMU can execute a project that will create enough value to repay the money. “It will be a next level, state-of-the-art integrated coastal zone management strategy that will involve a series of stakeholders: tourism, rum distilleries, light and power utilities, marinas, boaters, commercial fishermen, the port, divers,” Inniss details. “Key decision makers have recognized that coastal zone management is important not just as an environmental program but to grow the economy of Barbados.” Hopefully other Caribbean countries have taken notice, as Inniss herself has provided technical assistance to St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—while in turn taking cues from New Zealand, Hawaii, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada as a model of how to implement international standards.

Of course, there is still room for improvement. Even as the CZMU works closely with TCPDO on land use planning, with national marine parks to conduct ecosystem-based monitoring, and with civil engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, CZMU is still not fully integrated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing. For example, Inniss acknowledges, “We know scientifically that agricultural runoff is the biggest contributor of marine pollutants.”

Indeed, on a small island, the land and water are intrinsically interconnected. While Barbados continues to do its part in the battle against global climate change—another IDB loan signed alongside the coastal management funding will establish an Energy Smart Fund to reduce dependence on fossil fuels—it cannot sit tight and wait for the larger countries of the world to act. As small, developing island states in the Indian and Pacific oceans face the prospect of resettling their populations in other countries a few decades down the road, Barbadians plan to stay and protect their piece of paradise.

About the Authors

Gregory R. Scruggs was a consultant to the American Planning Association for Latin America and the Caribbean from 2010 to 2013. He is currently pursuing a master’s in regional studies of Latin America and the Caribbean at Columbia University. Contact: gscruggs.apa.consult@gmail.com.

Thomas E. Bassett, a senior program associate at the American Planning Association, works on the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas grant from the U.S. Department of State as well as the domestic Community Assistance Program. Contact: thomas.e.bassett@gmail.com.

Resources

Bassett, Thomas E. and Gregory R. Scruggs. 2013. Water, Water Everywhere: Sea level Rise and Land Use Planning in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Pará. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP13TB1. https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2282_1621_Bassett_WP13TB1.pdf.

Belle, N. and B. Bramwell. 2005. Climate change and small island tourism: Policy maker and industry perspectives in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 44: 32–41.

Dharmartne, G. and A. Brathwaite. 1998. Economic valuation of coastline for tourism in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 37: 138–144.

Inter-American Development Bank. 2010. Indicators of disaster risk and risk management, Program for Latin America and the Caribbean, Barbados. September. Accessed July 9, 2012. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35160015.

Phillips, M. R. and A. L. Jones. 2006. Erosion and tourism infrastructure in the coastal zone: Problems, consequences, and management. Tourism Management 27: 517–52.

Shaping the Future of the American West

Summer Waters is the third director of Western Lands and Communities—a joint program established in 2003 by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Sonoran Institute to inform policy related to the use of land and natural resources in the Intermountain West. Summer has a B.S. in biology from the University of South Florida and an M.S. in civil engineering, with concentrations in environmental and water resources engineering, from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Before joining the Sonoran Institute, she spent 15 years working in urban planning and natural resources for government entities including the University of Arizona Cooperative Extension and the County of San Diego, where she won an Emmy award for coproducing an educational video.

LAND LINES: What attracted you to the challenge of directing this joint program between the Lincoln Institute and the Sonoran Institute?

SUMMER WATERS: The chance to help shape the future of the American West. The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is a thought leader in this realm, and the Sonoran Institute is well known throughout the region for its dedication to collaborative work with local communities and other organizations. Our shared mission is ambitious, but each organization has complementary attributes that make it successful. Our mutual, longstanding commitment gives the joint program depth and flexibility.

LL: Why is this job the right one at the right time for you?

SW: My interest in the natural world led me to study biology as an undergraduate, and my desire for a solutions-oriented career led me back to school for engineering. After graduation, I gravitated toward planning, because it allowed me to work with both the natural and built environments. After gaining professional experience, I began to recognize how the use of land, water, and energy interconnects with economics and community development. And I appreciated Western Lands and Communities’ holistic approach to the challenges facing the region.

LL: Both the Lincoln Institute and the Sonoran Institute have recently undergone leadership changes. What challenges and opportunities does this transition afford you?

SW: Both Stephanie Sklar, the new CEO of the Sonoran Institute, and Lincoln Institute President and CEO George McCarthy are motivated leaders who inspire me personally and professionally. Stephanie is ambitiously embarking on a strategic planning process that will guide the Sonoran Institute through its 25th anniversary as an organization. Her breadth and depth of knowledge inform the process and ensure that we both celebrate and evaluate our work. George McCarthy is a courageous and visionary leader guiding the Lincoln Institute through a similar transition. His appreciation for the West was obvious when he recently visited our Phoenix office. He comprehends the challenges we are facing and the importance of demonstration projects, such as our Colorado River Delta Restoration effort, in shaping the future of this region.

LL: How is Western Lands and Communities contributing to the Sonoran Institute’s effort to restore the ecology and economy of the Colorado River Delta?

SW: Western Lands and Communities supports the implementation of Minute 319, the binational agreement between the United States and Mexico that guides the sharing and delivery of water on the Colorado River under the 1944 treaty through 2017. Perhaps the most significant event resulting from this agreement was the release of a “pulse flow” of 105,000 acre-feet of water into Mexico in the spring of 2014. This intervention was designed to mimic what would have been the Colorado River’s natural flow cycles under spring conditions, when snowmelt from the mountains once ran through what is now seven U.S. states and two countries, ultimately to the Sea of Cortez. This historic effort breathed life into the desiccated delta, and in May 2014 the river reached the sea for the first time in years. In the spring of 2015, we will convene a group of NGO representatives, academic professionals, and agency scientists at the one-year anniversary of this event. Participants will discuss the impact of renewed flows on critical ecosystem functions in the region and evaluate the implications of this temporary agreement between the U.S. and Mexico. Through this process, we hope to inform future policies related to the allocation of this precious resource to the natural environment.

LL: I understand this project fits into your broader agenda to conserve large landscapes. Tell us more about that effort.

SW: Public land ownership in the Intermountain West is vast. At first glance, a map of the region depicts a disconnected pattern of various land agencies and managers with very different missions and approaches. Working lands and tribal lands further complicate that scenario. Landscape-scale conservation relies heavily on the full range of people who live within this picture; in order to avoid “random acts of conservation,” and to achieve more coordinated and meaningful results, collaboration among public entities, individual land owners, and tribes is key. Fortunately, Westerners—regardless of political viewpoints, upbringing, or economic status—typically unite around a shared goal of preserving a way of life that is intertwined with the landscapes they inhabit. The way forward involves capitalizing on this shared vision, engaging communities in shaping their own future, and connecting practitioners with stakeholders in a meaningful manner.

LL: How does Western Lands and Communities help communities respond better to the major challenges for the future of the Intermountain West?

SW: The West faces essentially the same challenges as other areas of the United States, but under a unique set of circumstances. We have a growing population, which triggers changing economies and demographics. Both urban and rural areas struggle to balance growth with natural resource protection. Given the sheer scale and grandeur of the natural environment in the West, it is easy to view our vast natural resources as infinite—a misperception that can lead to sprawl and other issues associated with natural resource extraction. Our expansive landscapes also create specific challenges related to transportation, which contributes to climate change—a force that exacerbates all other problems. The joint program assists communities through the development of planning tools, webinars on smart growth and sustainable development topics, and compilations of successful case studies from communities across the West.

LL: Western Lands and Communities is engaged in exploratory scenario planning—a unique approach to long-range planning that explicitly challenges communities to evaluate their proposals against an uncertain future. How is exploratory scenario planning different from traditional planning, and how is it being applied in the West?

SW: Exploratory scenario planning is a process that encourages imagination in the planning process. Through the engagement of stakeholders, community members, and experts, we develop a variety of plausible scenarios and acknowledge the complex forces, such as climate change, that could lead to a significantly different future. We help participants to view their particular issues in terms of the broader social, political, economic, and natural forces that shape communities in general. While some scenarios currently seem more probable or desirable than others, each receives equal consideration throughout the workshops. Most importantly, this process is more flexible, engaging, and dynamic than traditional planning, requiring participants to develop multiple strategies in response to a spectrum of future uncertainties. Western Lands and Communities has helped communities across the West apply this approach to General Plan updates, watershed plan development, and preparation for the economic impacts of changing climate and weather conditions. Ultimately, exploratory scenario planning is designed to help communities adapt to change better by addressing complex issues that are embedded in great uncertainties. The foresight and strategies generated through this process prepare leaders to guide their communities toward a more sustainable future.

LL: What are the special challenges of planning for climate change in the Intermountain West and how have WLC’s approaches recognized those issues?

SW: In the West, climate change affects ecosystems that are predominately arid and often exhibit high variability, compounding problems. In the past, we have built large reservoirs to cope with fluctuating water supplies due to cycles of drought. But that solution is no longer sufficient, as we are seeing droughts of unprecedented severity punctuated by extreme floods. Communities must now tackle issues that could once be left to the federal government. They must determine for themselves how to cope with diminishing water resources, increasing temperatures, migrating ecosystems, and extreme weather. The approach that Western Lands and Communities takes is to help communities identify priorities and develop policies to create resilience.

We have to be cognizant of the fact that neighboring communities can be very polarized when it comes to climate change. While some communities have embraced the reality of it, others hold onto a past way of life that is essential to the character of the region, yet leaves little room for adaptation. The West has large populations of American Indians and Latinos who are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts. We recently began working with urban Latino communities in Arizona to address their disproportionate exposure to the effects of global warming. We do this by convening leaders, crafting messages that resonate with Latino communities, and working with organizations to train community members to educate others on this topic. Every community is a little different, so we blend replicable methods with adaptive management.

LL: The scope of Western Lands and Communities’ work has widened considerably since it started with an exclusive focus on the needs, challenges, and opportunities for state trust lands. What is the significance of that original mission and the resulting relationship, built over time, with state trust land managers?

SW: Historically, state trust lands have been poorly understood by the general public and natural resource professionals alike, particularly with respect to their fiduciary responsibilities. People rely on state trust lands for their livelihoods, as do children and young adults who need access to quality public education. Here in Arizona, we have seen unprecedented cuts to funding for public schools and universities in recent years. Our work has brought greater understanding of state trust lands as a source of funding for public schools and as natural systems with important biological functions that need to be protected. Mitigation banking and land exchanges help to integrate state trust lands into the broader context of large landscape conservation and sustainable development. But most state trust lands managers face regulatory challenges when they try to implement conservation practices. Reform is necessary to remove barriers that hinder implementation of the full array of practices that provide for both conservation and profit.

The economic and environmental benefits of state trust lands will continue to be significant. Ultimately, our commitment to western communities through our work with state trust lands will remain intact. Although the focus of the program may change as states encounter new and different challenges, the need to educate people about the state trust land mandate to create value for the trust beneficiaries will remain constant in the years to come.

Holyoke, una ciudad de alrededor de 40.000 habitantes en el oeste de Massachusetts, fue una de las primeras comunidades industriales planificadas del país. A partir de finales de la década de 1840, inversores de Boston transformaron lo que había sido hasta entonces un área agrícola en un pueblo industrial impulsado por molinos de agua, aprovechando la ventaja de su ubicación geográfica cerca del Río Connecticut. Los inversores querían fabricar textiles de algodón. Pero con el tiempo la ciudad construyó un elaborado sistema de canales para permitir la instalación de más y más molinos, y comenzó a ser conocida también por la producción de seda, lana y papel. En aquel período, Holyoke se convirtió en la “Ciudad del Papel”, por los molinos de agua dedicados a su fabricación.

Con el desarrollo de los molinos, la ciudad prosperó. Con la abundancia de trabajo, la ciudad atrajo olas sucesivas de inmigrantes irlandeses, franco-canadienses, alemanes, polacos, judíos, italianos y puertorriqueños para trabajar en los molinos, quienes crearon pequeñas empresas, formaron familias y construyeron una ciudad que llegó a tener 63.000 habitantes en 1917 (McLaughlin Green 1939).

Después, todo comenzó a desmoronarse… lentamente. Desde su auge en la década de 1920, la industria local se fue reduciendo gradualmente cuando las empresas y los puestos de trabajo se mudaron al extranjero o migraron al Sur y al Oeste para estar más cerca de la materia prima y de mano de obra más barata. En el censo del 2000, la población de Holyoke se había reducido a menos de 40.000 habitantes. Como otras pequeñas ciudades industriales del país, se convirtió en un símbolo en vías de extinción del pasado industrial de los EE.UU., y la otrora próspera Ciudad del Papel luchaba por conservar su nivel económico.

Afortunadamente, a Holyoke le tocó la lotería en 2009, cuando fue seleccionada para albergar lo que hoy se conoce como el Centro Informático Verde de Alta Prestación de Massachusetts (Massachusetts Green High Performance Computing Center, MGHPCC) un complejo de supercomputadoras respetuoso con el medio ambiente para promover —según la denominación que le dieron los funcionarios estatales— la “economía innovadora” de Massachusetts. La energía hidráulica fue, una vez más, la clave del éxito para la ciudad. La ubicación de Holyoke sobre el río Connecticut ofrecía acceso a energía hidroeléctrica de bajo costo, y el río y los múltiples canales de la ciudad ofrecían agua para refrigeración, una ventaja importante para las supercomputadoras. “Holyoke ha tenido problemas para sobrevivir después de haber perdido su base industrial”, dice Kathleen Anderson, presidente de la Cámara de Comercio del Gran Holyoke. “Teníamos una infraestructura envejecida que necesitaba reutilizarse para otros fines, perdimos puestos de empleo y las condiciones demográficas cambiaron. Holyoke ha tenido que pensar creativamente y reconocer los activos que teníamos. Tanto el talento humano como la decisión de construir la represa y su energía hidroéctrica han sido esenciales para nuestro renacimiento”.

Cuando inauguramos el centro informático en 2012, representó un primer paso importante para mejorar el destino de Holyoke, pero ello no fue suficiente para restaurar su vitalidad. La ciudad emprendió un esfuerzo de planificación que dio como resultado un plan de renovación de 20 años para revitalizar y volver a desarrollar el área donde se encuentra el MGHPCC, en el centro de la ciudad. Un paso importante en la ejecución del plan fue la creación del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke, una inversión del estado por medio de la Asociación Tecnológica de Massachusetts (Massachusetts Technology Collaborative) que reunió a funcionarios locales, líderes empresariales y organizaciones comunitarias para estimular el desarrollo económico local y regional. “La instalación del centro informático en Holyoke desencadenó nuestro proceso de planificación alrededor del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke. Nosotros decimos que el Distrito de Innovación nació del centro informático”, dijo Marcos Marrero, director de planificación y desarrollo económico de Holyoke y copresidente del Distrito de Innovación de Holyoke, en una entrevista en septiembre (Desmarais 2015) aparecida en el periódico Bay State Banner.

Liderazgo, colaboración, resurgimiento

Fue entonces cuando entró en escena el Banco de la Reserva Federal de Boston. Desde 2008, el personal de investigación del banco había estado estudiando las viejas ciudades industriales similares a Holyoke, como parte del esfuerzo para ayudar a revitalizar otra ciudad de Massachusetts: Springfield. Como Holyoke, Springfield había visto días mejores. El banco realizó un estudio de dos años en colaboración con Springfield para analizar los desafíos que se presentaban para la cuarta ciudad más grande del estado, que seguía decayendo aun cuando el gobierno estatal y las organizaciones sin fines de lucro habían invertido millones de dólares en obras de revitalización.

Una parte del estudio trató de aportar lecciones para Springfield a partir de los destinos de otras 25 pequeñas ciudades industriales del noreste, medio oeste y sur septentrional de los EE.UU. Los economistas de la Reserva Federal de Boston descubrieron que algunas de estas ciudades pudieron mantener o recuperar su estabilidad económica, medida según su nivel de ingreso, tasas de pobreza, cantidad de población y vitalidad económica. Los investigadores las denominaron «ciudades renacientes», y buscaron aspectos comunes que pudieran explicar la razón de su éxito. Encontraron que todas estas ciudades habían enfrentado los mismo desafíos: pobreza, cambio del perfil racial y étnico y pérdida de su base industrial. Pero estaban tratando de superar estos desafíos y compartían un elemento clave del éxito: liderazgo sostenido y colaboración entre empresas, gobierno, organizaciones sin fines de lucro y grupos comunitarios. “Una y otra vez, nuestro análisis de la historia de las ciudades renacientes identificó el elemento de liderazgo por parte de instituciones o individuos clave, junto con la colaboración entre los diversos grupos que compartían su interés en el desarrollo económico”, escribieron los investigadores del banco en un informe de 2009 (Kodrzycki y Muñoz 2009).

Los investigadores también notaron que el origen del liderazgo local variaba de un lugar a otro. En New Haven, Connecticut, las universidades locales trabajaron con funcionarios gubernamentales y la industria privada con el objeto de brindar capacitación laboral y financiamiento para atraer compañías. En Providence, una fundación sin fines de lucro trabajó con ejecutivos empresariales para desarrollar ideas y llegar a un consenso sobre proyectos de desarrollo inmobiliario en el centro. En Evansville, Indiana, un alcalde inició el proceso de recuperación en la década de 1960, proceso que tuvo continuidad gracias a una agresiva campaña de desarrollo económico liderada por la Cámara de Comercio local. A pesar de sus diferencias, todos estos esfuerzos de revitalización económica se prolongaron durante décadas, y precisaron de un liderazgo sólido y continuado.

Todos estos esfuerzos también contaron con la colaboración activa de numerosos grupos e individuos. Según la investigación de la Reserva Federal, “la colaboración fue un elemento necesario porque la transformación económica es compleja y porque los agentes externos, como los gobiernos nacionales y estatales, las fundaciones y las empresas que son una fuente potencial de financiamiento y fuente de trabajo, requieren frecuentemente una evidencia de la colaboración conjunta para contribuir al desarrollo de una ciudad”.

A la altura del desafío

Estas conclusiones llevaron a la Reserva Federal de Boston a preguntarse qué se podría hacer para ayudar a construir la infraestructura cívica sólida que era fundamental para el resurgimiento. Esto llevó a la formación de Working Cities Challenge (Desafíos para Ciudades en Funcionamiento), una organización creada por el banco con la ayuda de Living Cities, una asociación de 22 fundaciones, instituciones financieras y otros miembros, con sede en Nueva York.

El Desafío consistió en una competencia entre las antiguas ciudades industriales pequeñas de Massachusetts. En la primavera de 2013, 20 comunidades solicitaron participar. De estas 20, seis ciudades fueron seleccionadas para recibir un total de US$1,8 millones en subvenciones para financiar proyectos de liderazgo y colaboración. Entre ellas se encontraba Holyoke, junto con Chelsea, Fitchburg, Lawrence, Salem y Somerville. El objetivo era simple: ayudar a salvar estas ciudades de Massachusetts que luchaban por sobrevivir, respaldando el desarrollo de las herramientas necesarias para ayudarse a sí mismas. Este programa fue un hito importante e inusual para un banco de la Reserva Federal. Los bancos son más conocidos por sus investigaciones económicas que por organizar programas concretos. No obstante, la iniciativa fue un reflejo del compromiso del presidente de la Reserva Federal de Boston, Eric Rosengren, para aplicar las investigaciones económicas del banco al mundo real, y para mejorar las comunidades de Nueva Inglaterra. Y el concepto se puede extender, con la posibilidad de impulsar a ciudades y pueblos en todo el país que han tenido problemas con las realidades económicas del siglo XXI.

Tamar Kotelchuck, directora de Working Cities Challenge, dice que las investigaciones del banco sobre las ciudades renacientes le enseñaron que hasta las ciudades con muchos problemas pueden mejorar. “Con base en lo que aprendimos del estudio de ciudades renacientes, nos comunicamos con Living Cities (Ciudades Vivas) y se nos ocurrió la idea de una competencia para otorgar financiamiento multianual con objeto de incentivar el liderazgo y la colaboración”, dijo.

Señala que el banco decidió comenzar con un programa piloto en Massachusetts, concentrándose en ciudades pequeñas y medianas. El objetivo eran ciudades de entre 35.000 y 250.000 habitantes que compartían determinados aspectos económicos y demográficos, como una gran cantidad de familias pobres y una baja mediana de ingresos. “Estas ciudades ya habían formado una coalición para apoyar sus intereses con la ayuda de MassINC, una ONG de expertos”, dice Kotelchuck. “Se hacían llamar Gateway Cities (Ciudades-Portal), y habían estado colaborando para resolver problemas económicos y políticos comunes desde hacía varios años. Aprendieron que el trabajo conjunto les daba cierta cantidad de poder que cada ciudad por separado no tenía”, dice (Forman et. al. 2007).

Working Cities adoptó una metodología original para ayudar a estas ciudades, según Andrew Reschovsky, fellow del Instituto Lincoln. “Lo original de la iniciativa de Working Cities es que, a diferencia de muchas otras estrategias de desarrollo económico urbano, se enfoca en mejorar el bienestar económico de los residentes de bajos ingresos que viven actualmente en cada ciudad”.

Los bancos de la Reserva Federal no pueden usar fondos propios para otorgar subvenciones, pero una serie de socios dispuestos a ayudar se ofrecieron a apoyar a Working Cities. Kotelchuck dice que, como parte de la iniciativa, la Reserva Federal se encargó del diseño e implementación del modelo, en conjunto con un comité directivo, proporcionando asistencia técnica y ayudando a los equipos a capacitarse mediante la asistencia de expertos, redes de contactos y buenas prácticas. Estas subvenciones son financiadas por varios donantes, como el gobierno estatal; Living Cities; Massachusetts Competitive Partnership (Asociación Competitiva de Massachusetts), asociación de los 16 empleadores más grandes del estado que se concentra en el crecimiento económico; y MassDevelopment, la agencia de desarrollo estatal.

Kotelchuck dice que cuando el banco y sus socios organizaron la primera competencia en 2013, dieron libertad a las ciudades para proponer cómo se usarían los fondos de la subvención. “No dijimos a las ciudades en qué tenían que trabajar”, dice. “El Desafío está diseñado para ayudar a construir colaboración sobre temas importantes a nivel local”. Sin embargo, un requisito importante para que un proyecto obtuviera éxito era que generara una colaboración entre el sector privado, el gobierno y otros grupos locales. “Buscamos proyectos que promovieran un cambio sistémico”, dice. “Nuestra meta fue ayudar a los líderes locales a solucionar problemas en sus propias ciudades”.

Un jurado independiente evaluó las propuestas de las ciudades en base a los criterios establecidos por Working Cities Challenge: colaboración, participación de la comunidad y el uso de pruebas concretas para medir el progreso. Los proyectos tenían que concretarse en una contribución duradera para mejorar las vidas de los residentes de bajos ingresos.

En enero de 2014 se anunciaron los premios de las primeras subvenciones. De las seis ciudades seleccionadas, cuatro recibieron subvenciones multianuales y dos recibieron subvenciones en forma de capital semilla. Todas las ciudades estaban combatiendo una alta tasa de desempleo, bajo desempeño estudiantil y un futuro incierto. No obstante, dice Kotelchuck: “Todas las ciudades ganadoras tenían propuestas distintivas. No había dos propuestas iguales. Todas abordaban necesidades locales específicas, tal como esperábamos”, dijo.

Por ejemplo, Fitchburg, situada en la región central del norte de Massachusetts, recibió una subvención de US$400.000 durante tres años para su Iniciativa eCarenomics, un esfuerzo para desarrollar medidas comunes para la salud y bienestar vecinal, con el objetivo de mejorar una parte de la ciudad. Chelsea obtuvo una subvención de tres años para su Iniciativa Shurtleff-Bellingham, diseñada para reducir la pobreza y las tasas de movilidad en un 30 por ciento en su barrio más problemático. Salem recibió una subvención de capital semilla de US$100.000 destinada a su plan para alinear los indicadores económicos de uno de sus barrios de bajos ingresos con el resto de la ciudad, enfocándose en el desarrollo económico, el desarrollo de pequeñas empresas, el desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo y el desarrollo de liderazgo. Somerville también recibió una subvención de capital semilla de US$100.000 dirigido a un programa de capacitación laboral para jóvenes de 18 a 24 años de edad que no estaban estudiando en la escuela.

El premio más cuantioso, una subvención de US$700.000 durante tres años, fue otorgado a Lawrence, en el noreste del estado, para la Lawrence Working Families Initiative (Iniciativa de Familias Trabajadoras de Lawrence), cuyo objetivo era crear un Centro de Recursos Familiares para aumentar los ingresos de los padres de estudiantes de escuelas locales en un 15 por ciento en un periodo de 10 años. La iniciativa está liderada por la organización Lawrence Community Works y el sistema escolar local, con respaldo de varios empleadores y organizaciones sin fines de lucro de la zona. “El sistema escolar de Lawrence había entrado en quiebra en 2011”, explicó Kotelchuck, así que era lógico concentrarse en las familias y las escuelas.

La ciudad también tenía características económicas que se ajustaban al modelo de Working Cities. La mediana de ingresos de la unidad familiar era la mitad que la mediana estatal, y su tasa de pobreza era casi el triple de la tasa estatal. “El 70 por ciento de la población de la ciudad es ciento hispana, y la tasa de desempleo era alta”, dice Kotelchuck. Muchos de los problemas de la ciudad se trasladaban a las escuelas. “El objetivo del Centro de Recursos Familiares es ayudar a las familias de todas las formas posibles. Brinda capacitación en temas financieros, apoyo en casos de crisis y otros servicios para fortalecer a las familias”, dice.

Además del centro familiar, una gran parte de la iniciativa está enfocado en lo que Kotelchuck llama “participación auténtica de los padres” en las escuelas. La iniciativa creó círculos de educación comunitaria, donde padres, maestros y estudiantes trabajan en problemas escolares específicos. “El objetivo es que los padres se comprometan y participen en el sistema escolar”, dice. Hasta ahora, el programa ha reclutado a 400 padres, ha contratado a un entrenador familiar y ha conseguido trabajo a más de 30 padres, según Kotelchuck.

Holyoke recibió el premio de una subvención de US$250.000 durante tres años que se está usando para implementar el programa de estimulación de potencial y acceso a recursos de conocimientos (Stimulating Potential, Accessing Resource Knowledge, SPARK). Este “centro de iniciativas comerciales y emprendimientos sociales” en el centro de la ciudad se propone aumentar la cantidad de empresas, sobre todo entre los residentes de la ciudad, incluyendo la población latina, que asciende al 60 por ciento del total. El equipo de proyecto que creó el programa se compone de representantes de la ciudad, la cámara de comercio, la biblioteca pública de Holyoke, un centro integral de empleo llamado CareerPoint y la organización local sin fines de lucro Nuestras Raíces.

El programa SPARK se “propone identificar, reclutar y estimular a los residentes y las organizaciones de Holyoke que tienen la ‘chispa’ o el deseo de convertir sus proyectos innovadores o propuestas de negocios de idea en realidad, poniendo énfasis en una metodología comunitaria integral de emprendimiento, aprendizaje individual y capacitación de liderazgo”, de acuerdo con la ciudad. En definitiva, está diseñado para ayudar a empresarios potenciales a elaborar planes de negocios para poner en práctica sus ideas.

Otro objetivo es incorporar a miembros de la comunidad del centro de Holyoke al Distrito de Innovación que la ciudad ha creado alrededor del centro de supercomputadoras. “La ciudad tiene un gran centro de datos “, dice Kotelchuck. “Pero ese hecho por sí mismo no necesariamente va a ayudar a las personas de bajos ingresos de Holyoke. La cuestión que SPARK trata de resolver es cómo aprovechar los recursos de la población inmigrante de Holyoke y conseguir que la gente se beneficie del desarrollo del Distrito de Innovación y sus alrededores.

Los funcionarios municipales están de acuerdo. “El premio de esta subvención es una buena noticia más para el futuro del Distrito de Innovación de la ciudad”, dijo el alcalde Alex Morse cuando se anunció. “Hemos hecho un gran esfuerzo para que Holyoke pueda competir en la economía moderna, para lo cual hace falta estimular proyectos innovadores y emprendimientos comerciales. Con la colaboración de algunas de las mejores organizaciones y líderes comunitarios de Holyoke, este financiamiento nos permitirá ayudar a los residentes locales a poner en práctica sus ideas innovadoras.

Kotelchuck dice que muchas ciudades tratan de atraer a profesionales jóvenes y enfocarse en trabajos de alta tecnología. Ven que otras ciudades han implementado y copiado este modelo con éxito, pero otras no. “Si no ayudamos a los residentes de bajos ingresos”, dice, “simplemente estaremos moviendo la pobreza de un lugar a otro, y eso no ayuda a nadie. La iniciativa Working Cities ayuda a la gente en el lugar donde vive. Ayuda a gente que de otra manera no tendría trabajo”.

“Muchas ciudades persiguen la estrategia de moda más llamativa para revitalizarse, pero al final no es la tendencia más novedosa lo que revitaliza una ciudad”, dice. “Son los efectos de muchas ideas a lo largo del tiempo, y sólo ocurre en aquellas ciudades que cuentan con participación y colaboración comunitaria. Nuestra recomendación es observar lo que uno tiene y construir sistemáticamente a partir de ello”.

Al supervisar el progreso del Desafío, comenta, ha notado diferencias en la manera en que las ciudades piensan sobre su futuro. “Algunas ciudades dicen: Tenemos muchísimos problemas, por favor dennos dinero”, continúa. “Pero otras dicen: Tenemos estos recursos. Tenemos cierta energía. Lo que necesitamos es ayuda para descubrir nuestro potencial”. Dice que las iniciativas de revitalización requerirán una década de esfuerzo o más. El objetivo de la Reserva Federal es proporcionar un adelanto de tres años para este esfuerzo.

También puede generar un interés más amplio en la revitalización de las ciudades. Recientemente, Holyoke SPARK recibió US$56.000 adicionales de Massachusetts Growth Capital Corp, una agencia cuasi pública que da apoyo a pequeñas empresas, para que el programa pueda ofrecer más clases, dar asesoramiento a los emprendedores y respaldar un programa de préstamos para microempresas para aquellos que reúnan las condiciones. También recibió este año financiamiento adicional de subvenciones en bloque para el desarrollo comunitario de la ciudad.

Signos de progreso

La Reserva Federal y sus socios están satisfechos con los resultados del proyecto hasta ahora, dice Kotelchuck. Y el banco anunció recientemente una segunda y tercera tanda de subvenciones para ciudades de Massachusetts y Rhode Island. Con el tiempo, ella cree que esta idea se podría difundir a otros distritos de la Reserva Federal. “Para la Reserva Federal es un modelo nuevo de involucrase en estas comunidades. Otras Reservas Federales están demostrando interés, y nos encantaría que esta idea prendiera en otros distritos”. Rosengren, el presidente del banco, dice que la Reserva Federal de Boston piensa expandir el programa, al menos a otros estados de Nueva Inglaterra.

El programa Working Cities tiene un gran potencial para extenderse más allá de la región. Hay pequeñas ciudades y pueblos en todo el país que han sido golpeados por el cambio de fortuna económica en las décadas recientes. Merecen una oportunidad de convertirse también en ciudades renacientes, y es gratificante ver como una organización como la Reserva Federal de Boston está invirtiendo su inteligencia y su influencia para mejorar el futuro. No hay una sola solución, no hay garantía de éxito, pero Working Cities Challenge demuestra que con tiempo, compromiso, esfuerzo y un poco de dinero se pueden conseguir buenos resultados.

Este es un punto que Reschovsky, del Instituto Lincoln, también subraya: “Aun cuando todas las ciudades involucradas actualmente en Working Cities necesitan más recursos económicos y fiscales, la clave para el éxito de la iniciativa será la combinación de recursos adicionales y el desarrollo y promoción de organizaciones sin fines de lucro, gobiernos, empresas e instituciones sociales.”

Eso parece, efectivamente, lo que está ocurriendo en Holyoke. Últimamente ha generado también algo de reconocimiento a nivel nacional. En el número de febrero de la revista Popular Mechanics, los editores nombraron las 14 mejores ciudades en marcha del país, expresando que querían identificar “la próxima ola de ciudades que están construyendo un ecosistema que convierta a los innovadores en emprendedores”. La lista incluye ciudades pequeñas a lo largo del país. Holyoke apareció en el sexto puesto (Popular Mechanics 2015).

Inevitablemente, la principal ventaja de la ciudad es lo que ya sabemos. “Tenemos energía barata”, escribió el alcalde Morse al describir la innovación aportada por Holyoke para la revista. “En el borde oriental de la ciudad, el río Connecticut tiene una caída de 17 metros en su avance hacia el sur. Cuando se fundó la ciudad en 1850, el río impulsó las ruedas de los molinos de papel; hoy genera energía barata y limpia”. También mencionó las viejas fábricas de ladrillo que se construyeron para la industria papelera, signos del pasado industrial que se han transformado en «atractivos espacios industriales de trabajo”.

“Holyoke ha vuelto a su punto de partida”, dice Anderson, de la Cámara de Comercio. “Nuestros antecesores construyeron un sistema de canales para utilizar la energía del río, y ahora estamos utilizando energía verde para alimentar una economía nueva”.

Billy Hamilton is vicecanciller ejecutivo y director financiero del Sistema Universitario de Texas A&M. Fue contralor adjunto de cuentas públicas del estado de Texas durante 16 años. Desde 2007, escribe una columna semanal para State Tax Notes.

Fotografía: Jeffrey Byrnes

Referencias

Desmarais, Martin. 2015. “The Holyoke Innovation District Finds Creative Solutions to Revitalizing the City.” The Bay State Banner. 10 de septiembre, 2015. baystatebanner.com/news/2015/sep/10/holyoke-innovation-district-finds-creative-solutio/?page=3

Forman, Benjamin, David Warren, Eric McLean-Shinaman, John Schneider, Mark Muro y Rebecca Sohmer. 2007. Reconnecting Massachusetts Gateway Cities: Lessons Learned and an Agenda for Renewal. The Brookings Institution and MassINC. Febrero. www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2007/02/regionsandstates-muro

Kodrzycki, Yolanda y Ana Patricia Muñoz. 2009. “Lessons from Resurgent Cities.” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 2009 Annual Report. www.bostonfed.org/about/ar/ar2009/lessons-from-resurgent-cities.pdf

McLaughlin Green, Constance. 1939. Holyoke, Massachusetts: A Case History of the Industrial Revolution in America. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Popular Mechanics. 2015. “The 14 Best Startup Cities in America.” Popular Mechanics. Febrero. www.popular mechanics.com/culture/advertorial/g1859/the-14-best-startup-cities-in-america

The introduction of land titling programs to the informal land market seemed to offer a magic solution to the problem of poverty in third world countries. Various governments breathed a sigh of relief, as the struggle to reduce poverty would no longer require the complex and stressful income redistribution measures that always cause conflicts between social groups and classes. According to this magic formula, all that was required was for informal urban dwellers (about 50 percent of the population in the major cities) to formally register their properties and thus gain access to title deeds, so they could obtain mortgage loans from private banks. Their titles and newfound access to loans would enable them to increase their real estate capital, improve their homes and develop small businesses (de Soto 1986; 2001).

To put this hypothesis to the test, and at the request of Perú’s National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática–INEI), I conducted a study of the official real estate registration policy under which more than one million title deeds were conferred in Perú between 1996 and 2000. This policy was implemented by the Commission for the Official Registration of Informal Property (COFOPRI) and the Real Estate Registry of Urban Settlements (RPU). As stated in Perú’s Law Decree 803 of March 1996, the purpose of this policy was to establish a formal relationship between the distribution of land titles, access to formal credit mechanisms and better standards of living. Based on information provided by National Household Surveys (ENAHO) for 1998 and 1999, conducted by INEI, my study analyzed data on housing that either was acquired through invasions or other illegal means and did not have property titles or had obtained titles from COFOPRI through the regularization process. The data base consisted of 913,335 units in 1998 and 1,033,480 in 1999, out of a total of 3,572,091 urban housing units for both years. The financing obtained for housing expansion and other domestic expenses was used as an indicator to determine the access to credit, whereas the structure of the dwelling and the supply of basic services were used to determine standards of living.

Those who advocate the regularization of property in Perú argue that property titles should be granted on a large scale by recognizing informal occupation (that is, legalizing land ownership), awarding registered land title deeds, and thus establishing the links needed to gain access to formal credit mechanisms. Official registration is the legal procedure whereby actual rights to a property result in legal ownership. A particular characteristic of this procedure is the firm resolve to establish connections between the legalization of land and property and the access to mortgages through the private banks. As described by the Path to Property Association, an organization dedicated to promoting these policies worldwide, the basic philosophy behind the formal registration process is that prosperity in countries with market economies is largely achieved because those societies have adequate property systems that enable their markets to operate through exchangeable ownership rights in a wide-ranging market.

To grant landowners indisputable proof of ownership and protect them from fraud and uncertainty ownership rights must be standardized, and universally accessible exchange instruments must be registered in a central government system by legal norms and regulation. Consequently, through the official registration of property, the “energy” of the informal sector can be channeled toward organized and prosperous market economies. From this perspective, informality is merely the inability of governments to make their laws coincide with the real circumstances under which people work and live. Nevertheless, this viewpoint fails to reduce a complex phenomenon to its legal dimension and neglects its economic aspects.

Land Titling Policy and Outcomes

To speed up the distribution of land titles and to avoid troublesome formalities, COFOPRI took over this responsibility from the municipalities. The World Bank supported this policy, granting COFOPRI a US$38 million loan in December 1998. Between 1996 and 2000, 1,134,000 duly registered land title deeds were awarded: 645,165 of them in Lima, 112,631 in Arequipa and 74,180 in Trujillo (the first, second and third largest cities in Perú, respectively). In terms of the distribution and registration of land titles, the success of the formal registration policy is undeniable. However, the fact that municipalities were removed from the process is questionable, since their legal role in the urban system was undermined.

A close connection between the official registration of property and the standard of living was observed in Lima after the policy was implemented. Between 1998 and 1999, regularized (formerly illegal or informal) housing in the capital city showed improved construction of walls, floors and roofing; however, the nonregularized housing units also had improved construction of walls and floors. In the rest of the country, informal housing in urban areas predominates over regularized housing.

While regularized housing units outside Lima increased from 17,929 to 48,869 between 1998 and 1999, the number of units still without property titles increased from 371,005 to 392,436, indicating the persistence of invasion mechanisms. The gaps between different types of improvements on regularized and informal houses outside Lima increased between 1998 and 1999 for most categories (see Table 1).

Looking at the relationship between official land titles and access to credit, the study found that of the 70,725 houses in Lima awarded land title deeds by COFOPRI in 1998, about 23,965 (34 percent) of those homeowners gained access to varied types of financing, such as loans from banks, lending agencies or family members, to improve or renovate their homes. In 1999, the owners of about 23,804 (18.3 percent) out of a total of 129,588 titled houses obtained such financing. Although there is no official information on how many homeowners applied for credit and were denied, this result proves that officially registered households that gain access to loans are a minority and, in fact, the number has decreased. This situation is explained by complex factors including the economic recession, the default rate of 10 percent on private bank loans, fear of giving loans to lower-income sectors, and fear among these residents of mortgaging their houses and land.

Similarly, the number of bank loans to already titled landowners in Lima decreased from 12,750 in 1998 to 8,993 in 1999. In contrast, the use of own resources to finance housing improvements rose from 12,282 in 1998 to 14,811 in 1999. Not only is a larger majority spending their own funds on housing, but they are facing more difficulties in gaining access to credit institutions, despite the formal registration of their properties. A study by COFOPRI-DESCO (Riofrío 2001) identified several characteristics of those who are willing to take mortgages:

• Stable nuclear families;
• Both husband and wife are wage-earners;
• Entrepreneurial mentality and willingness to take risks;
• Have self-owned businesses (microbusinesses, taxis, etc.); and
• Have information on the use of the Urban Land Registry.

Of the 12,750 households officially registered and regularized in Lima in 1998 that also received bank loans for renovations and improvements, 52.6 percent obtained their loans from the Banco de Materiales and 47.4 percent from the National Construction Company (ENACE). In 1999, 8,993 officially registered and regularized households received loans for renovations and improvements, 7,593, or 84.43 percent from the Banco de Materiales and 15.57 percent from the ENACE. Since these are both public entities that grant subsidized loans (at the same annual interest rate of 7 percent), there is no connection between the official registration of property through regularization programs and access to loans from private banks.

With respect to seeking financing for other kinds of household expenses, only 11,323 (8.7 percent) out of a total of 129,588 households registered in Lima in 1999 resorted to any kind of financial assistance. Since no public entity provides loans for these expenses, most households receive money from friends and relatives (47 percent) or other sources such as lending agencies (25 percent). Only 28 percent of these 11,323 registered households gained access to loans from private banks for household needs.

In other urban areas, the situation of officially registered households is different from Lima’s experience. In 1998, the use of the households’ own funds for housing improvements predominated over bank loans (78.7 percent compared with 21.2 percent), whereas in 1999 bank loans predominated over own funds (51.3 percent compared with 42.9 percent). In 1998, all of the loans were public loans granted by Banco de Materiales, and 93 percent were from that source in 1999. With respect to loans for other household expenses, 6,163 (13 percent) of the total of 47,302 households officially registered during 1999 received some financing. Of this small group, 45 percent received financial assistance from lending agencies and other sources, 34 percent from friends and relatives, and 21 percent from their employers or work centers. None of them obtained funds from private banks.

Conclusions

The study yielded the following conclusions with regard to the relationship between official registration of titles and access to credit:

• In general, and despite the increase in the number of properties regularized between 1998 and 1999, access to loans decreased during that period, coinciding with the economic recession and related problems affecting private banks.
• The use of personal resources predominates over bank loans as a source of funds for the expansion of both regularized and informal housing. Loans for other household expenses are obtained mainly from relatives and friends, followed by private banks and informal lending systems. Lower-income families primarily use their own funds or those of social networks for improvements to both regularized and informal housing; resources from formal public or private institutions are secondary.
• Surprisingly, informal households gain more access to loans from private banks than do regularized households. For example, in 1999, 100 percent of loans for improvements to housing units regularized by COFOPRI in Lima were public loans, thus none received private loans, whereas 28 percent of nonregularized housing units did obtain private loans. This suggests that the eligibility criteria used by private banks is based on job stability and fixed monthly income, rather than on land tenancy. The information obtained from ENAHO shows that in 1998, 25 percent of families living in informal dwellings earned about US$747.50 per month. This is the equivalent of “6 to 7 minimum monthly wages,” a frequently used measure for salaries for lower-income sectors in Latin American countries. In contrast, only 12 percent of families living in officially registered properties regularized by COFOPRI earned a comparable salary. This paradoxical situation, whereby title holders do not have access to private banks, while those without titles have higher incomes and better access to loans, may be explained by the fact that COFOPRI, seeking to grant a large number of titles quickly and to create political impact, concentrated its efforts in newer, fragmented neighborhoods where it was easier to identify the landowners. In contrast, COFOPRI tended to ignore older and more close-knit neighborhoods where it was harder to identify the owners due to the presence of multiple generations living under the same roof.
• In the case of both regularized and informal properties, the main sources of loans were public entities that grant subsidized loans (i.e., Banco de Materiales).

>

Thus, there is no direct relationship between the number of title deeds handed over to informal dwellers and their subsequent access to loans from private banks. This conclusion was confirmed when the transition government that succeeded former President Fujimori (1990-2000) revealed in 2001 that only 12,388 mortgages had been recorded in the RPU throughout the country, which is equivalent to only 5 percent of potential beneficiaries. Although registration facilities may be useful, they are certainly not sufficient to increase access to credit. Effective policies require an in-depth study of a number of different factors, including:

• The policies on which private bank loans are based. Discriminatory policies (redlining, etc.) are prevalent in Latin America, as in the U.S.
• The popular credit culture, particularly as regards poor people’s fear of losing their property (which is virtually their only asset), as well as the lack of understanding of concepts of property titles, credit and even banks. It’s important to study the patterns of cultural inertia that are put to the test by this type of policies and consider the opportunities for education that could facilitate these processes.
• The reluctance of people to register their properties and use the registries. The intention of this article, and the research behind it, is not to minimize the importance of policies aimed at facilitating access to credit by the poor by means of regularization programs. On the contrary, such policies are important and should be stimulated, although we would not suggest urban poverty can be resolved exclusively through this means. For the system to improve, it is essential to have a better understanding of the credit system and the popular credit culture, as well as to develop financial assistance programs that address the current resistance to the use of mortgages by both the poor and the banking sector.

Julio Calderón Cockburn is a sociologist and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Perú. He has written many books and articles published in the Americas and Europe, and he currently works as an independent consultant and university professor. He is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute, which supported the study reported here and other research and teaching projects in the past. Several of his written works are available on the Lincoln Institute website in the Latin America section under LAC Papers (www.lincolninst.edu).

References

Calderón Cockburn, Julio A. 2001. Comparative analysis of the benefited and non-benefited population by the national formalization plan. In Has the well-being of the population improved?: A balance of the main social policies and programs. Lima: National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (INEI): 65-92. de Soto, Hernando. 1986. The Other Path. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

_____. 2002. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.

Fernandes, Edesio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. Land Lines 14 (1): 5–8.

Riofrío, G., J. Calderón y M. Zolezzi. 2001. Estudio sobre cultura registral. Lima: COFOPRI-DESCO. Agosto.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 5 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Pocos países de América Latina (o del resto del mundo) se han atrevido a poner en práctica reformas tan radicales de la política de tierras urbanas como lo ha hecho Chile en los últimos 20 años. En 1979 el gobierno comenzó a aplicar las políticas de desregulación mediante la publicación de un documento donde se establecía que la escasez de la tierra era un producto artificial de la excesiva regulación, que había llevado a la virtual eliminación de los límites de crecimiento urbano.

Desde entonces ha habido cambios numerosos en la morfología y estructura interna de las ciudades chilenas, pero la evaluación de dichos cambios varía según la posición ideológica de quien evalúa. Si bien las políticas urbanas explícitas de orientación social han propiciado un mejoramiento significativo en lo que se refiere al acceso a la vivienda para la población de bajos recursos, algunas personas sostienen que la segregación espacial derivada de tales políticas ha perjudicado a la sociedad al indirectamente disminuir la calidad de vida, impedir el acceso al trabajo y agravar la alienación social.

Incluso antes del período del gobierno militar de 1973 a 1990, Chile estaba reconocido por su sistema político unitario y centralista, caracterizado por una fuerte presencia del Estado en la economía y la política. Esta sociedad con cultura relativamente homogénea se diferencia de otros países latinoamericanos por su fuerte tradición legalista. De la misma manera, las ciudades chilenas exhiben marcados contrastes cuando se las compara con sus homólogas latinoamericanas. Prácticamente no hay mercados de tierra informales; la tenencia de la tierra ha sido casi completamente regularizada mediante programas públicos radicales; y la mayoría de los pobres urbanos viven en áreas urbanizadas cuyas calles principales están pavimentadas. La violencia urbana, a pesar de su tendencia creciente, es aún mínima si se la compara con el resto del continente.

Políticas y problemas de la liberalización

Entre los aspectos más innovadores de la política urbana chilena figuran los siguientes:

• La eliminación de límites al crecimiento urbano, manteniendo al mismo tiempo la designación de áreas sensibles para la protección ambiental. Esta medida tuvo dos propósitos: delegar un papel de liderazgo en el desarrollo urbano y uso de la tierra a las fuerzas del mercado, y reducir los precios del suelo.
• El establecimiento de un sistema de subsidios con el objetivo de reducir el déficit de vivienda. Considerado por muchos como el pilar de la política habitacional de Chile, el sistema de subsidios es ampliamente percibido como la síntesis original y más innovadora de las políticas de liberalización con la tradición estadista de Chile. A través de este programa se canalizan subsidios sustanciales a familias (mediante la asignación de cupones o vouchers por puntajes, basada en los ingresos familiares, estructura familiar, capacidad de ahorro demostrada, y condición de vivienda actual) a fin de financiar una vivienda facilitada por el sector privado según ciertos criterios preestablecidos. Como resultado, Chile se ha destacado por ser el único país de la América Latina en donde, desde 1992, el aumento de viviendas nuevas ha sido más acelerado que la formación de nuevos hogares, lo cual ha eliminado gradualmente el déficit habitacional.
• El desalojo de los asentamientos pobres de áreas de altos recursos, y otras políticas evidentemente segregacionistas. No muchos países se atreverían hoy en día a poner en práctica tales políticas, que sin duda suscitarían una fuerte oposición en sociedades menos autocráticas que reconocen como legítimos los derechos de sus habitantes pobres.

Si bien, algunos de los logros de estas políticas de liberalización se han reconocido ampliamente como positivos -particularmente en lo que se refiere a la regularización legal y física o urbanística y la cantidad de vivienda social proporcionada- muchos chilenos creen que las políticas de los últimos 20 años han sido una fuente de nuevos problemas, entre ellos:

• Una expansión urbana desenfrenada, con sus consiguientes efectos de aumento de tráfico y peligrosos niveles de contaminación del aire. Como ejemplo, los niveles de contaminación del aire en Santiago son equivalentes a los de ciudades tres veces mayores tales como Ciudad de México y São Paulo, incluso con un uso relativamente bajo del automóvil.
• La formación de vecindades de bajos recursos, pobremente equipadas y socialmente segregadas. En el contexto de una creciente inseguridad económica y laboral, estas áreas se convierten en un núcleo de problemas sociales como drogadicción y delincuencia, apatía y alienación juvenil1. Cualquier visitante a Santiago, la capital chilena, no puede dejar de notar el marcado contraste entre las comunas2 -jurisdicciones planificadas y pudientes tales como Las Condes-, y la monotonía de vecindades desarrolladas por constructores privados en comunas periféricas, como Maipú y La Florida.
• El aumento continuo del precio de la tierra. En contraposición a las predicciones hechas por los responsables de las políticas de liberalización, el precio del suelo chileno ha aumentado, absorbiendo una porción aun mayor del programa de subsidio habitacional3. Algunos analistas aseveran que los precios de la tierra ya corresponden a un 60 a 100 por ciento del subsidio. Esto no sólo está seriamente comprometiendo la capacidad de sustentación del sistema de vouchers, sino que está forzando a los sectores más pobres fuera del programa. No obstante, estos aumentos en los precios de la tierra no deberían sorprender, si se piensa en las experiencias similares de otros países donde las políticas de liberalización han influido en las expectativas de demandas futuras de alternativas más baratas de desarrollo en la periferia urbana, como alternativa a los centros congestionados.

No está claro si estos cambios urbanos pueden atribuirse directamente a la eficacia de las políticas urbanas de mercado, o a la positiva evolución de la economía chilena en general. El crecimiento sostenido del producto interno bruto (GDP), con un promedio del 7 % anual desde 1985, se interrumpió sólo recientemente debido a los efectos de la crisis asiática.

Expansión del debate

A pesar de que la liberalización de los mercados de suelo urbano en Chile constituye una experiencia interesante e innovadora desde un punto de vista internacional, el debate público interno ha sido limitado. No obstante, los logros y problemas de la liberalización han llegado a tal punto de importancia que últimamente han estimulado un nivel generalizado de preocupación y una variedad de planteamientos al respecto. Más aún, el gobierno está proponiendo una serie de modificaciones de la actual “Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones”, que traerían consigo un número de cambios significativos, entre ellos:

• Ampliación de las responsabilidades de planificación urbana, las cuales tendrían que contemplar todos los espacios del territorio (no solamente las áreas urbanizadas dentro de cada municipalidad, como se hace en la actualidad), y
• La aplicación de una serie de regulaciones económicas o de mercado tales como la emisión de “certificados de constructibilidad” especiales, diseñados para conservar el patrimonio arquitectónico del país, y la creación de “zonas de desarrollo urbano condicionado” para favorecer esquemas mixtos de uso del suelo.Pese a la importancia que tienen estas potenciales modificaciones sobre la planificación futura, todavía no ha habido una discusión cabal sobre las mismas. La propuesta legislativa no contempla consideraciones teóricas ni explicaciones justificativas de los cambios propuestos.

Con el fin de facilitar una discusión concentrada en los temas anteriores, Carlos Montes, Presidente de la Cámara de Diputados de Chile, invitó al Instituto Lincoln a participar en un seminario coordinado con el Instituto de Estudios Urbanos de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. El seminario, llamado “A 20 años de la liberalización de los mercados de suelo urbano en Chile: Impactos en la política de vivienda social, el crecimiento urbano y los precios del suelo”, tuvo lugar en octubre de 1999 en la ciudad de Santiago. Allí se reunieron miembros del Congreso chileno y de la comunidad comercial (promotores, líderes financieros, etc.), oficiales de organismos públicos (ministerios, municipalidades, etc.), académicos y representantes de organizaciones no gubernamentales para participar en un animado debate. En la discusión se notó una marcada polarización ideológica entre las metodologías “liberal” y “progresiva” utilizadas para entender y resolver los asuntos de la liberalización, es decir, “más mercado” frente a “más Estado”.

Desde el punto de vista liberal4, estos problemas emergen y persisten debido a que los mercados de tierra no han sido nunca suficientemente liberalizados. De hecho, algunos liberales insisten en que la intervención pública no desapareció nunca, y creen que la regulación más bien aumentó después de que Chile retornara a la democracia en 1990. Por ejemplo, los liberales citan varios medios, a menudo indirectos, que utiliza el Estado para restringir el libre crecimiento de las ciudades, tales como cuando se intenta ampliar áreas designadas con protección ambiental y cerradas a usos urbanos, o se impone un criterio oficial y casi homogéneo de densificación para todo espacio urbano. También aseveran que los ciudadanos deberían tener la libertad de elegir diferentes estilos de vida, y que las autoridades deberían limitarse a informar a los ciudadanos sobre el costo privado y social de sus opciones, con el entendimiento implícito de que tales costos están reflejados en los precios del mercado cuando hay un funcionamiento eficaz de los mercados de suelo urbano, es decir, cuando están completamente liberalizados.

La principal explicación ofrecida por los liberales sobre los problemas de equidad y eficiencia que enfrenta el desarrollo urbano chileno actual son los avances insuficientes en la aplicación de criterios para “internalizar las externalidades”, particularmente externalidades negativas, por aquellos que son responsables por ellas. Tal como lo han clamado apasionadamente algunos de los representantes de este grupo, se debería permitir a los agentes privados actuar con libertad, siempre que éstos estén dispuestos a hacerse cargo de los costos sociales involucrados.

Por otra parte, los progresistas creen que la liberalización se ha excedido en su abordaje de mercado y ha dejado muchos problemas sin resolver, tales como el aumento en los precios del suelo; los problemas en la calidad y durabilidad de la vivienda; las condiciones de servicio de la tierra; los problemas sociales asociados con la pobreza urbana; y los problemas de eficiencia y equidad derivados de los patrones de crecimiento de las ciudades, p. ej., la disparidad entre áreas dotadas de servicios públicos y las localidades seleccionadas para proyectos privados de desarrollo.

Estas críticas reconocen la naturaleza imperfecta de los mercados urbanos y la necesidad de tener mayores niveles de control e intervención. Entre las formas de intervención recomendadas por muchos progresistas se encuentran los instrumentos de captura de plusvalía, los cuales raramente han sido empleados o incluso contemplados en programas de financiamiento para la provisión pública de nueva infraestructura y nuevos servicios urbanos. La creación de tales mecanismos apoyaría la idea de internalizar las externalidades, un punto de relativo consenso entre progresistas y liberales. La diferencia principal es que los liberales restringirían la captura de plusvalía a la recuperación pública de costos específicos, mientras que los progresistas considerarían el derecho a capturar la plusvalía entera que resulte de cualquier acción pública, bien sea como resultado de inversión como de regulación.

En términos más generales, los progresistas claman que no todo puede medirse estrictamente en términos monetarios. Hay valores y objetivos urbanos relacionados con la política pública que no pueden conseguirse a través del mercado, ni siquiera por ley, tal como el sentido de comunidad. Aunque mayormente se le desatiende en las nuevas opciones habitacionales facilitadas por promotores privados a familias de bajos recursos, tales como el sistema de vouchers, la solidaridad comunitaria es un asunto de enorme importancia para contrarrestar los problemas sociales que la segregación espacial tiende a exacerbar. La protección ambiental es otro ejemplo de un objetivo de política urbana para el cual las “etiquetas de precios” son de dudosa eficacia.

Con respecto al crecimiento libre de las ciudades y la idea de respetar las opciones para sus ciudadanos, los progresistas apuntan los fuertes costos ambientales y sociales que normalmente acompañan el crecimiento descontrolado. También hacen notar el hecho de que el único grupo que realmente puede elegir su estilo de vida a través del mercado es la minoría pudiente. Si bien conceden que hay beneficios en la concentración, los progresistas también expresan sus inquietudes sobre el exceso de densificación. Algunos chilenos han expresado interés en una autoridad metropolitana que maneje los asuntos regionales, y también en el uso de inversión en infraestructura pública como forma de orientar el crecimiento.

Las respuestas adecuadas a estos asuntos y perspectivas implican algo que va más allá de soluciones técnicas o fiscales, tales como el punto al cual los promotores realmente pagan por el costo total de los cambios que imponen en la sociedad (para no hablar del problema de evaluar los costos con precisión) o la sustentación del sistema de vouchers bajo demanda, que constituye la base de la política habitacional de Chile. Las soluciones también involucran inquietudes de mayor amplitud y con más contenido valórico, tales como los costos ambientales del crecimiento descontrolado y la importancia de mantener las identidades e iniciativas comunitarias locales. La discusión continúa en el Congreso y en otros entornos, pero es de esperar que pase un tiempo antes de que los bandos opuestos lleguen al consenso.

Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln. Francisco Sabatini es profesor asistente de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Otros contribuyentes a este artículo fueron Laura Mullahy, asistente de investigación, y Armando Carbonell, Senior Fellow, ambos del Instituto Lincoln.

Notas: En contraste con el resto del continente, las drogas no eran un problema mayor en Chile hasta hace poco tiempo.

2 El área metropolitana de Santiago se compone de 35 jurisdicciones administrativo-políticas independientes llamadas comunas.

3 Véase Gareth A. Jones, “Comparative Policy Perspectives on Urban Land Market Reform”, Land Lines, noviembre de 1998.

4 El uso del término “liberal” en este contexto corresponde a su connotación en Chile, la cual se refiere a la fuerte influencia del principio económico del libre mercado, tal como la aboga la teoría desarrollada por la Escuela de Chicago.

Fuentes: Francisco Sabatini y colaboradores, “Segregación social en Santiago, Chile: Conceptos, métodos y efectos urbanos” (monografía, 1999); y Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Comisión de Planificación de Inversiones en Infraestructura de Transporte (SECTRA), “Encuesta de recorridos de origen y destino en Santiago”(1991).

The complexity that characterizes the interaction of transportation and land use in urban areas is matched by the variety of the disciplines called on to address these issues, including economics, urban planning and civil engineering. In recent decades, communication among scholars in these disciplines has improved and the acceptance of a common base of theory and method, based on economics, is increasing. The Taxation, Resources and Economic Development (TRED) conference on “Transportation and Land Use” held at the Lincoln Institute in October 1996 focused on these issues. Ten papers presented at that conference are now published in a special issue of the journal Urban Studies. The papers are organized into four groups as summarized below.

Trends in Urban Development

Gregory Ingram’s paper on “Metropolitan Development: What Have We Learned?” documents the worldwide prevalence of several trends that characterize modern urbanization. Employment decentralization and the emergence of multiple employment centers in large metropolitan areas are observed worldwide in both developing and developed countries. Although employment continues to be more centralized than population, the typical Central Business District does not contain more than about 20 percent of jobs, and much smaller percentages are common in the U.S. Manufacturing employment has become more decentralized than service employment. Decentralization has reduced traffic congestion and travel distances and has contributed to a weakening of transit systems. The increased affordability of motorized transportation worldwide has led to more trip-making, with work trips typically being less than a third of all trips in urbanized areas.

Peter Gordon, Harry Richardson and Gang Yu find evidence that the suburbanization and exurbanization of employment in the U.S. has picked up its pace since 1988. In their paper, “Metropolitan and Non-Metropolitan Employment Trends in the U.S.: Recent Evidence and Implications,” they argue that the ability of manufacturing and even of services to locate in exurban and rural areas, shunning inner-suburban and central city locations, is a consequence of the continued weakening of the agglomeration economies that shaped the now outdated downtown-oriented city.

Robert Cervero and Kang-Li Wu examine the relationship between average commuting distance and employment subcentering in their paper, “Subcentering and Commuting: Evidence from the San Francisco Bay Area, 1980-1990.” They are concerned with changes in employment densities in 22 employment subcenters and with the commuting distances and travel times of those employed in these subcenters. The authors find that employment densities have increased more in the outlying suburban centers and that commuting to these centers has experienced modal shifts away from transit and in favor of the automobile. According to their data, while jobs in these centers grew by 18 percent during the decade, average one-way commuting distances to these 22 subcenters increased by 12 percent, and average one-way travel times rose by only 5 percent.

These findings are consistent with theory: with the number of subcenters fixed and the degree of spatial mismatch between jobs and housing invariant with job growth, an increase in the number of jobs in each subcenter should result in longer commutes on average. If new subcenters are spawned in between existing ones or new ones develop in outlying areas-something that does not appear to have occurred in the Bay Area-then average commutes should decrease. The 22 subcenters account for less than half of total employment in the Bay Area, the rest of the jobs being broadly dispersed throughout. Because such dispersed employment is not included in their study, we do not know about the total effect of job decentralization on average commute distances and times.

Genevieve Giuliano’s paper, “Information Technology, Work Patterns and Intrametropolitan Location: A Case Study,” examines the impact of information technology, including the advent of fax machines, computers, modems and the internet. One of her central observations is that while the U.S. labor force increased by 14 percent from 1980 to 1990, the “contingent workforce,” a diverse group of temporary workers, part-time workers, the self-employed and business service workers, increased much faster, from about 25 to 33 percent.

This trend implies that the information revolution is causing structural shifts in the labor force as more and more workers offer temporary services to a variety of employers and, as a result, do not have a long-term attachment to any one employer. Theory suggests that such workers should locate in a way that is sensitive to their expected accessibility to jobs. Also, the advent of information technology should facilitate “telecommuting,” thus reducing the need for physical proximity to jobs.

Giuliano uses the 1990 U.S. Census Public Use Microsample for the Los Angeles region to compare the residential location and commuting patterns of contingent and non-contingent workers. The socioeconomic complexity of contingent workers makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions, but Guiliano does find that those contingent workers who live in suburban areas are likely to live in high amenity areas. Controlling for socioeconomic factors, commuting distances are shorter for part-time workers than they are for full-time workers, and among full-time workers the self-employed have the shortest commutes.

Agglomeration Economies

The next two papers offer empirical contributions on intra-urban employment agglomeration. “Spatial Variation in Office Rents within the Atlanta Region,” by Christopher Bollinger, Keith Ihlanfeldt and David Bowes, is a hedonic rent study for office buildings in the Atlanta area from 1990 to 1996. The authors find that part of the rent differences among office buildings is due to differences in wage rates, transportation rates and proximity to concentrations of office workers. More importantly, the convenience of face-to-face meetings facilitated by office agglomerations is also reflected in office rents, providing evidence that agglomerative tendencies continue to be important in explaining office concentrations, despite the ability of information technology to reduce the need for some such contacts. In their paper, “Population Density in Suburban Chicago: A Bid-Rent Approach,” Daniel McMillen and John McDonald show that population density patterns in the Chicago MSA are strongly influenced by proximity to subcenters, which include the Central Business District, O’Hare Airport and 16 other centers. Site-specific variables such as access to commuter rail stations or highway interchanges have smaller influences on population densities.

Travel Behavior and Residential Choice

Among the challenges posed by the evolving trends in transportation and land use is a better explanation of the role of non-work travel in residential location decisionmaking. Motorized mobility has greatly increased non-work travel, thus weakening the relevance of the now classical commuting-based theory of residential location. While information technology may result in more telecommuting, the importance of non-work travel relative to work travel may grow even more in the future.

Two papers attempt to develop new techniques that can be used to explain the influence of non-work travel behavior on residential location and land use patterns, and vice versa. Central to this research is the notion that when a household makes a residential choice decision it will consider the pattern of non-work trips its members are likely to make. Accessibility to non-work opportunities is likely to be important and, for many households, perhaps more important than accessibility to jobs.

Moshe Ben-Akiva and John Bowman model the probability of choosing a residential location by treating the non-work trip patterns and activity schedules of the household’s members as explanatory variables. Their model allows the treatment of trips as tours with stops at multiple destinations. In their paper, “Integration of an Activity-Based Model System and a Residential Location Model,” the authors report that their model does not fit the data as well as a work-trip-based comparison model. But, the non-work accessibility measures are more appealing conceptually and allow a richer set of predictions and simulations to be made.

Until recently, economists have suppressed the importance of non-work trips in their theories of land use. Planners have viewed land use planning as a tool that can affect behavior and travel demand. But what is the evidence that travel patterns can be influenced meaningfully by manipulating land use at the neighborhood level or in a larger area?

Marlon Boarnet and Sharon Sarmiento tackle this question by means of a travel diary survey of Southern California residents. Their paper is titled “Can Land Use Policy Really Affect Travel Behavior? A Study of the Link Between Non-work Travel and Land Use Characteristics.” The number of work trips made by residents is explained by sociodemographic variables describing the residents and by land use characteristics describing their place of residence. Generally, the land use variables describing the neighborhood are not statistically significant, but future studies could follow this approach by trying more complex specifications and using better data.

Jobs-Housing Mismatch

As first stated by John Kain in 1968, the “spatial mismatch hypothesis” claimed that black central city residents are increasingly at a disadvantage economically as jobs disperse to the suburbs. Many suburban governments limit the quantity of high-density/low-income housing, forcing workers to make long, expensive commutes. Although there is a wealth of empirical work on the mismatch hypothesis, Richard Arnott’s paper, “Economic Theory and the Mismatch Hypothesis,” is one of the first attempts to formulate a microeconomic theory of the mismatch problem. In Arnott’s model, jobs flee to the suburbs because of the advent of international trade (relaxation of global trade barriers) and the emergence of suburban-based inter-city truck transport after World War II. At the same time, large-lot zoning and discrimination in suburban housing markets force minorities to reside in central cities. An increase in the cost of commuting effectively lowers the wage paid to low-skilled labor from the city.

In “Where Youth Live: Economic Effects of Urban Space on Employment Prospects,” John Quigley and Katherine O’Regan investigate how neighborhood of residence and access to jobs affect the employment prospects of minority youth. Black youth unemployment rates are higher in metropolitan areas where blacks are more isolated geographically. Controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, minority youth who have less residential exposure to whites are more likely to be unemployed. Finally, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics as well as residential exposure to whites, minority youth living in neighborhoods that are less accessible to jobs are more likely to be unemployed. While these findings support the mismatch hypothesis, they also suggest the importance of social networks and spatial search as important mechanisms in the intra-urban labor market.

Alex Anas, professor of economics at the State University of New York at Buffalo, was the editor of the special issue of Urban Studies (Vol. 35, No. 7, June 1998). The article and figures used in Land Lines are adapted with permission.

Note: Ben Chinitz, former director of research at the Institute, helped organize the 1996 TRED conference and the following colleagues served as discussants of the papers: James Follain, Vernon Henderson, Douglass Lee, Therese McGuire, Peter Mieszkowski, Edwin Mills, Sam Myers, Dick Netzer, Stephen Ross, Anita Summers, William Wheaton, Michelle White and John Yinger. The conference participants were saddened when news arrived that William Vickrey, who had been named a Nobel laureate in economics only a few days before, had passed away while traveling to the conference. Professor Vickrey had been a leading thinker on issues of transportation and land use and a regular attendee of previous TRED conferences. The special issue of Urban Studies based on the 1996 conference serves as a tribute to his memory.

Water companies and the communities they serve have been grappling for years with complex issues of water treatment and provision, watershed management, public finance and control over regional land use decisionmaking. The federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 prompted water providers across America to face a dilemma: “to filter or not to filter.” Some states or regions require filtration to ensure water quality, but elsewhere communities explore alternative strategies to both protect natural filtration processes in their watersheds and avoid the enormous costs of installing water treatment plants.

The hard-fought conversion of the New Haven Water Company from a private, investor-owned company to a public regional water authority provides an informative case study of a partnership strategy. In the process of hammering out agreements on difficult land use and tax issues, the city and surrounding suburbs succeeded in breaking down conventional barriers and recognized that regional solutions can meet shared needs for a safe water supply, open space protection, recreation and fiscal responsibility.

The drama unfolded in 1974, when the Water Company attempted to sell over 60 percent of its 26,000 acres of land in 17 metropolitan area towns to generate capital for filtration plant construction. The announcement of this massive land sale created vehement opposition throughout the state. Residents of the affected towns viewed the largely undeveloped land as an integral part of their community character. They feared losing control of the land as well as environmental damage and increased costs associated with potential new development.

Several New Haven area legislators recognized the critical link between the city and its watershed communities. They introduced legislation imposing a moratorium on the land sale and proposing public ownership of the water works. New Haven Mayor Frank Logue countered with an announcement that the city planned to buy the water company under a purchase option in a 1902 contract. The suburban towns responded by promoting regional ownership as the only viable alternative to city control.

After a lengthy feasibility study, and despite a gubernatorial veto, legislation enabling the creation of the South Central Connecticut Regional Water Authority (RWA) was enacted in 1977. In addition, separate legislation classified all utility-owned watershed land and severely restricted its sale. The sale restrictions combined with standards for source protection, provisions for public recreation and consideration of the financial impact on ratepayers, also diminished the land’s market value, thereby limiting the Water Company’s ability to use the land as a source of capital.

Regionalization of the Water Company also required a regional approach to taxation. This was the most difficult obstacle to overcome in passing the RWA enabling legislation. With New Haven Water Company’s projected capital investments in excess of $100 million, the region’s towns had looked ahead to vastly increased tax revenues from the private utility. However, New Haven, with the majority of consumers, was more concerned with keeping water rates low.

The conflict between city and suburbs was resolved through the principle that the regionalization of the water utility would cause no erosion of the tax base. Under the agreement, each town would receive payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) on all property acquired by the RWA, equivalent to the taxes that would be paid by a private owner. However, while these payments would rise and fall with future assessments, the RWA would not be required to make such tax-substitution payments for any new capital improvements.

Lessons of Regional Resource Sharing

In addition to forcing a reconsideration of the balance between suburban tax bases and urban water rates, New Haven’s Regional Water Authority has broadened its own mission. While protecting the water supply is the primary focus of all RWA land use policies, the authority also manages recreational use of the land to meet the needs of both inner city and suburban residents.

The early success of the conservation and recreational use plans depended on public participation in formulating the RWA Land Use Plan. Many types of active recreation would have been unsuitable for water supply land, but it was determined that hiking and fishing, the two most popular activities, could be conducted without threatening water quality.

The RWA’s active program for policing the watersheds was reinforced by establishing a center to educate future consumers on water supply protection. Located at the base of the dam at Lake Whitney, the Whitney Water Center annually teaches thousands of children the basics of drinking water science. It emphasizes the interdependence of source protection and safe drinking water.

Primary among the lessons to be learned from the New Haven Water Company’s ill-advised land sale proposal is that the value of a water supply watershed as a natural and human resource is far greater than its value as a market commodity. Management of the watershed’s natural resource potential must extend beyond the collection and distribution of water to include the needs of the people who live within the watershed. At the same time, limiting watershed land activities to low-risk uses minimizes the water treatment costs that are still necessary for safe drinking water.

Regional cooperation need not begin and end with water. Developing economic and ecological partnerships between cities and their suburbs for tax-sharing, recreation, and education recognizes that the economic and ecological concerns of all residents in a metropolitan region are interdependent. Successfully bucking the trend toward privatization, the RWA demonstrates that regional resource sharing is the most viable way of meeting the needs of New Haven and its suburbs.

Watershed Protection vs. Filtration in Other Regions

The public acquisition of the New Haven Water Company in the 1970s provided a preview of 1990s approaches to managing water resources. Today, water supply management is increasingly becoming watershed management, with plans reflecting the broader ecological functions of watersheds and the importance of partnerships with local residents. Conflict resolution has become an essential skill for today’s watershed managers.

Watershed land acquisition continues to be a key filtration avoidance strategy in many areas. New York City has the nation’s largest unfiltered water supply, and some experts have called on the city to develop programs to filter its drinking water. However, New York Governor George E. Pataki has taken the position he would “do whatever it takes to avoid filtration,” from working with farmers and businesses on mutually beneficial voluntary programs to buying up to 80,000 acres from willing sellers to protect the water supply.

New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman has committed to a “hands across the border” $10 million contribution toward purchasing the New York portion of the two-state metropolitan watershed in Sterling Forest, which is threatened with commercial recreational and housing development. The nonprofit Trust for Public Land and the Open Space Institute are negotiating the purchase on behalf of both states, and recent congressional action has guaranteed funding for the project.

In central Massachusetts, the Metropolitan District Commission’s Quabbin Reservoir has met the Safe Drinking Water Act’s criteria as an unfiltered water supply source for the Boston area, but the MDC’s Wachusett Reservoir has not. A recently approved $399 million state open space bond includes funds for land acquisition in the Wachusett watershed.

Acknowledging the essential function that undeveloped land serves in preventing contaminants from reaching water supplies is long overdue. But is watershed source protection alone a viable alternative to filtration?

In North Carolina, where all surface water supplies are already filtered, state legislation requires local water authorities to develop watershed land use plans that must be approved by the state. Although such legislation can reduce the health risks of watershed development and the cost of water treatment, it cannot prevent future development.

Our conclusion is that the combination of watershed protection and filtration is a proven, cost effective approach to ensure safe drinking water while also building partnerships to implement regional land use policies.

_____________

Dorothy S. McCluskey was a Connecticut State Representative from 1975 to 1982 and chaired the Environment Subcommittee on the Sale of Water Company Land. She subsequently served as director of government relations for The Nature Conservancy Connecticut Chapter. Claire C. Bennitt, secretary-treasurer of the Regional Water Authority since 1977, was a resident of North Branford when the threatened land sale galvanized the New Haven region. She worked with Rep. McCluskey as her administrative assistant in the state legislature. They have written Who Wants to Buy a Water Company: From Private to Public Control in New Haven, to be published in early 1997 by Rutledge Books, Inc., of Bethel, Connecticut.