Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

El 18 de julio de 1997 el Congreso de la República de Colombia aprobó una innovadora Ley de Desarrollo Territorial con objetivos ambiciosos que permiten que los municipios y distritos recuperen el valor de la tierra creado socialmente, es decir, las plusvalías. Específicamente, la Ley 388 establece que los ciudadanos tienen derecho a “participar” en el aumento del valor de la tierra cuando el marco legal que regula su uso aumenta el potencial de desarrollo. Se distinguen tres categorías de acción urbanística:

1. cambio en la clasificación, de tierra rural (en la que el desarrollo está sumamente limitado) a tierra para expansión urbana o suburbana;
2. modificación de la zonificación u otras regulaciones del uso de la tierra;
3. modificación de las regulaciones que permiten un mayor aprovechamiento de la tierra.

Para expresarlo de forma breve, la legislación estipula que el precio del metro cuadrado de tierra se calculará antes y después de cualquier acción urbanística. Cualquier municipio, por iniciativa del alcalde, podrá exigir su “participación” y así podrá recuperar entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento (según lo decida el mismo municipio) de la plusvalía generada. El precio se determina multiplicando los dos precios en metros cuadrados por el área de cada predio individual en cuestión y restando el precio antes de la acción urbanística del nuevo precio de referencia. Se fijó una tasa máxima del 50 por ciento para garantizar que siguiera habiendo motivación financiera para los promotores inmobiliarios.

Con esta legislación, Colombia ha dado fuerza de ley nacional a la premisa fundamental de los postulados de Henry George, quien sostenía que los ciudadanos tienen el derecho moral de recuperar el valor creado socialmente, como se evidencia en este caso con el aumento del precio de la tierra generado por las tres categorías de acción urbanística mencionadas anteriormente. Tal vez con la única excepción de Taiwán, pocos países, por no decir ningún otro, han intentado incorporar de manera tan directa los principios de George en una ley verdadera de carácter nacional.

Procedimientos para la aplicación

La legislación actual es apenas el primer paso. Según las prácticas colombianas, el Congreso actúa para trazar las políticas generales, pero su aplicación depende del seguimiento que se haga en el nivel ejecutivo nacional y en el nivel municipal. Para hacer el peritazgo crítico por metro cuadrado anterior y posterior a la acción urbanística con la mayor objetividad posible, una entidad independiente llamada Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi llevará a cabo los avalúos de acuerdo a las directrices establecidas en la ley para cada una de las tres categorías.

Las tasas (denominadas participaciones en la ley) deben pagarse cuando el propietario solicita una licencia de urbanización o construcción, cuando cambia el uso del inmueble, cuando hay transferencia del dominio sobre el inmueble o cuando se adquieren títulos valores (representativos de los derechos adicionales de desarrollo y construcción). Estas tasas deben quedar asentadas en el registro de escrituras de propiedades para garantizar el cumplimiento del pago, y el dominio del inmueble no podrá ser transferido en dicho registro hasta que se paguen las tasas mediante alguna de estas modalidades de pago:

1. en dinero efectivo;
2. por transferencia a una entidad pública de una porción del predio con valor equivalente al monto de la participación;
3. por canje de predios de valor equivalente localizados en otras zonas urbanas;
4. haciendo socia a una entidad pública en la ejecución del proyecto con un interés social equivalente a la participación;
5. mediante la ejecución de obras de infraestructura o áreas de recreación de valor equivalente; o
6. mediante la cesión de una parte, de valor equivalente, de los derechos de desarrollo derivados de la acción urbanística.

Es de esperar que la mayoría de los promotores privados preferirá asociarse con los municipios en lugar de pagar dinero efectivo. De hecho, la legislación prevé a manera de incentivo un descuento del 10 por ciento sobre el monto de la participación al utilizar la modalidad (6) y un descuento del 5 por ciento al utilizar las modalidades (2) y (4).

Los municipios y distritos deben destinar los recursos provenientes de las participaciones en las plusvalías para fines específicos:

• compra de predios o inmuebles para viviendas de “interés social”;
• obras de infraestructura en las áreas donde el desarrollo sea inadecuado;
• ampliación de la red de espacio público urbano;
• financiamiento del sistema de transporte masivo;
• ejecución de macroproyectos urbanos o programas de renovación urbana;
• pago de los costos de expropiación de inmuebles para programas de renovación urbana; o
• fomento de la conservación del patrimonio histórico.

Posibles repercusiones de la ley

Esta legislación aborda muchos aspectos de las políticas de la tierra que por mucho tiempo han sido de interés para el Instituto Lincoln. Martim Smolka, director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto y otras instituciones asociadas realizan seminarios y programas de capacitación con el propósito de compartir las experiencias adquiridas durante los procedimientos de implementación, posiblemente brindar asistencia en los proyectos piloto y seguir la evolución del experimento colombiano.

Uno de estos programas fue un taller de tres días impartido en marzo y copatrocinado por la Universidad Nacional de Colombia y la Escuela Superior de Administración Pública de Bogotá. El taller comprendía las observaciones formales e informales de un amplio espectro de partes interesadas en el tema, tanto de Colombia como de otros países. Puesto que es obvio que Colombia ha dado un paso atrevido y existen pocos precedentes que sirvan de orientación, los funcionarios públicos responsables de la implementación deben actuar de manera innovadora. En el taller se identificaba un número de posibles complicaciones que pueden presentarse a medida que avanza la implementación.

Aspectos constitucionales: La nueva ley se fundamenta inequívocamente en el artículo 82 de la Constitución de Colombia de 1991, que en sí mismo es un documento sumamente novedoso en muchos aspectos de la reforma de políticas de tierra urbanas. Para expresarlo de forma sencilla, el artículo 82 establece que cuando las acciones urbanísticas aumentan el potencial de desarrollo de la tierra, los ciudadanos tienen el derecho de participar en la plusvalía generada por tales acciones, de manera que se sufrague y distribuya equitativamente el costo del desarrollo urbano.

El debate legal y constitucional tiene dos facetas: 1) ¿Pueden los municipios actuar con base únicamente en la ley o deben esperar hasta que el gobierno nacional decrete “regulaciones” para luego ceñirse a ellas por completo? y 2) ¿debe la ley limitarse a establecer los principios generales comunes, dado que la Constitución de 1991 confiere la responsabilidad de los impuestos territoriales exclusivamente a los municipios?

Efectos prácticos de la sindéresis municipal: En el taller también se señaló que la naturaleza voluntaria de la ley puede tener consecuencias negativas y posiblemente imprevistas. Puesto que es el alcalde de cada municipio quien da inicio a la tasación de la “participación”, puede verse sometido a una presión considerable, tanto financiera como de otra índole. En áreas de rápido desarrollo, una tasa entre el 30 y el 50 por ciento del incremento en el valor de la propiedad puede ser una suma altísima. Un vocero, por ejemplo, aseguró que en Cali el 60 por ciento de las plusvalías generadas por las decisiones de planificación equivalían al monto total del presupuesto municipal. Por otra parte, la ley puede facilitar negociaciones y asociaciones de beneficio mutuo entre los municipios y los promotores inmobiliarios, las cuales no ocurren en este momento.

Cuidado del electorado: El ambiente político que produjo esta valiente legislación abarcaba casos escandalosos de fortunas repentinas que surgieron a raíz del cambio de zonificación en Bogotá y de la decisión de extender el perímetro urbano de Cali. En este último caso, se dijo que el precio de la tierra llegó a multiplicarse, ¡más de mil veces!

Además de la implementación inicial, se plantea la cuestión sempiterna de mantener un electorado que permita la efectiva implementación de dicha ley de cara a la resistencia poderosa y bien financiada que oponen los terratenientes y promotores inmobiliarios privados. Por otra parte, la habilidad de cualquier gobierno nacional que haya aprobado una ley de este tipo es de por sí un logro que despierta interés especial en aquellos que consideran la “recuperación de plusvalías” como un elemento esencial de la política de desarrollo urbano.

Objetividad de los avalúos: A pesar de los procedimientos tan específicos estipulados en la ley con la finalidad de lograr la mayor objetividad y transparencia posibles, no será fácil para el Instituto Codazzi cumplir a cabalidad con el avalúo previo y posterior a la acción urbanística dadas las limitaciones de tiempo que establece la ley. Más aún, las distintas alternativas de transferencia para el pago de las tasas con dinero efectivo, que seguramente gozarán de mayor popularidad, dependen de la apreciación local que se haga de lo que se considera “valor equivalente”. Varios oradores señalaron que este proceso podría ser una invitación a la corrupción.

Aspectos técnicos: Los oradores también hicieron mención a un número de problemas de avalúo técnico con las directrices establecidas en la ley. Por ejemplo, si la zonificación restrictiva hace que un propietario pierda valor de su propiedad, y esto a su vez aumenta el valor de un propietario adyacente, ¿qué disposición puede estipularse para proteger al primer propietario sin dejar de recuperar la plusvalía del segundo? Es más, puesto que el mercado anticipa la acción urbanística, ¿se reflejará ya en el avalúo “previo” el aumento de valor que provoca la probabilidad de la acción? O, si las regulaciones del uso de la tierra o de la construcción aumentan el valor de los propietarios de bajos ingresos con predios o inmuebles pequeños, es posible que éstos no cuenten con el dinero efectivo necesario para pagar las tasas por desarrollo, y a pequeña escala tampoco serían viables las otras modalidades de pago. Esto podría traer como resultado ventas forzadas o el desplazamiento de los habitantes pobres. Estos asuntos plantean un reto para la viabilidad de la política: ¿Es mejor seguir adelante y resolver las dificultades a medida que se presenten o intentar una modificación legislativa de los problemas técnicos antes de proseguir?

Efectos económicos: Aunque legalmente se describe como participación pública en el aumento del valor que generan las acciones urbanísticas, la legislación también puede ser considerada como una forma de impuesto a las ganancias de capital. ¿Con qué frecuencia se aplicará? ¿La implementación tenderá a bajar los precios de las tierras afectadas o será el consumidor final el que absorba los cambios en el valor? Si ocurre esto último, la ley podría tener un efecto negativo sobre las viviendas de precio asequible. Por esta razón el artículo 83 (4) exonera del cobro de la participación a los inmuebles destinados a “viviendas de interés social”, según la definición que de esto hace el gobierno nacional. ¿Se convertirá esto en una ruta de escape para la evasión masiva? Existe poca experiencia internacional para responder estas interrogantes.

Planes de ordenamiento territorial: La Ley 388 de 1997 también estipula que todos los municipios y distritos deben elaborar planes de ordenamiento y proporciona descripciones bastante detalladas de dichos planes en los artículos 9 al 35. Sin duda la planificación altera las expectativas de los propietarios y, por ende, el valor de los inmuebles. La interacción administrativa y económica del proceso de planificación de la ciudad y la recuperación de las plusvalías seguramente será un asunto complejo.

Conflictos en los objetivos: Como suele suceder con los instrumentos fiscales, los nuevos cambios buscan alcanzar varios objetivos que no siempre son compatibles: financiar un mejor desarrollo urbano, reducir la especulación inmobiliaria, darle mayor equidad y carácter progresivo a la tributación y cerrar algunas de las vías predilectas para la corrupción de los funcionarios municipales.

Aprendizaje mediante la innovación

Pese a estas inquietudes, Colombia continúa la tradición de ser una de las naciones más innovadoras del mundo en el campo de la planificación de desarrollo urbano, legislación y finanzas. Bogotá fue la primera ciudad importante del mundo en crear un distrito de zonificación especial que reconocía las realidades de las prácticas de vivienda para sectores de ingresos menores. Con el estímulo producido por las ideas y la influencia del fallecido Lachlin Currie, asesor económico del gobierno nacional durante aproximadamente 30 años, la ciudad utilizó distritos de avalúo especial (llamados contribuciones de valoración) para llevar a cabo una transformación física de envergadura en los años 1960. Las leyes colombianas sobre el desarrollo territorial de 1989 y 1991, modificadas y ampliadas por esta ley de 1997, se encuentran entre los enfoques más integrales de la planificación urbana desde la ley británica para el control del desarrollo urbano promulgada en 1947 (British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947). Asimismo, la constitución colombiana prácticamente es única en mencionar el derecho moral que tienen los ciudadanos a las plusvalías generadas por las acciones urbanísticas.

Como cabría esperarse, algunas de estas innovaciones a la larga no llenarán las expectativas iniciales. De hecho, algunos participantes del taller sostenían que los esfuerzos invertidos en la recuperación de la plusvalía podrían ser de mayor utilidad en el mejoramiento de la eficacia de los impuestos a la propiedad convencionales. Por otra parte, la nueva ley está abordando y resolviendo algunos problemas causados por legislaciones y políticas anteriores, y el país está aprendiendo de esta experiencia. La conclusión de los participantes en el taller fue que el proceso bien ha valido la pena y que la nueva ley debe entenderse y evaluarse comparándola con otros instrumentos para la recuperación de plusvalías establecidos anteriormente y la política fiscal en general.

William A. Doebele es profesor emérito de planificación urbana y diseño en la Escuela de Postrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard y miembro asociado del cuerpo docente del Instituto Lincoln. La preparación de este artículo contó con las valiosas colaboraciones de Martim Smolka, miembro superior de los programas para América Latina, Fernando Rojas, docente invitado del Instituto, y Fernanda Furtado, asociada del cuerpo docente y de investigación del Instituto.

Q & A with Mario Coyula

Q. Why is Havana so acclaimed for its beautiful old buildings and neighborhoods?

A. More than two hundred years ago Havana was the preeminent city in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean basin. Established as a service-oriented Spanish colonial settlement, the city spread west and southwest from its initial development next to the port, leaving behind a valuable built heritage representing many different architectural styles over more than four centuries.

The historic character of Havana persists both by accident and by design: By accident, because the 1959 revolution quickly stopped an on-going process of replacing fine old buildings with high-rise condominiums; by design, because one early goal of the new government was to reduce rural poverty and improve living conditions in the countryside and smaller cities and towns. As a result, Havana became more dilapidated, but the population goal was cut short, and the city was spared the fate of traumatic urban renewal and speculative real estate development.

Q. What are the two faces of Havana referred to in the title of your forthcoming book, Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis?

A. Every city has at least two faces, depending on the social, cultural and political bias of the observer. Havana had many very wealthy people, but many poor people as well. Some people will tell you that pre-revolutionary Havana was a wonderful, glamorous city, a perfect place to live until communism arrived. Others will recall it as a place ridden with poverty, discrimination and social injustice; they believe that the revolution opened equal opportunities to all.

Some will tell you that present-day Havana is on the verge of collapse because of the lack of maintenance, and dull because of the lack of services and choices. Others will point out that because of that, Havana’s unique architecture was protected from redevelopment. People in the inner districts may be overcrowded, but they have not been expelled by gentrification. In every case, it is both things at the same time. Maybe that is what makes Havana so fascinating.

Q. What is the mission of the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital?

A. The Group was created in 1987 as an interdisciplinary team of experts to advise the city government on urban policies. Our mission is to place on an equal footing the economic and social development of the city, emphasizing the active participation of the city’s residents. Preserving Havana’s extensive built heritage represents an impossible drain of state funds at a time when the Cuban economy is severely impaired. Yet investment is critical to reassert Havana’s leading role in the region and to create an urban environment that can stimulate economic growth and improve the quality of life of the residents.

New investments should encourage residents to identify and solve their own problems, and progress must be monitored to avoid negative impacts on the natural environment as well as the built and social fabric. Planning for change in Havana demands a pattern of development that would be economically feasible, environmentally sound, socially fair and politically participatory. We want to work with investors who understand and respect the community, to help build a social identity and neighborhood commitment through improving material aspects such as housing, transportation, education and health.

Q. What is the role of the neighborhood transformation workshops started by the Group?

A. These are organizations of neighborhood residents, guided and stimulated by architects, social workers, planners and engineers. We try to find professionals who actually live full-time in the neighborhood for each group. The groups choose and manage revitalization, housing construction, recreation, or other economic and social projects, according to their own vision and priorities for community development in their specific neighborhoods.

Some of the workshops have chosen to focus on the manufacture of building materials, even by recycling rubble (an abundant raw material in Havana!), using these for their own projects but also selling them to other groups. Other neighborhood workshops have chosen to focus on urban gardening or recycling waste. Most importantly, these workshops encourage the self-reliance and commitment of the residents, thus developing a local pride that helps prevent marginality.

Q. What are the respective roles of the central government and the neighborhoods in the revitalization of Havana?

A. The central government has found it increasingly difficult to meet the needs of the neighborhoods, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. Fuel, food and transportation were once supplied and managed centrally, or even imported. Citizens grew to expect a benevolent government to take care of things from the top down. Now one of our biggest challenges is to energize and empower citizens to provide these things locally, from the bottom up. For example, the government has authorized the creation of tens of thousands of small, community gardens on vacant lots, and the surplus from these gardens is sold in city markets.

Q. What are the pros and cons of tourism development in Havana?

A. On the one hand, tourism can attract new investment and income that will help to improve the living standard of the city’s residents. On the other hand, large-scale construction just for tourists can overwhelm the local built environment, and encourage Cubans to see tourists not as fellow human beings but just as an economic resource—almost the way the hungry man in the old Charlie Chaplin film saw everyone around him as a roast chicken or a delicious dessert.

I would rather attract many small investors than a few large ones and find ways of reusing some of the city’s old mansions as small-scale hotels. That way, we can manage both the benefits and the risks of tourism more effectively, and spread the benefits and costs more thinly across many neighborhoods. This pattern should be more sustainable and less vulnerable in an unfriendly external context, including the American embargo.

Q. The Group has built a huge scale model of Havana. How do you use it?

A. We use the model as an educational tool, to help people see the city as a whole and to place their neighborhood within it. Because the buildings are color-coded by the period when they were constructed, the model also helps people see how the city grew, and how newer buildings replaced or overwhelmed older ones. The model was built at a scale of 1:1000 and now covers 112 square meters. It is exhibited in a custom-made pavilion that serves as an information center for anyone living in or visiting the city.

We also use model to test the visual impact of new projects. By placing proposed buildings on their intended sites, we help people get more information on different options and opportunities. This process has actually stopped some inappropriate, disruptive projects because everyone—planners, developers, neighborhood residents—could see clearly how a new structure would impact the community.

Editor’s Note: Architect and planner Mario Coyula spoke at the Lincoln Institute, the Harvard University Graduate School of Design and the Kennedy School of Government in April about the history and architecture of Havana, his home town. He has been a full professor at the Faculty of Architecture of Havana since 1964 and is vice-director of the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC). Dr. Coyula is also a member of several commissions, scientific councils and advisory councils. He is a co-author of the forthcoming book Havana: Two Faces of the Antillean Metropolis (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, 1997) with Roberto Segre and Joseph L. Scarpaci, Jr.

Brownfields are industrial and commercial properties with known or suspected soil contamination problems. The environmental and financial challenges of dealing with these sites represent serious barriers to potential urban revitalization.

As the antonym for greenfields, or undeveloped land in suburban and rural communities, brownfields have made their way to the top of many urban priority lists. The National Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Economic Development Administration, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are among the groups that have made recent brownfield policy statements.

Development Perspectives

Many central cities have nearly exhausted their supply of “clean” land for development, contributing to their loss of residents, jobs and a stable tax base. Inner-city businesses often relocate to surrounding suburbs because land is not available in the city to support their future expansion. Thus, urban brownfields give an inadvertent boost to the economic development strategies of outlying areas. This increased development pressure, in turn, can pose complex suburban and rural growth management issues.

While most known or suspected brownfields are in central cities, the problem is also evident in older inner-ring suburbs, some rural areas and military base communities. Brownfields, in short, play an important role in shaping regional development patterns by influencing the location of residential and business activities. Central cities must tackle the brownfields problem to provide new land for development and reverse their declining economic competitiveness.

Environmental Perspectives

Varying opinions exist on the extent of the brownfields problem, and more importantly what the public and private sectors should do about assessing environmental hazards on these sites. This situation will change, but not before environmental regulators clarify the relevant policies. Brownfields are not Superfund sites by regulatory definitions. The environmental and health risks of Superfund sites are significantly greater than those of brownfields. Nevertheless, brownfields can pose serious environmental threats where “real” environmental and health risks are documented through risk assessment. In many instances, however, brownfields may be less threatening than earlier thought.

Depending upon future site use, environmental and health threats can vary considerably, which raises the “how clean is clean” issue. Regulators, property owners, developers, lenders, insurers and local government officials are engaged in an open debate over future brownfields clean-up standards. Many experts, myself included, advocate standards based upon the future use of the property, as opposed to a “one standard applies to all uses” approach. Earlier regulatory practices required sites to be fully cleaned for potential residential use, which requires the highest level of clean-up. These practices are being challenged because they are so costly and because they discourage recycling of industrial land.

State Policy Innovations

Nineteen states have created voluntary brownfields clean-up programs as alternatives to regulatory enforcement. Programs such as those in Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota and New Jersey allow property owners, municipalities and other parties greater flexibility in meeting clean-up standards.

State voluntary programs are positive for several reasons. First, because they are voluntary they allow property owners and developers to initiate the process without traditional enforcement pressures. This leads to more response from private markets, and to more creative and cost-effective clean-up and redevelopment. Secondly, these programs encourage problem solving at the local level, where land use, zoning and planning regulations can contribute to solutions.

Thirdly, the state programs address key liability concerns by offering a level of “comfort” to banks, property owners, and others involved in clean-up and redevelopment. Many argue these programs must go even further. A final benefit is that state government is often willing to provide financial incentives, which experience shows are often necessary to get companies and developers to clean and reuse these properties.

State programs are expected to continue to gain momentum over time, but most administrators believe they need extra help from the EPA to make their programs more successful. They are urging federal authorities to strengthen assurances against future liability claims by stronger “comfort letters” to property owners, lenders and developers. Currently the federal government cannot provide a 100 percent delegation of authority to the states for brownfield regulation, without future federal legislative changes. Better intergovernmental coordination and greater information exchange about standards and remediation technology would help the situation. The states would welcome federal financial support for their programs, even though many will rely on private user fees to finance program administration.

Future Knowledge and Investment Needs

Most cities discover that the unknowns outweigh the facts about older industrial and commercial properties. This lack of knowledge limits city leaders’ ability to shape cost-effective strategies to cope with these problems. Knowledge is an essential ingredient in effective strategy development—ask any corporation employing knowledge strategies to best their competition. Communities with brownfields must inventory these sites and investigate the risks and opportunities associated with these properties.

Properly used, the information from these investigations can help separate real from perceived problems related to site conditions and future development potential. Knowledge can help manage the risks and reduce the uncertainty. In short, we need to end the hysteria about brownfields, which may motivate political action but also may reduce public and private confidence that cities can be revitalized and made whole once again.

Many people are searching for “deep pockets” to finance brownfield remediation. This search frightens all levels of government as budget-cutting pressures continue to grow across the public sector. Corporations and private property owners, on the other hand, reject the notion that they should either pay clean-up costs that may be unnecessary or pay for pollution problems created by previous owners or third parties.

Overall national costs to the public and private sectors of cleaning up brownfields are unknown because there is no agreed-upon definition of brownfields, and because clean-up standards continue to change. Both problems greatly affect cost estimates. City officials are unable to assess the cost of property clean-up within their jurisdictions for the same basic reasons. Future use of risk assessment techniques, coupled with the use of more cost-effective remediation technology, will help to lower these costs.

In the absence of deep pockets, communities must identify creative approaches to funding site clean-up and redevelopment. Through citywide planning, policymakers must establish useful priorities to guide their investments based upon future development trends and land use patterns. Serious environmental threats should be eliminated on any site, regardless of its development potential. In most other cases, the development potential should be a primary factor in considering next steps.

The public sector should engage corporations that own contaminated sites, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and real estate investment funds to determine what is required to attract private capital to fund clean-up and redevelopment. Private property owners, corporations and developers should seek state and local economic development groups as potential investment partners in returning these sites to productive use.

Donald T. Iannone directs the Economic Development Program and the Great Lakes Environmental Finance Center in The Urban Center at Cleveland State University. Much of his work focuses on financing the redevelopment of brownfield sites.

Additional information in printed newsletter.

1. Photo caption: The Publicker site, a former distillery on the Delaware River in Philadelphia, was cleaned up with EPA funds and will be redeveloped as a shipping terminal.

Photo credit information: – Richard McMullin, photographer, Office of the City Representative, Philadelphia

2. Map of U.S.: EPA Brownfields Demonstration Cities

Large Cities:

Cleveland/Cuyahoga County, Ohio
Baltimore, Maryland
Detroit, Michigan
Indianapolis, Indiana
New Orleans, Louisiana
St. Louis, Missouri

Mid-Size Cities:

Birmingham, Alabama
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Knoxville, Tennessee
Louisville, Kentucky
Richmond, Virginia
Rochester, New York
Sacramento, California
Trenton, New Jersey

Smaller Cities/Clusters:

Cape Charles/Northampton County, Virginia
Laredo, Texas
Oregon Mill Sites (7 small towns), Oregon
West Central Municipal Conference, Cook County, Illinois

Caption: Eighteen cities or regions have already received grants of up to $200,000 through the EPA’s Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative. An additional 32 cities will receive funds by the end of 1995. The common objectives of these projects are to assess contamination at abandoned sites; involve community residents in decision making; leverage other public and private funds for clean-up and redevelopment; resolve liability issues; and serve as role models for other communities.

From the earliest days of the Republic, civic boosters have prodded American governments to develop large-scale physical facilities—mega-projects, we label them—ranging from canals and railroads in the nineteenth century to rail transit systems and convention centers today. Until the mid-twentieth century, such projects tended to involve modest public expenditures by contemporary standards and they rarely caused significant disruption of the existing urban fabric.

This pattern altered abruptly in the 1950s and early 1960s. Central city economies had, with rare exceptions, stagnated through the Great Depression and World War II, and they continued to do so in the early postwar years. Local business and political leaders concluded that if central cities—particularly those developed prior to the auto age—were ever to thrive again, they would require major surgery. Specifically, they needed to clear slums to provide large downtown sites for redeveloped office districts; to facilitate high-speed automotive movement between suburban and central city locations; and to provide larger airfields with attractive terminals for the nascent commercial aviation industry.

Recognizing that they could not finance these expensive projects with locally generated funds, urban leaders campaigned aggressively for federal assistance, and they were successful in obtaining considerable amounts of funding. We attribute their success mainly to the following factors: (1) public confidence in government was unusually high in the postwar period; (2) business leaders generally accepted the need for government activism to sustain prosperity; and (3) although cities lacked the political clout to secure expensive programs on their own, they were able to participate in much broader coalitions—most notably, those focused on housing (which expanded to include urban renewal) and highways. Urban aviation advocates were less successful, but as aviation traffic boomed they were able to fund new airports and expand old ones by relying primarily on revenues from landing fees and terminal leases.

During the late 1950s and the 1960s these efforts combined to produce an unprecedented wave of urban public investment. While often successful on their own terms, these projects tended to be highly disruptive as well, destroying in particular vast amounts of low-income housing and urban parkland. Project advocates maintained that the public should accept such impacts to advance the greater good. Robert Moses, New York’s famed master builder, never tired of citing a French proverb: “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” (Caro 1974).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, neighborhood activists allied with those involved in the emerging environmental movement against the full panoply of mega-project programs that had come into being during the 1950s. They succeeded not just in blocking large numbers of planned expressways, renewal schemes and airport projects, but also in securing the adoption of numerous statutes, regulations and judicial doctrines, thus strengthening the hands of critics in urban development controversies. For a time it seemed to most observers that the era of mega-project investment in cities was over.

“Do No Harm” Planning

The forces committed to mega-projects have proven highly resilient and adaptive, however. While the character of such investment has changed dramatically since the 1970s, its volume has remained high. Nevertheless, mega-project advocates have had to work within new constraints; they have had to learn the art of making omelets without leaving a residue of broken eggs. We label this art, as exercised in the domain of urban land use, “do no harm” planning. Its essential components are the selection, siting and design of projects to minimize disruptive side effects, and the aggressive mitigation of any harmful impacts that cannot be avoided entirely. Most obviously, governments have ceased clearing slums and building expressways through developed neighborhoods, and only one major new passenger airport—in Denver—has been constructed since the early 1970s.

Public investment in facilities such as rail transit systems, festival retail markets, sports stadiums and arenas, and convention centers has surged. Within the transportation sector, moreover, investment priorities have shifted toward the reconstruction of existing highways, new construction on suburban fringes and airport terminals rather than runway improvements. The great advantage of such projects is that they are relatively easy to site either at some distance from existing development or in older commercial districts that have few preservationist defenders.

Where cities and states have gone forward with major highway and airport projects, they have taken extraordinary steps to minimize social and environmental impacts. The new Denver airport, for example, is on a previously rural 53-square-mile site 25 miles east of downtown. Its location and scale were determined primarily by two considerations: land assembly without the disruption of existing residential enclaves; and future airport operation without significant noise impacts overflowing the airport boundary. Boston’s $14.6 billion Central Artery/Tunnel project, known colloquially as “The Big Dig,” appears very different, in that it is located in the heart of downtown, but it is virtually identical in its do no harm planning orientation. It is almost entirely underground as it passes close to built-up areas (replacing a previous elevated roadway); it has been threaded into the urban fabric without the taking of a single home; and it will add significantly to the city’s parkland.

Common Themes

In addition to do no harm planning, our review of mega-projects built over the past two decades identified the following themes as particularly salient.

Business Support

While insufficient by itself, strong business support has generally been an indispensable condition for mega-project development. Within the business community, leadership has almost invariably come from enterprises with deep local roots, particularly in real estate ownership, development and finance. The strongest supporters of Denver’s new airport, for example, were those who owned property with commercial development potential near the new site; downtown businesses concerned that the city’s existing airport was too small to allow for the region’s continued development; and the banks and financial service firms that had lent money to many of the city’s property owners and developers. Similarly, the most active and effective support group for Boston’s Big Dig has been the Artery Business Committee, a coalition of those who own major buildings adjacent to the artery’s corridor and several major employers with historic roots in downtown Boston.

Public Entrepreneurs

In addition to well-mobilized constituencies, aggressive, deft government officials have been indispensable to the success of recent mega-project proposals. Indeed, it was frequently they who originated project ideas and first sparked the formation of supportive coalitions. Even when others initiated, they commonly took the lead in crafting strategies, tactics and plans; in lobbying for state and federal aid; in securing other types of needed legislation and regulatory approvals; and in dealing with project critics.

Though business groups initiated some projects, they seemed more frequently to “invest” in proposals originated by public entrepreneurs. The business constituents were by no means easy marks, of course. Like venture capitalists in the private sector, they considered a great many ideas brought to them by public entrepreneurs (and others), but invested only in those few that looked particularly good for their enterprises, were to be carried out mainly or entirely at public expense, and had a reasonable chance of securing the myriad approvals required.

Illustratively, Boston’s Big Dig was conceived by Fred Salvucci, a transportation engineer who had become active in battles against planned highway and airport projects during the 1960s and then served as transportation secretary for twelve years under Governor Michael Dukakis. During the first Dukakis administration (1975–1979) the main constituencies for a new harbor tunnel (business) and for depressing the central artery (neighborhood and environmental groups) were at loggerheads. While temporarily out of office from 1979 to 1983, however, Salvucci concluded that the politically feasible strategy might be to marry these projects, while also relocating the tunnel to an alignment far from a neighborhood that it had historically threatened. This strategy in fact resolved the local controversy, and prepared the way for a successful campaign for massive federal aid, led again by Salvucci with critical business support.

Denver Mayor Federico Peña broke a similar type of logjam that had persisted for years over whether to expand Denver’s existing Stapleton Airport or build a new facility on a large site outside the city’s borders. Concluding that the obstacles, both political and environmental, to expanding Stapleton were insuperable, but that city ownership and operation of any new airport remained a critical objective, he negotiated successfully with adjacent Adams County for a massive land annexation. To achieve this objective, he accepted conditions protecting county residents from significant airport noise and guaranteeing Adams County most of the tax benefits that would flow from economic development around the new airport. With local agreements in hand he, like Salvucci, then led a successful campaign for special federal assistance.

Mitigation

Do no harm plans avoid substantial neighborhood and environmental disruption but it is impossible to build a mega-project with no negative side effects. The commitment of do no harm planning is to ameliorate such impacts as much as possible, and to offset them with compensatory benefits when full direct mitigation cannot be achieved. The boundary between mitigating harm and providing net benefits to protesting groups is often indistinct, however, so the norm of mitigation provides leverage as well for skilled activists whose demands are at times tangential to the mega-projects whose budgets they seek to tap. Mega-project champions in turn reflected on the fate of such projects as New York City’s proposed Westway, which failed because of what seemed at first a minor legal challenge. They were deathly afraid of litigation and were frequently willing to make very expensive concessions in return for agreements by critics not to sue.

During permitting for the Big Dig, for example, Boston’s Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a group whose signature strategy was litigation for environmental purposes, threatened to sue unless the state committed to accompany the highway project with a multi-billion dollar set of rail transit investments, mainly for expansion. CLF’s rationale was that the transit projects would prevent the new road from filling up with traffic, which in turn would generate more air pollution. Modeling done for the project (as well as data from other regions) showed that the Big Dig would not in fact have significant air pollution effects, and that investing in rail transit extensions would be a particularly inefficient way to offset pollution effects if they did occur. Nonetheless, both Democratic and Republican state administrations acquiesced to CLF’s demands because they did not want to risk litigation, which at the very least threatened project delays and might also have imperiled the breadth of local consensus in support of the Big Dig.

Bottom-up Federalism

A naïve observer of American politics might assume that the federal government distributes grants to achieve national goals. In fact, however, the grantor-grantee relationship is usually much more complicated than that. Recipient jurisdictions are typically active participants in the coalitions that bring new programs into being and provide them with critical support each budget season. The programs of aid for mega-project investment that we examined were all distinguished more by their openness to local initiative than their sharp definition of national purpose. If grantee jurisdictions had a great deal of influence collectively on program structure, moreover, they had even more when it came to projects, and they were able to exercise it individually.

Every project we studied was initiated by subnational officials and interest groups, and it was they who took the lead at every stage in the decision process. While limited in their discretion by federal program rules, they were alert as well to opportunities for securing waivers, statutory amendments and add-on funds, with the assistance of their congressional delegations. Stated another way, when federal aims are diffuse and weakly defended, principal-agent theory (as applied to the intergovernmental system) needs to be read bottom-up rather than top-down.

High and Rising Costs

Do no harm designs and related mitigation agreements have tended to produce projects that are vastly more expensive than their historic predecessors. According to Brian Taylor (1995), the average cost per centerline mile of urban freeways rose by more than 600 percent in real terms from the 1960s to the 1980s, and costs were even more extreme in some of the mega-projects we examined. Whereas Taylor found that urban freeways cost on average about $54 million per centerline mile (in 2002 dollars) in the 1980s, for example, the Big Dig cost $1.9 billion per centerline mile. Judith Grant Long (2002) reports in a similar vein that the average cost of new stadiums and arenas more than quadrupled in real terms from the 1950s to the 1990s, and we have calculated that light rail development costs increased by nearly two-fifths from the 1980s to the 1990s.

Both older and more recent projects have been marked by a consistent pattern of substantial cost increases between authorization and completion. The projected cost of Boston’s Big Dig, for example, has roughly tripled in real terms since its approval by Congress as an interstate highway project in 1987. The cost of Denver International Airport more than doubled from the late 1980s, when it received voter approval and its federal funding commitments, to its completion six years later.

While a full study of this issue was beyond the scope of our work, we judge that the consistent pattern of underestimation has two primary causes. First, project advocates have very strong incentives to estimate optimistically as they seek political commitments of support. Second, mega-projects are often so complex—both technically and in terms of the mitigation agreements that will often prove necessary to keep them on track—that early cost estimates are typically little more than guesses within very broad ranges.

Locally Painless Project Funding

The hallmark of successful mega-project financing is that projects should appear costless, or nearly so, to the great majority of local voters. The easiest way to achieve this result is to rely on funding from higher-level governments. Where such aid is unavailable or insufficient, the challenge is to identify other sources of revenue to which local voters are generally insensitive—which means, above all, avoiding local property and income taxes and spreading the burden beyond host city residents.

This challenge became increasingly salient after 1970 with rising antitax sentiment, the end of federal renewal aid, and the surge in capital spending for such facilities as stadiums, arenas and convention centers, for which federal aid was only rarely available. In the growing domain of mass transit, moreover, federal matching ratios have tended to decline since 1980.

The revenue strategies adopted to deal with these challenges have been varied and ingenious. New terminals and runways at major airports have been funded largely by increased landing fees, lease payments, and (since the early 1990s) ticket surcharges authorized by the federal government but imposed locally. Stadiums, arenas and convention centers are commonly funded by taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents, such as taxes on hotel rooms, car rentals and restaurant bills. Where broad-based taxes have been unavoidable, the preferred method has been incremental add-ons to sales taxes, which typically require voter approval. Voters have often said no, but sales tax increases provide large amounts of revenue when they are adopted—and when they are not, project advocates routinely come back with revised plans. In Los Angeles and Seattle, for example, transit advocates responded to referendum defeats by scaling back their rail plans and allocating some of the projected revenue to bus service and local road improvements.

Looking to the Future

Almost two decades ago, when New York City’s ambitious Westway project died even though its backers had helped pioneer the do no harm planning and design paradigm, then-Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wondered whether it had become so difficult to build public projects that “Central Park could not conceivably be built today” (Finder 1985). Recent history suggests, however, that the mega-project impulse remains strong. The pertinent question is not whether the U.S. political system can still generate mega-projects but whether the projects that go forward are typically worth their costs to taxpayers.

In general, economists are skeptical about the cost-effectiveness of the most prominent mega-projects, from the Big Dig to the scores of rail transit systems, professional sports facilities and convention centers, built over the past 25 years. Project advocates invariably retort that the economists miss intangible project benefits such as fostering community pride and (in the case of transit, particularly) strengthening the likelihood of smart growth practices in new development. The national coalitions in support of highway and airport improvements, which economists tend to rate more favorably than other types of projects, have argued vociferously that current environmental rules and opportunities for critics to litigate are too onerous and should be relaxed.

There is no easy resolution of these issues because they involve tradeoffs between important, deeply held values. However, our review of a half-century of public works projects in urban areas has left us with three clear impressions. First, states and localities should be required to bear half or more of the cost of projects they undertake, because great windfalls of earmarked money from higher levels of government tend to overwhelm serious local deliberation. Second, strong environmental regulation helps ensure that local pro-growth coalitions do not leave fouled environments or devastated neighborhoods in their wake. Finally, while referenda are in general a flawed instrument of policy making, the evidence seems to suggest that the requirement of voter approval for major local projects tends to have a salutary effect on the bargaining between business groups that stand to benefit financially from the proposed investments and the more general interests of local taxpayers and residents.

_____________________

Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff are the coauthors of Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment. Altshuler is the Stanton Professor of Urban Policy at the Kennedy School of Government and the Graduate School of Design (GSD) at Harvard University, and director of the Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Luberoff is the Taubman Center’s associate director and an adjunct lecturer at GSD.

References

Caro, Robert A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Finder, Alan. 1985. Westway: A road that was paved with mixed intentions, losing confidence and opportunities. New York Times, September 22, sec. 4, 6.

Long, Judith Grant. 2002. Full count: The real cost of pubic funding for major league sports facilities and why some cities pay more to play. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.

Taylor, Brian. 1995. Public perceptions, fiscal realities, and freeway planning: The California case. Journal of the American Planning Association 61 (1): 43–56.

Francisco Sabatini, a sociologist and urban planner, is a professor at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago, where he lectures on urban studies and planning and conducts research on residential segregation, value capture and environmental conflicts. He combines his academic work with involvement in NGO-based research and action projects in low-income neighborhoods and villages. He served as an advisor to the Chilean Minister of Housing and Urban Affairs after democracy was restored in 1990, and as a member of the National Advisory Committee on the Environment in the subsequent democratic governments. Sabatini has published extensively in books and journals, and has taught in several countries, mainly in Latin America. He is a long-standing collaborator in the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, as a course developer, instructor and researcher.

Land Lines: Why is the topic of residential segregation so important for land policy and urban planning in general?

Francisco Sabatini: Zoning, the centerpiece of urban planning, consists of segregating or separating activities and consolidating homogeneous urban areas, for either exclusionary or inclusionary purposes. At the city level, this planning tool was introduced in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1891 and was adopted elsewhere to address environmental and social problems due to rapid urbanization and industrialization. In modern cities the widespread practice of zoning to separate different activities and groups has aggravated these and other problems. It affects traffic and air pollution because more car trips are needed to move around the city, and it contributes to environmental decay and urban ghettos characterized by symptoms of social disintegration, such as increasing rates of school dropouts, teenage pregnancy and drug addiction.

It is indisputable that the desire for social segregation has long been a component of exclusionary zoning, along with concerns related to the environment and health. The influx of working-class families and immigrants is often considered undesirable and politically threatening, and zoning has been used to segregate such groups. Ethnic and religious discrimination are the most negative forms of social segregation. When a national government defines itself in religious, ethnic or racial terms, residential segregation usually remains entrenched as a severe form of discrimination, intolerance and human exploitation, as in Ireland, South Africa and Israel. Segregation can be positive, however, as in many cities around the world that become socially enriched with the proliferation of ethnic enclaves.

LL: What are the economic impacts of segregation?

FS: Besides its urban and social effects, residential segregation is an important aspect of land policy because it is closely connected to the functioning of land markets and is a factor in motivating households to pursue economic security and the formation of intergenerational assets. Fast-growing cities in unstable and historically inflationary economies convert land price increments into an opportunity for households at every social level to achieve their goals. It is no coincidence that the percentage of home ownership is comparatively high in Latin American cities, including among its poor groups. Land valuation seems to be an important motivation behind the self-segregating processes of the upper and middle classes. And, the increase in land prices is a factor in limiting access to serviced land and contributing to spatial segregation. In fact, the scarcity of serviced land at affordable prices, rather than the absolute scarcity of land, is considered the main land problem in Latin American cities, according to research conducted at the Lincoln Institute.

LL: What makes residential segregation so important in Latin America?

FS: Two of the most salient features of Latin America are its socioeconomic inequality and its urban residential segregation. There is an obvious connection between the two phenomena, though one is not a simple reflection of the other. For example, changes in income inequality in Brazilian cities are not necessarily accompanied by equivalent changes in spatial segregation. Residential segregation is closely related to the processes of social differentiation, however, and in that sense is deeply entrenched in the region’s economically diverse cities.

The rapidly increasing rate of crime and related social problems in spatially segregated low-income neighborhoods makes segregation a critical policy issue. These areas seem to be devolving from the “hopeful poverty” that predominated before the economic reforms of the 1980s to an atmosphere of hopelessness distinctive of urban ghettos. How much of this change can be attributed to residential segregation is an open question, on which little research is being done. I believe that in the current context of “flexible” labor regimes (no contracts, no enforcement of labor regulations, etc.) and alienation of civil society from formal politics, residential segregation adds a new component to social exclusion and desolation. In the past, spatial agglomeration of the poor tended to support grassroots organizations and empower them within a predominantly elitist political system.

LL: What features are characteristic of residential segregation in Latin America, as contrasted to the rest of the world?

FS: Compared to societies with strong social mobility, such as the United States, spatial segregation as a means of asserting social and ethnic identities is used less frequently in Latin America. Brazil shares with the U.S. a history of slavery and high levels of immigration, and it is one of the most unequal societies in the world; however, there is apparently much less ethnic or income segregation in residential neighborhoods in Brazil than in the U.S.

At the same time, there is a high degree of spatial concentration of elites and the rising middle class in wealthy areas of Latin American cities, although in many cases these areas are also the most socially diverse. Lower-income groups easily move into these neighborhoods, in contrast with the tradition of the wealthy Anglo-American suburb, which tends to remain socially and economically homogeneous over time.

Another noteworthy spatial pattern is that the segregated poor neighborhoods in Latin America are located predominantly on the periphery of cities, more like the pattern of continental Europe than that of many Anglo-American cities, where high concentrations of poverty are found in the center. The powerful upper classes in Latin America have crafted urban rules and regulations and influenced public investment in order to exclude the “informal” poor from some of the more modern zones, thus making the underdevelopment of their cities and countries less visible.

Finally, the existence of a civic culture of social integration in Latin America is manifested in a socially mixed physical environment. This widespread social mingling could be linked to the Catholic cultural ethos and the phenomenon of a cultural mestizo, or melting pot. The mestizo is an important figure in Latin American history, and it is telling that in English there is no word for mestizo. Anglo-American, Protestant cities seem to demonstrate more reluctance to encourage social and spatial mixing. Expanding this Latin American cultural heritage should be a basic goal of land policies aiming to deter the formation of poor urban ghettos, and it could influence residential segregation elsewhere.

LL: What trends do you perceive in residential segregation in Latin America?

FS: Two trends are relevant, both stimulated by the economic reforms of the 1980s: the spatial dispersal of upper-class gated communities and other mega-projects into low-income fringe areas; and the proliferation of the ghetto effect in deprived neighborhoods. The invasion of the urban periphery by large real estate projects triggers the gentrification of areas otherwise likely to become low-income settlements, giving way to huge profits for some. It also shortens the physical distance between the poor and other social groups, despite the fact that this new form of residential segregation is more intense because gated communities are highly homogeneous and walls or fences reinforce exclusion. Due to the peripheral location of these new developments, the processes of gentrification must be supported by modern regional infrastructures, mainly roads. Widespread private land ownership by the poor residents could help to prevent their complete expulsion from these gentrified areas and achieve a greater degree of social diversity.

The second trend consists of the social disintegration in those low-income neighborhoods where economic and political exclusion have been added to traditional spatial segregation, as mentioned earlier.

LL: What should land policy officials, in Latin America and elsewhere, know about residential segregation, and why?

FS: Residential segregation is not a necessary by-product of public housing programs or of the functioning of land markets, nor is it a necessary spatial reflection of social inequality. Thus, land policies aimed at controlling residential segregation could contribute to deterring the current expansion of the ghetto effect. In addition, officials should consider measures aimed at democratizing the city, most notably with regard to the distribution of investments in urban infrastructure. Policies such as participatory budgeting, as implemented in Porto Alegre and other Brazilian cities, could be indispensable in helping to undermine one of the mainstays of residential segregation in Latin American cities: public investments biased toward affluent areas.

LL: How is your work with the Lincoln Institute addressing these problems?

FS: Residential segregation is widely recognized as a relevant urban topic, but it has been scarcely researched by academics and to a large extent has been neglected by land policy officials. With the Institute’s support I have been lecturing on the topic in several Latin American universities over the past year, to promote discussion among faculty and students in urban planning and land development departments. I also lead a network of scholars that has recently prepared an eight-session course on residential segregation and land markets in Latin America cities. It is available in CD-ROM format for public officials and educators to support teaching, research and debate on the topic.

LL: Please expand on your new role as a Lincoln Institute partner in Chile.

FS: This year we inaugurated the Program on Support for the Design of Urban Policies at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago. The program’s advisory board includes members of parliament, senior public officials, business leaders, researchers, consultants and NGO representatives. With its focus on land policy, particularly actions related to the financing of urban development and residential social integration, this board will identify relevant national land policy objectives and adequate strategies to reach them, including activities in the areas of training, applied policy research and dissemination of the results.

The board’s first task is to promote broad discussion of the draft reform of major urban laws and policies that the government recently sent to the Chilean Parliament. Since the late 1970s, when the urban and land market liberalization policies were applied under the military dictatorship, the debate on urban policies has fallen nearly silent, and Chile has lost its regional leadership position on these issues. Overly simplistic notions about the operation and potential of land markets, and especially about the origins of residential segregation (due in part to ideological bias), have contributed to this lack of discussion. Both land markets and the processes of residential segregation must be seen as arenas of critical social and urban importance. We want to reintroduce Chile into this debate, which has been facilitated by the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean and its networks of experts over the past 10 years.

References and Resources

Sabatini, Francisco, and Gonzalo Cáceres. 2004. Barrios cerrados: Entre la exclusión y la integración residencial (Gated communities: Between exclusion and residential integration). Santiago: Instituto de Geografía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

———. Forthcoming. Recuperación de plusvalías en Santiago de Chile: Experiencias del Siglo XX. (Value capture in Santiago, Chile: Experiences from the 20th century). Santiago: Instituto de Geografía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.

Sabatini, Francisco, Gonzalo Cáceres and Gabriela Muñoz. 2004. Segregación residencial y mercados de suelo en la ciudad latinoamericana. (Residential segregation and land markets in Latin American cities). CD-ROM.

Espaço e debates. 2004. Segregações urbanas 24(45).

The core competence of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy is the analysis of issues related to land, and ours is one of the few organizations in the world with this focus.

The Institute’s current work program, both in the United States and in selected countries around the world, encompasses the taxation of land, the operation of land markets, the regulation of land and land use, the impacts of property rights, and the distribution of benefits from land development. This focus on land derives from the Institute’s founding objective—to address the links between land policy and social and economic progress—as expressed by Henry George, the nineteenth-century political economist and social philosopher.

The Institute plays a leading role in the analysis of land and property taxation, land valuation and appraisal, the design of land information and cadastral systems, and the reform and establishment of property tax systems. Work on the operation of land markets includes the analysis of transit-oriented development and research on urban housing and the expansion of urban areas. The regulation of land encompasses work on smart growth and growth management, visualizing density and the physical impact of development, mediating land use disputes, land conservation, and the management of state trust lands in the West. Analysis of property rights includes research on diverse topics including informal markets and land titling in developing countries, the establishment of conservation easements, and the preservation of farmland. Much work is underway on the distribution of benefits from land development, including value capture taxation, tax increment financing, university-led development, and community land trusts that seek to promote affordable housing.

While the Institute’s work in recent years has emphasized urban land issues, it has also addressed problems beyond urban boundaries such as conservation, management of state trust lands, and farmland preservation. A balance of activities across urban and rural topics will persist as the Institute’s work program continues to focus on land issues of relevance to social and economic development. The Institute will not normally address topics that lack a strong link to land policy.

Communicating new findings through education programs, publications, and Web-based products is a core Institute activity. The overarching objective is to strengthen the capacity of public officials, professionals, and citizens to make better decisions by providing them with relevant information, ideas, methods, and analytic tools. The Institute offers traditional courses and seminars, and is moving aggressively to make many of its offerings available on the Web as either programmed instruction or as online courses with real-time interactions between students and instructors. The Institute also develops training materials and makes them available to others, for example through activities in several developing countries that involve the training of trainers in topics such as appraisal and tax administration.

Research strengthens the Institute’s training programs and contributes to knowledge about land policy generally. The Institute supports both mature scholars who conduct groundbreaking research and advanced students who are working on their dissertations or thesis research. The Institute offers several fellowship programs and other opportunities for researchers to propose work on important topics that can contribute to current debates on land policy. The results of this research are regularly posted on the Institute Web site as working papers and are published in books, conference proceedings, and policy focus reports.

Demonstration and evaluation activities constitute the third major component of the Institute’s agenda. Recently the Institute has begun to combine education, training, research, and dissemination in demonstration projects that apply knowledge, data collection, and analysis to the development and implementation of specific policies in the areas of property taxation, planning, and development. These projects are being expanded to include the analysis of policies as they are applied, and to assess and evaluate outcomes in terms of the intended objectives of the policies. The goal is to provide more rigorous evidence about how well and in what circumstances specific land and tax policies achieve their objectives so that information can be incorporated into future research and training programs.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Durante la última década, el autobús de transporte rápido (BRT, por sus siglas en inglés) ha revolucionado la planificación del transporte regional en gran parte del mundo desarrollado y en vías de desarrollo. El BRT pasó de ser una opción de transporte marginal utilizada en unas pocas ciudades de Brasil y Australia a convertirse en una importante alternativa de transporte masivo para los gobiernos locales y nacionales.

El BRT no es un concepto único, sino que engloba una variedad de aplicaciones diseñadas para mejorar el nivel de servicio que proporciona el transporte masivo en autobús ofreciendo movilidad de forma económica y cómoda, similar a la que ofrece el ferrocarril urbano (Wright y Hook 2007, 11). Se basa en mejoras coordinadas en tecnología, infraestructura y equipamiento para conseguir un servicio de calidad (Oficina General de Cuentas de los Estados Unidos 2001). Desde el punto de vista operativo, las aplicaciones del BRT incluyen autobuses con derecho de paso exclusivo, con estaciones dedicadas y abono de tarifas previo al abordaje, o autobuses que transitan por carriles de tráfico mixtos en las principales arterias de la ciudad.

Podría afirmarse que el concepto del BRT que goza del mayor reconocimiento es la provisión de un derecho de paso exclusivo para el transporte en autobús unido a la alta frecuencia del servicio. En Sudamérica, los sistemas BRT de Curitiba, en Brasil, y Bogotá, en Colombia, integran redes de carriles dedicados al uso exclusivo de autobuses articulados de gran capacidad, con embarque y desembarque rápido.

Doce ciudades latinoamericanas, tres australianas, siete estadounidenses, ocho asiáticas y dieciocho europeas han implementado sistemas BRT. En algunas los sistemas son completos mientras que en otras son líneas únicas. También hay sistemas actualmente en construcción en todo el mundo, como en Dar es Salaam en Tanzania, Jinán en China, Bolonia en Italia, Mérida en Venezuela y Auckland en Nueva Zelandia. En marzo de 2007, GTZ, la empresa federal de desarrollo de Alemania, estimó que había al menos 27 ciudades con procesos activos de planificación de sistemas BRT, mientras que 14 sistemas estaban considerando su ampliación (Wright y Hook 2007).

El extraordinario éxito del BRT se debe en parte a la relación costo-efectividad y a la relativa flexibilidad de la inversión necesaria. Los sistemas BRT a menudo pueden transportar tantos pasajeros como los sistemas de ferrocarril urbano convencionales pero por una fracción del costo. Los sistemas BRT también son comparables a los sistemas de ferrocarril tipo metro, excepto en situaciones de muy alta demanda de pasajeros, superior a los 50.000 pasajeros por sentido y por hora. Igual que en el ferrocarril urbano, no obstante, la relación costo-efectividad del BRT se apoya en la capacidad de disponer de usos del suelo que concentran la actividad a lo largo de corredores del sistema. Por lo tanto, en la mayoría de los casos, los sistemas BRT se han construido en corredores con una demanda comprobada.

INVERSIÓN EN TRANSPORTE Y URBANIZACIÓN/REURBANIZACIÓN DEL SUELO

También resulta plausible que los sistemas BRT puedan atraer una urbanización densa que a su vez mejore el sistema BRT en el futuro. Esta conexión recíproca entre inversión en BRT y urbanización ha sido el puntal del éxito en Curitiba. A pesar de la importancia de esta conexión para la viabilidad futura y la relación costo-efectividad de los sistemas BRT, aún disponemos de poca evidencia empírica. Dado el elevado número de ciudades que están considerando la construcción de nuevas líneas BRT o la ampliación de sus sistemas, resulta crucial comprender si se producirán cambios en la urbanización del suelo a fin de prever los beneficios del sistema y poder estimar el impacto fiscal de la inversión.

La teoría económica urbana proporciona un punto de partida para explicar cómo la inversión en transporte puede influir en la urbanización o reurbanización del suelo. Se espera que tal inversión proporcione beneficios de accesibilidad a quienes se ven afectados positivamente a través de la disminución del tiempo de desplazamiento que les brinda la inversión.

En un mercado del suelo metropolitano, se espera que la inversión en transporte proporcione ventajas en cuanto a accesibilidad a los terrenos cercanos a la inversión en comparación con los terrenos relativamente poco afectados por dicha inversión. Puesto que el número de terrenos que se benefician de las mejoras de accesibilidad es limitado, se espera que las familias y las empresas que valoren tales beneficios en un mercado competitivo estén dispuestas a pagar más por las propiedades que ofrecen buen acceso que por otras propiedades, suponiendo que las demás condiciones son iguales. En este sentido, los beneficios de acceso que ofrecen las inversiones en transporte, de existir, se capitalizarán en el valor de las propiedades.

La capitalización de los beneficios de accesibilidad estimula la urbanización potenciando el atractivo de los terrenos para su urbanización o reurbanización. Los terrenos que anteriormente no eran considerados candidatos preferenciales para la inversión inmobiliaria se tornan más atractivos después del anuncio o implementación de la inversión en transporte. Por otro lado, un terreno ya urbanizado o en fase de planificación puede urbanizarse más intensivamente como resultado del aumento de valor. Esta relación es la piedra angular de la urbanización enfocada hacia el transporte (ver la Figura 7.5.3.1 en anexo).

Además del potencial urbanizable propiciado por la inversión en transporte, los aumentos en el valor del suelo también son relevantes para las finanzas municipales y la financiación de proyectos específicos. El éxito de instrumentos locales como la financiación mediante incrementos impositivos (Tax Increment Financing, o TIF) y la recuperación de plusvalías depende del valor del suelo y de los cambios de urbanización asociados al proyecto.

EL SISTEMA TRANSMILENIO DE BOGOTÁ

Bogotá, la capital de Colombia, tiene aproximadamente 6,8 millones de habitantes que ocupan aproximadamente 29.000 hectáreas de suelo urbanizado (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 2003). Antes de TransMilenio, todo el transporte público de Bogotá lo proporcionaban choferes de autobús privados organizados en empresas o asociaciones, las cuales añadían o cancelaban servicios con poca supervisión por parte del gobierno. Los ingresos para los choferes del autobús estaban basados exclusivamente en las tarifas pagadas por los pasajeros, lo que provocaba una intensa competencia entre los conductores. Este marco operativo tuvo un costo social considerable, en congestión, calidad inadecuada y falta de seguridad (debido a la escasa inversión en mantenimiento de los vehículos). En 1999 los residentes experimentaban velocidades medias de desplazamiento en los autobuses de sólo 9 km/h durante el período de máxima actividad del día.

A finales de la década de 1990, preocupado por una oferta excesiva de capacidad del transporte, malas condiciones ambientales y de seguridad y velocidad decreciente de los autobuses, el gobierno municipal invirtió en una amplia red BRT, pero ésta cubría únicamente las zonas con alta demanda de transporte público. Las zonas de la ciudad donde no llegaba el BRT continuaron servidas por las asociaciones originales, y siguieron sufriendo el efecto medioambiental y de tiempo. La inversión en BRT, TransMilenio, formaba parte de una estrategia integrada más amplia para abordar los problemas de movilidad, reclamar los espacios públicos para los peatones y aumentar el acceso a zonas verdes.

TransMilenio se ha implementado en dos fases, con una tercera fase actualmente en proceso de diseño. La primera fase se planificó en 1998, se construyó en 1999–2000 y entró en funcionamiento en diciembre de 2000 en dos corredores. La segunda fase, que comenzó a funcionar a finales de 2003, añadió tres corredores más de forma paulatina. Todas las fases se han implementado a través de un exitoso acuerdo entre entidades públicas y privadas: el gobierno financia la infraestructura y supervisa las funciones de planificación a largo plazo, y las empresas privadas licitan la operación de conjuntos de rutas o zonas de influencia.

El sistema comprende una infraestructura especializada, que incluye carriles exclusivos para ofrecer una capacidad de alto servicio, estaciones de embarque cerradas y una flota racionalizada de autobuses articulados con sistema de cobro de tarifas en plataforma previo al embarque. Un servicio coordinado con rutas alimentadoras permite acceder a TransMilenio desde vecindarios alejados de la ruta del autobús. A noviembre de 2007, el sistema tenía 114 estaciones, operaba más de 1.000 autobuses y realizaba más de 1,4 millones viajes en sentido único por día a una velocidad media de 27 km/h.

Considerado como un excelente ejemplo de sistema BRT, el caso de Bogotá ilustra la transformación de corredores de transporte tradicionales afectados de una seria contaminación, problemas de seguridad y un entorno poco atractivo en un nuevo sistema que ofrece tiempos de desplazamiento considerablemente menores, menos ruido y menos emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero (Cain y col. 2006).

IMPACTO DE TRANSMILENIO SOBRE EL VALOR DEL SUELO

TransMilenio ha sido el centro de atención de al menos cuatro estudios que relacionan el valor del suelo con el sistema BRT (ver recuadro en anexo). Aunque la evidencia hasta la fecha sobre la relación entre TransMilenio y el valor de las propiedades inmobiliarias ha resultado útil, su capacidad para influir en las políticas sigue siendo limitada. Por ejemplo, estos estudios se basan en datos transversales, por lo que resulta imposible identificar si el sistema BRT produjo el cambio en el valor del suelo, o si los planificadores fijaron las estaciones en lugares que ya eran bien valorados por los residentes. Asimismo, a pesar del interés por parte de los gobernantes en ampliar los sistemas BRT establecidos y en buscar formas de financiarlos, ningún estudio ha examinado si estas ampliaciones traen beneficios a las propiedades que ya disfrutaban del servicio del BRT.

Utilizando los datos sobre los precios pedidos por las propiedades anteriores y posteriores al TransMilenio, examinamos si los precios cambiaron a medida que se ampliaba el sistema. Comprender en qué medida han cambiado los precios en Bogotá es particularmente importante dada la extensa experiencia del gobierno colombiano con los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías del suelo y el aumento del interés por encontrar nuevas fuentres de financiación para futuras ampliaciones del BRT (Furtado 2000).

Nuestros datos se tomaron de una muestra de propiedades en la zona metropolitana de Bogotá entre 2001 y 2006. La fase II de la ampliación del TransMilenio, abierta al público en diciembre de 2003, proporcionó el escenario del estudio. En el análisis utilizamos propiedades unifamiliares ubicadas en un radio de 1 km del sistema BRT que se beneficiaron de la ampliación del sistema de una o dos formas: obteniendo acceso local a TransMilenio gracias a la ampliación, u obteniendo acceso regional gracias al mayor alcance de la red, lo que denominamos “efecto de la red”.

Para medir los efectos de la red utilizamos propiedades que anteriormente sólo tenían acceso local a una estación de TransMilenio, pero que ahora se benefician del mayor alcance del sistema BRT. Por otro lado, las propiedades que no tenían acceso local a TransMilenio antes de diciembre de 2003, pero que también se beneficiaron de la ampliación, sirvieron para examinar los efectos del acceso local (ver Figura 7.5.3.2 en anexo).

Todas las propiedades susceptibles de verse afectadas por TransMilenio se consideran pertenecientes a zonas de intervención de acceso local o del efecto de la red. Sin embargo, puesto que los valores de las propiedades cambian de antes a después de la intervención por razones diferentes a los cambios producidos por TransMilenio, también incluimos propiedades dentro de una zona de control que no se benefició directamente de ninguna de las inversiones de TransMilenio, ni de otras inversiones en rutas para bicicleta o en parques importantes.

La estadística descriptiva simple tanto de ambas zonas de intervención como de la zona de control muestra que las propiedades dentro de la zona de efecto de la red eran más caras que las situadas en las otras dos zonas, tanto antes como después. Las propiedades de la zona de acceso local tenían precios similares a las de la zona de control, antes y después. Asimismo, los precios pedidos aumentaron en índices diferentes. Respecto de las propiedades dentro de la zona de efecto de la red, los precios aumentaron un 5,1 por ciento, en comparación con un 9,5 por ciento para las propiedades dentro de la zona de acceso local y un 7,7 por ciento para las situadas en la zona de control durante el mismo período. No obstante, estas diferencias pueden resultar engañosas, porque las propiedades ofrecidas en el mercado pueden haber sido diferentes antes y después de la intervención.

Por ejemplo, la zona de control tenía un índice considerable de usos industriales (22,7 por ciento) y terrenos vacantes (14,1 por ciento) comparada con las otras dos (zona de efecto de la red: 0,5 por ciento de uso industrial y 0,8 de terrenos vacantes; zona de acceso local: 13,7 por ciento de uso industrial y 7,0 por ciento de terrenos vacantes), aunque la densidad de población es similar. Las zonas de acceso local y de control tienen poco o ningún uso comercial, mientras que la zona de efecto de la red tiene una mezcla más homogénea de usos residenciales y comerciales. Por tanto, fue necesario un análisis de regresión para ayudar a aislar la variación de precio identificada de los efectos de la presión inflacionista, las diferencias en la oferta de vivienda o el efecto de la ampliación de TransMilenio sobre el precio de la vivienda. Nuestros modelos corrigieron además la correlación existente para las propiedades que están más juntas desde el punto de vista espacial, con respecto a las que están más distantes.

Cambios en el valor de las propiedades en las zonas con servicio BRT

Los hallazgos de nuestro modelo de regresión para la zona de efecto de la red con respecto a la zona de control mostraron una evidencia uniforme de que los precios en 2001 y 2002 eran similares entre la zona de intervención y la zona de control, sin que se produjera una apreciación. Sin embargo, detectamos una apreciación positiva uniforme en la zona de intervención desde el año 2003 en adelante, con respecto a la zona de control.

Los precios pedidos por las propiedades resultantes según las estimaciones se muestran en la Figura 7.5.3.3 (en anexo), creada mediante una simulación basada en coeficientes estimados y en su matriz de varianza-covarianza. Los valores representan una propiedad de entre 10 y 20 años de antigüedad, con todas las demás variables establecidas en sus valores medianos, variando el año de 2001 a 2006.

Las propiedades de la zona de intervención se apreciaron antes y en mayor grado que las propiedades de la zona de control. La Figura 7.5.3.4 (en anexo) muestra el cambio en los precios entre la zona de intervención y la zona de control en términos de porcentaje. El pico de precios de 2003 en la zona de intervención puede ser el resultado de la previsión de los propietarios ante la expectativa de apertura de la ampliación del sistema BRT, o de otros cambios en el submercado inmobiliario que nuestras variables no tuvieron en cuenta. Aunque se han documentado efectos similares de previsión de extensión de transporte masivo en otros lugares (Knaap, Ding y Hopkins 2001), no se ha examinado ni documentado ninguno de ellos para los efectos de la red que crean dichas ampliaciones.

Cambios en el valor de las propiedades en las zonas sin servicio del BRT

Los hallazgos de nuestro modelo de regresión para la zona de acceso local con respecto a la zona de control arrojaron una evidencia mixta de aumento de los precios en zonas que anteriormente no estaban servidas por el sistema BRT. En algunos casos (dependiendo del modelo especificado) los precios en la zona de intervención eran superiores a los de la zona de control para las propiedades ofertadas en 2001, 2003, 2004 y 2006. Otros modelos mostraron relaciones menos consistentes. Una prueba de los coeficientes correspondientes al período anterior y del coeficiente del período posterior no muestra una diferencia simultánea en los precios de las propiedades.

EL RESULTADO NETO: TRANSMILENIO Y LOS VALORES DE LAS PROPIEDADES

En general nuestros resultados dibujan un panorama mixto de apreciación como consecuencia de las ampliaciones del BRT. Por un lado, la evidencia sugiere la apreciación de las propiedades que ya estaban servidas por el BRT, puesto que también se beneficiaron de las ampliaciones. La plusvalía estimada del precio pedido por las propiedades se sitúa entre el 15 y el 20 por ciento, aunque la apreciación comenzó un año antes de inaugurarse la ampliación. Esto resulta significativo, dado que sabemos poco acerca de la magnitud potencial de estos efectos. En contraste, encontramos poca evidencia de aumento de los precios de las propiedades situadas a lo largo del corredor que anteriormente no tenía una estación local de BRT, pero que ahora recibe servicio gracias a la ampliación.

No podemos afirmar sin lugar a equívocos que los aumentos de precio fueron el resultado de la ampliación del BRT, porque podrían deberse a variaciones en el submercado inmobiliario local. Por ejemplo, la ciudad de Bogotá resurgió de una profunda recesión que terminó a principios de 2000. Si los efectos de la recesión no fueron uniformes en todos los vecindarios, es posible que eso explique el diferencial encontrado. Además, es posible que las propiedades que ya disfrutaban del servicio del BRT simplemente estaban capitalizando los beneficios de la inversión original realizada apenas cuatro años antes.

Otras explicaciones posibles de los resultados que quizá interesen a los planificadores que estén considerando hacer inversiones en BRT incluyen la cronología de los efectos. La capitalización de los beneficios de las ampliaciones del BRT puede tardar tiempo en materializarse. Nuestro análisis cubre solamente hasta tres años después de la inauguración de la ampliación, pero el impacto de los proyectos de transporte tiende a tardar más tiempo. Una explicación relacionada es que las propiedades también se aprecian ante la expectativa de la inversión en transporte, más que cuando se inauguran las ampliaciones.

También es posible que los efectos difieran en los vecindarios de cada zona estudiada. Aunque utilizamos propiedades en un radio de 1 km de una estación de BRT (la zona de influencia identificada por los planificadores locales en sus estudios de viabilidad de TransMilenio), es posible que los precios aumentaran, pero sólo para un subconjunto de propiedades (por ejemplo, las más próximas a una estación). Por último, es probable que el efecto sobre el valor del suelo derivado de la inversión pública en transporte sea diferente para las propiedades comerciales, las viviendas unifamiliares y las multifamiliares. Se han detectado aumentos en el precio de los espacios comerciales en otras ciudades (Cervero y Susantono 1999; Cervero y Duncan 2002).

No existe una forma sencilla de examinar sin ambigüedades los efectos sobre el valor del suelo derivados de la inversión pública en transporte. En este estudio, hemos intentado profundizar en el tema sobre la base de otros estudios y superar sus limitaciones. Nuestras conclusiones revelan una cierta promesa para la financiación de infraestructura a través de las plusvalías que puede crear. Pero perduran ciertas ambigüedades y advertencias que no son fáciles de resolver. Mientras tanto, los encargados de tomar decisiones seguirán explorando soluciones para las opciones de transporte masivo y las formas de financiarlas, y el sistema BRT contribuirá a abordar la acuciante necesidad de movilidad en las ciudades de todo el mundo.

Referencias

Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. 2008. Población por localidad. Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá 2003. http://www.bogota.gov.co/galeria/cifraspoblaciondelocalidades1973a2003.pdf

Cain, A., G. Darido, M. R. Baltes, P. Rodríguez, and J. C. Barriors. 2006. Applicability of Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT system to the United States. Tampa, FL: National Bus Rapid Transit Institute.

Cervero, R., and M. Duncan. 2002. Transit’s value-added: Effects of light and commuter rail services on commercial land values. Transportation Research Record 1805:8–15.

Cervero, R., and B. Susantono. 1999. Rent capitalization and transportation infrastructure in Jakarta. Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies 11 (1):11–23.

Furtado, F. 2000. Colombia: Economic aspects of the country’s land use. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 59 (5):97–110.

Knaap, G. J., C. R. Ding, and L. D. Hopkins. 2001. Do plans matter? The effects of light rail plans on land values in station areas. Journal of Planning Education and Research 21 (1):32–39.

Mendieta, J. C., and J. A. Perdomo. 2007. Especificación y estimación de un modelo de precios hedónico espacial para evaluar el impacto de Transmilenio sobre el valor de la propiedad en Bogotá. Bogotá, Colombia: CEDE.

Munoz-Raskin, R. 2006. Walking accessibility to bus rapid transit in Latin America: Does it affect property values? The case of Bogotá, Colombia. In TRB 86th Annual Meeting Compendium of Papers CD-ROM.

Perdomo, J. A., J. C. Mendieta, C. A. Mendoza, and A. F. Baquero. 2007. Investigación sobre el impacto del proyecto de transporte masivo Transmilenio sobre el valor de las propiedades en Bogotá, Colombia. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Rodríguez, D.A., and C. Mojica. 2008. Capitalization of BRT network effects into land prices. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Rodriguez, D. A., and F. Targa. 2004. Value of accessibility to Bogotá’s bus rapid transit system. Transport Reviews 24 (5):587–610.

U.S. General Accounting Office. 2001. Bus rapid transit shows promise. Washington, DC: General Accounting Office.

Wright, L., and W. Hook. 2007. Bus rapid transit planning guide. New York: Institute for Transportation and Development Policy.

An architect who specializes in urban and regional planning, Eduardo Reese is the deputy administrator of the Institute for Housing of the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. In previous professional positions he provided technical advice for the master plans of more than 20 cities in Argentina; was secretary of socioeconomic policies at the Ministry of Human Development and Labor of the Province of Buenos Aires; adviser for the Urban Planning Counsel of the City of Buenos Aires; and planning secretary in the City of Avellaneda.

Reese also teaches at the Conurbano Institute at the National University General Sarmiento in Buenos Aires. Currently he is a professor of urban management in the Institute’s B.A. program in urbanism. He also teaches urban development at master’s programs at the School of Architecture, Urbanism and Design of the University of La Plata, as well as at universities in Mar del Plata and Córdoba. In addition, he directs the master planning of the Matanza-Riachuelo watershed in Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: How long have you been involved with the Institute’s Latin America Program?

Eduardo Reese: My relationship dates back to 1997 when we were drafting the plan for the City of Córdoba, which included several large-scale urban projects. We worked to expand the debate about the impacts of these projects on the land market and, consequently, on shaping the city. I continued to participate in various activities, and four years ago I took over the coordination of the annual lectures of the Land Management in Large Urban Projects series, following the death of Mario Lungo, who had led that program for many years.

In 2004, in conjunction with the Conurbano Institute of the National University of General Sarmiento, we conducted a course on Land Markets: Theory and Tools for Policy Management, which was the first one involving a seven-month training program for 50 Argentine students. That educational experience helped create a critical mass of technicians and professionals with an innovative vision toward the management of land policies. The program’s impact has been reflected in urban policy decisions in different municipalities (such as San Fernando and Morón in Greater Buenos Aires); in the Argentine Constitution; in the Urban Reform Movement in 2005; and in academic changes at the Conurbano Institute itself.

Land Lines: What role can large urban projects play in the quality of life of Latin American cities?

Eduardo Reese: Large-scale projects in defined sectors of the city (both central and peripheral areas) have been great protagonists of contemporary urbanism in the past quarter century. Today in Latin America there are many types and sizes of projects, even though more rigorous theoretical thinking is still needed. Important examples are the Bicentennial Portal (Portal del Bicentenario) projects in Santiago de Chile; the Integral Urban Projects (Proyectos Urbanos Integrales) in Medellín, Colombia; urban operations in different cities of Brazil; and the restructuring project in the northwestern sector of San Fernando (Argentina).

Large-scale urban operations as instruments of intervention in the city have been implemented for many decades. In Buenos Aires, for instance, the Avenida de Mayo and the Diagonals, which were planned around 1880, had important impacts on physical space as well as in social, economic, and symbolic aspects. This approach of multiple impacts undoubtedly allowed better assimilation of the Avenida de Mayo, but it also generated a huge debate over who should finance the operation and who would appropriate the land rents generated. Ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that the municipality could not finance the work with the surplus created because the rents belonged entirely to the landowners. For many years this case set a judicial precedent regarding the state’s intervention in the process of valuing land generated by a large-scale public project.

Land Lines: You have a critical view on the widely acclaimed Puerto Madero urban regeneration project in Buenos Aires. What would you do differently in other large redevelopment areas?

Eduardo Reese: Puerto Madero is emblematic of urban projects that promote a model of segregated urban planning and are now being “exported” to other countries as a basic tool to compete for international investment. In this project the state submitted to the market and allowed the construction of an exclusive neighborhood for very high-income sectors. It is a notorious example of public policy explicitly designed to favor the wealthy segments without any recovery of the huge land valuations that were the product of public policy.

Moreover, to guarantee investors an overvaluation of the properties they purchased, the venture has a number of features that cut it off (physically and socially) from the rest of the city, creating even greater value because of its segregation. Puerto Madero has no external wall, as gated condominiums have, but rather multiple implicit, explicit, and symbolic signals that clearly indicate this place is off limits to most of society.

• It is the only neighborhood managed by a state corporation that for 19 years has paid the salaries of public servants and managers to build and maintain a few square meters of park accessible only to that wealthy neighborhood.
• The project has a highly designed urban landscape that contrasts sharply with the brutal poverty in the rest of the city. The parks and amenities are on land already privatized to ensure that the investments, although made using public funds, benefit only the elite owners of the housing and office high-rise buildings nearby.
• A sophisticated system of cameras and security forces defines and controls access to the overprotected zone.
• All these mechanisms serve to ensure the overvaluation of the properties so that only upper social classes can afford to purchase them.

In the end, Puerto Madero is a clear demonstration of the regressive distribution of urban planning and public policy: a trouble-free ghetto for the rich.

Land Lines: As municipalities continue to compete for outside investments, is it possible to reconcile alternative objectives such as social and environmental priorities?

Eduardo Reese: The problem in our cities is not the lack of planning, but the current exclusionary pattern of planning policies. There cannot be one law for the formal city and exceptions for the rest. It is necessary to create a new urban and legal order in Latin America based on the right to the city, the equitable sharing of the benefits of urbanization, and the social function of land ownership.

Land Lines: How does the municipality of San Fernando in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area offers an alternative to this approach?

Eduardo Reese: San Fernando is located some 30 kilometers (km) north of Buenos Aires, with a land area of 23 square km and a population of 156,000 inhabitants. A 5 km long riverside faces the Río Luján and another part of the city faces the mouth of Río de la Plata, where productive nautical activities are concentrated. This privileged location has high property values and all urban services.

The plan and model of urban land management in the city began in 2003 through an agreement between the municipality and the Conurbano Institute. In 2005, a Lincoln Institute training seminar helped broaden the local debate on land management, which led to a series of major decisions:

• to generate sustainable resources to redirect urban development;
• to recover the culture of public works financed by a tax for improvements;
• to recover land for social housing, urban facilities, and road networks;
• to strengthen the city and municipal administration as innovative actors in implementing public policies; and
• to limit the overvaluation of land by intervening in the market through mechanisms such as new urban planning legislation, instruments to collect the surplus, and a large supply of land for the poor.

The urban policy focused on a set of action strategies including (1) ensuring accessibility to new public spaces for recreational, sports and commercial purposes on the riverside, especially for the use and enjoyment of the poor; and (2) the comprehensive regularization of the western sector of the municipality, where most poverty is concentrated.

To implement these strategies it was necessary to increase fiscal resources for public investment in two ways: appropriation of the profitability of land use or municipal land on the riverside through the creation of the Consortium San Fernando Marina Park Company (PNSFSA) and participation of the municipality in the surplus generated from municipal tax reform. (PNSFSA is a company created by the municipality of San Fernando to manage the riverside of the northwest sector of the city, defined as Marina Park.)

The experience of San Fernando is based on a set of management tools within an urban plan focused on the redistribution of income to build a more equitable city. Land is considered a key asset within a wider strategy of local development and, therefore, management relies on a broad mix of planning, administrative, economic, fiscal, and legal instruments aimed at strengthening the role of the public sector. The core axis of policies is the search for equity in the distribution of the costs and benefits of urbanization, within the challenging context of growing pressure on land throughout metropolitan Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: What could or should be changed in the educational system that trains urban planners and managers in Latin America?

Eduardo Reese: First, it is necessary to incorporate a greater understanding of the functioning of land markets in the present context of developing and shaping cities. Second, a more critical analysis is needed of adequate theoretical, methodological and technical instruments to undertake diagnosis and intervention in urban land issues. The 2004 course on Land Markets that I described earlier attempted to develop these kinds of materials to enable students to cover the different scales and dimensions of the problem.

Land Lines: What tensions exist between private and public interests in urban planning?

Eduardo Reese: This is a critical question because the whole history of urban land management has had a common thread: the rights of private ownership of land and the structure of ownership have always come into conflict with urban planning activity, which is a public responsibility. In that sense, there will always be tension between public and private interests in building the city.

In my view, urban projects in Latin America have the responsibility to contribute not only to the creation of new spaces for public use and enjoyment, employment generation and environmental sustainability, but also social inclusion, equity in the access to services and the redistribution of urban rents generated by the project. The four cases on Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina mentioned earlier show that these benefits are possible in many contexts.

However, instead many urban projects have been justified as necessary to attract investment and/or consumers and to ensure or reinforce the dynamic competitive advantages of the city. These undoubtedly positive goals are sometimes used as a mechanism to legitimize interventions that deepen the serious sociospatial segregation of cities. Such adverse effects of the market are not fatal to the city, but are the outcome of perverse political choices.

Many countries in Latin America have passed legislation that supports value capture policies as a way to recoup some or all the unearned increase in private land values resulting from public regulations or investments. Thus far, however, only a few jurisdictions in certain countries have applied this potentially powerful financing tool systematically and successfully.

In 2011 and 2012 the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy surveyed public officials and academics in the region to discover why value capture has not been used more often. The 2012 questionnaire was designed to elicit respondents’ views about the prospects for designing, institutionalizing, and implementing two emblematic value capture instruments–betterment contributions and the sale of building rights.

Betterment contributions (known as special assessments in the United States) are charges imposed on owners of selected properties to defray the cost of a public improvement or service from which they specifically benefit (Borrero 2011; Borrero et al. 2011). Under the sale of building rights, in contrast, the government charges for special rights that it grants, such as allowing a higher floor-to-area ratio (FAR), a zoning change (e.g., from residential to commercial), or conversion of land from rural to urban use (Sandroni 2011).

The results of both surveys challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the use of value capture policies in Latin America. In particular, respondents with actual experience in using these tools consider legal and technical difficulties less of an obstacle to implementation than the lack of understanding among key government executives about their potential payback. Moreover, value capture is still viewed primarily as a tool to promote equity in cities rather than as a way to improve municipal fiscal autonomy.

Survey Distribution

Launched in the spring of 2011, the first survey was distributed to 436 public officials and academics who had participated in one or more of the Lincoln Institute’s previously offered courses and workshops on value capture issues. A second questionnaire with a different set of questions was sent by email in February 2012 to 14,355 people affiliated with the Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Respondents (134 and 1,066 respectively) included officials at all levels of government, city planners, academics, independent scholars and consultants, and members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

When classified by country, responses to individual choices for many questions numbered fewer than ten. For this reason and to simplify the presentation, the analysis combines the responses from countries with similar sociopolitical characteristics in terms of value capture into three groups.

1. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. All five countries have some national legislation on value capture and are currently run by governments sympathetic to value capture policies. Uruguay in 2008 (Law No. 18.308 of 18.VI.2008) and Ecuador in 2010 (with its new national code, COOTAD ) approved national legislation enhancing the scope of government prerogatives with regard to land value increments.

2. Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru. These fast-growing, mature countries are still struggling to introduce more explicit national legislation on value capture, in addition to imposing betterment levies.

3. Central America and the Dominican Republic. Countries in this region comprise a single group because they are relatively small and have liberal urban development regimes.

Brazil and Colombia are presented separately because they make up a significant share of survey respondents, and they have the most experience with value capture tools. The number of respondents generally follows the size of the population of the country group, except for Brazil and Colombia, which account for disproportionately large numbers of respondents (table 1).

The Pragmatic Character of Value Capture

Even though only a few countries explicitly prescribe value capture in their legislation, the smaller 2011 survey revealed detailed information about jurisdictions that had recovered some land value increment resulting from changes in land use. Of 13 countries covered in that survey, respondents cited 22 cases of value capture in 30 jurisdictions in 8 countries. In general, these cases involved some kind of benefit exactions for the community achieved through direct negotiation between developers and public authorities.

On average, though, the value extracted was less than one-third of the estimated land value increment. The likelihood of the contribution exceeding one-third of the total value was higher when the contribution was made in cash rather than in kind. These cases occurred in countries without explicit legislation on the sale of building rights, such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru, illustrating the pragmatic approach to value capture on the part of officials in charge of urban land management.

Overall, survey respondents consider themselves familiar with the topic, and the findings of the 2012 survey reinforce the point that awareness of value capture instruments is not limited to countries that have institutionalized the practice. Relatively few respondents claimed to be unfamiliar with value capture instruments, although the real number of officials may be larger, given the self-selection bias of the survey respondents (table 2). The share of respondents unfamiliar with value capture instruments in Brazil and Colombia is about half the share of respondents from other countries.

The Implementation Challenge

One of the common arguments raised about the chances of applying value capture policies in Latin America relates to the technical difficulty of implementation–specifically, assessing the land value increment resulting from public interventions. To probe the importance of this issue, the 2012 survey asked whether respondents consider a 30-percent margin of error in valuation acceptable enough to justify application of value capture. The overwhelming majority of respondents (89 percent) stated that, regardless of the margin of error, value capture policies should be applied. Only 11 percent argued to the contrary.

The main reason cited for supporting value capture is again a pragmatic one. Similar margins of error occur in other contexts, such as valuation for property taxation purposes (36.9 percent). A close second is the “need to establish the principle” (31.8 percent). The fact that value capture instruments are contemplated in the legislation places third (21.4 percent). As expected, respondents from Brazil and Colombia rank the legal reason for applying value capture as more important (27 percent and 31.6 percent, respectively) than respondents in other countries (15.2 percent on average).

It is notable that 41.8 percent of respondents in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—countries still striving to pass national legislation on value capture—ranked “need to establish the principle” higher than other respondents. In contrast, Colombian respondents ranked this reason third. Reasons given by respondents from the other country groups are not significantly different from the sample average (31.8 percent). Among the 11 percent of respondents opposed to value capture policies, legal and legitimacy arguments prevail over pragmatic ones (illegitimacy of policy or administrative and judicial costs).

The Known versus the Unknown

Laws throughout Latin America support betterment contributions, and local governments frequently count on revenues from that source in their budgets. However, these revenues are generally modest and rarely account for more than 1 percent of local own-revenues in most places except in Colombia and to a lesser degree in certain cities with experience using this instrument, such as Cuenca, Ecuador, and San Pedro Sula, Honduras, and in a few Brazilian jurisdictions in the State of Paraná. The sale of building rights, in contrast, is still being established as a value capture tool and is legislated in only a few countries.

Survey respondents were also asked about their preference between betterment contributions (the familiar value capture tool that performs poorly) and the sale of building rights (the newer instrument with stronger revenue-generating potential). Across all countries the results show greater support for betterment contributions: 59 percent versus 41 percent.

Even among respondents from Brazil, the only country where preference for the sale of building rights was significantly above average (48.9 percent), betterment contributions still rank as the preferred value capture instrument (51.1 percent). This is remarkable in light of São Paulo’s success in generating considerable revenue from selling building rights. For example, the April 2012 auction of Certificates of Additional Construction Potential (CEPACs) in São Paulo added US$420 million to public coffers, on top of about US$2.5 billion from previous auctions (São Paulo Stock Exchange 2012).

The survey evidence suggests that most respondents are not fully aware of the difference in the revenue potential of these two value capture tools. In fact, only 10 percent of respondents cite revenue potential as the main reason to prefer one over the other. Proponents of value capture give top priority to promoting equity rather than to generating revenue–another surprising finding given the potential of value capture to strengthen municipal autonomy.

When asked how they would characterize the arguments for value capture, respondents in the 2011 survey could choose from 50 terms related to land policy attributes. The eight terms that received the most responses (49.7 percent of the total) were associated with equity issues such as charges and benefits, redistribution, social function of property, anti-speculation, equity, and social justice. The one exception was a financial term, which ranked fourth.

In contrast, terms such as fiscal autonomy, fiscal harmony, decentralization, tax, self-sufficiency, financing, and additional resources received only 18.7 percent of the votes, while terms related to the functioning of urban markets, such as efficiency and market discipline, received just 11 percent. Arguments against value capture were associated with such terms as tax, fiscal burden, acquired rights, and double taxation, as well as abuse, violation of rights, and illegitimacy.

Respondents to both the 2011 and 2012 surveys cited ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy as the primary reason for preferring one value capture tool over the other. Indeed, the 59 percent of respondents favoring betterment contributions over the sale of building rights mention ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy as the most important reason for their choice. The 41 percent of respondents favoring sales of building rights gave the same reasons for their preference. At the same time, 24.4 percent of respondents favoring the sale of building rights consider the capacity to generate revenues the second most important reason for choosing that instrument, but only 17.6 percent of respondents favoring betterment contributions share the same opinion.

All in all, this suggests that officials in Latin America often tolerate a wide gap between the equity-legitimacy principle and revenue generation, based on a perception of greater technical ease in charging betterment contributions. From another perspective, it appears that they favor the quicker path to the moral high ground rather than one leading to higher local revenues.

Experience Matters

After ethical and sociopolitical legitimacy, the next most important reason for preferring a particular value capture instrument varies according to the respondent’s level of experience. Strong confirmation of the importance of implementation experience comes from the two countries that have applied the tools: Colombians favor betterment contributions, and Brazilians prefer the sale of building rights.

Colombia has long experience with betterment contributions, which may explain why 16 percent of respondents from that country cite technical ease of implementation as the reason to choose that approach. By comparison, only 7.9 percent of respondents in other countries mention that reason. Meanwhile, 12.6 percent of respondents in Brazil favor the sale of building rights due to ease of implementation, compared with just 5 percent of respondents from other countries. These results underscore how much experience shapes opinions about the technical constraints involved in applying value capture tools.

Obstacles to Implementation

Respondents to the 2012 survey attribute the reluctance of public officials to apply value capture policies primarily to lack of information (23.2 percent) and political risk (22.5 percent). Other explanations include complicity with landowners’ interests (18.4 percent) and technical difficulties in implementation (15.4 percent). Few consider lack of legislation as an important reason for not using value capture instruments (1.5 percent), with ideological motives (3.2 percent) and administrative costs (3.8 percent) ranking somewhat higher.

Pragmatic reasons are important only among respondents from countries lacking significant experience with such tools. While 13 percent of respondents from Brazil and Colombia mention technical implementation difficulties as the primary obstacle, 31 percent of respondents from other countries cite that reason on average. This reinforces the finding that experience with value capture tools counts. Brazilians explain why value capture instruments are not used in terms of land interests and political risk, which together account for 59 percent of responses. Among Colombians, 26 percent see no reason not to use value capture instruments. This is a much higher share than among respondents from other countries (7.2 percent on average), indicating a perception in Colombia that the tools are getting the attention they deserve.

Targeting Key Stakeholders

The 2012 survey asked respondents to select which stakeholders involved in the debate should be the primary targets of capacity building in order to overcome resistance to value capture policy. High on the list are heads of the executive branches of government, such as mayors and directors, followed by members of the legislature, including members of congress and city councilors (table 3). Planners–who are frequently on the front line of policy operations–rank third.

Surprisingly, only 6.2 percent of respondents cite members of the judiciary (judges, lawyers, and public attorneys), even though the courts often block value capture initiatives. Brazilian respondents are the only ones to assign a higher importance to members of the judiciary. Consistent with the institutional advances their countries have made in value capture, respondents from both Brazil and Colombia give lower priority to legislators (20.7 percent) than respondents from other countries (32.3 percent on average).

Respondents from all occupation groups rank academics and journalists last. As a result, the strategy of training the trainers would seem counterproductive as long as academics are not considered critical stakeholders in reducing resistance to value capture policies. This result supports the Lincoln Institute’s program focus on building capacity of public officials directly involved in the policy debate or tool implementation, rather than on building capacity in graduate schools. The low priority given to journalists as a target for capacity building is puzzling, but may reflect the fact that the value capture discussion is still largely confined to public agencies and academia. Nevertheless, greater involvement of the media could have a positive influence in broadening the debate.

One other interesting result of the survey is that responses across various groups are relatively consistent. Occupation, institutional affiliation, place of employment, level of education, and even size of the respondent’s city make little difference. Indeed, only the distinction between respondents from countries with and without significant experience with value capture seems to stand out as important.

Conclusions

The survey results point to a relatively consistent understanding about the state of the debate and implementation of value capture across Latin America. The prospects for successfully implementing value capture policies in the region, however, are less clear. The social justice rhetoric still seems to prevail even among “informed” supporters. In addition, decision makers in critical executive positions are seen as ill-informed or lacking in political will. Moreover, as the experiences of Brazil and Colombia attest, institutionalizing value capture policies is a process of painstaking trial and error that takes time to succeed.

Three lessons follow from the work done by the Lincoln Institute on value capture in Latin America. First, land value increments are captured more successfully from specific actors who receive greater benefits from a public sector intervention than from the general community (the win-win condition). Second, value capture tools are more likely to succeed when conceived to address a locally recognized problem than to emulate alleged best practices.

Third, strengthening the legitimacy of value capture policies is essential. This can be achieved by publicizing successful projects, especially in countries where value capture initiatives are still isolated and sporadic. It is important to shift the debate on value capture from ideological, wishful-thinking rhetoric to a more technical and practical context grounded in evidence that it can be done and, most importantly, that it has been implemented effectively in many cases.

About the Author

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. He has been researching policies and experiences with value capture for many years.

References

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar. 2011. Betterment levy in Colombia: Relevance, procedures, and social acceptability. Land Lines 23(2): 14-19.

Borrero Ochoa, Oscar, Esperanza Durán, Jorge Hernández, and Magda Montaña. 2011. Evaluating the practice of betterment levies in Colombia: The experience of Bogotá and Manizales. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Sandroni, Paulo Henrique. 2011. Recent experience with land value capture in São Paulo, Brazil. Land Lines 23(3): 14-19.

São Paulo Stock Exchange. 2012. http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/mercados/download/Agua-Suplemento-27012012.pdf

Por cada nota periodística sobre turismo que muestra el paraíso caribeño de Barbados, con sus aguas tranquilas besando las playas de fina arena, hay también una noticia inquietante sobre un huracán en ciernes. Las Antillas Menores, un archipiélago de islas pequeñas que forman una media luna en el este del Mar Caribe, han sido siempre particularmente vulnerables, inmersas en las volubles aguas del Océano Atlántico. En 1776, el huracán Pointe-à-Pitre azotó la colonia francesa de Guadalupe y mató a 6.000 personas, resultando ser la tormenta atlántica más mortífera de la historia hasta ese momento. Cuatro años más tarde, el Gran Huracán de 1780 golpeó con más fuerza aún, tocando tierra en Barbados y después haciendo estragos en las islas vecinas, matando a casi 20.000 personas y destruyendo las flotas de Gran Bretaña y Francia en el punto álgido de la Revolución Norteamericana. Dos siglos y docenas de tormentas más tarde, el Huracán Iván, si bien no tan mortífero, devastó Granada en 2004, dejando su parlamento en ruinas y dañando el 85 por ciento de las estructuras de la isla.

En décadas recientes, los cambios climáticos han intensificado las amenazas para la región. Las estrategias empleadas en los EE.UU. cuando el Huracán Katrina o la Supertormenta Sandy no son particularmente relevantes para estas islas frágiles pero dinámicas de las Antillas Menores, desde Puerto Rico en el norte a Trinidad y Tobago en el sur. Con economías dependientes del turismo y una cantidad extremadamente limitada de suelos desarrollables, particularmente en las islas montañosas, este popurrí de países independientes, territorios dependientes y colonias extranjeras comparte un desafío común en el uso de su suelo: cómo manejar los patrones de desarrollo inmobiliario orientados a la costa y al mismo tiempo controlar la amenaza creciente del ascenso del nivel del mar.

Hay una isla en la región que sobresale por su capacidad excepcional para reconocer y prepararse para la crecida de la marea: Barbados, una isla con forma de pera, se ha convertido en un líder del Caribe en gestión integrada de la zona costera, la práctica contemporánea de integración de sectores, niveles de gobierno y disciplinas para administrar la zona costera, tanto en el agua como en tierra firme. El uso de suelos costeros y la gestión medioambiental son siempre temas contenciosos en una pequeña isla. Pero, como señaló una vez el exSecretario General de la ONU, Kofi Annan, en analogía con el boxeo: “Barbados golpea con mucha más fuerza de lo que corresponde a su peso”. A casi 50 años de su independencia, este país isleño ha utilizado una combinación de previsión, respaldo internacional y capacidad local para desarrollar instituciones de planificación y prepararse para un futuro incierto.

Del azúcar a los amantes del sol

Hoy en día, Barbados es famoso como destino turístico internacional de alto nivel, con sus playas de característica arena blanca, agua cálida de color aguamarina y sol abundante a lo largo de sus 100 kilómetros de costa. Casi 300.000 personas viven en esta isla de 430 kilómetros cuadrados; el 44 por ciento de la población vive en zonas urbanas, centradas en Bridgetown, y a lo largo de las costas desarrolladas del sur y el oeste. Con un PIB per cápita de US$23.600 y alfabetismo casi universal, Barbados está en el puesto 38 del mundo, y primero del Caribe, según el Índice de Desarrollo Humano de 2013 del Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas. Sobre la base de su arena y oleaje, el 80 por ciento de US$4.400 millones de PIB de Barbados proviene del turismo y las industrias de servicios.

Pero esta evolución ha sido reciente, y forma parte de un patrón similar de desarrollo en todo el Caribe, consecuencia de los movimientos independentistas y la llegada de la aviación comercial. Originalmente habitada por una población nativa amerindia, por primera vez en 1627 se asentaron en Barbados los ingleses, quienes rápidamente la convirtieron en uno de los productores principales de azúcar del mundo. La historia colonial de Barbados es inusual para la región; a diferencia de muchas otras islas del Caribe, colonizadas por múltiples potencias europeas, Barbados permaneció bajo bandera británica hasta su independencia en 1966, adoptando el seudónimo de “Pequeña Inglaterra”.

La economía colonial fue un modelo clásico de comercio para enriquecer a la metrópolis. Los ingleses importaron esclavos africanos para trabajar en las plantaciones de caña de azúcar, refinerías de melaza y destilerías de ron. Como resultado, el 90 por ciento de la población actual de Barbados es de ascendencia africana. Después de la independencia, la cosecha de azúcar, ya empobrecida, que sufría las fluctuaciones comunes de todo monocultivo, se hizo aún menos confiable a medida que la presión para liberalizar el comercio llevó al Reino Unido y más tarde a la Unión Europea a ir reduciendo lentamente los subsidios y precios preferenciales.

Al mismo tiempo, Barbados invirtió con fuerza en sus servicios de turismo, lo cual modificó el foco de su desarrollo. Históricamente, la isla fue en su mayor parte rural, con plantaciones de caña de azúcar en el interior del país, que también era el lugar donde vivían los esclavos y más adelante los aparceros itinerantes que cargaban con casas móviles de madera tipo “chattel”, la arquitectura vernácula de Barbados. En la costa se encuentra Bridgetown, el puerto principal, donde un río navegable desemboca en el mar, y otros pueblos más pequeños y villas de pescadores. Un puerto de aguas profundas excavado en 1961 también sentó las bases para la llegada de cruceros. El número creciente de turistas necesitaba de hoteles, balnearios, restaurantes, tiendas y bares, todos a escasos metros del mar. Este impulso llevó al desarrollo de franjas costeras, entre el aeropuerto y Bridgetown, en la costa sur y a lo largo de la costa oeste, donde las aguas son más calmas y se encuentran los encantadores poblados de Holetown y Speightstown. Para la década de 1990, el Aeropuerto Internacional Grantley Adams de Barbados recibía vuelos regulares de British Airways desde Londres en uno de los pocos jets Concorde supersónicos existentes.

La respuesta local a la crecida de las aguas

Ubicada un poco al este del arco principal de las otras islas del este del Caribe, fuera del cinturón de huracanes del Atlántico, Barbados tiene una ventaja meteorológica. Si bien sigue siendo susceptible a grandes tormentas, experimenta muchos menos huracanes que sus vecinos del noroeste. Sin embargo, cualquier amenaza a las playas y corales que rodean Barbados podría tener consecuencias devastadoras, dada la dependencia económica de la isla de su costa. Su bienestar se ve amenazado por el lento aumento del nivel del mar, asociado a las posibles mareas tormentosas si la isla sufriera incluso sólo tangencialmente un huracán importante. El Grupo Intergubernamental de Expertos sobre el Cambio Climático (IPCC) tiene pruebas concluyentes de que tras un período de varios siglos con casi ningún cambio, se ha producido un aumento en el nivel mundial del mar en el siglo XX, y que esta tendencia se está acelerando en el siglo XXI. En agosto, el IPCC dijo que los niveles del mar podrían crecer más de un metro para el año 2100.

Los pequeños países-isla, que nunca han contribuido significativamente a las emisiones de carbono, sufren un impacto desproporcionado debido al cambio climático mundial producido por la industrialización moderna en el resto del mundo. Los cambios en los patrones climáticos han producido una gran cantidad de tormentas importantes, un aumento de las temperaturas mundiales, y el derretimiento de los hielos polares, contribuyendo al aumento en el nivel del mar. Mientras que los países industrializados más grandes, como los Estados Unidos, China y los países de Europa Occidental, también han sido afectados por el aumento en el nivel del mar, la proporción vulnerable de estos países es minúscula en comparación con las áreas susceptibles de Barbados. La incapacidad del mundo desarrollado para comprender el impacto y las consecuencias de su comportamiento, como lo demuestra la inacción política en temas como los acuerdos de intercambio de créditos de carbono (cap-and-trade), ha forzado a los países en vías de desarrollo a actuar ahora o confrontar un futuro lleno de peligros.

Paradójicamente, el historial imperial de Barbados —con frecuencia una carga en los países poscoloniales— ha sido una ventaja, ya que la isla tiene una historia prolongada e ininterrumpida de planificación urbana y rural al estilo británico. Como el Reino Unido, Barbados está dividida administrativamente en parroquias, y las leyes modernas de desarrollo se basan en la Ley de Planificación Urbana y Rural (Town and Country Planning Act) de Gran Bretaña de 1947. Cuando declaró su independencia, Barbados estableció su propio plan maestro con la Orden de Desarrollo de Planificación Urbana y Rural de 1972. En la actualidad, toda la construcción en la isla es supervisada por la Oficina de Planificación de Desarrollo Urbano y Rural (Town and Country Development Planning Office, o TCDPO), y el jefe de planificación urbana reporta directamente al primer ministro.

El desarrollo inmobiliario de la isla está guiado por el Plan de Desarrollo Físico de 1988. Desde la enmienda al documento de 2003, se ha producido un giro hacia el desarrollo sostenible, no solo como lema, sino como una visión integral del gobierno de la isla. En un discurso dado en una conferencia en 2008, el anterior primer ministro, David Thompson, reseñó algunas de las ideas centrales del plan: proteger los recursos naturales, agrícolas y culturales; promover los centros y corredores de uso mixto para alentar una economía diversificada, mantener el centro de Bridgetown como eje financiero y comercial; y estimular el turismo modernizando las viejas propiedades costeras y desarrollando nuevos emprendimientos. El primer ministro actual, Freundel Stuart, ha continuado con este empuje de sostenibilidad, tal como lo demuestra su participación en paneles de alto nivel en la Conferencia de Desarrollo Sostenible Rio+20 de las Naciones Unidas el año pasado.

Hacia finales de la década de 1970, los dueños de propiedades individuales comenzaron a notar que la erosión costera afectaba sus terrenos. Los medios de comunicación comenzaron a insistir en este tema, de forma concurrente con el impulso del turismo, que se estaba convirtiendo rápidamente en la fuente principal de reservas de divisas extranjeras. Motivado por esta erosión costera —pero también preocupado por eventos catastróficos como huracanes, terremotos, marejadas, erupciones volcánicas y derrames de petróleo— el gobierno de Barbados inició un estudio de diagnóstico de factibilidad en 1981, con financiamiento del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), como parte de su Programa de Conservación Costera. El estudio se centró en las costas oeste y sur, ya que estas áreas de la isla tenían el mayor potencial para la infraestructura turística. Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno estableció temporalmente una Unidad de Proyecto de Conservación Costera (Coastal Conservation Project Unit, o CCPU), que super-visó el estudio de factibilidad y llegó a una serie de conclusiones sobre las causas de la erosión costera y el daño a las propiedades de la costa. Por ejemplo, como la calidad del agua en el interior de Barbados era mala, su escurrimiento contaminaba el mar y dañaba los arrecifes de coral. Ciertos fenómenos naturales, como las marejadas provocadas por tormentas y los huracanes erráticos ocasionales, también causaban erosión. A su vez, las estructuras de defensa marina existentes habían sido diseñadas de forma deficiente. El estudio del BID sugirió que la CCPU siguiera vigilando las líneas de la costa, brindara asesoramiento al público sobre temas costeros y actuara de consultora de la TCDPO en cuestiones de desarrollo de la costa.

El nacimiento de la Unidad de Gestión de la Zona Costera

La Unidad de Proyecto de Conservación Costera continuó con su mandato por una década, y el gobierno de Barbados, con financiamiento adicional del BID, se embarcó en otro estudio, que recomendó el establecimiento de una unidad permanente para vigilar la zona costera. La Unidad de Gestión de la Zona Costera (Coastal Zone Management Unit, o CZMU) fue creada en 1996 para regular, hacer recomendaciones y educar a la población de Barbados sobre la gestión costera. La CZMU, que sigue recibiendo una gran parte de su financiamiento del BID, se aloja actualmente en el Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Hídricos y Drenaje. Como lo sugiere su título, la CZMU gestiona la zona costera, definida como “la zona de transición donde el suelo se une con el agua, la región influenciada de forma directa por los procesos hidrodinámicos marinos, extendiéndose mar adentro hasta la barrera de la plataforma continental, y mar afuera hasta el primer cambio importante de topografía por encima del alcance del oleaje de tormentas importantes”. Por lo tanto, la unidad supervisa los arrecifes de coral alrededor de Bar-bados y todos los proyectos de ingeniería costera, y funciona como asesor de la TCDPO para el desarrollo costero en tierra firme.

La relación entre la CZMU y la TCDPO está marcada por temas del uso del suelo. Cuando la TCDPO recibe una solicitud para desarrollar la zona costera, se la envía automáticamente a la CZMU para su revisión y comentario. Como la industria turística se concentra principalmente en la zona costera de la isla, gran parte de las solicitudes de desarrollo inmobiliario de Barbados pasan por las manos del CZMU. La unidad inspecciona la solicitud para verificar que los retrocesos son correctos: 30 metros de la cota máxima de agua para los emprendimientos a lo largo de la costa, y 10 metros para aquellos a lo largo de los acantilados, medidos tierra adentro de la cota. Además de verificar los retrocesos, la CZMU analiza los requisitos de drenaje, zonas de amortiguamiento, restricciones de cercas y otras reglamentaciones. La CZMU luego hace recomendaciones a la TCDPO sobre la solicitud.

La Directora en Ejercicio de la CZMU, la Dra. Lorna Inniss, que tiene un PhD. en Oceanografía por la Universidad Estatal de Luisiana, alaba este proceso: “Nuestra colaboración interministerial es extremadamente cercana. Tenemos la capacidad para establecer y mejorar la estructura gubernamental que es inclusiva y consultiva por naturaleza”. El proceso gubernamental es admirable por su cooperación y tendencia a derribar silos; desafortunadamente, las recomendaciones de la CZMU son puramente consultivas y no tienen el poder vinculante necesario para que la TCDPO pueda obligar su cumplimiento. Las reglamentaciones de la zona costera no son retroactivas a las incontables propiedades construidas durante el boom del desarrollo de balnearios, y las sanciones para aquellos que las violan siguen siendo muy bajas. Este proceso es lo más cerca que llega Barbados a la evaluación de impacto medioambiental formalizada del modelo de los EE.UU., pero es un primer paso importante para el Caribe. La CZMU y la TCDPO han tenido más éxito al planificar el desarrollo futuro de bajo impacto a lo largo de la costa este más montañosa, por ejemplo, donde el Plan de Desarrollo Físico contempla la creación de un parque nacional.

La CZMU es más efectiva cuando implementa proyectos de ingeniería costera para proteger la línea de la costa y frenar la erosión de las playas. La técnica de conservación más natural es restaurar las dunas y manglares. La plantación de vegetación en las áreas costeras permite la formación natural de dunas y evita las inundaciones debido a marejadas de tormenta, mientras que los manglares absorben la acción de las olas. La alimentación artificial de la playa es una solución rápida y popular, pero es un arreglo caro y poco efectivo, ya que las corrientes y tormentas pueden erosionar fácilmente las playas rellenadas artificialmente.

La CZMU introduce también salvaguardas en la costa con varias intervenciones físicas, como rompeolas, espigones y malecones. Los rompeolas son estructuras de hormigón, enterradas cerca de la playa, que obligan a las olas a romper más lejos de la costa, para que no golpeen directamente sobre la arena. Los espigones son estructuras de roca que penetran en el mar para inmovilizar los sedimentos. Los malecones son el tipo más grande de inter-vención de la CZMU. Diseñados para proteger las áreas más pobladas, estos proyectos de construcción consisten en rocas grandes dispuestas en forma de escollera o una muralla de contención plana de hormigón que puede crear un espacio público atractivo tanto para turistas como residentes, como el Paseo Richard Haynes, financiado parcialmente por un préstamo del BID. Como estas técnicas pueden exacerbar a veces la erosión y requerir un mantenimiento más caro que las intervenciones naturales, su eficacia a largo plazo es discutida, pero en el corto plazo protegen la línea de la costa y la industria turística.

Dada la vulnerabilidad de la isla a las tormentas, los proyectos de ingeniería pueden ser costosos. Inniss, sin embargo, explica: “Tenemos una política de consulta rigurosa a las partes interesadas, y no es simplemente una formalidad. Nuestra temporada alta es de noviembre a abril; en un proyecto reciente en Holetown, los comerciantes nos dijeron que era fundamental que el trabajo se completara antes de noviembre, así que nos apuramos para hacerlo. Cuando hay un espíritu de cooperación mutua, podemos obtener el apoyo del sector privado”. Con un poco de suerte, la CZMU podrá utilizar el capital político obtenido del sector privado en este tipo de proyectos, para conseguir que las reglamentaciones más estrictas sean vinculantes en el futuro.

Para poder obtener apoyo, la CZMU ha lanzado una campaña de gran envergadura para educar a la población de la isla, que a juicio de Inniss es la razón por la cual la CZMU es exitosa, tanto interna como externamente. “Comienza con un alto nivel nacional de educación y alfabetismo — más del 98 por ciento desde hace décadas”. El exsenador Henry Fraser concuerda con ella: “La gente pregunta por qué las cosas funcionan en Barbados. Principalmente se debe al énfasis puesto en educación desde que nos emancipamos. Y porque es un lugar pequeño y muy religioso, en el que la gente vive cerca, con respeto, tolerancia y una ética de trabajo mayor que en otros lados».

Para profundizar la base educativa del enfoque cooperativo de Barbados sobre la gestión de las zonas costeras, la CZMU distribuye un boletín, mantiene una fuerte presencia en los medios sociales, y produce un programa de televisión educativo que explica la historia geológica de la isla y técnicas para aumentar el nivel de conciencia sobre el aumento del nivel del mar y la importancia de la gestión costera. También patrocina muchas actividades, como el Día Internacional de Limpieza de la Costa, las Caminatas en la Playa a la Puesta del Sol, la Serie de Seminarios de Verano y un programa de residencia de verano para estudiantes del nivel secundario y terciario. También da conferencias para escuelas e instituciones educativas, ONG, organizaciones privadas y el público en general.

Próximos pasos y cooperación global

El BID sigue brindando un respaldo importante a los esfuerzos de Barbados. La ayuda más reciente prestada por el banco de desarrollo al país incluye un préstamo de $30 millones de dólares a 25 años plazo para un Programa de Gestión y Evaluación de Riesgo Costero. Inniss se entusiasma con la confianza implícita en este respaldo financiero, ya que es una señal de que el gobierno cree que la CZMU puede ejecutar un proyecto que generará el valor suficiente como para devolver el dinero prestado. “Será una estrategia de gestión de zona costera integrada, moderna y superior, con la participación de una serie de partes interesadas: el turismo, destilerías de ron, empresas de electricidad, puertos recreativos, navegantes, pescadores comerciales, el puerto, los buzos”, detalla Inniss. “Los dirigentes clave han reconocido que la gestión de la zona costera es importante no solo como un programa medioambiental sino también para hacer crecer la economía de Barbados”. Esperamos que otros países del Caribe hayan tomado nota, puesto que la propia Inniss ha proporcionado asistencia técnica a St. Lucia, Trinidad y Tobago, y St. Vincent y las Granadinas, inspirada a su vez por el modelo de Nueva Zelanda, Hawái y la Administración de Pesca y Océanos de Canadá para implementar estándares internacionales.

Por supuesto, hay todavía lugar para mejorar. Si bien la CZMU trabaja de cerca con la TCPDO en la planificación del uso del suelo, con los parques nacionales marinos para vigilar los ecosistemas, y con los ingenieros civiles del Ministerio de Obras Públicas, la Unidad no está completamente integrada todavía con el Ministerio de Agricultura y Pesca. Por ejemplo, reconoce Inniss: “Sabemos científicamente que el escurrimiento agrícola es el mayor contribuyente a los contaminantes marinos”.

En efecto, en una isla pequeña, el suelo y el agua están intrínsecamente interconectados. Mientras Barbados está cumpliendo su parte en la batalla contra el cambio climático mundial —otro préstamo del BID firmado al mismo tiempo que el financiamiento de la gestión costera establecerá un Fondo de Energía Inteligente para reducir la dependencia de combustibles fósiles— no puede quedarse sentada a esperar que los países más grandes actúen. Mientras que otras islas pequeñas en vías de desarrollo en el Océano Índico y el Océano Pacífico están contemplando la posibilidad de reubicar su población a otros países dentro de algunas décadas, los habitantes de Barbados piensan quedarse y proteger su pequeña porción del Paraíso.

Sobre los autores

Gregory R. Scruggs fue consultor de la Asociación Americana de Planificación para América Latina y el Caribe desde 2010 a 2013. En la actualidad está estudiando una maestría en estudios regionales de América Latina y el Caribe en la Universidad de Columbia. Contacto: gscruggs.apa.consult@gmail.com.

Thomas E. Bassett, asistente senior de programa en la Asociación Americana de Planificación–(APA), trabaja con una beca de la Asociación de Energía y Clima de las Américas para el Departamento de Estado de los EE.UU, así como también a nivel nacional en el Programa de Ayuda a la Comunidad. Contacto: thomas.e.bassett@gmail.com.

Recursos

Bassett, Thomas E. and Gregory R. Scruggs. 2013. Water, Water Everywhere: Sea level Rise and Land Use Planning in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Pará. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP13TB1. https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2282_1621_Bassett_WP13TB1.pdf.

Belle, N. and B. Bramwell. 2005. Climate change and small island tourism: Policy maker and industry perspectives in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 44: 32–41.

Dharmartne, G. and A. Brathwaite. 1998. Economic valuation of coastline for tourism in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 37: 138–144.

Inter-American Development Bank. 2010. Indicators of disaster risk and risk management, Program for Latin America and the Caribbean, Barbados. September. Accessed July 9, 2012. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35160015.

Phillips, M. R. and A. L. Jones. 2006. Erosion and tourism infrastructure in the coastal zone: Problems, consequences, and management. Tourism Management 27: 517–52.