Es difícil figurarse la manera en que la pérdida constante de población ha devastado a Detroit. Entre 1900 y 1950, cuando el crecimiento de la manufactura automotriz en los EE.UU. la convirtió en uno de los principales centros industriales y culturales del país, la población de Detroit saltó de 300.000 a 1,85 millones de habitantes. A partir de 1950, sin embargo, comenzó a disminuir. Y este descenso ha continuado hasta la actualidad, desplomándose a sólo 700.000 habitantes en 2010, una tasa de reducción casi tan rápida como lo había sido el aumento en la primera mitad del siglo XX.

A pesar del esfuerzo de Detroit durante varias décadas para mantenerse al ritmo de la pérdida de población eliminando el inventario de viviendas ruinosas, aproximadamente un cuarto de sus 380.000 parcelas se encuentra hoy abandonado y administrado por la ciudad u otros entes públicos. Hasta julio de 2014 se han demolido 114.000 propiedades, y 80.000 más se consideran arruinadas (Austen 2014). Si bien es cierto que el centro se está recuperando y los suburbios siguen mostrando vitalidad, un visitante desprevenido quedará anonadado por la “incomprensible desintegración del paisaje edificado” en amplias zonas de la ciudad (Austen 2014).

Este artículo, el primero de una serie de dos, considera las causas fiscales y repercusiones del superávit de viviendas y terrenos baldíos en Detroit, desde la extensión y ubicación de las casas y lotes abandonados en la ciudad hasta la espiral descendente de los precios de las viviendas, que ha provocado una sobrevaluación de las propiedades, mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad y ejecuciones tributarias; la adquisición pública de dichas propiedades; el patrón de valores del suelo a lo largo de la ciudad; y, finalmente, algunas maneras potenciales de reconciliar la cantidad de habitantes que quedan con la cantidad de propiedades vacantes y administradas públicamente. Estas medidas van desde revitalizar vecindarios densamente poblados a establecer un cinturón verde y adquirir parcelas vacantes para uso público, como parques, bosques, zonas de amortiguamiento industrial, lagunas de retención y otros espacios abiertos (Austen 2014).

Factores de la caída

Las causas de la decadencia de Detroit son múltiples y quizás demasiado conocidas. La infraestructura de transporte subsidiada por el gobierno federal, como por ejemplo el sistema de autovías interestatales, facilitó la rápida suburbanización, promovida además por códigos de desarrollo inmobiliario permisivos. La tensión racial, las fuerzas económicas globales y la corrupción desgastaron lo que quedaba de la ciudad propiamente dicha. En las primeras etapas del deterioro, los residentes de mayores ingresos, la mayoría de los cuales era de origen caucásico, se mudó a los suburbios en busca de una mejor calidad de vida, como se muestra en la tabla 1. Para 1990, la población afroamericana también había alcanzado su pico, y comenzó a disminuir en la primera década del siglo XXI. A comienzos de 1960, la manufactura de automóviles de Michigan inició su largo y vertiginoso declive, que afectó de forma desproporcionada a Detroit y Flint. La pérdida de puestos de empleo bien remunerados para la clase media dañó aún más la base demográfica y económica urbana, ya que dichas familias fueron a buscar oportunidades de empleo en otro lado. Las crecientes tasas de crimen y la erosión constante de los servicios públicos provocaron otra ola de deserciones.

La tabla 1 ilustra esta decadencia de las condiciones demográficas y económicas de la ciudad entre 1950 y 2010. Para el 2012, según fuentes gubernamentales, la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares era de solamente US$25.000, menos de la mitad de la mediana nacional de ingresos. Los índices de pobreza y desempleo eran 38 y 27,5 por ciento, respectivamente. La tasa de participación laboral era del 54 por ciento (comparado con el 63 por ciento en todo el país) y por cada 6,35 trabajadores empleados había una persona que recibía beneficios de discapacidad del Seguro Social (comparado con 1 de cada 12 en todo el país). Más del 34 por ciento de la población de la ciudad recibía cupones de alimentos, y el 81 por ciento de los niños de las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit eran elegibles para el Programa de Almuerzo Gratis o a Precio Reducido. Las fuentes de ingreso comenzaron a depender cada vez más de aportes externos, incluyendo los no residentes, como se explica en el recuadro 1. En 2013, cuando la ciudad finalmente sucumbió al peso de los problemas fiscales acumulados y se declaró en quiebra, sus deudas y obligaciones sin fondos ascendían a US$18.000 millones, o sea US$68.000 por unidad familiar, lo cual es aproximadamente 2,7 veces la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares (Turbeville 2013).

El fracaso del mercado de la vivienda

El descomunal excedente de oferta de viviendas que se acumuló a lo largo de las décadas como consecuencia de la demanda selectiva en Detroit corroyó el valor de la propiedad. La crisis inmobiliaria de 2007–2008 asestó el golpe final, lo que dio como resultado la desintegración casi completa del mercado de la vivienda de Detroit. En 2010, el precio promedio de una propiedad residencial, que en 2006 era US$57.000, se había desplomado a alrededor de US$7.000 (Hodge et al. 2014a). El excedente actual de suelo y vivienda de Detroit podría inhibir una recuperación de los precios inmobiliarios en los próximos años, incluso si la población se estabilizara.

Mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad, abandono y adquisición pública de propiedades

Los funcionarios de la administración tributaria no han recalibrado el valor de tasación de las propiedades para que este refleje la caída del precios de las viviendas. Esto ha traído como consecuen-cia una sobrevaluación de hasta el 80 por ciento (Hodge et al. 2014a), contribuyendo a una falta de voluntad generalizada para pagar los impuestos, según Alm et al. (2014). Su investigación también muestra que hubo otros factores que agravaron, como las altas tasas tributarias estipuladas por ley, y la limitación de servicios como la seguridad pública.

En el medio de esta crisis inmobiliaria, la tasa de mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad llegó a un nivel alarmante del 50 por ciento (Alm et al. 2014). La figura 2 (pág. 15) muestra las tasas de mora por vecindario de la ciudad en 2010. La recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad depende de la capacidad de una jurisdicción para imponer sanciones por falta de pago, como señala Langsdorf (1973). Cuando los valores inmobiliarios colapsan, las autoridades tributarias no tienen un mecanismo de cumplimiento práctico; el ahorro de los propietarios por no pagar el impuesto sobre la propiedad es mayor que el valor de la casa que poseen y que perderían en caso de ejecución tributaria. Más aún, lo recaudado por la venta de propiedades ejecutadas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir la deuda tributaria morosa y el costo para el gobierno de iniciar las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria.

La falta de pago generalizada del impuesto sobre la propiedad y el abandono subsiguiente de las viviendas ha traído como consecuencia la adquisición pública de miles de propiedades en todo Detroit. El quince por ciento de las parcelas de esta ciudad de 360 km2 está ahora vacante, y cerca del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de Detroit no es actualmente tributable al ser propiedad o estar administrada por la ciudad o algún otro ente público (Sands y Skidmore 2014), como se ilustra en la figura 3.

La espiral descendente de ejecuciones tributarias

En la actualidad, la cantidad de propiedades que pasan a manos públicas por ejecuciones tributarias es mucho mayor que la cantidad de propiedades públicas adquiridas de vuelta por contribuyentes privados.

En Michigan, los impuestos sobre la propiedad morosos están sujetos a una tasa administrativa del 4 por ciento y un interés mensual del 1 por ciento sobre el monto adeudado, a una tasa de interés no compuesta y a partir del primer mes de falta de pago. Después de un año de mora, la ciudad transfiere la propiedad al gobierno del condado y el dueño es sujeto a un cargo de interés mensual adicional del 0,5 por ciento. Durante este período de dos años, los dueños pueden recuperar sus propiedades pagando todos los impuestos y cargos vencidos.

Si el impuesto sobre la propiedad queda sin pagar por más de dos años, el tesorero del condado de Wayne inicia las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria. Después de una audiencia para demostrar causa justificada en la corte de apelaciones, el tesorero del condado vende las parcelas ejecutadas en subasta pública. El monto inicial de la subasta es el del equivalente a los impuestos sobre la propiedad adeudados más intereses y penalizaciones, y lo recaudado se distribuye en forma proporcional entre las jurisdicciones tributarias. Si la propiedad no se vende en la primera subasta, el condado reduce el monto de subasta mínimo a US$500 y organiza una segunda subasta. Este procedimiento ha causado más evasión tributaria, ya que algunos propietarios prefieren ignorar sus facturas de impuestos a la espera de volver a comprar su parcela por US$500 en la segunda subasta.

Las propiedades que no se venden en ninguna de las subastas se pueden transferir a un organismo público (municipal o estatal) o a un banco de suelo estatal o local, o se puede retener para una subasta subsiguiente. Los registros del condado indican que el 80 por ciento de las parcelas vendidas a compradores privados en subasta en los últimos dos años están nuevamente en mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013). Dado que la tasa de mora tributaria es del 67 por ciento para propietarios que no residen en su vivienda (Alm et al. 2014), da la impresión de que una cantidad significativa de los compradores en subasta son propietarios absentistas que pretenden reducir sus gastos operativos y aumentar sus ingresos netos de alquiler dejando de pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad.

En las parcelas de bajo valor, los impuestos sobre la propiedad son, en la práctica, optativos. Para reducir la cartera de lotes con mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013), el condado no ejecuta la hipoteca de propietarios que deben menos de US$1.600 en impuestos y multas acumuladas, con lo cual estas deudas se convierten en optativas.

La recaudación prevista por la venta de parcelas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir los gastos legales de una ejecución por falta de pago de impuestos y saldos tributarios impagados. El resultado final es una creciente tasa de mora e inventario de propiedades indeseadas que terminan en manos públicas, donde no generan ningún ingreso para la ciudad.

Y de aquí, ¿adónde vamos?

Se espera otra ola de ejecuciones tributarias a fines de 2014 y comienzos de 2015. ¿Qué se puede hacer para estabilizar la situación?

Cómo poner freno a la mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad

Como se mencionó previamente, la mora se reducirá cuando los contribuyentes perciban que reciben un valor proporcional a su dinero. Así, si se mejoran los servicios prestados con la recaudación de impuestos como la seguridad pública, la evasión y el pago atrasado de impuestos se reducirá (Alm et al. 2014). Bajo el liderazgo del alcalde recientemente electo, Mike Duggan, el gobierno de la ciudad está adoptando medidas para mejorar el suministro de servicios públicos básicos y ordenar su panorama fiscal. Por ejemplo, en la actualidad sólo 35.000 de las 88.000 luces de la ciudad funcionan, así que Duggan piensa instalar cada mes 2.400 luces que alumbren (Austen 2014). También aumentó la cantidad de autobuses operativos de 143 a 190 y mejoró los servicios de remoción de nieve durante el pasado invierno, que fue particularmente riguroso.

Una reducción de las tasas de impuestos también reduciría modestamente la tasa de mora (Alm et al. 2014). Las tasas tributarias de Detroit, que son aproximadamente el doble del promedio de la región, son de 67 y 85 milésimas por dólar de valuación para propiedades que son un bien de familia y que no lo son, respectivamente. Este valor es el máximo admitido por el estado. Si bien es cierto que una reducción mejoraría la competitividad de la ciudad con relación a otras comunidades de la región, en la actualidad no se está considerando una reducción en la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad.

La alineación de la valuación con las condiciones del mercado actual también reduciría la mora. El Alcalde Duggan recientemente prometió reducir las valuaciones en un 5 al 20 por ciento en toda la ciudad, para reconciliarlas con las pautas estatales. No obstante, las reducciones prometidas por Duggan son sólo una pequeña fracción del recorte del 80 por ciento necesario para alinear las valuaciones con el valor del mercado, según Hodge et al. (2014a).

Retirar suelo del mercado

En la ausencia de una demanda sólida de suelo, la cual no parece probable en un futuro cercano, el excedente se tiene que retirar del mercado por un período de tiempo con objeto de que el valor inmobiliario mejore de manera general en toda la ciudad. Dado que los entes públicos poseen ahora tantas propiedades, son las autoridades gubernamentales las que tienen el poder para retirarlas del mercado de forma creíble. Sin este tipo de medidas políticas, la posibilidad de que estas parcelas se transfieran rápidamente al sector privado afectará la recuperación de los precios.

En la actualidad, hay muchos entes públicos que poseen suelos. Las autoridades de la ciudad de Detroit, el condado de Wayne y el gobierno estatal están colaborando para consolidar estas parcelas bajo un solo ente que pueda administrarlas de manera más efectiva. Detroit Future City (2010) detalla esta propiedad fragmentada de suelos públicos:

Los suelos públicos en Detroit están en manos de muchas agencias distintas de la ciudad, el condado y el estado, como también de muchas entidades autónomas o cuasi autónomas como las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit, la Comisión de Vivienda de Detroit y la Corporación de Crecimiento Económico de Detroit. Hay pocas ciudades que tengan un inventario de propiedades tan fragmentado de suelo público. No hay coherencia de políticas, procedimientos o misiones entre estos entes, y muchos de ellos están maniatados por requisitos legales burocráticos y procedimientos complejos. El Departamento de Planificación y Desarrollo controla la mayor cantidad de propiedades; sin embargo, su capacidad para darles un destino estratégico está restringida por obstáculos de procedimiento, como la necesidad de obtener aprobación del Concejo Municipal para cualquier transacción, no importa cuán pequeña o insignificante sea desde la perspectiva de la ciudad.

Aunque este proceso de consolidación es necesario, no es suficiente. Hacen falta recursos financieros para eliminar el deterioro urbano e implementar planes de uso del suelo. Los dirigentes municipales se centran principalmente en estrategias para devolver estas parcelas a manos privadas. Si pudieran estimular un mayor interés en las propiedades de Detroit, esta estrategia podría ser viable.

Hay, efectivamente, oportunidades emergentes para estimular la propiedad privada en el distrito comercial central (central business district, o CBD). Daniel Gilbert, fundador de Quicken Loans, ha mudado su sede al centro de Detroit y ha invertido US$1.300 millones en bienes inmuebles (Forbes 2014). Y la renovación del área del centro ha generado un aumento considerable de los precios de alquiler (Christie 2014).

Los valores del suelo en el CBD son muy altos, como se muestra en la figura 4 por las parcelas negras, que representan los valores del suelo más alto del mapa. Sin embargo, el gradiente de valores del suelo en Detroit es muy pronunciado. Si bien varias zonas dentro del anillo que rodea el CBD han retenido algo de valor, el precio del suelo cae rápidamente a medida que aumenta la distancia al CBD, aun cuando vuelven a subir al acercarse a de los límites de la ciudad, probablemente debido a las comodidades disponibles en los suburbios cercanos, como centros comerciales.

Dada la débil demanda fuera del CBD, podría ser más efectivo determinar qué propiedades públicas deberían volver a manos de contribuyentes privados, qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado durante una década o dos, con la opción de volver a introducirlas al mercado en caso de que las condiciones cambien, y qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado de manera permanente.

El plan de ordenamiento de 2012, delineado por Detroit Future City, propone la reasignación de suelo para parques, bosques, amortiguadores industriales, vías verdes, lagunas de retención, jardines comunitarios y hasta campamentos (Austen 2014). La implementación plena de esta propuesta ambiciosa requiere recursos financieros importantes. Pero consideremos la manera en que las autoridades estatales y federales intervinieron en el último episodio importante de ejecución tributaria masiva. Durante la Gran Depresión, muchos dueños de residencias familiares en suelos agrícolas marginales de Michigan, Minnesota y Wisconsin ya no pudieron pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad, lo que causó una ola masiva de mora tributaria, ejecuciones hipotecarias, abandonos y en última instancia confiscaciones. En esos estados, los gobiernos del condado frecuentemente pasaron a poseer miles de hectáreas, gran parte de las cuales fueron vendidas a los gobiernos estatales y federal. Los seis bosques nacionales de Minnesota, Wis-consin y Michigan, así como numerosos bosques estatales de la región, tuvieron su origen en el abandono masivo de suelo durante la Gran Depresión, cuando las autoridades estatales y federales fueron uniendo en mosaico un conjunto de suelos adyacentes adquiridos a los condados, ansiosos de vender las propiedades que habían decomisado por falta de pago.

En la actualidad, las autoridades del estado y el gobierno federal no se inclinan por un rescate financiero de Detroit. Pero la historia sugiere que los gobiernos federal y estatal podrían ayudar a Detroit a recuperar su viabilidad fiscal adquiriendo grupos de parcelas no deseadas, realizando pagos en lugar de impuestos (como es habitual para otros suelos públicos) y usando después el suelo para beneficio del público en general. Los usos potenciales se describen en el plan de ordenamiento mencionado anteriormente, y se exploran en el segundo artículo de esta serie. Una alianza del gobierno federal con el gobierno estatal y los gobiernos locales para hacerse cargo de estas propiedades podría ayudar a estabilizar el mercado del suelo y crear una fuente de ingresos para la ciudad y demás jurisdicciones fiscales pertinentes (incluyendo el gobierno estatal mismo, a través del impuesto de educación del estado). La recuperación del valor de la propiedad en combinación con la reinversión en el centro de la ciudad, el mantenimiento de los esfuerzos para mejorar el paquete de servicios brindados con la recaudación tributaria de Detroit y la eliminación del deterioro urbano, y una inversión a largo plazo en el capital humano y social de Detroit son elementos esenciales para una recuperación sostenible de la ciudad.

————————

Recuadro 1: Los no residentes como fuente de ingresos

Las fuentes de ingresos de Detroit dependen cada vez más de aportes externos, como por ejemplo de los no residentes, ya que su población y su base económica se han reducido. Este cambio se produjo en parte porque con el tiempo las legislaturas estatales de Michigan permitieron que la ciudad de Detroit usara estrategias de exportación de impuestos para afianzar su situación tributaria debilitada y lidiar con los cambios estructurales masivos de la economía regional. Aunque hubo períodos en que parecía que Detroit estaba por recuperarse, varias fuerzas impidieron la “velocidad de escape”.

Hoy en día, la ciudad de Detroit depende del impuesto sobre los ingresos, el impuesto sobre la propiedad, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, la coparticipación en los ingresos estatales, un impuesto de uso sobre las utilidades, subvenciones federales, y varios aranceles y licencias para financiar sus servicios públicos. De estos, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos y el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos se adoptaron para reforzar los debilitados ingresos provenientes de fuentes más tradicionales.

El impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, basado en las facturas de las ganancias de los apostadores, ha adquirido particular importancia para la ciudad de Detroit en la última década, como se muestra en la figura 2, que resume las tendencias de las fuentes principales de ingresos de la ciudad entre 1960 y 2012. La legislatura estatal autorizó la actividad de apuestas en casinos y el impuesto sobre las apuestas en Detroit en 1996 para ayudar a superar sus problemas fiscales. La construcción del casino se completó en 2001. Los US$180 millones en ingresos anuales adicionales ayudaron a reducir la presión financiera mientras otras fuentes, como el impuesto sobre los ingresos y la coparticipación de ingresos estatales, se iban reduciendo. Hasta el 85 por ciento de los apostadores de los tres casinos principales de Detroit no son residentes, según informes recientes y entrevistas con expertos de las apuestas (Miklojcik 2014).

Desde 1963, el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos ha representado la fuente de ingresos más importante y, durante varios años, la de mayor crecimiento. En el momento de su adopción, la mayor parte del impuesto sobre los ingresos era abonada por los residentes de la ciudad. Sin embargo, a medida que la población se ha ido reduciendo, el impuesto sobre los ingresos de los no residentes que trabajan en la ciudad ha cobrado una participación cada vez mayor en la base gravable tributaria, compuesta de sueldos y salarios ganados por empleo dentro de la ciudad. La tasa tributaria es del 2,4 por ciento para los residentes de la ciudad, y del 1,2 por ciento para los no residentes. Aunque las corporaciones y sociedades también pagan un impuesto sobre los ingresos, es una porción muy pequeña de los ingresos totales recaudados. Según Scorsone y Skidmore (2014), aproximadamente la mitad de la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos en Detroit está pagada por no residentes.

La coparticipación de los ingresos estatales sigue desempeñando un papel clave en las finanzas de Detroit, a pesar de que la pérdida de población también ha reducido esta fuente de ingresos. En Michigan, el gobierno estatal recauda un impuesto estatal sobre las ventas y después comparte una porción de lo recaudado con los gobiernos municipales. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre las ventas se asignan a los gobiernos locales de acuerdo a disposiciones constitucionales y legislación estatal. La porción constitucional de la coparticipación de los ingresos depende del porcentaje de la población total del estado de cada jurisdicción. Dada la disminución del número de residentes en Detroit, esta porción de la coparticipación estatal ha venido disminuyendo a lo largo de varias décadas. La ciudad experimentó un crecimiento significativo de los fondos de coparticipación de ingresos en las décadas de 1970 y 1980 debido a aumentos en la coparticipación de los ingresos estipulados por las leyes estatales, que se distribuyen de acuerdo a fórmulas que los legisladores han ido ajustando en décadas recientes. Pero los nuevos cambios en las leyes estatales, en combinación con el estancamiento del impuesto sobre las ventas, ha provocado una reducción del crecimiento y en última instancia una caída en los ingresos de coparticipación de todas las ciudades del estado en la década de 1990. Durante la década de 2000, Michigan experimentó una recesión y esta caída continuó en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones locales, incluyendo Detroit.

Algunos han señalado que las reducciones en la coparticipación de ingresos fue una de las causas principales de los problemas financieros de la ciudad de Detroit y uno de los catalizadores fundamentales de su quiebra. No obstante, estas reducciones afectaron a todas las ciudades que recibieron fondos de coparticipación en Michigan. Si bien la reducción de los ingresos de coparticipación probablemente aceleró la declaración de quiebra de Detroit, no fue la causa principal. Más aún, es importante recalcar que la coparticipación de ingresos estatales de Detroit representa una transferencia neta positiva de fondos del resto del estado a la ciudad. Según el censo económico de 2007, las ventas al por menor en la Ciudad de Detroit fueron de US$3.200 millones, o sea alrededor del 2,9 por ciento de los ingresos totales del estado de Michigan, de US$109.000 millones. En 2012, los ingresos totales por coparticipación en todas las municipalidades de Michigan fueron aproximadamente US$1.000 millones, y la parte que le tocó a Detroit fue de US$172 millones, es decir el 17,2 por ciento. Dado que Detroit representa sólo el 3 por ciento de las ventas minoristas totales de Michigan, se puede concluir que la mayor parte de los ingresos de coparticipación estatal que ingresaron en Detroit se originó en transacciones producidas fuera de la ciudad.

En 2014, la ciudad de Detroit contaba con aproximadamente US$1.000 millones en su Fondo General, un monto considerablemente menor que en 2002, cuando los ingresos llegaron a un pico de US$1.400 millones. Esta caída de ingresos del 30 por ciento a lo largo del tiempo, sin un recorte proporcional en los gastos, condujo a la crisis fiscal de Detroit y su declaración de quiebra en 2013. Para el año 2012, Detroit había tomado en préstamo más de US$1.000 millones para tratar de evitar la mora y una crisis de liquidez (Departamento del Tesoro de Michigan, 2013).

————————

Sobre el autor

Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde ocupa la Cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Política Gubernamental Estatal y Local, con nombramientos conjuntos del Departamento de Economía Agrícola, de Alimentos y Recursos y del Departamento de Economía.

Referencias

Alm, J., T. Hodge, G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Detroit Property Tax Delinquency—Social Contract in Crisis.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Austen, B. 2014. “The Post-Apocalyptic Detroit.” New York Times, 13 de julio. http://nyti.ms/1mFu3Jn

Center for Educational Performance and Information. Accedido en julio de 2014 en www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451—,00.html

City of Detroit. 2013. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/finance/CAFR/Final%202012%20Detroit%20Financial%20Statements.pdf

Christie, Les. 2014. “I’ve Been Priced Out of Downtown Detroit.” CNN Money, 27 de mayo. http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/27/real_estate/downtown-detroit/index.html

Detroit Future City. 2010. Detroit Future City Strategic Framework Book. http://detroitfuturecity.com/framework

Forbes. 2014. “World’s Billionaires.” www.forbes.com/profile/daniel-gilbert

Hodge, T., D. McMillen, G. Sands, y M. Skidmore. 2014a. “Tax Base Erosion and Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Hodge, T., G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014b. “The Land Value Gradient in a (Nearly) Collapsed Urban Real Estate Market.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Landsdorf, K. 1973. “Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis.” The Urban Lawyer 5: 729–748.

MacDonald, C. 2013. “Half of Detroit Property Owners Don’t Pay Taxes.” The Detroit News, 12 de febrero.

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2013. Supplemental Documentation of the Detroit Financial Review Team. www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Review_Team_Report_Supplemental_2–19-13_411866_7.pdf

Michigan Department of Treasury. 2010. Real Property Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosure. www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43535_55601—,00.html

Miklojcik, J. 2014. President of Michigan Consultants. Información compartida en entrevista personal con Eric Scorsone.

National Public Radio. 2014. “Chinese Investors Aren’t Snatching up Detroit Property Yet.” www.npr.org/2014/03/04/285711091/chinese-investors-arent-snatching-up-detroit-property-yet

Sands, G. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit.” Journal of Urban Affairs 36(4) Octubre.

Scorsone, E. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Blamed for Incompetence and Lack of Foresight and Left to Die.” Response to William Tabb’s “If Detroit Is Dead Some Things Need to Be Said at the Funeral.” Por publicarse en Journal of Urban Affairs.

Turbeville, W. 2013. “The Detroit Bankruptcy.” Demos, 20 de noviembre. www.demos.org/publication/detroit-bankruptcy

This article reviews the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, in which state planners from 13 western states have participated. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for land use planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to land use planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of land use planning strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.

Forces and trends of land use planning. The West is changing and there are many differences in the states’ approach to land use planning. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities, and landscapes—directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning, and changing the way development occurs.

Major themes related to land use planning and growth in the West;

Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, land use planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support.

What is the role of state government? State programs should support local land use planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions and maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.

How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges.

Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use planning decisions to drive the decisions.

How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local land use planning. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?

The Three Cs of Planning—three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country. First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community; second, rely on collaborative approaches; third, foster regional connections.

“This [the West] is the native home of hope. When it fully learns that cooperation, not rugged individualism, is the quality that most characterizes and preserves it, then it will have achieved itself and outlived its origins. Then it has a chance to create a society to match its scenery.”

Wallace Stegner, The Sound of Mountain Water (Penguin Books 1980, 38)

During the past two years, state planners in 13 western states have met in the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, an annual event sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Western Consensus Council. Cosponsors include the Western Governors’ Association, the Council of State Governments–WEST, and the Western Planners’ Association. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we have learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.

Forces and Trends

The West is changing. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities and landscapes, directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. One force that sets the West apart from other regions of the country is the overwhelming presence of the landscape. The West has more land and fewer people than any other region, yet is also very urbanized. More people live in urban centers than in rural communities.

The dominance of land in the politics and public policy of the West is due in part to the large amount of land governed by federal and tribal entities (see Figure 1). More than 90 percent of all federal land in the U.S. lies in Alaska and the 11 westernmost contiguous states. The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manage most of the West’s geography and significantly influence the politics of land use decisions. Indian tribes govern one-fifth of the interior West and are key players in managing water, fish and wildlife.

The West is also the fastest growing region of the country (see Figure 2). The five fastest-growing states of the 1990s were Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah and Idaho. Between 1990 and 1998, the region’s cities grew by 25 percent and its rural areas by 18 percent, both significantly higher rates than elsewhere in the U.S. As western demographics diversify, the political geography has grown remarkably homogeneous. Following the 2000 elections, Republicans held three-quarters of the congressional districts in the interior West (see Figure 3) and all governorships except the coastal states of California, Oregon and Washington.

Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning and changing the way development occurs in the West. They also point out many differences in their states’ approaches to planning. Oregon and Hawaii have long-standing statewide land use planning efforts, but planning in Nevada is a recent phenomenon, limited mainly to the Las Vegas and Reno areas. Vast federal holdings in Nevada, Idaho and Utah dictate land use management more than in other states, and Arizona and New Mexico share planning responsibilities with many sovereign tribal governments. Alaska and Wyoming—with small populations and little or no growth—do very little planning.

Major Themes

Based on the first two retreats, we have identified six major themes related to planning and growth in the West.

Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support. Particularly during economic recession, planning takes a back seat—the public can focus on only so many problems at once. Today, the most compelling argument for planning is that it can be a vehicle to promote economic development and sustain the quality of life. People move to the West and create jobs because they like the quality of life in the region, and planners need to tap into this motivation.

In Utah, for example, quality of life is an economic imperative, so state planners tie their work to enhancing quality of life rather than to limiting or directing growth. It is used to integrate economic vitality and environmental protection. Several years ago, business leaders and others created Envision Utah, a private-public partnership. Participants use visualization techniques and aerial photos, mapping growth as it might occur without planning, and then again under planned cluster developments with greenbelts and community centers. These “alternative futures” scenarios help citizens picture the changes that are coming and the alternatives for guiding those changes in their communities. As Utah’s state planner says, “Growth will happen, and our job is to preserve quality. That way, when growth slows, we will still have a high quality of life.”

Kent Briggs, executive director for the Council of State Governments–WEST (a regional association for state legislators), and Jim Souby, executive director of the Western Governors’ Association, acknowledge the difficulty of nurturing public and political support for growth management in the West. They agree that political power shifts quickly from one party to the other, and yet is a lagging indicator of cultural, demographic and economic change. Governors and legislators might be more convinced to support land use planning, they say, by using visualization techniques to help them understand the costs of existing patterns of development, and to picture the desired future of our communities and landscapes.

How much planning is enough, and who should be in the driver’s seat? Arizona and Colorado have smart growth programs designed to help communities plan for growth and preserve open space. In the November 2000 elections, citizen initiatives in both states introduced some of the nation’s most stringent planning requirements, but both initiatives failed by a 70 to 30 percent vote, suggesting that citizens want to maintain flexibility and freedom—and local control—when it comes to planning and growth management. The story is similar in Hawaii, where business profitability—not zoning maps—directs land use. In May 2001, Hawaii’s governor vetoed a smart growth initiative because it was perceived as being too environmental and would limit developers’ ability to convert agricultural lands.

This emphasis on home rule or local control is supported by a recent survey of citizens in Montana, conducted by the Montana Association of Realtors. In the survey, 67 percent of respondents said that city or county governments should have the power to make land use decisions, while 60 percent opposed increasing state involvement in managing growth-related problems.

In Oregon, citizens narrowly passed Measure 7, an initiative requiring state and local governments to pay private property owners for any regulations that restrict the use or reduce the value of real property. While the impacts and constitutionality of this initiative are still being debated, it sends a strong message to planners in a state that has had one of the most progressive land use and growth management programs for 25 years. The message, according to Oregon’s state planner, is to not rest on your successes, and to keep citizens and communities engaged in an ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of land use planning. He also stressed the need to balance preservation with appropriate development, emphasizing that “good planning doesn’t just place limits on growth and development.”

What is the role of state government? Douglas Porter, keynote speaker at the first retreat and a nationally known consultant on land use and growth policy, says that one of the most important state roles is to offset the lack of will to plan at the local level. He says that state programs should support local planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions. Porter also suggests that state governments can maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.

Oregon’s state government attracted $20 million in federal funding to help communities overhaul zoning ordinances and remove obstacles to mixed uses. Colorado created an Office of Smart Growth to provide technical assistance on comprehensive planning; document best practices for planning and development; maintain a list of qualified mediators for land use disputes; and provide grants for regional efforts in high growth areas. In Arizona, Montana and New Mexico, state planning offices provide a range of technical services to assist communities, such as clarifying state laws, promoting public participation, and fostering intergovernmental coordination.

Jim Souby suggests that one of the most effective roles of state government is to promote market-based strategies and tax incentives. “Tax what you don’t like, subsidize what you do like,” Souby says. Other incentives might include cost sharing and state investment strategies—similar to Maryland and Oregon—to drive development in a positive direction.

How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. In Washington, citizens recently rejected the top-down smart growth model popularized in Florida due to concerns over home rule and private property rights. In response, the state legislature approved a system of regional planning boards that instill some statewide consistency while allowing for regional and local differences.

Nevada, despite double-digit growth in the Las Vegas and Reno areas, does not have a state planning office. However, the legislature mandated Washoe County (home of Reno and Sparks) to create a regional planning commission to address growth issues jointly rather than in a piecemeal manner. Key municipal and county officials in Clark County (Las Vegas) formed their planning coalition voluntarily—compelled to cooperate by the highest growth rate in the nation. This coalition recently presented the state legislature with a regional plan that emphasizes resolving growth issues locally rather than at the state level.

In New Mexico, the city and county of Santa Fe each recently updated their comprehensive land use plans. The plans were fine, except that they were stand-alones prepared with no coordination. Citizens demanded better integration of planning efforts and pushed for a new regional planning authority. Within 18 months, citizens and officials developed a joint land use plan for the five-mile zone around the city, and the regional authority is now developing zoning districts and an annexation plan. In Idaho, city and county officials in Boise voluntarily created the Treasure Valley Partnership as a forum to discuss policies for controlling sprawl, and to coordinate the delivery of services. They are also reviewing the possibility of light rail development.

Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges. For example, the city of Reno has been reluctant to join the neighboring city of Sparks and Washoe County in revising their regional plan. With no enforcement or penalty at the state level, the other jurisdictions can do little to encourage Reno’s involvement. Likewise, New Mexico has no policy framework for regional planning and thus no guidelines on how to share taxing authority, land use decision making and enforcement responsibilities.

Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaborative forums allow local officials to weigh and balance competing viewpoints, and to learn more about the issues at hand. According to Jim Souby, local efforts should incorporate federal land managers because they play such a dominant role in the region’s political geography. Kent Briggs agrees that collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use decisions to drive the decisions. Collaborative processes, when they include all affected interests, can generate enormous political power, even when such efforts do not have any formal authority. While it may be appropriate in some cases to have national or state goals, it is ultimately up to the people who live in the communities and watersheds of the West to determine their future, according to Briggs.

How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local planning. The commission recommended that the state should monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning on an ongoing basis. The governor recently appointed an oversight council to continue this work, but council members say that clear benchmarks are needed against which to evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning—a percentage of open space preserved, for example, or a threshold on new development that triggers tighter growth restrictions. Arizona law, however, simply identifies the issues that must be addressed in comprehensive land use plans. It does not set specific standards or expectations, making meaningful evaluation impossible. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?

The Three Cs of Planning

Three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country.

First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community. What are you trying to promote, or prevent? Be explicit about the values driving the planning process. Emphasize the link between quality of life, economic development and land use planning as a way to sustain the economy and the environment. Remember that people must have meaningful reasons to participate constructively in the planning process.

Second, rely on collaborative approaches. Engage the full range of stakeholders, and do it in a meaningful way. A good collaborative process generates a broader understanding of the issues—since more people are sharing information and ideas—and also leads to more durable, widely supported decisions. Collaboration may also be the most effective way to accommodate the needs and interests of local citizens within a regional approach and when the state’s role is limited.

Third, foster regional connections. Recognize that planning is an ongoing process, not a product to be produced and placed on a shelf. Link the present to the future using visualization and alternative futures techniques. Build monitoring and evaluation strategies into plan implementation. Encourage regional approaches that build on a common sense of place and address transboundary issues. Emphasize that regionalism can lead to greater efficiencies and economies of scale by coordinating efforts and sharing resources.

Matthew McKinney is executive director of the Western Consensus Council in Helena, Montana, a nonprofit organization that helps citizens and officials shape effective natural resource and other public policy through inclusive, informed and deliberative public processes. Will Harmon is the communications coordinator for the Western Consensus Council and a freelance writer based in Helena.

References

Center for Resource Management. 1999. The Western Charter: Initiating a Regional Conversation. Boulder, CO: Center for Resource Management.

Kwartler, Michael. 1998. Regulating the good you can’t think of. Urban Design International 3(1):13-21.

Steinitz, Carl and Susan McDowell. 2001. Alternative futures for Monroe County, Pennsylvania: A case study in applying ecological principles, in Applying Ecological Principles to Land Management, edited by Virginia H. Dale and Richard A. Haeuber. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 165-189.

Swanson, Larry. 1999. The emerging ‘new economy’ of the Rocky Mountain West: Recent change and future expectation. The Rocky Mountain West’s Changing Landscape 1(1):16-27.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. Environmental Planning for Communities: A Guide to the Environmental Visioning Process Utilizing a Geographic Information System (GIS). (September).

While the issue of managing suburban growth has long been on the Lincoln Institute’s agenda, “sprawl” is now receiving a great deal of attention from citizens, policy analysts and policymakers, as well as the popular press. However, crafting policies to respond to suburban growth is extremely difficult for a variety of reasons.

First, we lack a public consensus about what sprawl is. Even paraphrasing former US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, “. . . but I know it when I see it” does not work in this case. For example, one often hears from anti-sprawl activists that they do not want their community to be “another Los Angeles.” However, Los Angeles is more densely populated today than it was 30 years ago.

Dowell Myers and Alicia Kitsuse report that “the Los Angeles urbanized area (the region excluding mountains and deserts) has the highest gross population densities among the 20 largest metropolitan regions, higher even than New York.”1 Exploring deeper, one finds that “Los Angeles” is code for a variety of social problems that are concentrated in our nation’s cities, such as urban crime, teenage pregnancy, poverty, persistent unemployment, and a variety of other concerns, not the least of which is the organization of uses in metropolitan space.

A second challenge to crafting policies to respond to suburban growth is the threat to anticipated economic gain by some of those who own undeveloped land on the fringes of metropolitan areas. For example, one can imagine the great interest these landowners would have in negotiations to redraw urban growth boundaries. The line on the map can have significant monetary implications for a parcel depending on which side of the line it lands.

A third challenge is the variety of existing policies and laws that have encouraged suburban growth over the past 50 years. In a recent Institute-supported study, Patricia Burgess and Thomas Bier make a strong case that governmental fragmentation on two fronts contributes to a policy environment that supports sprawl.2 Fragmentation between levels of government makes regional planning approaches difficult, while fragmentation across functional agencies impedes comprehensive solutions. In another study, Joseph Gyourko and Richard Voith have argued that the combination of the federal mortgage interest deductions and local-level exclusionary zoning have encouraged low-density residential development in jurisdictions surrounding central cities.3

Finally, there is little agreement about desired future development patterns. Thus, if the forces that create sprawl are based on a combination of federal, state and local policies, if our existing landscape reflects both public and private actions, and if the desired future is unclear, how does one even begin to address the issue? The Lincoln Institute’s mission is to contribute to and improve the quality of debate about land policies. Toward that end, our work on sprawl is multi-dimensional, focusing on educational programs for policy officials at the federal, state and local levels.

Programs for Federal and State Officials

Land use issues have increased in importance on the federal policy agenda, and the Institute has begun working with Region 1 of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), based in Boston, to develop a training course for senior administrators. Many staff at EPA are not schooled in land use planning, but their work in traditional EPA areas such as water or air quality requires that they pay attention to land use issues.

Harvey Jacobs, professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, developed and taught a course to two groups of EPA administrators in the fall of 1998. Response to the two-day program, which included the historical and institutional context of land use planning, was so positive that the EPA asked the Institute to offer this program annually as part of EPA’s required orientation for new administrators.

At the state level, the Institute has recently supported programs to facilitate information exchanges among legislators and planning directors. Patricia Salkin of the Government Law Center at the Albany Law School has researched lessons to be learned from states that attempted state-level legislation on growth management, but failed. Among her findings was the lack of in-depth knowledge among state legislators and executive-level policymakers about the causes and consequences of suburban sprawl. In order for any kind of growth management legislation to be passed successfully, sponsorship is needed by the appropriate legislator. Depending on the state, this might be the chair of the Local Affairs Committee or a different committee leader.

In an attempt to respond to this need for better understanding about sprawl on the part of legislators and their staffs, the Lincoln Institute and the Albany Law School cosponsored a briefing session in February 1999, in Albany. It coincided with the legislative session and, fortuitously, was held on the day of a press conference announcing that the bipartisan “Smart Growth Economic Competitiveness Act of 1999” had been filed in both houses of the New York legislature. The bill includes three key provisions:

(1) It charges the Governor to create an inter-agency council to review existing policies related to growth and development.

(2) It creates a task force to study the issue and come up with recommendations.

(3) It asks the Governor to provide grants for regional compact efforts.

National experts on sprawl, state legislators and commissioners, and Mayor William A. Johnson of Rochester and members of his staff exchanged up-to-date information on related state-level efforts, as well as possible resources for their continued work on this issue. The briefing session gave prominence to the issue of growth management at an important juncture in the state’s history. Perhaps most useful to the legislators and other senior-level policymakers was the neutral forum that the briefing provided for frank discussion of the complexities of “smart growth.” While the event was designed with legislators in mind, it is clear that participants from the executive branch who attended the briefing session also benefited.

In another attempt to target our educational programs to key decision makers, the Lincoln Institute, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) and the New Jersey State Planning Commission cosponsored a leadership retreat for state planning directors from ten of the eleven Northeast states. The directors, or in states without a state planning director a representative from the executive branch, met in Princeton in March for a day characterized by peer-to-peer training.

States with nascent state-level efforts were able to learn from those with more institutionalized programs. While Delaware is as different from New York as Connecticut is from Maine, their state officials were able to benefit enormously from stepping outside their individual political, geographic and economic contexts and considering alternative solutions to similar problems. While each state must construct strategies appropriate to its own needs, all states face many common concerns.

The gathering also provided an opportunity to contribute to a larger, region-wide planning effort. Among the initiatives presented by Robert Yaro, executive director of RPA, was Amtrak’s introduction of high-speed rail service between Boston and Washington, DC, which may leverage substantial economic growth for cities along the corridor. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington will clearly benefit from rapid, comfortable transportation between terminals. However, it may be in smaller cities such as Providence, Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport, Stamford, Newark, Trenton and Wilmington where high-speed rail could have a far greater impact. Frequent service to these cities, where airline connections are limited, could bring new investment as well as increased access to other employment centers for their residents.

RPA is drafting a proposal to provide the analysis and preliminary recommendations needed to evaluate the benefits of the Amtrak service. The state planning officers at the Princeton meeting felt that the initiative would be of great interest to their governors and agreed to take the RPA proposal back to their states in an effort to broaden the coalition in support of Amtrak’s high-speed rail service in the Northeast Corridor.

Programs for Local Officials and Community-Based Organizations

At the local level, strategies to address suburban sprawl also need to focus on development and redevelopment in the cities, and the Institute is expanding its course offerings to groups long interested in urban policy. Last November, the Institute cosponsored “Breaking Barriers, Building Partnerships: Urban Vacant Land Redevelopment” with the Massachusetts Association of Community Development Corporations. Meeting in Boston, staff from community development corporations and private and non-profit lenders explored strategies for bringing underutilized land back into use. A similar group gathered in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in May for a workshop cosponsored by the North Carolina Community Development Initiative and the Kenan Institute for Private Enterprise. The hands-on training was designed to give participants experience in generating alternative financing strategies for urban redevelopment

In another effort in the Southeast, the Lincoln Institute provided support to Spelman College as part of an effort to contribute to the redevelopment of its neighborhood in Atlanta. In June, Spelman and its partners from the Atlantic University Center held a community summit as part of a larger initiative to identify both neighborhood needs and university-community strategies to address those needs.

Our experiences in these programs confirm the complex factors influencing current development patterns: the variety of social, economic, technological and political forces; complex and sometimes conflicting policies at the local, state and federal levels; and the actions of those in the public, private and non-profit sectors. Through this work we have come to understand the need for basic information about the broader issue of land markets. In particular we are interested in how and why land markets operate as they do and the implications of land market activity on various public and private stakeholders. Future curriculum development efforts in this area will concentrate on materials to help policymakers and citizens gain a better appreciation of these markets. In doing so, we will have a fuller understanding of the sprawl issue: what causes sprawl, where interventions will be effective, and the characteristics of successful interventions.

Rosalind Greenstein is a senior fellow and director of the program in land markets at the Lincoln Institute.

Notes

1. Myers, Dowell, and Alicia Kitsuse, “The Debate over Future Density of Development: An Interpretive Review.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1999: 22.

2. Burgess, Patricia, and Thomas Bier, “Public Policy and ‘Rural Sprawl’: Lessons from Northeast Ohio.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1998.

3. Gyourko, Joseph, and Richard Voith, “The Tax Treatment of Housing and Its Effects on Bounded and Unbounded Communities.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1999.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En el área metropolitana de Lima, el acceso a la tierra urbana por parte de los sectores populares presenta un historial de problemas que son resultado de la combinación de una ocupación irregular y espontánea de la tierra con políticas de corto alcance para regularizar la tenencia de las tierras. Estas políticas diseñadas para resolver o mitigar la ocupación irregular, en vez de contribuir a una solución, han aumentado el problema.

El seminario, “Los gobiernos locales y el manejo de la tierra urbana: Perú y América Latina”, llevado a cabo en Lima en febrero, reunió representantes municipales, expertos de América Latina y líderes de la comunidad para responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Asegura el actual marco regulatorio el crecimiento ordenado y equitativo de Lima y de las otras ciudades peruanas?. El programa fue organizado por el Instituto Lincoln; el Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano CENCA, una organización no gubernamental que basa su trabaja con las comunidades; la Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú, y la Red de Políticas de Suelo de la Coalición Internacional del Habitat (HIC).

Políticas de Regularización

Por regularización de la tierra se entiende en general el proceso de intervención pública en zonas ocupadas ilegalmente, a fin de proveer mejoras de infraestructura urbana y reconocer títulos de propiedad u otros derechos de ocupación. En muchos países en desarrollo se necesitan políticas de regularización para contrarrestar los patrones irregulares, y a veces ilegales, de desarrollo de la tierra, en que la ocupación del terreno e incluso la construcción de viviendas precede la instalación de obras de infraestructura y la documentación legal.

Desde 1961, el gobierno central de Perú ha apoyado políticas que permitieron que la población de bajos ingresos ocupara las tierras públicas vacantes, consideradas como un recurso natural de “banco de tierras”. La mayor parte de estos terrenos eran arenosos, casi desérticos, ubicados en los alrededores de Lima y de poco valor comercial. Un 34% de la población de Lima vivía en “barriadas” o asentamientos irregulares para 1993.

Ante la ausencia de políticas efectivas para asegurar el acceso legal y organizado a la tenencia de la tierra, la permisividad que llevó al desarrollo irregular de estas áreas periféricas ha llevado a una crisis que domina actualmente la discusión de las políticas relativas a la tierra urbana (Figura 1). Muchos funcionarios gubernamentales y otros observadores reconocen que el sistema en sí mismo fomenta y permite el crecimiento informal e irregular, y que algunas de las políticas diseñadas para regularizar la tierra han contribuido en la práctica a crear más irregularidades.

Problemas del Manejo de la Tierra Urbana

El manejo de las políticas de la tierra urbana en Perú está siendo reexaminado a causa de tensiones entre el gobierno central y el gobierno local. Entre 1981 y 1995, las municipalidades administraron los procedimientos, autorizaciones y políticas relacionados con la regularización de la tierra. En 1996, el gobierno peruano centralizó la administración de los recursos económicos sobre la vivienda y el desarrollo urbano, retomando los temas de regularización. Esta centralización política, administrativa y fiscal ha creado serias ineficacias e ineficiencias, puesto que aún las agencias de los gobiernos locales tienen que responder a las demandas diarias de la población con respecto a tierra y vivienda, y no tiene ya un control integral de esta problemática.

También existen tensiones a causa de las contradicciones entre el marco legal y el mercado informal de las transacciones cotidianas. Esta falta de relación se refleja en la falta de comprensión y desconfianza que existe entre las autoridades y los agentes privados e individuos que operan fuera del marco de las políticas formales.

A pesar de los intentos por parte de municipalidades y organizaciones no gubernamentales por mejorar la coordinación e implementación de las políticas de la tierra que afectan a los mecanismos formales e informales del mercado formal e informal, los líderes políticos todavía toman la decisión final. Esta situación se ve sujeta a la politización de la administración pública, por ejemplo, a través de políticas creadas para satisfacer a los políticos en vez de la comunidad. Al mismo tiempo, esta situación fomenta las perspectivas a corto plazo, puesto que la autoridad gobernante está más interesada en el trabajo inmediato que en el seguimiento detallado de planes de desarrollo que requieren de un plazo más largo para su ejecución. Como resultado, los problemas graves de crecimiento de Lima no reciben una respuesta adecuada por el marco regulador, legal y político actual.

Problemas Comunes

Un resultado importante de este seminario en Perú fue el intercambio de experiencias con otras ciudades latinoamericanas y asiáticas, en las cuales los gobiernos locales pueden utilizar recursos públicos para promover ciudades urbano más ordenadas. Aún cuando los problemas del manejo de la tierra son amplios y complejos, ciertos problemas comunes fueron identificados para ser discutidos en programas futuros:

• El desarrollo de políticas públicas e iniciativas a nivel de la comunidad para capturar el valor de la tierra “intermedia” que se encuentra en proceso de desarrollo y es frecuentemente la más vulnerable a la especulación.
• Programas municipales de vivienda que utilicen el marco legal existente para fomentar la ocupación ordenada del espacio. Específicamente, hay una necesidad de promover la coordinación entre los diversos agentes públicos y privados; así como mecanismos que apoyen créditos financieros para la población de bajos ingresos, la construcción de vivienda, los servicios básicos de infraestructura y las estrategias de participación del vecindario.
• Las políticas de regularización de la tierra y su articulación con políticas de acceso a la tierra, a fin de romper el círculo vicioso de irregularidades que causa los problemas actuales de manejo y de crecimiento urbano.
• Una mayor comprensión de la dinámica de los mercados formales e informales de la tierra, por aquellos encargados de desarrollar e implementar las políticas apropiadas para dirigir las complejas actividades vinculadas al mercado de tierras.

Julio Calderón, investigador urbano y consultor en programas de desarrollo social, está afiliado a Red Suelo, la red de políticas de la tierra de la Coalición Internacional para el Habitat.

Figura 1: Políticas de Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra en Lima

Febrero 1961-1980: Se estableció la Ley 13517, responsabilizando a varias agencias del gobierno central para regularizar los procedimientos de tenencia de la tierra, pero sólo se emitieron 20.000 títulos.

1981-1995: La función de emisión de títulos fue transferida a la Municipalidad de Lima y la entrega de títulos de propiedad de la tierra aumentó a unos 200.000. En los años noventa la capacidad de entrega de títulos disminuyó gradualmente hasta generar una crisis en el mercado de la tierra.

Abril 1996: La Comisión del Estado de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFROPI) asumió las responsabilidades que estaban asignadas a la municipalidad. A partir de la promesa presidencial de incorporar la población de bajos ingresos al proceso del mercado de la tierra, se entregaron cerca de 170.000 títulos de propiedad entre julio de 1996 y julio de 1997. Se espera que 300.000 títulos más sean emitidos para el año 2000. Sin embargo, COFROPI afirma que el 90% de los títulos entregados antes de 1995 presentan problemas de registro, de manera tal que muchos de los títulos entregados desde 1996 son revisión de otros entregados anteriormente. En consecuencia, es difícil reconstruir la cantidad exacta de títulos emitidos bajo cada administración.

Algunas Definiciones

Ilegal – Ocupación de la tierra que contradice expresamente las normas existentes, el código civil y la autorización pública.

Informal – Actividad económica que no se adhiere a las reglas institucionales y que no está protegida por ellas, en oposición a la actividad formal que opera dentro de los procedimientos establecidos.

Irregular – Subdivisión que está aprobada oficialmente pero que no ha sido ejecutada de acuerdo con la ley.

Clandestina – Subdivisión establecida sin reconocimiento oficial.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 6 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Hoy en día la mayoría de los países de América Latina son más urbanos que rurales y están tratando de desarrollar sus economías como partes integrales del mercado global. Este proceso introduce profundos cambios culturales y espaciales tales como mayor segregación y conflictos sobre el uso del suelo urbano.

Es sabida la necesidad de fortalecer la conciencia ciudadana sobre la liberalización de los mercados y la pérdida de protagonismo del Estado en los esquemas de economía y planificación. Este cambio en el papel del Estado —de “proveedor” a “facilitador”— crea un vacío en las necesidades sociales urbanas. Los participantes sugirieron tres abordajes para poder mejorar la gestión del suelo urbano y la igualdad social de manera simultánea.

Primero que todo, utilizar herramientas básicas para establecer y apoyar los sistemas de información urbana: un mecanismo de monitoreo con capacidad para identificar datos de agentes y transacciones, incluidos los precios del suelo; conocimiento de los “ciclos de vida” de las zonas urbanas; y modelos de predicción que permitan establecer la relación entre las economías municipales y nacionales y el mercado de bienes raíces.

En segundo lugar, instituir políticas urbanas que equilibren los mecanismos de mercado existentes, que suelen ser contradictorios. Por ejemplo, es difícil liberalizar los mercados y al mismo tiempo imponer límites en la expansión urbana cuando se intenta ofrecer suministros de suelo adecuados para satisfacer las necesidades de la población pobre trabajadora.

Tercero, reconocer y dar apoyo a las acciones positivas de grupos comunitarios y organizaciones no gubernamentales que se propongan combatir los patrones de segregación de clases, como también a los intentos municipales de utilizar instrumentos como reservas territoriales, mecanismos de financiamiento progresivos y mejoras en los procedimientos administrativos y fiscales.

Uno de los mayores problemas de la planificación territorial en América Latina es encontrar el “borde” de la ciudad, especialmente cuando la tenencia y ocupación del suelo responden a la necesidad social, más que a la ley. Entre las formas de propiedad urbana que funcionan fuera de los reglamentos comerciales está la tierra mantenida bajo el sistema de ejido , que ocupa más del 50 por ciento del territorio mexicano y forma parte de las zonas metropolitanas más importantes. El ejido dificulta el crecimiento natural del mercado de bienes raíces y propicia la expansión de mercados secundarios (informales) descontrolados.

Estos y otros temas afines concentraron la discusión en una reunión que tuvo lugar en México en el mes de abril. En ella, peritos y personalidades académicas compartieron sus puntos de vista sobre los procesos que afectan el orden territorial urbano y los instrumentos disponibles y necesarios para poder lograr una intervención pública eficaz, conducente al logro de objetivos de igualdad social y planificación territorial. Si bien los participantes del seminario manifestaron sus inquietudes por el efecto a largo plazo de la globalización en América Latina, también reconocieron que el escenario de acción, al menos durante los años venideros, será a nivel municipal más que a nivel nacional.

Sobre los autores

Luis Fernando Alvarez es investigador principal del Centro de Estudios Metropolitanos, Centro Universitario de Arte, Arquitectura y Diseño de la Universidad de Guadalajara, México.

William J. Siembieda es profesor de planificación de la Escuela de Arquitectura y Planificación de la Universidad de Nuevo México. El seminario sobre temas de suelo urbano y reserva territorial fue copatrocinado por el Instituto Lincoln y por el Centro de Estudios Metropolitanos en la Universidad de Guadalajara.

If cynics know the price of everything but the value of nothing, then they may have something in common with contemporary American planners. Constrained by the courts, the planning fraternity sometimes appears to have spent the last decade rationalizing nexuses and quantifying costs without really addressing the social and environmental values that should underpin the planning process. Under assault from those criticizing government, as well as from the property rights movement, the profession seems to have retreated into the land of that dismal science, economics. This allegation has been made in a number of ways over the past few years by critics as diverse as New Urbanist architects and, in England, the Royal Family. Is it really justified?

This article is written from an English perspective and is based on research into the types of planning tools used in the United States to minimize the adverse effects and costs of development or to maximize public benefits. The intention is to adapt the best American practices for future use in the United Kingdom.

A broad analysis of the types of policy processes presently being used highlights an amazing breadth and depth of local policy innovation. The accompanying table outlines the range of policies found, broken down either by the way they have been justified or the process that has been used. This “family” grouping may help in suggesting other types of policies that can be used to achieve similar goals. It may also provide a useful reminder that the policies are always supposed to achieve aims, and that those aims should always be in a constant state of review.

The policies span a wide range. Some are not traditionally thought of as land use or planning policies. Indeed, in many cases the policies are not promoted with any explicit intention of achieving specific land use goals. They are, however, all capable of directly affecting land use patterns and, properly used, can all realize benefits to the community.

Purpose Policies

Harm, quality of life and control policies are all well-accepted planning tools. They work to prevent development in inappropriate areas–on wetlands or in congested districts, for example–or to require development in certain places. For the most part these policies do not offer any new lessons to UK planners. However, their scope is widening. New harms are being defined, such as air quality, lack of public transit accessibility and effects on the water table.

In addition, new, more limited types of land interests, such as easements and deed restrictions, are being used as controls, and new actors are becoming involved. For example, in South Florida the Water Management District is now a major purchaser of land and development rights, working in loose alliance with planning authorities. School boards, forest preserve districts and private utility companies have also become more interventionist.

Nevertheless, the main areas of experimentation are in other family groups. Cost policies are being used more proactively and are being expanded in scope. Fees are being used to either encourage or discourage development in particular locations. In San Diego impact fees in outlying zones have been set at economically prohibitive levels to deter development. In Dade County, Florida, road impact fees are banded and fees increase towards the urban fringe. In Montgomery County, Maryland, certain fees are waived when affordable housing is provided.

Cost policies can also be used to raise revenue to meet off-site costs for nontraditional “infrastructure.” In Boston and San Francisco linkages have been identified between the construction of new offices and the need for housing, justifying the extraction of money sums. In principle the range of these fees could be expanded. The City of San Diego already charges developers for new libraries, fire stations and other community facilities, and includes some future maintenance costs. In rapidly growing areas, the public costs of new health infrastructure, hospitals and clinics might also be considered.

Some municipalities have considered the possibility of charging “disassociation fees” that recognize the cost to the community of development away from central cities. “Historic investment” or “recoupment” fees could account for the cost of past provision of infrastructure. In the case of schools or hospitals, a charge could also be made to reflect the cost of wasted desk and bed capacity in the area from which migration has occurred. Alternatively, fees could be charged for the “softer” social costs of increasing the distance that citizens need to travel to reach open space or to reflect the additional stress that occurs from lengthy journeys through strip development.

Process Policies

Market policies have been described as creating “a currency in the public domain that [can] then be traded.” Unsurprisingly, new markets have developed swiftly, responding to local conditions. These policies generally require zoning that sets limits on development at lower levels than the market would otherwise build. A release from that limitation can then be “sold” or transferred for use either on or off site. Seattle, New York state, Maryland and New Jersey lead the way with policies of this type, creating the necessary currency in the form of bonus floor areas and transferable rights. They also provide “market” infrastructure such as credit banks in some cases. In Florida the private sector has set up profitable “mitigation banks” that reclaim damaged land to create mitigation credits for future use by developers whose projects would threaten wetlands. Private sector sales of “utility credits” also occur.

Fiscal policies are all too often seen as intended simply to raise revenue. Yet they can also guide land uses and capture public benefits from increases in the development value of private land. In some Business Improvement Districts, such as those in Miami Beach and Chicago, increased tax assessment streams have been bonded and the proceeds spent on capital works achieving planning aims. In San Diego’s special assessment areas the cost of new social infrastructure, such as parks and libraries, is borne in this way.

In some areas it is possible to secure contributions towards public works that lead to private benefits, for example when major new transport links or services are provided. In downtown Miami, businesses that benefit from a transit system pay a property assessment that meets the county’s share of the original infrastructure cost.

The final two categories of policies are important for different reasons. Adequate transitionary policies are essential. Politically and legally it is difficult to introduce new policies unless careful attention is paid to minimizing or mitigating the immediate costs. Providing for a lengthy period of introduction, or providing compensating credits, as in Montgomery County, may offer some comfort. In some areas “reversionary” permits have been proposed, where development rights revert back to an earlier or less valuable use if they remain unimplemented for a period of time. The miscellaneous policies provide clear means for enforcement. All too often well-intentioned policies are not rigorously applied. Agreements may allow easier control and greater certainty.

Conclusion

It is clear that a large number of policy tools are available to and used by American planners. The opening criticism questioned their fixation with economics. While economic issues are and always should be part of the planning process, the scope of planning policies itself shows that planning is about more than economics. However, it has also become apparent that planners tend to use only a limited range of instruments, even when alternative approaches might better achieve their policy goals.

For a variety of legal and institutional reasons, municipalities understandably concentrate on those policies that they have already used and that have worked. Notwithstanding that, to an English planner the American system as a whole offers a mouthwatering array of policy feasts. It is a shame that so many planners operating within the system only nibble at the corners of a table that is groaning with the weight of possible delights.

Stephen Ashworth is a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute and a Harkness Fellow in a program sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund of New York. In the United Kingdom he is a partner in the firm of Denton Hall, Lawyers. This article is drawn from his research on “Harnessing Land and Development Values for Public Benefit.”

In the past quarter century, the People’s Republic of China has achieved remarkable progress in economic growth, social advancement, and political and administrative reforms. These achievements are largely attributed to the commitment of the Chinese government to improve its people’s welfare through adherence to a free market economy. The interrelated forces of economic growth and policy reform are stimulating rapid and fundamental transformation, especially in Chinese cities, where infrastructure projects, urban renewal, housing development and reform of state-owned enterprises are taking place at an unprecedented pace and scale.

The catalyst for this surge in urban development has been the widespread adoption of the Land Use Rights System (LURs) in which land ownership and use rights have been separated. Its impacts are two-fold. First, it promotes the development of markets for land use rights in which land prices and market mechanisms begin to affect land use and land allocation decisions. Second and more important, it creates an institutional capacity for local governments to raise much-needed revenues to finance urban redevelopment and economic reforms. This revenue-raising ability is rooted in the land ownership structure and power of Chinese government, since the state owns virtually all land in cities and towns. Users are required to pay upfront leasing fees for 40- to 70-year periods, depending on the type of use.

Along with its fiscal impacts, the LURs has created several problems that have drawn increasing attention. First, revenues from leasing state-owned land are not sustainable from a long-term perspective; leasing of existing urban land has been the primary revenue source for financing urban projects, and sooner or later cities will run out of urbanized land available for leasing. For example, Hanzhou City will collect 6 billion RMB (US$732 million) in 2003 from the sales of land use rights, most of them on existing urban land, but land sale revenues have already reached their peak and have started to decline.

Second, Chinese governments lack instruments to capture their share of the increases in land value that are driven up by the combined forces of urbanization, public investment in infrastructure and private efforts. Based on the proposition that one should be rewarded only for one’s own effort, government should capture the increased land value resulting from public investment, rather than having it accrue to the private landowner.

Third, laws do not specify concrete measures for implementing lease renewals. It will be more difficult to collect leasing fees in the renewal period since local governments will have to deal with thousands of households compared to a small number of developers in the first round of leases. Finally, some local government officials have been politically motivated to create an oversupply of land and overheated real estate activity, thus diminishing the central government’s efforts to institutionalize land management and urban planning.

Compulsory Land Acquisition

The other major source of land revenues for local governments is the leasing of former farmland. Both the Chinese Constitution and the 1999 Land Administration Law (LAL) specify that the state, in the public interest, may lawfully requisition land owned by collectives, thus setting the stage for compulsory land acquisition. The local government is thereby able to acquire land cheaply from farmers and sell it to developers at much higher prices. This is a complicated process because it requires first acquiring the land, then converting it to state ownership, resettling the displaced farmers and providing urban infrastructure before finally leasing the land to developers. The law requires that peasants’ lives should not be adversely affected by land acquisition. However, this requirement is difficult to implement, in part because measures of life changes for peasants are multifaceted; financial compensation is only one of the considerations.

Since there is no market data for farmland prices, the government pays collectives and peasants a compensation package that includes three components: compensation for the land itself; resettlement subsidies; and compensation for improvements to the land and for crops growing on the requisitioned land. The law stipulates that compensation for cultivated land shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the acquired land for the three years preceding the requisition.

The amount of the resettlement subsidies depends on the number of people living on the land, but each person’s subsidy shall not exceed six to ten times that of the annual yield from the occupied land. Recognizing diversity of local conditions in terms of socioeconomic development status, productivity, and per capita income, the local government is permitted to raise the sum of the resettlement subsidies and land compensation up to 30 times the previous three years’ average output value on the acquired land.

Emerging Issues

Several significant issues are emerging from this land acquisition process. The first relates to the ill-defined concept of property rights and development rights: who is entitled or empowered to acquire land from peasants for urban development? Currently any entity can acquire land from peasants as long as it can justify public interest or purpose. This public interest requirement was easy to fulfill in the 1990s, since there were many state-owned enterprises that provided services and/or goods to the public. They could acquire land to launch profitable commercial, housing, entertainment and industrial development projects. Individual developers also can acquire land if they have strong political connections. However, these profit-making and political motivations for land acquisition are responsible for increasing corruption in real estate and housing developments and creating chaotic and uncoordinated urban development patterns. Recent economic reforms and privatization have begun to diminish the roles of state-owned enterprises, so it is time to reexamine the concept and definition of public interest and public projects.

The interactions of multiple players in land acquisition (including individuals, corporations and governments) create several problems in land management and planning: (1) it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate land development so that infrastructure and transportation facilities are used efficiently; (2) it voids many urban planning efforts; and (3) it is blamed for “villages in the city” (cheng zhong chun), a phenomenon in which villages and farmland are surrounded by developed land, making the city unattractive, disrupting the continuity of economic, social and cultural functions, and significantly increasing transportation costs.

The second issue is who is entitled to compensation and at what level. The village collective is the basic socioeconomic organization in rural areas, and its largest asset is the land collectively owned by the members. Even though laws recognize that both the collective and its members should be entitled to sharing compensation, there are no specific policy guidelines or regulations on how to divide the shares in different situations. The collective’s share is supposed to enhance its capacity in farmland productivity and social welfare, thus benefiting all its members. However, the role of the collective is diminishing, in part because its membership is decreasing as some farmers leave to become urban residents following acquisition of communal land, and in part because of socioeconomic changes due to advancing urbanization. The revenue sharing scheme reflects this transformation.

To make matters worse, different levels of governments take a cut out of the monetary compensation that is supposed to go to the farmers. For example, the Chinese government built a pipeline that transfers natural gas from the western to the eastern part of the country. This was a national project, so compensation to peasants was paid by the state, but the amount of compensation varied from province to province. The state gave 20,000 RMB (US$2,500) per mu (one mu=666.67 square meters) to peasants in Henan province for their land. Given the fiscal structures between governments, these funds were allocated downward to lower levels of government (from state to province to city to county to township, respectively). At each transfer point, a portion of funds was retained for that level of government to finance their own public goods and services. The peasants received only 5,000 RMB in the end.

The situation here is similar to the concept of value capture in which governments are entitled to retain a portion of land value increases in exchange for their efforts in urban development and infrastructure provision. In a case like Henan it is legitimate to ask if the state’s compensation reflected the true market value of the land. If it did, then local governments should be entitled to their shares. Alternatively, if the state captures the entire land value increase, then the state should reimburse at least the costs of infrastructure provisions supplied by the local government.

The third issue is the equity of compensation, which involves both the level of compensation as well as variations in payments in different situations. Since there are no market data that can truly reflect the price of farmland, compensation hardly reflects market conditions and it varies dramatically from case to case, mainly depending on who plans to develop the land. For instance, profitable projects such as commercial housing and business developments can afford to pay higher prices for land than public transportation and infrastructure projects such as highways, railroads, airports and canals. If these different types of projects, private and public, occur in one village at different times or in neighboring villages at the same time, peasants who are less well compensated feel unequally treated by the government. Many complaints have something to do with this inconsistency in compensation. Such inequity contributes to rising tensions and distrust between peasants and the government and adversely affects subsequent planning and implementation of land management policies.

Finally, it is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to resettle peasants. The LAL requires that the quality of life of farmers shall not be adversely affected by compulsory land acquisition, but does not specify concrete measures to achieve this goal. As a result, many peasants end up living under worse conditions several years after their land was taken than they did before. This situation is not difficult to imagine. Farming does not make peasants rich, but it generates sufficient income to support a minimum level of livelihood and security. Without appropriate training and skills in managing their lump sum payment and without appropriate investment channels (if their compensation is sufficient to make any investment at all), it is common for peasants to end up with no land to farm, no income stream to support themselves, and no job skills to compete in the tight urban job markets.

Land Policy Challenges

China is facing many challenges in its efforts to supply land for new development as rapid urbanization continues. First, it is becoming more difficult for local governments to acquire land for true public works and transportation projects, since they cannot offer peasants as much compensation as developers of more profitable commercial projects.

A second challenge is to fairly compensate peasants when their farmland is acquired. As governments capture a greater proportion of the land value increases, the low level of compensation to peasants imposes a serious long-term threat to sustainable development in China. The number of people who live in poverty after land acquisition continues to rise. For instance, Zhijiang province alone has more than 2 million farmers who have lost their farmland. In 2002, more than 80 percent of legal cases filed by peasants against governments in the province were related to land acquisition.

This situation is a potential source of instability and is likely to escalate in the future as increasing urbanization puts even more pressure on the need for new land for development. According to the General National Land Use Comprehensive Plan, China needs 18.5 million mu of land for nonagricultural uses in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and 90 percent of that land will be acquired from farmers. It is estimated that 12 million farmers will lose their land through this type of acquisition. Without fair compensation or other efforts to assure their social security over the long term, these farmers will impose enormous socioeconomic problems on China for years to come.

The third challenge is associated with the rate of urbanization. According to the report of the 16th Communist Party Convention in 2003, the total population of China is estimated to be 1.6 billion to1.8 billion by 2020, with more than 55 percent living in cities, compared to the current population of 1.3 billion with 38 percent in urban areas. Migration from rural areas to cities is expected to be around 15 million annually, after taking into account the rate of natural urban population growth. Sustainable and affordable urban economic development is urgently needed to absorb these large numbers of rural immigrants.

A final dilemma is how to achieve a balance between farmland preservation and urban spatial expansion. Farmland preservation will inevitably increase land costs, which in turn will slow down urban development. At the same time, it is necessary to promote urban economic growth to provide sufficient job opportunities. This in turn leads to urban encroachment into rural areas to take advantage of less expensive land.

To address these challenges, Chinese officials need to ask some fundamental questions:

• What are the impacts of urbanization and infrastructure provision on the value of farmland, and how do the values change over space and time?
• Who is entitled to the value increases in land, and what is the peasants’ fair share?
• What constitutional rights do peasants possess? Will the Chinese Constitution be amended soon? If so, what will be the impacts?
• What are some other mechanisms of capturing land value? What are the merits and drawbacks of these mechanisms, and will they work in China? If so, how can the government make them work?

Land Acquisition Reform

It is hard to anticipate how Chinese officials will address these questions, but rapid urbanization and massive infrastructure provision will inevitably increase land values over the next two decades. Recognizing the enormous problems associated with land acquisition, several cities have adopted different approaches to protect farmers’ rights and interests so their lives will not be adversely affected. These approaches include:

• Joint ventures (Shanghai). Collectives share stock in the land they transfer for projects. In return, they receive annual cash payments equivalent to average profits from farming.
• Extra allowance for construction on land in villages (Shuzhou). Local governments strictly control the amount of nonagricultural construction on land owned by a collective. By providing an extra allowance for nonagricultural land, villages are able to pursue economic activities other than agriculture and are able to generate income simply by renting out their land for nonagricultural purposes.
• Combination of cash resettlement and provision of social security funds (Zhuzhou and Jiaxing). The population in a village where land will be acquired is divided into three age groups: youth, adults and elders. The younger residents are paid a cash compensation. The cash compensation for adults is double the youth amount and half of it is earmarked for job training. Those two groups are compensated upfront in a lump sum payment. The local government establishes a social security fund for the elderly so they are paid on a monthly basis rather than in a lump sum fashion. The amount of their pay is equivalent to the minimum standard set by governments for urban laid-off workers.
• Compensation based on location, not previous land use (Nanjing City). This example is closer to compensation based on farmland markets.

The Chinese government is taking other measures, such as attempting to make the land acquisition process more transparent so farmers know where and when their land will be acquired and how much they will be compensated for it. This transparency will also help to reduce corruption and improve land management. There is also an urgent need to establish legal channels for farmers to file appeals and protests against governments in compulsory land acquisition cases. The development of farmland markets may challenge land acquisition and also may have substantial impacts on fiscal policy and government financing.

All of these efforts will change both the way land will be taken from farmers and how the issues and challenges of land acquisition will be addressed. Although it is too early to predict how and to what extent these measures and reforms may affect urban and rural development, China is certain to be one of the most fascinating and dynamic places for continuing research and study of land policy reform and societal transformation.

Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.

Note: RMB is the Chinese currency; US$1=8.20RMB.

The Lincoln Institute’s China Program was established several years ago, in part to develop training programs on property taxation policy and local government finance with officials from the State Administration of Taxation (SAT). The Institute and SAT held a joint forum on international property taxation in Shenzhen in December 2003, and more than 100 participants attended another course held in China in May 2004. In January 2005, 24 Chinese tax officials from 15 provinces visited the United States for additional programs; many of them are developing property tax systems in six pilot cities. The Institute also supports the Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council to research property tax assessment in China, and they jointly organized a forum in February 2005.

Economic growth and institutional reforms in China over the past two decades have created profound changes within the society. The central authorities now need to set forth new policies and procedures for modern governance to address devolution of certain authority to local governments, rapid urban and rural development, and changes in land uses and land and fiscal policies. The national government’s commitment to further modernization is most evident in the effort to develop and implement a new property taxation system.

This article describes the current system and discusses issues and challenges that must be overcome to implement a successful property tax policy in China. Given the complexity of this endeavor and the huge variation in economic development across the country, a gradualist approach, which has proved effective in China’s modernization process, may be the best way to initiate property tax reform and development.

Current Taxation System

China collects 24 types of taxes. The central and local governments share the value added tax (VAT) and business tax revenues; the former tax is the primary revenue source for the central government, whereas the latter is the most important tax for local governments. Two other important tax sources for the central government are the consumption (excise) tax and the personal income tax. Twelve taxes are related to land and property, but most do not generate significant revenues. The business tax accounted for 14.41 percent of total central and local government revenues in 2002, but only a small portion of that amount was generated from property-related sources. The reason is that business and income taxes are collected only when land or property is rented or sold, and thus do not provide a steady stream of revenue. It is hard to imagine that any of the 12 property-related taxes could play a key role in resource allocation and local government finance over the long term.

An evaluation of the current tax system reveals additional concerns.

• The tax structure is out of date. The urban real estate tax was developed in 1951 and several other taxes, including the farmland occupation tax, the urban land use tax and the housing tax, were institutionalized in the late 1980s. Given the tremendous advances in economic and institutional reform since then, China’s tax system needs to be updated to function effectively within this new context.
• Domestic and foreign entities operate under differing tax bases and rates. The Chinese government offers tax incentives to foreign entities to attract foreign direct investment that domestic investors do not receive. In addition, domestic land users pay the urban land use tax and housing tax, whereas foreign land users pay the urban real estate tax. Furthermore, structures used for commercial or industrial purposes in rural areas do not pay any land- or property-related taxes. As a result of these differing tax policies, the overall tax rate for foreign enterprises is generally 10 percent lower than that for domestic enterprises.
• Several of the taxes are redundant. For example, the business tax and housing tax are both based on housing rental income; the land value incremental tax, enterprise (corporate) income tax and personal income tax are all based on the net rental or transaction income from property.
• Land and property taxes are levied on transactions rather than asset holdings. This arrangement produces a market-dependent revenue stream and is vulnerable to fluctuations over time.
• The tax base is narrowly defined. Properties used for commercial purposes are subject to certain taxes, but residential properties are exempt.
• The tax system is not well equipped to address the complexities of emerging market development. For instance, current land and property taxes impede the development of real estate markets for mortgaging, re-renting and subleasing transactions.

The shortcomings in the current taxation system have resulted in major fiscal problems for the central government, such as declining revenue mobilization and ineffective use of tax policy to leverage macroeconomic policy (Bahl 1997). When the government conducted tax reform in 1993 to overcome some of the problems, one of the largest initiatives shifted responsibility for urban and public services to local governments.

This measure was successful in improving the central government’s fiscal condition; however, the revenue share for local governments was not increased at a level commensurate with their increased responsibility. Consequently, many local governments face increasing budgetary deficits. Figure 1 illustrates the financial deficit for local governments after the 1993 tax reform. More than one-third of county-level governments have serious budget problems and over half of the local governments directly below the provincial level have budgets that merely cover the basic operations of public entities.

Public Land Leasing

One of the means by which local governments increase revenues in the absence of an effective taxation system is through public land leasing. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the state introduced market principles into the decision-making process regarding land use and allocation by separating land use rights from ownership. This separation promotes the development of land markets, which in turn have created tremendous impacts on real estate and housing development, urban land use and land allocation. Except for a short yet dramatic drop in the early 1990s due to a macroeconomic policy designed to prevent the national economy from overheating, the prices for access to land use rights and public land leasing rates have been increasing steadily.

Despite the significant number of land leasing transactions, the government closely regulates and controls the amount of land being leased by maintaining a monopoly on land supply (Ding 2003). Most land in rural areas still belongs to the collectives, and urban construction is prohibited on rural land unless it is first acquired by the state. Land developments that occur on collectively owned rural land are considered illegal, and administrative efforts such as monitoring and inspecting have been implemented to eliminate these violations.

General land use plans and regulations to preserve cultivated land further control the amount of land available for urban development. The land use plans determine the total amount of land that can be added to existing urbanized areas through an annual land supply quota. At the same time, China’s preservation policy for cultivated land influences both land supply and the location of land available for urban development. The Land Administration Law specifies that at least 80 percent of cultivated land should be designated as basic farmland and prohibited from land development. Land productivity is the dominant factor used to delineate the boundaries of basic farmland. Since most cities are located in areas with rich soil resources, farmland protection designations commonly exist in urbanizing areas. Thus farmland protection inevitably results in urban sprawl and leapfrog development patterns requiring costly infrastructure investments and land consumption.

Financing Local Government. As a result of the government’s regulations and monopoly on selling land use rights, local authorities use the public land leasing system to increase their revenues through land use conveyance fees. For instance, Hangzhou City, the capital of Zhejiang Province with a population of almost four million, is among the top five in per capita national income and GDP. The city generated land conveyance fees of more than six billion YMB in 2002, more than 20 percent of the total municipal government revenues.

Interestingly, these fees were generated largely from selling to commercial users the right to access the state-owned land, yet commercial land development represented only 15 percent of total land uses in newly developed areas. The rest of the land was allocated to users through negotiation in which the sale price either barely covered the costs of acquiring and improving the land, or land was offered free to generate competition for businesses and investments.

Local governments can raise enormous revenues from limited-market transactions of land use rights, in part because land conveyance fees represent lump-sum, up-front land rent payments for a leasing period and in part because local governments exercise their strong administrative powers to require farmers to sell their land at below-market rates. When the government later resells the land at market rates, the price could be more than 100 times the purchase price. After considering the costs of land improvement, however, net revenues may be only ten times the total cost of the land.

Rising land prices resulting from the government monopoly allow local governments to use the land as collateral to borrow money from banks. These loans plus the revenue generated from conveyance fees accounted for 40 to 50 percent of the Hangzhou municipal government budget in 2002. In turn these revenues were used to fund more than two-thirds of the city’s investments in infrastructure and urban services.

Hangzhou City specializes in textiles, tourism, construction and transportation, and generates substantial revenue from business and value-added taxes, although the city’s share of income generated through the public land leasing system is also large. Many smaller cities and towns with fewer commercial and business resources use land leasing directly through land conveyance fees or indirectly as collateral to support up to 80 or 85 percent of their total investments in urban initiatives. These smaller cities must turn to land to generate revenues to fuel economic growth, launch urban renewal projects, and provide infrastructure and urban services that were neglected for a long time prior to the reform era. Land-generated revenue is also used to improve the overall financial environment, attract businesses and investments, and support the reform and reallocation of state-owned enterprises.

Negative Consequences. Despite the importance of public land leasing for income generation, the practice of using this tool to finance local governments may have serious consequences in the long run. The fiscal incentives that compel local governments to control and monopolize the land markets will negatively impact real estate and housing development, industrialization and land use. Furthermore, land is a fixed resource and ultimately there will be no more land left to lease for revenue.

Increasing pressure to protect the rights of farmers also makes it more difficult and costly to acquire land from farmers. As a result, local governments must increase land prices or face reduced revenues from land leasing. Finally, not only does land scarcity and farmer compensation pose a challenge to income generation, but recent policy reform now permits land owned by a collective to enter the land market directly. This change will prevent local governments from acquiring collective lands and exacting conveyance fees for these transfers.

Taxation Reform: Principles and Challenges

The fiscal deficits experienced by local governments and the problems with the resulting public land leasing system provided the impetus for the central government to restructure the entire taxation system. That reform is based on four guiding principles: (1) simplify the tax system; (2) broaden the tax base; (3) lower tax rates; and (4) strictly administer tax collection and management. The central authorities in charge of tax policy and administration offer several specific goals with respect to property-related taxes.

• Unify the tax system so that domestic, foreign, urban and rural entities are treated similarly.
• Terminate taxes at odds with efforts to foster the emergence of healthy land and real estate markets, such as the farmland occupation tax.
• Merge the housing tax, urban real estate tax, and urban land use tax into a single property tax, and treat domestic and foreign entities equally in levying this tax.
• Adopt a value-based property tax.

Considerable debate exists over the merits of the proposed property-related tax reform. Despite the lack of consensus as to the best option, the costs and benefits must be assessed to effectively guide the development and implementation of a new property tax system. In addition, several outstanding issues need to be resolved in order to implement the proposed land and property tax reform.

• What are the existing laws and statutes relevant to property rights and taxation, how will they be amended and how will new laws be developed to legislate the new system?
• What role will property taxation play in intergovernmental fiscal relations and local government financing?
• What will the objectives of property taxation be as a fiscal and land use tool?
• How should land and property taxation be tied to the concept of achieving value capture and financing urban infrastructure and services?
• How will the land and property tax system relate to and be consistent with land policy reforms such as public land leasing, land acquisition, and the development of land markets in urban and rural areas such as agricultural farming?

The implementation of a value-based tax also will require the assembly and cataloguing of massive quantities of data, which historically have not been collected systematically. Furthermore, the data that have been collected are stored in different locations and in paper format. The Ministry of Land and Resources records and handles land-related data and information, whereas the Ministry of Construction is in charge of structure-related information. Matching related records from different ministries and digitizing this data will take years if not decades and will require a huge investment of resources.

The Chinese public has limited understanding of property taxation systems, so education will be required to avoid potentially significant political resistance. Capacity building within the Chinese government also will require professional training in appraisal, evaluation, appeals and collection to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the new tax system.

Conclusions

Despite these unanswered issues and challenges, the Chinese government appears committed to implementing property taxation reform. The application of the widely used and successful gradualist approach for implementing policy and institutional reforms will ensure that the development and institutionalization of the property tax system proceeds on course. For example, data for industrial and commercial structures is more complete and of higher quality than data for residential structures. Furthermore, newer structures tend to have better records than older structures, and records are more complete for structures in urban areas than in rural areas. Thus, applying the property taxation system first to commercial and industrial structures, newly developed land with residential structures, and urban areas will allow the system to take hold before attempts are made to implement change in the areas with greater obstacles to overcome.

References

Bahl, Roy. 1997. Fiscal policy in China: Taxation and intergovernmental fiscal relations. Burlingame, CA: The 1990 Institute.

Development Research Center. 2005: Issues and challenges of China’s urban real estate administration and taxation. Report submitted to the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Ding, Chengri. 2003. Land policy reform in China: Assessment and prospects. Land Use Policy 20(2): 109-120.

Liu, Z. 2004. Zhongguo Suizi Gailan. Beijing: Jinji Chuban She. (China’s taxation system. Beijing: Economic Science Publisher).

Lu, S. 2003. YanJiu ZhengDi WenTi TaoShuo GaiKe ZhiLu (II). Beijing: Zhongguo Dadi Chuban She. (Examination of land acquisition issues: Search for reforms (II). Beijing: China Land Publisher.)

Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.

Harmful impacts of sprawl in terms of air and water pollution, waste of energy and time, traffic congestion and highway accidents, lack of affordable housing, increased flooding, and loss of biodiversity have been widely documented (Platt 2004, ch. 6). Also, the fiscal impacts of sprawl on local communities have been evaluated by researchers at the Brookings Institution, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and elsewhere.

Slaying the “beast of sprawl” has been the Holy Grail of planners and land use lawyers for decades, stimulating the development of new tools like planned unit development (PUD), cluster zoning, subdivision exactions, preferential taxation of farm and forest land, transfer of development rights (TDR), state land use planning, and growth management. Reflecting the antisprawl fervor of the 1970s, a prominent policy report titled The Use of Land euphorically declared:

“There is a new mood in America. Increasingly, citizens are asking what urban growth will add to the quality of their lives. They are questioning the way relatively unconstrained, piecemeal urbanization is changing their communities and are rebelling against the traditional processes of government and the marketplace.” (Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1973, 33)

An architect who specializes in urban and regional planning, Eduardo Reese is the deputy administrator of the Institute for Housing of the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. In previous professional positions he provided technical advice for the master plans of more than 20 cities in Argentina; was secretary of socioeconomic policies at the Ministry of Human Development and Labor of the Province of Buenos Aires; adviser for the Urban Planning Counsel of the City of Buenos Aires; and planning secretary in the City of Avellaneda.

Reese also teaches at the Conurbano Institute at the National University General Sarmiento in Buenos Aires. Currently he is a professor of urban management in the Institute’s B.A. program in urbanism. He also teaches urban development at master’s programs at the School of Architecture, Urbanism and Design of the University of La Plata, as well as at universities in Mar del Plata and Córdoba. In addition, he directs the master planning of the Matanza-Riachuelo watershed in Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: How long have you been involved with the Institute’s Latin America Program?

Eduardo Reese: My relationship dates back to 1997 when we were drafting the plan for the City of Córdoba, which included several large-scale urban projects. We worked to expand the debate about the impacts of these projects on the land market and, consequently, on shaping the city. I continued to participate in various activities, and four years ago I took over the coordination of the annual lectures of the Land Management in Large Urban Projects series, following the death of Mario Lungo, who had led that program for many years.

In 2004, in conjunction with the Conurbano Institute of the National University of General Sarmiento, we conducted a course on Land Markets: Theory and Tools for Policy Management, which was the first one involving a seven-month training program for 50 Argentine students. That educational experience helped create a critical mass of technicians and professionals with an innovative vision toward the management of land policies. The program’s impact has been reflected in urban policy decisions in different municipalities (such as San Fernando and Morón in Greater Buenos Aires); in the Argentine Constitution; in the Urban Reform Movement in 2005; and in academic changes at the Conurbano Institute itself.

Land Lines: What role can large urban projects play in the quality of life of Latin American cities?

Eduardo Reese: Large-scale projects in defined sectors of the city (both central and peripheral areas) have been great protagonists of contemporary urbanism in the past quarter century. Today in Latin America there are many types and sizes of projects, even though more rigorous theoretical thinking is still needed. Important examples are the Bicentennial Portal (Portal del Bicentenario) projects in Santiago de Chile; the Integral Urban Projects (Proyectos Urbanos Integrales) in Medellín, Colombia; urban operations in different cities of Brazil; and the restructuring project in the northwestern sector of San Fernando (Argentina).

Large-scale urban operations as instruments of intervention in the city have been implemented for many decades. In Buenos Aires, for instance, the Avenida de Mayo and the Diagonals, which were planned around 1880, had important impacts on physical space as well as in social, economic, and symbolic aspects. This approach of multiple impacts undoubtedly allowed better assimilation of the Avenida de Mayo, but it also generated a huge debate over who should finance the operation and who would appropriate the land rents generated. Ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that the municipality could not finance the work with the surplus created because the rents belonged entirely to the landowners. For many years this case set a judicial precedent regarding the state’s intervention in the process of valuing land generated by a large-scale public project.

Land Lines: You have a critical view on the widely acclaimed Puerto Madero urban regeneration project in Buenos Aires. What would you do differently in other large redevelopment areas?

Eduardo Reese: Puerto Madero is emblematic of urban projects that promote a model of segregated urban planning and are now being “exported” to other countries as a basic tool to compete for international investment. In this project the state submitted to the market and allowed the construction of an exclusive neighborhood for very high-income sectors. It is a notorious example of public policy explicitly designed to favor the wealthy segments without any recovery of the huge land valuations that were the product of public policy.

Moreover, to guarantee investors an overvaluation of the properties they purchased, the venture has a number of features that cut it off (physically and socially) from the rest of the city, creating even greater value because of its segregation. Puerto Madero has no external wall, as gated condominiums have, but rather multiple implicit, explicit, and symbolic signals that clearly indicate this place is off limits to most of society.

• It is the only neighborhood managed by a state corporation that for 19 years has paid the salaries of public servants and managers to build and maintain a few square meters of park accessible only to that wealthy neighborhood.
• The project has a highly designed urban landscape that contrasts sharply with the brutal poverty in the rest of the city. The parks and amenities are on land already privatized to ensure that the investments, although made using public funds, benefit only the elite owners of the housing and office high-rise buildings nearby.
• A sophisticated system of cameras and security forces defines and controls access to the overprotected zone.
• All these mechanisms serve to ensure the overvaluation of the properties so that only upper social classes can afford to purchase them.

In the end, Puerto Madero is a clear demonstration of the regressive distribution of urban planning and public policy: a trouble-free ghetto for the rich.

Land Lines: As municipalities continue to compete for outside investments, is it possible to reconcile alternative objectives such as social and environmental priorities?

Eduardo Reese: The problem in our cities is not the lack of planning, but the current exclusionary pattern of planning policies. There cannot be one law for the formal city and exceptions for the rest. It is necessary to create a new urban and legal order in Latin America based on the right to the city, the equitable sharing of the benefits of urbanization, and the social function of land ownership.

Land Lines: How does the municipality of San Fernando in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area offers an alternative to this approach?

Eduardo Reese: San Fernando is located some 30 kilometers (km) north of Buenos Aires, with a land area of 23 square km and a population of 156,000 inhabitants. A 5 km long riverside faces the Río Luján and another part of the city faces the mouth of Río de la Plata, where productive nautical activities are concentrated. This privileged location has high property values and all urban services.

The plan and model of urban land management in the city began in 2003 through an agreement between the municipality and the Conurbano Institute. In 2005, a Lincoln Institute training seminar helped broaden the local debate on land management, which led to a series of major decisions:

• to generate sustainable resources to redirect urban development;
• to recover the culture of public works financed by a tax for improvements;
• to recover land for social housing, urban facilities, and road networks;
• to strengthen the city and municipal administration as innovative actors in implementing public policies; and
• to limit the overvaluation of land by intervening in the market through mechanisms such as new urban planning legislation, instruments to collect the surplus, and a large supply of land for the poor.

The urban policy focused on a set of action strategies including (1) ensuring accessibility to new public spaces for recreational, sports and commercial purposes on the riverside, especially for the use and enjoyment of the poor; and (2) the comprehensive regularization of the western sector of the municipality, where most poverty is concentrated.

To implement these strategies it was necessary to increase fiscal resources for public investment in two ways: appropriation of the profitability of land use or municipal land on the riverside through the creation of the Consortium San Fernando Marina Park Company (PNSFSA) and participation of the municipality in the surplus generated from municipal tax reform. (PNSFSA is a company created by the municipality of San Fernando to manage the riverside of the northwest sector of the city, defined as Marina Park.)

The experience of San Fernando is based on a set of management tools within an urban plan focused on the redistribution of income to build a more equitable city. Land is considered a key asset within a wider strategy of local development and, therefore, management relies on a broad mix of planning, administrative, economic, fiscal, and legal instruments aimed at strengthening the role of the public sector. The core axis of policies is the search for equity in the distribution of the costs and benefits of urbanization, within the challenging context of growing pressure on land throughout metropolitan Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: What could or should be changed in the educational system that trains urban planners and managers in Latin America?

Eduardo Reese: First, it is necessary to incorporate a greater understanding of the functioning of land markets in the present context of developing and shaping cities. Second, a more critical analysis is needed of adequate theoretical, methodological and technical instruments to undertake diagnosis and intervention in urban land issues. The 2004 course on Land Markets that I described earlier attempted to develop these kinds of materials to enable students to cover the different scales and dimensions of the problem.

Land Lines: What tensions exist between private and public interests in urban planning?

Eduardo Reese: This is a critical question because the whole history of urban land management has had a common thread: the rights of private ownership of land and the structure of ownership have always come into conflict with urban planning activity, which is a public responsibility. In that sense, there will always be tension between public and private interests in building the city.

In my view, urban projects in Latin America have the responsibility to contribute not only to the creation of new spaces for public use and enjoyment, employment generation and environmental sustainability, but also social inclusion, equity in the access to services and the redistribution of urban rents generated by the project. The four cases on Chile, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina mentioned earlier show that these benefits are possible in many contexts.

However, instead many urban projects have been justified as necessary to attract investment and/or consumers and to ensure or reinforce the dynamic competitive advantages of the city. These undoubtedly positive goals are sometimes used as a mechanism to legitimize interventions that deepen the serious sociospatial segregation of cities. Such adverse effects of the market are not fatal to the city, but are the outcome of perverse political choices.