SHARE
Mexico is beginning to create an enabling environment to use land value increments for development purposes. Recent constitutional and legal reforms have authorized the clarification of land titling as well as the commercialization of land. Real estate markets are gradually superseding the immobile land tenure arrangements that gave rise to informal markets characterized by confusing and often arbitrary arrangements and high transaction costs. The private sector is moving into the areas of low-income housing and public-private arrangements for balanced and sustainable land developments.
The State of Mexico has launched a comprehensive program, known as PRORIENTE, to promote government, business and community interaction for joint management and financing of urban development in the eastern part of the territory. PRORIENTE’s vision is one of “new cities” surrounding the Mexico City megalopolis, characterized by balanced growth between demographic densification, income-generating activities and environmental protection. The creation of employment in and around the new settlements is an overriding social and economic goal of the program.
Given the intricate pattern of interests involved, PRORIENTE has adopted an intersectorial and interjurisdictional approach. Indeed, PRORIENTE requires that the State of Mexico take the initiative to coordinate land and fiscal policies and instruments among the federal government, the newly elected opposition government of the Federal District, and the many municipalities that are largely controlled by opposition parties.
The challenges for PRORIENTE are formidable:
Population growth in the region between now and the year 2,020 is estimated at five million people.
Deforestation and disorganized urbanization of agricultural areas are leading to further desertification of this region.
Innovative policies and contractual arrangements have yet to be introduced to create effective land markets.
Uncontrolled urbanization has been dominated by private developers who speculate with land prices, ignore urban planning and appropriate huge increases in land values, as well as by settlements of low-income immigrants. New mechanisms for public capture of increases in land values that emanate from new policies and/or administrative decisions will have to overcome serious resistance.
Real estate taxation is largely underdeveloped, and the property tax structure is plagued with many exceptions. Cadasters are often outdated and have only weak connections with the system of transfer and registration of real property.
Public-private partnerships that are accountable to the communities and operate on a transparent basis are practically unknown in a country with a tradition of a strong federal government.
Intergovernmental fiscal relations and interjurisdictional arrangements have been dominated by the will and the overwhelming fiscal power of the federal government, which controls 80 percent of public income compared to four percent for the municipalities and 16 percent for the state. Local and regional governments are just beginning to experiment with political coalitions and multiparty governments capable of surviving the short life span of one administration.
In view of these obstacles and challenges, the leaders of PRORIENTE have adopted a participatory, negotiating approach that is already producing visible results. Businesses have formed large-scale conglomerates capable of funneling much-needed capital and management technologies into the area. The federal government, the Federal District, municipalities and communities are invited to the negotiating table to participate in an ongoing process that nurtures an expanding program rather than a precise policy or institutional goal.
The Lincoln Institute recognizes that this project presents an excellent opportunity to study the complex role of land as a strategic factor for development throughout Latin America. Last April, the Institute coordinated a seminar on urban land markets in the city of Toluca, and is continuing to serve as a sounding board for policymakers of the State of Mexico and other public and private actors involved in PRORIENTE.
In addition, a Lincoln Institute team is cooperating with other institutions and practitioners to share international experiences regarding both the process of policy formation and the operational side of the PRORIENTE program. Special attention is given to the sustainability and replicability of strategies to facilitate the transition from restrictive land tenancy systems, weak property tax administrations and highly centralized fiscal resources to competitive land markets and local land use initiatives to encourage development. The Institute will utilize this experience in Mexico for developing courses in other countries facing similar situations.
Fernando Rojas, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is a legal scholar and public policy analyst from Colombia. He was formerly a visiting fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University. Alfonso Iracheta is technical secretary of PRORIENTE and the director of planning for the State of Mexico.
SHARE
Despite the long-term and continuing trend away from central business districts and toward suburban development, a number of factors are motivating recent attention to rail transit. These factors include:
concerns about the negative impact of auto-oriented sprawl desires to reduce air pollution and energy consumption interest in rebuilding urban communities need to provide access and mobility to those without autos desires to save the costs and avoid the impacts of new or widened roadways
Many metropolitan areas in the United States are considering the addition or expansion of light rail and commuter rail systems to link employees with business centers. The land use characteristics of the corridors where transit lines operate have been shown to influence transit ridership, but much of the previous work is more than 20 years old and based on data from a limited number of regions.
Our national research project, conducted for the Transit Cooperative Research Program with Jeffrey Zupan, expands and updates earlier research. We analyzed information on 261 stations on 19 light rail lines in 11 cities, including Baltimore, Cleveland and St. Louis, and 550 stations on 47 commuter rail lines in the six city regions of Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Philadelphia and Washington, DC.
The study shows that light rail and commuter rail serve distinctly different markets and land use patterns. Light rail with its closely spaced stations attracts more riders per station when it is located in denser residential areas. Feeder bus service helps to boost ridership. Light rail can function in regions with a wide range of CBD sizes and employment densities. Commuter rail depends more on park-and-ride lots at stations in low-density, high-income suburban areas farther from the CBDs, which tend to be larger and more dense than those in light rail areas.
Light rail, with its more frequent service, averages about twice as many daily boarders per station as commuter rail, even though light rail is more often found in smaller metropolitan areas. Figure 1 shows that light rail is most effective in attracting passengers close to the CBD. Figure 2 shows that commuter rail attracts the largest number of its riders about 35 miles out from the CBD. In both figures, other factors affecting ridership, except CBD employment density, are held constant.
Because most transit systems emanate from and focus on a region’s CBD, the amount of employment concentrated downtown clearly affects the demand for transit. Figures 1 and 2 also show that ridership increases with CBD density for both light rail and commuter rail. For light rail, the effects of CBD density on ridership are most pronounced for stations within 10 miles of the core, while for commuter rail the larger impacts occur at stations 20 to 50 miles outside the city.
Changes in Employment and Residential Density
CBD employment density (as measured by employment per gross CBD acre) is nearly twice as important for commuter rail ridership as for light rail. Our study shows that a 10 percent increase in CBD employment density produces 7.1 percent more commuter rail riders, but only 4.0 percent more light rail riders. Commuter rail boardings are more strongly influenced by CBD employment density because these systems usually have a single downtown terminal. Higher-density CBDs assure that more jobs are within walking distance of the commuter rail station. Employment density in city centers is less important in light rail regions since they have more stations distributed throughout the CBD.
On the other hand, a 10 percent increase in station area residential density (as measured by number of persons per gross acre within two miles of a station) boosts light rail boardings by 5.9 percent and commuter rail boardings by only 2.5 percent. Throughout the study these effects are measured holding constant transit system characteristics such as parking availability, station distance to the CBD and station area income levels.
Light rail, with its relatively short lines, is most effective in attracting passengers when stations are in higher-density residential areas close to the CBD. Commuter rail ridership rises more slowly with residential density because commuter rail is a high-fare mode, and its higher-income riders tend to live in more expensive, lower-density places. Moreover, the higher speeds and longer distances on commuter rail tend to increase ridership to the CBD from precisely those places outside the city where residential densities tend to be low.
Cost-efficiency and Effectiveness
In this study, cost-efficiency is measured by annual operating costs plus depreciation per vehicle mile. Effectiveness is measured by daily passenger miles per line mile. For light rail, these measures indicate a strong positive relationship with CBD employment size and residential density. A weaker but still significant relationship occurs for CBD employment density and for the line distance from the CBD. This suggests that medium to large cities with higher density corridors work best for light rail. For commuter rail, larger, denser CBDs attract more riders per line mile, but add to the cost per vehicle mile, creating a trade-off between effectiveness and cost-efficiency.
The length of the rail line is important for both light rail and commuter rail. Longer light rail lines are both slightly more cost-efficient and effective, but ridership diminishes beyond 10 miles. Commuter rail lines are much more cost efficient when they are longer, but their effectiveness declines beyond 50 miles.
This summary does not address many other significant factors in rail transit usage and land use patterns, including operating, capital and environmental costs saved as a result of not using other modes of transportation, notably automobiles and buses. Cities considering investment in new or expanded rail systems need to examine carefully all transportation alternatives in a corridor, including site-specific conditions and local preferences. Further, our study makes clear the need to integrate transit planning with land use planning at the earliest possible stage.
___________________________
Judy S. Davis is an urban planner and Samuel Seskin is a senior professional associate with Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade and Douglas in Portland, Oregon. As a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute, Seskin also develops and teaches courses linking land use and transportation. This article is derived from a report titled Commuter and Light Rail Transit Corridors: The Land Use Connection. It will be published by the Transit Cooperative Research Program in the summer of 1996 as part of Volume 1 of An Examination of the Relationship Between Transit and Urban Form, TCRP Project H-1.
SHARE
From the earliest days of the Republic, civic boosters have prodded American governments to develop large-scale physical facilities—mega-projects, we label them—ranging from canals and railroads in the nineteenth century to rail transit systems and convention centers today. Until the mid-twentieth century, such projects tended to involve modest public expenditures by contemporary standards and they rarely caused significant disruption of the existing urban fabric.
This pattern altered abruptly in the 1950s and early 1960s. Central city economies had, with rare exceptions, stagnated through the Great Depression and World War II, and they continued to do so in the early postwar years. Local business and political leaders concluded that if central cities—particularly those developed prior to the auto age—were ever to thrive again, they would require major surgery. Specifically, they needed to clear slums to provide large downtown sites for redeveloped office districts; to facilitate high-speed automotive movement between suburban and central city locations; and to provide larger airfields with attractive terminals for the nascent commercial aviation industry.
Recognizing that they could not finance these expensive projects with locally generated funds, urban leaders campaigned aggressively for federal assistance, and they were successful in obtaining considerable amounts of funding. We attribute their success mainly to the following factors: (1) public confidence in government was unusually high in the postwar period; (2) business leaders generally accepted the need for government activism to sustain prosperity; and (3) although cities lacked the political clout to secure expensive programs on their own, they were able to participate in much broader coalitions—most notably, those focused on housing (which expanded to include urban renewal) and highways. Urban aviation advocates were less successful, but as aviation traffic boomed they were able to fund new airports and expand old ones by relying primarily on revenues from landing fees and terminal leases.
During the late 1950s and the 1960s these efforts combined to produce an unprecedented wave of urban public investment. While often successful on their own terms, these projects tended to be highly disruptive as well, destroying in particular vast amounts of low-income housing and urban parkland. Project advocates maintained that the public should accept such impacts to advance the greater good. Robert Moses, New York’s famed master builder, never tired of citing a French proverb: “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” (Caro 1974).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, neighborhood activists allied with those involved in the emerging environmental movement against the full panoply of mega-project programs that had come into being during the 1950s. They succeeded not just in blocking large numbers of planned expressways, renewal schemes and airport projects, but also in securing the adoption of numerous statutes, regulations and judicial doctrines, thus strengthening the hands of critics in urban development controversies. For a time it seemed to most observers that the era of mega-project investment in cities was over.
“Do No Harm” Planning
The forces committed to mega-projects have proven highly resilient and adaptive, however. While the character of such investment has changed dramatically since the 1970s, its volume has remained high. Nevertheless, mega-project advocates have had to work within new constraints; they have had to learn the art of making omelets without leaving a residue of broken eggs. We label this art, as exercised in the domain of urban land use, “do no harm” planning. Its essential components are the selection, siting and design of projects to minimize disruptive side effects, and the aggressive mitigation of any harmful impacts that cannot be avoided entirely. Most obviously, governments have ceased clearing slums and building expressways through developed neighborhoods, and only one major new passenger airport—in Denver—has been constructed since the early 1970s.
Public investment in facilities such as rail transit systems, festival retail markets, sports stadiums and arenas, and convention centers has surged. Within the transportation sector, moreover, investment priorities have shifted toward the reconstruction of existing highways, new construction on suburban fringes and airport terminals rather than runway improvements. The great advantage of such projects is that they are relatively easy to site either at some distance from existing development or in older commercial districts that have few preservationist defenders.
Where cities and states have gone forward with major highway and airport projects, they have taken extraordinary steps to minimize social and environmental impacts. The new Denver airport, for example, is on a previously rural 53-square-mile site 25 miles east of downtown. Its location and scale were determined primarily by two considerations: land assembly without the disruption of existing residential enclaves; and future airport operation without significant noise impacts overflowing the airport boundary. Boston’s $14.6 billion Central Artery/Tunnel project, known colloquially as “The Big Dig,” appears very different, in that it is located in the heart of downtown, but it is virtually identical in its do no harm planning orientation. It is almost entirely underground as it passes close to built-up areas (replacing a previous elevated roadway); it has been threaded into the urban fabric without the taking of a single home; and it will add significantly to the city’s parkland.
Common Themes
In addition to do no harm planning, our review of mega-projects built over the past two decades identified the following themes as particularly salient.
Business Support
While insufficient by itself, strong business support has generally been an indispensable condition for mega-project development. Within the business community, leadership has almost invariably come from enterprises with deep local roots, particularly in real estate ownership, development and finance. The strongest supporters of Denver’s new airport, for example, were those who owned property with commercial development potential near the new site; downtown businesses concerned that the city’s existing airport was too small to allow for the region’s continued development; and the banks and financial service firms that had lent money to many of the city’s property owners and developers. Similarly, the most active and effective support group for Boston’s Big Dig has been the Artery Business Committee, a coalition of those who own major buildings adjacent to the artery’s corridor and several major employers with historic roots in downtown Boston.
Public Entrepreneurs
In addition to well-mobilized constituencies, aggressive, deft government officials have been indispensable to the success of recent mega-project proposals. Indeed, it was frequently they who originated project ideas and first sparked the formation of supportive coalitions. Even when others initiated, they commonly took the lead in crafting strategies, tactics and plans; in lobbying for state and federal aid; in securing other types of needed legislation and regulatory approvals; and in dealing with project critics.
Though business groups initiated some projects, they seemed more frequently to “invest” in proposals originated by public entrepreneurs. The business constituents were by no means easy marks, of course. Like venture capitalists in the private sector, they considered a great many ideas brought to them by public entrepreneurs (and others), but invested only in those few that looked particularly good for their enterprises, were to be carried out mainly or entirely at public expense, and had a reasonable chance of securing the myriad approvals required.
Illustratively, Boston’s Big Dig was conceived by Fred Salvucci, a transportation engineer who had become active in battles against planned highway and airport projects during the 1960s and then served as transportation secretary for twelve years under Governor Michael Dukakis. During the first Dukakis administration (1975–1979) the main constituencies for a new harbor tunnel (business) and for depressing the central artery (neighborhood and environmental groups) were at loggerheads. While temporarily out of office from 1979 to 1983, however, Salvucci concluded that the politically feasible strategy might be to marry these projects, while also relocating the tunnel to an alignment far from a neighborhood that it had historically threatened. This strategy in fact resolved the local controversy, and prepared the way for a successful campaign for massive federal aid, led again by Salvucci with critical business support.
Denver Mayor Federico Peña broke a similar type of logjam that had persisted for years over whether to expand Denver’s existing Stapleton Airport or build a new facility on a large site outside the city’s borders. Concluding that the obstacles, both political and environmental, to expanding Stapleton were insuperable, but that city ownership and operation of any new airport remained a critical objective, he negotiated successfully with adjacent Adams County for a massive land annexation. To achieve this objective, he accepted conditions protecting county residents from significant airport noise and guaranteeing Adams County most of the tax benefits that would flow from economic development around the new airport. With local agreements in hand he, like Salvucci, then led a successful campaign for special federal assistance.
Mitigation
Do no harm plans avoid substantial neighborhood and environmental disruption but it is impossible to build a mega-project with no negative side effects. The commitment of do no harm planning is to ameliorate such impacts as much as possible, and to offset them with compensatory benefits when full direct mitigation cannot be achieved. The boundary between mitigating harm and providing net benefits to protesting groups is often indistinct, however, so the norm of mitigation provides leverage as well for skilled activists whose demands are at times tangential to the mega-projects whose budgets they seek to tap. Mega-project champions in turn reflected on the fate of such projects as New York City’s proposed Westway, which failed because of what seemed at first a minor legal challenge. They were deathly afraid of litigation and were frequently willing to make very expensive concessions in return for agreements by critics not to sue.
During permitting for the Big Dig, for example, Boston’s Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a group whose signature strategy was litigation for environmental purposes, threatened to sue unless the state committed to accompany the highway project with a multi-billion dollar set of rail transit investments, mainly for expansion. CLF’s rationale was that the transit projects would prevent the new road from filling up with traffic, which in turn would generate more air pollution. Modeling done for the project (as well as data from other regions) showed that the Big Dig would not in fact have significant air pollution effects, and that investing in rail transit extensions would be a particularly inefficient way to offset pollution effects if they did occur. Nonetheless, both Democratic and Republican state administrations acquiesced to CLF’s demands because they did not want to risk litigation, which at the very least threatened project delays and might also have imperiled the breadth of local consensus in support of the Big Dig.
Bottom-up Federalism
A naïve observer of American politics might assume that the federal government distributes grants to achieve national goals. In fact, however, the grantor-grantee relationship is usually much more complicated than that. Recipient jurisdictions are typically active participants in the coalitions that bring new programs into being and provide them with critical support each budget season. The programs of aid for mega-project investment that we examined were all distinguished more by their openness to local initiative than their sharp definition of national purpose. If grantee jurisdictions had a great deal of influence collectively on program structure, moreover, they had even more when it came to projects, and they were able to exercise it individually.
Every project we studied was initiated by subnational officials and interest groups, and it was they who took the lead at every stage in the decision process. While limited in their discretion by federal program rules, they were alert as well to opportunities for securing waivers, statutory amendments and add-on funds, with the assistance of their congressional delegations. Stated another way, when federal aims are diffuse and weakly defended, principal-agent theory (as applied to the intergovernmental system) needs to be read bottom-up rather than top-down.
High and Rising Costs
Do no harm designs and related mitigation agreements have tended to produce projects that are vastly more expensive than their historic predecessors. According to Brian Taylor (1995), the average cost per centerline mile of urban freeways rose by more than 600 percent in real terms from the 1960s to the 1980s, and costs were even more extreme in some of the mega-projects we examined. Whereas Taylor found that urban freeways cost on average about $54 million per centerline mile (in 2002 dollars) in the 1980s, for example, the Big Dig cost $1.9 billion per centerline mile. Judith Grant Long (2002) reports in a similar vein that the average cost of new stadiums and arenas more than quadrupled in real terms from the 1950s to the 1990s, and we have calculated that light rail development costs increased by nearly two-fifths from the 1980s to the 1990s.
Both older and more recent projects have been marked by a consistent pattern of substantial cost increases between authorization and completion. The projected cost of Boston’s Big Dig, for example, has roughly tripled in real terms since its approval by Congress as an interstate highway project in 1987. The cost of Denver International Airport more than doubled from the late 1980s, when it received voter approval and its federal funding commitments, to its completion six years later.
While a full study of this issue was beyond the scope of our work, we judge that the consistent pattern of underestimation has two primary causes. First, project advocates have very strong incentives to estimate optimistically as they seek political commitments of support. Second, mega-projects are often so complex—both technically and in terms of the mitigation agreements that will often prove necessary to keep them on track—that early cost estimates are typically little more than guesses within very broad ranges.
Locally Painless Project Funding
The hallmark of successful mega-project financing is that projects should appear costless, or nearly so, to the great majority of local voters. The easiest way to achieve this result is to rely on funding from higher-level governments. Where such aid is unavailable or insufficient, the challenge is to identify other sources of revenue to which local voters are generally insensitive—which means, above all, avoiding local property and income taxes and spreading the burden beyond host city residents.
This challenge became increasingly salient after 1970 with rising antitax sentiment, the end of federal renewal aid, and the surge in capital spending for such facilities as stadiums, arenas and convention centers, for which federal aid was only rarely available. In the growing domain of mass transit, moreover, federal matching ratios have tended to decline since 1980.
The revenue strategies adopted to deal with these challenges have been varied and ingenious. New terminals and runways at major airports have been funded largely by increased landing fees, lease payments, and (since the early 1990s) ticket surcharges authorized by the federal government but imposed locally. Stadiums, arenas and convention centers are commonly funded by taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents, such as taxes on hotel rooms, car rentals and restaurant bills. Where broad-based taxes have been unavoidable, the preferred method has been incremental add-ons to sales taxes, which typically require voter approval. Voters have often said no, but sales tax increases provide large amounts of revenue when they are adopted—and when they are not, project advocates routinely come back with revised plans. In Los Angeles and Seattle, for example, transit advocates responded to referendum defeats by scaling back their rail plans and allocating some of the projected revenue to bus service and local road improvements.
Looking to the Future
Almost two decades ago, when New York City’s ambitious Westway project died even though its backers had helped pioneer the do no harm planning and design paradigm, then-Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wondered whether it had become so difficult to build public projects that “Central Park could not conceivably be built today” (Finder 1985). Recent history suggests, however, that the mega-project impulse remains strong. The pertinent question is not whether the U.S. political system can still generate mega-projects but whether the projects that go forward are typically worth their costs to taxpayers.
In general, economists are skeptical about the cost-effectiveness of the most prominent mega-projects, from the Big Dig to the scores of rail transit systems, professional sports facilities and convention centers, built over the past 25 years. Project advocates invariably retort that the economists miss intangible project benefits such as fostering community pride and (in the case of transit, particularly) strengthening the likelihood of smart growth practices in new development. The national coalitions in support of highway and airport improvements, which economists tend to rate more favorably than other types of projects, have argued vociferously that current environmental rules and opportunities for critics to litigate are too onerous and should be relaxed.
There is no easy resolution of these issues because they involve tradeoffs between important, deeply held values. However, our review of a half-century of public works projects in urban areas has left us with three clear impressions. First, states and localities should be required to bear half or more of the cost of projects they undertake, because great windfalls of earmarked money from higher levels of government tend to overwhelm serious local deliberation. Second, strong environmental regulation helps ensure that local pro-growth coalitions do not leave fouled environments or devastated neighborhoods in their wake. Finally, while referenda are in general a flawed instrument of policy making, the evidence seems to suggest that the requirement of voter approval for major local projects tends to have a salutary effect on the bargaining between business groups that stand to benefit financially from the proposed investments and the more general interests of local taxpayers and residents.
_____________________
Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff are the coauthors of Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment. Altshuler is the Stanton Professor of Urban Policy at the Kennedy School of Government and the Graduate School of Design (GSD) at Harvard University, and director of the Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Luberoff is the Taubman Center’s associate director and an adjunct lecturer at GSD.
References
Caro, Robert A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Finder, Alan. 1985. Westway: A road that was paved with mixed intentions, losing confidence and opportunities. New York Times, September 22, sec. 4, 6.
Long, Judith Grant. 2002. Full count: The real cost of pubic funding for major league sports facilities and why some cities pay more to play. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.
Taylor, Brian. 1995. Public perceptions, fiscal realities, and freeway planning: The California case.
SHARE
A conservation easement is private land, held by a private nonprofit corporation (typically a land trust) or a government agency. Though conservation easements are perceived as a win-win land protection strategy, there are several downfalls in their design—requiring this fairly new real estate law to come under increased scrutiny.
Conservation easements leave the land in private ownership and often achieve the goals of land protection without regulation or adversity, and usually without any government oversight. There is often concern that the terms of the conservation easement will be honored and that the conservation easement holder will have the capacity and resolve to monitor, enforce and defend the restrictions of the conservation easement in perpetuity, as conservation easements promise.
Because conservation easements are privately held property, most states have no public registry for conservation easements, no particular legal structure and no public review, transparency or accountability concerning their design, monitoring, enforcement, defense or stewardship.
This article identifies issues with the current practices for conservation easements and seeks solutions for the future of the conservation easement. Should their be standards enforced by federal or state governments? Should more responsibility be placed on the land owners? How would new regulations affect the use of the land? If conservation easements are to serve future generations as is their promise, they will have to resolve the issues they face.
Advance page to read full article
No recent happening in land conservation rivals the deployment from coast to coast of conservation easements. Beyond tax and other public subsidies, one of the driving forces favoring this phenomenon is that conservation easements are perceived as a win-win strategy in land protection, by which willing landowners work with private land trusts or government agencies to provide lasting protection for portions of the American landscape. Conservation easements leave land in private ownership, while allowing the easement holder (the land trust or agency) to enforce voluntary, contracted-for, often donated but increasingly paid-for restrictions on future uses of the easement-encumbered property. Conservation easements are often welcomed as achieving the goals of land protection without regulation or adversity, and usually without any government oversight.
At the same time, the rapid increase in the use of conservation easements raises the concern that they may present something of a time bomb that requires preventive action. Most of the laws and conventions concerning conservation easements were created at a time when no one could have foreseen their explosive growth and complexity. These laws and conventions require well-considered approaches to reform, lest we ultimately risk losing the public benefits that we thought conservation easements would secure in the future.
Definitions
A “conservation easement” (in some states referred to as a conservation restriction or similar term) is a set of permanently enforceable rights in real property, held by a private nonprofit corporation (typically a land trust) or a government agency. These rights impose a negative servitude (in other words, a set of promises not to do certain things) on the encumbered land, and they are permanently enforceable by the easement holder. Conservation easements are a relatively recent invention of real estate law and are enabled by statute in virtually every state.
A “land trust” is a loosely defined concept that usually includes at least two basic elements. First, it is a private, nonprofit charitable corporation incorporated under the laws of a state and qualified as tax-exempt and entitled to receive tax-deductible donations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Second, depending on state law, a land trust’s mission, but not necessarily its exclusive or even primary one, is the conservation of land.
The Public Stake in Conservation Easements
Why should the public, and therefore its government at all levels, care about how conservation easements are created and managed? One reason is that virtually every conservation easement is associated with a significant public subsidy. Although most easements are donated by private landowners to private land trusts, they almost always result in public subsidies in the form of income tax deductions to the easement donors. In many cases a further subsidy comes in the form of reduced real property and estate taxes in the future. Increasingly, conservation easements are being purchased with public money, sometimes on a grand scale involving millions of dollars.
The public should care about how its money is being spent, whether it is being spent for something of long-term public benefit, and whether it is being spent efficiently; that is, the public should be interested in whether it is getting a fair public bang for its buck.
Beyond the public’s financial investment, its interest in conservation easements as a form of charitable trust transcends the interests of the private parties to the transaction. Further, some conservation easements guarantee public access to the property, such as for hiking or scenic enjoyment, giving the public an added stake in the long-term security of the easement. In the case of conservation easements granted by developers as a quid pro quo for regulatory permits, these easements may also comprise a public investment because they are part of the consideration in exchange for the right to proceed with a project that may cause environmental harm. Finally and not least importantly, the public has an abiding concern in the orderly future of legal understandings and the stability of interests in real estate.
In sum, when a conservation easement is created there is a legitimate public interest and concern that the terms of the easement will be honored and that the easement holder will have the capacity and resolve to monitor, enforce and defend the restrictions of the easement in perpetuity, as conservation easements promise. Indeed, the very purpose of state and federal laws that support and subsidize the creation of conservation easements is that the public interest is intended to permanently benefit from them.
Trends and Problems
Rapid growth. The attractiveness of conservation easements is demonstrated by the explosive growth of land trusts established to accept easements. Land trusts have become a big business in America, both for their vast holdings of conservation easements and other properties and for their increasing memberships and finances. Even so, many land trusts have come into existence only during the past 15 years and operate at a local level. While land trust creation continues to increase rapidly, an important policy question is whether the ever-expanding number of small land trusts throughout the nation is something that is good for our (and their) future.
The Land Trust Alliance (LTA), an organization that serves many land trusts nationwide, reported in its national census that between 1998 and 2003 the number of local and regional land trusts increased 26 percent from 1,213 to 1,526; the number of conservation easements held by these land trusts grew from 7,400 to nearly 18,000; and the area covered by these easements expanded from nearly 1.4 million acres to more than 5 million acres (Land Trust Alliance 2004; see Figures 1 and 2). In addition, there are a number of national organizations, such as The Nature Conservancy and the American Farmland Trust, that hold additional thousands of conservation easements. Untold thousands of easements also are held by federal, state and local governments.
Often land trusts and government agencies alike focus on, publicize and celebrate the accumulating numbers of conservation easements in their portfolios, as well as the numbers of acres that they cover, without equivalent regard for the quality of the easements or of the lands they protect. Since conservation easements bring with them long-term and costly responsibilities for the holder in monitoring, stewardship, enforcement and defense, this focus on numbers can be short-term thinking that leads to long-term problems.
Lack of uniformity. The terms of conservation easements are infinitely variable. Calling something a conservation easement tells one nothing about what protections it affords or even what legal boilerplate it includes. Many conservation easement advocates extol the virtues of this flexibility, since it allows the landowner and easement holder to tailor each easement to their mutual interests.
However, this increasing variability of conservation easements inevitably will result in more problems over time for both easement holders and future successions of landowners in understanding, undertaking, monitoring, defending and upholding all of the legal rights and responsibilities of each easement. Heightening this effect is the fact that many conservation easements are increasingly negotiated, nuanced and complex agreements, leaving even legal experts challenged in easement preparation, interpretation, oversight and enforcement.
Valuation issues. The valuation problem for conservation easements arises in two forms: the opportunity for excessive claims of income, estate and property tax deductions or reductions; and uncertainty as to the societal and cost-benefit calculus of each easement. The valuation of donated conservation easements has become a major cause for alarm by the Internal Revenue Service, which says that it will be applying an increasingly watchful eye on the deductions taken for these donations. However, part of the problem may be that the IRS has not been precise enough in stating how conservation easement appraisals should be undertaken.
Even if the IRS adopts a more rigorous approach to easement appraisal in the future, it will never be in a good position to determine whether each easement, for which a charitable deduction is taken, is worthy in terms of conferring a public benefit commensurate with the public subsidy. That task must be undertaken by others, starting with the land trust or other easement holder and embracing some degree of broader public participation.
Lack of legal standards. While conservation easements are intended to be permanent servitudes on privately held property, most states have no public registry for conservation easements, no particular legal structure and no public review, transparency or accountability with respect to their design, monitoring, enforcement, defense or stewardship. Accordingly, there may be a growing disconnect, or perhaps it is a correlation, between the massive deployment of these new interests in real estate, their nearly infinite variability and the multitude of new-born land trusts that hold them on the one hand, and the largely undisciplined laws and conventions that govern them on the other.
In sum, potential legal and other reforms should be considered to respond to many diverse issues related to conservation easements.
This state of affairs, already evident in many thousands of conservation easements, cannot serve future generations well. Under the present laws and conventions, how can we expect holders of these easements and succeeding generations of landowners to understand, no less attend to, the often subtle differences in their terms and to comply with, uphold, defend and enforce conservation easements forever?
Although the nearly exponential trends in the deployment of conservation easements may be heartening to many in the land conservation community, they also pose equivalent challenges that require critical examination and consideration of reform. The evident solution is to create standards for conservation easements and their holders that are more uniform, explicit, publicly transparent and rigorous. Doing so would be in the long-term best interests of those in the conservation easement community and the public at large.
Potential Solutions
Among the general approaches to reform are changes to federal tax laws; greater state oversight of conservation easements and their holders; increased self-regulation by the land trust community; consolidation and networking of land trusts; and greater supervision of conservation easements and their holders by funding sources. The purpose of advancing these reform ideas is to create more predictability and stability in the design and long-term management of conservation easements, so there can be a greater degree of assurance that these new inventions of real estate law will deliver on the promises that they make to future generations.
The most universal approach to reform would be to create more rigorous IRS standards for conservation easements, their appraisals and their holders, so there is greater assurance that their public subsidy will result in conservation easements that are permanently monitored and enforced. A second and complementary approach would be for the National Conference of Commissioners, which gave birth to the Uniform Conservation Easement Act in 1981, to reconvene and consider the issues that went unresolved in its earlier work. A third approach would be for each state to consider amendments to its conservation easement enabling act that respond to these issues. Finally, the Land Trust Alliance is already making efforts to inform and encourage its members to take affirmative but voluntary action to resolve many of these concerns.
Even while considering needed change, these reforms should not impose unreasonable transaction costs on conservation easements. The goal is to select reforms that are efficient in making a difference. At the same time, it is important to consider the tremendous and increasing public subsidies of conservation easements, their opportunity costs and potential effects on government regulatory and land acquisition programs. This scrutiny is not a condemnation of conservation easements, but rather is aimed at articulating issues and possible reforms that can make easements deliver their promises.
Conclusions
This should be an uneasy time for those in the conservation easement community. Because of alleged abuses widely reported by the media, both Congress and the IRS are investigating easement practices by their donors and holders. Congressional proposals are emerging to substantially reduce tax incentives for donations of conservation easements. The time is right to explore potentially useful reforms of all kinds in order to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
The principal source of many issues with conservation easements is the laws and conventions that govern these interests in real estate, which were created at a time when no one could have anticipated the explosive growth of easements and land trusts. While national organizations like the Land Trust Alliance have shown outstanding leadership in devising and promoting standards, practices and other assistance for land trusts, these standards are purely voluntary, and land trusts have no legal obligation to follow them. Moreover, in some cases the worst problems with respect to long-term management of conservation easements involve understaffed or inattentive government holders.
How dire is the future of conservation easements? Just as conservation easements are intended to endure, each of the problems reported here will have its day, and some already have. When evaluating the effectiveness of conservation easements under the prevailing legal structure, perhaps the best answer is that the jury will be out for 100 years, but one should be sufficiently concerned about a possibly adverse verdict to consider these issues and ways to resolve them.
If conservation easements are to serve future generations as is their promise, they will have to live up to three essential principles.
With these principles in mind, there are many approaches to resolving the issues presented by conservation easements. However, to fashion the solutions one must first acknowledge the problems. If ever we are to take action to assure the future of conservation easements, the time to do so may never be better, nor easier, than now.
Jeff Pidot is a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute, on leave from his work as chief of the Natural Resources Division of the Maine Attorney General’s Office, a position he has held since 1990. He has been an active participant in the land trust movement in Maine and has a wealth of experience with conservation easements in both his professional and volunteer work. While at the Lincoln Institute, he is researching and writing about the challenges of conservation easements and reforms that may be considered to meet these challenges.
His working paper, Reinventing Conservation Easements: A Critical Examination and Ideas for Reform, is available on the Institute’s website.
Reference
Land Trust Alliance. 2004. National Land Trust Census. November 18 http://www.lta.org/census/index.shtml
SHARE
Faculty Profile of Fernanda Furtado
SHARE
Eduardo Reese, arquitecto que se especializa en planeamiento urbano y regional, es el subadministrador del Instituto de la Vivienda de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. En cargos profesionales anteriores, fue asesor técnico para los planes maestros de más de 20 ciudades en argentina; Secretario de Políticas Socioeconómicas del Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano y Laboral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; asesor al Consejo de Planeamiento Urbano de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; y Secretario de Planeamiento en la ciudad de Avellaneda.
Reese es docente en el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional del General Sarmiento en Buenos Aires. Actualmente es profesor de gestión urbana en el programa de grado en urbanismo en dicha universidad. También enseña desarrollo urbano en programas de maestría de la Faculta de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño de la Universidad de La Plata, así como en universidades de Mar del Plata y Córdoba. Además, dirige el plan maestro de la cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo en Buenos Aires.
Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró usted en el Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln?
Eduardo Reese: Mi relación con el Programa se remonta a 1997, cuando estábamos elaborando el plan de la ciudad de Córdoba, que incluyó la formulación de diferentes proyectos urbanos de gran escala. En ese momento el Instituto colaboró activamente para ampliar el debate de los impactos de estos proyectos sobre el mercado de suelo y, consecuentemente, en la configuración de la ciudad. Posteriormente, me fui integrando en diversas actividades del Instituto, y hace cuatro años asumí la coordinación de los cursos anuales de Gestión del Suelo en Grandes Proyectos Urbanos, a partir del fallecimiento de Mario Lungo, quien había dirigido ese programa desde su inicio.
En el 2004, el Programa y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, realizamos en conjunto el curso Mercados de Suelo: Teoría e instrumentos para la gestión de políticas, el cual fue la primera actividad del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe que implicó un programa de formación de siete meses para 50 alumnos argentinos. Esa experiencia educativa ayudó a formar una masa crítica de técnicos y profesionales con una visión innovadora y diferente respecto de la gestión de las políticas de suelo. El impacto de ese curso se ha reflejado en decisiones de políticas urbanas en diferentes municipalidades (tales como San Fernando y Morón en el Gran Buenos Aires); en la constitución en Argentina del Movimiento de Reforma Urbana en 2005; y en cambios académicos en el mismo Instituto del Conurbano.
Land Lines: ¿Qué rol puede jugar un proyecto urbano en la calidad de vida de una ciudad en el contexto latinoamericano?
Eduardo Reese: Las grandes operaciones o proyectos urbanísticos sobre sectores definidos de la ciudad (tanto en áreas centrales como en las periferias) han sido grandes protagonistas del urbanismo contemporáneo en el último cuarto de siglo. En América Latina se cuenta hoy con un amplio muestreo de experiencias y proyectos, aunque todavía se requiere una reflexión teórica más rigurosa. Algunos ejemplos importantes son los proyectos del Portal del Bicentenario en Santiago de Chile; los proyectos urbanos integrales en Medellín, Colombia; las operaciones urbanas en diferentes ciudades de Brasil; y el proyecto de reestructuración en el sector Oeste de San Fernando, Argentina.
Sin embargo, es importante aclarar que las grandes operaciones urbanísticas son un instrumento de intervención en la ciudad que ya tienen muchos años no sólo en los países centrales, sino también en nuestras sociedades. En Buenos Aires, por ejemplo, la apertura de la Avenida de Mayo y de las diagonales, proyectada hacia 1880 y llevada a cabo en las décadas siguientes, implicó importantes impactos, tanto en lo físico-espacial como en lo social, económico y, fundamentalmente, en el campo simbólico. Este enfoque de múltiples impactos permite, sin duda, asimilar la operación de Avenida de Mayo a un gran proyecto urbano contemporáneo, pero también generó un gran debate sobre quién debía financiar la operación y quién se apropiaría de las rentas de suelo generadas. En última instancia, la Corte Suprema falló que la municipalidad no podía financiar las obras con la plusvalía generada, porque las rentas eran enteramente de los terratenientes. Durante muchos años, este caso fue un precedente en relación a la intervención estatal en el proceso de valorización de suelo generado por un gran proyecto público.
Land Lines: Usted tiene una mirada muy crítica del reconocido proyecto de regeneración urbana Puerto Madero, en Buenos Aires. ¿Qué haría de manera diferente en otras grandes áreas de redesarrollo?
Eduardo Reese: Puerto Madero es un caso emblemático de proyectos urbanos que promueven un modelo de planeamiento urbano segregado y que hoy en día se “exporta” a otras ciudades y países como instrumento básico para poder “competir” por las inversiones internacionales. En este proyecto el Estado adoptó una posición de sumisión frente al mercado y permitió la construcción de un barrio exclusivo para sectores de altísimos ingresos. Es un ejemplo notorio de una política pública diseñada explícitamente para privilegiar a los sectores más ricos sin recuperación de las enormes valorizaciones del suelo que fueron producto de esta misma política pública.
Más aún, a fin de garantizar a los inversionistas la sobrevalorización de las propiedades que compraron, el emprendimiento tiene una serie de características que la “recortan” (física y socialmente) del resto de la ciudad, creando con ello rentas aún mayores debido a la segregación. Puerto Madero no tiene un muro explícito, como los condominios cerrados, pero tiene múltiples acciones y mensajes implícitos, explícitos y simbólicos que señalan claramente que ese lugar está fuera del alcance para la mayoría de la sociedad:
En definitiva, Puerto Madero es la clara demostración de urbanismo y política pública de distribución regresiva: un “ghetto” libre de problemas para ricos.
Land Lines: En la medida en que las municipalidades compiten por inversiones externas, ¿es posible reconciliar esto con objetivos alternativos tales como prioridades ambientales y sociales?
Eduardo Reese: El problema de nuestras ciudades no es la falta de planeamiento, sino el actual orden excluyente de las políticas y del urbanismo. No puede haber una ley para la ciudad formal y un conjunto de excepciones para el resto. Es necesario crear un nuevo orden urbanístico y jurídico en América Latina respecto al derecho a la ciudad, la distribución equitativa de los beneficios de la urbanización, y la función social de la tenencia de suelo.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera la municipalidad de San Fernando, en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires, ofrece una alternativa a este enfoque?
Eduardo Reese: San Fernando es un municipio ubicado en la zona norte del Gran Buenos Aires, a 30 km de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, con una superficie continental de 23 km² y una población de 156.000 habitantes. Tiene un frente litoral al Río Luján de 5 km de extensión sobre su desembocadura en el Río de la Plata donde se concentra una gran cantidad de actividades productivas vinculadas con la náutica. Este sector del municipio tiene una ubicación privilegiada, con altos valores inmobiliarios y está dotado de la totalidad de los servicios urbanos.
El plan urbano y el modelo de gestión del suelo se comenzaron a elaborar en el 2003 a través de un convenio entre el municipio y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento. En el año 2005, un seminario de capacitación del Instituto Lincoln ayudó a ampliar las ideas tradicionales sobre manejo de suelo que abundaban en los grupos profesionales locales y llevó a una serie de decisiones importantes:
La política urbana en San Fernando se enfocó en una serie de estrategias de acción que incluyeron (1) asegurar el acceso a nuevos espacios públicos sobre el río para fines recreativos, deportivos y comerciales, especialmente para ser aprovechados por los sectores pobres; y (2) la regularización comprehensiva del sector oeste de la municipalidad, donde se concentra los mayores niveles de pobreza.
Para implementar estas estrategias, fue necesario aumentar los recursos fiscales para inversión pública de dos maneras: a través de la apropiación de la rentabilidad del uso del suelo o tierra municipal sobre el río a través de la creación del consorcio Parque Náutico de San Fernando, S.A. (PNSFSA); y con la participación de la municipalidad en la plusvalía a partir de una reforma tributaria municipal. (PNSFSA es una empresa creada por la municipalidad de San Fernando para administrar las tierras del dominio municipal en la costa ribereña del sector este de la ciudad, conocida como Marina Park).
La experiencia de San Fernando se basa en un conjunto de herramientas de gestión orientadas a la redistribución de rentas urbanas para construir una ciudad más equitativa. El suelo se considera como un activo clave dentro de una estrategia más amplia de desarrollo local y, por lo tanto, la gestión depende de una combinación de instrumentos de planeamiento, administrativos, económicos, fiscales y legales orientados a fortalecer el papel del sector público. El eje central de las políticas es la búsqueda de equidad en la distribución de los costos y beneficios de la urbanización, dentro del contexto desafiante de la creciente presión sobre el suelo en toda el área metropolitana de Buenos Aires.
Land Lines: ¿Qué cambios habría que realizar en el sistema educativo para la capacitación de los planificadores urbanos?
Eduardo Reese: Primero, es necesario incorporar una mayor comprensión del funcionamiento de los mercados de suelo en el contexto actual de las ciudades de los países en desarrollo. Segundo, hace falta un análisis más crítico de los instrumentos teóricos, metodológicos y técnicos para llevar a cabo el diagnóstico e intervención en asuntos de suelo urbano. El curso sobre mercados de suelo de 2004 que mencioné antes buscó desarrollar este tipo de materiales para permitir que los estudiantes cubrieran las diferentes escalas y dimensiones del problema.
Land Lines: ¿Qué tensiones existen entre intereses públicos y privados en el planeamiento urbano?
Eduardo Reese: Esta es una pregunta crucial porque toda la historia de la gestión territorial en nuestras ciudades ha tenido un hilo conductor: el derecho de la propiedad privada del suelo juntamente con la estructura de la propiedad han entrado siempre en conflicto con la actividad urbanística que es una responsabilidad pública. En ese sentido siempre habrá una tensión entre intereses públicos y privados en la construcción de la ciudad.
A mi juicio, los proyectos urbanos en América Latina tienen la responsabilidad de contribuir a la creación de nuevos espacios de uso y goce público, a la inclusión social, a la generación de empleo, a la equidad en el acceso a los servicios para todos, a la sostenibilidad ambiental y a la redistribución de las rentas urbanas generadas por el proyecto. Los cuatro casos mencionados antes de Chile, Colombia, Brasil y Argentina muestran que estos beneficios son posibles en muchos países.
Sin embargo, y lamentablemente, en una gran cantidad de casos en América Latina los proyectos urbanos se han justificado como necesarios para atraer inversiones y/o consumidores y asegurar o reforzar las ventajas competitivas dinámicas de la ciudad. Estos insospechados objetivos positivos a veces se usan como un mecanismo para legitimizar intervenciones que profundizan la segregación socioespacial de las ciudades. Estos efectos adversos del mercado no son fatales para las ciudades, sino que son el resultado de elecciones políticas perversas.
SHARE
The use of computer models in the planning of land use and transportation and for the analysis of urban housing markets has a long and variable history. One pioneering application of a large-scale computer model that linked land use and urban transportation was the 1960 Chicago Area Transportation Study. It used a spatially disaggregated model that included a detailed transportation network and embodied the classic land use, trip generation, modal choice, and network assignment steps of urban transport planning.
Applying a more analytic approach to predicting land use patterns, an influential model formulated by Ira Lowry for Pittsburgh in 1964 used economic base theory to distribute export-oriented economic activity. This was followed by the allocation of residences and population-serving employment within the metropolitan area to derive work and shopping trip patterns.
More attention to spatially disaggregated models of urban housing markets followed in the early 1970s in the form of the Urban Institute Housing Model (representing decadal housing market changes) and the National Bureau of Economic Research Urban Simulation Model (a microanalytic model annually projecting the behavior of 85,000 households identified by workplace and residential locations). Both models were used to analyze the impact of housing allowance programs and were applied more for policy analysis than planning.
In the late 1970s, the focus turned to the development and application of sketch planning models, particularly in transportation. While these models were still spatially disaggregated, they used tens instead of hundreds of traffic zones, and transport networks were represented in less detail. Such models were adapted to represent transport-related outcomes beyond network flows, including vehicular emissions, exposure of populations to air pollution, vehicle miles of travel, and energy consumption. These smaller models migrated from mainframe computers to personal computers in the 1980s, easing their application. Their data needs were still great, but many of them made more systematic use of available spatially disaggregated census data, aiding the transfer and calibration of models among locations.
In the past two decades, the advent of geographic information systems (GIS) and the development of software to visually display data in three dimensions have been transforming the use of computers in planning. GIS-compatible data are now available from satellites, census sources, and government agencies. Local municipalities have moved rapidly to combine their data on property records with data on crime, transport, and demographics, and such municipal data files are often available on the web. While the availability of GIS data has clearly increased, variations in formats, definitions, and coverage can make it challenging to combine information from different sources into a unified data set for a metropolitan region.
The use of three-dimensional displays of spatially disaggregated data has transformed the presentation of data and model results. These techniques, including 3D maps at the metropolitan level and the ability to “fly through” a street or neighborhood at the project level, facilitate community consultation. They also make it much easier for nonspecialists to understand and participate in the process and interpret the results of alternative planning scenarios.
Along with the advances in data and its presentation, computer software has become easier to use and more widely available on open source platforms. While the codes of many earlier computer-based planning tools have been available in the public domain, using them generally has required high-level programming skills. As more of these tools are presented in user-friendly formats and integrated with other modules, the use of computer-based methods to compare and contrast alternative development scenarios will be more accessible than ever. Indeed, many planning agencies are now able to use scenario planning tools to produce alternative possible futures that provide a foundation for discussions and public consultations to identify which outcomes are desirable and which are to be avoided.
As reported elsewhere in this issue of Land Lines, the Lincoln Institute is supporting the use of various types of planning tools for research and evaluation on the effectiveness of policies intended to improve land development outcomes.
SHARE
For every travel article featuring a Caribbean paradise with gentle waters lapping a sandy beach, there is an anxious news story about a brewing hurricane. The Lesser Antilles, an archipelago of small islands that form a crescent in the eastern Caribbean, have always been particularly vulnerable, thrust into the volatile waters of the Atlantic Ocean. In 1776, the Pointe-à-Pitre hurricane struck the French colony of Guadeloupe and killed 6,000, making it the deadliest Atlantic storm on record at that time. Four years later, the Great Hurricane of 1780 hit even harder, making landfall in Barbados, then ravaging nearby islands, killing at least 20,000 and wrecking British and French fleets maneuvering at the height of the American Revolution. Two centuries and dozens of storms later, even Hurricane Ivan wasn’t as deadly when it devastated Grenada in 2004, leaving the parliament in ruins and 85 percent of the structures on the island damaged.
In recent decades, climate change has heightened threats to the region. U.S. strategies employed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy are not especially relevant to the fragile, yet vibrant islands of the Lesser Antilles, from Puerto Rico in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south. With tourism-dependent economies and extremely limited amounts of developable land, especially on mountainous islands, this potpourri of independent countries, dependent territories, and overseas departments share a common land use challenge: how to grapple with development patterns oriented toward the coast while managing the growing threat of sea level rise.
One island in the region stands out for its exceptional capacity to recognize and prepare for the rising tide: Pear-shaped Barbados has become a Caribbean leader in integrated coastal zone management—the contemporary practice of integrating sectors, levels of government, and disciplines to address the coastal zone both in the water and on dry land. Coastal land use and environmental management are always contentious issues on a small island. But, as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once remarked, “Barbados consistently punches above its weight.” Almost 50 years since independence, the island nation has leveraged a combination of foresight, international support, and local capacity to develop planning institutions and prepare for an uncertain future.
From Sugar to Sun Worshippers
Today, Barbados is famous as a top international tourist destination, with trademark white-sand beaches, warm aquamarine water, and ample sunshine along its 60 miles of coastline. Nearly 300,000 people live on the 166 square-mile island; 44 percent of Barbadians are classified as living in urban areas, centered in Bridgetown and along the developed south and west coasts. With a per capita GDP of US$23,600 and near-universal literacy, Barbados ranks 38th in the world and first in the Caribbean according to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2013 Human Development Index. Relying on its sand and surf, Barbados derives 80 percent of its US$4.4 billion GDP from its tourism and service industries.
But this evolution is a recent one, part of a similar pattern of development across the Caribbean in light of independence movements and the advent of commercial aviation. Originally inhabited by a native Amerindian population, Barbados was first settled in 1627 by the English, who quickly turned it into one of the world’s leading sugar producers. Barbados’s colonial history is unusual for the region; unlike many other Caribbean islands that saw multiple changes of European powers, Barbados did not leave British rule until independence in 1966—earning it the nickname “Little England.”
The colonial economy was a classic model of trade to enrich the metropolis. The English imported African slaves to work sugarcane plantations, molasses refineries, and rum distilleries. As a result, 90 percent of modern-day Barbadians claim African descent. Following independence, the already-lagging sugar crop, which suffered fluctuations common to any monoculture, became even less reliable as the push for free trade led the U.K. and later the EU to slowly draw down subsidies and preferential pricing.
At the same time, Barbados invested heavily in its tourism services, which shifted the locus of development. Historically, the island was mostly rural, with sugarcane plantations carving up the interior of the country, home to slaves and, later, itinerant sharecroppers toting moveable wooden “chattel” houses, Barbados’s typical vernacular architecture. The coast was home to Bridgetown, the principal port, where a navigable river meets the ocean, and a few smaller towns and fishing villages. A deep-water port dredged in 1961 also laid the groundwork for the arrival of cruise ships. The growing number of tourists necessitated hotels, resorts, restaurants, shops, and bars, all within a stone’s throw of the ocean. This impulse led to strips of coastal development between the airport and Bridgetown, on the south coast, and along the west coast, home to the calmest water and charming Holetown and Speightstown. By the 1990s, Barbados’s Grantley Adams International Airport was receiving regularly scheduled British Airways flights from London on one of the few Concorde supersonic jets.
The Local Response to Rising Waters
Lying just east of the main arc of the other eastern Caribbean islands, outside the Atlantic hurricane belt, Barbados has a meteorological advantage. Although it’s still susceptible to major storms, it experiences far fewer hurricanes than its neighbors to the northwest. Yet any threat to the beach and coral lining Barbados would have devastating consequences, given the island’s economic dependence on the coast. Its well-being is endangered by creeping sea level rise, coupled with possible storm surge if the island suffers even a glancing blow from a major hurricane. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has strong evidence that following a period of almost no change for centuries, there was an increase in global sea level measures in the 20th century, and that trend is accelerating in the 21st century. In August, the IPCC said sea levels could rise more than three feet by 2100.
Never a major contributor of carbon emissions, small island states are disproportionately impacted by global climate change resulting from modern industrialization elsewhere in the world. Shifts in weather patterns have produced a greater number of major storm systems, increased global temperatures, melted polar ice caps, and contributed to sea level rise. While major industrialized countries such as the United States, China, and Western Europe also experience impacts from sea level rise, the vulnerable proportion of these countries is miniscule compared to the susceptible areas of Barbados. The developed world’s inability to understand the impacts and consequences of its behavior, as evidenced by political inaction on issues such as carbon cap-and-trade agreements, has forced countries in the developing world to act now or face a perilous future.
Paradoxically, Barbados’s imperial history—often a burden on postcolonial countries—has proved an advantage, in that the island has a long, uninterrupted history of British-style town and country planning. Like the United Kingdom, Barbados is administratively divided into parishes, and modern development law is based on the British Town and Country Planning Act of 1947. Once independent, Barbados established its own planning framework with the 1972 Town and Country Planning Development Order. Presently, the Town and Country Development Planning Office (TCDPO) oversees all construction on the island, with the chief town planner reporting directly to the prime minister.
The Physical Development Plan from 1988 guides development on the island. Since the document’s amendment in 2003, there has been a turn toward sustainable development, not just as a catch phrase, but as an inherent value for the government’s vision for the island. In a 2008 conference speech, the previous prime minister, David Thompson, outlined a few core ideas of the plan: protect natural, agricultural, and cultural resources; promote mixed-use centers and corridors to encourage a diversified economy; maintain central Bridgetown as the financial and commercial hub; and stimulate tourism by the modernization of older beachfront properties and development of new opportunities. Today, the current prime minister, Freundel Stuart, continues this push for sustainability, as shown by his participation in high-level panels at last year’s United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20.
By the late 1970s, individual property owners began to notice coastal erosion affecting their land. The media began to harp on this issue, as it was concurrent with the push for tourism, quickly becoming the country’s main source of foreign exchange reserve. Prompted by this coastal erosion—but also concerned about catastrophic events such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanic eruptions, and oil spills—the Barbados government embarked on a diagnostic pre-feasibility study in 1981 with funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as part of its Coastal Conservation Program. The study focused on the west and south coasts, as these areas of the island had the greatest potential for tourism infrastructure. At that time, the government set up the temporary Coastal Conservation Project Unit (CCPU), which oversaw the pre-feasibility study and came to a series of conclusions on the causes of coastal erosion and damage to beachfronts. For example, because inland Barbados had poor water quality, the runoff polluted the sea, damaging coral reefs. Natural phenomena, such as storm swells and the occasional erratic hurricane, also caused erosion. In turn, the sea defense structures in place were poorly designed. The IDB study mandated the CCPU to continue monitoring the shorelines, to provide advice to the public on coastal matters, and to serve as an advisor to the TCDPO on waterfront development.
Coastal Zone Management Unit is Born
As the Coastal Conservation Project Unit continued its mandate for a decade, the Government of Barbados, along with additional funding from the IDB, embarked on another study, which recommended the establishment of a permanent unit to oversee the coastal zone. This Coastal Zone Management Unit (CZMU) was created in 1996 to regulate, make recommendations, and educate the Barbadian population about coastal management. Still receiving a large amount of its funding from the IDB, the CZMU is currently housed in the Ministry of Environment, Water Resources, and Drainage. As its title suggests, the CZMU manages the coastal zone, which it defines as “the transition zone where the land meets water; the region that is directly influenced by marine hydrodynamic processes; extends offshore to the continental shelf break and onshore to the first major change in topography above the reach of major storm waves.” Therefore, the unit oversees the coral reefs around Barbados and all coastal engineering projects, while serving as an advisor to the TCDPO for onshore coastal development.
Land use issues are at the forefront of the relationship between the CZMU and TCDPO. When the TCDPO receives any application for development in the coastal zone, it forwards it automatically to the CZMU for review and comment. Since the tourism industry is based mainly in the coastal zone of the island, many of Barbados’s development applications go through the CZMU for review. The unit vets the application to make sure the setbacks are correct, 30 meters from the high water mark for developments along the beach and 10 meters for developments along cliffs, measured from the landward point of undercut. In addition to verifying setbacks, the CZMU looks at drainage requirements, buffer zones, fencing restrictions, and other regulations. The CZMU then makes recommendations to the TCDPO on the application.
CZMU Acting Director Dr. Lorna Inniss, who holds a Ph.D. in oceanography from Louisiana State University, praises this process. She says, “Our interministerial collaboration is extremely high. We have the ability to establish and improve government structure that’s inclusive and consultative by nature.” The government process is admirable for its cooperation and silo-breaking tendencies; unfortunately the CZMU’s recommendations are purely advisory and have no binding power for the TCDPO to enforce. Regulations in the coastal zone are not retroactive for the legions of properties built during the resort boom, and penalties for violations also remain very low. This process is the closest Barbados approaches to a formalized environmental impact assessment, per a U.S. model, but it’s a strong first step for the Caribbean. CZMU and TCDPO have been more successful in planning for low-impact future development—along the more rugged east coast, for example, where the Physical Development Plan envisions a national park.
The CZMU is most effective in implementing coastal engineering projects to protect the coastline and stop beach erosion. The most natural conservation technique is to restore sand dunes and mangroves. Planting vegetation in the coastal areas allows the dunes to form naturally and hold back inundations from storm surges, while mangroves absorb wave action. Beach nourishment is a popular quick fix but more of a Band-Aid approach that is more costly and less effective, as currents and storms can easily erode the nourished beach.
The CZMU safeguards the coast with various physical interventions as well, including breakwaters, groynes, and seawalls. Breakwaters are concrete structures, sunken close to the beach, that force waves to break farther from the coast so they don’t directly pummel the sand. Groynes are rock structures that jut out into the ocean to disrupt the movement of sediment. Seawalls are the CZMU’s largest type of intervention. Intended to protect more populated areas, these construction projects involve either a riprap design of large rocks or a flat, concrete seawall that can create public space attractive to both tourists and residents, such as the Richard Haynes Boardwalk, partially funded by an IDB loan. Because these techniques can sometimes exacerbate erosion and require more expensive maintenance than natural interventions, their long-term efficacy is up for debate, but, in the short term, they protect the coastline and the tourism industry.
Given the island’s vulnerability to storms, engineering projects can be costly. Inniss, however, explains, “We have a policy of rigorous stakeholder consultation, and it’s not just lip service. November through April is our high season; on a recent project in Holetown, we heard from merchants that it was vital to complete work by November, so we hustled to do so. In a spirit of mutual cooperation, we can get private sector buy-in.” Hopefully, the CZMU can leverage the political capital it earns from the private sector on such projects, in order to make more demanding regulations become binding down the road.
In order to build support, the CZMU maintains a major outreach campaign to educate the island’s population, to which Inniss herself attributes the success of the CZMU internally and externally: “It begins with a nationally high level of education and literacy—over 98 percent for decades.” Former Senator Henry Fraser echoes her, “People ask, ‘Why do things work in Barbados?’ It’s largely because of the emphasis on education since emancipation. And, because it’s a small, highly religious place with people living close together, respect, tolerance, and a work ethic are greater than elsewhere.”
To deepen the educational foundation of Barbados’s cooperative approach to coastal zone management, the CZMU distributes a newsletter, maintains a strong social media presence, and produces an educational television show that explains the geological history of the island and techniques to raise awareness about sea level rise and the importance of coastal management. It also hosts many activities such as International Coastal Clean-Up Day, Sundown Beach Walks, Summer Seminar Series, and a summer internship program for secondary- and tertiary-level students. It also provides lectures for schools and educational institutions, NGOs, private organizations, and the general public.
Next Steps and Global Cooperation
The IDB continues to be a major supporter of Barbados’s efforts. The development bank’s most recent aid to the country includes a 25-year, $30 million loan to pursue a Coastal Risk Assessment and Management Programme. Inniss is excited by the confidence that such support expresses, as it indicates the government’s belief that the CZMU can execute a project that will create enough value to repay the money. “It will be a next level, state-of-the-art integrated coastal zone management strategy that will involve a series of stakeholders: tourism, rum distilleries, light and power utilities, marinas, boaters, commercial fishermen, the port, divers,” Inniss details. “Key decision makers have recognized that coastal zone management is important not just as an environmental program but to grow the economy of Barbados.” Hopefully other Caribbean countries have taken notice, as Inniss herself has provided technical assistance to St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—while in turn taking cues from New Zealand, Hawaii, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada as a model of how to implement international standards.
Of course, there is still room for improvement. Even as the CZMU works closely with TCPDO on land use planning, with national marine parks to conduct ecosystem-based monitoring, and with civil engineers from the Ministry of Public Works, CZMU is still not fully integrated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishing. For example, Inniss acknowledges, “We know scientifically that agricultural runoff is the biggest contributor of marine pollutants.”
Indeed, on a small island, the land and water are intrinsically interconnected. While Barbados continues to do its part in the battle against global climate change—another IDB loan signed alongside the coastal management funding will establish an Energy Smart Fund to reduce dependence on fossil fuels—it cannot sit tight and wait for the larger countries of the world to act. As small, developing island states in the Indian and Pacific oceans face the prospect of resettling their populations in other countries a few decades down the road, Barbadians plan to stay and protect their piece of paradise.
About the Authors
Gregory R. Scruggs was a consultant to the American Planning Association for Latin America and the Caribbean from 2010 to 2013. He is currently pursuing a master’s in regional studies of Latin America and the Caribbean at Columbia University. Contact: gscruggs.apa.consult@gmail.com.
Thomas E. Bassett, a senior program associate at the American Planning Association, works on the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas grant from the U.S. Department of State as well as the domestic Community Assistance Program. Contact: thomas.e.bassett@gmail.com.
Resources
Bassett, Thomas E. and Gregory R. Scruggs. 2013. Water, Water Everywhere: Sea level Rise and Land Use Planning in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Pará. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP13TB1. https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2282_1621_Bassett_WP13TB1.pdf.
Belle, N. and B. Bramwell. 2005. Climate change and small island tourism: Policy maker and industry perspectives in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 44: 32–41.
Dharmartne, G. and A. Brathwaite. 1998. Economic valuation of coastline for tourism in Barbados. Journal of Travel Research 37: 138–144.
Inter-American Development Bank. 2010. Indicators of disaster risk and risk management, Program for Latin America and the Caribbean, Barbados. September. Accessed July 9, 2012. http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35160015.
Phillips, M. R. and A. L. Jones. 2006. Erosion and tourism infrastructure in the coastal zone: Problems, consequences, and management. Tourism Management 27: 517–52.
SHARE
Es difícil figurarse la manera en que la pérdida constante de población ha devastado a Detroit. Entre 1900 y 1950, cuando el crecimiento de la manufactura automotriz en los EE.UU. la convirtió en uno de los principales centros industriales y culturales del país, la población de Detroit saltó de 300.000 a 1,85 millones de habitantes. A partir de 1950, sin embargo, comenzó a disminuir. Y este descenso ha continuado hasta la actualidad, desplomándose a sólo 700.000 habitantes en 2010, una tasa de reducción casi tan rápida como lo había sido el aumento en la primera mitad del siglo XX.
A pesar del esfuerzo de Detroit durante varias décadas para mantenerse al ritmo de la pérdida de población eliminando el inventario de viviendas ruinosas, aproximadamente un cuarto de sus 380.000 parcelas se encuentra hoy abandonado y administrado por la ciudad u otros entes públicos. Hasta julio de 2014 se han demolido 114.000 propiedades, y 80.000 más se consideran arruinadas (Austen 2014). Si bien es cierto que el centro se está recuperando y los suburbios siguen mostrando vitalidad, un visitante desprevenido quedará anonadado por la “incomprensible desintegración del paisaje edificado” en amplias zonas de la ciudad (Austen 2014).
Este artículo, el primero de una serie de dos, considera las causas fiscales y repercusiones del superávit de viviendas y terrenos baldíos en Detroit, desde la extensión y ubicación de las casas y lotes abandonados en la ciudad hasta la espiral descendente de los precios de las viviendas, que ha provocado una sobrevaluación de las propiedades, mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad y ejecuciones tributarias; la adquisición pública de dichas propiedades; el patrón de valores del suelo a lo largo de la ciudad; y, finalmente, algunas maneras potenciales de reconciliar la cantidad de habitantes que quedan con la cantidad de propiedades vacantes y administradas públicamente. Estas medidas van desde revitalizar vecindarios densamente poblados a establecer un cinturón verde y adquirir parcelas vacantes para uso público, como parques, bosques, zonas de amortiguamiento industrial, lagunas de retención y otros espacios abiertos (Austen 2014).
Factores de la caída
Las causas de la decadencia de Detroit son múltiples y quizás demasiado conocidas. La infraestructura de transporte subsidiada por el gobierno federal, como por ejemplo el sistema de autovías interestatales, facilitó la rápida suburbanización, promovida además por códigos de desarrollo inmobiliario permisivos. La tensión racial, las fuerzas económicas globales y la corrupción desgastaron lo que quedaba de la ciudad propiamente dicha. En las primeras etapas del deterioro, los residentes de mayores ingresos, la mayoría de los cuales era de origen caucásico, se mudó a los suburbios en busca de una mejor calidad de vida, como se muestra en la tabla 1. Para 1990, la población afroamericana también había alcanzado su pico, y comenzó a disminuir en la primera década del siglo XXI. A comienzos de 1960, la manufactura de automóviles de Michigan inició su largo y vertiginoso declive, que afectó de forma desproporcionada a Detroit y Flint. La pérdida de puestos de empleo bien remunerados para la clase media dañó aún más la base demográfica y económica urbana, ya que dichas familias fueron a buscar oportunidades de empleo en otro lado. Las crecientes tasas de crimen y la erosión constante de los servicios públicos provocaron otra ola de deserciones.
La tabla 1 ilustra esta decadencia de las condiciones demográficas y económicas de la ciudad entre 1950 y 2010. Para el 2012, según fuentes gubernamentales, la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares era de solamente US$25.000, menos de la mitad de la mediana nacional de ingresos. Los índices de pobreza y desempleo eran 38 y 27,5 por ciento, respectivamente. La tasa de participación laboral era del 54 por ciento (comparado con el 63 por ciento en todo el país) y por cada 6,35 trabajadores empleados había una persona que recibía beneficios de discapacidad del Seguro Social (comparado con 1 de cada 12 en todo el país). Más del 34 por ciento de la población de la ciudad recibía cupones de alimentos, y el 81 por ciento de los niños de las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit eran elegibles para el Programa de Almuerzo Gratis o a Precio Reducido. Las fuentes de ingreso comenzaron a depender cada vez más de aportes externos, incluyendo los no residentes, como se explica en el recuadro 1. En 2013, cuando la ciudad finalmente sucumbió al peso de los problemas fiscales acumulados y se declaró en quiebra, sus deudas y obligaciones sin fondos ascendían a US$18.000 millones, o sea US$68.000 por unidad familiar, lo cual es aproximadamente 2,7 veces la mediana de ingresos de las unidades familiares (Turbeville 2013).
El fracaso del mercado de la vivienda
El descomunal excedente de oferta de viviendas que se acumuló a lo largo de las décadas como consecuencia de la demanda selectiva en Detroit corroyó el valor de la propiedad. La crisis inmobiliaria de 2007–2008 asestó el golpe final, lo que dio como resultado la desintegración casi completa del mercado de la vivienda de Detroit. En 2010, el precio promedio de una propiedad residencial, que en 2006 era US$57.000, se había desplomado a alrededor de US$7.000 (Hodge et al. 2014a). El excedente actual de suelo y vivienda de Detroit podría inhibir una recuperación de los precios inmobiliarios en los próximos años, incluso si la población se estabilizara.
Mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad, abandono y adquisición pública de propiedades
Los funcionarios de la administración tributaria no han recalibrado el valor de tasación de las propiedades para que este refleje la caída del precios de las viviendas. Esto ha traído como consecuen-cia una sobrevaluación de hasta el 80 por ciento (Hodge et al. 2014a), contribuyendo a una falta de voluntad generalizada para pagar los impuestos, según Alm et al. (2014). Su investigación también muestra que hubo otros factores que agravaron, como las altas tasas tributarias estipuladas por ley, y la limitación de servicios como la seguridad pública.
En el medio de esta crisis inmobiliaria, la tasa de mora en el pago del impuesto sobre la propiedad llegó a un nivel alarmante del 50 por ciento (Alm et al. 2014). La figura 2 (pág. 15) muestra las tasas de mora por vecindario de la ciudad en 2010. La recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad depende de la capacidad de una jurisdicción para imponer sanciones por falta de pago, como señala Langsdorf (1973). Cuando los valores inmobiliarios colapsan, las autoridades tributarias no tienen un mecanismo de cumplimiento práctico; el ahorro de los propietarios por no pagar el impuesto sobre la propiedad es mayor que el valor de la casa que poseen y que perderían en caso de ejecución tributaria. Más aún, lo recaudado por la venta de propiedades ejecutadas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir la deuda tributaria morosa y el costo para el gobierno de iniciar las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria.
La falta de pago generalizada del impuesto sobre la propiedad y el abandono subsiguiente de las viviendas ha traído como consecuencia la adquisición pública de miles de propiedades en todo Detroit. El quince por ciento de las parcelas de esta ciudad de 360 km2 está ahora vacante, y cerca del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de Detroit no es actualmente tributable al ser propiedad o estar administrada por la ciudad o algún otro ente público (Sands y Skidmore 2014), como se ilustra en la figura 3.
La espiral descendente de ejecuciones tributarias
En la actualidad, la cantidad de propiedades que pasan a manos públicas por ejecuciones tributarias es mucho mayor que la cantidad de propiedades públicas adquiridas de vuelta por contribuyentes privados.
En Michigan, los impuestos sobre la propiedad morosos están sujetos a una tasa administrativa del 4 por ciento y un interés mensual del 1 por ciento sobre el monto adeudado, a una tasa de interés no compuesta y a partir del primer mes de falta de pago. Después de un año de mora, la ciudad transfiere la propiedad al gobierno del condado y el dueño es sujeto a un cargo de interés mensual adicional del 0,5 por ciento. Durante este período de dos años, los dueños pueden recuperar sus propiedades pagando todos los impuestos y cargos vencidos.
Si el impuesto sobre la propiedad queda sin pagar por más de dos años, el tesorero del condado de Wayne inicia las actuaciones de ejecución tributaria. Después de una audiencia para demostrar causa justificada en la corte de apelaciones, el tesorero del condado vende las parcelas ejecutadas en subasta pública. El monto inicial de la subasta es el del equivalente a los impuestos sobre la propiedad adeudados más intereses y penalizaciones, y lo recaudado se distribuye en forma proporcional entre las jurisdicciones tributarias. Si la propiedad no se vende en la primera subasta, el condado reduce el monto de subasta mínimo a US$500 y organiza una segunda subasta. Este procedimiento ha causado más evasión tributaria, ya que algunos propietarios prefieren ignorar sus facturas de impuestos a la espera de volver a comprar su parcela por US$500 en la segunda subasta.
Las propiedades que no se venden en ninguna de las subastas se pueden transferir a un organismo público (municipal o estatal) o a un banco de suelo estatal o local, o se puede retener para una subasta subsiguiente. Los registros del condado indican que el 80 por ciento de las parcelas vendidas a compradores privados en subasta en los últimos dos años están nuevamente en mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013). Dado que la tasa de mora tributaria es del 67 por ciento para propietarios que no residen en su vivienda (Alm et al. 2014), da la impresión de que una cantidad significativa de los compradores en subasta son propietarios absentistas que pretenden reducir sus gastos operativos y aumentar sus ingresos netos de alquiler dejando de pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad.
En las parcelas de bajo valor, los impuestos sobre la propiedad son, en la práctica, optativos. Para reducir la cartera de lotes con mora tributaria (MacDonald 2013), el condado no ejecuta la hipoteca de propietarios que deben menos de US$1.600 en impuestos y multas acumuladas, con lo cual estas deudas se convierten en optativas.
La recaudación prevista por la venta de parcelas de bajo valor es insuficiente para cubrir los gastos legales de una ejecución por falta de pago de impuestos y saldos tributarios impagados. El resultado final es una creciente tasa de mora e inventario de propiedades indeseadas que terminan en manos públicas, donde no generan ningún ingreso para la ciudad.
Y de aquí, ¿adónde vamos?
Se espera otra ola de ejecuciones tributarias a fines de 2014 y comienzos de 2015. ¿Qué se puede hacer para estabilizar la situación?
Cómo poner freno a la mora en el impuesto sobre la propiedad
Como se mencionó previamente, la mora se reducirá cuando los contribuyentes perciban que reciben un valor proporcional a su dinero. Así, si se mejoran los servicios prestados con la recaudación de impuestos como la seguridad pública, la evasión y el pago atrasado de impuestos se reducirá (Alm et al. 2014). Bajo el liderazgo del alcalde recientemente electo, Mike Duggan, el gobierno de la ciudad está adoptando medidas para mejorar el suministro de servicios públicos básicos y ordenar su panorama fiscal. Por ejemplo, en la actualidad sólo 35.000 de las 88.000 luces de la ciudad funcionan, así que Duggan piensa instalar cada mes 2.400 luces que alumbren (Austen 2014). También aumentó la cantidad de autobuses operativos de 143 a 190 y mejoró los servicios de remoción de nieve durante el pasado invierno, que fue particularmente riguroso.
Una reducción de las tasas de impuestos también reduciría modestamente la tasa de mora (Alm et al. 2014). Las tasas tributarias de Detroit, que son aproximadamente el doble del promedio de la región, son de 67 y 85 milésimas por dólar de valuación para propiedades que son un bien de familia y que no lo son, respectivamente. Este valor es el máximo admitido por el estado. Si bien es cierto que una reducción mejoraría la competitividad de la ciudad con relación a otras comunidades de la región, en la actualidad no se está considerando una reducción en la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad.
La alineación de la valuación con las condiciones del mercado actual también reduciría la mora. El Alcalde Duggan recientemente prometió reducir las valuaciones en un 5 al 20 por ciento en toda la ciudad, para reconciliarlas con las pautas estatales. No obstante, las reducciones prometidas por Duggan son sólo una pequeña fracción del recorte del 80 por ciento necesario para alinear las valuaciones con el valor del mercado, según Hodge et al. (2014a).
Retirar suelo del mercado
En la ausencia de una demanda sólida de suelo, la cual no parece probable en un futuro cercano, el excedente se tiene que retirar del mercado por un período de tiempo con objeto de que el valor inmobiliario mejore de manera general en toda la ciudad. Dado que los entes públicos poseen ahora tantas propiedades, son las autoridades gubernamentales las que tienen el poder para retirarlas del mercado de forma creíble. Sin este tipo de medidas políticas, la posibilidad de que estas parcelas se transfieran rápidamente al sector privado afectará la recuperación de los precios.
En la actualidad, hay muchos entes públicos que poseen suelos. Las autoridades de la ciudad de Detroit, el condado de Wayne y el gobierno estatal están colaborando para consolidar estas parcelas bajo un solo ente que pueda administrarlas de manera más efectiva. Detroit Future City (2010) detalla esta propiedad fragmentada de suelos públicos:
Los suelos públicos en Detroit están en manos de muchas agencias distintas de la ciudad, el condado y el estado, como también de muchas entidades autónomas o cuasi autónomas como las Escuelas Públicas de Detroit, la Comisión de Vivienda de Detroit y la Corporación de Crecimiento Económico de Detroit. Hay pocas ciudades que tengan un inventario de propiedades tan fragmentado de suelo público. No hay coherencia de políticas, procedimientos o misiones entre estos entes, y muchos de ellos están maniatados por requisitos legales burocráticos y procedimientos complejos. El Departamento de Planificación y Desarrollo controla la mayor cantidad de propiedades; sin embargo, su capacidad para darles un destino estratégico está restringida por obstáculos de procedimiento, como la necesidad de obtener aprobación del Concejo Municipal para cualquier transacción, no importa cuán pequeña o insignificante sea desde la perspectiva de la ciudad.
Aunque este proceso de consolidación es necesario, no es suficiente. Hacen falta recursos financieros para eliminar el deterioro urbano e implementar planes de uso del suelo. Los dirigentes municipales se centran principalmente en estrategias para devolver estas parcelas a manos privadas. Si pudieran estimular un mayor interés en las propiedades de Detroit, esta estrategia podría ser viable.
Hay, efectivamente, oportunidades emergentes para estimular la propiedad privada en el distrito comercial central (central business district, o CBD). Daniel Gilbert, fundador de Quicken Loans, ha mudado su sede al centro de Detroit y ha invertido US$1.300 millones en bienes inmuebles (Forbes 2014). Y la renovación del área del centro ha generado un aumento considerable de los precios de alquiler (Christie 2014).
Los valores del suelo en el CBD son muy altos, como se muestra en la figura 4 por las parcelas negras, que representan los valores del suelo más alto del mapa. Sin embargo, el gradiente de valores del suelo en Detroit es muy pronunciado. Si bien varias zonas dentro del anillo que rodea el CBD han retenido algo de valor, el precio del suelo cae rápidamente a medida que aumenta la distancia al CBD, aun cuando vuelven a subir al acercarse a de los límites de la ciudad, probablemente debido a las comodidades disponibles en los suburbios cercanos, como centros comerciales.
Dada la débil demanda fuera del CBD, podría ser más efectivo determinar qué propiedades públicas deberían volver a manos de contribuyentes privados, qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado durante una década o dos, con la opción de volver a introducirlas al mercado en caso de que las condiciones cambien, y qué propiedades deberían retirarse del mercado de manera permanente.
El plan de ordenamiento de 2012, delineado por Detroit Future City, propone la reasignación de suelo para parques, bosques, amortiguadores industriales, vías verdes, lagunas de retención, jardines comunitarios y hasta campamentos (Austen 2014). La implementación plena de esta propuesta ambiciosa requiere recursos financieros importantes. Pero consideremos la manera en que las autoridades estatales y federales intervinieron en el último episodio importante de ejecución tributaria masiva. Durante la Gran Depresión, muchos dueños de residencias familiares en suelos agrícolas marginales de Michigan, Minnesota y Wisconsin ya no pudieron pagar sus impuestos sobre la propiedad, lo que causó una ola masiva de mora tributaria, ejecuciones hipotecarias, abandonos y en última instancia confiscaciones. En esos estados, los gobiernos del condado frecuentemente pasaron a poseer miles de hectáreas, gran parte de las cuales fueron vendidas a los gobiernos estatales y federal. Los seis bosques nacionales de Minnesota, Wis-consin y Michigan, así como numerosos bosques estatales de la región, tuvieron su origen en el abandono masivo de suelo durante la Gran Depresión, cuando las autoridades estatales y federales fueron uniendo en mosaico un conjunto de suelos adyacentes adquiridos a los condados, ansiosos de vender las propiedades que habían decomisado por falta de pago.
En la actualidad, las autoridades del estado y el gobierno federal no se inclinan por un rescate financiero de Detroit. Pero la historia sugiere que los gobiernos federal y estatal podrían ayudar a Detroit a recuperar su viabilidad fiscal adquiriendo grupos de parcelas no deseadas, realizando pagos en lugar de impuestos (como es habitual para otros suelos públicos) y usando después el suelo para beneficio del público en general. Los usos potenciales se describen en el plan de ordenamiento mencionado anteriormente, y se exploran en el segundo artículo de esta serie. Una alianza del gobierno federal con el gobierno estatal y los gobiernos locales para hacerse cargo de estas propiedades podría ayudar a estabilizar el mercado del suelo y crear una fuente de ingresos para la ciudad y demás jurisdicciones fiscales pertinentes (incluyendo el gobierno estatal mismo, a través del impuesto de educación del estado). La recuperación del valor de la propiedad en combinación con la reinversión en el centro de la ciudad, el mantenimiento de los esfuerzos para mejorar el paquete de servicios brindados con la recaudación tributaria de Detroit y la eliminación del deterioro urbano, y una inversión a largo plazo en el capital humano y social de Detroit son elementos esenciales para una recuperación sostenible de la ciudad.
————————
Recuadro 1: Los no residentes como fuente de ingresos
Las fuentes de ingresos de Detroit dependen cada vez más de aportes externos, como por ejemplo de los no residentes, ya que su población y su base económica se han reducido. Este cambio se produjo en parte porque con el tiempo las legislaturas estatales de Michigan permitieron que la ciudad de Detroit usara estrategias de exportación de impuestos para afianzar su situación tributaria debilitada y lidiar con los cambios estructurales masivos de la economía regional. Aunque hubo períodos en que parecía que Detroit estaba por recuperarse, varias fuerzas impidieron la “velocidad de escape”.
Hoy en día, la ciudad de Detroit depende del impuesto sobre los ingresos, el impuesto sobre la propiedad, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, la coparticipación en los ingresos estatales, un impuesto de uso sobre las utilidades, subvenciones federales, y varios aranceles y licencias para financiar sus servicios públicos. De estos, el impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos y el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos se adoptaron para reforzar los debilitados ingresos provenientes de fuentes más tradicionales.
El impuesto sobre las apuestas en casinos, basado en las facturas de las ganancias de los apostadores, ha adquirido particular importancia para la ciudad de Detroit en la última década, como se muestra en la figura 2, que resume las tendencias de las fuentes principales de ingresos de la ciudad entre 1960 y 2012. La legislatura estatal autorizó la actividad de apuestas en casinos y el impuesto sobre las apuestas en Detroit en 1996 para ayudar a superar sus problemas fiscales. La construcción del casino se completó en 2001. Los US$180 millones en ingresos anuales adicionales ayudaron a reducir la presión financiera mientras otras fuentes, como el impuesto sobre los ingresos y la coparticipación de ingresos estatales, se iban reduciendo. Hasta el 85 por ciento de los apostadores de los tres casinos principales de Detroit no son residentes, según informes recientes y entrevistas con expertos de las apuestas (Miklojcik 2014).
Desde 1963, el impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos ha representado la fuente de ingresos más importante y, durante varios años, la de mayor crecimiento. En el momento de su adopción, la mayor parte del impuesto sobre los ingresos era abonada por los residentes de la ciudad. Sin embargo, a medida que la población se ha ido reduciendo, el impuesto sobre los ingresos de los no residentes que trabajan en la ciudad ha cobrado una participación cada vez mayor en la base gravable tributaria, compuesta de sueldos y salarios ganados por empleo dentro de la ciudad. La tasa tributaria es del 2,4 por ciento para los residentes de la ciudad, y del 1,2 por ciento para los no residentes. Aunque las corporaciones y sociedades también pagan un impuesto sobre los ingresos, es una porción muy pequeña de los ingresos totales recaudados. Según Scorsone y Skidmore (2014), aproximadamente la mitad de la recaudación del impuesto municipal sobre los ingresos en Detroit está pagada por no residentes.
La coparticipación de los ingresos estatales sigue desempeñando un papel clave en las finanzas de Detroit, a pesar de que la pérdida de población también ha reducido esta fuente de ingresos. En Michigan, el gobierno estatal recauda un impuesto estatal sobre las ventas y después comparte una porción de lo recaudado con los gobiernos municipales. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre las ventas se asignan a los gobiernos locales de acuerdo a disposiciones constitucionales y legislación estatal. La porción constitucional de la coparticipación de los ingresos depende del porcentaje de la población total del estado de cada jurisdicción. Dada la disminución del número de residentes en Detroit, esta porción de la coparticipación estatal ha venido disminuyendo a lo largo de varias décadas. La ciudad experimentó un crecimiento significativo de los fondos de coparticipación de ingresos en las décadas de 1970 y 1980 debido a aumentos en la coparticipación de los ingresos estipulados por las leyes estatales, que se distribuyen de acuerdo a fórmulas que los legisladores han ido ajustando en décadas recientes. Pero los nuevos cambios en las leyes estatales, en combinación con el estancamiento del impuesto sobre las ventas, ha provocado una reducción del crecimiento y en última instancia una caída en los ingresos de coparticipación de todas las ciudades del estado en la década de 1990. Durante la década de 2000, Michigan experimentó una recesión y esta caída continuó en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones locales, incluyendo Detroit.
Algunos han señalado que las reducciones en la coparticipación de ingresos fue una de las causas principales de los problemas financieros de la ciudad de Detroit y uno de los catalizadores fundamentales de su quiebra. No obstante, estas reducciones afectaron a todas las ciudades que recibieron fondos de coparticipación en Michigan. Si bien la reducción de los ingresos de coparticipación probablemente aceleró la declaración de quiebra de Detroit, no fue la causa principal. Más aún, es importante recalcar que la coparticipación de ingresos estatales de Detroit representa una transferencia neta positiva de fondos del resto del estado a la ciudad. Según el censo económico de 2007, las ventas al por menor en la Ciudad de Detroit fueron de US$3.200 millones, o sea alrededor del 2,9 por ciento de los ingresos totales del estado de Michigan, de US$109.000 millones. En 2012, los ingresos totales por coparticipación en todas las municipalidades de Michigan fueron aproximadamente US$1.000 millones, y la parte que le tocó a Detroit fue de US$172 millones, es decir el 17,2 por ciento. Dado que Detroit representa sólo el 3 por ciento de las ventas minoristas totales de Michigan, se puede concluir que la mayor parte de los ingresos de coparticipación estatal que ingresaron en Detroit se originó en transacciones producidas fuera de la ciudad.
En 2014, la ciudad de Detroit contaba con aproximadamente US$1.000 millones en su Fondo General, un monto considerablemente menor que en 2002, cuando los ingresos llegaron a un pico de US$1.400 millones. Esta caída de ingresos del 30 por ciento a lo largo del tiempo, sin un recorte proporcional en los gastos, condujo a la crisis fiscal de Detroit y su declaración de quiebra en 2013. Para el año 2012, Detroit había tomado en préstamo más de US$1.000 millones para tratar de evitar la mora y una crisis de liquidez (Departamento del Tesoro de Michigan, 2013).
————————
Sobre el autor
Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde ocupa la Cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Política Gubernamental Estatal y Local, con nombramientos conjuntos del Departamento de Economía Agrícola, de Alimentos y Recursos y del Departamento de Economía.
Referencias
Alm, J., T. Hodge, G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014. “Detroit Property Tax Delinquency—Social Contract in Crisis.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Austen, B. 2014. “The Post-Apocalyptic Detroit.” New York Times, 13 de julio. http://nyti.ms/1mFu3Jn
Center for Educational Performance and Information. Accedido en julio de 2014 en www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451—,00.html
City of Detroit. 2013. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/finance/CAFR/Final%202012%20Detroit%20Financial%20Statements.pdf
Christie, Les. 2014. “I’ve Been Priced Out of Downtown Detroit.” CNN Money, 27 de mayo. http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/27/real_estate/downtown-detroit/index.html
Detroit Future City. 2010. Detroit Future City Strategic Framework Book. http://detroitfuturecity.com/framework
Forbes. 2014. “World’s Billionaires.” www.forbes.com/profile/daniel-gilbert
Hodge, T., D. McMillen, G. Sands, y M. Skidmore. 2014a. “Tax Base Erosion and Inequity from Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: The Case of Detroit.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Hodge, T., G. Sands, and M. Skidmore. 2014b. “The Land Value Gradient in a (Nearly) Collapsed Urban Real Estate Market.” Documento de trabajo. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Landsdorf, K. 1973. “Urban Decay, Property Tax Delinquency: A Solution in St. Louis.” The Urban Lawyer 5: 729–748.
MacDonald, C. 2013. “Half of Detroit Property Owners Don’t Pay Taxes.” The Detroit News, 12 de febrero.
Michigan Department of Treasury. 2013. Supplemental Documentation of the Detroit Financial Review Team. www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/Review_Team_Report_Supplemental_2–19-13_411866_7.pdf
Michigan Department of Treasury. 2010. Real Property Tax Forfeiture and Foreclosure. www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,4676,7-238-43535_55601—,00.html
Miklojcik, J. 2014. President of Michigan Consultants. Información compartida en entrevista personal con Eric Scorsone.
National Public Radio. 2014. “Chinese Investors Aren’t Snatching up Detroit Property Yet.” www.npr.org/2014/03/04/285711091/chinese-investors-arent-snatching-up-detroit-property-yet
Sands, G. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Making Ends Meet: Options for Property Tax Reform in Detroit.” Journal of Urban Affairs 36(4) Octubre.
Scorsone, E. y M. Skidmore. 2014. “Blamed for Incompetence and Lack of Foresight and Left to Die.” Response to William Tabb’s “If Detroit Is Dead Some Things Need to Be Said at the Funeral.” Por publicarse en Journal of Urban Affairs.
Turbeville, W. 2013. “The Detroit Bankruptcy.” Demos, 20 de noviembre. www.demos.org/publication/detroit-bankruptcy
SHARE
This article reviews the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, in which state planners from 13 western states have participated. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for land use planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to land use planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of land use planning strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.
Forces and trends of land use planning. The West is changing and there are many differences in the states’ approach to land use planning. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities, and landscapes—directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning, and changing the way development occurs.
Major themes related to land use planning and growth in the West;
Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, land use planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support.
What is the role of state government? State programs should support local land use planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions and maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.
How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges.
Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use planning decisions to drive the decisions.
How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local land use planning. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?
The Three Cs of Planning—three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country. First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community; second, rely on collaborative approaches; third, foster regional connections.
“This [the West] is the native home of hope. When it fully learns that cooperation, not rugged individualism, is the quality that most characterizes and preserves it, then it will have achieved itself and outlived its origins. Then it has a chance to create a society to match its scenery.”
Wallace Stegner, The Sound of Mountain Water (Penguin Books 1980, 38)
During the past two years, state planners in 13 western states have met in the Western State Planning Leadership Retreat, an annual event sponsored by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Western Consensus Council. Cosponsors include the Western Governors’ Association, the Council of State Governments–WEST, and the Western Planners’ Association. The retreats provide a forum for state-level planners to compare their experiences, learn from each other’s successes and failures, and build a common base of experience for planning in their states and across the region. Rather than promote a particular approach to planning and growth management, the retreats encourage planners to explore a range of strategies for responding to growth and land use issues in the West. This article summarizes what we have learned during the first two retreats in 2000 and 2001.
Forces and Trends
The West is changing. New forces and trends are redefining the region’s quality of life, communities and landscapes, directly influencing how we approach land use planning and growth management. One force that sets the West apart from other regions of the country is the overwhelming presence of the landscape. The West has more land and fewer people than any other region, yet is also very urbanized. More people live in urban centers than in rural communities.
The dominance of land in the politics and public policy of the West is due in part to the large amount of land governed by federal and tribal entities (see Figure 1). More than 90 percent of all federal land in the U.S. lies in Alaska and the 11 westernmost contiguous states. The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manage most of the West’s geography and significantly influence the politics of land use decisions. Indian tribes govern one-fifth of the interior West and are key players in managing water, fish and wildlife.
The West is also the fastest growing region of the country (see Figure 2). The five fastest-growing states of the 1990s were Nevada, Arizona, Colorado, Utah and Idaho. Between 1990 and 1998, the region’s cities grew by 25 percent and its rural areas by 18 percent, both significantly higher rates than elsewhere in the U.S. As western demographics diversify, the political geography has grown remarkably homogeneous. Following the 2000 elections, Republicans held three-quarters of the congressional districts in the interior West (see Figure 3) and all governorships except the coastal states of California, Oregon and Washington.
Within these trends, western state planners recognize a variety of common challenges—pockets of explosive population growth, sprawl, drought, out-of-date legislation, a lack of funding, and a lack of public and political support for planning and changing the way development occurs in the West. They also point out many differences in their states’ approaches to planning. Oregon and Hawaii have long-standing statewide land use planning efforts, but planning in Nevada is a recent phenomenon, limited mainly to the Las Vegas and Reno areas. Vast federal holdings in Nevada, Idaho and Utah dictate land use management more than in other states, and Arizona and New Mexico share planning responsibilities with many sovereign tribal governments. Alaska and Wyoming—with small populations and little or no growth—do very little planning.
Major Themes
Based on the first two retreats, we have identified six major themes related to planning and growth in the West.
Why plan? How can we build public and political support for planning? Historically, planning was motivated by a concern to promote orderly development of the landscape, preserve some open spaces, and provide consistency among developments. These continue to be important objectives, but they are insufficient for building public and political support. Particularly during economic recession, planning takes a back seat—the public can focus on only so many problems at once. Today, the most compelling argument for planning is that it can be a vehicle to promote economic development and sustain the quality of life. People move to the West and create jobs because they like the quality of life in the region, and planners need to tap into this motivation.
In Utah, for example, quality of life is an economic imperative, so state planners tie their work to enhancing quality of life rather than to limiting or directing growth. It is used to integrate economic vitality and environmental protection. Several years ago, business leaders and others created Envision Utah, a private-public partnership. Participants use visualization techniques and aerial photos, mapping growth as it might occur without planning, and then again under planned cluster developments with greenbelts and community centers. These “alternative futures” scenarios help citizens picture the changes that are coming and the alternatives for guiding those changes in their communities. As Utah’s state planner says, “Growth will happen, and our job is to preserve quality. That way, when growth slows, we will still have a high quality of life.”
Kent Briggs, executive director for the Council of State Governments–WEST (a regional association for state legislators), and Jim Souby, executive director of the Western Governors’ Association, acknowledge the difficulty of nurturing public and political support for growth management in the West. They agree that political power shifts quickly from one party to the other, and yet is a lagging indicator of cultural, demographic and economic change. Governors and legislators might be more convinced to support land use planning, they say, by using visualization techniques to help them understand the costs of existing patterns of development, and to picture the desired future of our communities and landscapes.
How much planning is enough, and who should be in the driver’s seat? Arizona and Colorado have smart growth programs designed to help communities plan for growth and preserve open space. In the November 2000 elections, citizen initiatives in both states introduced some of the nation’s most stringent planning requirements, but both initiatives failed by a 70 to 30 percent vote, suggesting that citizens want to maintain flexibility and freedom—and local control—when it comes to planning and growth management. The story is similar in Hawaii, where business profitability—not zoning maps—directs land use. In May 2001, Hawaii’s governor vetoed a smart growth initiative because it was perceived as being too environmental and would limit developers’ ability to convert agricultural lands.
This emphasis on home rule or local control is supported by a recent survey of citizens in Montana, conducted by the Montana Association of Realtors. In the survey, 67 percent of respondents said that city or county governments should have the power to make land use decisions, while 60 percent opposed increasing state involvement in managing growth-related problems.
In Oregon, citizens narrowly passed Measure 7, an initiative requiring state and local governments to pay private property owners for any regulations that restrict the use or reduce the value of real property. While the impacts and constitutionality of this initiative are still being debated, it sends a strong message to planners in a state that has had one of the most progressive land use and growth management programs for 25 years. The message, according to Oregon’s state planner, is to not rest on your successes, and to keep citizens and communities engaged in an ongoing discussion about the effectiveness of land use planning. He also stressed the need to balance preservation with appropriate development, emphasizing that “good planning doesn’t just place limits on growth and development.”
What is the role of state government? Douglas Porter, keynote speaker at the first retreat and a nationally known consultant on land use and growth policy, says that one of the most important state roles is to offset the lack of will to plan at the local level. He says that state programs should support local planning efforts, and should try to engage the “big players,” such as transportation departments, to work with local jurisdictions. Porter also suggests that state governments can maintain their state’s economic competitiveness by encouraging local communities to improve their quality of life through infill, redevelopment, and preserving the natural environment.
Oregon’s state government attracted $20 million in federal funding to help communities overhaul zoning ordinances and remove obstacles to mixed uses. Colorado created an Office of Smart Growth to provide technical assistance on comprehensive planning; document best practices for planning and development; maintain a list of qualified mediators for land use disputes; and provide grants for regional efforts in high growth areas. In Arizona, Montana and New Mexico, state planning offices provide a range of technical services to assist communities, such as clarifying state laws, promoting public participation, and fostering intergovernmental coordination.
Jim Souby suggests that one of the most effective roles of state government is to promote market-based strategies and tax incentives. “Tax what you don’t like, subsidize what you do like,” Souby says. Other incentives might include cost sharing and state investment strategies—similar to Maryland and Oregon—to drive development in a positive direction.
How can regional approaches to land use planning complement state actions? Regionalism allows multiple jurisdictions to share common resources and manage joint services, such as water treatment facilities and roads. In Washington, citizens recently rejected the top-down smart growth model popularized in Florida due to concerns over home rule and private property rights. In response, the state legislature approved a system of regional planning boards that instill some statewide consistency while allowing for regional and local differences.
Nevada, despite double-digit growth in the Las Vegas and Reno areas, does not have a state planning office. However, the legislature mandated Washoe County (home of Reno and Sparks) to create a regional planning commission to address growth issues jointly rather than in a piecemeal manner. Key municipal and county officials in Clark County (Las Vegas) formed their planning coalition voluntarily—compelled to cooperate by the highest growth rate in the nation. This coalition recently presented the state legislature with a regional plan that emphasizes resolving growth issues locally rather than at the state level.
In New Mexico, the city and county of Santa Fe each recently updated their comprehensive land use plans. The plans were fine, except that they were stand-alones prepared with no coordination. Citizens demanded better integration of planning efforts and pushed for a new regional planning authority. Within 18 months, citizens and officials developed a joint land use plan for the five-mile zone around the city, and the regional authority is now developing zoning districts and an annexation plan. In Idaho, city and county officials in Boise voluntarily created the Treasure Valley Partnership as a forum to discuss policies for controlling sprawl, and to coordinate the delivery of services. They are also reviewing the possibility of light rail development.
Regional approaches are gaining momentum, but they also create new challenges. For example, the city of Reno has been reluctant to join the neighboring city of Sparks and Washoe County in revising their regional plan. With no enforcement or penalty at the state level, the other jurisdictions can do little to encourage Reno’s involvement. Likewise, New Mexico has no policy framework for regional planning and thus no guidelines on how to share taxing authority, land use decision making and enforcement responsibilities.
Foster effective planning and growth management through collaboration. Collaboration can be defined many ways, but most planners agree with the premise that if you bring together the right people with good information they will create effective, sustainable solutions to their shared problems. Collaborative forums allow local officials to weigh and balance competing viewpoints, and to learn more about the issues at hand. According to Jim Souby, local efforts should incorporate federal land managers because they play such a dominant role in the region’s political geography. Kent Briggs agrees that collaboration, when done correctly, allows the people most affected by land use decisions to drive the decisions. Collaborative processes, when they include all affected interests, can generate enormous political power, even when such efforts do not have any formal authority. While it may be appropriate in some cases to have national or state goals, it is ultimately up to the people who live in the communities and watersheds of the West to determine their future, according to Briggs.
How do we measure success? In 1998, the Arizona legislature passed the Growing Smarter Act, which was amended in 2000, and created a Growing Smarter Commission. The act reformed land use planning and zoning policies and required more public participation in local planning. The commission recommended that the state should monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning on an ongoing basis. The governor recently appointed an oversight council to continue this work, but council members say that clear benchmarks are needed against which to evaluate the effectiveness of land use planning—a percentage of open space preserved, for example, or a threshold on new development that triggers tighter growth restrictions. Arizona law, however, simply identifies the issues that must be addressed in comprehensive land use plans. It does not set specific standards or expectations, making meaningful evaluation impossible. This brings us full circle to our first theme—Why are we planning?
The Three Cs of Planning
Three recommendations emerge from the western state planners’ retreats that can be implemented throughout the country.
First, identify the most compelling reason to plan in your community. What are you trying to promote, or prevent? Be explicit about the values driving the planning process. Emphasize the link between quality of life, economic development and land use planning as a way to sustain the economy and the environment. Remember that people must have meaningful reasons to participate constructively in the planning process.
Second, rely on collaborative approaches. Engage the full range of stakeholders, and do it in a meaningful way. A good collaborative process generates a broader understanding of the issues—since more people are sharing information and ideas—and also leads to more durable, widely supported decisions. Collaboration may also be the most effective way to accommodate the needs and interests of local citizens within a regional approach and when the state’s role is limited.
Third, foster regional connections. Recognize that planning is an ongoing process, not a product to be produced and placed on a shelf. Link the present to the future using visualization and alternative futures techniques. Build monitoring and evaluation strategies into plan implementation. Encourage regional approaches that build on a common sense of place and address transboundary issues. Emphasize that regionalism can lead to greater efficiencies and economies of scale by coordinating efforts and sharing resources.
Matthew McKinney is executive director of the Western Consensus Council in Helena, Montana, a nonprofit organization that helps citizens and officials shape effective natural resource and other public policy through inclusive, informed and deliberative public processes. Will Harmon is the communications coordinator for the Western Consensus Council and a freelance writer based in Helena.
References
Center for Resource Management. 1999. The Western Charter: Initiating a Regional Conversation. Boulder, CO: Center for Resource Management.
Kwartler, Michael. 1998. Regulating the good you can’t think of. Urban Design International 3(1):13-21.
Steinitz, Carl and Susan McDowell. 2001. Alternative futures for Monroe County, Pennsylvania: A case study in applying ecological principles, in Applying Ecological Principles to Land Management, edited by Virginia H. Dale and Richard A. Haeuber. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 165-189.
Swanson, Larry. 1999. The emerging ‘new economy’ of the Rocky Mountain West: Recent change and future expectation. The Rocky Mountain West’s Changing Landscape 1(1):16-27.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. Environmental Planning for Communities: A Guide to the Environmental Visioning Process Utilizing a Geographic Information System (GIS). (September).
