Growing the International Land Conservation Network

Laura Johnson is an attorney and lifelong conservationist with more than 30 years of experience in nonprofit management. She is currently director of the new International Land Conservation Network (ILCN), a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and chair of the Land Trust Alliance board of directors.

Laura was the president of Mass Audubon from 1999 to 2012. Prior, she worked for 16 years at The Nature Conservancy as a lawyer, Massachusetts state director, and vice president of the northeast region.

Laura received a B.A. in history from Harvard University and a J.D. from New York University Law School. From 2013 to 2014, she was a Bullard Fellow at the Harvard Forest, Harvard University, where she completed a study on private land conservation efforts around the world.

LAND LINES: Your program, the International Land Conservation Network (ILCN), is new this year, but it has some antecedents at the Lincoln Institute. Can you tell us about that history?

LAURA JOHNSON: There are some wonderful connections between the new network and the Lincoln Institute’s past support of the innovative, capacity-building effort devoted to conservation that eventually became the Land Trust Alliance.

In the early 1980s, Kingsbury Browne, a prominent Boston lawyer, decided to take some time away from his law firm, and he used a sabbatical at the Lincoln Institute to explore the needs and opportunities of private land trusts in the United States. Up until that point, there was no nationwide effort to seek out the best examples of land protection activities, to share those ideas and best practices, or even to keep track of what was happening in land conservation around the country. Kingsbury Browne’s study led him, along with several other land trust leaders at the time, to start a new organization called the Land Trust Exchange, which connected the country’s small but growing conservation community through a newsletter and some basic research and training activities. The Lincoln Institute played a crucial role in helping to launch the Exchange, which grew over the years and changed its name to become the Washington, DC–based Land Trust Alliance. There were fewer than 400 U.S. land trusts in 1982 when the Exchange got started; now the Land Trust Alliance serves 1,200 land trusts all over the United States. The Exchange started out with a modest newsletter in the 1980s; now the Alliance provides an online learning center, a full conservation and risk management curriculum, and more than 100 webinars and 300 workshops that served close to 2,000 people in 2014.

LL: Throughout most of your career, you have been deeply engaged in U.S.-based land conservation work. What attracted you to expand your efforts on an international scale?

LJ: When I stepped down from the presidency of Mass Audubon two years ago, I began talking with Jim Levitt, a fellow at the Lincoln Institute, the director of the Program on Conservation Innovation at the Harvard Forest, and a former Mass Audubon board member. It was initially his idea that I explore how conservationists outside the United States were using and adapting conservation tools that had been developed over the years here. Jim had become very involved in private conservation efforts in Chile, and there was an opportunity to strengthen the very new movement there by sharing U.S.-based measures such as conservation easements. At about the same time, Peter Stein received the Kingsbury Browne fellowship and award from the Land Trust Alliance and the Lincoln Institute, which allowed him to explore the breadth of worldwide conservation organizations as well. Through our different projects, Jim, Peter, and I came to the similar conclusion that many people around the globe shared a strong interest in connecting to each other and to U.S. conservationists. This desire for a community of practice seemed like a remarkable opportunity to help build capacity for privately protecting land.

LL: Why is this role the right challenge at the right time for you?

LJ: I have had the incredible good fortune to work with some great organizations and wonderfully talented people. As a young lawyer just starting out at The Nature Conservancy in the 1980s, I was able to grow professionally at a pivotal time for conservation in the United States. Looking at the historic trend lines, the U.S. land conservation movement took off then, and it was very exciting to be a part of that growth. Then when I went to Mass Audubon in 1999, I was able to run the nation’s largest independent state Audubon organization, which provided leadership not just with land conservation, but with environmental education and public policy as well. Now, I have the honor of serving on the board of the Land Trust Alliance, which does such remarkable work here in the United States to enable effective land and resource protection. Along the way, my legal training was certainly useful, but I have also learned a tremendous amount about what makes organizations successful and likely to have a positive impact. I feel very fortunate to have this background and set of experiences, and I want to bring it to bear on the issues facing the international land conservation community.

LL: You’ve mentioned capacity building and creating successful organizations a few times. Can you comment on what that means in the context of land conservation?

LJ: Land conservation organizations need all the elements of any sound nonprofit organization—a clear mission, a compelling vision and strategy, disciplined planning and clear goals, sufficient financial resources, and great people. But working on land protection requires a very long-term outlook. To start with, a land trust needs to have the knowledge and resources to assess what land should be protected—whether the mission is to conserve natural resources or scenic, cultural, or historic values—and what legal and financial tools are best suited to achieving a good outcome. Then it can take years of working with a landowner to get to a point where everyone is ready to agree on a deal. Land trusts need to have people with the training, knowledge, and experience to carry out transactions that are legally, financially, and ethically sound. Once land is protected by a trust, that organization is making a commitment to manage the land it owns or has restrictions on forever. Museums are a good analogy, but instead of Rembrandts and Picassos, land conservation organizations are stewards of invaluable living resources, and the land and water we all depend on to survive.

LL: Why is private land conservation particularly important now? Why do we need an international network?

LJ: We are at a critical juncture as the pressures of climate change, land conversion, and shrinking government resources are making it more challenging than ever to protect land and water for the public benefit. Therefore the mission statement of the new International Land Conservation Network emphasizes connecting organizations and people around the world that are accelerating voluntary private action that protects and stewards land and water resources. Our premise is that building capacity and empowering voluntary private land conservation will strengthen the global land conservation movement and lead to more long-lasting and effective resource protection.

Support for better coordination of international private land conservation is emerging from many sources. For example, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) considered the role of private land conservation in the context of global efforts at its November 2014 World Parks Congress held in Sydney, Australia. The Futures of Privately Protected Areas, an IUCN-commissioned report released at that conference, provided a number of recommendations, such as developing relevant training and improving knowledge sharing and information, which are certainly important goals for the new network. We expect to work in collaboration with partners such as the IUCN, and with the existing regional or countrywide networks that are already in existence. And of course we have the very powerful example of the Land Trust Alliance and what it has been able to accomplish over 30 years to build the capacity of land trusts in the United States.

LL: What will you try to accomplish in the first year to address these needs?

LJ: We’ve had to get ourselves organized and deal with basic issues such as our name, visual identity, mission statement, goals, and governance structure. We will be designing and launching a website to serve as the essential repository of case studies, research, best practices, events, and conferences. Eventually, we want to have a continuum of learning available on the website through tools like webinars that address a range of subjects, from legal instruments to organizational best practices. We also want to carry out a census of existing networks and active organizations, to start building a baseline of knowledge about private land protection that will help measure progress over time.

LL: What are the greatest challenges to starting the network?

LJ: There are many. Money is a big one, of course. We’ve received a generous start-up grant from the Packard Foundation, and we have great support from the Lincoln Institute. But we are working hard to identify additional sources of funding, in order to grow the network and increase its impact. And of course we are still proving that the network will provide useful, important, and actionable information and training to meet a tremendous variety of needs within the international land conservation community. We know that we can’t do everything, so we must be strategic and choose activities that will have impact. The global scale also presents a host of cultural and logistical challenges, requiring us to navigate different legal systems, languages, customs, and, last but not least, time zones.

On the positive side, we already have a very committed group of land conservation practitioners who came together at our organizing meeting in September 2014 and enthusiastically signed on to be the “sweat equity”—to provide the network with knowledge, expertise, experience, and wise counsel. It’s already very clear to me that this is a wonderful group of colleagues who are doing interesting and important work around the globe. It will be an adventure—and I know I’ll learn a lot—to grow this new network together.

Harvey M. Jacobs is on the faculty of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he holds a joint appointment as professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning and the Institute for Environmental Studies and serves as director of the Land Tenure Center. His research and teaching investigate public policy, theory and philosophy for land use and environmental management. During the last decade he has focused his domestic work on the impact of the private property rights movement. He wrote the book Who Owns America? Social Conflict over Property Rights and the Lincoln Institute policy focus report State Property Rights Laws: The Impacts of Those Laws on My Land, and his work has been published in academic and professional journals in the U.S. and Western Europe. Jacobs also has investigated international issues of land use policy formation by national ministries and new local governments in Eastern Europe and southern Africa, with a specific focus on peri-urban (urban fringe) land management and the definition of private property rights. He is particularly interested in how societies define property and the policy structures they develop to manage the public-private property relationship.

Jacobs is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute, where he teaches courses for policy makers and practitioners in land use planning and management. He developed a Lincoln course titled “Land Use in America,” originally designed for staff of the Environmental Protection Agency and now available through open enrollment, which he has taught several times in Cambridge. As part of his current education and research project with the Institute, he will lead a seminar in Cambridge in May on the future of private property rights in America, and he is working on another book to be titled Private Property in the 21st Century. This essay outlines his views on the uncertain future of the American ideal of private property rights.

Property Rights and Environmental Planning

Social conflict over property rights is at the center of all U.S. land and environmental planning and policy. One key source of this conflict is the differing interpretations of the so-called Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights: “. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

Those who support the integrity of private property rights and stand against land use and environmental regulation by state and local governments can be understood as participants in one of the most significant U.S. land use and environmental movements of recent times. This movement is referred to by a variety of labels, including the private property rights movement, the land rights movement, the wise use movement and, by the environmental community, the anti-environmental movement. This movement’s leaders have succeeded in keeping their agenda before the U.S. Congress since the early 1990s, though as yet no action has resulted from their efforts. More significantly, they have succeeded in having bills reflecting their agenda introduced in all 50 states, and they have secured the passage of significant legislation in over half of the states. In addition, they have promoted significant parallel activity in over 300 counties. Perhaps most important, they have reshaped public debate on how the media communicates to the American public about issues of land and environmental management, and the balancing of the public good with individual property rights.

The potential power of the property rights movement became even more important after the 2000 elections. While governor of Texas, George W. Bush exhibited strong sympathies to the arguments of the property rights movement and supported state-based legislation in accordance with the movement’s goals. Among his most prominent initial appointments as president were the selection of a secretary of the interior and a solicitor general with explicit ties to the property rights movement and commitments to the property rights issue. These developments, together with renewed activity at the state level, indicate that the property rights movement seems to be alive and well in America. The passage of Measure 7 in the state of Oregon in the fall of 2000 is of particular interest, since this measure is one of the most stringent state property rights laws in what is considered one of the most progressive states in its land use and environmental management policies. The measure, passed by initiative, requires landowners to be compensated if the value of their property is reduced by a state or local law or regulation. It is under state constitutional challenge by land use and environmental groups, and its implementation is being held back until this challenge is settled by the Oregon courts.

Historical Context

Underlying the policy agenda of the property rights movement and the conflict with the land use and environmental movements is a fundamental debate about U.S. history, the cultural myths that inform our understanding of ourselves as a nation, and the intended meanings of selected provisions of the Bill of Rights. From the perspective of the property rights movement, strong individual private property rights are an integral component of our democratic society. Drawing from the writings of the nation’s founders such as John Adams, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, these proponents argue that liberty, equality and citizenship in a democracy, in fact democracy itself, can not be secured and sustained without a robust set of property rights essentially unassailable by the power of the state. From this perspective, land use and environmental laws become a threat to the very nature of democratic way of life. Richard Epstein, one of the leading legal scholars articulating this view, has suggested that “the [entire] system of land use planning is a form of socialism in microcosm” (Epstein 1992, 202).

In opposition, the land use and environmental movements also draw from the writings of the founders, including Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, to argue that property rights are created by the public sector to serve social ends, and that citizens’ rights in property have to bend and flex with society’s changing needs over time. Land use and environmental proponents tend to make arguments about rights and responsibilities in property, rather than to see individual rights as preexisting or standing before the rights of society, as expressed through the actions of government.

The historical challenge for this debate is the that private property has been subject to substantial local regulation even since colonial times, and it has been fundamentally reshaped at several times in American history, to reflect changing social values and changing technology. For example, in the 1860s the property ownership rights of slave-owning plantation farmers in the South and in the 1960s the commercial trespass rights of lunch-counter owners were significantly reshuffled to reflect changing social values about race relations. In the early part of the twentieth century it was necessary to reconceptualize the property rights bundle as a function of the invention of the airplane and the seeming nonsense of allowing individual owners to claim trespass for air travel above their property.

Changing Conditions

Social reformulation of private property to reflect changing conditions continues. During the 1990s resistance by male-only membership clubs and male-only colleges to the admission of women was prominent in the media and the courts. Like the prior slavery and civil rights situations, here, too, individuals lost their rights in property, absent compensation, to reflect changing social values.

Thus, we know that private property is not a static concept or entity. In America it has changed since its creation during colonial times, and there is every reason to believe it will continue changing in the future. In fact, for over fifty years some ecologists and land ethicists—most prominently and enduringly Aldo Leopold (1949)—have called for a fundamental reinvention of property, based on new scientific knowledge that is less individual-rights oriented and more oriented toward social and ecological responsibilities.

It is reasonable to say that both sides to this debate have legitimate concerns and perspectives on the issue. Some property rights reforms through land use and environmental planning and policy, when taken too far, do seem to violate fundamental American understandings about the social contract that underlies national life. On the other hand, unassailable bundles of private property rights seem to leave society in a place that does not allow for change through the integration of new technologies, new social values, or new concepts of ourselves and the land on which we live.

Social conflict over property rights is at the center of all U.S. land and environmental planning and policy. However, much of the current scholarly inquiry and legislative and judicial debate that occurs now is formalized posturing, with little real communication around an issue that is one of the most central to our democratic society. Too often, the well-known players trot out their already settled analyses and opinions and wave them at one another. Little real progress occurs, either in intellectual understanding of these matters or in policy innovation.

The goal of my current work is to get key actors to put aside their rancor and agree to talk with one another instead of at one another. Is it possible to move beyond the broad rhetoric in this debate to a determination of clear, specific areas of agreement and disagreement about the place and role of the property rights bundle and the concept of property rights in our American democratic-legal schema? The challenge is twofold: accepting that private property is fundamental to the American character and the design of American democracy, and acknowledging that private property has changed significantly through the centuries and thus will continue to change. The issue is not if private property will evolve, but how it will evolve.

As we seek to address this issue, many questions present themselves. How much will new ecological knowledge and social values transform our sense of what is mine to use (and misuse and abuse) as I please? Is the evolutionary transformation of private property a slippery slope that eventually undermines the viability of contemporary democratic forms of governance? Are the ideals and principles of the founding fathers about the relationship of land ownership to liberty and democracy irrelevant in a world of urban wage earners, in contrast to the world of farmers, foresters and ranchers for which they were formulated? These are among the challenges we face in trying to untangle a puzzle that is the key to the future of American (and increasingly global) land use and environmental planning.

References

Epstein, Richard. 1992. Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, California Western Law Review 29(1):187-207.

Jacobs, Harvey M. 1998. Who Owns America? Social Conflict over Property Rights. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

——. 1999. Fighting Over Land: America’s Legacy . . . America’s Future? Journal of the American Planning Association 65(2):141-149.

——. 1999. State Property Rights Laws: The Impacts of Those Laws on My Land. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Leopold, Aldo. 1968 [1949]. A Sand County Almanac. London and New York: Oxford University Press.

My experience in attending the “Who Owns America? II” conference in Madison, Wisconsin, last June was like contemplating a landscape of ideas about land and people. From my perspective, this landscape had four salient features:

• the expansion of property rights;
• the challenge of the private/public dichotomy;
• the growing complexity of the physical world, which constitutes the ‘object’ of property rights;
• and the narrative approach as a methodological tool for better understanding property as a social relationship.

The most noticeable feature in U.S. legal thinking about land is the great importance of property rights. Latin American legal tradition, following French jurist Leon Duguit’s doctrine of the social function of property, tends to see property rights as something to be limited by government and law in order to meet social needs. So, it was a cultural shock for me to discover the popularity of Charles Reich’s theory about property, where egalitarian ideas are advanced by means of asserting individual property rights.

At the conference, one could see many different ways in which the notion of property rights was expanded to accommodate new social demands. Eric Freyfogle’s contention that property should have an honored place in society is one example. Of course, an idea does not have to be accepted unanimously in American legal thinking for it to be an important aspect of today’s landscape of ideas about property.

The second feature refers to the distinction between public and private-a distinction that is so essential to modern societies that it is usually taken for granted. We are used to recognizing the coexistence of two separate forms of social control over the same piece of land: that of private landowners and that of public government organizations. However, one has to remember that this separation is not eternal or universal; it is a historical product.

Urban studies have long shown that land use regulations constantly affect the relationships between public and private control. Planning powers and development rights have been shrinking and expanding since the inception of modern urban management, and that process is now seen as normal. A more profound challenge to the separation of public and private categories was raised at the conference by indigenous peoples’ claims to their territories in the United States.

Those claims refer to a third, not yet fully codified, form of social control over land. In general, indigenous peoples do not aim at controlling local governments, i.e. governing a territory through conventional means. They also reject being treated simply as private corporations who own land. They talk about rights of a different nature, with old and new elements, and they do so by challenging a series of treaties between the people and the state. A treaty is the typical form of legal relationship between a nation-state and an external force. Apparently, past treaties were supposed to ‘settle’ the territorial question. But those treaties are now being questioned both in terms of the public/private dichotomy and because the formation of a nation-state was not completed.

We must also recognize that classical legal thinking does not have the tools to give meaning to these developments, because it is the very foundation of that thinking that is being shaken. Clearly, these concerns are also being raised in Canada and Mexico, although under different forms and with different outcomes. Scholars and practitioners in legal theory, and particularly constitutional theory, in all three countries of North America can learn a lot from each other in this process.

We should not be surprised to see new forms of territorial control when there have been so many changes in the land itself. Thousands of books have been written about the transformation of the land, mainly from what we now call an environmental perspective. Land as the ‘object’ of property relations has become extremely complex, and this complexity is the third feature I see in this landscape of ideas. Territories have become very difficult to understand, and perhaps the most relevant development is the blurring of the urban/rural distinction. We do not have cities in the traditional sense of the word; what we have is a set of urbanization processes.

The heralds of cyberspace tell us that as distances are shortened through new technologies, space and distance have become irrelevant. The truth is that technological change, combined with demographic and social change, has only made land more complex. This is clear when we see, as in the papers presented at the conference, the great number of disciplines that describe, analyze and even sing about land. There is not a single discipline that can embrace land into one form of discourse.

Maybe the most interesting new way of looking at land is the narrative approach, the fourth feature in our landscape. Listening to stories about land throws more light on property relationships than many other empirical methods because it allows us to recognize the subjective aspects without getting too far from empirical social sciences. Compared to the rigidity of legal and economic approaches, personal accounts give us the fluidity of property as a social relationship, the changes that occur in that relationship as a result of many interactions, and the different meanings that a piece of land or a neighborhood can have for its dwellers, new settlers, visitors or others.

Recognizing the richness and vividness of people’s stories and contrasting this richness against the rigidity of legal categories does not require neglecting those categories. Indeed, this more subjective approach can be another way of taking the law seriously. There is hardly any social discourse about land, even in its most vernacular form, which does not have a normative connotation. When someone says ‘this land is (was or should be) mine,’ he or she is making a legal claim. Legal categories are important outside the professional circles of lawyers, judges and realtors precisely because they are part of people’s stories; moreover, their function is to give meaning to people’s experiences.

When legal categories are not able to embrace a people’s normative representations about land, the law has lost its meaning. If traditional legal thinking defines property as a bundle of rights, the narrative approach can teach us to see property rights as bundles of representations that can be used to help people give meaning to their relationship to the land. Maybe this is the main lesson I have learned from “Who Owns America?”: to use many lenses to look at the landscape and to explore comparative ideas about individual and community ownership, informal settlements and legal systems throughout North America.

Antonio Azuela is the Attorney General for Environmental Protection in the federal government of Mexico. A graduate of Universidad Iberoamericana (Mexico City) and the School of Law, University of Warwick (England), he has been the legal advisor to several state governments and federal government agencies on planning law. Mr. Azuela is author of La Ciudad la Propiedad. Privada y el Derecho-The City: Private Property and the Law (El Colegio de Mexico, 1989) and numerous other publications on urban and environmental law from a sociological perspective.

Editor’s Note: The “Who Owns America? II” conference in June 1998 was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute and the North American Program of the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The University of Wisconsin Press has recently published Who Owns America? Social Conflict over Property Rights, edited by Harvey M. Jacobs, and based on the first conference in 1995. Contact: www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress

I am pleased to report that the Lincoln Institute has signed an agreement of understanding with the Ministry of Land and Resources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to work together on researching and teaching about land and tax policies. Many places in the world face fundamental problems in land allocation and land taxation, but it is difficult to imagine a place and time where the resources of the Lincoln Institute could be more influential and could help more people than in China during the early twenty-first century.

Land and tax policy makers in China are faced with enormous challenges as a result of the extraordinary urbanization of the past two decades. The number of established cities in China grew from 182 in 1982 to 324 in 1985, and reached 666 by 1996, and the average urban population grew by 227 percent between 1957 and 1995. Some cities grew by 200 percent from 1985 to 1995, and the urbanized area of Beijing doubled from 1985 to 1992. However, the extent of urbanization in the future will dwarf that of the recent past. Based on forecasts of population growth and migration, China must provide enough urban land and infrastructure to accommodate more than 450 million persons over the next 20 years. If all of the additional urban population were put in new cities of 10 million persons each, China would need to develop and finance 45 such cities.

China initiated fundamental and revolutionary land use reforms during the mid-1980s. The first reforms established privately held land use rights. The second set of reforms included multiple elements, such as land banking, land trusts, land readjustments, and development of land markets in both urban and rural areas. We believe that the Institute can make a real difference in assisting these reform measures by sponsoring education and training for government officials, supporting research and publications by U.S. and Chinese scholars, and facilitating more in-depth interactions through workshops and conferences.

Over the past two years the Institute has led two training programs in Beijing and participated in meetings between Chinese officials and scholars and Institute board members, faculty and staff. The Institute also sponsored several sessions on land and housing markets in the PRC at the First World Planning Congress in Shanghai in 2001. We anticipate several more training and exchange programs this year, but we believe this is still just the beginning of an expanded effort by the Institute to have a positive impact on land and tax policy in the world’s most populous country. In this issue, Institute faculty associates Chengri Ding and Gerrit Knaap examine some of the recent reforms and current trends in urban land policy in China.

Land value is determined primarily by external factors, mainly changes that occur in the neighborhood or other parts of the city rather than by direct actions of the landowner. This observation is especially valid for small lots whose form or type of occupancy do not generate sufficiently strong externalities to increase their own value retroactively; that is, a small lot generally does not have a significant impact on those very external factors that could affect its own value. However, large urban projects (grandes proyectos urbanos or GPUs) do influence those factors, and also the value of the land that supports them. Herein lies the essence the Lincoln Institute’s interest in such projects.

We propose two perspectives for analyzing GPUs that complement and contrast with others that formerly predominated in this debate. First, these projects can be a stimulating force for immediate urban change that is capable of affecting land values, and therefore land use, for large areas if not an entire city region. This view is focused more on urban design or urbanism and stresses the study of the physical, esthetic and symbolic dimensions of large urban projects. A second approach, covering the field of regulation, attempts to understand the land value appreciation generated by the implementation and operation of these projects as a potential means for self-support and economic feasibility. It analyzes the role of GPUs in providing a new function for certain areas of the city. Both perspectives require a more holistic understanding that includes the diversity and levels of complexity of the projects, their relation to the city plan, the type of regulatory framework they require, the role of the public and private sectors in managing and financing them, land taxation and fiscal policies, and other factors.

These large projects are not new to Latin America. In the early twentieth century, many cities were impacted by programs that used public-private management arrangements, including outside players (national and international) and complex financial structures. Some projects had the potential to trigger urban processes capable of transforming their surroundings or even the city as a whole, as well as accentuating the preexisting socio-spatial polarization. Often the projects were layered over existing regulations, contributing to questions about the urban planning strategies in force at the time. Large urban developers and utility companies (English, Canadian, French and others) coordinated the provision of services with complex real estate development operations in almost all the major cities of Latin America.

Today large projects attempt to intervene in especially sensitive places to reorient urban processes and create new urban identities on a symbolic level. They also aim to create new economic areas (sometimes territorial enclaves) able to foster an environment protected from urban poverty and violence, and more favorable to domestic or international private investment. When describing the motives that justify these programs, the rhetoric focuses on their instrumental role in strategic planning, their alleged contribution to urban productivity, and their effectiveness in boosting their intercity competitive position.

In a context marked by transformations due to globalization, economic reforms, deregulation and the introduction of a new focus on urban management, it is not surprising that these programs have been the subject of much controversy. Their scale and complexity often spur new social movements; redefine economic opportunities; put into question urban development regulatory frameworks and land use rules; strain local finances; and expand political arenas, thus altering the roles of urban stakeholders. An additional complication is the long time frame for executing large urban projects, which usually exceeds the terms of municipal governments and the limits of their territorial authority. This reality presents additional management challenges and formidable dilemmas within the public and academic debate.

The Lincoln Institute’s contribution to this debate is to underscore the land component in the structure of these large projects, specifically the processes associated with urban land management and the mechanisms for land value capture or the mobilization of land value increments for the benefit of the community. This article is part of a broader, ongoing effort to systematize recent Latin American experience with GPUs and to discuss the relevant aspects.

A Wide Range of Projects

As in other parts of the world, large urban projects in Latin America comprise a wide range of activities: restoration of historic downtown areas (Old Havana or Lima); renovation of neglected downtown areas (São Paulo or Montevideo); redevelopment of ports and waterfronts (Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires or Ribera Norte in Concepción, Chile); reuse of old airports or industrial zones (the Tamanduatehy artery in Santo Andre, Brazil, or the Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile); expansion zones (Santa Fé, Mexico, or the former Panama Canal zone); residential or neighborhood improvement projects (Nuevo Usme in Bogotá or Favela Bairro in Rio de Janeiro); and so on.

Land management is a key component in all of these projects, and it presents diverse sets of conditions (Lungo 2004; forthcoming). One common trait is that the projects are managed by a government authority as part of a city project or plan, even though they enjoy private participation in several respects. Thus exclusively private programs, such as shopping centers and gated communities, are a different category of development project not included in this discussion.

Scale and Complexity

The minimum threshold of scale, in terms of surface area or amount of financial investment, for a project to meet the GPU criteria depends on the size of the city, its economy, social structure and other factors, all of which help define the complexity of the project. In Latin America projects often combine large scale and a complex set of players associated with key roles in land policy and management, including various levels of government (national, provincial and municipal), private entities and community leaders from the affected area. Even relatively small upgrading projects are often formidably complex with regard to the land readjustment component.

There is obviously a huge difference between a project proposed by one or a few owners over a large area (such as ParLatino, an abandoned industrial site in São Paulo) and a project involving the cooperation of many owners of small areas. The latter requires a complex series of actions capable of generating synergies or sufficient external economies to make each action economically viable. Most projects fall between the two extremes. They often involve the prior acquisition of rights over smaller parcels by a few agents in order to centralize control over the type and management of the development.

The key to analysis and design of GPUs in Latin America lies in the ability of the institutional organization in charge of project management to incorporate and coordinate scale and complexity appropriately. Governmental corporations have been created in some cases, but they operate autonomously (as in Puerto Madero) or as special public agencies attached to the central or municipal governments (as in the housing program being developed in the city of Rosario, Argentina, or the Nuevo Usme program in Bogotá). The case of the failed project to build the new Mexico City airport demonstrates the negative consequences of not correctly defining this fundamental aspect of GPUs.

Relationship of GPUs to the City Plan

What is the point of developing GPUs when the city has no comprehensive urban development plan or socially shared vision? It is possible to find situations where execution of GPUs may stimulate, enhance or strengthen the city plan, but in practice many such projects are established without any plan. One of the main criticisms aimed at GPUs is that they become instruments for excluding citizen participation in decision making about individual elements of what is expected or supposed to be part of an integrated urban project, as is normally provided for in a city’s master plan or land use plan.

This is an interesting debate within the framework of urban policies in Latin America, since urban planning itself has been criticized as being elitist and exclusionary. Some authors have concluded that urban planning has been one if not the main cause of the excesses of social segregation typical of cities in the region. In this context the recent popularity of GPUs can be seen as a reaction of the elite to redemocratization and participatory urban planning. Others may view GPUs as an advanced (and perverse) form of traditional urban planning; a yielding to the failures or ineffectiveness of urban planning; or even a lesser evil because at least they ensure that something is done in some part of the city.

There are many challenges for GPUs regarding their relationship to a city plan. They can help build a city plan where none exists, alter traditional plans, or do what we might call “navigating through the urban fog” if the former paths are not viable. In any case, land management proves to be a critical factor, both for the plan and for the projects, because it refers to the fundamental role of the regulatory framework covering urban land use and expansion.

Regulatory Framework

The preferred regulatory solution would be a two-part intervention: on one hand, maintaining general regulations for the whole city but changing the conventional criteria to be more flexible in absorbing the constant change taking place in urban environments; and on the other, allowing specific regulations for certain projects but avoiding regulatory frameworks that may contradict the stated goals of the city plan. Urban Operations, a specific and ingenious instrument devised under the Brazilian urban development legislation (Statute of the City Act of 2001), has been used widely to accommodate these dual needs. The city of São Paulo alone has 16 such operations in effect. Another version of this instrument is the so-called “partial planning” provision to readjust large tracts of land, which is included in Colombia’s equally innovative Law 388 of 1997.

Again in practice we see that exceptions are often granted in an apparently arbitrary manner, and regulatory restrictions are frequently ignored. The point is that neither type of regulation is submitted to any assessment of its socioeconomic and environmental value, thus losing a significant portion of its justification. Given the financial and fiscal fragility of cities in Latin America, what prevails is an extremely low capacity for public discussion of the requests made by the proponents of GPUs. The absence of institutional mechanisms that would make these negotiations transparent makes them more venal, insofar as they expose the capacity to discuss other, less prosaic legal challenges.

Public or Private Management and Financing

What is the desirable combination of public and private management of these projects? To guarantee that public management of a large urban project fulfills its function, land use must be monitored and regulated, although the degree to which the control should be exercised, and on which specific components of land ownership rights, is unresolved. Ambiguity in the courts and the uncertainties associated with the development of GPUs often result in public frustration over unanticipated outcomes favoring private interests. The proper balance between effective ex ante (GPU formulation, negotiation and design) and ex post (GPU implementation, management, operation and impacts) controls over land uses and rights is at the heart of the problem. Typically in the Latin American experience with GPUs there is a huge gap between original promises and actual outcomes.

In recent years the management of GPUs has been confused with the utility and feasibility of public-private partnerships, such as those set up in many countries to carry out specific projects or programs. Some stakeholders even propose the possibility of privatizing urban development management in general. If the private sector has complete control over the land, however, GPUs are severely limited in their ability to contribute to socially sustainable urban development, despite the fact that in many cases the projects contribute significant taxes to the city (Polese and Stren 2000).

The preferred public management system should call on the greatest social participation possible and include the private sector in the financing and implementation of these projects. The large urban programs that seem to contribute the most to the development of a city are those based on public management of the land.

Land Value Appreciation

There is consensus around the fact that GPUs generate an appreciation in land value. Differences emerge when we try to assess the real amount of this appreciation, if it is to be redistributed and, if so, how it should be shared and whom it should benefit, both in social and territorial terms. Again we have the public-private conundrum, wherein this redistribution formula often leads to the appropriation of public resources by the private sector.

The appreciation of land value as a resource that can be mobilized for self-financing the GPU or transferred to other areas of the city could be a way to measure whether or not public management of these projects is a success. However, we rarely have an acceptable estimate of this land value increment. Even in the Puerto Madero project in Buenos Aires, which is considered to be a success, to date there is no evaluation of the land value increment associated with either the properties within the project itself or those in neighboring areas. As a result, the discussion of possible redistribution has not gone beyond a few educated guesses.

GPUs conceived as instruments for achieving certain strategic urban goals are generally registered as successes when they are executed according to plan. The question regarding to what extent these goals were actually reached is not fully answered, and it is often conveniently forgotten. The hypothesis that best seems to fit Latin American experiences with GPUs is that the apparent lack of interest in goals has little to do with any technical inability to make the source of the increased value transparent. Rather, this inattention comes from the need to hide the role of public management in facilitating the private sector’s capture of the land value increment in general, if not its capture of public resources used to develop the construction project itself.

We are not feigning ignorance of or trying to minimize the difficulties in advancing knowledge about how land value appreciation is formed and in measuring its size and circulation. Indeed, there are many technical obstacles to overcome when faced with complicated land rights, the vicissitudes or permanent flaws in cadastres and property registers, and the lack of an historical series of geo-referenced real estate values. Even the smallest plan must distinguish between the appreciation generated by the project itself and that generated by urban externalities that almost always exist despite the scale of the project, the different sources and rates of appreciation, and so forth. Some encouraging work has been done on measuring and evaluating the land value increment associated with development, but technical obstacles seem to be less relevant than the lack of political interest in knowing how these projects are being managed.

When land value increments are created, they are usually distributed in the immediate project area or nearby. This principle is based on the need to finance a specific project within the area, to offset certain negative impacts, or to implement actions such as relocating precarious housing sited on the land or its surroundings that may detract from the image of the new project. Given the socioeconomic conditions found in the typical Latin American city, it is not hard to see that the preferred use of the captured value is to earmark it for projects of a social nature in other parts of the city, such as housing complexes. In fact a significant part of the generated land value increment results exactly from the removal of negative externalities produced by the presence of low-income families in the area. Needless to say, this strategy raises conflicting opinions.

There is certainly a need to devise better legislation and instruments to overcome the trade-off between socially mobilized land value increment and gentrification through displacement. Despite the lack of hard empirical studies, there are reasons to believe that a broader understanding of the impacts of these projects will show that some of the compensatory intracity transfers may actually prove to be counterproductive. For example, the resulting higher land price differences and social residential segregation may involve higher social costs that will need to be addressed by additional public resources in the future (Smolka and Furtado 2001).

Positive and Negative Impacts

On the other hand, the negative impacts caused by GPUs often obscure the varied positive impacts. The challenge is how to reduce the negative impacts produced by this type of urban intervention. It soon becomes clear, whether directly or indirectly, that the role of land management is critical to understanding the effects of large interventions in urban development, planning, regulation, socio-spatial segregation, and the urban environment and culture. Scale and complexity have a role as well, depending on the type of impact. For example, scale is more relevant to environmental and urban development impacts, while complexity is more critical in terms of social impact and urban policy.

As already mentioned, the gentrification that these projects generally produce encourages the displacement of the existing, usually poor, inhabitants from the new project area. However, gentrification is a complex phenomenon that requires further analysis of its own negative aspects, as well as how it could help to raise living standards. It could be more useful to move on from simple mitigation of unwanted negative impacts to better management of the processes that create these risks.

Any GPU can have positive or negative effects, depending on the way urban development is managed, the role of the public sector, and the existing level of citizen participation. We have emphasized that one of the central issues is management of the land and of the land value increment associated with these projects. Large urban projects can not be analyzed in isolation from the entire development of the city. Likewise, the land component must be evaluated with respect to the combination of scale and complexity that is appropriate for each project.

Mario Lungo is a professor and researcher at the Central American University (UCA José Simeón Cañas) in San Salvador, El Salvador. He formerly served as executive director of the Office of Planning for the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, cochairman of the Department of International Studies and director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.

References

Lungo, Mario, ed. 2004. Grandes proyectos urbanos (Large urban projects). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.

Lungo, Mario (forthcoming). Grandes proyectos urbanos. Una revisión de casos latinoamericanos (Large urban projects: A review of Latin American cases). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.

Smolka, Martim and Fernanda Furtado. 2001. Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina (Value capture in Latin America). Santiago, Chile: EURE Libros.

Polese, Mario and Richard Stren. 2000. The social sustainability of cities. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

That there is social conflict over property rights is clear to anyone with even passing attention to the national media.

At the end of 2009, the United States faced an economic disaster of major proportions, with trillions of dollars of asset value lost, more than 16 million people unemployed, and four consecutive quarters of rapidly falling GDP. These events were the direct and indirect result of extreme volatility in the value of residential property that had served as collateral for the nation’s huge stock of home mortgages.

Between 2000 and 2005, the value of residential land and buildings increased from about $14 trillion to $24 trillion. About half of this increase reflected new construction, and half was due to rising land values, primarily on the coasts (Case 2007). But in late 2006 prices began to decline, and by mid-2009 they had fallen roughly 30 percent.

Measuring House Price Appreciation and Depreciation

The S&P/Case-Shiller repeat sales home price indexes were developed 25 years ago to track changes in the market value of existing homes. Based on observed values of properties that changed hands more than once, the indexes were proposed as an alternative to the prevailing measure of home price appreciation or depreciation, which was the median price of homes sold in a city or region. A simple median price will move up or down over time with changes in the mix of properties that sell, as well as with changes in the price or value of houses. This can cause the median price to shift even if no appreciation or depreciation occurs, particularly when new, higher-valued properties are part of the sales base.

In the repeat sales methodology we collect all available data on home sales and then determine if the same house has been sold in the past 20 years or so. Each pair of sales provides information on appreciation or depreciation. We then eliminate sales where the property has been changed significantly, or the sale was not arm’s length, such as purchases by a financial institution or sales where the buyer and seller have the same name.

Finally, we reduce the weight assigned to paired sales that are far apart in time, in part because there is a greater chance that those properties have undergone physical changes. We also eliminate paired sales that are less than six months apart, because they may represent purely speculative activity. We publish only results that are supported by strong statistical tests of confidence.

Home Prices: 1990–2010

Between 1975 and 2006 no measure of home prices showed a national decline. The S&P/Case-Shiller and OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) national house price indexes both show a continuous rise, accelerating around the year 2000 and peaking between 2006 and 2007 (figures 1a and 1b). However, Case and Shiller (2003) found that in 43 states the ratio of house prices to income remained low and constant between 1985 and 2002, even as house prices rose, suggesting that it was changes in per capita income that explained the increase in home values.

Figure 2 shows the ratio of home price to per capita income for 17 of the more volatile metropolitan areas between the first quarters of 1987 and 2009. After 2000, this ratio began to increase in virtually all of these metropolitan areas, with steep acceleration after 2002. The data suggest four distinct submarkets. The first consists of Las Vegas, Miami, and Phoenix, with a virtually constant price/income ratio until 2000, followed by a rapid increase in 2003 and 2004.

The California submarket was even more explosive. San Diego doubled its ratio from below 8 to above 16, with San Francisco and Los Angeles close behind. New York and Boston, in the third group, experienced accelerating ratios, but they were not as dramatic as those in the first two subgroups. In the Midwestern cities of Chicago, Charlotte, Portland, and Minneapolis, the increases were much lower than those observed on the coasts.

Figure 3 shows the volatility of home prices in the same 17 metropolitan areas based on sales in the lower third tier of sales prices. The number of these sales tripled in Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, San Diego, and Las Vegas. In September 2005, Boston saw a price drop that later spread to every metropolitan area in the country.

Table 1 shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Index through September 2009, when prices began to stabilize and then rise. The bottom two lines show composite indexes for two sub-samples of the 20 available metropolitan areas. Both have fallen nearly 30 percent since the summer of 2006.

How Did It Happen?

Needless to say, a credit expansion of this magnitude had a major impact on the housing market. As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2006 prices in the bottom tier of the market increased the most—by 241 percent in Miami, 249 percent in Los Angeles, and 200 percent in Washington, DC, Las Vegas, and San Diego. The S&P/Case-Shiller composite indexes more than doubled, and the national index increased by nearly 90 percent.

At the end of 2005 and into 2006, the housing market began to soften. Interest rates rose, and the 30-year mortgage interest rate was back to 6.6 percent by the last half of 2006. Gluts of speculative building slowed markets in Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Homes in California and in the Northeast had become very expensive relative to incomes, and the manufacturing base of the Midwest fell into recession. As expectations turned gloomy in 2006, 16 of the 20 S&P/Case-Shiller metropolitan areas showed price declines, and by 2007 all were declining. This had never happened before.

Then inventories of houses for sale began to increase. In the past, when markets rose too quickly, prices were slow to change and adjustment was orderly. With house prices falling nationally, and with the bulk of the newly written mortgage debt carrying high loan-to-value ratios, mortgage default rates rose sharply.

Underwriting standards changed over this period as well. Statistical models of default and foreclosure seemed to “explain” defaults as a function of borrower and loan characteristics. These models were used by all market participants, sometimes even without their knowledge. The most widely known underwriting tools were Loan Prospector and Desktop Underwriter, developed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac respectively. Their low cost and ease of operation made them the industry standard. As these models spread throughout the market, mortgage lenders and insurers that did not accept their results garnered little new business. The rating agencies also fell victim to the same statistical methods, which suggested a very low likelihood of rapidly rising defaults.

The stated goal of the new model of underwriting was to transform a patchwork risk-allocation process into a more efficient and accurate pricing system. But this proved to be not only difficult, but ultimately impossible. Analysts seeking to predict the likelihood of default had little choice but to look to the past: at what rate did mortgages with the same characteristics fail in the past?

But past experience dealt with a 30-year period of rising prices in which the collateral was in most cases sufficient to cover claims. Thus, outside of a few regional downturns, no experience provided data that could accurately measure the impact of falling house prices on delinquency, default, and foreclosure.

The historic housing boom of 2000–2005, together with the change in underwriting standards and credit market operations, made the period of 2000–2008 one of the truly important economic episodes of the last century. Its legacy is a flood of bad mortgages with millions of homes headed for foreclosure.

The Government Has Played a Big Role

One additional factor clearly played a role in all of this: the federal government’s strong efforts to promote home ownership for rich and poor alike. In 1977 Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), designed to increase bank lending to low-income and minority households. Even today, banks have a CRA exam every year to determine whether they are meeting the credit needs of their entire CRA area, which in almost all cases includes low-income neighborhoods that in previous years might have been rejected (“redlined”) for loans or insurance.

These programs reflect a belief that the nation has an interest in promoting home ownership as the American Dream, which is thought by many to lead to meritorious behavior. A homeowner is considered likely to be a better citizen, and more involved in local affairs. Home ownership was also thought to be a way of building wealth for low-income households, part of the social safety net (Case and Marynchenko 2002).

Home ownership was encouraged in a variety of ways. The federal subsidy in the income tax treatment of home ownership (the mortgage interest deduction, the capital gains exclusion, the property tax deduction, and the nontaxation of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing) amounts to about $140 billion annually. The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginny Mae), and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were all set up to channel capital into home mortgages.

The national housing boom had its roots in unprecedented events that unfolded in U.S. financial markets beginning in 2000. The rapid decline of high tech industries, the stock market collapse in 2000 and 2001, the slow level of technology investment resulting from Y2K, and finally, of course, the events of 9/11 led to a relaxed monetary policy as the Federal Reserve continually reduced interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy and prevent recession. In January 2001 the Fed cut the federal funds rate (the interest rate banks charge one another for the use of federal funds) from 6.5 percent to 6 percent, and by the end of 2002 had reduced the rate 11 times, to 1.75 percent.

When the easing of credit began, the 30-year fixed rate for a conventional mortgage was 7.17 percent, down slightly from the 8.3 percent average rate over the first nine months of 2000. By the time the federal funds rate fell to 1.75 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002, the conventional fixed mortgage rate was 6.39 percent. The federal funds rate continued its downward trend until it hit 1 percent in July 2003 and remained there for over a year. By that time, the conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage carried an interest rate of 4.6 percent. This easing of credit was the result of a massive injection of liquidity. The dramatic drop in interest rates reduced returns on many investments, placing pressure on yields around the world.

The expansionary monetary policy pursued during this short period reduced the cost of buying a home by almost a third. If its purpose had been to stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, the policy certainly worked, as lower interest rates reduced mortgage costs. Housing production and sales of existing homes boomed. In October 2001 there were about 1.52 million housing starts annually. By the end of 2003 housing starts had increased by a third, to well over 2 million.

Existing home sales were 5.2 million annually at the beginning of 2001 and 6.5 million by the third quarter of 2003. By 2005 they reached 7 million and stayed at about 6 million until 2007. There is little doubt that the housing market kept the economy out of recession through the turbulent early years of the decade.

Figure 4 shows the explosion in home sales and mortgage volume at the end of 2002 and into 2003. Low interest rates stimulated demand for refinancing, and between the fourth quarters of 2002 and 2003, $5.5 trillion in mortgages were originated, and $3.7 trillion were paid off. Over five quarters, the total value of new mortgages was about the same as the entire stock of mortgage debt outstanding in 2001. Seventy-five percent of the new mortgages were written for refinancings rather than purchases of new homes.

By bundling large numbers of mortgages into securities, Wall Street could offer an investment vehicle that combined the implicit government guarantees of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) with a history of very low default rates. As a result, much of the liquidity that drove the economic expansion was channeled directly into mortgages.

In June 2003, mortgage rates began to rise, moving from 4.60 percent to 5.97 percent by August. The third quarter of 2003 saw the highest volume of refinancings, with originations of $942 billion. The refinancing boom ended with the rise in interest rates, dropping 56 percent in the fourth quarter.

During this expansion of credit, the mortgage industry became highly profitable, collecting fees of about 2.5 percent of the $4 trillion in total originations in 2003 alone—over $100 billion. Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) estimate that fees for refinancings and home equity loans in 2004 reached $200 billion. With default and foreclosure rates low and housing prices high, lenders competed vigorously for the business of homebuyers.

Mortgages for home purchases doubled from $239 billion in 2004 to $478 billion in 2005. Much of this business was directed at low-income neighborhoods and sub-prime borrowers. Between 2002 and 2006, the market originated $14.4 trillion in mortgages, retired $10.3 trillion in debt, and increased the stock of outstanding mortgage debt to $10.3 trillion from $6.2 trillion.

This not-so-subtle pressure from the Congress was clearly accepted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the price they needed to pay to maintain the implicit guarantee of their debt, which they enjoyed as a result of their government franchises. There can be no precise division of responsibility between the GSEs and the private sector in expanding the housing bubble.

Several factors played a role in the ultimate collapse: the competitive battle for market share waged by Wall Street investment banks, the private securities markets, and some highly leveraged specialty firms; the high credit ratings that were distributed by the rating agencies; and the fact that default and foreclosure rates remained low. In fact, it took a partnership between public legislation, governmental regulation, private market exuberance, and an extreme increase in liquidity to bring the markets down.

Where Do We Go From Here?

By late 2009, housing markets seemed to be approaching a bottom with prices stabilizing, but many forecasts anticipate declines extending well into 2010. If that were to happen, numerous mortgages written in 2008 and 2009 would not be fully secured and could turn unprofitable.

A prolonged period of falling prices would prevent a significant increase in housing construction. Despite record low interest rates, housing starts have been in uncharted territory for more than a year, having fallen below levels seen in prior downturns. The last four recessions began with large declines in housing starts. At the end of 2008, starts were down from a peak of 2.27 million in 2006 to around 500,000, where they stayed for more than a year, well below the typical bottom of one million starts per year. This represents a decline of approximately $600 billion in aggregate demand.

Two market-clearing processes are currently underway in the housing market, operating side by side, often neighborhood by neighborhood, within metropolitan areas. First, there is the traditional search for a new equilibrium. Inventories remain high as risk-averse sellers seek to avoid sharp price reductions. Sellers without access to liquid capital can actually be among the most reluctant to sell, because they cannot afford to incur high transactions costs. Homeowners do not like to sell at a loss, and may postpone sales in hope of a rising market. This type of market-clearing process is slow and usually results in a long and costly period of quantity adjustment with relatively little change in sale prices.

Second, banks, loan servicers, and other market participants are left holding properties because of defaults and foreclosures. These houses are typically sold at auction, often at very low prices. In every past regional decline these two processes worked together to clear the market. The final result will be the product of a battle between them.

At the end of 2009, homes were selling at a rate of about 6 million per year, 5.5 million existing and 500,000 new homes, including between 1 and 1.5 million sales at foreclosure auctions. The bad news is that new properties are entering the foreclosure process faster than older cases are being resolved, suggesting that the portion of all sales accomplished through the auction process is likely to grow.

But a number of facts suggest that the current bottom could hold and eventually turn upward. First, prices have fallen substantially. In Boston, they have been falling for some time, and in California they are down over 50 percent. Eventually, when prices get low enough, people will start buying again. Furthermore, interest rates are remaining at all-time low levels, with the conventional 30-year fixed-mortgage rate below 5 percent.

In short, all housing market indicators are improving. Pending home sales, existing home sales, new home sales, and housing starts were all up during 2009; and prices actually stopped falling. The OFHEO price index and the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes for 18 of the 20 cities analyzed were up for several months in a row. New home inventories fell to 251,000 (7.4 months of inventory) in September, after having fallen for 13 consecutive prior months.

California represents about 25 percent of all the land value in the United States, and events there have major implications for the rest of the country. The good news is that for the last three months, the indexes for San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles have led the nation in price appreciation. The California Association of Realtors reports substantial increases in home sales volumes except in the Central Valley.

It is important to remember that it takes only a relatively small number of buyers to move the market. Our measures of home values are based on observed sales, but only 5 to 7 percent of the total housing stock changes hands annually. Even with an unemployment rate near 10 percent, homebuyers continue to be very optimistic, and now there may be enough of them to change the market’s direction.

But, we are by no means out of the woods. Unemployment remains very high and jobs are still being lost. In addition, the foreclosure pipeline is moving very slowly, and foreclosures are spreading from the sub-prime market to the presumably more secure A-, Alt A, and prime loans. If the jobs picture does not brighten, and the market does not speed up the process of resolving foreclosures, the housing market could face a long period of stagnation and even a return to falling prices.

References

Case, Karl E. 1986. The Market for Single-family Homes in Boston. New England Economic Review May/June: 38–48.

———. 2007. The Value of Land in the United States: 1975–2005. In Land Policies and Their Outcomes, ed. Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, 127–147. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Case, Karl E., and Maryna Marynchenko. 2002. Home Appreciation in Low and Moderate Income Markets. in Low Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal, ed. Nicolas Retsinas and Eric Belsky. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Case, Karl E., and Robert J. Shiller. 1987. Prices of Single-family Homes since 1970. New England Economic Review September/October: 45–56.

———. 1989. The Efficiency of the Market for Single-family Homes. The American Economic Review 79(1): 125–137.

———.2003. Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. September 5.

Greenspan, Alan, and James Kennedy. 2008. Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes. Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Working Paper Series 2007-20, October. http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf

About the Author

Karl E. “Chip” Case is the Katharine Coman and A. Barton Hepburn Professor of Economics at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. With Robert J. Shiller he developed the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. Case is a former member of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy board of directors.

With more than 25,000 local governments in the United States involved in the review and approval of proposed changes in zoning, planning, and property development, the number of local land use decisions made annually likely runs into the millions. While the vast majority of such determinations proceed in a routine fashion, more complex and contentious changes in land use and zoning frequently involve lengthy and acrimonious conflicts. Excess development entitlements in the Intermountain West (p. 4) exemplify such a challenging land use issue.

Land use and real estate development disputes are ranked among the most common types of civil disagreements in the United States, and they generally include multiple parties, properties, and interests. These contests produce costs for all parties directly involved as well as for the public more generally. Yet long experience with the resolution of land use disputes indicates that changes in the land use decision-making process can produce better outcomes at lower cost.

Local governments normally have a board charged with making decisions about changes in land use, and such boards employ a four-step process. First, the party seeking a change or permission to develop a property files an application with the board. Second, the board reviews the submission and may seek responses or modifications from the applicant. Third, there is an opportunity for public comment, which may lead to an additional dialog between the board and the applicant and further modifications in the application. Finally, the board renders a decision. This process works well for the majority of applications that are processed reasonably quickly. However, most of the board’s time is spent on the minority of cases that involve many interests and numerous rights that can be overlapping, contradictory, or imprecise.

The typical four-step process focuses on adjudicating rights; when the issues are few and simple, and the rights are well defined for the properties in question, this method works well. For more complex cases, however, an expanded approach that focuses on mutual gains for all concerned parties is more promising. The mutual gains approach is most productive when: there are many interested stakeholders; the deciding board has some discretion in the particular decision; the impacts of the decision are long-term and far-reaching; and a non-collaborative outcome is likely to be challenged by one or more of the involved stakeholders. The mutual gains approach should not be viewed as an alternative to the usual four-step process but as an expansion of it—essentially through the addition of extra steps or the expansion of existing steps in the standard procedure.

The key to successful use of the mutual gains approach is to discover stakeholders’ underlying interests—behind their publicly announced positions—and then to develop new options or solutions that are responsive to those interests. It is ideal if this step occurs early in the process when positions are still flexible.

This process of investigation and discovery is an element of the first stage of the mutual gains approach, which involves identifying the stakeholders, listening carefully to their concerns, and building on their interests. In the usual four-step process, this would likely occur in a pre-application phase addressing development and design concepts before final proposals are formulated. The second stage of the mutual gains approach is to design a process for collaboration that involves all stakeholders and offers opportunities for them to share information and learn from each other. The third stage is to promote successful deliberation among the stakeholders—typically by using a good facilitator who can build relationships and trust among those involved. The final stage is to implement the agreements that have been forged, ensuring that the proposed solutions incorporate the accords reached by the participants while also meeting the requirements of the decision-making board.

A much more detailed description of the mutual gains approach, along with informative case studies, is available in the recent Lincoln Institute book, Land in Conflict, authored by Sean Nolon, Ona Ferguson, and Pat Field. This title is available in both print and ebook formats.

Liz Wood quería comprar una casa. Corría el año 2006, había estado alquilando por una década y sus pagos mensuales le estaban resultando muy altos. Tenía 43 años de edad y un empleo estable como educadora familiar en el que ganaba US$34.000 al año más beneficios. No quería nada lujoso; simplemente un lugar donde pudiera “crear amor y tener estabilidad”. No quería vivir más allá de sus recursos.

De todas maneras, las cuentas no le cuadraban. Wood vive en Duvall, Washington, un pueblo de aproximadamente 7.500 habitantes al pie de las Montañas Cascade. Duvall, inmerso en un bosque frondoso, se encuentra a alrededor de 48 kilómetros de Seattle y apenas 13 kilómetros de la ciudad de Redmond, sede de Microsoft. La mediana de ingresos en Duvall es casi el doble de la del estado de Washington en general, y las viviendas de la zona son caras. En 2010, la mediana del valor de las viviendas ocupadas en Duvall era de US$373.500, en comparación con US$262.100 del estado, según la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU.

Entre las pocas opciones que tenía, Wood se decidió finalmente por una casa prefabricada de segunda mano de US$55.000 en Duvall Riverside Village, una comunidad de dos hectáreas con 25 viviendas prefabricadas, ubicada en el centro de Duvall. “Vivir aquí es increíble”, declaró. “Mi propiedad da sobre el río, así que cuando salgo de mi casa veo agua, pinos y un sendero por el cual puedo caminar hasta el pueblo vecino. Me despierto por la mañana escuchando a los pájaros. Conozco a todos mis vecinos; estoy conectada con mi comunidad. Estoy a una cuadra de la comisaría. Me siento segura”.

Pero aun así, su situación era complicada. Wood era dueña de su casa, pero no del terreno donde estaba ubicada. Alquilaba el terreno por US$450 mensuales, más el pago del agua y los demás servicios públicos, como el resto de los residentes de Duvall Riverside Village. Por lo tanto, Wood y sus vecinos estaban básicamente a merced del dueño de la propiedad, y no gozaban de la autonomía y seguridad legal asociadas con los modelos de propiedad de vivienda más tradicionales.

El propietario prohibía la construcción de garajes, limitando las opciones de almacenamiento de los residentes. Cobraba US$25 al mes por cada automóvil o persona adulta adicional que no se hubiera registrado en el momento de la mudanza. Cobraba US$5 al mes por cada mascota y los perros no podían quedar sueltos en ningún momento. Había que pagar una cuota mensual de US$5 por cada dos metros cúbicos de leña extra, que Wood necesitaba para alimentar su estufa. Aunque el propietario había contratado un empleado de mantenimiento, no había instalado alumbrado exterior ni mantenía las calles de la comunidad, que estaban llenas de baches y grietas.

En 2012, Wood y sus vecinos recibieron un aviso por escrito de que el propietario estaba vendiendo el suelo. A diferencia de otros propietarios, que preferían vender su terreno a un emprendedor inmobiliario, este propietario estaba dispuesto a vendérselo a los residentes. Había aceptado organizar una reunión entre los inquilinos, un corredor de bienes raíces y el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste (Northwest Cooperative Development Center), una organización sin fines de lucro que apoya a las cooperativas. Las partes consideraron la posibilidad de establecer una cooperativa de residentes sin fines de lucro para comprar la propiedad. De esa manera podrían conservar el suelo para las casas prefabricadas, seguir viviendo en comunidad y administrar colectivamente un lugar seguro, económico y de alta calidad.

Los residentes votaron a favor de esta propuesta. El propietario tenía dos demandas. Quería vender su propiedad a un valor justo de mercado, y quería completar la venta antes del fin del año. Estaban ya en agosto. Tenían cinco meses.

Además de colaborar con el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste, los residentes también comenzaron a trabajar con ROC USA, una organización sin fines de lucro de Nueva Hampshire que ofrece a los residentes de comunidades de casas prefabricadas una combinación de asistencia técnica y financiamiento asequible para comprar su suelo alquilado cuando se pone a la venta. Desde su fundación en 2008, ROC USA ha facilitado con éxito 80 transacciones de este tipo en todo el país y consiguió préstamos de financiamiento por más de 175 millones de dólares.

ROC USA trabaja con una red de ocho filiales regionales, una de las cuales es el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste. En Duvall, las organizaciones sin fines de lucro trabajaron con los residentes para hacer un análisis económico de la oferta y confirmar que era una buena oportunidad para que los residentes fueran propietarios de la comunidad. A continuación, las organizaciones ayudaron a los residentes a contratar a un abogado independiente y establecer su cooperativa, que funcionaría como una democracia, en la que los residentes elegirían a sus propios dirigentes. ROC USA ayudó a los residentes a contratar a un ingeniero independiente para realizar la diligencia debida de la propiedad; a conseguir financiamiento a través de la subsidiaria de préstamo de ROC USA, llamada ROC USA Capital; a comprar la propiedad y realizar las reparaciones indispensables; y a organizar la transferencia inmobiliaria.

El 27 de diciembre de ese año, la nueva cooperativa compró Duvall Riverside Village con US$1,3 millones en financiamiento de ROC USA Capital, y Wood y los demás propietarios pasaron a controlar sus propias viviendas y a preservar de forma permanente 25 viviendas económicas en un pueblo donde la oferta de este tipo de viviendas es escasa.

Los residentes continuaron pagando US$450 mensuales para alquilar el terreno, pero ahora votan para establecer las reglas de la comunidad, y usan el pago del alquiler para realizar mejoras y pagar la hipoteca, los impuestos y los gastos de comunidad.

“Ahora puedes tener un garaje si quieres”, explica Wood, que es la presidente de la cooperativa de residentes de Duvall y miembro de la junta directiva de ROC USA. “E invertimos US$35.000 para arreglar las calles. Ya no tenemos que vivir con temor, así que la gente está dispuesta a invertir en sus casas. Tenemos reuniones anuales para votar sobre proyectos. Si en el presupuesto hay cosas que no necesitamos, podemos reducir nuestro alquiler mensual. En última instancia, controlamos nuestro propio destino”.

Después de completar la venta, ROC USA y el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste han seguido proporcionando a los residentes asistencia técnica para garantizar el buen funcionamiento de la comunidad.

“Si simplemente nos hubieran prestado dinero y nos hubieran dicho: ‘Estas son las pautas, y esto es lo que tienen que hacer’, hubiéramos fracasado”, explica Wood. “Pero son un recurso constante. Nos ayudan en situaciones difíciles o cuando no sabemos hacer algo de forma legal. Nuestra meta es independizarnos y poder administrar nuestra comunidad como un negocio. Pague sus cuentas y su casa puede quedarse donde está. Punto. Para siempre”.

Beneficios

Más de 18 millones de estadounidenses viven en casas prefabricadas, lo cual representa el 5 por ciento del inventario de viviendas en las áreas metropolitanas de los Estados Unidos, y un 15 por ciento en las comunidades rurales. Su calidad tiene variaciones significativas. Aproximadamente el 25 por ciento de las casas prefabricadas son las casas rodantes frágiles desvencijadas de la década de 1960 y comienzos de la de 1970, fabricadas antes de que el gobierno federal introdujera controles de calidad en 1976. El 75 por ciento restante cumple con las normas federales, y muchas son viviendas agradables y térmicamente eficientes, que a simple vista no se pueden distinguir de las viviendas tradicionales construidas sobre el terreno. Si bien las casas prefabricadas han sido despreciadas durante mucho tiempo como el último recurso para vivienda, los modelos actuales son robustos, eficientes y atractivos, con el potencial de aliviar la carencia de viviendas seguras y económicas en el país.

Las casas prefabricadas modernas cuestan aproximadamente la mitad que las construidas sobre el terreno, y se pueden construir cinco veces más rápido, convirtiéndose en una opción realmente viable para los consumidores de bajos ingresos. El proceso de producción es menos costoso y los modelos que cumplen con las normas Energy Star del gobierno federal ofrecen a los propietarios un importante ahorro de energía. Y son duraderas. Mientras que las casas prefabricadas construidas antes de las regulaciones de 1976 fueron diseñadas para ser portátiles, como vehículos recreativos, los modelos modernos están construidos con materiales más fuertes y diseñados para ser permanentes. Las casas prefabricadas de hoy pueden sustentarse en los mismos tipos de cimientos que se usarían para una estructura construida sobre el terreno, ofreciendo flexibilidad para usarlas en una amplia gama de geografías y ambientes.

“El inventario de casas prefabricadas es un componente fundamental de las viviendas económicas del país”, dice George McCarthy, presidente y Director Ejecutivo del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. “Supera fácilmente dos o tres veces el inventario de viviendas subsidiadas en casi todos los mercados”.

Las casas prefabricadas son más baratas de producir que las casas construidas sobre el terreno, debido a su proceso de manufactura. Andrea Levere, presidente de Corporation for Enterprise Development, ha escrito en The Huffington Post que “el término ‘casa prefabricada’ tiene menos que ver con la calidad que con el proceso de producción, que deriva de las cadenas de montaje creadas por Henry Ford. Este modelo permite construir las casas prefabricadas en un ambiente de trabajo más controlado, con costos más predecibles, mayor eficiencia y menos residuos” (Levere 2013).

En 2013, el costo de una nueva casa prefabricada térmicamente eficiente era de US$64.000, en comparación con los US$324.500 de una nueva casa construida sobre el terreno, según el Censo de los Estados Unidos, si bien el precio de la segunda incluye el suelo. Pero incluso cuando se descuenta el costo del suelo, las casas prefabricadas siguen siendo significativamente más baratas, con un promedio de US$4 por metro cuadrado, en comparación con US$8,7 por metro cuadrado para las casas construidas sobre el terreno. Y no son viviendas subsidiadas, lo cual es una ventaja cuando se tiene en cuenta la oferta extremadamente escasa de viviendas subsidiadas en comparación con la demanda. En la actualidad, sólo una de cuatro familias que reúne los requisitos debido a sus bajos ingresos recibe una vivienda subsidiada, de acuerdo a la Comisión Bipartidista de Políticas, dejando al 75 por ciento restante en necesidad de una alternativa económica sin subsidiar. Al ayudar a cubrir ese vacío, las casas prefabricadas pueden aliviar algo esta demanda de casas subsidiadas que los gobiernos estatales y el gobierno federal tienen tanta dificultad para ofrecer debido a la reducción de sus presupuestos. “La mayoría de las familias que viven en casas prefabricadas serían elegibles para viviendas subsidiadas, pero en su lugar eligen esta opción más barata y sin subsidio”, dice McCarthy.

El inventario es también muy versátil, señala McCarthy, citando el papel que las casas prefabricadas cumplieron en el periodo inmediatamente posterior al Huracán Sandy. “Los trabajadores de emergencia instalaron 17 casas prefabricadas en Nueva Jersey a pocas semanas del huracán. Estas eran casas permanentes para inquilinos desplazados, no los problemáticos ‘tráileres Katrina’. Y lo hicieron antes de que la mayoría de las organizaciones elaborara siquiera un plan de vivienda. Esto es una muestra de la eficiencia y flexibilidad de las casas prefabricadas. Los plazos de producción son aproximadamente 80 por ciento más cortos que los de las casas construidas sobre el terreno, convirtiéndolas en la mejor opción de vivienda como respuesta a las catástrofes”.

De todas maneras, las casas prefabricadas con frecuencia tienen mala reputación, debido en gran medida a la percepción equivocada de que los modelos de hoy en día son los mismos que los de las primeras generaciones de casas móviles, antes de la introducción de normas de control de calidad por el Departamento de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano en 1976. Hoy en día hay aproximadamente 2 millones de casas construidas antes de 1976; muchas de ellas apenas se sostienen erguidas, y alojan a la población más vulnerable, como los ancianos y discapacitados. Si bien el inventario de viviendas anteriores a 1976 no tiene casi relación con sus contrapartes de la actualidad, estas viviendas más viejas y deterioradas dominan la percepción pública de las casas prefabricadas en los Estados Unidos.

La reputación del inventario de estas viviendas es aún menor por las vulnerabilidades que tienen los residentes que no son dueños del terreno donde viven. Aproximadamente 3 millones de personas viven en una de las 50.000 comunidades de viviendas prefabricadas del país, mientras que otros 3 millones alquilan una casa prefabricada en terrenos privados. Hay comunidades de casas prefabricadas en todos los estados del país. Como en el caso de Duvall Riverside Village, muchas se encuentran en terrenos privilegiados, y los propietarios de esos terrenos reciben habitualmente ofertas de emprendedores inmobiliarios.

Los promotores de casas prefabricadas y de su viabilidad como alternativa de vivienda económica se han enfocado en tres áreas fundamentales de innovación: conservar los parques de casas móviles; reemplazar las unidades anteriores a 1976 por casas térmicamente eficientes; y aumentar el acceso a financiamiento asequible para los compradores potenciales, ya que es prácticamente inaccesible en el mercado actual, y es imperativo para acumular un patrimonio neto y preservar el valor de reventa de la casa.

Conservación de las comunidades de casas prefabricadas

La conversión de una comunidad de casas prefabricadas de propiedad privada a una cooperativa de residentes, como se hizo en Duvall Riverside Village, no es frecuente. Por cada comunidad que se ofrece a la venta y se preserva satisfactoriamente como vivienda económica, hay muchas más que se terminan vendiendo para realizar emprendimientos inmobiliarios, desplazando a los residentes, quienes quizás no tengan ninguna otra buena alternativa.

“No es tan sencillo como sólo mover la casa”, dice Ishbel Dickens, presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Propietarios de Casas Prefabricadas. “Primero está la cuestión de si la casa se puede mover. Puede ser demasiado vieja o inestable para moverse. Y aunque se pueda mover, esta operación es cara, y es muy difícil encontrar un espacio en otra comunidad. En la mayoría de los casos, cuando un parque de casas cierra, los residentes probablemente van a perder la casa y todos sus recursos. Lo más probable es que nunca puedan ser propietarios de una vivienda. Probablemente terminarán en una lista de viviendas subsidiadas, o acabarán viviendo en la calle”.

Hasta cierto punto, es un accidente histórico que tantos parques de casas móviles ocupen terrenos valiosos, dice Paul Bradley, presidente de ROC USA. En las décadas de 1950 y 1960, los estadounidenses comenzaron a comprar casas rodantes, en parte debido al surgimiento de una cultura de recreación al aire libre, y en parte debido a que las fábricas comenzaron a producirlas para utilizar la capacidad de manufactura excedente después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, haciéndolas atractivas y asequibles. A medida que las unidades se fueron haciendo más populares, pasaron de ser estructuras transitorias a permanentes, y la gente comenzó a agregar garajes provisionales para sus automóviles y solarios. En ese momento, los planificadores urbanos aceptaron la evolución hacia la permanencia. Desde su punto de vista, la mayoría de las casa rodantes se encontraban en terrenos periféricos que no se usaban para emprendimientos inmobiliarios. ¿Qué tenía de malo dejar estas casas móviles por un tiempo hasta que las ciudades se expandieran hasta llegar allí, y en ese momento desarrollar el suelo?

“Estas comunidades originales se construyeron con un plan en mente para eliminarlas”, dice Bradley. “En ese entonces, nadie contempló las consecuencias de crear un inventario de viviendas donde los propietarios no podían controlar el suelo donde se encontraban. Nadie anticipó que estas comunidades se llenarían de propietarios de bajos y moderados ingresos, quienes invertían su dinero para comprar estas casas y tenían muy pocas alternativas viables. Y hoy en día todavía estamos tratando de resolver este problema. Esta falta de control del suelo significa que los propietarios de las viviendas viven con una profunda sensación de inseguridad, y de que es absurdo efectuar inversiones en su vivienda, porque nunca las van a poder recuperar. ¿Cuál es la consecuencia para un propietario que no puede invertir racionalmente en su casa? ¿Qué significa esto para el inventario de viviendas? ¿Para los barrios?”

Las políticas de corto plazo para el uso del suelo no son el único problema para preservar las comunidades de casas prefabricadas. Otro obstáculo igualmente oneroso es la falta de protección legal para los residentes. En 34 estados y el Distrito de Columbia, el propietario puede vender el terreno sin dar a los residentes la oportunidad de comprarlo. De hecho, en la mayoría de los estados el propietario no tiene siquiera que notificar a los residentes que la comunidad está a la venta; puede esperar hasta que la propiedad se haya vendido antes de informar a los residentes de la transacción, dejándolos de golpe en una situación muy frágil. Incluso los 16 estados que exigen al propietario la notificación previa a la comunidad de la venta de viviendas prefabricadas no brindan necesariamente las protecciones que requieren los inquilinos. “En la mayoría de los estados con notificación previa, hay tantas limitaciones en los requerimientos de la notificación que pocas veces sirve de algo a los residentes”, dice Carolyn Carter, directora de promoción en el Centro Nacional de Derecho del Consumidor (National Consumer Law Center).

Para proteger mejor a los promotores respaldan reformas legislativas a las leyes estatales e incentivos tributarios para que los propietarios vendan el suelo a los residentes. La estrategia más efectiva consiste en promulgar leyes estatales que requieren al dueño que dé un aviso anticipado de la venta a los residentes (idealmente de 60 días) junto con la oportunidad de comprar la propiedad, señala Carter. Según ella, hay seis estados que tienen leyes que “funcionan en la práctica, y brindan oportunidades reales para que los residentes compren sus comunidades”: Nueva Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, Vermont y Delaware. Dice también que Oregón promulgó una legislación prometedora en enero de 2015. “En estos estados con avisos efectivos y leyes que brindan la oportunidad de comprar, está tomando fuerza el que los residentes se conviertan en propietarios”, explica Carter.

Aproximadamente el 46 por ciento de las 80 comunidades respaldadas por ROC USA se encuentra en Nueva Hampshire o Massachusetts, dos estados pequeños con algunas de las protecciones más efectivas del país para los residentes. Hay 89 cooperativas de residentes adicionales en Nueva Hampshire anteriores al lanzamiento de ROC USA.

Para comprender el valor de las leyes de protección firmes para los residentes, basta con contar la historia de Ryder Woods, un parque de 174 casas móviles en Milford, Connecticut, a 18 kilómetros al sur de New Haven, pegado a una carretera principal. Connecticut es uno de 19 estados que ofrecen incentivos tributarios o brindan a los residentes “algunas” protecciones cuando se vende la comunidad, aunque también presenta “importantes vacíos”, según Carter. En 1998, el dueño de Ryder Woods vendió su propiedad a emprendedores inmobiliarios. Informó a los residentes por medio de avisos de desalojo, en contravención de las leyes estatales, que le exigían no sólo dar un aviso por adelantado de la venta pendiente sino también ofrecerles la oportunidad de ser los primeros en comprar el suelo. Ryder Woods tenía una asociación de propietarios activa y rápidamente se organizaron protestas, peticiones y campañas ante la legislatura estatal para cancelar la venta. Finalmente, los medios de comunicación se hicieron cargo de la historia, y una abogada de Milford ofreció sus servicios de forma voluntaria para ayudarlos. A medida que profundizaba en el caso, se dio cuenta de que la ley estaba del lado de los residentes, y que la comunidad necesitaba más respaldo legal que el que ella podía ofrecer por sí sola. Pidió ayuda a un amigo y colega, socio de una importante compañía de Hartford, que aceptó tomar el caso pro bono y asignó la tarea a un equipo de abogados. El caso finalizó en un juicio y en última instancia llegó hasta la corte suprema estatal. El comprador original, que no estaba interesado en este embrollo legal, vendió la propiedad a un segundo emprendedor.

Cuatro años después de la venta original, el tribunal falló a favor de los residentes. En un pacto sin precedentes, y como parte del acuerdo, el segundo emprendedor compró un nuevo terreno a un kilómetro y medio de la parcela original y reconstruyó completamente allí la comunidad. El emprendedor compró 174 casas móviles nuevas y se las vendió a los residentes a un precio significativamente reducido, con hipotecas más favorables que cualquier otro financiamiento convencional del mercado. Construyó un centro comunitario y un estanque que completó con cisnes. Y como parte del acuerdo dio a los residentes la oportunidad de formar una cooperativa y comprar el terreno, lo cual hicieron en 2009 con un financiamiento de compra de US$5,4 millones de ROC USA Capital. La escritura de compra se firmó en las oficinas de la mencionada compañía de Hartford, la cual siguió prestando sus servicios de forma voluntaria a los residentes hasta que se completó la venta. Hoy, en el suelo que ocupaba la comunidad original de Ryder Woods, hay una tienda de Walmart.

“A veces, cuando recordamos lo que pasó, pensamos que fue una locura. Contratamos un autobús, fuimos a Hartford, hablamos con la legislatura, y luchamos. Nos juntamos y ganamos contra dos emprendedores multimillonarios”, explica Lynn Nugent, de 68 años de edad, vendedora a tiempo parcial en una tienda de Sears, y una de los residentes que ayudó a organizar la campaña junto con su marido, cerrajero jubilado. “Yo siempre digo: Antes pertenecíamos a otra persona; ahora nos pertenecemos a nosotros mismos”.

Mejor acceso a casas prefabricadas económicas y de calidad

A diferencia de los residentes de Ryder Woods, muchos propietarios de casas prefabricadas tienen problemas para conseguir una unidad de calidad con un financiamiento asequible. De nuevo, el principal responsable es la legislación. Según la ley federal, las casas prefabricadas se consideran una propiedad personal, como un automóvil o una embarcación, y no una propiedad inmueble como las casas tradicionales. Por lo tanto, los compradores no pueden acceder a préstamos hipotecarios. En cambio, el financiamiento se realiza por medio de préstamos personales. Estos préstamos son más caros que las hipotecas, con un promedio de tasas de interés 50 a 500 puntos básicos mayor, y con menores protecciones al consumidor. Más del 70 por ciento de los préstamos para la compra de casas prefabricadas es de este tipo, considerado un sustituto de productos subprime.

“Esta situación de pertenecer a un segundo nivel es una de las mayores limitaciones para aumentar el inventario de casas prefabricadas permanentemente asequibles”, dice McCarthy. “Es un obstáculo al financiamiento de las casas, incrementando su costo y reduciendo el potencial de acumulación de patrimonio neto, porque reduce la demanda efectiva de unidades existentes”.

Si bien la solución ideal sería cambiar las leyes federales de la titulación, no es probable que ocurra. En cambio, Next Step, una organización sin fines de lucro de Kentucky, ha establecido el concepto de “Viviendas Prefabricadas Hechas Correctamente” (Manufactured Housing Done Right o MHDR)”. Esta estrategia innovadora pone casas prefabricadas asequibles de alta calidad —junto con el financiamiento correspondiente— a disposición de consumidores de ingresos bajos a moderados, por medio de una combinación de casas térmicamente eficientes, educación a los compradores y financiamiento barato. Funciona de la siguiente manera.

Primero, Next Step brinda a los compradores de bajos ingresos acceso a casas prefabricadas de alta calidad. La organización creó una cartera de modelos sólidos y asequibles. Cada casa de Next Step cumple o excede las normas Energy Star, reduciendo tanto los costos de los servicios públicos para el propietario como la huella medioambiental. De acuerdo a Next Step, las pruebas han demostrado que estas casas son un 30 por ciento más eficientes que una casa básica que cumple con el código de edificación, y 10 a 15 por ciento más eficiente que una casa Energy Star básica. En promedio, esto genera un ahorro de energía de US$1.800 al año por cada casa móvil anterior a 1976 reemplazada, y US$360 al año por cada casa nueva establecida.

Además, las casas de Next Step están “diseñadas para garantizar que sean económicas al tiempo que cumplen con las normas de calidad”. Se instalan sobre cimientos permanentes, proporcionando un mayor soporte estructural contra el viento y reduciendo los problemas de asentamiento. Las casas tienen pisos y aislamiento de alta calidad, lo cual ayuda a aumentar su durabilidad y reducir los gastos de energía. Y como el problema principal de los cimientos es el agua, las casas de Next Step tienen protecciones adicionales contra la humedad.

Mejor acceso a financiamiento sostenible

Next Step también asegura a los compradores de vivienda un financiamiento seguro, sostenible y económico. “Uno de los problemas de esta industria es que los mercados de capital no participan de forma importante”, explica Stacey Epperson, Directora Ejecutiva de Next Step. “No hay un mercado secundario significativo, de manera que hay muy pocos prestamistas en el mercado y muy pocas opciones para los compradores. Nuestra solución es preparar a nuestros prestatarios para que sean propietarios, y después conseguirles buenos préstamos”.

Next Step trabaja con una combinación de prestamistas con y sin fines de lucro, aprobados por la organización, que proporcionan un financiamiento seguro a precios razonables. Como contrapartida, Next Step reduce el riesgo de los prestamistas. Las casas están diseñadas para cumplir con los requisitos de los prestamistas, y los compradores reciben capacitación financiera integral para que puedan tener éxito como compradores. Por lo tanto, los compradores de casas de Next Step no sólo obtienen una mejor hipoteca inicial, sino que tienen la capacidad para acumular patrimonio neto y obtener un buen precio de reventa cuando decidan vender su casa.

Además, cada casa de Next Step se instala sobre un cimiento permanente para que el propietario pueda cumplir con los requisitos de ciertos programas hipotecarios con garantía gubernamental, que son menos onerosos que un préstamo personal. Next Step estima que ha ahorrado a sus 173 propietarios aproximadamente US$16,1 millones en pagos de interés.

“En estos momentos, cerca del 75 por ciento del financiamiento de casas prefabricadas se hace con préstamos personales. Pero el 70 por ciento de casas nuevas prefabricadas se instala en suelos privados donde, en muchos casos, la casa se podría colocar sobre un cimiento permanente, y el dueño podría obtener una hipoteca de largo plazo con una baja tasa de interés”, dice Epperson.

El modelo de MHDR es innovador en parte porque es escalable. Next Step capacita y depende de una red de organizaciones miembros sin fines de lucro para implementar el modelo en sus comunidades respectivas. Next Step vende casas a sus miembros a precios competitivos, y después las organizaciones miembros supervisan el proceso de identificar y educar a los compradores, ayudando a conseguir el préstamo y administrando la instalación.

“En el modelo tradicional de la industria, no había manera de que una organización sin fines de lucro pudiera comprar una casa prefabricada a precios de mayorista. Esto es lo que hemos diseñado, y como resultado podemos ofrecer una vivienda mucho más económica que si la organización sin fines de lucro o el propietario tratara de comprarlas por sí mismos”, explica Kevin Clayton, presidente y Director Ejecutivo de Clayton Homes, uno de los productores más grandes de casas prefabricadas del país, y uno de los proveedores de largo plazo de Next Step.

“El programa Next Step funciona porque prepara a la gente para tener éxito”, dice Clayton. “Next Step les ofrece asesoramiento para ser propietarios y les brinda apoyo si tienen problemas económicos en el futuro. Pueden comprar su casa por mucho menos dinero, acumular patrimonio neto y pagar una cuota mensual baja por su préstamo y sus costos de energía”.

Cyndee Curtis, una propietaria de Next Step, está de acuerdo. Curtis tenía 27 años de edad, era soltera y estaba embarazada cuando compró una casa móvil usada modelo Fleetwood de 1971 por US$5.000 en 2001. La colocó en un lote de su propiedad en las afueras de Great Falls, Montana.

“No tenía dinero, no tenía un título universitario, y no tenía opciones”, dice Curtis. “El viejo tanque séptico de acero tenía agujeros por el óxido, era como una bomba de tiempo. La alfombra estaba completamente gastada, el linóleo debajo de la alfombra tenía agujeros de quemaduras, y el cielorraso tenía fugas donde se había colocado una extensión de la casa. Todos los años compraba libros de construcción, iba a Home Depot y preguntaba cómo arreglar esa fuga. Y todos los años me encontraba en la situación de arreglarla sola. Había moho en el umbral de la puerta debido a esa fuga, y tenía un recién nacido viviendo en la casa”.

En 2005, Curtis volvió a la universidad por dos años, obtuvo su título de enfermera y comenzó a trabajar como enfermera práctica registrada, ganando US$28.500 por año. “Ahora que estaba ganando un sueldo decente, podía explorar mis opciones”, dijo Curtis, madre soltera de dos hijos. “Quería conseguir un lugar donde mis hijos pudieran crecer con orgullo, y aprovechar el lote al máximo”.

Pero su historial de crédito no era bueno, y finalmente recaló en NeighborWorks Montana, un miembro sin fines de lucro de Next Step, que le informó sobre el programa de Next Step. En los dos años y medio siguientes, Curtis trabajó con el personal de NeighborWorks Montana para reparar su historial de crédito. Con su ayuda, consiguió una hipoteca y compró una casa de Next Step por US$102.000, que incluía no sólo la casa sino también la extracción, eliminación y recambio de su viejo sistema séptico. Como la casa de Next Step está instalada sobre un cimiento permanente que reúne ciertas calificaciones, y debido a haberse mejorado el historial de crédito, los ingresos y las condiciones de vivienda de Curtis, pudo conseguir una hipoteca del programa de Desarrollo Rural del Departamento de Agricultura de los EE.UU., mucho menos onerosa que los préstamos personales comunes. Además, mientras que la casa móvil anterior de Curtis tenía un título equivalente a un automóvil, su casa de Next Step tiene una escritura similar a la de una casa construida sobre el terreno. Por lo tanto, un futuro comprador también estará en condiciones de solicitar una hipoteca tradicional.

Curtis dice que su casa de Next Step le ha proporcionado ahorros de energía significativos. “Tengo 40 metros cuadrados más que antes. Antes tenía un baño; ahora tengo dos. Y sin embargo, mis gastos de gas y electricidad se han reducido en dos tercios”.

Dice además: “Mi casa es mil por ciento mejor que donde vivía antes. Si una persona entra a mi casa, no se da cuenta de que es prefabricada. Tiene lindas puertas, con paredes texturizadas. Se parece a cualquier otra casa nueva donde uno quisiera vivir. A veces la gente cree que tiene que sufrir con una vivienda en malas condiciones. Yo sé lo que es vivir así, y les quiero decir que si trabajan con dedicación pueden mejorar su vida y la de su familia”

Loren Berlin es escritora y consultora de comunicaciones del área metropolitana de Chicago.

Referencias

Levere, Andrea. 2013. “Hurricane Sandy and the Merits of Manufactured Housing.” Huffington Post. 8 de enero. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-levere/hurricane-sandy-manufactured-housing_b_2426797.html

Editor’s note: This article summarizes a recent Lincoln lecture by Dean Gerald Korngold of the Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He outlined the current status of the law on nonpossessory rights in property and discussed its future direction.

Everyday life presents many examples of agreements that divide the rights to possession of property. A typical lease allows the tenant a period of possession in exchange for payment of rent, and joint ownership arrangements provide a means of sharing or dividing possession. But, nonpossessory interests are equally important because they provide a mechanism for private land use regulation. Some examples are condominium owners’ rights in their building’s common areas, storekeepers’ agreements with the operator of the shopping center in which they are located, and gated communities’ covenants to restrict access. None of these convey possession, but all affect daily living and business arrangements. The widespread adoption of public zoning restrictions over the past century has by no means diminished the role of private land use agreements, and may even have enhanced it by making limitations on a possessor’s rights of use a familiar and accepted aspect of property ownership.

An agreement concerning the use of property could, of course, take the form of a simple contract, whether between neighbors, store owners and a mall operator, or condominium residents and their homeowners’ association. But such a contract would not necessarily survive a sale, inheritance or other transfer of ownership of the property in question. A generation later, a court might well refuse to enforce an agreement where neither the person violating its provisions nor the person seeking to uphold them were parties to the original contract. For this reason, long-term durability requires that private land use restrictions take the form of a conveyance of a property interest, rather than a contract.

The New Restatement of Property

Part of the complexity of nonpossessory rights stems from the numerous and often ambiguous distinctions among them in the common law. They fall within four traditional categories:

• An easement is a nonpossessory right in the land of another.
• A profit allows the holder to enter on land that he or she does not possess and remove resources from it, as by mining coal or harvesting timber.
• Covenants, including both real covenants and equitable servitudes, are promises between owners of neighboring land, differing only in the remedy available in the event the promise is broken.
• An equitable servitude can be specifically enforced by ordering action to be taken and the promise kept; breach of a real covenant would only result in monetary damages.

It is clear even from this cursory description that a given interest might be assigned to more than one category. For example, an agreement between neighbors not to construct commercial buildings on their properties might be characterized as an easement, an equitable servitude, or a real covenant, and each result would carry different legal consequences.

Traditionally, courts were most favorably disposed toward easements, and were much less likely to enforce real covenants and equitable servitudes. Over time two distinct categories of property law developed to address similar issues in these different contexts. In 2000 the American Law Institute, an organization of practitioners, jurists and scholars concerned with legal reform, took a major step in attempting to simplify and rationalize the law of nonpossessory interests. Its Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property adopted a single unified approach and a new category, termed “servitudes,” encompassing all earlier classifications. Restatements have no binding legal effect, but they often influence both legislatures considering changes to the law and courts charged with its interpretation.

Policy Arguments: Pro and Con

Judicial decisions concerning nonpossessory interests often give weight to larger issues of public policy in determining whether to enforce these agreements. Four major policy considerations often support enforcement: the moral obligation accompanying a promise; interests of economic efficiency; respect for freedom of choice; and a desire to promote certainty in business agreements.

Moral Obligation. This issue reflects a sense of fairness in enforcing a promise and applies both to the original parties to the agreement and to their successors in ownership. When restrictions that are intended to affect future purchasers (i.e., restrictions that “run with the land”) are recorded at public registries and available for inspection, failure to enforce these agreements will produce an unwarranted windfall for the parties who breach them. The original owners who entered the agreement did so voluntarily and in anticipation of some benefit. Later purchasers presumably made their own bargains in light of these agreements. A buyer of restricted property will generally pay less for it than he or she would if a more profitable use were permitted. Thus the new owner would receive an unfair benefit if the lower purchase price were followed by a release from the obligation to adhere to the restrictions.

Efficiency and Freedom of Choice. Nonpossessory agreements promote efficiency by greatly expanding the range of possible property interests that may be transferred. Consider the case of an owner seeking to insure that there is no intrusive construction on a neighboring lot in the future. Absent the availability of a nonpossessory interest, the owner’s only recourse would be to purchase the entire neighboring lot, even if outright ownership was not desired and in fact precluded other nonobjectionable use by a different party. The ability to acquire only part of the bundle of rights constituting the property allows flexibility that can benefit all affected parties. In this way efficiency concerns are closely related to those favoring freedom of choice. The value our society places on individual autonomy leads to a presumption in favor of voluntary private arrangements concerning land ownership. This is especially important when the subject matter concerns one’s home, as do many land use agreements.

Certainty. Enforcement of private agreements also promotes the certainty and stability necessary for long-term planning and investment. By contrast, a zoning ordinance may be varied in individual instances or altered in response to political pressure. This is one important incentive for private agreements to restrict land use, even when such limitations are already part of the local zoning code.

These concerns, however, are balanced by other policy considerations that may argue against enforcement of a servitude. Perhaps the most significant is the centuries-old common-law distrust of restrictions on future land use, development and sale. Recognizing that we have no special power to predict the social and economic concerns of future generations, courts have traditionally limited the extent to which contemporary agreements may bind later owners. In fact, the term “mortmain,” referring to property held without the power of sale, literally refers to the “dead hand” of past restrictions. From this perspective, policy considerations favoring efficiency, flexibility and personal choice can militate against as well as in favor of enforcement of restrictions in specific cases.

In some instances, this concern centers on restraints on alienation, or provisions that make the land more difficult to sell. However, the very flexibility fostered by the introduction of a market for new partial property interests will often obviate this objection. A prospective owner who wishes to buy property free and clear of a longstanding servitude can often accomplish this by a two-part transaction: purchasing the encumbered property at the lower price it currently commands on the market and simultaneously paying the holder of the servitude the amount needed to release it. Thus, a purchaser of property limited by private agreement to residential use could build a retail structure there (assuming it were permitted by local zoning ordinances) if he or she were able to negotiate with the neighbor a termination of the agreement prohibiting such construction. The lifting of a “cloud on title” of this type is extremely common, as in the case of a new owner who negotiates with a current tenant over payment for early termination of a lease.

New Models for Judicial Decisions

Given the effort of the Restatement to release some of the “dead hand” of common law classification, and given the enormous proliferation of commercial, condominium, homeowner and conservation restrictions in recent years, what new criteria should courts apply in determining whether to enforce a specific agreement?

One frequently discussed criterion concerns subject matter: should certain categories of restrictions be suspect because they may infringe on special rights, such as the right to individual expression and free speech? Should a homeowners’ association be able to bar the display of flags and political posters from its members’ premises? One real-life dispute pitted the governing board of a cooperative on the East Side of Manhattan against a unit owner who refused to cease sponsoring baptisms in the apartment’s swimming pool. (The owner argued that often the ceremonies involved college football players, who were too large to fit in a bathtub.) Note that these disputes do not involve the First Amendment, which only prohibits governmental restrictions on speech and religion, not voluntary private agreements. Restrictions also increasingly address architectural and aesthetic issues, which combine concerns for common amenities with problems of limiting personal expression and individual freedom.

Instead of allowing the subject matter to determine the outcome of these cases, an alternate approach would enforce only those covenants that regulate external behavior, not those that seek to limit personal status or activities within a private residence. This would permit restrictions on outside flags and posters, but not prohibitions on unmarried couples living together or the conduct of church services within a home (including baptisms in the bathtub). Of course, it would permit restrictions on the external effects of such arrangements, such as garbage, traffic, parking and noise. Similarly, it would generally support architectural limitations on landscape and external building elements, for these have important “spillover” effects on other residents.

The new Restatement of the Law of Property does not attempt to formulate this approach into a formal rule. However, it does recommend that general considerations of public policy guide courts in determining whether to enforce a specific servitude, and it notes the need for special concern in addressing issues of personal autonomy.

The Special Case of Conservation Easements

Conservation easements are currently one of the most significant and fastest-growing types of servitudes. They convey to a conservation organization or governmental unit the right to enforce a limitation on development of privately owned property, illustrating the great potential of nonpossessory interests. Often families who are the most committed to the preservation of their land and have a strong sense of its value as open space are the least interested in selling the property to a charity or to the government. The conservation easement permits protection against development while the land remains in private ownership. The organization holding the easement does not have the responsibilities of ownership, and some portion of the property value remains on the tax rolls. The net expenditure, even when the easement must be purchased, is less than the cost of the entire parcel. It is easy to see why conservation easements have become tremendously popular land preservation tools.

At the same time, some of the public policy concerns that argue against enforcement of other servitudes can be operative here as well. In particular, unease over long-term restrictions on land use is magnified in this case because federal income tax law allows a deduction for the gift of an easement only if it operates in perpetuity. Perpetuity is a long time, and appropriate land use may change dramatically in the future. Conservation easements are also “in gross,” meaning that they can be held by organizations that are not neighboring property owners. The original limitation of covenants to nearby owners reflected a concern that distant parties might be uninterested in or uninformed about local issues, with no necessary stake in promoting efficient land use and economic development. They could also be difficult to locate if needed to release a covenant or servitude. Finally, there are troubling antidemocratic aspects of a system that permits private parties to impose perpetual land use restrictions without public oversight.

These concerns are not grounds for recommending wholesale changes to the law of conservation easements, such as a restriction to type of ownership or a uniform limitation on duration. These requirements would be too rigid a response, particularly when more time is needed to understand how well-founded such misgivings might be. Individual decisions informed by experience, rather than expansive rulemaking on the basis of abstract reasoning, is the greatest strength of our common-law heritage. This approach permits courts to intervene selectively in the rare cases where the public interest may not support specific enforcement of an easement. This is already a familiar response in, for example, the law of nuisance, where individual awards may be limited to monetary damages alone. State attorneys general may also be able to exercise increased oversight and represent the public interest more actively as conservation easements come into ever-broader use.

Conclusion

Nonpossessory interests in property are as widespread as rights of way and as familiar as the covenants in a homeowners’ association agreement. The enormous usefulness of these servitudes makes efforts to modernize and rationalize their application critically important. At the same time, because their influence is felt in numerous facets of everyday life, judicial analysis of their legal effects provides a context within which to consider bedrock issues of public policy.

Joan Youngman is senior fellow and chairman of the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and an attorney who writes on legal aspects of property taxation policy and practice. She has developed and teaches numerous Institute courses on conservation easements, land valuation techniques and the interaction of property taxation and public finance.