Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 1 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En los últimos años, el Instituto Lincoln ha venido colaborando con el programa de becas Loeb, el cual tiene sede en la Escuela de Posgrado en Diseño de la Universidad de Harvard. Este programa se inició en 1970 gracias a la generosidad de John L. Loeb, egresado de Harvard, con la finalidad de permitir que profesionales de mediana trayectoria cursaran estudios independientes y adquirieran herramientas adicionales dirigidas a la reactivación del medio ambiente natural y urbano. Los becarios de Loeb para el período 2001-2002 hicieron un viaje de fin de año a Cuba a mediados de junio, que incluía una estancia de dos días en Santiago de Cuba, cuatro en La Habana y un recorrido adicional desde esta última hasta Trinidad, con paradas en algunos destinos intermedios.

Con sus fachadas neoclásicas, adoquines blancos, nubes caribeñas y tonos pasteles, Trinidad se ha detenido en el tiempo como una postal de acuarela. Puesto que el patrimonio arquitectónico de Cuba es el núcleo de un creciente interés internacional y no está amenazado por las oleadas de nuevas construcciones, el futuro del pasado parece estar a salvo. Por su parte, el futuro en sí mismo es mucho más difícil de hallar. Mientras nuestro grupo de becarios de Loeb buscaba indicios en tres ciudades y localidades de la provincia, descubrimos que pese al estancamiento económico y la tensión política internacional los cubanos trabajan con esmero por un futuro que sólo pertenece a ellos.

La afluencia de dólares provenientes del turismo y una férrea campaña de preservación cubana han comenzado a rescatar las riquezas de La Habana Vieja de las garras del descuido no intencionado. Después de por lo menos una experiencia negativa con una nueva construcción, la Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad –encargada de coordinar la impresionante restauración y renovación mayor de La Habana Vieja– todavía trata de resolver el problema de integrar lo nuevo con lo histórico. Una manera de abordar el problema es estudiar minuciosamente el diseño de edificaciones que ocupan una manzana. Caminamos por un estacionamiento grande de estructura moderna dentro de La Habana Vieja que será reconstruido para convertirlo en un edificio de uso múltiple, con un estacionamiento adyacente, según un diseño que busca reproducir la escala y algunos rasgos monumentales del convento colonial que una vez ocupaba el lugar.

Aunque se está reubicando a algunos residentes en la misma zona y otras partes, muchos regresan a sus hogares después de que los barrios son rehabilitados.

Considerado ahora como un modelo para otras iniciativas dirigidas a financiar la rehabilitación de otros distritos de la ciudad, la renovación de La Habana Vieja se fundamenta en un sistema de impuestos y empresas conjuntas que comprende ingresos provenientes de empresas privadas que se benefician del turismo generado por la restauración. La Oficina del Historiador maneja un presupuesto anual de 50 millones de dólares que se divide entre la construcción y la asistencia social a los cubanos que residen dentro de los límites de la zona de rehabilitación. Esto podría interpretarse como un sistema de “recuperación de plusvalías”, tema que suscita gran interés en el Instituto Lincoln.

Julio César Pérez, arquitecto cubano, urbanista y defensor de la planificación con base en la comunidad, era uno de los integrantes del grupo de becarios de Loeb. Gracias a la perspectiva particular que tiene por ser profesional local, mostró a nuestro grupo algunos de sus ejemplos favoritos del rico legado de la arquitectura prerrevolucionaria art deco y moderna de La Habana. Joyas de cinco pisos de altura se destacan en medio del variopinto paisaje urbano de La Habana central, que también incluye el Edificio Focsa de 28 pisos, con sus 375 unidades de apartamentos, construido en el ocaso del gobierno de Batista.

A los talones de las manzanas de viviendas y casinos con estilo internacional de los años 1950, la revolución implantó su propia forma de uso revisado del suelo. Julio contó la historia de un partido de golf que jugaron el Che Guevara y Fidel Castro en los vastos campos del antiguo Habana Country Club para celebrar la revolución. Según la leyenda, se preguntaron: “¿cómo podemos darle un buen uso a este terreno?” Los resultados de su conversación son las muy grandilocuentes y en su mayoría inconclusas Escuelas Nacionales de Arte diseñadas por Ricardo Porro, Vittorio Garratti y Roberto Gottardi. La postura de estas edificaciones es deliberadamente indiferente a la casa club o al plan del campo de golf; el área abierta es tratada como si fuera una enorme pradera en medio de territorio virgen. Está previsto un proyecto de restauración de los edificios, que se ha complicado más debido a la inestabilidad de las fundaciones y los problemas hidrológicos.

Julio también identificó ejemplos más recientes de construcciones de grandes dimensiones en La Habana, como son el Hotel Meliá Cohíba con su voluminoso arco incorporado y el Miramar Trade Center, un centro comercial (con transacciones en dólares) al otro lado de la calle. Además de ser fracasos de diseño, estos costosos proyectos no logran captar la relación del sitio con el mar ni la posibilidad de crear un nuevo género arquitectónico en un distrito en desarrollo.

Con el estancamiento de la economía y de las relaciones internacionales en los años 1990, el arquitecto y planificador cubano Miguel Coyula y sus colegas han utilizado el tiempo y los materiales que tienen a su alcance para adoptar un enfoque más cuidadoso del uso y desarrollo del suelo. Mientras en todo el mundo hay un surgimiento acelerado y avasallante de ciudades verticales de acero y vidrio, en La Habana se construye una de las maquetas de mayor escala en el mundo con cajas viejas de habanos. Esta asombrosa ciudad en miniatura fue concebida como herramienta para la planificación y asidero para los esfuerzos del Grupo para el Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC), que ha asesorado al gobierno municipal en asuntos de planificación urbana desde 1988.

La maqueta 1:1000 de toda La Habana ha ido creciendo por piezas exactas durante la mayor parte de la última década y actualmente ocupa 112 metros cuadrados, es decir, aproximadamente una cuarta parte de una cancha de baloncesto. Se encuentra en un pabellón especialmente diseñado iluminado con luz natural en el área de Miramar, cercano al centro de la ciudad, donde los visitantes ocasionales pueden circular cómodamente alrededor de la maqueta y verla desde los niveles superiores de acceso con rampas. En la base topográfica de madera hay colocados modelos a escala de prácticamente todas las estructuras de la ciudad. Cada edificio está codificado por un color que indica el desarrollo urbano en cada período histórico: colonial, moderno prerrevolucionario (1900 a 1958) y posrevolucionario.

Miguel describe un proyecto de construcción, un edificio alto para el Comité Estatal de Colaboración Económica (CECE), que fue cancelado porque con la maqueta se pudo ver claramente que era desproporcionado para el resto de la arquitectura del centro de La Habana. La decisión parece haber sido un hito ya que se trataba de un proyecto real y también ha sido ejemplo de la determinación de construir con conciencia por el medio ambiente –pese a las presiones para dar cabida a inversionistas foráneos en una Cuba necesitada de ingresos–.

La misión fundamental del GDIC se asemeja mucho a la que se plantean los planificadores estadounidenses para el urbanismo dentro de las grandes ciudades: comenzar por los vecindarios. El grupo ha realizado una serie de “talleres integrales de transformación del barrio” ofrecidos a los residentes locales y dirigidos por diseñadores y planificadores profesionales, preferentemente que habiten en la misma área. Estos proyectos se inscriben en la misma tendencia del movimiento internacional de diseño comunitario, una tradición vinculada a los Estados Unidos y surgida hace 45 años en la cual los diseñadores trabajan directamente para el beneficio de los residentes de un área determinada. Desde que la depresión económica sobrevenida en los años 1990 después de la disolución de la Unión Soviética y el bloqueo impuesto por los Estados Unidos comenzaron a tener efectos realmente adversos en Cuba, estos talleres han cobrado gran importancia. Han conjugado la planificación y el desarrollo económico en un nuevo contexto local, en el que los vecindarios emprenden diversos proyectos, como son los cultivos urbanos y la manufactura de materiales de construcción a partir del reciclaje de escombros.

Los talleres de transformación del barrio y otras iniciativas similares llevadas a cabo en los últimos 20 años han contribuido a crear un puente entre el precepto revolucionario cubano de igualdad de tratamiento para todos y el precepto humano básico de tomar decisiones sobre la familia, la comunidad y la vida cotidiana. Otro ejemplo lo constituye el proyecto Arquitectos de la Comunidad, una modalidad de diseño comunitario a cargo de un sector cívico nacional que participa en la construcción urbana y la planificación ambiental, además de ofrecer servicios asequibles de diseño para familias individuales. Basada en las teorías del arquitecto argentino Rodolfo Livingston, la práctica fomenta una relación directa entre el usuario y el arquitecto, a la vez que se incorpora en cada proyecto de construcción el concepto de sostenibilidad y sensibilidad contextual. Julio trabajó con el grupo durante cinco años antes de irse a Harvard y presentó una ponencia junto con Kathleen Dorgan, también becaria de Loeb, en la conferencia de la Asociación de Escuelas y Facultades de Arquitectura celebrada en la primavera pasada. Como defensor de un uso más humano y sensato del suelo y del diseño urbano en su país, Julio se cuenta entre un grupo de arquitectos cubanos preocupados por los valores tradicionales del oficio y el diseño idóneo para el medio ambiente.

Con la existencia de esfuerzos como éstos, tenemos esperanza para que en el futuro la construcción se fundamente en una calibración cuidadosa de relaciones proporcionadas y bien reflexionadas entre las edificaciones y los rasgos naturales del entorno, así como la comodidad y placer de los usuarios. El desafío radica en encontrar medios económicos y normativos para apoyar una modalidad apropiada de construcción. Hasta ahora, el estado ha mantenido el control sobre el uso del suelo gracias a su condición de propietario directo y casi exclusivo y ha hecho negociaciones de arrendamiento con algunos inversionistas privados y foráneos a través de una red delicada y sumamente frágil de fórmulas económicas y jurídicas para valorar los terrenos en cuestión. A medida que la economía se hace más dependiente de los recursos provenientes del exterior, aumenta la probabilidad de que estos arrendamientos devengan en transacciones más predecibles y transparentes. Tal vez no tardarán en llegar las ventas de tierras y la aplicación de mayores impuestos.

Con la llegada de inversiones extranjeras y las presiones para una apertura aún mayor, habrá plena oportunidad de que el futuro esté constreñido por decisiones sobre el uso del suelo impulsadas por los márgenes de ganancias de organizaciones distantes, lo que sería una lamentable añadidura a la carga histórica de Cuba. Porque, a pesar de la belleza de sus paisajes naturales y urbanos, Cuba es un mapa de victimización: a causa del colonialismo, de la flagrante explotación económica, de la confrontación revolucionaria y del brutal desarrollo al estilo soviético.

Los becarios de Loeb captaron una perspectiva general de un nacionalismo intenso construido sobre una cultura profunda y diversa, una historia cosmopolita y los logros incuestionables de los últimos 40 años. Cuba es un lugar de grandes penurias y también de enorme potencial, para los cubanos mismos y para el resto del mundo. Esperamos que el futuro no albergue solamente explotación y degradación cultural cuando finalmente caigan las barreras para el comercio y el viaje internacional. También esperamos demostrar que Cuba es un lugar para aprender de los errores del pasado –los suyos y los nuestros– y para descubrir lo que es posible cuando la gente tiene libertad para proteger, respetar y mejorar su entorno.

In the past quarter century, the People’s Republic of China has achieved remarkable progress in economic growth, social advancement, and political and administrative reforms. These achievements are largely attributed to the commitment of the Chinese government to improve its people’s welfare through adherence to a free market economy. The interrelated forces of economic growth and policy reform are stimulating rapid and fundamental transformation, especially in Chinese cities, where infrastructure projects, urban renewal, housing development and reform of state-owned enterprises are taking place at an unprecedented pace and scale.

The catalyst for this surge in urban development has been the widespread adoption of the Land Use Rights System (LURs) in which land ownership and use rights have been separated. Its impacts are two-fold. First, it promotes the development of markets for land use rights in which land prices and market mechanisms begin to affect land use and land allocation decisions. Second and more important, it creates an institutional capacity for local governments to raise much-needed revenues to finance urban redevelopment and economic reforms. This revenue-raising ability is rooted in the land ownership structure and power of Chinese government, since the state owns virtually all land in cities and towns. Users are required to pay upfront leasing fees for 40- to 70-year periods, depending on the type of use.

Along with its fiscal impacts, the LURs has created several problems that have drawn increasing attention. First, revenues from leasing state-owned land are not sustainable from a long-term perspective; leasing of existing urban land has been the primary revenue source for financing urban projects, and sooner or later cities will run out of urbanized land available for leasing. For example, Hanzhou City will collect 6 billion RMB (US$732 million) in 2003 from the sales of land use rights, most of them on existing urban land, but land sale revenues have already reached their peak and have started to decline.

Second, Chinese governments lack instruments to capture their share of the increases in land value that are driven up by the combined forces of urbanization, public investment in infrastructure and private efforts. Based on the proposition that one should be rewarded only for one’s own effort, government should capture the increased land value resulting from public investment, rather than having it accrue to the private landowner.

Third, laws do not specify concrete measures for implementing lease renewals. It will be more difficult to collect leasing fees in the renewal period since local governments will have to deal with thousands of households compared to a small number of developers in the first round of leases. Finally, some local government officials have been politically motivated to create an oversupply of land and overheated real estate activity, thus diminishing the central government’s efforts to institutionalize land management and urban planning.

Compulsory Land Acquisition

The other major source of land revenues for local governments is the leasing of former farmland. Both the Chinese Constitution and the 1999 Land Administration Law (LAL) specify that the state, in the public interest, may lawfully requisition land owned by collectives, thus setting the stage for compulsory land acquisition. The local government is thereby able to acquire land cheaply from farmers and sell it to developers at much higher prices. This is a complicated process because it requires first acquiring the land, then converting it to state ownership, resettling the displaced farmers and providing urban infrastructure before finally leasing the land to developers. The law requires that peasants’ lives should not be adversely affected by land acquisition. However, this requirement is difficult to implement, in part because measures of life changes for peasants are multifaceted; financial compensation is only one of the considerations.

Since there is no market data for farmland prices, the government pays collectives and peasants a compensation package that includes three components: compensation for the land itself; resettlement subsidies; and compensation for improvements to the land and for crops growing on the requisitioned land. The law stipulates that compensation for cultivated land shall be six to ten times the average annual output value of the acquired land for the three years preceding the requisition.

The amount of the resettlement subsidies depends on the number of people living on the land, but each person’s subsidy shall not exceed six to ten times that of the annual yield from the occupied land. Recognizing diversity of local conditions in terms of socioeconomic development status, productivity, and per capita income, the local government is permitted to raise the sum of the resettlement subsidies and land compensation up to 30 times the previous three years’ average output value on the acquired land.

Emerging Issues

Several significant issues are emerging from this land acquisition process. The first relates to the ill-defined concept of property rights and development rights: who is entitled or empowered to acquire land from peasants for urban development? Currently any entity can acquire land from peasants as long as it can justify public interest or purpose. This public interest requirement was easy to fulfill in the 1990s, since there were many state-owned enterprises that provided services and/or goods to the public. They could acquire land to launch profitable commercial, housing, entertainment and industrial development projects. Individual developers also can acquire land if they have strong political connections. However, these profit-making and political motivations for land acquisition are responsible for increasing corruption in real estate and housing developments and creating chaotic and uncoordinated urban development patterns. Recent economic reforms and privatization have begun to diminish the roles of state-owned enterprises, so it is time to reexamine the concept and definition of public interest and public projects.

The interactions of multiple players in land acquisition (including individuals, corporations and governments) create several problems in land management and planning: (1) it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate land development so that infrastructure and transportation facilities are used efficiently; (2) it voids many urban planning efforts; and (3) it is blamed for “villages in the city” (cheng zhong chun), a phenomenon in which villages and farmland are surrounded by developed land, making the city unattractive, disrupting the continuity of economic, social and cultural functions, and significantly increasing transportation costs.

The second issue is who is entitled to compensation and at what level. The village collective is the basic socioeconomic organization in rural areas, and its largest asset is the land collectively owned by the members. Even though laws recognize that both the collective and its members should be entitled to sharing compensation, there are no specific policy guidelines or regulations on how to divide the shares in different situations. The collective’s share is supposed to enhance its capacity in farmland productivity and social welfare, thus benefiting all its members. However, the role of the collective is diminishing, in part because its membership is decreasing as some farmers leave to become urban residents following acquisition of communal land, and in part because of socioeconomic changes due to advancing urbanization. The revenue sharing scheme reflects this transformation.

To make matters worse, different levels of governments take a cut out of the monetary compensation that is supposed to go to the farmers. For example, the Chinese government built a pipeline that transfers natural gas from the western to the eastern part of the country. This was a national project, so compensation to peasants was paid by the state, but the amount of compensation varied from province to province. The state gave 20,000 RMB (US$2,500) per mu (one mu=666.67 square meters) to peasants in Henan province for their land. Given the fiscal structures between governments, these funds were allocated downward to lower levels of government (from state to province to city to county to township, respectively). At each transfer point, a portion of funds was retained for that level of government to finance their own public goods and services. The peasants received only 5,000 RMB in the end.

The situation here is similar to the concept of value capture in which governments are entitled to retain a portion of land value increases in exchange for their efforts in urban development and infrastructure provision. In a case like Henan it is legitimate to ask if the state’s compensation reflected the true market value of the land. If it did, then local governments should be entitled to their shares. Alternatively, if the state captures the entire land value increase, then the state should reimburse at least the costs of infrastructure provisions supplied by the local government.

The third issue is the equity of compensation, which involves both the level of compensation as well as variations in payments in different situations. Since there are no market data that can truly reflect the price of farmland, compensation hardly reflects market conditions and it varies dramatically from case to case, mainly depending on who plans to develop the land. For instance, profitable projects such as commercial housing and business developments can afford to pay higher prices for land than public transportation and infrastructure projects such as highways, railroads, airports and canals. If these different types of projects, private and public, occur in one village at different times or in neighboring villages at the same time, peasants who are less well compensated feel unequally treated by the government. Many complaints have something to do with this inconsistency in compensation. Such inequity contributes to rising tensions and distrust between peasants and the government and adversely affects subsequent planning and implementation of land management policies.

Finally, it is becoming increasingly difficult and costly to resettle peasants. The LAL requires that the quality of life of farmers shall not be adversely affected by compulsory land acquisition, but does not specify concrete measures to achieve this goal. As a result, many peasants end up living under worse conditions several years after their land was taken than they did before. This situation is not difficult to imagine. Farming does not make peasants rich, but it generates sufficient income to support a minimum level of livelihood and security. Without appropriate training and skills in managing their lump sum payment and without appropriate investment channels (if their compensation is sufficient to make any investment at all), it is common for peasants to end up with no land to farm, no income stream to support themselves, and no job skills to compete in the tight urban job markets.

Land Policy Challenges

China is facing many challenges in its efforts to supply land for new development as rapid urbanization continues. First, it is becoming more difficult for local governments to acquire land for true public works and transportation projects, since they cannot offer peasants as much compensation as developers of more profitable commercial projects.

A second challenge is to fairly compensate peasants when their farmland is acquired. As governments capture a greater proportion of the land value increases, the low level of compensation to peasants imposes a serious long-term threat to sustainable development in China. The number of people who live in poverty after land acquisition continues to rise. For instance, Zhijiang province alone has more than 2 million farmers who have lost their farmland. In 2002, more than 80 percent of legal cases filed by peasants against governments in the province were related to land acquisition.

This situation is a potential source of instability and is likely to escalate in the future as increasing urbanization puts even more pressure on the need for new land for development. According to the General National Land Use Comprehensive Plan, China needs 18.5 million mu of land for nonagricultural uses in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and 90 percent of that land will be acquired from farmers. It is estimated that 12 million farmers will lose their land through this type of acquisition. Without fair compensation or other efforts to assure their social security over the long term, these farmers will impose enormous socioeconomic problems on China for years to come.

The third challenge is associated with the rate of urbanization. According to the report of the 16th Communist Party Convention in 2003, the total population of China is estimated to be 1.6 billion to1.8 billion by 2020, with more than 55 percent living in cities, compared to the current population of 1.3 billion with 38 percent in urban areas. Migration from rural areas to cities is expected to be around 15 million annually, after taking into account the rate of natural urban population growth. Sustainable and affordable urban economic development is urgently needed to absorb these large numbers of rural immigrants.

A final dilemma is how to achieve a balance between farmland preservation and urban spatial expansion. Farmland preservation will inevitably increase land costs, which in turn will slow down urban development. At the same time, it is necessary to promote urban economic growth to provide sufficient job opportunities. This in turn leads to urban encroachment into rural areas to take advantage of less expensive land.

To address these challenges, Chinese officials need to ask some fundamental questions:

• What are the impacts of urbanization and infrastructure provision on the value of farmland, and how do the values change over space and time?
• Who is entitled to the value increases in land, and what is the peasants’ fair share?
• What constitutional rights do peasants possess? Will the Chinese Constitution be amended soon? If so, what will be the impacts?
• What are some other mechanisms of capturing land value? What are the merits and drawbacks of these mechanisms, and will they work in China? If so, how can the government make them work?

Land Acquisition Reform

It is hard to anticipate how Chinese officials will address these questions, but rapid urbanization and massive infrastructure provision will inevitably increase land values over the next two decades. Recognizing the enormous problems associated with land acquisition, several cities have adopted different approaches to protect farmers’ rights and interests so their lives will not be adversely affected. These approaches include:

• Joint ventures (Shanghai). Collectives share stock in the land they transfer for projects. In return, they receive annual cash payments equivalent to average profits from farming.
• Extra allowance for construction on land in villages (Shuzhou). Local governments strictly control the amount of nonagricultural construction on land owned by a collective. By providing an extra allowance for nonagricultural land, villages are able to pursue economic activities other than agriculture and are able to generate income simply by renting out their land for nonagricultural purposes.
• Combination of cash resettlement and provision of social security funds (Zhuzhou and Jiaxing). The population in a village where land will be acquired is divided into three age groups: youth, adults and elders. The younger residents are paid a cash compensation. The cash compensation for adults is double the youth amount and half of it is earmarked for job training. Those two groups are compensated upfront in a lump sum payment. The local government establishes a social security fund for the elderly so they are paid on a monthly basis rather than in a lump sum fashion. The amount of their pay is equivalent to the minimum standard set by governments for urban laid-off workers.
• Compensation based on location, not previous land use (Nanjing City). This example is closer to compensation based on farmland markets.

The Chinese government is taking other measures, such as attempting to make the land acquisition process more transparent so farmers know where and when their land will be acquired and how much they will be compensated for it. This transparency will also help to reduce corruption and improve land management. There is also an urgent need to establish legal channels for farmers to file appeals and protests against governments in compulsory land acquisition cases. The development of farmland markets may challenge land acquisition and also may have substantial impacts on fiscal policy and government financing.

All of these efforts will change both the way land will be taken from farmers and how the issues and challenges of land acquisition will be addressed. Although it is too early to predict how and to what extent these measures and reforms may affect urban and rural development, China is certain to be one of the most fascinating and dynamic places for continuing research and study of land policy reform and societal transformation.

Chengri Ding is associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at the University of Maryland, in College Park. He specializes in urban economics, housing and land studies, GIS and spatial analysis. He is also special assistant to the president of the Lincoln Institute for the Program on the People’s Republic of China.

Note: RMB is the Chinese currency; US$1=8.20RMB.

Education, training, research, and dissemination have been the instruments used most frequently by the Lincoln Institute to achieve its goals of expanding and making available its knowledge of land policy and taxation. Recently the Institute has begun to combine these instruments in demonstration projects, which involve the application of knowledge, data collection, and expertise to the development and implementation of policy in specific circumstances.

Several ongoing projects provide expert advice and assistance to agencies that are considering new approaches to property taxation, planning, or development. Examples include the consideration of property and land tax reform in several states, the management of state-owned lands, land market monitoring, and support for new approaches to urbanization in Latin America.

Moving forward, the scope of Institute demonstration projects will expand to include the analysis of policies as they are being applied and to document their outcomes. The aim of this expansion is to improve our understanding of the effectiveness of new policy initiatives—what works and in what conditions it does so.

Whether a policy works or not is normally defined in terms of the achievement of the policy’s intended objectives. Thus, our approach would be limited to those policies that have well-defined objectives or intended outcomes. Assessing the achievement of outcomes will be based on performance indicators that measure attainment of the policy’s objectives as well as on the change in other relevant parameters.

Perhaps most important, these demonstration projects will require the collection of baseline data before policy implementation begins so that the analysis of policy effects has a valid benchmark for comparison. Many studies of the impact of policies are severely handicapped by a lack of a good baseline from which to measure change.

When a policy intervention is successful in one application, its results are sometimes readily transferable to other environments, but that is not always the case. For example, the effectiveness of property tax policies may vary with institutional factors such as the clarity of a country’s property rights regime or the independence of the assessment appeal process from political pressure. If institutional dimensions are important determinants of policy effectiveness, more than one assessment of a policy application is needed to determine the influence of those factors. The assumption that “one size fits all” is rarely true when institutional details are an important determinant of policy performance—as they often are in land policy and taxation.

Well-documented case studies of the impact of policies can be powerful instruments in the classroom and as evidence in policy debates. Policy makers and many students often find the results of rigorous case studies to be more accessible and compelling. We anticipate that the results of the Institute’s demonstration projects will contribute valuable new material to our education and research programs.

In its short history, European spatial planning has been through several iterations, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy has supported many related activities that document that process, as well as the participating individuals and entities. Following a course held in Cambridge in 2001, the Institute published the book European Spatial Planning (Faludi 2002) on the movement’s early years when the European Union (EU) had no particular planning mandate. Rather, the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) was an initiative of the member states, supported by the European Commission.

Eduardo Reese, arquitecto que se especializa en planeamiento urbano y regional, es el subadministrador del Instituto de la Vivienda de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. En cargos profesionales anteriores, fue asesor técnico para los planes maestros de más de 20 ciudades en argentina; Secretario de Políticas Socioeconómicas del Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano y Laboral de la Provincia de Buenos Aires; asesor al Consejo de Planeamiento Urbano de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires; y Secretario de Planeamiento en la ciudad de Avellaneda.

Reese es docente en el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional del General Sarmiento en Buenos Aires. Actualmente es profesor de gestión urbana en el programa de grado en urbanismo en dicha universidad. También enseña desarrollo urbano en programas de maestría de la Faculta de Arquitectura, Urbanismo y Diseño de la Universidad de La Plata, así como en universidades de Mar del Plata y Córdoba. Además, dirige el plan maestro de la cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo en Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró usted en el Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln?

Eduardo Reese: Mi relación con el Programa se remonta a 1997, cuando estábamos elaborando el plan de la ciudad de Córdoba, que incluyó la formulación de diferentes proyectos urbanos de gran escala. En ese momento el Instituto colaboró activamente para ampliar el debate de los impactos de estos proyectos sobre el mercado de suelo y, consecuentemente, en la configuración de la ciudad. Posteriormente, me fui integrando en diversas actividades del Instituto, y hace cuatro años asumí la coordinación de los cursos anuales de Gestión del Suelo en Grandes Proyectos Urbanos, a partir del fallecimiento de Mario Lungo, quien había dirigido ese programa desde su inicio.

En el 2004, el Programa y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, realizamos en conjunto el curso Mercados de Suelo: Teoría e instrumentos para la gestión de políticas, el cual fue la primera actividad del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe que implicó un programa de formación de siete meses para 50 alumnos argentinos. Esa experiencia educativa ayudó a formar una masa crítica de técnicos y profesionales con una visión innovadora y diferente respecto de la gestión de las políticas de suelo. El impacto de ese curso se ha reflejado en decisiones de políticas urbanas en diferentes municipalidades (tales como San Fernando y Morón en el Gran Buenos Aires); en la constitución en Argentina del Movimiento de Reforma Urbana en 2005; y en cambios académicos en el mismo Instituto del Conurbano.

Land Lines: ¿Qué rol puede jugar un proyecto urbano en la calidad de vida de una ciudad en el contexto latinoamericano?

Eduardo Reese: Las grandes operaciones o proyectos urbanísticos sobre sectores definidos de la ciudad (tanto en áreas centrales como en las periferias) han sido grandes protagonistas del urbanismo contemporáneo en el último cuarto de siglo. En América Latina se cuenta hoy con un amplio muestreo de experiencias y proyectos, aunque todavía se requiere una reflexión teórica más rigurosa. Algunos ejemplos importantes son los proyectos del Portal del Bicentenario en Santiago de Chile; los proyectos urbanos integrales en Medellín, Colombia; las operaciones urbanas en diferentes ciudades de Brasil; y el proyecto de reestructuración en el sector Oeste de San Fernando, Argentina.

Sin embargo, es importante aclarar que las grandes operaciones urbanísticas son un instrumento de intervención en la ciudad que ya tienen muchos años no sólo en los países centrales, sino también en nuestras sociedades. En Buenos Aires, por ejemplo, la apertura de la Avenida de Mayo y de las diagonales, proyectada hacia 1880 y llevada a cabo en las décadas siguientes, implicó importantes impactos, tanto en lo físico-espacial como en lo social, económico y, fundamentalmente, en el campo simbólico. Este enfoque de múltiples impactos permite, sin duda, asimilar la operación de Avenida de Mayo a un gran proyecto urbano contemporáneo, pero también generó un gran debate sobre quién debía financiar la operación y quién se apropiaría de las rentas de suelo generadas. En última instancia, la Corte Suprema falló que la municipalidad no podía financiar las obras con la plusvalía generada, porque las rentas eran enteramente de los terratenientes. Durante muchos años, este caso fue un precedente en relación a la intervención estatal en el proceso de valorización de suelo generado por un gran proyecto público.

Land Lines: Usted tiene una mirada muy crítica del reconocido proyecto de regeneración urbana Puerto Madero, en Buenos Aires. ¿Qué haría de manera diferente en otras grandes áreas de redesarrollo?

Eduardo Reese: Puerto Madero es un caso emblemático de proyectos urbanos que promueven un modelo de planeamiento urbano segregado y que hoy en día se “exporta” a otras ciudades y países como instrumento básico para poder “competir” por las inversiones internacionales. En este proyecto el Estado adoptó una posición de sumisión frente al mercado y permitió la construcción de un barrio exclusivo para sectores de altísimos ingresos. Es un ejemplo notorio de una política pública diseñada explícitamente para privilegiar a los sectores más ricos sin recuperación de las enormes valorizaciones del suelo que fueron producto de esta misma política pública.

Más aún, a fin de garantizar a los inversionistas la sobrevalorización de las propiedades que compraron, el emprendimiento tiene una serie de características que la “recortan” (física y socialmente) del resto de la ciudad, creando con ello rentas aún mayores debido a la segregación. Puerto Madero no tiene un muro explícito, como los condominios cerrados, pero tiene múltiples acciones y mensajes implícitos, explícitos y simbólicos que señalan claramente que ese lugar está fuera del alcance para la mayoría de la sociedad:

• Es el único barrio administrado por una Corporación Estatal que, además, hace 19 años paga sueldos de funcionarios y gerentes para construir y mantener unos pocos metros cuadrados de parque accesibles únicamente a aquel barrio adinerado.
• El proyecto creó una escenografía urbana diseñada y de cuidadosos detalles estéticos que contrasta fuertemente con la pobreza brutal del espacio público en el resto de la ciudad. Los parques e infraestructura son construidos sobre suelo ya privatizado para garantizar las inversiones, pese a utilizar fondos públicos, que benefician únicamente a los propietarios de élites de las torres de vivienda y oficinas que los rodean.
• El sistema se apoya en un sofisticado sistema de cámaras y de seguridad que definen y controlan el acceso a una zona sobreprotegida.
• Todos estos mecanismos están al servicio de garantizar la sobrevalorización de las propiedades como un seguro de que allí solo podrá comprar y habitar la clase social más alta.

En definitiva, Puerto Madero es la clara demostración de urbanismo y política pública de distribución regresiva: un “ghetto” libre de problemas para ricos.

Land Lines: En la medida en que las municipalidades compiten por inversiones externas, ¿es posible reconciliar esto con objetivos alternativos tales como prioridades ambientales y sociales?

Eduardo Reese: El problema de nuestras ciudades no es la falta de planeamiento, sino el actual orden excluyente de las políticas y del urbanismo. No puede haber una ley para la ciudad formal y un conjunto de excepciones para el resto. Es necesario crear un nuevo orden urbanístico y jurídico en América Latina respecto al derecho a la ciudad, la distribución equitativa de los beneficios de la urbanización, y la función social de la tenencia de suelo.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera la municipalidad de San Fernando, en el Área Metropolitana de Buenos Aires, ofrece una alternativa a este enfoque?

Eduardo Reese: San Fernando es un municipio ubicado en la zona norte del Gran Buenos Aires, a 30 km de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, con una superficie continental de 23 km² y una población de 156.000 habitantes. Tiene un frente litoral al Río Luján de 5 km de extensión sobre su desembocadura en el Río de la Plata donde se concentra una gran cantidad de actividades productivas vinculadas con la náutica. Este sector del municipio tiene una ubicación privilegiada, con altos valores inmobiliarios y está dotado de la totalidad de los servicios urbanos.

El plan urbano y el modelo de gestión del suelo se comenzaron a elaborar en el 2003 a través de un convenio entre el municipio y el Instituto del Conurbano de la Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento. En el año 2005, un seminario de capacitación del Instituto Lincoln ayudó a ampliar las ideas tradicionales sobre manejo de suelo que abundaban en los grupos profesionales locales y llevó a una serie de decisiones importantes:

• generar recursos sustentables para reorientar el desarrollo urbano;
• recuperar la cultura de financiamiento de obras públicas con una contribución por mejoras
• recuperar suelo para vivienda social, infraestructura urbana y redes viales
• fortalecer las administraciones urbanas y municipales como actores innovadores en la implementación de políticas públicas; y
• limitar la sobrevaluación del suelo al intervenir en el mercado a través de mecanismos tales como nueva legislación de planeamiento urbano, instrumentos para recuperar la valorización, y una importante oferta de suelo para los sectores de bajos ingresos.

La política urbana en San Fernando se enfocó en una serie de estrategias de acción que incluyeron (1) asegurar el acceso a nuevos espacios públicos sobre el río para fines recreativos, deportivos y comerciales, especialmente para ser aprovechados por los sectores pobres; y (2) la regularización comprehensiva del sector oeste de la municipalidad, donde se concentra los mayores niveles de pobreza.

Para implementar estas estrategias, fue necesario aumentar los recursos fiscales para inversión pública de dos maneras: a través de la apropiación de la rentabilidad del uso del suelo o tierra municipal sobre el río a través de la creación del consorcio Parque Náutico de San Fernando, S.A. (PNSFSA); y con la participación de la municipalidad en la plusvalía a partir de una reforma tributaria municipal. (PNSFSA es una empresa creada por la municipalidad de San Fernando para administrar las tierras del dominio municipal en la costa ribereña del sector este de la ciudad, conocida como Marina Park).

La experiencia de San Fernando se basa en un conjunto de herramientas de gestión orientadas a la redistribución de rentas urbanas para construir una ciudad más equitativa. El suelo se considera como un activo clave dentro de una estrategia más amplia de desarrollo local y, por lo tanto, la gestión depende de una combinación de instrumentos de planeamiento, administrativos, económicos, fiscales y legales orientados a fortalecer el papel del sector público. El eje central de las políticas es la búsqueda de equidad en la distribución de los costos y beneficios de la urbanización, dentro del contexto desafiante de la creciente presión sobre el suelo en toda el área metropolitana de Buenos Aires.

Land Lines: ¿Qué cambios habría que realizar en el sistema educativo para la capacitación de los planificadores urbanos?

Eduardo Reese: Primero, es necesario incorporar una mayor comprensión del funcionamiento de los mercados de suelo en el contexto actual de las ciudades de los países en desarrollo. Segundo, hace falta un análisis más crítico de los instrumentos teóricos, metodológicos y técnicos para llevar a cabo el diagnóstico e intervención en asuntos de suelo urbano. El curso sobre mercados de suelo de 2004 que mencioné antes buscó desarrollar este tipo de materiales para permitir que los estudiantes cubrieran las diferentes escalas y dimensiones del problema.

Land Lines: ¿Qué tensiones existen entre intereses públicos y privados en el planeamiento urbano?

Eduardo Reese: Esta es una pregunta crucial porque toda la historia de la gestión territorial en nuestras ciudades ha tenido un hilo conductor: el derecho de la propiedad privada del suelo juntamente con la estructura de la propiedad han entrado siempre en conflicto con la actividad urbanística que es una responsabilidad pública. En ese sentido siempre habrá una tensión entre intereses públicos y privados en la construcción de la ciudad.

A mi juicio, los proyectos urbanos en América Latina tienen la responsabilidad de contribuir a la creación de nuevos espacios de uso y goce público, a la inclusión social, a la generación de empleo, a la equidad en el acceso a los servicios para todos, a la sostenibilidad ambiental y a la redistribución de las rentas urbanas generadas por el proyecto. Los cuatro casos mencionados antes de Chile, Colombia, Brasil y Argentina muestran que estos beneficios son posibles en muchos países.

Sin embargo, y lamentablemente, en una gran cantidad de casos en América Latina los proyectos urbanos se han justificado como necesarios para atraer inversiones y/o consumidores y asegurar o reforzar las ventajas competitivas dinámicas de la ciudad. Estos insospechados objetivos positivos a veces se usan como un mecanismo para legitimizar intervenciones que profundizan la segregación socioespacial de las ciudades. Estos efectos adversos del mercado no son fatales para las ciudades, sino que son el resultado de elecciones políticas perversas.

Infrastructure (comprising energy, telecommunications, transportation, water supply, and sanitation) plays an important role in urban land development, and it influences city and country productivity. Data on the amount of infrastructure stocks at the national (but, alas, not the metropolitan) level are available for many developing and high-income countries and support several results summarized here.

The amount of infrastructure stocks per capita across countries is strongly related to per capita income levels—when country incomes double, infrastructure stocks nearly double as well. However, country infrastructure stocks have essentially no association with a country’s level of urbanization once country income is taken into account. This seems surprising because cities have large amounts of infrastructure. But they also have dense populations that use the infrastructure intensively, so per capita urban infrastructure stocks are similar to national levels.

The composition of infrastructure stocks also varies systematically with per capita income. Roads have the largest share of infrastructure stocks in the lowest income countries, with water systems second and electric power systems a close third. As country incomes increase, the infrastructure related to electric power systems increases more rapidly than income levels. Infrastructure for water and sewer systems increases less rapidly, and for roads the change is in proportion to income. As a result, in high-income countries electric power systems are the largest component of infrastructure, followed by roads, whereas water, sanitation, and telephone systems comprise only a modest share of their infrastructure.

Based on recent rates of economic growth, and using the existing relations between infrastructure and per capita income, developing countries are likely to need to spend about 5 percent of their GDP on infrastructure (3 percent for expansion and 2 percent for maintenance)—currently about $750 billion annually—to maintain existing ratios between infrastructure and GDP. For high-income countries, total spending would be lower, at 1.7 percent of GDP (about evenly divided between investment and maintenance)—currently about $700 billion annually. Countries growing faster than average need to invest a higher share of their GDP so that infrastructure stocks can keep up with economic growth.

In some countries, improving the efficiency of service production from existing infrastructure is an alternative to new investment. For example, average electricity losses across countries range as high as 25 percent, and leakage and unbilled water can exceed 30 percent. Reducing such high losses can forestall the need for additional capacity. Somewhat surprisingly, performance within countries across sectors varies greatly—efficient performance by a country in one infrastructure sector is uncorrelated with performance in other sectors.

What sources will provide these investment funds, particularly for developing countries? Foreign assistance and development bank financing of infrastructure in developing countries currently total about $40 billion annually, and that figure has more than tripled since 1990 in current dollars. Private investment in infrastructure in developing countries has recently reached $160 billion annually and has grown eight-fold since 1990, also in current dollars. Foreign assistance is directed mainly at energy, transport, and water and sanitation systems, with virtually no funding for telecommunications. In contrast, more than half of private funding goes to telecommunications (particularly mobile telephony), followed by energy. Telecommunications and energy draw more private investment in developing countries because their tariff revenues cover a large share of operating costs, whereas tariff revenues and user fees cover a much smaller share of costs for transport and water and sanitation. Private investment in infrastructure was concentrated in Latin America and East Asia in the 1990s but has spread more evenly across global regions in the 2000s.

Despite the growth in international funding, large and growing metropolitan areas in developing countries still need to raise significant sums to finance infrastructure investments. This will involve raising tariffs charged to users, increasing taxes (particularly property taxes) on properties whose value is enhanced by infrastructure investments, and establishing municipal bond markets such as the one being developed in South Africa.

Over the past several decades, the structure of the U.S. economy has changed as it experienced a continuing reduction of overall employment in manufacturing and ongoing growth in the service sector, especially services involving knowledge workers. The geographic distribution of activity has also changed as population has continued to shift from the seasonal Northeast and Midwest to the warmer South and West. Finally, within metropolitan areas, populations and employment moved from cities to the suburbs as trucking and automobile travel became ubiquitous. These three trends have left many cities in the Northeast and Midwest with much smaller populations, weaker economies, fewer manufacturing jobs, and an inability to offset lost employment opportunities with gains from sectors that are expanding nationally. These are today’s legacy cities, which often have excess infrastructure capacity, underutilized housing stocks, and fiscal stress related to past obligations from public sectors now greatly diminished in size. A recent Lincoln Institute policy focus report, Regenerating America’s Legacy Cities, by Alan Mallach and Lavea Brachman, reviews the performance of a sample of these urban areas and identifies steps the more successful cities have taken to produce stronger outcomes.

While the declines of legacy cities have common causes, their economic performance has become quite diverse in recent decades, as some have delivered much stronger economic, institutional, and fiscal results than others. All legacy cities have an array of assets including infrastructure, neighborhoods, institutions, populations, and ongoing economic activity. Differences in their comparative performance are related to how local policies and leadership have leveraged existing inventories of these assets. In particular, recovering legacy cities have built upon and expanded existing institutions in research, medicine, health, and education. They have also exploited the growing interest in urban neighborhoods where it is easy to walk to stores and restaurants, and where residential densities are higher than those in most suburban communities. Recovering cities also typically have maintained or attracted more educated residents and have seen growth in knowledge-related activities.

Legacy cities that have seen their economies begin to transform and grow again have not necessarily experienced population increases. The population of most legacy cities peaked in the mid-20th century and then declined. Buffalo and St. Louis, for example, had lower populations in 2000 than in 1900. Sometimes the decline in city populations is offset by suburban growth, so that metropolitan populations do not decline. But some successful legacy cities, such as Pittsburgh, have experienced modest population declines even at the metropolitan level. Changing the composition of city populations and economic activity is more important for success than population growth alone.

The successful recovery of legacy cities normally has not resulted from megaprojects that focus on redevelopment, but on the accretion of many small steps with a large cumulative impact—an approach Mallach and Brachman have dubbed “strategic incrementalism.” Their research shows that successful legacy cities have pursued such an approach continually and relentlessly. The key elements of strategic incrementalism require the evolution of new forms for a city’s physical organization, economic components, governance, and linkages to its surrounding region. Physically, the practice involves focusing on the city’s central core, its key neighborhoods, and the management of vacant land. Economically, it involves restoring the economic role of the city based on its comparative advantages and existing assets, sharing the benefits of growth with its population, and strengthening connections to the city’s region. Cities also must strengthen their governance and address the flow of services and fiscal resources between the city and the municipalities in the greater metropolitan area.

Legacy cities have declined over many decades, and recovery will take time and require patience. While the performance of some, such as Camden, NJ, continues to deteriorate, others show signs of progress. In Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Milwaukee, and other legacy cities on the rebound, economic performance has improved, and the rates of unemployment, crime, and poverty have fallen below national averages despite the fact that populations remain well below their peak 60 years ago.

For additional information on the determinants of legacy city success, see http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/2215_Regenerating-America-s-Legacy-Cities.

As a graduate student studying urban design and planning, Matt Tomasulo organized a clever wayfinding project to encourage residents of Raleigh, North Carolina, to walk more rather than drive. With a group of confederates, he designed and produced 27 Coroplast signs, each one-foot square, printed with simple messages such as: “It’s a 7 Minute Walk to Raleigh City Cemetery,” color-coded by destination category, with an arrow pointing the way. The group attached these with zipties to stoplight poles and the like around three downtown intersections. It took less than 45 minutes to install them all—after dark, because, although the signs looked official, this effort was “unsanctioned,” as Tomasulo put it.

As you might expect, the city had the signs taken down. And that could have been the end of it: a provocative gesture and a smart portfolio piece. But in fact, Walk Raleigh has undergone an unexpected metamorphosis since it first appeared back in 2012, evolving into Walk [Your City] (WalkYourCity.org), an ambitious attempt to take the underlying idea nationwide and work with (instead of around) city and planning officials. This year, Tomasulo’s fledgling organization received a $182,000 grant from the Knight Foundation, sparking a new phase for the project that includes a particularly thoughtful series of deployments coordinated with officials in San Jose, California.

This surprising outcome owes much to shrewd uses of technology—and perhaps even more to the input of a handful of planning officials who saw deeper potential in what could have been a fun but ephemeral stunt.

The core of Tomasulo’s original insight was to probe and attempt to shift perceptions of walking: he’d come upon some interesting research suggesting that people often choose not to walk because a destination simply “feels” farther away than it really is.

Older downtowns such as Raleigh’s are often “more walkable than people realize,” says Julie Campoli, an urban designer and author of Made for Walking: Density and Neighborhood Form (2012), published by the Lincoln Institute. But in many cases, decades of traffic engineering have eroded the sense of walkability in built environments where signage is arranged to be visible to drivers, and offers distance information in the car-centric form of miles. For the most part, she says, “The streets are designed for cars.”

Tomasulo did his own research in Raleigh, asking neighbors and others if they would, say, walk rather than drive to a certain grocery store if it took 14 minutes. “They’d say, ‘Sure, sometimes, at least.’ And I’d say: ‘Well, it’s 12 minutes.’ Again and again I had this conversation. People would say, ‘I always thought it was too far to walk.’”

Thus Tomasulo’s original signs were oriented to pedestrian eye level, and described distance in terms of minutes to a particular destination of potential interest. Tomasulo documented and promoted the project on Facebook. The enthusiasm there helped attract media attention, climaxing in a visit from a BBC video crew.

That’s when Tomasulo reached out via Twitter to Mitchell Silver, Raleigh’s then planning director, and a former president of the American Planning Association. Silver didn’t know much about Walk Raleigh, but agreed to talk to the BBC anyway, discussing the desirability of pro-walking efforts and praising this one as a “very cool” example . . . that probably should have gotten a permit first. The clip got even more attention. And when that resulted in inquiries about the signs’ legality, Silver removed them himself and returned them to Tomasulo.

But Silver also recognized the bigger opportunity. Raleigh’s long-term comprehensive plan explicitly called for an emphasis on increasing walkability (and bike-ability), an issue that resonated with the fast-growing municipality’s notably young population (about 70 percent under age 47 at the time). “It really became a critical thing,” he recalls. “Are we going to embrace innovation? Did Walk Raleigh do something wrong or are our codes out of date?” says Silver, now commissioner of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation. “Innovation tests regulation. Matt, without realizing it, tested us.”

The short-term solution: Tomasulo could donate his signs to the city, which could then reinstall them on an “educational pilot” basis. To help Silver convince the City Council, Tomasulo used online petition tool SignOn.org to gather 1,255 signature in three days. The Council unanimously approved the return of Walk Raleigh.

Tomasulo pushed a little further. (He has since finished with school, and has a Masters in city and regional planning from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and another in landscape architecture from North Carolina State University.) Raising $11,364 on Kickstarter, he and partners built WalkYourCity.org, which offers customizable signage templates to anyone, anywhere. This has led to more than 100 communities creating citizen-led projects in large and small municipalities across the U.S. and beyond.

That shouldn’t be a surprise, given what Campoli describes as a growing interest in walkability among citizens and planners alike. The smart growth movement has revived interest in compact city forms, she says, “And in the last ten years, that has converged in this idea of walkability.” Particularly in key demographics—millenials and empty-nesters prominently among them—there has been a recognition that car culture is “not as wonderful as it was made out to be,” she observes.

And there’s an economic dimension for cities, she adds. One way to gauge that is through growing real-estate values associated with more compact, walkable forms.

The economic impact factor inspired a recent collaboration with officials in San Jose, which stands out as an example of how tactical urbanism can cross over into real-world planning influence. Sal Alvarez, of the city’s Office of Economic Development, was a fan of WalkYourCity.org as an open online platform—but pointed out that “The city will probably come take the signs down,” he says. “You need a champion on the inside, really.” He and Jessica Zenk of the city’s Department of Transportation served that role in San Jose, quickly launching three pilot programs.

Each is concentrated and strategic. The first leverages the popularity of the newish San Pedro Square Market, a concentration of restaurants and businesses in the city’s two-square-mile downtown. It’s a favored local destination, but the sort that people often drive to and from without exploring. So a set of 47 signs points to attractions in the adjacent Little Italy district, a park with extensive walking trails, the arena where the city’s National Hockey League team plays, and a second park that has been the focus of ongoing revitalization efforts. A second downtown project involved recruiting a dozen volunteers to help put up 74 signs meant to draw links between the city’s SoFa arts district and walking-distance landmarks like the convention center.

The popularity of these two experiments inspired a city council member to propose the third, set in a neighborhood outside the downtown core. This centers on a road currently being converted from four lanes to two, with a middle turn lane and bike lane to enable a shift away from vehicle travel. Tomasulo has added a new batch of color-coded sign designs that point specifically to other car-alternative infrastructure, including bike-share locations and Caltrain stops. The city has been gathering traffic data around this project that may help measure the impact of these 50 or so signs at 12 intersections. To Alvarez, the signs are useful tools in pushing the cultural changes that help make infrastructure shifts take hold.

More broadly, San Jose officials are working with Tomasulo to “put some tools in the toolbox” of Walk [Your City] to encourage and help enthusiasts to find their own champions within local municipalities, so these projects can contribute to the planning process. “If you don’t get the city to buy in at some point,” Campoli says, “you’re not going to get that permanent change that a short-term event is intended to lead to.”

Back in Raleigh, the original project is evolving into a permanent feature of the landscape, with fully vetted and planned campaigns in four neighborhoods, and a partnership with Blue Cross/Blue Shield. That’s a solid example of what Silver advocated: a city embracing a grassroots urbanism project instead of just regulating.

But the San Jose example is showing how much the reverse proposition matters, too: tactical urbanism can benefit from embracing official planning structures. Tomasulo certainly sounds pleased with his project’s transition from “unsanctioned” experiment to active partnerships with insiders in San Jose and elsewhere. He uses a term he picked up for officials whose enthusiasm, creativity, and practical how-to-get-it-done wisdom cuts against an all-too-common stereotype. “They’re not bureaucrats,” he says. “They’re herocrats.”

Rob Walker (robwalker.net) is a contributor to Design Observer and The New York Times.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En los últimos años América Latina ha sufrido muchos desastres naturales que han tenido impactos particularmente graves en asentamientos irregulares de áreas densamente urbanizadas. Con base en las conclusiones de investigaciones que el Banco Mundial y otras instituciones financiaron en México en noviembre de 2000, el Instituto Lincoln copatrocinó un seminario en las ciudad porteña de Veracruz, enfocado en las vías para atenuar los riesgos y resultados de los desastres naturales. El seminario exploró problemas como:

• La relación entre los asentamientos irregulares en áreas de alto riesgo y la regularización de procesos;
• las actitudes y esfuerzos de las poblaciones locales;
• los avances tecnológicos recientes y su relevancia para diagnosticar riesgos;
• las lecciones aprendidas de desastres anteriores; y
• las experiencias exitosas en la prevención y alivio de desastres.

Representantes de autoridades municipales y organizaciones comunitarias compartieron sus experiencias, así como metodologías técnicas y prácticas aprendidas para identificar zonas de alto riesgo, implementar políticas para reducir asentamientos ilegales en esas zonas y establecer medidas de prevención y alivio. Los participantes también identificaron la importancia de la participación social en el proceso. Las principales conclusiones se resumen a continuación:

• Los asentamientos ilegales o irregulares reflejan la incapacidad de los mercados inmobiliarios de proporcionar espacios residenciales apropiados (de bajo riesgo) para familias de bajos ingresos. Los intentos por proporcionar alivio continuarán viéndose frustrados a menos que este ambiente político mejore.
• En los niveles más altos del gobierno las acciones se emprenden casi exclusivamente de manera reactiva, tal es el caso de las medidas de alivio que se dan solamente después de ocurridos los desastres y los esfuerzos limitados para mejorar la planificación y la prevención. Existe una necesidad urgente de que los gobiernos modifiquen sus prioridades para poder evitar parte de los impactos predecibles de los desastres naturales.
• Los datos e instrumentos de dirección para mejorar los enfoques preventivos deben ponerse a la disposición de los ciudadanos y las autoridades locales, quienes han generado la mayoría de los esfuerzos exitosos de alivio en los últimos años y se encuentran en la mejor posición para generar iniciativas en el futuro.
• Es importante comenzar a promover y desarrollar pólizas de seguro que retribuirán a los hogares y localidades por daños y pérdidas y pondrán en su lugar las iniciativas para mejorar prácticas con respecto a los niveles de construcción, el mantenimiento de cursos de agua y otras medidas de prevención.
• Como la urbanización acelerada y mal administrada ha sido una causa importante en aumentar el número de familias en riesgo, así como los niveles de riesgo, una planificación urbana fortalecida debe ser un instrumento cuando se busca reducir los efectos de los desastres.

El Instituto Lincoln ha estado trabajando este problema con Servicios Urbanos Municipales y Estatales (SUME), una institución establecida a finales de 1999 para elevar la calidad y eficiencia de los niveles de administración y de gobierno a nivel local y estatal en México. SUME busca lograr estos objetivos a través de la asesoría, asistencia técnica y entrenamiento de funcionarios de gobierno. Sus actividades han sido respaldadas por el Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (Hábitat), que copatrocinó este seminario, y por el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo.

Douglas Keare es miembro del Instituto Lincoln y Luis Javier Castro es el director general de Servicios Urbanos Municipales y Estatales (SUME) en la Ciudad de México.

Like many fast-growing areas across the country, the Bluegrass region of central Kentucky is dealing with two complementary growth management issues:

• How to manage growth that takes place within the 40-year-old urban growth boundary around Lexington and in the smaller cities and towns of the surrounding counties;
• How to best preserve the unique rural character of the countryside beyond urban growth areas.

Civic leadership for this critical planning process is provided by Bluegrass Tomorrow, a non-profit, community-based organization formed in 1989 to ensure that the region’s extraordinary resources-physical, natural and fiscal-are soundly managed for the future. Bluegrass Tomorrow works within the seven-county area for solutions that build a strong and efficient economy, a protected environment and livable communities. The organization accomplishes its goals by promoting regional dialogue and collaborative goal-setting among diverse interests, facilitating public, private and corporate sector cooperation, and developing innovative planning solutions to growth and conservation concerns.

The guiding framework for Bluegrass Tomorrow is the Bluegrass Regional Vision that was developed in 1993 through a broad-based regional planning process. In seeking to maintain a clear definition between town and country, this Vision reflects the region’s legacy of a large urban center (Lexington) surrounded by smaller, distinct cities and towns. These communities are separated and yet connected by a beautiful greenbelt of agricultural land and areas rich in environmental and historic resources.

Smart Growth Choices

Continuing a partnership established in the early 1990s, the Lincoln Institute and Bluegrass Tomorrow cosponsored a conference in October that focused on smart growth choices for the region. The conference was designed to bring together public officials, business interests and concerned citizens to revisit the Regional Vision, discuss why that Vision remains important for good business, good cities and a good environment, and to explore how it is being unraveled by current development pressures. Through a combination of keynote addresses, plenary sessions and interactive workshops, participants learned about smart growth principles and evaluated the appropriateness of various approaches and models to their region.

William Hudnut, senior resident fellow at the Urban Land Institute in Washington, D.C., discussed the characteristics of smart growth, which are also the goals of the Bluegrass Regional Vision:

• Begin with the end in mind and work back from there to plan in advance.
• Use incentives to guide development to areas that make sense.
• Think, plan and act as a region and work out issues through collaboration and teamwork.
• Make the commitment to preserve farmland and open space.
• Demonstrate environmental sensitivity, recognizing that “we borrow the land from our children.”
• Value compact, mixed-use development that supports alternative choices of transportation.
• Provide certainty for developers with less contention.
• Reuse older areas of cities and towns including abandoned lands and obsolete buildings.
• Preserve and reinvest in traditional downtowns and neighborhoods. “You can’t be a suburb of nothing.”
• Create a sense of place and community.

The conference program highlighted three smart growth themes, offered illustrative case studies from other regions in the U.S., and provided opportunities for participant feedback on promising directions and possible obstacles.

Planning and Paying for Infrastructure

The Bluegrass region’s ability to create incentives to promote smart growth practices is often limited because local governments are always in the business of playing “catch up.” This creates a problem because of the need for local government to be able to use public infrastructure to promote development in areas appropriate for growth, away from rural conservation areas, and to help in the purchase of development rights to protect the Bluegrass farmland.

Paul Tischler, a fiscal, economic and planning consultant from Bethesda, Maryland, advocated that government use a capital improvement plan to address this problem. This planning tool allows governments to create a comprehensive approach to current and future needs in one integrated program. It establishes goals for what projects are needed and how and when to pay for them. Peter Pollock of the Boulder, Colorado, Planning Department presented a case study of how his city has implemented a capital improvement program that addresses capital facilities planning and budgeting, equity concerns and linkage of service availability to development approval.

Infill Development

Promotion of more intense development and redevelopment within established cities and towns in the Bluegrass is a critical smart growth issue. It encourages more efficient use of the region’s highly valued Bluegrass farmland and makes better use of existing infrastructure. Too often, however, developers are required to reduce the density of development to respond to neighborhood concerns about incompatibility with the existing community character. As a result, land within urban areas is being used less efficiently, which increases the pressure to convert farmland on the edge of developed areas into future home sites.

To address this problem, Nore Winter, an urban design review consultant in Boulder, Colorado, discussed how communities can make sure that infill and redevelopment enhance the community and the quality of life in the surrounding neighborhood. He explained how to avoid “generica” by defining community character and using design guidelines to improve new developments with visual examples that demonstrate the type of development that is preferred. David Rice, executive director of the Norfolk, Virginia, Redevelopment and Housing Authority, shared examples of infill development projects in that city, which has successfully created quality neighborhoods, encouraged community participation and addressed difficult zoning, design and permitting concerns.

Regional Cooperation

The seven central Bluegrass counties constitute a highly integrated region in terms of land use, economy, and natural and cultural resources. Decisions in one county can have a long-term impact on another county. Although Bluegrass Tomorrow has drawn the region together to work on these issues, the current rate of change requires more intensive planning and coordination.

Curtis Johnson, president and chairman of the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities area in Minnesota, explored with conference participants many examples of additional steps that can be taken to promote regional cooperation. The good news for the Bluegrass, Johnson noted in his opening observations, is that unlike some regions of the U.S., the Bluegrass is still able to make important choices. He cautioned, though, that any region has only a few opportunities to get it right, and that there is no magic solution. He also offered several succinct ideas about regionalism: “setting a bigger table, including those who disagree,” “it’s never over,” and “no one is excused.”

Next Steps

Conference participants and local community and political leaders who held a follow-up meeting concluded that the region needs to explore seven action steps to build on the ideas generated by the conference speakers and discussion sessions.

1. Encourage communities to put in place a well-communicated and clearly explained capital improvement plan to help build community confidence that government can meet and pay for the needs of local communities and the region as a whole. The plan should match services to regional growth and build consensus among diverse interest groups about which areas are to be designated as urban and which will remain rural.

2. Promote infill development by using a redevelopment authority to build downtown housing, redevelop old strip centers and explore new projects in overlooked urbanized areas.

3. Develop design guidelines for infill and redevelopment projects that work as a friend, not a foe. The guidelines should be developed in partnership with the neighbors to build confidence in the process, remove fear of the unknown, and set a design framework rather than dictate a particular design style.

4. Use Bluegrass farmland as the niche or “brand identity” when marketing the Bluegrass as a location.

5. Educate the business community, especially the lending community, about the reasons for and benefits of smart growth.

6. Address concerns over economic winners and losers in the region, and undertake economic planning accordingly.

7. Build on collaborative regional efforts now in place and the common sense of place in the Bluegrass to strengthen regional planning efforts. This involves taking care to maximize alliances among groups and to balance strategic long-term planning with specific actions.

What will become of these ideas? If the past is any measure, over the next several months the leaders and citizens of the Bluegrass region will sort out which of these ideas will work best, and they will form the coalitions necessary to make them work. Bluegrass Tomorrow will continue to provide a unique model of private sector leadership on smart growth issues in collaboration with the region’s public officials and community residents.

Jean Scott is executive director of Bluegrass Tomorrow, based in Lexington, Kentucky, and Peter Pollock is director of community planning in Boulder, Colorado, and a former visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute. Together they developed and organized the conference on Smart Growth for the Bluegrass.