Few places in Latin America, or in the rest of the world, have dared to implement such radical urban land policy reforms as Chile has over the last 20 years. In 1979, the government began initiating deregulation policies by releasing a document that stated that the scarcity of land was artificially produced by excessive regulation, which resulted in the virtual elimination of urban growth boundaries.
Since then much has changed in the morphology and internal structure of Chilean cities, but the assessment of these changes varies greatly according to one’s ideological position. Explicit socially oriented urban policies have allowed for significant improvements in access to housing by the poor, but some argue that the spatial segregation impacts of such policies have imposed a high toll on society by indirectly lowering quality of life, impeding access to jobs and aggravating social alienation.
Even before the 1973-1990 period of military government, Chile was recognized as a unitarian and centralist political system, characterized by the strong presence of the state in economics and politics. It is a society with a relatively homogenous culture and is unique among Latin American countries in its strong legalist tradition. Chilean cities also present a sharp contrast to their counterparts in Latin America. There are virtually no informal land markets; land tenure has been almost completely regularized by strong public programs; and the majority of the urban poor live in areas where the main streets are paved and sanitary services are provided. Urban violence, in spite of growing trends, is still minimal compared to the rest of the continent.
Deregulation Policies and Problems
Among the most innovative aspects of Chilean urban policy are the following:
Although some of the achievements of these deregulation policies are widely recognized as positive-particularly in regard to legal and physical or urbanistic regularization and the quantity of social housing provided-many Chileans believe that the policies of the past 20 years have only caused new problems. Some of them are:
It is unclear whether these urban changes can be attributed directly to the effectiveness of market-oriented land policies or to the strong overall performance of the Chilean economy. The steady growth in gross domestic product (GDP), averaging about seven percent a year since 1985, was interrupted only recently due to the Asian economic crisis.
Expanding the Debate
The liberalization of urban land markets in Chile represents an intriguing and innovative experience from an international perspective, yet internal public debate has been limited. Recently, the achievements and problems of liberalization have reached a point of such undeniable importance that they have stimulated broad concerns. Furthermore, the government has proposed modifying the current “Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones” (Law of Urban Planning and Construction), which would result in a number of significant changes. Among the most important are:
To facilitate a focused discussion of these issues, Carlos Montes, President of the Chilean House of Representatives, invited the Lincoln Institute to participate in a seminar coordinated with the Institute of Urban Studies of the Catholic University of Chile. Titled “20 Years of Liberalization of Land Markets in Chile: Impacts on Social Housing Policy, Urban Growth and Land Prices,” the seminar was held in October 1999 in Santiago. It brought together members of the Chilean Congress, the business community (developers, financial leaders, etc.), officials of public agencies (ministries, municipalities, etc.), academics and representatives of NGOs to engage in a lively public debate. The discussion highlighted a clear ideological polarization between “liberal” and “progressive” approaches to understanding and solving deregulation issues (i.e., “more market” versus “more state”).
From a liberal point of view, these problems emerge and persist because land markets have never been sufficiently deregulated. Some liberals, in fact, insist that public intervention never disappeared; they believe that regulation actually increased after Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. For example, liberals cite various means, often indirect, by which the state restricts the free growth of cities, such as when it attempts to expand environmentally protected areas that are closed to urban uses or to impose an official and almost homogenous criterion of densification to all urban space. They also assert that citizens should be free to choose different lifestyles and that the authorities should limit themselves to informing citizens of the private and social costs of their options, with the implicit understanding that such costs are reflected in market prices when urban land markets are functioning efficiently (i.e., when they are fully liberalized).
The principal explanation offered by the liberals for the problems of equity and efficiency facing Chilean urban development today are insufficient advances in the application of criteria to “internalize the externalities,” particularly negative externalities, by those responsible for them. As passionately argued by some representatives of this group, private agents should be allowed to act freely, as long as they are willing to compensate society for the implied social costs incurred.
On the other hand, the progressives believe that liberalization has gone too far in its market approach and has left many problems unsolved: the increase in land prices; problems in the quality and durability of housing; the conditions under which land is serviced; social problems associated with urban poverty; and problems of efficiency and equity derived from the growth patterns of cities, such as the mismatch between areas where services are provided and the locations chosen for private developments.
These criticisms recognize the imperfect nature of urban markets and the need for greater levels of control and intervention. Among the forms of intervention recommended by many progressives are value capture instruments, which have rarely been used or even contemplated in financing programs for the public provision of new urban infrastructure and services. The creation of such mechanisms would be consistent with the idea of internalizing the externalities, a point of relative consensus between the progressives and the liberals. The main difference is that the liberals would restrict value capture to the public recovery of specific costs, whereas the progressives would consider the right to capture the full land value increment resulting from any public action, whether resulting from investment or regulation.
In more general terms, the progressives argue that not everything can be considered in strictly monetary terms. There are urban values and objectives related to public policy that cannot be achieved through the market, or for that matter by law, such as the sense of community. Although largely disregarded in the new housing options provided by private developers to low-income families, such as the voucher system, community solidarity is of tremendous importance to counteract the social problems that spatial segregation tends to exacerbate. Environmental conservation is another example of an urban policy objective for which “price tags” are seen to be of questionable effectiveness.
With regard to the free growth of cities and the idea of respecting the options of their citizens, the progressives react by noting that steep social and environmental costs tend to go hand-in-hand with sprawl. They also point out that the only group that can truly choose its way of life through the marketplace is the wealthy minority. While seeing benefits in concentration, progressives also voice concerns about extreme density. Some Chileans have expressed an interest in a metropolitan authority to deal with regional issues, and in the use of public infrastructure investment as a means of guiding growth.
Adequate responses to these issues and perspectives involve more than technical or fiscal solutions, such as the extent to which developers actually pay for the full cost of the changes they impose on society (let alone the problem of accurately assessing the costs) or the sustainability of the demand-driven voucher system which constitutes the core of Chile’s housing policy. The solutions also involve broader and more value-related concerns, such as the environmental costs of sprawl and the importance of maintaining local community identities and initiatives. Discussion in the Congress and other settings is still expanding, but is expected to take some time before the opposing perspectives reach consensus.
Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and the director of the Lincoln Institute’s Latin America and Caribbean Program. Francisco Sabatini is assistant professor of the Institute of Urban Studies at the Catholic University of Chile in Santiago. Laura Mullahy, research assistant, and Armando Carbonell, senior fellow, both of the Lincoln Institute, also contributed to this article.
Notes:
In contrast to the rest of the continent, drugs were not a major problem in Chile until recently.
2 Metropolitan Santiago is comprised of 35 independent political-administrative jurisdictions called comunas.
3 See Gareth A. Jones, “Comparative Policy Perspectives on Urban Land Market Reform,” Land Lines, November 1998.
4 Our use of the term “liberal” corresponds to its connotation in Chile, which refers to the strong influence of the economic principle of freeing market forces to their limits, as espoused by the “Chicago School.”
Sources: Francisco Sabatini, et.al., “Social Segregation in Santiago, Chile: Concepts, Methods and Urban Effects” (monograph, 1999) and Executive Secretariat of the Planning Commission for Investments in Transportation Infrastructure (SECTRA), “Survey of Origin and Destination of Trips in Santiago”(1991).
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas; Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Brasilia, la capital de Brasil, fue inaugurada a principios de los años 1960 como una “nueva ciudad” que daría comienzo a una era distinta para las metrópolis en América Latina y que demostraría cómo el gobierno hacía un uso eficaz de la tierra en aras de un crecimiento urbano planificado. Tal propósito se servía de dos instrumentos básicos: un control normativo del uso de la tierra basado en un plan general diseñado por Lucio Costa y el gobierno como propietario de las tierras de la capital federal, lo que permitiría que ésta fuera planificada sin los tipos de restricciones y conflictos que normalmente surgen cuando la tierra está en manos privadas. Sin embargo, tres décadas y media más tarde, los problemas asociados con el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia no se diferencian sustancialmente de los que padecen otras ciudades grandes de América Latina.
Falta de visión para la tenencia de la tierra y padrinazgo administrativo
Brasilia se presenta como un ejemplo único de la gestión de tierras urbanas en América Latina porque la responsabilidad de administrar las tierras públicas siempre ha recaído sobre el gobierno local. Sin embargo, la periferia de la ciudad ha sufrido un índice explosivo de crecimiento con un patrón concomitante de ocupación irregular de la tierra, subdivisiones ilegales y carencia de infraestructura. En Brasilia la posibilidad de dirigir el proceso de crecimiento urbano a través de una política explícita de acceso a las tierras públicas se ha visto comprometida de forma lenta e irremediable por la ocupación espontánea (e ilegal) de la tierra. Esta falta de visión en el uso de las tierras públicas suele ser disfuncional tanto para la densidad urbana como para las finanzas públicas, por lo que obstruye los esfuerzos que hace el gobierno local para proveer infraestructura a esos asentamientos irregulares.
Más aún, las influencias políticas que intervienen en el proceso de desarrollo han menoscabado en gran medida las posibilidades de manejar con eficacia la oferta de tierras públicas en Brasilia. A principios de los años 1990 el gobierno distribuyó unas 65.000 parcelas en áreas que carecían de infraestructura básica. Además de reducir las reservas de tierras públicas, este “padrinazgo de la tenencia de la tierra” generó la necesidad de encontrar otras fuentes para financiar nueva infraestructura. Dado que el principal recurso que tiene disponible la entidad de desarrollo urbano del Distrito Federal (Terracap) es la tierra misma, esta política de padrinazgo trajo como resultado la venta de otras tierras públicas para financiar la construcción de infraestructura en los asentamientos irregulares. Este círculo vicioso ha provocado graves distorsiones que la administración local actual pretende resolver usando tierras públicas como “capital” para crear una política efectiva que permita controlar los ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y los costos urbanos.
La experiencia de Brasilia parece confirmar los argumentos de Henry George y otros de que la propiedad de tierras públicas no conduce por sí sola a un crecimiento urbano más equilibrado y equitativo socialmente. La estrategia del gobierno local actual de definir maneras de manejar el ingreso proveniente de tierras públicas para así controlar el uso de tierra urbana indica una nueva modalidad de interacción gubernamental con el mercado inmobiliario. En tal sentido, el gobierno cambia su función y deja de ser el propietario principal para convertirse en el administrador de los beneficios de la tierra.
Tierras públicas como capital de tenencia de la tierra
El principio medular de la nueva estrategia de Brasilia para administrar la equidad de la tierra es la definición de tierra pública como “capital de tenencia de la tierra”. El uso de esta tierra se somete a una serie de acciones estratégicas que transforman el capital de las tierras públicas en un factor que propicia la consolidación del complejo tecnológico del Distrito Federal. Se trata de la contraparte pública en el proceso de reconvertir el uso de la tierra en el centro de la ciudad en un instrumento de promoción social en el programa de regulación de la tenencia de la tierra: las tierras públicas se usan como activos mediante ventas, arrendamientos y asociaciones en proyectos urbanos.
La aplicación de estrategias diferenciadas para la tenencia de la tierra confiere mayor flexibilidad al gobierno para coordinar sus acciones. La búsqueda del equilibrio entre las iniciativas de índole social y otras en las que el gobierno intenta maximizar sus ingresos está cobrando la apariencia de una verdadera política de administración de tierras públicas que rompe con las anteriores prácticas de padrinazgo.
En este contexto de exploración de nuevos enfoques para el uso de tierras públicas con la finalidad de controlar el desarrollo urbano en Brasilia, el Instituto Lincoln, el Instituto de Planificación del Distrito Federal y Terracap organizaron un seminario internacional sobre gestión de ingresos provenientes de la tenencia de la tierra y costos urbanos en junio de 1998.
El programa reunió a expertos internacionales, ministros gubernamentales y administradores locales con miras a evaluar las experiencias internacionales en el uso de tierras públicas para financiar el crecimiento urbano en Europa, los Estados Unidos y América Latina. Martim Smolka del Instituto Lincoln describió las relaciones entre las operaciones del mercado inmobiliario, las regulaciones sobre el uso de la tierra y la recuperación pública de plusvalías. Alfredo Garay, arquitecto y exdirector de planificación de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, expuso las experiencias en el desarrollo de terrenos públicos en los alrededores del puerto de esa ciudad.
Bernard Frieden del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts describió cómo se usan las actividades comerciales realizadas en tierras públicas en el oeste de los Estados Unidos para recaudar fondos para la educación y otros fines locales. Henk Verbrugge, director del organismo fiscal de Rotterdam y representante de Holanda ante la Asociación Internacional de Peritos, describió el sistema que tiene el país para la tenencia hereditaria, una regulación legal con la cual la tierra puede tener uso y beneficios completamente privados al tiempo que permanecen bajo control y propiedad económica de la municipalidad.
Los participantes discutieron la medida en que estas experiencias eran comparables a la situación en Brasilia y concluyeron que el éxito de varias estrategias para el uso de tierras públicas depende de la idoneidad de los proyectos específicos para la cultura empresarial del país en cuestión y las prácticas institucionales vigentes en la administración local.
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Increasing socio-economic and spatial disparities in Latin American cities have prompted a revival of interest in equity-oriented government policies to reduce those disparities. However, solutions to the major urban problems being faced today must go far beyond the implementation of inconsistent and narrowly defined actions. The solutions must ensure equity for all sectors of society. In too many places, entire neighborhoods are forced to exist under deplorable living conditions while government agencies seek to evict residents in the name of environmental protection. It is evident that urban legislation can no longer ignore the rights of people to have a place in which to live in security and dignity.
The critical impact of land inequity on the urban environment requires that the urban poor gain access to the technical information necessary to better negotiate their concerns with public officials. My research explores the role of environmental education in low-income communities in developing countries. Taking a perspective based on self-help capacity building, my goal is to develop programs to train community leaders at the grassroots level to deal more effectively with local land use conflicts and environmental risks.
Impacts of Land Inequity
Like many Latin American cities, Rio de Janeiro is strongly affected by prevailing poverty and environmental degradation. Complex factors are involved: economic instability, inequitable land ownership, short-sighted development policies, and a lack of a democratic system that provides for human rights and freedoms. In my view, the problems experienced by Rio de Janeiro during the last few decades are mainly a result of existing “apartheid” urban planning assumptions and a lack of political will to incorporate the popular sectors in land use policy making.
In the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá-at the heart of the core expansion area of Rio de Janeiro-the extraordinary process of urban growth since the 1970s has provoked dramatic changes in the landscape, as well as a variety of environmental problems. Amidst the spectacular natural beauty of lagoon ecosystems, mangrove forests and wetlands, the region remains home to a large population of urban poor who live in favelas-shanty communities resulting from largely uncontrolled urbanization of public land.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the region enjoyed an unprecedented development boom that has fostered unsustainable patterns of land use. Discrimination against the poor inhabitants and inequalities in landownership allowed landowners and speculators to capitalize on the boom by formally obtaining titles and subdividing the land. In addition, a select group of private builders injected themselves into the local scene with multiple court permits to develop the region for high-income residential condominiums, commercial establishments and industrial enterprises.
Increasing pressures on the land snowballed into a wide range of protests between the popular sectors and the powerful land developers, posing the threat of forced eviction of the poor inhabitants. The accumulated discontent against the government for failing to control land speculation and ensure protective legislation created an extremely dangerous situation. Violence and persecution claimed the lives of 30 community leaders, presidents of local community associations, their family members and relatives. The murders were carried out by what are known in the region as “extermination squads,” and no criminal investigation has taken place.
The Vicious Cycle of Poverty and Environmental Degradation
Since poverty and environmental degradation are interdependent, it is appropriate to think of environmental concerns in terms of social justice. My research revolves around the problems of inequality and the environmental risks faced by the residents of the Via Park village-an informal settlement located in the region of Baixada de Jacarepaguá. A basic question arising from this research is to what extent can improved access to land equity actually contribute to mitigate the factors that encourage environmental degradation. By connecting land use issues to the learning process of environmental education, the research demonstrates that environmental degradation is a recurring phenomenon manifested in the inequitable ways land has been used and distributed in the region.
Via Park village has been caught in a serious land use struggle since the 1970s, when urban development began to impact many traditional fishing communities in the area. Builders were eager to lobby the government to break the fishermen’s land tenure system, which was enforced by law, and thereby turn the land over to market forces. In the 1980s, the area was designated a public reserve for environmental preservation, enshrined in Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). Since the village was located on protected land, the city’s planning authorities then argued that the Via Park residents had no legitimate claims of ownership.
Living in an atmosphere of fear and at mercy of the land developers and speculators who continued to flourish, the Via Park residents started illegally subdividing and selling small parcels of land to new settlers. The growth of the poor population and the concentration of land ownership and speculation contributed to the expansion of informal land markets into nearby low-income communities.
Underlying these practices was a more complex system of commercial transactions and civil relations governing the invasion of vacant lands, as well as the division and sale of plots. Throughout Rio de Janeiro, land development through informal channels is the predominant “territorial pact” by which disadvantaged local groups have been able to gain access to land and housing. At the same time, agents from the “formal world” have developed political arrangements to support and take advantage of existing informal land markets.
It was in this context that a program for grassroots environmental improvement was conceived and eventually implemented in Via Park village. However, given the residents’ long history of exclusion-including threats of forced eviction-they remained suspicious. It became clear that successful program implementation would depend on managerial strategies based on an integrated vision of the geographic/ecological and social/cultural environment.
If the dilemma of poverty and environmental degradation is to be overcome, then the task of improving the environment must be shown to be compatible with the struggle for land equity. This innovative approach toward environmental education differs from traditional methodology, which is generally more concerned with simply introducing physical changes to the environment. The key here is to focus on the conditions that are favorable for the development and exercise of a sense of “community belonging”-a tangible expression of shared sentiments, values and identities where land is understood not only as a component of wealth, but as a common settled place invested with symbolic meanings.
Lessons of Via Park Village
While there is no single solution to the social and environmental vulnerability of the urban poor living in the Via Park village, their experience does offer some insights. One alternative suggests creating “urban natural reserves” integrated into the community where those threatened with forced eviction are encouraged to maintain their traditional lifestyles. In exchange, government authorities at all levels would accept the obligation to promote land equity, giving security of tenure and protection to those forced by circumstances to live in informal settlements.
Aspects of the environmental education program initiated in the Via Park village are applicable to other Latin American cities. The fundamental principle is based on insuring respect for the inherent identity of the community. The experience of the Via Park residents demonstrates that local action can contribute to consolidating a socio-political struggle for land equity with protection of the environment. This is in line with current thinking about land use and environmental management, which suggests an integrated approach that acknowledges the leadership role of the local residents.
The Via Park case reveals that a routine excuse being used to justify evictions is “protecting the environment.” In other words, the urban poor most often accused of being the primary protagonists of environmental degradation are in reality the greatest victims. For the 450 residents of the Via Park village, the trauma of being forcibly evicted from their homes will never be overcome. Five people, including two children and one woman, lost their lives in the confrontation. The Via Park village, now destroyed by bulldozers, still reminds us that hope for land equity lies in community solidarity, effective governance and democracy.
Sonia Pereira is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute. She is also completing her Ph.D. thesis from the Institute of Earth Sciences of the Federal University in Rio de Janeiro, with support from a Fulbright scholarship. An environmental lawyer, biologist, social psychologist and activist on behalf of human rights, she has been widely recognized for her work on environmental protection for low-income communities in Brazil. She is a Citizen of the World Laureate (World Peace University, 1992) and a Global 500 Laureate (United Nations Environment Programme-UNEP, 1996).
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Driven by an awareness of population expansion and the difficulties that follow growth, Oregon’s Departments of Transportation and of Land Conservation and Development created the “Smart Development” program. The state retained Leland Consulting Group and Livable Oregon to define the goals of Smart Development, to identify obstacles to its execution and to enjoin the development community in discussions about how to implement its goals.
Smart Development is land use that:
In examining over 60 projects across the country that attempt comprehensive solutions to problems of urban growth, the consultant team looked at examples of “new urbanism,” as well as infill development, subdivisions, affordable housing, adaptive re-use and neighborhood revitalization. While common factors exist among all projects, none of the ones that are successful for their developers satisfy all Smart Development goals at once. The good news is that careful attention to local market conditions and demographics can result in successful projects that do satisfy many of these goals.
Why Smart Development Raises Financing Questions
Projects that satisfy some goals are unlikely to satisfy others because the goals may have different land use solutions which—when built in current markets—are in conflict. Proponents of neotraditional, transit-oriented, small-lot, pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use and grid-platted development have bundled these styles as a single concept. Developers and lenders do not understand the markets, values and risks for these hybrid products.
When we surveyed lenders about the factors that affect their decision to finance Smart Development projects, they explained unequivocally that financing of innovation required clear limits on the risk the lender could accept. While factors such as preleasing and on-site management were considered important, lenders strongly preferred working with a developer who had a track record, financial capacity and experience in the product type.
Lenders also expressed doubts about the willingness of the secondary market to lend on innovative projects. The problem is not innovation in physical design itself, but lenders’ anxieties about FannieMae’s “pass-through” requirement: the bank is financially responsible for the project through foreclosure of the asset. FannieMae support does not insulate the bank from the risk of default. Since banks do not want to own real estate, innovative project types that cannot show strong track records cause anxiety that is not allayed by securitization.
Overcoming the Obstacles
There are three technical obstacles to financing Smart Development:
A fourth obstacle is financial, relating to the first phase provision of new infrastructure.
Appraisal and Comparables: Standard appraisals usually focus on the housing product without accounting for the economic value produced by higher quality infrastructure, adjacent services, pedestrian amenities, and access to transit. By comparing only housing units, appraisals allot them the value that they would have in adjoining subdivisions that contain none of the amenities. Yet, new projects that we reviewed were often higher in price than the surrounding market. The quality of new designs may justify pricing, but appraisals based on the local area did not support the same percentage of purchase price as for nearby units. Smart Development projects also required proportionately higher cash down-payments, making the units harder to buy (and harder for the developer to sell).
It must be emphasized that Smart Development features are positive attributes that have long-term effects on value. Appraisal is regularly performed involving regression equations to model the economic value of positive externalities and could be applied to this area to produce new standards for evaluation of Smart Development. This process needs research but is well within the professional purview of the appraisal community.
New Market Studies: Smart Development, with its sophisticated land use and concepts such as inclusion of retail into subdivision development, attracts different demographic groups than standard development. Income levels per capita are higher, household sizes are smaller, and the use of transit and other services per person is often greater.
To overcome feasibility and appraisal obstacles, it is useful to consider Smart Development not as a single market concept but as a series of land use solutions that incorporate traditional real estate products in innovative ways. The market for the products can then be assessed in the same way as existing similar land uses that have attracted the demographic groups noted above—older neighborhoods with the sort of land use proposed in these projects. Through this method it is possible to avoid the pitfalls of “trend” studies that are unable to assess the market for new products.
Presentation of Smart Development to Lenders: The business plan for new products describes how products were arrived at in response to market niches and supporting demographics and sales potential. Every aspect of the business is revealed: project principals and roles; financial structure; applied start-up capital; reserves for operational deficits; and projections of revenues, cash flows and profits. The plan illustrates potential risks and suggests mitigations for risk should conditions not meet expectations.
Presentation of real estate development is typically done through market trend studies and architectural drawings. Neither of these modes addresses the issues raised in a business plan. It may be worthwhile for proactive lenders to consider offering assistance with business planning and presentation of innovative projects to alleviate the anxieties of capital investors and loan boards.
First Phase Financial Feasibility: In many western U.S. cities, grid street plans were built by the city and then builders provided the houses. After World War II, American cities stopped creating streets and the developers began providing the local infrastructure. The major public infrastructure dollars were funneled through federal agencies into regional infrastructure improvements (freeways) which sped private development into fringe areas.
It is now understood that highways and major arterials do not eliminate congestion but rather act as a subsidy for congestion-producing development. New requirements for grid streets, pedestrian amenities, sidewalks and parking strips with trees can make development either unaffordable to median buyers or financially infeasible, and there are no local support mechanisms equal to the magnitude of highway funding.
If the goals of Smart Development are serious social goals, then some level of first phase credit enhancement in exchange for fulfillment of social goals is appropriate. Such credit enhancement would serve to produce land use with the long-term benefits of lowered social cost through reduction of congestion and auto use and a better quality of life.
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Edward H. Starkie, principal, and Bonnie Gee Yosick, associate, conduct economic analysis and research on downtown redevelopment for Leland Consulting Group, 325 Northwest 22nd Street, Portland, OR 97210; 503/222-1600.
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I am pleased to report that the Lincoln Institute has signed an agreement of understanding with the Ministry of Land and Resources in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to work together on researching and teaching about land and tax policies. Many places in the world face fundamental problems in land allocation and land taxation, but it is difficult to imagine a place and time where the resources of the Lincoln Institute could be more influential and could help more people than in China during the early twenty-first century.
Land and tax policy makers in China are faced with enormous challenges as a result of the extraordinary urbanization of the past two decades. The number of established cities in China grew from 182 in 1982 to 324 in 1985, and reached 666 by 1996, and the average urban population grew by 227 percent between 1957 and 1995. Some cities grew by 200 percent from 1985 to 1995, and the urbanized area of Beijing doubled from 1985 to 1992. However, the extent of urbanization in the future will dwarf that of the recent past. Based on forecasts of population growth and migration, China must provide enough urban land and infrastructure to accommodate more than 450 million persons over the next 20 years. If all of the additional urban population were put in new cities of 10 million persons each, China would need to develop and finance 45 such cities.
China initiated fundamental and revolutionary land use reforms during the mid-1980s. The first reforms established privately held land use rights. The second set of reforms included multiple elements, such as land banking, land trusts, land readjustments, and development of land markets in both urban and rural areas. We believe that the Institute can make a real difference in assisting these reform measures by sponsoring education and training for government officials, supporting research and publications by U.S. and Chinese scholars, and facilitating more in-depth interactions through workshops and conferences.
Over the past two years the Institute has led two training programs in Beijing and participated in meetings between Chinese officials and scholars and Institute board members, faculty and staff. The Institute also sponsored several sessions on land and housing markets in the PRC at the First World Planning Congress in Shanghai in 2001. We anticipate several more training and exchange programs this year, but we believe this is still just the beginning of an expanded effort by the Institute to have a positive impact on land and tax policy in the world’s most populous country. In this issue, Institute faculty associates Chengri Ding and Gerrit Knaap examine some of the recent reforms and current trends in urban land policy in China.
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The Lincoln Institute has been collaborating with the Loeb Fellowship Program at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design for several years. The program was established in 1970 through the generosity of alumnus John L. Loeb, and each year invites about 10 mid-career professionals to study independently and develop insights and connections that can advance their work in revitalizing the built and natural environments. In May 2004 this year’s group of Loeb Fellows took their class study trip to China. They held a seminar on land use planning for the Beijing Municipal Planning Commission and were hosted by senior planning officials on land use tours in Beijing and Shanghai. This article offers some brief observations by four of the fellows.
China’s great cities are rushing toward a tipping point where a rich legacy of innovative styles of urban living may be swept away by unbridled modernization. The country’s land planners face Herculean challenges in shaping the fastest growing urban settlements the world has known, and it is easy to imagine how nuanced planning can be lost in this rapid tide of change. In China’s quest to catch up with the West, it might be tempting to simply replicate Western patterns and practices. However, not all of those approaches are worthy of emulation, and in some cases China may be emulating the wrong ones.
The Car Culture
In a time of global concern over dependence on oil, Chinese officials seem to be encouraging the car to prevail over other transportation infrastructure and policy options, although the rate and extent of development of Beijing’s public transit system is commendable. Following the decision to award the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing, the municipal government announced it would complete construction of its light rail system along with Metro lines 5 and 8 by 2005, extending the rail systems by 85 km to a total of 138 km. The city also plans to start on Metro lines 4 and 9 during the next five years. Yet, there are also plans to build the 5th and 6th ring roads around the capital, reflecting both the phenomenal growth of the city and the anticipated explosion in car ownership and use. Also troubling is the constant relegation of existing dedicated bicycle lanes to additional vehicular traffic, thereby creating a vicious cycle of ever more citizens surrendering their bikes for cars.
Beyond the social, cultural, environmental and economic consequences of this process, which are in themselves largely irreversible, these asphalt expansions result in irreparable damage to the city’s urban fabric and structures. While this condition is obvious to local planners, they seem to have bowed to the citizens’ strong yearnings for car ownership. These aspirations are spurred by a national policy of accelerating automobile production for domestic use, conceived as a leading catalyst in the country’s industrial and economic advancement.
Acknowledging these trying circumstances, the enforcement of mitigating measures within the jurisdiction of local government could help restrain the increase in car use. For example, a curb on parking would decrease commuter traffic substantially, but would only indirectly challenge the nation’s automobile consumption policy, since these coveted status symbols would remain available for noncommuting needs. Car sharing, a commercial enterprise that has enjoyed great success in Europe and more recently in transit-rich U.S. cities, is an alternative that would give many more Chinese the benefits and convenience of car usage without necessitating the cost and impact of individual automobile ownership. Many nations, including Singapore and most European Union countries, have automobile-related taxes on purchasing prices, fuels and registration, as well as parking and tolls. These taxes are intended to internalize the costs of pollution, infrastructure, traffic congestion, accidents and noise, but they also act as financial disincentives to car ownership.
The conditions in Beijing appear particularly favorable to introducing transportation management policies. While many cities might be wary that such measures could dampen inner-city development, these propositions would not alter the projected growth in Beijing’s core. Regarding a parking policy, for instance, rapid development over the past decade has already produced a substantial number of covered parking spaces, arguably meeting minimum needs. Conversely, the extent of projected development would render these measures particularly effective in limiting additional traffic.
Local policies that focus on controlling car use would also benefit Beijing’s cultural destinations, where cars already encroach on pedestrian sidewalks in parks and around lakes. From an environmental perspective, beyond the reduction in carbon emissions due to fewer cars, a sharp reduction in the extent of roadways, parking lots and related construction of impervious surfaces would contribute to increased groundwater recharge to replenish the already parched aquifer on which the city’s water supply depends.
Scales of Urban Living
Despite China’s vast expanse, population pressures in the cities dictate that every bit of land in metropolitan regions be put to work. Each road leading out of the city is lined for many kilometers with nurseries of trees, shrubs and flowering plants to provide mature landscaping for every new park, building, road, plaza and mall as soon as the project is completed. The result is surprisingly green boulevards and generously planted parks. The plantings tend to be both water- and labor-intensive varieties, but that might change as water resources are likely to become scarce before cheap labor does.
Beijing and Shanghai demonstrate the uniquely complex ways of living that have evolved over many years (e.g., small-scale farming, sidewalk markets, bicycles and motorcycle taxis), but these urban features can be jarring when juxtaposed against the dynamic scale of current development. Even as these authentic, small-scale living arrangements are being buffeted, and perhaps eradicated, by large-scale planning and the concomitant rush toward modernization in many city districts and neighborhoods, new innovations in urban living are emerging. For instance, the illegal motorcycle taxis observed at a 50,000-unit suburban housing development are a creative and practical solution to the problems of getting around a huge pedestrian-unfriendly project with inadequate public transit and amenities that are concentrated in a large core rather than scattered within walking distance.
Other new districts, such as Pudong in Shanghai, represent instances where a grandiose scale results in dissatisfying urban places that look like American cities of the Sunbelt, designed around cars with too much open space and decorative landscaping. These vast plazas may be appreciated from the air or the upper floors of nearby high-rise buildings, but they are incoherent at ground level. Pedestrians avoid the arid spaces, preferring the charm of the older urban districts with their more human scale, shade, shops and seating. More participation in the planning process by those who live and work in these areas would likely yield an environment more tailored to quality of life than a monument to progress.
Indeed, more resident participation in the planning process is one of the Western practices that is seldom replicated, but can most contribute to better-quality outcomes. Perhaps not understood is that residents, provided with enough background, will often point to similar but more helpfully nuanced ways of achieving the goals sought by planners. Enfranchisement in planning and economic outcomes can make allies of those in historic districts and on the urban frontiers who are currently a growing political and public relations problem for officials. Such a process can also improve market efficiency, since residents often know best what is needed and will work locally.
The willingness to create a culture of participation, dissent and engagement is a far from certain proposition, even for planning and development purposes. As design professionals observing Chinese cities for much too short a time, we can only hope that in the future more can be done to preserve successful forms of traditional urban living and create uniquely new Chinese forms that will contribute to the higher quality of life the policy makers, planners and architects we met seem so eager to embrace.
Loeb Fellows, 2003–2004
Ann Coulter, Executive Vice President, RiverCity Company, Chattanooga, Tennessee
Stephan Fairfield, CEO, Covenant Community Capital, Houston, Texas
Gerald Green, Former Director, San Francisco Planning Department, San Francisco, California
Michael Houck, Executive Director, Urban Greenspaces Institute, Portland, Oregon
Yan Huang, Deputy Director, Beijing Municipal Planning Commission, Beijing, China
Cheryl Hughes, Director of Program Development, Mayor’s Office of Special Events, Chicago, Illinois
Matthew Jelacic, Architect, New York, New York
Ofer Manor, Chief Architect, City of Jerusalem, Israel
David Perkes, Director, Jackson Community Design Center, Jackson, Mississippi
Rodolpho Ramina, Environmental Design Consultant, Curitiba, Brazil
Harriet Tregoning, Executive Director, Smart Growth Leadership Institute, Washington, DC
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Margaret Dewar is the Emil Lorch Professor of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Taubman College of Architecture and Urban Planning at the University of Michigan. She directs the Detroit Community Partnership Center through which University of Michigan faculty and students work with community-based organizations and city agencies on community-identified neighborhood issues. Dewar is also faculty director of the Ginsberg Center for Community Service and Learning, whose mission is to involve faculty, students, staff, and community partners in learning together through community service and civic participation in a diverse democratic society. She and her students have worked on brownfield redevelopment with numerous organizations in Detroit and Flint.
Dewar’s research is concerned with American government effectiveness in intervening in microeconomic systems to deal with economic distress such as troubled industries, declining regions, distressed cities, and poverty. She has written books and articles on industrial policy, rural economic development programs, and urban revitalization. Her current research focuses on ways to address the barriers to equitable redevelopment of older industrial cities. She is writing about systems for moving tax-reverted property to new uses, the role of place-committed coalitions in redevelopment of brownfields, and indicators of early neighborhood decline and revitalization that can facilitate public intervention.
Dewar has a Ph.D. in Urban Studies and Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Master of City Planning from Harvard University. She received her undergraduate degree from Wellesley College.
Land Lines: How did you become involved in and concerned about brownfield redevelopment?
Margaret Dewar: I had done quite a lot of research on the effects of state and local economic development incentives on business location and expansion decisions. I also had taught courses where students worked on plans for urban redevelopment with nonprofit organizations in Detroit.
The calls for subsidies for brownfield redevelopment grew louder in the mid-1990s as states reformed their laws about cleanup requirements and liability. Given my background in economic development and urban redevelopment, I thought those calls sounded inauthentic. The campaigns for cleanup subsidies were essentially claiming that if the subsidies were provided, redevelopment of contaminated property would occur, implying that the only barrier to land reuse was the dirty dirt.
However, urban redevelopment is a very complex process that involves the assembly of land owned by many people, relocation of residents, demolition of structures, removal and replacement of infrastructure, and adherence to or release from regulatory restrictions and requirements—to name a few of the issues. Contamination could not be the only barrier, and, I thought, it was not even likely to be the most important one.
Further, state and local incentives for economic development rarely change business location and expansion decisions. I suspected that brownfield incentives would have a similar effect. Therefore, I started to do research on the determinants of brownfield redevelopment to place this kind of development in the broader urban redevelopment context.
Land Lines: How has your brownfield research evolved over the last decade?
Margaret Dewar: As I watched community development corporations (CDCs) in Detroit struggle with redevelopment, I became interested in whether place-committed coalitions were more or less effective in brownfield redevelopment than other kinds of developers.
Place-committed coalitions are the alliances of CDCs, nonprofit housing corporations, neighborhood organizations, and determined residents who are going to stay in place, no matter what. Unlike many other developers or businesses, they will not move to the suburbs because development is easier and more profitable there. They are often the only developers interested in the poorest neighborhoods, and any hope for a better physical environment in those places rests with them. Unlike private developers, they are not seeking especially profitable redevelopment projects; if they can break even, much of the return on their investment is seen in the creation of a better neighborhood.
When place-committed coalitions succeed in redevelopment, they may create market conditions that are attractive to private developers and therefore spur further redevelopment, or they may demonstrate market potential through bellwether projects. As a result, nonprofit developers are especially important in making urban redevelopment succeed.
However, I found that these coalitions were rarely successful in brownfield redevelopment, although development on contaminated land did not seem particularly different from other kinds of redevelopment. Now most of my own research projects and quite a few of the student projects I supervise are concerned with factors that lead to positive reuse of abandoned property in cities, especially reuse by nonprofit developers.
Land Lines: How do you involve your students in this work?
Margaret Dewar: I get many research ideas from working with CDCs, nonprofit housing corporations, and public agencies on plans for brownfield reuse, and I am able to bring these ideas into planning practice on specific projects. Twice each year I teach a course where advanced urban planning students develop plans with organizations working on strengthening their city neighborhoods and help advance the organizations’ efforts.
For example, my students and I worked with the Genesee County Brownfield Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the Genesee County Land Bank to inventory brownfields in Flint, Michigan. We also helped to prioritize sites for attention based the goals of the BRA and the land bank, which are now following up on the recommendations in the plan with a neighborhood nonprofit and a group of diverse property owners.
Another team of students worked with a neighborhood nonprofit organization in southwest Detroit to identify brownfields and determine which sites have the greatest priority for reuse. Although the staff praised the plan, the organization has not been able to act on the recommendations. The contrast in these two experiences, along with the literature on determinants of nonprofit developers’ success, suggests numerous hypotheses about what helps and hinders the reuse of brownfield sites in such situations.
Land Lines: What is your most recent project with the Lincoln Institute?
Margaret Dewar: With Kris Wernstedt at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, I am looking at some of these hypotheses about why CBOs are successful or not in reusing vacant, abandoned, and contaminated property. Kris is looking at the work of CBOs in Baltimore, Portland, and Denver, and I am studying their reuse of such property in Detroit, Cleveland, and Flint. Because the demand for land in my set of three cities is similar, the comparison holds the market constant and promises to reveal institutional, political, and legal factors that are important in CBOs’ results.
The three midwestern cities differ in the strength of their nonprofit development sectors. Cleveland has an active network of nonprofit developers that have constructed thousands of units of housing over the last 15 years. Detroit has a maturing nonprofit development sector that is growing in its capacity to do projects, but Flint has very little such activity.
These differences can help reveal factors that matter and the ways they matter in redevelopment success. For instance, a commonly cited force in the success of Cleveland’s nonprofit developers is the commitment of foundations to provide funding for redevelopment. However, Flint also has foundations with large amounts of resources committed to that city. What are the differences in how the foundations in each city work that might help explain these differences in nonprofit development activity and effectiveness?
Land Lines: How can CBOs be most effective in brownfields redevelopment?
Margaret Dewar: Kris Wernstedt and I pose four groups of hypotheses or framing perspectives in our research on CBOs’ effectiveness in redeveloping brownfields. First, the special features of CBOs—their shortage of funds, small number of professional staff, lack of skills for redevelopment, and other issues—may interfere with implementing successful projects to reuse vacant, abandoned, and/or contaminated sites. CBO staff may especially lack the background to take on projects that involve contaminated sites.
Second, legal and political issues may interfere with the transfer of tax-reverted property to nonprofit developers for redevelopment projects, even though this land is essential for projects to go forward.
Third, weak local institutional settings may leave CBOs without adequate political or financial support for undertaking projects to reuse vacant, abandoned, and/or contaminated properties. Local government, financial institutions, foundations, and intermediaries may not provide sufficient backing to help CBOs over the substantial hurdles.
Fourth, federal and state legal and regulatory structures and financing provisions for contaminated sites in particular may interfere with CDCs’ efforts to reuse such property.
Another factor is that the demand for land in different cities affects the approach and efficacy of CBOs in redeveloping that land. In cities or neighborhoods with strong market demand, CBOs may have little opportunity to obtain such property for redevelopment because they are competing with private developers. On the other hand, in cities with weak demand for land, CBOs may struggle to find tenants or buyers for redeveloped property.
Land Lines: How is your work with the Lincoln Institute helping to broaden the scope of brownfield research?
Margaret Dewar: I continue to believe that contamination is rarely the determining factor in whether land can be reused or not, especially now that cleanup standards and liability risks have changed. By placing contamination in the larger context of the redevelopment of vacant, abandoned, and contaminated property in cities, we gain a better understanding of the complexity of redevelopment in general and of the kinds of changes that would help CBOs be more effective in remaking cities in ways that can improve the quality of life in distressed areas.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Nuevas evidencias de Brasil indican que la regulación del uso del suelo y las normas de construcción pueden reforzar otros factores que contribuyen a la ocupación informal e irregular del suelo urbano. No es posible explicar del todo la magnitud y la persistencia de la informalidad en las ciudades de América Latina con los índices de pobreza (en descenso), la insuficiente inversión pública en vivienda social o en infraestructura urbana (en aumento), ni siquiera por la tolerancia del gobierno ante determinadas prácticas oportunistas de urbanizadores y pobladores (The Economist 2007). Si bien estos factores son sin duda importantes, el uso inadecuado del suelo y la regulación de la construcción también parecen jugar un papel en la persistencia del problema. Se puede aducir como corolario que un marco regulador alternativo puede ayudar a paliar la informalidad en los mercados del suelo urbano.
La relación entre informalidad y normas de vivienda excesivas no es nueva en la bibliografía (Turner 1972); y la relación económica entre la regulación del uso del suelo y la elasticidad de la oferta de vivienda fue propuesta por Ellickson (1977). La novedad es la aplicación del mismo marco utilizado para entender la dinámica del precio de la vivienda en los Estados Unidos a los países en desarrollo. Los pocos trabajos empíricos en economía que tratan de relacionar la regulación y el uso del suelo no han trazado de manera formal un modelo de la sustitución entre los mercados formales e informales. En consecuencia, no utilizaron las diferencias entre los dos mercados como sus variables principales.
El alcance del problema
La informalidad y la precariedad de la vivienda son grandes preocupaciones en los países en desarrollo. Según estimaciones de las Naciones Unidas, más de mil millones de personas viven en asentamientos informales, que representan un 32 por ciento de la población urbana de todo el mundo (UN Habitat 2006). En América Latina, el porcentaje de vivienda irregular medido por indicadores observables como el régimen de propiedad o la conexión con el sistema de alcantarillado está disminuyendo en algunos países, si bien en proporción desigual. Sin tener en cuenta la disputa continua sobre la forma correcta de medir la informalidad, en la mayoría de las ciudades de América Latina el problema sigue siendo de proporciones considerables, y es necesario comprender mejor su dinámica a fin de recomendar una política de vivienda razonable.
En la práctica, los indicadores conmensurables de informalidad que se basan en la ausencia de títulos de propiedad o el acceso a infraestructura y servicios son más fáciles de obtener que los basados en la falta de cumplimiento de la regulación del uso del suelo o las normas de construcción. La pobreza (en todas sus dimensiones) y la inversión pública insuficiente (en vivienda social, infraestructura y servicios) son las explicaciones más comunes de la persistencia de la informalidad. Pero también aumenta la percepción de que los mercados del suelo urbano en general y las normas y la regulación urbanística en particular son factores relevantes que contribuyen a ella.
El elevado costo de las transacciones en los mercados del suelo urbano se incrementa debido a la burocracia, la falta de información o su poca claridad, y las prácticas discriminatorias, así como por otras discordancias funcionales del mercado derivadas de la estructura de propiedad del suelo, las prácticas especulativas y de monopolio, y la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción, que dificultan el cumplimiento de las normas por parte de las familias con bajos ingresos. Estos factores aumentan la ineficacia del mercado y sostienen la informalidad.
En este artículo argumentamos que la regulación del uso del suelo y de la construcción administrada por los planificadores urbanos y por los funcionarios a nivel local puede contribuir efectivamente a la incidencia de la informalidad. Entre el 20 por ciento de municipios brasileños que redujeron la pobreza en mayor medida a lo largo de los últimos nueve años, un 23 por ciento también redujo drásticamente el número de viviendas sin título de propiedad, pero el 24 por ciento aumentó la informalidad en más de un 3,2 por ciento, el ritmo más rápido observado en todo el país (IBGE 1991; 2000). Tales diferencias de rendimiento del mercado de la vivienda en el segmento de bajos ingresos no puede explicarse únicamente por la incidencia de la pobreza, el ritmo de la urbanización y el crecimiento de la población u otros medidores a nivel macro.
Las ventajas e inconvenientes de la regulación urbana
La regulación urbana beneficia a las políticas de vivienda porque soluciona un problema de derechos de propiedad. Regular la distancia entre viviendas, por ejemplo, ayuda a proteger los derechos de privacidad de los demás. La regulación ayuda además a solucionar problemas de externalidad o efectos indirectos. Por ejemplo, no regular las anomalías de vivienda podría dar lugar a problemas de salud pública debido al aumento de humedad, la falta de luz o a problemas graves de seguridad. En este caso, la regulación elimina las efectos indirectos negativos y aumenta el bienestar general de los residentes.
La regulación puede tener también un efecto beneficioso al reducir el vacío de información en el mercado. Si no existen normas de construcción previamente definidas, los urbanizadores pueden aprovecharse de los compradores inexpertos y cobrarles en exceso por una vivienda que es insegura, o podrían venderles un terreno en una nueva urbanización que no proporciona servicios adecuados, como ocurre con frecuencia.
No obstante, la regulación también tiene aspectos potencialmente negativos. Una consecuencia es el inconveniente de procedimientos complicados que pueden conducir a la corrupción. Por ejemplo, no es poco frecuente que se tarde más de cuatro años en emitir una licencia de subdivisión. En su estudio clásico, Mayo y Angel (1993) asocian el complicado marco regulador de Malasia con funcionarios corruptos que intentan capturar rentas de la población a cambio de relajar las normas, agilizar la concesión de licencias o permitir excepciones al reglamento.
En segundo lugar, algunas regulaciones − como por ejemplo las ordenanzas de zonificación − pueden dar lugar a una segregación por ingresos en determinados vecindarios al establecer niveles mínimos que elevan los precios y disuaden efectivamente a las familias con ingresos más bajos de competir en el mercado formal. Los precios elevados de la vivienda pueden deberse a la gran demanda, pero también a la poca elasticidad de la oferta provocada por tales regulaciones y restricciones exclusivas. Malpezzi (1996) ha resaltado el aspecto de exclusión que tiene la regulación del uso del suelo en los Estados Unidos, que limita la integración de residentes con altos y bajos ingresos con la intención específica de evitar las subvenciones para las escuelas y otros servicios públicos locales.
Biderman (2008) ofrece evidencia sobre Brasil para apoyar el argumento propuesto de que las familias pobres a menudo eligen viviendas informales (sin título) por encima de las formales (con título) como respuesta a las regulaciones que exigen costos adicionales o “credenciales” para poder acceder al mercado formal y/o que reducen la flexibilidad del diseño en la construcción de viviendas. Este aspecto exclusivo de la regulación urbana es real en Brasil en cuanto a la infraestructura y los servicios públicos porque en cualquier caso rara vez se facilitan éstos en los asentamientos informales. De hecho, hasta 1988 la ley impedía oficialmente a los municipios facilitar servicios a los terrenos ocupados de forma irregular, aunque en la práctica algunos sí los facilitaron.
La economía política en la que se basan los aspectos de exclusión de la regulación tiene un precedente duradero en la historia de Brasil. El sistema Sesmarias de derechos de propiedad del suelo, instaurado por el rey Fernando I de Portugal en 1375, proporcionaba un régimen de propiedad mediante otorgamiento real (para la élite) o mediante una prueba de uso productivo del suelo (para quienes tenían medios de explotación del mismo). Los municipios de Brasil siguen aplicando las regulaciones urbanísticas en algunas partes de la ciudad, pero no en otras (Rolnik 1997). La retirada en lugar de la mejora de los asentamientos informales en los vecindarios del centro de la ciudad, con alto nivel de ingresos, es un caso oportuno. Este doble estándar permite alojar a los pobres en determinadas zonas sin invertir en infraestructura y provisión de servicios.
Otras razones de la presencia de regulaciones poco razonables en las ciudades de Brasil son la búsqueda de rentas por parte de los funcionarios que provoca la resistencia a la reforma reguladora, y la respuesta del regulador a la presión de los urbanizadores para mantener a las familias con bajos ingresos alejadas de ciertas zonas. Existen muchos ejemplos ilustrativos de esa corrupción y connivencia en Brasil en la bibliografía sobre planificación urbana.
Asimismo, los reguladores tienden a ignorar los efectos no intencionados de las ordenanzas sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción. No es poco frecuente que un municipio adopte simplemente las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas de otro municipio con el fin de cumplir las órdenes federales sobre planes maestros, por poner un ejemplo. Esta práctica sólo aumenta la probabilidad de que se produzcan efectos negativos en el mercado de la vivienda porque permite que se perpetúen las políticas reguladores inadecuadas.
Un ejemplo del impacto de las regulaciones urbanísticas en el costo de la vivienda y potencialmente en la informalidad en Brasil es el Urbanizador Social, una iniciativa pública ideada para tentar a los urbanizadores informales para que cumplan con las regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo. El primer caso llevado a cabo con éxito en São Leopoldo en 2008, el urbanizador solicitó al municipio la reducción del tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 a 160m2 con el fin de ofrecer opciones de vivienda más asequibles. A cambio, el urbanizador aceptó algunas imposiciones del municipio en forma de inversión directa en infraestructura y servicios urbanos (Damasio et al., próxima publicación).
Efecto de la regulación sobre la informalidad
En la década de 1990 los municipios de Brasil promulgaron diversas regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo y la construcción que pueden agruparse en cuatro tipos principales: normas de parcelación, zonificación, límites del crecimiento urbano y códigos de construcción. Algunos municipios adoptaron algunas de estas regulaciones en la década de los ochenta o incluso antes, otros lo hicieron durante la primera mitad de la década de 2000, y muchos otros aún no han adoptado todas o ni siquiera una de ellas. Estas diferencias temporales en cuanto a su adopción ofrecen una oportunidad analítica única para intentar aislar el papel desempeñado por la regulación de otros eventos que afectan al mercado de la vivienda.
Idealmente, el impacto de la regulación en el mercado de la vivienda debería evaluarse comparando municipios que son idénticos a excepción de que uno de ellos adopta una regulación particular mientras que el otro no. Sin embargo, encontrar municipios idénticos no siempre es factible. Un procedimiento estándar para solventar parcialmente este problema es utilizar los resultados de los municipios que no han adoptado la regulación a fin de estimar lo que habrían experimentado los municipios que sí la adoptaron si no hubieran introducido una regulación. La diferencia entre el resultado de adoptar o no adoptar una regulación sugeriría una estimación superficial del impacto de la regulación en la variación en la proporción de la informalidad.
Nuestro estudio aprovechó las oportunidades que ofrecía el caso de Brasil. En primer lugar, la diferencia cronológica en la adopción de regulaciones entre los municipios permite establecer comparaciones entre ellos. En segundo lugar, la información disponible en el censo y otros estudios a nivel nacional es extensa, e incluye la fecha de promulgación de la regulación, el estado de régimen de propiedad declarado por los propietarios de viviendas, y una cifra generosa de variables de control que incluyen la población, los ingresos y el nivel de pobreza. En tercer lugar, hay datos disponibles sobre más de 2.000 municipios, lo que permite realizar un análisis estadístico significativo. Tener una oportunidad como ésta de investigar los asentamientos informales es poco común, y es una de las principales razones por las que es tan difícil encontrar en la bibliografía pruebas contundentes sobre los factores determinantes de la informalidad.
Dada la naturaleza duradera de una vivienda, tanto las viviendas formales como informales se miden como proporción de todo el conjunto de viviendas, en lugar de como un número designado de viviendas. La medida de la informalidad utilizada en este estudio es la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que se define como la ocupación del terreno sin ostentar un título de propiedad declarada por propietarios de vivienda que respondieron a una pregunta en un estudio del censo sobre si eran o no propietarios del terreno en el que está ubicada su vivienda.
Según esta definición, la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad en las ciudades brasileñas descendió en la década de los noventa, debido en parte a los cambios institucionales asociados a la Constitución de 1988, que redujo de 25 a 5 años el tiempo necesario para legitimizar el derecho de posesión adversa de la ocupación de un terreno urbano no reclamado. Los terratenientes se volvieron menos condescendientes con respecto a tolerar la ocupación del terreno, tal y como se observa en la disminución de las invasiones de terreno y el aumento de las adquisiciones de mercado (aunque por medios informales) como la forma predominante de adquirir terrenos utilizada por los pobres. El descenso en la tendencia a la informalidad también se asocia a la estabilización económica, el fortalecimiento de las finanzas municipales locales, la revitalización del mercado hipotecario y el lento descenso de los índices de pobreza observados durante la década. El impacto de los programas de regularización, aunque su alcance es limitado, es otro factor que influye en la reducción de los asentamientos informales.
La Figura 7.2.5.1 (en anexo) presenta proyecciones utilizando parámetros estimados que comparan la disminución en el porcentaje de viviendas sin título de propiedad, que comienza en un 17,5 por ciento en 1985, con unos límites superior e inferior basados en una desviación estándar. La línea negra (naranja) de la cifra representa la tendencia exponencial en los municipios que no han promulgado regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo o sobre la construcción. Las líneas de color gris (morado o azul verdoso) representan los límites superior (más regulación) e inferior (menos regulación) de los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones en 1991, cuando la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad alcanzó el 14 por ciento.
Una forma de interpretar estos resultados es fijar un objetivo deseado en términos de proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad, y después evaluar cuánto tiempo se necesita para alcanzar este objetivo dados los cambios regulatorios en los municipios. Si el objetivo es reducir la proporción de viviendas sin título de propiedad del 14 al 12 por ciento, entonces una ciudad que no promulgara regulaciones que afectaran al mercado formal de la vivienda habría alcanzado este objetivo en el año 1996, mientras que una ciudad de iguales características que promulgara regulaciones en 1991 habría tardado, en promedio, de dos a diez años más en alcanzar el mismo objetivo. En otras palabras, el plazo de tiempo será mayor en los municipios más regulados.
Los resultados muestran claramente un impacto significativo de la regulación sobre la informalidad y refutan la noción de que los mercados de vivienda formales e informales son independientes. Parece que la informalidad puede ser provocada por las mismas regulaciones que se aplican a los mercados formales, lo que significa que es incorrecto diseñar políticas circunscritas a las zonas informales. Aunque los resultados no siempre se estiman con gran precisión, las medidas de la regulación siempre tienen señales esperadas y sus niveles de confianza están siempre por encima del 81 por ciento. Asimismo, cuando comparamos los municipios que promulgaron regulaciones urbanas más cerca del año 2000, el impacto estimado sobre la informalidad disminuye como se esperaba, lo que demuestra coherencia con los resultados (Biderman 2008).
Perspectivas de futuro
El argumento y la evidencia presentados en este artículo sugieren que la regulación inadecuada en los países en desarrollo puede reducir las alternativas residenciales de las familias, incitándolas o presionándolas para buscar opciones informales. Las subvenciones podrían proporcionar una compensación adecuada a fin de mitigar los efectos de exclusión o las consecuencias imprevistas de determinadas regulaciones necesarias, al hacerlas aplicables a cada ciudadano. Pero en ausencia de tales subvenciones, los niveles de urbanización indebidamente elevados y las restricciones al uso del suelo podrían excluir a un grupo bastante numeroso. Por ejemplo, una norma de parcelación muy elevada (por ejemplo, un tamaño mínimo de parcela de 300m2 cuando los terrenos de 50m2 no son poco comunes) puede dar lugar a que existan grupos que viven en parcelas más grandes y otros en parcelas mucho más pequeñas. En lugar de garantizar niveles mínimos para todos, una norma como esta podría exacerbar las desigualdades.
Evidentemente, no se puede deducir que deberían eliminarse las regulaciones sobre la construcción y el uso del suelo. Las regulaciones desempeñan un papel importante en la creación de un entorno urbano mejor. No obstante, es necesario afrontar las consecuencias no deseadas de la inducción a la informalidad producto de los elevados precios de la vivienda. Una política de vivienda sensata debería tener en cuenta estos efectos indirectos. El desafío actual es cómo conservar los efectos indirectos positivos de las normas urbanísticas estimulando a la vez la construcción de viviendas asequibles. También se debería tener en cuenta el tema de cuántos efectos indirectos positivos pueden extraerse realmente de una regulación determinada.
Por ejemplo, el valor social del efecto indirecto externo generado por una restricción de la densidad podría no ser necesariamente mayor que el valor de la pérdida de bienestar asociada a una restricción en la oferta de suelo urbanizado. En efecto, podríamos argumentar sobre la medida en la que determinadas regulaciones aplicadas actualmente en los municipios de Brasil, proporcionan de hecho más privilegios de exclusión a determinados grupos o una burocracia flagrante y obstáculos de procedimiento que elevan los precios de la vivienda sin crear efectos indirectos positivos para el conjunto del municipio (Henderson 2007).
Ya a finales de la década de los ochenta, los planificadores urbanos de Brasil reconocieron que las normas y las regulaciones urbanísticas estaban aumentando los costos de urbanización y afectando a las viviendas sociales. A pesar de la falta de pruebas estadísticas, los profesionales se dieron cuenta de que los tamaños mínimos de parcela, los terrenos de estacionamiento obligatorios, los impedimentos a los usos mixtos (comerciales y residenciales), y otras regulaciones sobre el uso del suelo urbano no favorecían el aumento de la oferta de vivienda asequible.
Se adoptó un enfoque pragmático a fin de minimizar esas limitaciones a través de la noción ZEIS (Zona Especial de Interés Social), donde se flexibilizaban las regulaciones que incrementaban los costos con el objetivo de promover la oferta de viviendas asequibles. Las ZEIS se definen mayoritariamente de forma que coincidan con los límites de asentamientos ocupados existentes y los municipios las utilizan como herramienta para regularizar ocupaciones de suelo irregulares previas simplemente enunciando que el asentamiento no necesita cumplir las normas aplicables de forma general a las zonas urbanas del municipio. El inconveniente de esta medida paliativa es que el municipio ya no se ve obligado a intervenir en la zona puesto que, por definición, la zona ZEIS ya es conforme a la norma. En otras palabras, el doble estándar abre la vía para que el municipio ignore el problema más allá de la emisión de una ordenanza sobre zonificación.
En resumen, la reforma de la política de vivienda en Brasil exige actualmente un enfoque más amplio que estructure de forma conjunta los elementos de financiación, tecnología y gestión urbanística, y se aleje de la visión paternalista de ofrecer un cobijo o del enfoque limitado sobre los asentamientos informales. Hemos argumentado que el papel de la regulación del suelo urbano y de la construcción es un factor indispensable a tener en cuenta en cualquier intento de afrontar con seriedad el desafío que plantea la informalidad en Brasil y en otras ciudades del tercer mundo.
Referencias
Biderman, C. 2008. Informality in Brazil: Does urban land use and building regulation matter? Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Damasio, Claudia, Claudio Gutierrez, Gevaci Perfroni y Jacqueline Menegassi. Próxima publicación. Estudo de caso de urbanizaçao social no municipio de São Leopoldo. Documento de trabajo. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
Ellickson, R. 1977. Suburban growth controls: An economic and legal analysis. Yale Law Journal 86 (3).
Henderson, J.V. 2007. The effect of residential land market regulations on urban welfare. Urban Research Symposium 2007. Banco Mundial, 14–16 de mayo.
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica/Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). 1991 y 2000. http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/
Malpezzi, S. 1996. Housing prices, externalities, and regulation in U.S. metropolitan areas. Journal of Housing Research 7(2): 209–241.
Mayo, S. y S. Angel. 1993. Housing: Enabling markets to work. A World Bank Policy Paper.
Rolnik, R. 1997. A cidade e a lei: Legislação, política urbana e territórios na cidade de São Paulo. São Paulo: Studio Nobel: Fapesp.
The Economist. 2007. Adios to poverty, hola to consumption. 16 de agosto. http://www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9645142&CFID=8338952&CFTOKEN=92529416
Turner, J.F.C. y R. Fichter. 1972. Freedom to build: Dweller control of the housing process. New York: The Macmillan Company.
UN Habitat. 2006. State of the world’s cities 2006. London: Earthscan y UN Habitat.
Sobre los autores
Ciro Biderman es Visiting Fellow del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy e investigador adjunto al Departamento de Planificación y Estudios Urbanísticos del Instituto de Tecnología de Massachusetts. Asimismo es profesor asociado en la Fudación Getulio Vargas e investigador asociado al Centro de Estudio de las Políticas y Economía del Sector Público (CEPESP/FGV) de São Paulo, Brasil (en licencia).
Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.
Anna Sant’Anna es investigadora asociada principal del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.
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Ethan Seltzer is a professor in the Nohad A. Toulan School of Urban Studies and Planning at Portland State University. He previously served for six years as the director of the school, and prior to that for eleven years as the founding director of Portland State’s Institute of Portland Metropolitan Studies.
Before joining Portland State in 1992 he served as the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland area; assistant to Portland City Commissioner Mike Lindberg; assistant coordinator for the Southeast Uplift Neighborhood Program in Portland; and coordinator of the Drinking Water Project for the Oregon Environmental Council.
Seltzer received his Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning and Master of Regional Planning from the University of Pennsylvania. His doctoral dissertation examined the role of citizen participation in environmental planning. Current research interests include regional planning, regionalism, regional development, and planning in the Pacific Northwest.
In addition to his current work with the Lincoln Institute, his publications include chapters titled Maintaining the Working Landscape: The Portland Metro Urban Growth Boundary, in Regional Planning for Open Space, edited by Arnold van der Valk and Terry van Dijk (Routledge 2009); and It’s Not an Experiment: Regional Planning at Metro, 1990 to the Present, in The Portland Edge, edited by Connie Ozawa (Island Press 2004).
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Ethan Seltzer: Regional planning has been at the center of my career for a long time. I used to be the land use supervisor for Metro, the regional government in the Portland metropolitan region. In the late 1980s we were just starting work on what is now the Region 2040 Growth Concept. Part of that work involved seeking out new ideas about planning, land use, land management, and related topics, and through that search, I started to engage with the Lincoln Institute. A few years later, I was part of a planning project organized through the Regional Plan Association in New York that brought U.S. and Japanese planners together. I met Armando Carbonell (chair of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Urban Form) through that process, and we have remained collaborators on a number of projects since then.
Land Lines: What was the first project you conducted for the Lincoln Institute?
Ethan Seltzer: The first one I recall had to do with re-establishing a dialogue around regional planning and building on the ideas put forth by the old Regional Plan Association of America going back to the 1920s. I was also a part of numerous Lincoln Institute seminars, including one held in Chicago on the relationships and interdependencies between cities and suburbs. The papers were published by the Institute in 2000 in the book Urban-Suburban Interdependencies, edited by Rosalind Greenstein and Wim Wiewel. Since then I have been involved in several Institute-sponsored projects and events, most recently in conjunction with the showing of the film Portland: Quest for the Livable City as part of the Making Sense of Place documentary film series.
Land Lines: How has your association with the Lincoln Institute influenced your research?
Ethan Seltzer: I think the Lincoln Institute is one of the only, maybe the only, institution that has consistently focused on the confluence of issues associated with planning practice, place, regionalism, and land use. There are few other places that address these issues in such a thoughtful, deliberate manner. The support that the Lincoln Institute provides for thinking and writing about these issues is part of what makes it possible for me to find both an audience and like-minded colleagues. There are other networks important to me as well, notably the connections provided by the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. Nonetheless, the Lincoln Institute is uniquely a forum for the things that I am most interested in and where I hope to contribute.
Land Lines: What are your current projects for the Lincoln Institute?
Ethan Seltzer: I am working on a book on regional planning in America with an explicit focus on practice. I teach courses in regional planning and, though there is an interesting literature on the reasons why regional planning might make sense and the stark challenges to pulling it off, there is not much information available regarding what regional planners do, and how regional planning is distinguished from other types of planning (i.e., city, urban, transportation).
With support from the Lincoln Institute, and in collaboration with coeditor Armando Carbonell, I was able to recruit a group of talented authors and put together a series of chapters that, we expect, will more completely present what gets done in the name of regional planning in the United States today. We also hope this project will provide a basis for better understanding the unique aspects of regional planning practice.
The working title for the book is American Regional Planning: Practice and Prospect. Coauthors include Tim Beatley, Robert Fishman, Kate Foster, John Fregonese and CJ Gabbe, Frank and Deborah Popper, Manuel Pastor and Chris Benner, Gerrit Knaap and Rebecca Lewis, Fritz Steiner, and Bob Yaro. The manuscript will be completed this fall and the book will be published in the spring of 2011.
Land Lines: Regional planning seems to be a really challenging idea in America. Why are you so interested in it?
Ethan Seltzer: You are absolutely right, but it’s often hard to find a place in the scheme of things for regions and regional planning. The history of America is told with broad, sweeping regions in mind—the South, New England, the West—but the history of planning in America is largely one of local institutions, states, and the federal government.
Regional planning, then, is both present at the outset and a latecomer to the planning game. The institutional turf is quite congested. Although the need for better regional coordination and planning actually predates the “invention” of modern city planning in America (consider that the Burnham Plan for Chicago was a regional plan), regional planning has never been able to mount a convincing challenge to the profoundly local emphasis of planning.
Still, it simply makes too much sense to put aside regional planning for long. One need not be a rocket scientist to recognize that many of the things we care about and depend on are not well managed or defined by local jurisdictions. When I worked as the land use supervisor for Metro in Portland, I was struck by the fact that everyone—rich, poor, and in-between—lived regional lives. That is, households in our region were working, socializing, recreating, worshipping, schooling, and sleeping in territories of their own devising, none of which corresponded to any single local jurisdiction. Consequently, planning by jurisdiction, which is the norm in Oregon and elsewhere, becomes a more complicated proposition. It really makes one wonder for whom the planning is intended. If it is simply about maintaining local property values, then we’ve both made that task overly complicated and are poorly serving a whole host of larger values, goals, and objectives.
However, the other thing that struck me while working for Metro is that if people don’t feel empowered to address the issues right in front of them when they walk out the front of their house or apartment building, then they will never relate to the kinds of things we are talking about at the regional scale. Local empowerment made regional planning and growth management possible. Local and regional, then, go hand in hand, and you cannot have one without the other.
Having worked at the regional level, served as president of my local planning commission, and provided planning assistance to neighborhood associations early in my career, I am familiar with the ongoing tensions between these scales—the scale at which we live in the region, and the scale at which we are empowered at the locality. I think this tension is always going to be present, and I am under no illusions that it will evaporate or that the region will “win” any time in the future.
Still, I, like others, keep coming back to the region because to ignore it is to give up on things that are important to our sense of place and quality of life. The region helps us understand the world and how it works, and makes one look deeply into the causal relationships that link us together and to the natural world. I guess the ecologist in me will never give up on that.
Land Lines: What other kinds of research topics have you been investigating?
Ethan Seltzer: I guess you could summarize my work under several headings. I have written about planning in Portland, particularly regional planning and the way that Metro developed a regional growth management plan. That work has been incorporated in publications and projects in the United States, Japan, and the Netherlands.
More recently, I have been engaged in the work of America 2050 on megaregions. I have provided information about Cascadia, the megaregion of the Pacific Northwest, and participated in several research seminars organized to further our understanding of the nature of megaregions, planning for megaregions, and the utility of that concept for better understanding issues associated with sustainability and competitiveness in the years ahead.
I have also worked with Connie Ozawa, a colleague at Portland State, on the kinds of skills needed by entry-level planners, and therefore the nature of the relationship between graduate planning education and planning practice. I am also working with colleagues at the University of Oregon and Oregon State University to investigate the dynamics underlying and opportunities for bridging the “urban/rural” divide in Oregon. A book on that topic will be published by Oregon State Press in 2011. The fundamental themes that tie all of this together have to do with place and practice—the place being the Portland metropolitan region and the Pacific Northwest, and the practice being what actually gets done by planners.
Land Lines: Any last thoughts?
Ethan Seltzer: In an interesting way, the Lincoln Institute’s association with the ideas of Henry George and their extension into thematic areas of land as property, taxation, and land planning is very contemporary. The challenges we face in the United States and globally due to climate change and instability, the pressure for sustainability, urbanization, and the future of our cities and metropolitan regions all come together around these themes.
Ultimately, the challenges that we talk about in sweeping terms must make sense and be addressed democratically and locally. Pulling that off in a manner that acknowledges the global context for local action is really about infusing what we do as planners and academicians with a new ethical commitment to acknowledging and acting at the true scales at which these issues operate.
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La infraestructura, en cuya definición se incluye el transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía eléctrica, el agua potable y los servicios de limpieza, es uno de los temas candentes tanto en los países industriales como en los países en vías de desarrollo. En los Estados Unidos, existen motivos de preocupación en cuanto al insuficiente mantenimiento de la infraestructura y la resultante disminución de la calidad de las instalaciones y servicios, en particular del transporte. En las propuestas para estimular la demanda, el empleo y el crecimiento económico también ha tenido un gran peso la cuestión de mayores inversiones en infraestructura. En los países en vías de desarrollo, los desafíos en cuanto a la infraestructura tienen más que ver con aumentar la capacidad de prestar servicios no sólo a los residentes urbanos ya existentes sino también a los dos mil millones de residentes nuevos que se esperan para el año 2050. En la Séptima Conferencia Anual sobre Políticas de Suelo del Instituto Lincoln, celebrada a principios de junio de 2012, se trataron varios aspectos relacionados con la infraestructura, tales como inversiones, mantenimiento y externalidades.
Aspectos económicos.
El trabajo empírico llevado a cabo en los últimos 25 años sobre el rendimiento macroeconómico derivado de las inversiones en infraestructura ha arrojado una amplia variedad de resultados, que van desde rendimientos negativos hasta rendimientos de más del 30 por ciento anual. Según una meticulosa encuesta realizada sobre estudios más recientes, la inversión en infraestructura del transporte, la energía y las telecomunicaciones probablemente obtenga efectos macroeconómicos positivos y aumente la productividad.
Al mismo tiempo, muchos países sólo asignan modestas sumas para el mantenimiento de la infraestructura, aun cuando existe un amplio consenso de opinión y pruebas empíricas que indican que el rendimiento derivado del mantenimiento (especialmente en el área del transporte) es muy alto. Un bajo nivel de mantenimiento puede ser el resultado de las preferencias de los donantes a financiar nuevas capacidades en los países en vías de desarrollo, pero los déficits en mantenimiento son muy comunes en los países desarrollados, lo que sugiere que probablemente también sean importantes otros factores institucionales.
Las redes de infraestructura dependen de las economías de escala, y algunas redes son monopolios naturales que deben sujetarse a las regulaciones económicas para evitar que las empresas monopolicen los precios. Aunque la necesidad de tener regulaciones es más evidente cuando la infraestructura es suministrada por empresas privadas, también resulta necesaria una supervisión regulatoria cuando la suministradora es una empresa pública.
Aspectos espaciales.
La infraestructura ejerce una gran influencia sobre los patrones de desarrollo espacial, por lo que puede utilizarse para dirigir el crecimiento, junto con la zonificación y otros incentivos, para lograr patrones de desarrollo más densos y compactos. No obstante, aunque sólo se dispone de unos pocos estudios, los trabajos empíricos indican que los costos de redesarrollo de lugares contaminados son mayores que los costos en lugares sin desarrollo previo, incluyendo los costos de la nueva infraestructura de servicios.
La desindustrialización de las ciudades sucede desde hace mucho tiempo; sin embargo, algunas ciudades, como San José, en California, ya no apoyan la conversión de espacios industriales o de oficinas en uso residencial o comercial. La intención de estas ciudades es mantener un espacio apropiado para el empleo cuando regrese el crecimiento económico, a fin de poder competir por nuevas empresas y fomentar la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo.
Externalidades.
Las áreas metropolitanas producen cerca de tres cuartos de las emisiones de gas de invernadero antropogénico de todo el mundo cada año, gran porcentaje de las cuales proviene del transporte y de la energía eléctrica. La sustitución de sistemas antiguos y la instalación de otros nuevos con mejores capacidades brindan una gran oportunidad para recurrir a sistemas más eficientes en energía y emisiones en las áreas urbanas. La gestión de los sistemas también puede mejorarse utilizando peajes, cuotas de estacionamiento y expansión del tráfico; garantizando que las tarifas cubren los costos de provisión de agua potable y energía eléctrica; y promoviendo las edificaciones ecológicas.
La reubicación de las familias que viven en los sectores donde se realizará la expansión de la infraestructura implica el desplazamiento de una gran cantidad de personas para construir nuevas carreteras o ampliar las existentes, la construcción de nuevas instalaciones, como centrales eléctricas, y embalses que inundan amplias áreas detrás de los diques. Según las estimaciones realizadas, entre 10 y 23 millones de personas deben reubicarse de forma involuntaria cada año en los países en vías de desarrollo, y la mayoría de estas reubicaciones se encuentra relacionada con la infraestructura. Algunos de estos reasentamientos involuntarios cumplen con las garantías promulgadas por el Banco Mundial u otros estándares, como los Principios del Ecuador, aunque la mayor parte de los reasentamientos se encuentra sujeta únicamente a políticas nacionales o provinciales.
Estos temas y muchos otros–como el impacto que tienen sobre la infraestructura ciertos megaeventos (como los Juegos Olímpicos), la tributación de servicios públicos, los efectos locales de los peajes, la variación en la calidad de los servicios de infraestructura y el significativo impacto de la telefonía móvil en el África–figurarán en el libro de ponencias que estará disponible en formato impreso en mayo de 2013 y, más adelante, como libro electrónico.
