Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

La inversión de fondos públicos en áreas urbanas suele traer como resultado un aumento en el valor de la tierra que solamente beneficia a un grupo pequeño de propietarios privados. En una iniciativa sin precedentes, la ciudad brasileña de Porto Alegre está usando el impuesto a la propiedad como un instrumento para recuperar la plusvalía de los bienes raíces, con lo cual logran frenar la especulación en el mercado inmobiliario y promueven el desarrollo urbano racional.

Contexto económico y social

Porto Alegre es la capital y la ciudad más grande del estado brasileño de Río Grande do Sul, el más meridional del país. Con una población de 1,5 millones de habitantes y aproximadamente 450.000 unidades inmobiliarias en 1994, las autoridades de la ciudad estimaron una escasez de más de 50.000 unidades residenciales. No obstante, los mayores problemas económicos y sociales limitaban la capacidad que tenía la ciudad para proporcionar viviendas a las familias de ingresos bajos y medianos.

Al igual que en muchos países en desarrollo con ciclos económicos inestables, la tierra es uno de los principales medios para acumular riqueza en Brasil. En Porto Alegre, la existencia de grandes predios sin urbanizar cerca del centro de la ciudad propicia la propagación urbana en la periferia. El principal factor causante de esta situación es la especulación con las tierras por parte de propietarios adinerados que poseen grandes extensiones de terreno baldío y esperan un momento favorable para realizar inversiones o vender los terrenos con enormes ganancias.

A medida que las familias de ingresos bajos son empujadas hacia la periferia, su segregación lleva a una exclusión social más acentuada y mayores demandas de servicios. No obstante, la dotación de infraestructura básica, como los servicios de transporte público en rutas largas entre la periferia y los núcleos de comercio, industria o entretenimiento, exige que el gobierno haga inversiones considerables.

Las autoridades de la ciudad de Porto Alegre se habían fijado una meta fundamental de proveer servicios urbanos de calidad para la comunidad de las afueras, entre ellos una infraestructura básica, educación, transporte público, limpieza de calles y seguridad. Sin embargo, un diagnóstico financiero de los ingresos de la ciudad hizo que las autoridades se percataran de la escasez de recursos para tal inversión. En contraste, muchos distritos en áreas más centrales estaban bien dotados de infraestructura, equipos y servicios, y su densidad de población era menor a la prevista en el plan de desarrollo urbano de la ciudad.

Era obvio que la especulación obstaculizaba el desarrollo de la tierra, pero las autoridades gobernantes creían que el ambiente político era favorable para un cambio. Después de un período en el que el gobierno se enfrentó a una inflación crónica en Brasil, se introdujo un programa de estabilización económica en julio de 1994. Antes del plan económico, la inflación anual llegó a alcanzar el asombroso nivel del 7.000 por ciento. A partir de la aplicación del plan, el índice promedio de la inflación mensual osciló entre el 0,7 y el 1,7 por ciento. La medición de la economía en términos del producto interno bruto (PIB) arrojó índices positivos de crecimiento anual a partir de 1993. El gobierno local tenía confianza en que el momento era ideal para recuperar la inversión y las actividades productivas que se habían paralizado durante el anterior período de inflación alta.

En resumen, los siguientes factores fomentaron la iniciativa de Porto Alegre de usar el impuesto a la propiedad como instrumento para simultáneamente recuperar la plusvalía de la tierra, refrenar la especulación en el mercado inmobiliario y promover la justicia social y el crecimiento económico:

• Estimulación de la ocupación y desarrollo de tierras urbanas, puesto que el mercado privado no respondía de forma positiva a la demanda de los residentes de ingresos bajos y medianos.
• Reducción de la escasez de viviendas.
• Asistencia a las familias de bajos recursos, para garantizarles mejores oportunidades de vida y trabajo.
• Recuperación del valor de la tierra generado por la inversión pública, motivando a aquellos individuos que habían sido favorecidos por la inversión pública para que retribuyeran los beneficios a la comunidad.
• Limitación de las inversiones adicionales a gran escala en infraestructura y servicios públicos mediante la utilización racional de los recursos financieros.

Medidas gubernamentales

La constitución de Brasil (1988) define el impuesto a la propiedad como un tributo aplicado a la tierra e inmuebles urbanos y especifica que puede utilizarse como un instrumento de las políticas urbanas a fin de promover un uso racional de la tierra que genere beneficios sociales para toda la comunidad. Esta disposición permitió que Porto Alegre emprendiera las siguientes acciones:

• Definir las zonas urbanas prioritarias para el desarrollo y la ocupación. El proceso implicaba la selección de cinco áreas distintas caracterizadas por su alta calidad en infraestructura urbana, equipos y servicios. Estas áreas acogerían una mayor densidad de población sin necesidad de inversiones públicas adicionales.
• Localizar 120 predios vacantes, cuya área oscilaba entre 3.000 y 360.000 metros cuadrados (m2) en las zonas prioritarias.
• Introducir una legislación local que estipulaba el desarrollo de las propiedades seleccionadas en lapsos de tiempo específicos. La ley establecía que si no se cumplía con dichos lapsos para el desarrollo de los predios, se aplicaría progresivamente el impuesto a la propiedad correspondiente. La tasa del impuesto aumentaría en intervalos de 20 por ciento anualmente hasta alcanzar un tasa máxima del 30 por ciento. Las tasas básicas para tierras vacantes varían entre el 5 y el 6 por ciento del valor de la propiedad en el mercado.
• Otorgar prioridad a los proyectos de construcción en los terrenos seleccionados. Las entidades del Ayuntamiento encargadas de los permisos de planificación facilitarían la construcción y la ocupación.

Efectividad de la iniciativa

La legislación fue promulgada a finales de 1993 y el gobierno comenzó a aplicarla en 1994. La propuesta contó con el apoyo de los miembros del Ayuntamiento, tanto los pertenecientes al partido de gobierno como los de la oposición; esta instancia tiene la responsabilidad de aprobar las decisiones en materia de legislación municipal.

A la fecha de octubre de 1997 la iniciativa no ha dado los resultados esperados. Sólo se han desarrollado cinco de los 120 predios vacantes. Los propietarios de 50 inmuebles están pagando el impuesto a la propiedad con una tasa de aumento progresivo. Tres de las propiedades fueron eliminadas de la lista porque habían sido incluidas incorrectamente desde un principio debido a registros inexactos sobre sus características físicas.

No se ha descrito el estado de desarrollo de las 62 propiedades restantes. Algunas pertenecen a terratenientes acaudalados y políticamente influyentes que apelaron ante el Tribunal Supremo contra la constitucionalidad de las medidas aplicadas por el gobierno de la ciudad. De hecho, dos terratenientes (A y B) que poseen casi el 44 por ciento de los terrenos baldíos están apelando y otros terratenientes aparentemente están a la espera de la decisión judicial para tomar sus propias decisiones. (Véase el cuadro.)

Solamente será posible evaluar la efectividad que ha tenido la iniciativa del impuesto a la propiedad en Porto Alegre después de que se conozcan las decisiones judiciales sobre la materia, pero otros beneficios cruciales derivados de la experiencia ya han garantizado su éxito. La legislación ha dado lugar a un debate intenso en el ámbito nacional y local sobre los derechos políticos y privados, los derechos de propiedad y los intereses públicos. La experiencia también ha servido como ejemplo para que otras autoridades gobernantes tomen conciencia de la responsabilidad que tienen de fomentar el uso racional de las tierras urbanas.

En Brasil, los factores culturales y económicos parecen seguir propiciando la especulación con la tierra, en detrimento de las actividades productivas, y la dificultad para establecer límites entre los intereses públicos y los derechos privados es, sin duda, compleja. No obstante, los esfuerzos iniciales realizados en Porto Alegre representan un paso decisivo hacia el control de la especulación privada y el fomento del desarrollo urbano responsable. Otras iniciativas similares en otros lugares ahora tienen mayores posibilidades de convertirse en alternativas viables para lograr justicia en la distribución de los recursos públicos con ventajas sociales para la comunidad.

Claudia M. De Cesare trabaja para la Municipalidad de Porto Alegre y está postulada para cursar un doctorado en el Centre for the Built and Human Environment, de la Universidad de Salford, Inglaterra.

After spending more than a decade on restructuring central-provincial fiscal relations, the Chinese government is advancing its efforts to reform local public finance. In 2003 the central government issued a directive to ameliorate the real property tax system in China. To fulfill this mandate, tax authorities are reviewing international property taxation experiences, sending officials overseas to study pertinent models and inviting foreign experts to China for consultation. Yet comparable cases from which the government can draw relevant lessons for tailor-making a Chinese property tax system are few. The danger is that when public officials are under pressure to move the reform forward, they may be tempted to adopt concepts that do not match the country’s conditions.

One recent proposal that may develop into such a scenario is to establish an ad valorem property tax system in which leasehold land would be taxed as if it were freehold. This article explains what the Chinese government’s current proposal entails, why it may not be consistent with existing land tenure arrangements and, more tentatively, how the establishment of a land rent system could mediate potential contradictions of taxing land that is not private property.

China’s Property Tax Reform Proposal

The Chinese property tax system currently has as many as nine property taxes, depending on the definitions (see Hong 2003; 2004). The central government has proposed to consolidate three of these taxes into a single levy to simplify the existing tax structure. One of them is the Township and Urban Land Use Tax (LUT), which all land users (except foreign entities, government and nonprofit agencies, and agricultural industries) are required to pay. To collect this tax, local governments divide their jurisdictions into different taxing zones according to population size or land use. Land in different zones is taxed at an array of tax rates preset by the central government, ranging from 0.2 to 10 yuan per square meter (1 yuan = US$0.122). Some Chinese officials have admitted that the tax rates for the LUT have been set too low; hence its collections have little impact on local revenue. The government plans to eradicate this tax.

The other two taxes, the Building (or House) Tax and Urban Real Estate Tax (URET), will also be subject to reform. While the Building Tax is imposed on income-generating properties held by Chinese nationals, the URET is levied on all real estate owned by foreign entities and overseas Chinese. Both are ad valorem taxes whose bases can be the discount original purchasing cost, assessed capital value or gross annual rental value of the property.

When the assessed capital value (or the purchasing cost for the Building Tax) is used as the basis for tax assessment, the tax rate is 1.2 percent for the Building Tax and 1.5 percent for the URET. If an estimated rental value is used instead, the tax rates for the Building Tax and URET will be 12 and 15 percent, respectively. In some locales, like Beijing, if actual rental value is available because individual property owners rent their dwellings to another party at the market rate, the Building Tax rate will be 4 percent of gross rental income of the property. In view of this discrepancy in taxing local- and foreign-owned real estate, the government would replace these two levies with a single property tax as part of the upcoming reform.

The proposed new property tax would be imposed on both land and buildings at a uniform rate. The tax base would encompass all properties, domestic and foreign, located in rural as well as urban areas. As some public officials argue, a standardized property tax could have at least three advantages. First, the new property tax system may ease tax administration. Instead of administering the collection of the LUT, Building Tax and URET separately, local tax bureaus will be able to concentrate their effort on just one tax.

Second, the new property tax would be a value-based tax, which allows the government to capture future land value increments if property reappraisal can be done regularly. Third, one key purpose for creating the new property tax is to convert selected real estate development charges into a unified tax. Many scholars argue that some local governments might have abused the current system of user charges, thereby making payments for public services unduly cumbersome.

Collecting these charges through the new property tax may lower the transaction costs of doing business. As well-intentioned as the proposal may sound, policy designers might have underestimated the importance of one fundamental matter: the integration of the new property tax system with the current land tenure arrangements.

Property Taxation and Public Leaseholds

As specified in the Chinese Constitution, urban land is owned by the state and rural land is owned by collectives. Local governments, empowered by the state, can assign land use rights to users through a set of leasing arrangements. Lease terms are 40 years for commercial land, 50 years for industrial land and 70 years for residential land. If a local government wants to lease an urban land site to a private entity, it must be assigned through a bidding process. The winning bidder must pay the total set of leasing fees (including a “conveyance fee,” expropriation costs if land is acquired from the collective, and various land allocation charges) in a lump sum and immediately to obtain the land use rights.

The payment of the market-determined conveyance fee allows the lessee to transfer or rent the land use rights to another party and to use them as collateral. In the past, land rights were allocated mainly to private entities through negotiation, but this method failed to collect proper fees due to personal connections or corruption and it was suspended by the central government in 2002.

Users of land assigned administratively to public agencies or state-owned enterprises are not required to pay the conveyance fee, but must compensate the state for any allocation costs. The assignment of the land rights has no term limit. According to the law, if a state-owned enterprise wants to transfer its land rights to a private entity for commercial purposes, it must pay the conveyance fee to the state before doing so. For the transfer of rural land into urban uses or to nonmembers of the collective, the state will first expropriate the land from the collective with compensation and then lease the use rights to interested users for the payment of the conveyance fee and other leasing charges.

Owing to a long bureaucratic process and high transaction fees, many users have transferred their land rights to other parties without going through the proper procedure and registration. As such informal exchanges have gained in popularity, the official land leasing record is no longer reliable. Hence, any future attempt to identify the actual landholders, delineate their land rights, and estimate the leasehold value for tax purposes would no doubt be a difficult task.

The design of the new property tax system must take these unique land tenure arrangements into consideration. Aside from the extensive informality involved in land transaction and possession—a topic that is beyond the scope of this article—the most basic question is: How can the government convince lessees to pay property tax on lands that they do not own?

Certainly not all property tax systems are based on the premise that property owners should be taxpayers; occupiers are sometimes liable for tax payment. In some countries, such as Australia, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, taxes paid by occupiers are referred to as rates, a council tax or a user tax to avoid any confusion. Despite the different names, the calculation of these levies is still based on either the capital or rental value of the property, which is the same approach as for the property tax.

More fundamentally, since the supply of land is fixed, the landowner (the state government in the case of China) would bear the ultimate tax burden even if land users paid the property tax directly to the government. This is because the new tax would dampen the demand for land use rights and in turn reduce the fees that local governments could receive from leasing public land.

Because the Chinese government is both the landowner and property tax collector, lessees who leased land in the past and paid the entire leasehold value without anticipating the additional property tax burden would wonder why they should pay more land tax to the government. Thus it is essential to have a rationale for taxing leasehold land, so as to convince lessees to comply with their property tax obligation.

One way to analyze the matter is to treat property rights as a bundle of rights, which includes the right to own, use, develop, transfer, bequest and benefit from land. This bundle also comprises the right to exclude others from enjoying these privileges.

Viewing the Chinese land tenure arrangements through this lens, the government holds the ownership of land and leases other attributes of the bundle of land rights to private entities. So long as the privileges and obligations of holding the leased land rights are fully delineated and recognized, both legally and by the society, there is no reason why leasehold rights cannot be regarded as private property of the lessees for a specific period of time as stipulated in the lease.

In 1988 the Chinese National People’s Congress amended the Constitution to acknowledge the transferability of the right to use land. Further amendments are needed to explicitly recognize leaseholds as private property and empower the state to establish special legislation for the enforcement and protection of leasehold rights. In this way, the implicit contradiction in imposing property tax on leased public land would be clarified and resolved.

One technical issue remains, however: valuation of leasehold rights for tax purposes. Since the new property tax will be value-based, assessors will face the challenges of estimating the leasehold value of land independently, based on market data that normally reflect a combined value of land and all improvements. Most property valuation methods presume that land is freehold, and that developed real estate markets are present. Neither of these assumptions can be applied to China. Although there are practices that separate land and building values for tax purposes, the divisions are generally based on crude assumptions. How can assessors modify the existing (or invent new) valuation techniques to accommodate these special Chinese conditions?

More important, leasehold value is highly sensitive to the lease term and conditions, both of which can vary significantly from one case to another. At this moment, time-tested mass appraisal techniques for assessing large numbers of leasehold sites do not exist. Do these issues imply that property assessment for tax purposes under the Chinese leasehold system requires a case-by-case approach? If so, do local governments have the capability to carry out such detailed property appraisals for the collection of the new property tax? The Chinese government must find ways to deal with these practical matters if it decides to tax leasehold rights as private property.

It is also extremely important to educate would-be taxpayers and public officials about the distinctions between freehold and leasehold systems. Lessees must recognize that they possess only the leased land rights that are not designed to last in perpetuity. If the rights and obligations of both the state and lessees are not clearly delineated, taxing leasehold rights as if they were freehold could complicate the implementation of future land and tax policy. For example, in Canberra, Australia, and Israel, lessees are requested to pay the entire leasehold value up front, and thereafter they pay an annual property tax (or rates in Australia) for leasing public land. Lease terms in both cases are long and renewable—99 years in Canberra and 49 years in Israel with four automatically renewable terms totaling 196 years.

This method of collecting leasehold charges and taxes is tantamount to the payment system for land in countries where land is freehold. Due to this similarity, lessees have developed the perception that land is privately owned (Hong and Bourassa 2003). This view, albeit legally a fiction, has engendered the expectation that any government’s attempt to exercise its rights as the landowner to retake land for public uses or to demand additional payments from lessees for enlarging or extending land use rights would constitute an infringement on private property.

This expectation has added conflict to government efforts to redistribute land and land value between private landholders and the state on behalf of the public. As Neutze (2003) argued, had the Canberra government provided enough public education about its leasehold system, it would have spared the Australian capital from many intractable disputes over land ownership.

The Chinese government has no immediate plan to give fee simple deeds to private landholders. Thus, if local governments continue to collect all leasehold charges up front and then levy the new property tax on both land and buildings, they may be at risk of creating the same mistaken expectations, that is, that land is privately owned. This may put the government and lessees at odds with each other when there is a later need to reallocate land from private to public uses. Designing a real property tax that will not add more complications to the already unsettling land tenure system is a critical task that policy makers should not overlook.

Land tenure reform is a long, controversial process, however, and the Chinese government would be ill-advised to delay the implementation of the new property tax system until land reform is completed. What the government needs is a transition system in which property tax reform can proceed as planned without interfering with its endeavors to restructure land ownership. Establishing a land rent system seems to be an option.

Land Rent System

Under a land rent system, leasehold charges would be paid in the form of an annual land rent, not a one-time leasing fee. Local land bureaus could continue to assign land use rights by public auction, but the bidding would be to determine the amount of annual land rent. Similarly for lands that were assigned to state agencies administratively, users would pay their conveyance fee for transferring land rights to other private parties in annual installments, which would be equivalent to the yearly rental payments. The land rent system has pros and cons (see Hong 2004 for a detailed discussion); four important advantages are discussed here.

First, collecting a land rent is the most straightforward way to characterize the landowner-tenant relationships between the state and lessees. More important, requesting lessees to make their rental payments annually would serve as a constant reminder of their leasehold relationships with the state.

Second, if leasehold charges were paid in annual installments, local officials would no longer be able to generate a large amount of cash instantly to cover short-term fiscal shortfalls. This in turn may lower their incentive to lease land rapidly—a major malady of the current land leasing system.

Third, research using the input-output (I/O) technique and the 1997 I/O Table of China found that collecting land rent could facilitate the transition to the new property tax system (Hong 2004). Had the central government required all land users to pay an annual land rent in 1997, rental income would have added 29.8 billion yuan (US$3.6 billion) to the government treasury, representing a 2.9 percent increase in total tax revenue (see Table 1). This revenue increase would represent a net gain over estimated tax revenue losses under the proposed property tax reform.

The land rent system, however, may generate a cash flow problem for local governments. When leasing fees are deferred and paid by lessees in annual installments, fewer funds would be immediately available for local governments to cover public expenditures. To resolve this problem, local jurisdictions may borrow money from the central government or other financial intermediaries, using perhaps the future land rent collections as collateral. Loans would then be repaid in annual installments by funds gathered from yearly rental payments made by lessees.

Had the government decided to keep the total tax revenue approximately the same, it could have set the new property tax rate at 4 percent, which is the same as the Building Tax rate for personal dwellings rented at market prices, and then discounted the land rent by as much as 47 percent (see Table 1). With a reasonable tax rate and a substantial reduction on rental payment, taxpayers would be less resistant to the reform.

Table 1 also shows several possible combinations of rent level and property tax rate to produce a revenue-neutral shift. If the government were to increase the new property tax rate to deepen the tax reform, it could lower the rent level to avoid antagonizing taxpayers. This approach would provide local governments with an array of options to adopt the new property tax system in stages and at a pace that suits their economies.

Fourth, the proposed land rent system could keep future tenure choices open. If the sociopolitical sentiment of the country favors public leaseholds, local governments could continue to levy the land rent and property tax at the ratio that matches local needs. Subsequent adjustments to the rent-tax ratio could also be made when new circumstances arise.

If central authorities, in response to popular demand, were to grant fee simple deeds to all lessees, it could order local governments to phase out the collection of land rent and raise the new property tax rate accordingly. As shown in Table 1, directing the reform toward either path would not create adverse effects on local government budgets.

This analysis shows that choices available to the Chinese government are not limited to privatizing land ownership and relying solely on real property taxation to recoup land value. Undeniably, the Chinese government may eventually choose to do just that because it is indeed an option, but there are many other possibilities as well. Why, then, should the government make such a decision now, when there may be other viable alternatives that can keep all options open? Recognizing that there are many choices could unleash the creative powers of policy makers and scholars to imagine a unique Chinese system to capture land value.

References

Director General of State Statistics Bureau. 1999. Input-output table of China, 1997. Beijing: China Statistical Press.

Hong, Yu-Hung. 2003. The last straw: reforming local property tax in the People’s Republic of China. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

_____. 2004. Assessing property tax reform in China. Report for the David C. Lincoln Fellowship Program. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

_____ and Steven C. Bourassa. 2003. Why public leasehold? Issues and concepts. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds., Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Neutze, Max. 2003. Leasing of publicly owned land in Canberra, Australia. In Leasing public land: Policy debates and international experiences, Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong, eds. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Yu-Hung Hong is a fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. This article reports on selected preliminary results of his research funded by the David C. Lincoln Fellowship in Land Value Taxation.

Most people are not particularly fond of paying taxes of any sort, but the discontent with one particular type of public levy, the local property tax, is gaining momentum across the country. Disgruntled homeowners are demanding that governors and mayors find alternative methods to raise revenue in order to relieve their own property tax burden.

Decades ago this discontent led to such tax limitation measures as Proposition 13 in California and Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts. More recently, this movement has been driven by sharply rising property tax levies in many cities and suburbs as a result of the extraordinary appreciation in property values over the past few years. The high visibility of the property tax, which in contrast to sales and income taxes is often paid annually in one or two large installments, makes this form of revenue generation an attractive target for taxpayer antipathy.

Municipalities around the country face a daunting fiscal crisis. Federal stimulus assistance has expired, and many states have made significant cuts in aid to municipalities. Meanwhile property values have declined 31 percent since their 2006 peak according to the S&P/Case-Shiller national home price index.

It will take several years to know how this historic decline will affect property tax revenues, because changes in property tax bills significantly lag changes in market values. However, cities faced declines in general fund revenues of 2.5 percent in 2009, and approximately 3.2 percent declines in 2010 (Hoene 2009; Hoene and Pagano 2010). Municipal responses to revenue shortfalls have included making cuts to personnel (71 percent of cities), delaying or cancelling capital projects (68 percent), and making across the board cuts (35 percent) (McFarland 2010).

To avoid further cuts, municipalities will need to raise additional revenues. But with anti-tax sentiment running high, many cities and towns may try to avoid raising tax rates and look instead to increased reliance on fees and other alternative revenue sources. One alternative that has attracted the attention of many local officials recently is payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) by nonprofit organizations.

PILOTs are voluntary payments made by tax-exempt nonprofits as a substitute for property taxes. These payments typically result from negotiations between local government officials and individual nonprofits, but the exact arrangements vary widely. PILOTs can be formal, long-term contracts, routine annual payments, or irregular one-time payments. The payments can go into a municipality’s general fund, or be directed to a specific project or program. PILOTs are most frequently made by hospitals, colleges, and universities, but also by nonprofit retirement homes, low-income housing facilities, cultural institutions, fitness centers, and churches. Some such payments are not even called PILOTs, but are know as “voluntary contributions” or “service fees.”

Since 2000, PILOTs have been used in at least 117 municipalities in at least 18 states (Kenyon and Langley 2010). These payments are concentrated in the Northeast, and especially in Massachusetts where they have been made in 82 out of 351 municipalities (figure 1). It is hard to make definitive statements about trends in the use of PILOTs, because there is no comprehensive source that tracks them, but press accounts suggest growing interest in PILOTs since the early 1990s, with a noticeable uptick in recent years. Major multiyear agreements have recently been reached in Pittsburgh and Baltimore; commissions have studied PILOTs in Boston, New Orleans, and Providence; and many smaller municipalities have reached new agreements with local charities.

The Revenue Potential of PILOTs

The revenue potential of PILOTs varies across municipalities because of large differences in the impact of the charitable property tax exemption on their tax bases. Figure 2 shows that in 23 large U.S. cities the value of tax-exempt nonprofit property as a share of total property value ranged from 10.8 percent in Philadelphia to 1.9 percent in Memphis and El Paso. Similarly, a fiscal year 2003 study of 351 municipalities in Massachusetts found that if the tax exemption for charitable and educational nonprofits were removed, these organizations would account for more than 10 percent of the property tax levy in 18 municipalities and between 2.5 and 10 percent in another 68, but less than 1 percent of the tax levy in 179 municipalities (McArdle and Demirai 2004).

Since nonprofit property tends to be highly concentrated in a relatively small number of municipalities, especially central cities and college towns, PILOTs have the potential to be a very important revenue source for some municipalities, even if they are unlikely to play a significant role in financing local government in the majority of cities and towns. Table 1 looks at PILOTs in ten municipalities where they rarely account for more than 1 percent of total revenues, but the dollar figures are often significant.

The impact of the charitable property tax exemption on municipal budgets also depends on the degree of reliance on property taxes as a revenue source. Local governments with a heavier reliance on sales and excise taxes, user fees, or state aid are in a better position to deal with forgone property tax revenues through those other sources.

Collaboration on PILOT Agreements

In seeking PILOT agreements, local officials sometimes resort to adversarial pressure tactics, which can backfire and jeopardize important relationships between municipalities and nonprofits. A more collaborative approach is usually more successful when local officials work to build genuine support among nonprofits for a PILOT program that is rooted in shared interests and mutual dependence for each other’s long-term success.

Many large nonprofits like hospitals and universities are quite immobile, and other smaller nonprofits may be committed to serving their local communities even if they could relocate with relative ease. The long-term success of these organizations depends on the municipality’s success. Because population loss, crime, and crumbling infrastructure can imperil a nonprofit’s future, having a local government with the capacity to provide quality public services is in its own self-interest.

Similarly, nonprofits are often major employers and provide services and activities that attract people to a city and improve the quality of life for local residents. Thus, the success of these organizations is also crucial for a municipality’s future. Even if the nonprofits are tax-exempt, their presence can significantly expand the local tax base by attracting businesses and homeowners.

Recognition of these shared interests by both sides is crucial to reaching sustainable PILOT agreements. Private conversations between high-ranking municipal and nonprofit officials can help break down barriers that sometimes block PILOTs. To make the case for PILOTs, municipalities often appeal to the nonprofits’ sense of fairness and community responsibility—arguing that it is fair for nonprofits to pay for the cost of public services they consume, and that a contribution will directly benefit the community.

These conversations should also touch on what the nonprofits need for their future success. In practice, municipalities are often most successful in obtaining PILOTs when nonprofits need something from the local government, such as building permits or zoning changes. The quid pro quo nature of these agreements is often viewed negatively—as a form of extortion or special treatment. However, accommodating these requests is often in a municipality’s own interest.

For major nonprofit development projects, a shortened approval process with less red tape can cut overall costs significantly, and such discussions can result in more creative arrangements. For example, as part of a 20-year PILOT agreement with Clark University, the City of Worcester, Massachusetts agreed to work with the university to convert a short section of a street into a pedestrian area.

When local officials use more aggressive tactics to obtain PILOTs, such as trying to shame nonprofits into making payments or threatening to challenge their tax-exempt status in court, the organizations may become defensive and less willing to cooperate. Charitable nonprofits have a strong record of defending their property tax exemptions, so such divisive tactics are likely to leave a municipality with no PILOT, potentially significant legal fees, and a damaged reputation.

Problems with PILOTs

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities with large nonprofit sectors, but there are many problems with these payments compared to more conventional taxes and fees.

First, at the same time that municipalities face a fiscal crisis caused by the recession, nonprofits face their own fiscal crisis due to declining endowment values and donations. In addition, government contracts—a major funding source for health and human service nonprofits—were cut, and some government entities are delaying contracts or payments. A 2009 survey found that 80 percent of nonprofit organizations were experiencing fiscal stress in the wake of the recession (Center for Civil Society Studies 2009). To nonprofits facing uncertain financial futures, it appears unfair for local governments to begin requesting PILOTs at this time (National Council of Nonprofits 2010).

Second, some degree of horizontal and vertical inequity in PILOT programs is almost inevitable, because their voluntary nature means there is no way to ensure that nonprofits with similar property values make comparable PILOTs. For example, even with Boston’s long-standing PILOT program, the four largest universities in the city made very different contributions in fiscal year 2009. Boston University paid $4,892,138 (8.53 percent of what it would pay in property taxes if taxable); Harvard University paid $1,996,977 (4.99 percent); Boston College paid $293,251 (1.92 percent); and Northeastern University paid only $30,571 (0.08 percent).

Third, PILOTs are a limited and frequently unreliable revenue source, rarely accounting for more than 1 percent of total revenues. This limited revenue potential must be weighed against some potentially significant costs associated with reaching PILOT agreements, such as upfront administrative costs, time spent by high-ranking officials negotiating agreements, or costs to obtain accurate assessments of exempt properties. PILOTs can also be an unreliable revenue source from one year to the next if they rely on short-term agreements.

Finally, the process used to reach PILOT agreements is often contentious and secretive, with contributions determined in an ad hoc manner lacking objective criteria. A collaborative approach can make PILOT requests less controversial, but reliance on private conversations also makes the process less transparent.

Systematic Programs to Mitigate Problems

Many of these problems with PILOTs can be mitigated if municipalities set up a systematic program that does not rely solely on case-by-case negotiation, especially for municipalities with a large number of nonprofits. A framework that applies to all organizations can provide guidance and bring consistency to the negotiations with individual nonprofits. The recommendations of Boston’s PILOT Task Force provide a concrete example (box 1).

Baltimore, Maryland: The city reached a $20 million six-year PILOT agreement with hospitals and universities in June 2010, with $5.4 million to be paid in each of the first two years. In return, the city dropped a proposed $350 fee per dorm and hospital bed, and protected hospitals and universities from increases in telecommunications and energy tax rates over the next six years (Walker and Scharper 2010).

Boston, Massachusetts: Beginning in January 2009, a task force of representatives from nonprofits, city government, business, labor, and the community met with a goal of making the city’s existing PILOT program more consistent. The final report has recommendations on key features of a systematic PILOT program: only nonprofits with property values exceeding a $15 million threshold are included in the program; the target PILOT for each institution is equal to 25 percent of what it would pay in property taxes, because roughly one-quarter of the city’s budget is devoted to core public services that benefit nonprofits; assessed value is used as a basis for the payments; and guidelines determine which types of services will count for community benefit offsets (City of Boston 2010).

New Orleans, Louisiana: A Tax Fairness Commission has been tasked with recommending changes to make the city’s tax system fairer and to broaden the tax base. While the commission may consider PILOTs, it is particularly interested in narrowing the nonprofit property tax exemption (Nolan 2011). Louisiana has a very broad charitable exemption compared to most states, with all properties owned by eligible institutions exempt from taxation regardless of use, including those not typically tax-exempt such as fraternal organizations, labor unions, and trade associations (Bureau of Government Research 1999).

Providence, Rhode Island: The mayor and city council members sought to increase the amount of PILOTs from the city’s four colleges and universities, but the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions (2010) recommended against renegotiating the 20-year $48 million PILOT agreement reached in 2003. Instead the commission recommended that the city should focus on forming partnerships with local nonprofits to foster economic growth, and the state should provide full funding of its PILOT program and provide Providence with a share of new income and sales tax revenues that result from nonprofit expansion.

Municipalities interested in establishing a systematic PILOT program should consider the following features.

Use a threshold level of property value or annual revenues to determine which nonprofits to include in the PILOT program. Excluding from PILOT requests certain types of nonprofits, such as religious organizations or small social service providers, may be a popular notion, but it can result in arbitrarily targeting some nonprofits while ignoring others. A more systematic policy with a threshold approach is easy to administer and will exclude only those nonprofits that do not meet the financial threshold to make significant contributions, rather than favor some organizations based on the nature of their activities.

Set a target for contributions that is justified. Instead of reaching an arbitrary dollar figure in negotiations, a target that applies to all nonprofits in the program can reduce horizontal inequities and may raise more revenue by creating the expectation for a certain contribution. For example, the target can be justified by estimating the cost of local public services that directly benefit nonprofits, such as police and fire protection and street maintenance.

Use a basis to calculate suggested payments. Using a basis with the rate set to reach the target contribution will also promote consistency. The fairest basis is the assessed value of exempt property, because the PILOT request will be proportional to the tax savings each organization receives from the property tax exemption. However, municipalities that want to avoid having to accurately assess tax-exempt properties can use another basis, such as the square footage of property or the organization’s annual revenues.

Include community benefit offsets, so nonprofits can reduce their target cash PILOTs in return for providing certain public services for local residents. Charitable nonprofits are typically more willing to provide in-kind services than to make PILOTs, and are well positioned to leverage their existing expertise and resources to provide needed services. For example, nonprofit hospitals can set up free health clinics, and universities can establish after-school tutoring programs. Local officials should be clear and consistent about which services are most needed by local residents and will count for community benefit offsets, and should rely on nonprofits to estimate the cash value of these donated in-kind services.

Reach long-term PILOT agreements. Both municipalities and nonprofits are better off with a long-term approach that allows them to build predictable payments into their respective budgets. Additionally, because PILOT requests can require considerable time to negotiate, both parties will benefit from reaching an agreement and then moving on to focus on their primary missions and perhaps other partnerships to serve the community. Several municipalities have 20- or 30-year PILOT agreements in place.

Alternatives to PILOTs

Given some of the common problems with PILOTs, municipalities with large nonprofit sectors that face revenue shortfalls may want to consider alternative revenue-raising measures.

Increase reliance on traditional user fees or special assessments. This alternative may be the most palatable in the current anti-tax climate. One consideration favoring this option is that nonprofits are typically not exempt from these charges, so increasing reliance on such sources will obtain revenue from a broad group of entities, including tax-exempt nonprofits. For example, a municipality could finance garbage collection through a fee instead of the property tax, or use special assessments to pay for sewer hookups in new subdivisions.

Establish municipal service fees. Some municipalities have carved out specific services that are normally funded through property taxes and instead charged nonprofits a fee for the service. These fees may or may not be assessed solely against tax-exempt nonprofits, and they often use a basis for the payments related to the size of the property rather than the assessed value. For example, Rochester, New York, has a local works charge to fund snowplowing and street repair. It is applied to both taxable and tax-exempt organizations using the property’s street frontage as the basis. Minneapolis, Minnesota, has a street maintenance fee that also uses square footage as the basis, but is only charged to nongovernmental tax-exempt properties.

Develop agreements for needed services. Local officials can decide not to pursue cash PILOTs, but instead develop formal partnerships with nonprofits to provide specific services for local residents or work together to foster economic development. Direct provision of needed services, sometimes known as services in lieu of taxes or SILOTs, will help the fiscal situation of the municipality in the short run, while joint efforts to foster economic development can have significant long-run benefits.

Expand the tax options for municipalities. This final alternative would require a change in state law in many instances. Some municipalities across the country have the ability to levy sales taxes, special excise taxes such as hotel taxes, income taxes, or payroll taxes. But most cities in the Northeast do not have these alternative tax sources, and are especially reliant on the property tax, which can be problematic if the tax-exempt sector is large or growing rapidly.

Conclusion

PILOTs have the potential to provide crucial revenue for municipalities that have a significant share of total property value owned by tax-exempt nonprofits, both as a stop-gap in the current municipal fiscal crisis and in the future. However, PILOTs rarely account for more than 1 or 2 percent of municipal revenues, so expecting these payments to eliminate local government deficits is unrealistic. Furthermore, singling out nonprofits to help address a municipal fiscal crisis is unfair since they face their own challenges due to the recent recession.

Local officials who do want to pursue PILOT agreements must tread carefully if they want to avoid some common pitfalls. First, PILOT requests can be highly contentious when local officials resort to heavy-handed pressure tactics to reach agreements. It is preferable for local officials to work collaboratively with nonprofit leaders to craft PILOT agreements that serve their mutual interests. Second, the voluntary nature of PILOTs limits the revenue potential of these agreements, results in inconsistent treatment of nonprofits, and leads to other problems. Municipalities with a large number of nonprofits can mitigate these problems by establishing a systematic PILOT program to provide guidance and bring consistency to their negotiations with individual nonprofits.

About the Authors

Daphne A. Kenyon is a visiting fellow in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and principal of D. A. Kenyon & Associates, Windham, New Hampshire.

Adam H. Langley is a research analyst in the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation and a master’s student in economics at Boston University.

References

Bureau of Government Research. 1999. Property tax exemption and assessment administration in Orleans parish. New Orleans, LA.

Center for Civil Society Studies. 2009. Impact of the 2007-09 Economic Recession on Nonprofit Organizations. Communique No. 14. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University for Policy Studies. June 29.

City of Boston. 2010. Mayor’s PILOT task force: Final report and recommendations. December.

Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. 2010. A call to build the capital city partnership for economic growth: Report to the Providence City Council from the Commission to Study Tax-Exempt Institutions. Providence, RI. November.

Hoene, Christopher W. 2009. City budget shortfalls and responses: projections for 2010-2012. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Hoene, Christopher W. and Michael A. Pagano. 2010. Research brief: City fiscal conditions in 2010. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

Kenyon, Daphne A. and Adam H. Langley. 2010. Payments in lieu of taxes: Balancing municipal and nonprofit interests. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Lipman, Harvy. 2006. The value of a tax break. The Chronicle of Philanthropy 19(4): 13.

McArdle, Regina, and Donna Demirai. 2004. A study of charitable and educational property tax exemptions. City and Town, January. Boston: Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services.

McFarland, Christiana. 2010. State of America’s cities survey on jobs and the economy. Washington, DC: National League of Cities.

National Council of Nonprofits. 2010. State budget crises: Ripping the safety net held by nonprofits. Washington DC. March 16.

Nolan, Bruce. 2011. N.O. Tax Fairness Commission begins rethinking property taxes. The Times-Picayune. February 3.

Walker, Andrea K., and Julie Scharper. 2010. Baltimore City Council committee backs $15 million in new taxes; deal with hospitals and universities announced for $20 million more. Baltimore Sun. June 10.

Adam H. Langley es analista senior de investigación en el Departamento de Valuación e Impuestos del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Previamente, Langley trabajó para la Asamblea del Estado de Nueva York. Obtuvo su licenciatura en Estudios políticos en el Bard College y una maestría en Economía en Boston University.

Las investigaciones de Langley han cubierto una serie de temas relacionados con las finanzas públicas estatales y locales, centrándose específicamente en el impuesto sobre la propiedad. Ha sido coautor de tres informes sobre enfoque en políticas de suelo del Instituto Lincoln: Property Tax Circuit Breakers: Fair and Cost-Effective Relief for Taxpayers (Fusibles para el impuesto sobre la propiedad: Alivio equitativo y económicamente efectivo para los contribuyentes) (2009), Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Balancing Municipal and Nonprofit Interests (Pagos en lugar de impuestos: Equilibrando los intereses de las municipalidades y organizaciones sin fines de lucro) (2010), y Rethinking Property Tax Incentives for Business (Repensando los incentivos del impuesto sobre la propiedad para las empresas) (2012). También ha liderado varios proyectos para proporcionar datos en el sitio web del Instituto Lincoln, como la creación de la base de datos de Ciudades Fiscalmente Estandarizadas (Fiscally Standardized Cities o FiSCs) y un juego de datos con amplia información sobre organizaciones sin fines de lucro que efectúan pagos en lugar de impuestos, y las localidades que los reciben.

Sus artículos han aparecido en publicaciones como Regional Science and Urban Economics, Public Finance and Management, y Publius: The Journal of Federalism. Su investigación también ha sido cubierta por más de cien medios periodísticos, incluyendo The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Governing, y The Boston Globe.

Land Lines: ¿En qué proyectos ha estado trabajando recientemente como analista de investigación senior del Instituto Lincoln?

Adam Langley: He estado trabajando en varios proyectos relacionados con las finanzas de los gobiernos locales. Un proyecto importante ha sido la creación de la base de datos de “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas” (Fiscally Standardized Cities o FiSCs). Este subcentro del sitio web del Instituto Lincoln permite a los usuarios realizar comparaciones significativas de las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel ciudad para 112 de las ciudades más grandes de los EE.UU. en los últimos 35 años. Utilicé estos datos en un artículo reciente sobre las finanzas municipales durante la Gran Recesión, que presenté en la 9.a Conferencia Anual sobre Política de Suelo el 2 de junio de 2014. También estoy creando una tabla resumida para describir los programas estatales de exención y créditos al impuesto sobre la propiedad, con información del subcentro “Características significativas del impuesto sobre la propiedad” del Instituto Lincoln. Pienso usar dicha tabla para estimar los gastos tributarios para estos programas en cada uno de los 50 estados.

Land Lines: Usted trabajó en varios proyectos para proporcionar datos en el sitio web del Instituto Lincoln. ¿Qué lo motiva a enfocarse en los datos?

Adam Langley: Estos proyectos de datos forman parte central de la misión del Instituto Lincoln de facilitar la toma de decisiones informadas sobre temas relacionados con el uso, la regulación y la tributación del suelo. Las bases de datos del Instituto han sido utilizadas por gestores de políticas, para ayudarles a guiar sus decisiones; por periodistas, para ampliar el contexto de sus notas; y por investigadores, para sus propios proyectos. El aprovisionamiento de datos accesibles sin cargo y fáciles de usar aumenta enormemente el alcance potencial del trabajo del Instituto en temas de políticas de suelo, porque permite a otros analistas realizar nuevas investigaciones sobre el tema.

También es esencial para el prestigio del Instituto Lincoln que nuestras recomendaciones de políticas se cimienten en un análisis de alta calidad y datos fidedignos. Para poder influir en las decisiones políticas, es fundamental que nuestras investigaciones sean ampliamente consideradas como objetivas, no partidistas y basadas en evidencias.

Land Lines: Usted dijo que la base de datos de “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas” permite realizar comparaciones significativas de las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel ciudad. ¿Qué tiene de malo la simple comparación de gobiernos municipales?

Adam Langley: Las responsabilidades de servicio de los gobiernos municipales varían mucho a lo largo del país. Mientras que algunas municipalidades brindan una oferta completa de servicios públicos a sus residentes, otras comparten estas responsabilidades con una serie de gobiernos independientes superpuestos. Debido a estas diferencias en la estructura de los gobiernos locales, la comparación simple de gobiernos municipales puede ser engañosa.

Por ejemplo, consideremos una comparación entre Baltimore y Tampa. El gobierno municipal de Baltimore gasta tres veces más per cápita que el gobierno municipal de Tampa (US$5.594 vs. US$1.829 en 2011). No obstante, la diferencia se debe casi por completo al hecho de que la ciudad de Tampa comparte el aprovisionamiento de servicios locales con un distrito escolar independiente y con el condado de Hillsborough al que pertenece, mientras que Baltimore no cuenta con ningún condado superpuesto, y las escuelas forman parte del gobierno municipal propiamente dicho. Cuando se tienen en cuenta todos los gobiernos superpuestos en la base de datos de FiSC, los gastos per cápita para los residentes de las dos ciudades son casi idénticos: US$6.083 en Baltimore vs. US$6.067 en Tampa.

Land Lines: ¿Puede explicar la metodología utilizada para crear las “Ciudades fiscalmente estandarizadas”?

Adam Langley: Las FiSC se construyen sumando los ingresos de cada gobierno municipal con la proporción pertinente de los condados superpuestos, distritos escolares independientes y distritos especiales. Los ingresos del condado se asignan a la base de datos FiSC según la proporción de la población del condado que vive en dicha ciudad; los ingresos escolares se asignan en base al porcentaje de estudiantes del distrito que vive en la ciudad central, y los ingresos de los distritos especiales se asignan en base a la proporción de los residentes del área de servicio del distrito que vive en la ciudad. Por lo tanto, la base de datos FiSC proporciona una representación plena de los ingresos recaudados de los residentes y comercios de la ciudad, ya sea por el gobierno municipal o por un gobierno separado superpuesto. Estas asignaciones se hacen para más de 120 categorías de ingresos, gastos, deudas y activos. La metodología de la base de datos FiSC fue desarrollada junto con Andrew Reschovsky, fellow del Instituto Lincoln, y Howard Chernick, profesor de Hunter College de la Universidad de la Ciudad de Nueva York. Calculamos las estimaciones usando datos fiscales de cada gobierno individual proporcionados por la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. y actualizamos la base de datos de FiSC con los datos de años posteriores, en la medida que se encuentren disponibles.

Land Lines: ¿Por qué es importante comparar las finanzas de los gobiernos locales a nivel de ciudad?

Adam Langley: Mucha gente quiere saber cómo se compara su ciudad con otras ciudades, pero al hacer estas comparaciones es fundamental contabilizar las diferencias en las estructuras de los gobiernos locales. La base de datos FiSC precisamente hace eso. Por lo tanto, se puede usar para comparar los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad en dos ciudades, clasificar a todas las ciudades por su nivel de gasto escolar, investigar cambios en los salarios del sector público a lo largo del tiempo, o ver qué ciudades dependen más de la ayuda estatal para financiar sus presupuestos.

En otro proyecto, junto con Andrew Reschovsky y Richard Dye, estamos usando la metodología de FiSC para estimar los costos de las pensiones y otras obligaciones de los gobiernos locales de cada ciudad. La cobertura en los medios de comunicación a veces da la impresión de que todos los planes públicos de pensiones tienen dificultades, pero en realidad hay mucha variación en el país. Para poder investigar estas diferencias, es fundamental contar con datos comparables de costos de pensiones de todos los gobiernos locales de cada ciudad. Por ejemplo, las estimaciones iniciales muestran que en promedio la contribución requerida anual (annual required contribution o ARC) de los planes de pensiones locales en 2010 ascendía al 4,9 por ciento de los ingresos generales en las 112 FiSC de la base de datos. No obstante, la ARC era más del 10 por ciento de los ingresos tanto en Chicago (11,7 por ciento) como en Portland, Oregón (10,9 por ciento).

Land Lines: ¿La disminución de los ingresos durante la Gran Recesión varió mucho en las distintas ciudades?

Adam Langley: Sí, la disminución de ingresos varió significativamente en las 112 FiSC durante y después de la recesión. Cuando se tiene en cuenta la inflación y el crecimiento de la población, sólo los ingresos de ocho FiSC evitaron una disminución neta a finales de 2011. Calculé los cambios en los ingresos reales per cápita con respecto al máximo de cada FiSC hasta finales de 2011. Alrededor de un tercio de ellas tuvo una disminución del 5 por ciento o menos (41 FiSC), otro tercio sufrió disminuciones de entre el 5 y 10 por ciento (34 FiSC), y alrededor de un cuarto sufrió disminuciones superiores al10 por ciento (29 FiSC). Las FiSC con las mayores disminuciones de ingresos fueron Las Vegas (20,2 por ciento), Riverside (18,0 por ciento) y Sacramento (18,0 por ciento).

Land Lines: ¿Se han recuperado mucho los ingresos de los gobiernos locales desde el fin de la recesión?

Adam Langley: Todavía no, porque los cambios en el nivel de ingresos se retrasaron varios años con respecto a los cambios en la economía durante y después de la recesión. Los ingresos gubernamentales reales per cápita fueron estables a lo largo de 2009, disminuyeron un poco en 2010, y cayeron de forma importante en 2011. El último año con datos completos es 2011, así que combiné distintas fuentes de datos para estimar los ingresos a lo largo de 2013. Estos datos sugieren que los ingresos tocaron fondo en 2012, cuando fueron entre un 5 y 6 por ciento inferiores a los de 2007. Esto quiere decir que los ingresos no llegaron a su valor mínimo hasta tres años después de que la recesión terminó oficialmente. Los ingresos comenzaron a recuperarse en 2013, pero siguieron siendo más del 4 por ciento inferiores a los niveles previos a la recesión.

Este retraso se debe a cambios en la ayuda intergubernamental y los impuestos sobre la propiedad, que en su conjunto financian casi dos tercios del presupuesto de los gobiernos locales. La Ley de Recuperación y Reinversión Americana proporcionó a los estados alrededor de 150.000 millones de dólares en estímulos federales entre 2009 y 2011, con fondos de estímulo adicionales proporcionados directamente a los gobiernos locales. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los fondos de estímulo desaparecieron el año 2012, lo cual condujo a los mayores recortes de gasto estatales de los últimos 25 años. Más aún, los cambios en los impuestos sobre la propiedad normalmente se retrasan con respecto a los cambios en los precios de las viviendas entre dos y tres años, debido a que el monto se basa en la tasación de años anteriores, hay retrasos en la actualización de dichas tasaciones y otros factores. Este retraso hizo que los impuestos sobre la propiedad crecieran a lo largo de 2009, no disminuyeran hasta 2011, y cayeran a su punto mínimo en 2012.

Land Lines: ¿Puede darnos más detalles sobre su trabajo acerca de la exención de impuestos sobre la propiedad y los programas de crédito?

Adam Langley: Ya casi he terminado con la primera etapa de este proyecto, que consiste en crear una tabla con el resumen de los programas de exención y créditos estatales. La tabla contiene datos de 167 programas, con 18 variables que describen las características principales de cada programa. Hay información sobre el valor de las exenciones expresadas en términos de valor de mercado; criterios relacionados con la edad, discapacidad, nivel de ingresos y si el beneficiario es un veterano de guerra; el tipo de impuesto afectado; si la pérdida de ingresos tributarios la sufre el estado o el gobierno local; opciones locales; etc. Una vez que haya completado la tabla, escribiré un resumen de política para describir las características principales de estos programas. Toda esta información se deriva de la tabla “Programas de alivio tributario para propiedades residenciales” del subcentro “Características significativas del impuesto sobre la propiedad” del sitio web del Instituto. La tabla original de “Alivio residencial” brinda descripciones detalladas de cada programa, mientras que la tabla resumida será más útil para aquellos usuarios que quieran hacer una comparación rápida entre estados, o para investigadores que quieran realizar análisis cuantitativos.

En la segunda etapa de este proyecto, calcularé los gastos tributarios de mantener estos programas de alivio tributario del impuesto sobre la propiedad. A pesar de la preponderancia de estos programas y su a menudo considerable impacto en la carga tributaria sobre la propiedad, no existen estimaciones completas sobre su costo. Usando datos de la tabla resumida y microdatos de la Encuesta de Comunidades Americanas, calcularé para cada estado el porcentaje de residentes que pueden beneficiarse de los programas de alivio tributario sobre la propiedad, el costo total de dichos programas, el beneficio promedio para los beneficiarios y el porcentaje de residentes elegibles y el beneficio promedio por quin-til de ingresos. Estos cálculos proporcionarán nueva y valiosa información sobre el impacto de los programas de alivio del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos.