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State trust lands in the Intermountain West could play an important role in the growing market for renewable energy. Congress granted these territories, covering 35 million acres, to states upon their entry to the Union, to support schools and other public institutions. As managers of these state trust lands search for innovative and sustainable ways to lease and sell parcels to generate income, renewables could prove to be a double boon—by supplying clean, sustainable power and providing a strong revenue stream for the public benefit.
All seven states in the Intermountain West—Arizona, Idaho, Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming (figure 1)—are using state trust lands to develop renewables, including wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass projects. Yet the industry has not flourished to its full potential. In 2011, the installed renewable energy production capacity on state trust lands was only 360 megawatts—not enough to power 2 percent of the homes in the region. The $2 million in revenue generated by these sources on state trust lands amounts to less than 1 percent of the $1 billion-plus generated there annually by other means (Berry 2013; WSLCA). Wind energy is experiencing the most activity by far; all the Intermountain West states have leased state trust lands for wind projects, and all have operational wind farms. Although Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah have leased state trust lands for solar operations, only one generation facility is in production on state trust lands in the Intermountain West, in Arizona. Only Utah has a geothermal plant on state trust land, and no states in this region have active biomass facilities on trust lands.
This article will focus on three types of renewable energy production in three states—a wind farm in Montana, geothermal projects in Utah, and solar generation in Arizona—and the conditions, legislation, and other factors that led to successful operations. All three examples demonstrate that these territories offer a largely untapped bounty for this burgeoning, sustainable market; provide learning opportunities across state lines; and help meet growing demand for renewable energy.
Judith Gap Wind Farm, Montana
Judith Gap is Montana’s only operational wind farm on state trust land, straddling private land as well, in the central-eastern part of the state. It has 90 turbines total, each with a capacity of 1.5 megawatts; 13 are on state trust lands, on the leading edge of the wind farm, with a total capacity of 19.5 megawatts. The per-megawatt fee of approximately 2.6 percent of gross receipts brings in about $50,000 per year according to Mike Sullivan of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). At the time of construction, there was a one-time installation fee of $20,000 (Rodman 2008).
Bob Quinn, founder of a local wind development company called Windpark Solutions, initiated the project in 2000, when he proposed the idea to a small group including representatives from the local utility, the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, and the DNRC. Quinn says that close collaboration between the developer and personnel in these state agencies was key to successfully siting the project on state trust land. State staff also helped Quinn navigate other difficult challenges including unanticipated delays in the request for proposals (RFP) process required by the state.
After conducting preliminary studies—allowed for one year through a land use license from the DNRC—developers must apply to the DNRC in order to proceed with energy projects. The state then issues a request for proposals (RFP). Applicants with a land use license do not receive preferential treatment. After a successful applicant is identified, the developer must conduct environmental analyses, secure a power purchase agreement with a utility, and determine economic feasibility before signing a lease with the DNRC. Currently, fees for new land use licenses are generally $2 per acre per year. Lease agreement costs for new wind projects include a one-time installation charge of $1,500 to $2,500 per megawatt of installed capacity, and annual fees of 3 percent of gross annual revenues or $3,000 for each megawatt of installed capacity, whichever is greater (Rodman 2008, Billings Gazette 2010).
Lease and Fee Structures
Every state has different leasing systems for renewable energy projects on state trust lands, but they all follow a similar pattern. The process usually starts with a short-term planning lease that allows for exploration and meteorological studies. The construction phase is next, followed by a longer-term production lease. Payments to the trust land management agency usually include a per-acre rent during the planning phase, which may continue into the production phase. There are additional installation charges for equipment, including meteorological towers, wind turbines, solar collectors, structures, and other infrastructure. During the production phase, the fee is typically based either on the installed capacity or the gross revenues of the generation facility.
Since Judith Gap was completed in 2005, several wind farms have proposed development on state trust lands in Montana, but none have reached the production phase. These include the Springdale Wind Energy project—an 80-megawatt wind farm consisting of 44 turbines, 8 of which would be on state trust lands. The DNRC has also leased 3,000 acres near Martinsdale to Horizon Wind Energy for a wind farm with 27 turbines, 7 to 15 of which would be on state trust lands. The Martinsdale wind farm could expand to 100 turbines in the future (MT DNRC).
In order to make state trust lands more attractive to these and other renewable energy developers, the DNRC would benefit from a more streamlined process. Developers working on state trust lands in Montana have cited struggles with timing, financing, environmental mitigation, cooperation from power buyers, and transmission (Rodman 2008). According to Quinn, Judith Gap succeeded in part due to dedication and close collaboration between agency personnel and the energy developer. In the future, the DNRC may need to assign personnel to renewable energy projects in order to guide developers through the process. The DNRC could also attract projects by granting land use license holders preferential status in the RFP process and by opening up bidding faster. Quinn notes that evaluating bids according to performance rather than price alone would improve the system.
Geothermal Energy, Utah
Geothermal energy is a potentially constant power source, offsetting fluctuations from intermittent renewables such as wind and solar. However, it’s also technically complex and expensive—and thus rare on state trust lands in the Intermountain West. Utah is currently the only state in the region with active geothermal facilities on state trust land. Measured by land area, geothermal is Utah’s largest renewable energy supply, with approximately 100,000 acres leased on state trust lands. There are currently two geothermal energy plants in production, generating revenue of $200,000 to $300,000 per year. For geothermal projects, the State and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (SITLA), which manages state trust lands in Utah, charges 2.25 percent of electricity sales for the first 5 or 10 years, and 3.5 percent thereafter.
PacifiCorp’s 34-megawatt Blundell plant, on a mix of federal, state, and private territory, was the state’s first, built in 1984. Blundell taps into an underground reservoir that is 3,000 feet deep, more than 500° F, and pressurized at 500 pounds per square inch. A well brings the hot, high-pressure water to the surface, where it powers a steam turbine. The Blundell plant has two units, a 23-megawatt unit built in 1984 and an 11-megawatt unit completed in 2007.
The newer Raser plant in Beaver County has been less successful. Raser originally planned to build a 15-megawatt operation using a new, modular technology produced by United Technologies, says John Andrews, SITLA associate director. The company aimed to cut costs and development time by exploring the geothermal resource while constructing the generation facility—instead of fully developing geothermal wells first, then building the power plant later. Unfortunately, the geothermal resource fell short of expectations and could not support a 15-megawatt operation. With limited income, Raser could not cover debts and declared bankruptcy in 2011. The plant continues to run at limited capacity (Oberbeck 2009).
The experience at Raser shows that the costs of geothermal development continue to be daunting and that it’s worthwhile to fully characterize the available geothermal resource prior to constructing generation facilities, although that additional step is costly and time-consuming. Future technological advances may help to cut the costs and time required for geothermal development, but, given the current state of technology, geothermal projects still require significant upfront outlays.
For renewable energy development, SITLA responds to applications as they are received; they can also offer lands through a request for proposals or a competitive sealed bid process (Rodman 2008). The state has mapped renewable energy zones, but the task of finding locations and proposing renewable energy projects devolves to developers.
Utah faces other challenges to all forms of renewable energy development on trust lands. Because of the high proportion and pattern of federally owned territory, national agencies sometimes take the lead on energy development projects. According to Andrews, the absence of an RPS in Utah is another drawback, leaving local utilities without a state mandate to supply renewable energy.
Even without an RPS, however, Utah is geographically well-positioned to export energy to other states—particularly to population centers on the west coast. Although transmission can be a barrier in some parts of the state, transmission capacity is available between Utah and southern California. What’s more, developers can tap an array of renewable resources—wind, solar, and geothermal. SITLA would benefit from marketing trust lands within renewable energy zones to potential developers and by offering reduced rates for renewable energy projects within these areas.
Solar Developments in Arizona
Even in Arizona—the sunniest state in the U.S., according to the National Weather Service—the solar industry faces several obstacles on state trust lands. The only active solar facility on state trust lands, the Foothills Solar Plant opened on 400 acres in Yuma County in April 2013, when the first 17 megawatts came online. An additional 18 megawatts are scheduled to go online in December 2013. Once it’s fully operational, the facility will serve 9,000 customers. The 35-year lease will generate $10 million for state trust lands beneficiaries, and most of that money will fund public education.
The slow development of the solar industry on trust lands mirrors a larger trend seen nationwide. In 2010, only 0.03 percent of the nation’s energy came from solar projects, while 2.3 percent came from wind (www.eia.gov). Solar projects usually require exclusive use of a site—putting them at an even greater disadvantage on state trust lands, where many acres are already leased for agriculture, grazing, or oil and gas production. Wind projects, by contrast, can co-exist with other land uses. Solar projects also require large tracts—as many as 12 acres per megawatt (Culp and Gibbons 2010)—whereas wind facilities have a relatively small footprint. And, although prices are dropping, solar generation facilities can be very expensive.
Despite these drawbacks, there are ways in which solar development is well-suited to state trust lands. For starters, these territories are untaxed and owned free and clear; unburdened by the carrying costs that private owners might have, state trust land management agencies have an advantage for holding and maintaining renewable energy projects. Some solar developers have found state trust land attractive because they can work with one owner for very large tracts. Solar generation is also well-suited to previously disturbed sites, such as old landfills and abandoned agricultural areas, which may include trust lands. Near urban areas, state trust lands slated for future development could be used for solar generation in the interim; after the solar leases expire, the grounds could be developed for urban uses (Culp and Gibbons 2010).
State-level RPS and tax incentives could also encourage solar development. Some states provide up to 25 percent investment tax credits, property tax exemptions, and standard-offer contracts on solar, guaranteeing a long-term market for solar output.
As one of the largest landowners in the state, with several large, consolidated parcels, the Arizona State Land Department (ASLD) would do well to position itself as an attractive partner for the renewable energy industry (Wadsack 2009). The ASLD is taking steps in the right direction by developing a GIS-based renewable energy mapping system to analyze state trust lands for general suitability for solar production, based on avoiding critical wildlife habitat and wilderness areas, and minimizing distance to roads, transmission, and load. But it must follow up and market the most suitable areas for renewables (Culp and Gibbons 2010) and facilitate the process for developers, who can be deterred by complex leasing structures, requirements for public auctions, and required environmental and cultural analyses (Wadsack 2009). The more the agency can build capacity to help developers through this process, the more the renewable energy industry might flourish on state trust lands. For example, the department could offer long-term leases, expedite land sales, or develop a reduced-cost, revenue-sharing lease system specifically tailored for renewable energy development.
General Recommendations for Montana, Utah, and Arizona
Leasing renewable energy on state trust lands is complicated. Each state has a unique set of political, environmental, and economic circumstances that makes it difficult to determine any one best method for all. However, the accomplishments, problems, and solutions detailed in the examples above provide some general recommendations for success.
At the state land trust agency level:
At the state level:
Federal policies play a considerable role as well. Production tax credits in particular have spurred U.S. renewable energy deployment in recent decades. Likewise, federal investment tax credits for renewable energy—which provide developers with a tax credit during the planning and construction phases—have helped the renewable energy industry grow in recent years, even when the national economy was in recession. Finally, there have been several proposals for a federal-level renewable portfolio standard, although researchers disagree whether this type of policy would interfere with existing state-level RPS policies, which have proven extremely effective.
Renewable energy offers state trust land managers an opportunity to diversify their revenue stream to benefit the public good. For the most part, wind and transmission projects can be co-located with pre-existing leases for grazing, agriculture, oil, and gas. Solar projects could have great potential in previously disturbed sites or areas with little other value. Where geothermal resources are available, they offer consistent power that can offset intermittent sources like wind or solar. Technological advances could help bring down prices for renewables, particularly solar, geothermal, and biomass. As our energy demands grow, state trust lands are poised to play an important role in the growing renewable energy industry.
This article was adapted from the Lincoln Institute working paper, “Leasing Renewable Energy on State Trust Lands,” available online here: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2192_1518_Berry_WP12AB1.pdf.
About the Author
Alison Berry is the energy and economics specialist at the Sonoran Institute, where her work focuses on land use issues in a changing West. She holds a bachelor’s degree in biology from the University of Vermont and a master’s degree in forestry from the University of Montana. Her work has been published in the Wall Street Journal, the Journal of Forestry, and the Western Journal of Applied Forestry, among other publications. Contact: aberry@sonoraninstitute.org.
Resources
Berry, Jason, David Hurlbut, Richard Simon, Joseph Moore, and Robert Blackett. 2009. Utah Renewable Energy Zones Task Force Phase I Report. http://www.energy.utah.gov/renewable_energy/docs/mp-09-1low.pdf.
Billings Gazette. 2010. Wind farm developers eye school trust land. April 22. http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/article_14bfb038-4e0a-11df-bc99-001cc4c002e0.html.
Bureau of Land Management. 2011. Restoration Design Energy Project. http://www.blm.gov/az/st/en/prog/energy/arra_solar.html.
Culp, Peter, and Jocelyn Gibbons. 2010. Strategies for Renewable Energy Projects on Arizona’s State Trust Lands. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper WP11PC2. https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1984_1306_CulpGibbon%20Final.pdf.
Montana Department of Natural Resources. 2011. Montana’s Trust Lands. Presented at the Western States Land Commissioners Association annual meeting. Online: http://www.glo.texas.gov/wslca/pdf/state-reports-2011/wslca-presentation-mt-2011.pdf accessed November 23, 2011.
Oberbeck, Steven. 2009. Utah geothermal plant runs into cold-water problems. Salt Lake Tribune. September 17. And Bathon, Michael. 2011. Utah’s Raser Technologies files Chapter 11. Salt Lake Tribune. May 2.
Rodman, Nancy Welch. 2008. Wind, wave/tidal, and in-river flow energy: A review of the decision framework of state land management agencies. Prepared for the Western States Land Commissioners Association. http://www.glo.texas.gov/wslca/pdf/wind_wave_tidal_river.pdf.
Wadsack, Karin. 2009 Arizona Wind Development Status Report. Arizona Corporation Commission.
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Una caricatura de Jack Ziegler en la revista New Yorker refleja la ironía esencial de participar en condominios, cooperativas y otros tipos de asociaciones de propietarios. Un automóvil está ingresando en un camino que conduce hasta un grupo de casas adosadas a lo lejos, con un cartel en la entrada que proclama “Bienvenido a Condoville y la ilusión de ser propietario de su propia vivienda” (Ziegler 1984).
A pesar de esta ambigüedad, aproximadamente un cuarto de la población estadounidense vive ahora en viviendas gestionadas por asociaciones, conocidas en su conjunto como comunidades de interés común (CIC). La figura 1 muestra el impresionante aumento de las CIC en las últimas décadas. Entre 1970 y 2013, la cantidad de unidades de vivienda en este tipo de comunidades pasó de alrededor de 700.000 a 26,3 millones, mientras que la cantidad de residentes se multiplicó por más de 30, de 2,1 millones a 65,7 millones.
Con su creciente popularidad, las comunidades de interés común han generado desafíos políticos y problemas legales que exigen constante resolución. Estos conflictos en general tienen que ver con preocupaciones externas de que las CIC segregan a los ricos del resto de la sociedad, o desacuerdos internos entre los propietarios individuales y los órganos de gobierno de sus asociaciones. Este artículo examina algunas de las controversias asociadas al modelo de CIC y su sistema de gobierno, y sugiere medidas para aumentar los beneficios de las comunidades de interés común, tanto para los propietarios como para la sociedad en general.
El aumento de las comunidades de interés común
La creciente industrialización que se produjo en el siglo XIX, causó contaminación, tráfico, ruido y enfermedades, lo que llevó a muchos planificadores y ciudadanos a favorecer la separación de usos residenciales, comerciales e industriales. (La zonificación como herramienta de planificación no había surgido todavía, y no sería legitimada por la Corte Suprema de Justicia de los Estados Unidos hasta 1926). Algunos emprendedores residenciales impusieron por lo tanto “servidumbres” (convenios, restricciones y derechos de acceso en predios ajenos) sobre sus proyectos de subdivisión. Las servidumbres generalmente restringían las propiedades a usos residenciales y frecuentemente creaban derechos compartidos para el uso de instalaciones y servicios comunales, a cambio de aranceles. Los compradores de lotes aceptaban estas servidumbres y, una vez que las restricciones se habían registrado, los compradores subsiguientes estaban legalmente obligados a respetarlas. El derecho consuetudinario resultó ser un vehículo efectivo para crear áreas residenciales de alto nivel, como Gramercy Park en Nueva York (1831) y Louisburg Square en Boston (1844).
Después de una desaceleración durante la Gran Depresión y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la construcción de CIC comenzó a crecer a fines de la década de 1960, y la Administración Federal de Viviendas (FHA) reconoció el condominio como un vehículo de propiedad asegurable, seguido de leyes legislativas estatales en el mismo sentido. Los seguros hipotecarios de la FHA animaron a los emprendedores a construir condominios para la clase media, que ganaron aceptación en el mercado como consecuencia del movimiento llamado “new town” (nuevos pueblos), ejemplificado por las primeras comunidades planificadas, como Reston, Virginia (1964) y Columbia, Maryland (1967). La aprobación de la Propuesta 13 en California, una iniciativa que limitó la tributación a la propiedad en 1978, y de medidas similares en otros estados, también impulsó el crecimiento de las CIC, ya que los gobiernos locales, necesitados de fondos y bajo creciente presión para suministrar más servicios, ya no estaban dispuestos a absorber los costos de infraestructura y servicios de nuevos emprendimientos. Por esta razón, tendieron a aprobar solamente nuevos emprendimientos en forma de CIC, donde los costos estaban cubiertos por el emprendedor (y en última instancia por los propietarios).
Hoy en día, los propietarios de CIC están sujetos generalmente a una variedad de restricciones sobre sus unidades privadas, desde limitaciones sobre la diagramación y el diseño de los edificios y el tipo de materiales de construcción utilizados, hasta restricciones en las decoraciones visibles, estructuras auxiliares y el paisajismo. Frecuentemente existen controles sobre la conducta de los propietarios y el uso de la propiedad, que está normalmente limitado a ocupación residencial. También se pueden imponer reglamentos sobre ruido, estacionamiento y tráfico, junto con restricciones vehiculares. En algunos casos también se prohíben carteles políticos, distribución de volantes y actividades asociadas.
A cambio de las cuotas de asociación, los propietarios tienen acceso a infraestructura común, como calles y áreas recreativas, y a servicios privados, como seguridad, recolección de basura, limpieza de calles y remoción de nieve. En general, la CIC es administrada por un gobierno residencial privado y varios comités, que son elegidos por los propietarios y están sujetos a las leyes que rigen contratos civiles, no al derecho público administrativo y constitucional (ver recuadro 1).
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Recuadro 1: Modelos de comunidades de interés común
Las CIC normalmente tienen un gobierno privado elegido por los propietarios para administrar y hacer cumplir los contratos, y para promulgar reglas que beneficien los intereses de la comunidad. Aunque la forma exacta de la estructura de gobierno puede variar, los conceptos básicos son similares.
Asociaciones de propietarios
Los propietarios de cada unidad –en general una vivienda unifamiliar o adosada– poseen el título de propiedad de la misma. La asociación posee el título de las áreas comunes y otorga a los propietarios derechos de servidumbre para poder usarlas. Éstas se pueden crear por derecho común o, en algunos estados, bajo derecho legislado. Las asociaciones de propietarios constituyen más de la mitad de las asociaciones comunitarias del país.
Condominios
Los propietarios de cada unidad poseen el título de propiedad de la misma, más un porcentaje de las áreas comunes. La asociación administra las áreas comunes, pero no posee el título de las mismas. Los condominios pueden ser verticales (edificios de apartamentos) u horizontales (viviendas unifamiliares o adosadas) y se crean exclusivamente bajo leyes estatales. Los condominios representan entre el 45 y 48 por ciento de las asociaciones comunitarias.
Cooperativas
Una corporación cooperativa es dueña del edificio, y los propietarios reciben acciones en la corporación y un contrato de alquiler de largo plazo, automáticamente renovable, sobre sus unidades individuales. A diferencia de los condominios y las asociaciones de propietarios, la corporación puede transferir el control de los contratos de alquiler y las acciones de los propietarios de la cooperativa. Sólo entre el 3 y 4 por ciento de las asociaciones comunitarias está organizado en cooperativas.
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Beneficios económicos de las CIC
Las CIC aportan beneficios económicos sustanciales a sus propietarios y a la sociedad en general. Los residentes que compran propiedades en estas comunidades han llegado a la conclusión de que las instalaciones compartidas, como las áreas recreativas, son, un mejor valor que, por ejemplo, las piscinas personales y otras instalaciones privadas. De manera similar, aquellos que se han unido a las CIC han llegado a la conclusión de que ciertas restricciones (como la prohibición de estacionar casas rodantes en las entradas de vehículos) aumentan el valor de su propiedad.
Estas comunidades también ayudan a lograr un uso eficiente del suelo. Los costos de organizar y administrar una comunidad residencial privada son menores que los de un sistema público (Nelson 2009). Los costos de transacción y captación de rentas por medio del sistema político también se reducen. Finalmente, como está libre de restricciones legislativas y constitucionales, una comunidad privada tiene mayor flexibilidad para crear sus propias reglas y operaciones, liberándola de la necesidad de cumplir con pautas públicas cuando firma contratos con proveedores de servicios y abastecedores.
Los tribunales estadounidenses han validado estos beneficios en eficiencia al reconocer los contratos de CIC y la participación de sus propietarios en los mismos. En opinión de un tribunal: “Es un hecho reconocido que [los convenios] aumentan el valor de la propiedad subdividida y crean un incentivo para que los compradores adquieran lotes dentro de la subdivisión” (Gunnels vs. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, Tex. Ct. App, 17013 [1978]).
Preocupaciones externas: Secesión de la comunidad general
A pesar de estos beneficios, varios comentaristas han argumentado a que los servicios e instalaciones privadas de las CIC están solamente disponibles para aquellos que tienen el dinero suficiente, y que sirven para separar a los ricos del resto de la sociedad. El resto de la municipalidad donde se encuentra la CIC se ve obligado a vivir sin estos privilegios, creando un sistema permanente de dos niveles de vivienda. Los críticos también argumentan que la privatización de infraestructura y servicios aísla a los residentes de las CIC y reduce su interés en temas comunales generales.
De acuerdo a esta lógica, los residentes de las CIC están menos dispuestos a participar con el gobierno público en asuntos cívicos, y son mucho más propensos a oponerse a los aumentos de impuestos, ya que los servicios son proporcionados por la CIC y no por el gobierno municipal. Cuando las asociaciones comunitarias forman parte de los emprendimientos suburbanos, el aislamiento del centro urbano puede agudizarse. Estas preocupaciones se centran frecuentemente en el miedo a sufrir segregación económica y de clase. El ex Secretario de Trabajo Robert Reich escribió en un artículo para el New York Times, titulado “Secesión de los exitosos”: En muchas ciudades y pueblos, los ricos han retirado de hecho su dinero del mantenimiento de los espacios e instituciones públicas compartidas por todos y han dedicado sus ahorros a sus propios servicios privados… Los condominios y las omnipresentes comunidades residenciales presionan a sus miembros a realizar trabajos que los gobiernos locales con fondos escasos ya no están en condiciones de hacer bien (Reich 1991).
Libertad de elección
Esta caracterización de las asociaciones comunitarias, sin embargo, contradice los valores estadounidenses fundamentales de libertad de contrato y libertad de asociación. Es un valor compartido por todos que la gente puede gastar su dinero y firmar contratos de la manera que quiera, siempre que sus fines sean lícitos. La ley sólo interfiere con la libertad de contrato ocasionalmente, cuando se ponen en juego consideraciones políticas importantes. Los tribunales han reconocido que la libertad de contrato es un elemento importante para sostener los acuerdos de servidumbre privados: Comenzamos con el supuesto de que las personas privadas, en el ejercicio de su derecho constitucional de libertad de contrato, pueden imponer las restricciones que quieran sobre el uso del suelo transferido a otro (Grubel vs. McLaughlin, D. Va. [1968]).
Las CIC también son un reflejo de la creencia estadounidense en la libertad de asociación, ejemplificada por una larga tradición de comunidades utópicas y otras redes basadas en creencias. Los residentes de las CIC modernas podrían compartir intereses comunes, como los propietarios que viven en comunidades ecuestres o de clubes de golf. Otros residentes pueden simplemente compartir el deseo de vivir con tranquilidad o de gozar del carácter del barrio. En Behind the Gates (Detrás de las puertas), Setha Low sugiere que las CIC permiten a las “familias de clase media establecer sus paisajes residenciales con “amabilidad”, de manera que puedan reflejar su propia estética de orden, constancia y control” (Low 2004). Cualquiera que sea la razón, las asociaciones comunitarias son congruentes con la observación de Tocqueville sobre las interacciones entre estadounidenses: Los estadounidenses de toda edad, condición y disposición están constantemente formando asociaciones.No sólo tienen compañías comerciales y de manufactura, de las cuales todos forman parte, sino también asociaciones de miles de otros tipos: religiosas, morales, serias, fútiles, amplias o restringidas, enormes o diminutas (de Tocqueville 1835).
Más aún, las pruebas disponibles demuestran que los residentes de CIC están generalmente contentos con su elección. En 2014, en una encuesta realizada por Public Opinion Strategies para el Instituto de Asociaciones Comunitarias, el 64 por ciento de los propietarios dieron una opinión positiva sobre su experiencia general, y el 26 por ciento dieron una opinión neutra. Si bien el 86 por ciento de los encuestados indicaron que preferiría menor regulación gubernamental o, por lo menos, que no quería ninguna regulación adicional, el 70 por ciento opinó que las reglas y restricciones de la asociación protegen y aumentan el valor de su propiedad.
El problema de doble tributación
Si bien el auge de las CIC se debe a una variedad de factores, uno especialmente clave fue la constricción financiera de las municipalidades después de las revueltas tributarias de la década de 1970. De hecho, una narrativa distinta sobre el tema de “la secesión” es que algunos de los propietarios en comunidades de interés común creen que el gobierno municipal los abandonó a ellos.
Los propietarios de CIC pagan impuestos sobre la propiedad a la misma tasa que otros ciudadanos, aunque a título privado servicios como recolección de basura, limpieza de calles y seguridad, como parte de las cuotas de asociación comunitaria. Esto equivale a una doble tributación, porque los propietarios de asociaciones pagan por un servicio que no reciben.
Si hubiera una política de no proveer de servicios efectivamente antes de que el propietario comprara una unidad en una CIC, teóricamente el comprador podría ofrecer un precio de compra más bajo que reflejase la falta de servicios municipales y el efecto de la doble tributación. El propietario de la unidad estaría protegido, y el emprendedor absorbería la pérdida. Pero si una municipalidad reduce los servicios pero no los impuestos después de la compra de la unidad, el propietario sufre una pérdida no compensada. Este resultado sería una mala política, pues supondría posibilitar la captación de rentas al permitir que una mayoría los ciudadanos de un pueblo seleccionara a un grupo de residentes para que soporte una carga tributaria adicional sin crear costos adicionales. Esto pervierte la noción de ecuanimidad y eficiencia, y es antitética a la construcción de comunidad y confianza cívica.
Es especialmente importante que las legislaturas eviten el uso de la doble tributación como política, dado que las acciones judiciales al respecto tienen poca probabilidad de tener éxito. Los pocos tribunales que han examinado ataques contra la doble tributación han sido indiferentes a los argumentos de que viola el proceso de derecho debido, viola la cláusula de protección igualitaria de la Constitución, o que equivale a la toma de una propiedad sin compensación. Si bien la doble tributación puede ser una mala política, no es inconstitucional. Los tribunales no deberían revocar estas decisiones legislativas, porque son esencialmente decisiones políticas que el público debería rechazar en las urnas.
La cuestión de desigualdad
El argumento de “secesión de los ricos” parece estar basado en la noción de que sólo los propietarios de mayores ingresos con viviendas de mayor valor son los que viven en comunidades de interés común. Los datos disponibles, sin embargo, no apoyan este supuesto con claridad. Como se indica en la figura 2, los precios de condominios y cooperativas –que suman la mitad de las unidades en CIC del país– son inferiores a los de todas las viviendas existentes (que incluyen condominios, cooperativas y viviendas unifamiliares dentro y fuera de asociaciones comunitarias). Si bien estas estimaciones no están segmentadas en profundidad (por ejemplo, no desglosan las viviendas unifamiliares dentro y fuera de las CIC), demuestran que los valores de condominios y cooperativas concuerdan con los valores de las viviendas en general.
El acceso a viviendas a un precio asequible es un desafío importante en los Estados Unidos, pero las asociaciones comunitarias no son necesariamente la causa de estos problemas arraigados y complejos. Antes de que las CIC se hicieran populares, los gobiernos locales ya habían impuesto la zonificación en forma de requerimientos de lotes de una gran superficie mínima, lo que frenaba a los emprendedores a construir viviendas de interés social. De hecho, se ha demostrado que las CIC han reducido los costos de la compra de vivienda. Las viviendas multifamiliares, como los condominios y las casas adosadas, son más económicas que las viviendas unifamiliares, porque recortan el costo del suelo, la infraestructura y la construcción (Ellickson & Been 2005). Las cooperativas de viviendas de interés social permiten restricciones a los precios de reventa y el nivel de ingresos del propietario, asegurando que las familias de bajos ingresos tengan la oportunidad de acceder a la vivienda. Con este propósito, los emprendedores que operan bajo requisitos o incentivos municipales frecuentemente designan como de interés social ciertas unidades de condominio dentro del proyecto.
Por lo tanto, es simplista y contraproducente considerar que las asociaciones comunitarias son un campo de batalla entre ricos y pobres.También el uso peyorativo del término “comunidades enrejadas” para describir las CIC con acceso público limitado no contribuye a comprender el problema. De hecho, una cooperativa de ingresos moderados con su puerta principal bajo llave por razones básicas de seguridad caería en la definición de “comunidad enrejada”.
Principios rectores
¿De qué manera debería la crítica de la “secesión de los exitosos” afectar nuestra comprensión, aceptación y autorización de las comunidades de interés común? El tema es complejo y no se presta a elecciones binarias. Por el contrario, es cuestión de acomodar intereses contrapuestos de acuerdo a los siguientes principios:
Conflictos internos: Propietarios individuales vs. la comunidad
En su libro pionero Privatopia: Las asociaciones de propietarios y el ascenso de los gobiernos residenciales privados (1996), Evan McKenzie advirtió: Las CIC tienen una forma de gobierno privado que expresa una preferencia norteamericana por la propiedad de viviendas privadas y, con demasiada frecuencia, se convierte en una ideología de privativismo hostil. El objetivo social más importante es la preservación de los valores de la propiedad, y todos los demás aspectos de la vida comunitaria están subordinados a él. El cumplimiento rígido, intrusivo y frecuentemente mezquino de las reglas es una caricatura de… la gestión benigna, y la creencia en la planificación racional se distorsiona al poner el énfasis en la conformidad por la conformidad misma.
Los conflictos entre los residentes y las asociaciones o juntas de las CIC frecuentemente se centran en torno a dos temas: el sentido de las restricciones y los procedimientos para hacerlas cumplir (ver el recuadro 2). La disputa puede enfocarse en una gama de temas que va desde restricciones de paisajismo a la cobranza de cuotas. En efecto, el 24 por ciento de los residentes de CIC que respondió a la encuesta de Public Opinion Strategies de 2014 había experimentado un problema o desacuerdo personal importante con su asociación. De este grupo, el 52 por ciento quedó satisfecho con las resoluciones y el 36 por ciento no; en el 12 por ciento de los casos, el problema todavía no se había resuelto.
Existe sin duda el riesgo de que las asociaciones comunitarias se excedan en el contenido y cumplimiento de las restricciones, pero estas preocupaciones políticas sustanciales y de procedimiento se pueden resolver por medio de legislación y supervisión judicial.
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Recuadro 2: Los conflictos son buenos para los medios
Mientras que los siguientes titulares omiten las múltiples interacciones positivas entre los propietarios individuales y las asociaciones, sí señalan algunas de las interacciones difíciles que se pueden producir.
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Libertad de elección
Como se dijo anteriormente, los individuos ejercen su libertad de elección al comprar viviendas en CIC y aceptar sus reglas. La vida en una asociación puede no ser para todos, pero en general se deben respetar las expectativas de la gente que elige vivir en una CIC, y no deben verse frustradas por alguien que después trata de violar el contrato. Los tribunales generalmente coinciden con esta opinión, como indica esta sentencia de 1981:
Las restricciones [originales] están revestidas de una presunción muy fuerte de validez, que deriva del hecho de que cada propietario individual de una unidad la compra sabiendo y aceptando las restricciones que se imponen sobre las mismas… [Una] restricción de uso en una declaración de condominio puede tener un cierto grado de irracionalidad, pero a pesar de ello resistir un ataque en los tribunales. De no ser así, el propietario de una unidad no podría confiar en las restricciones estipuladas en la declaración… ya que dichas restricciones podrían estar potencialmente en un estado de cambio continuo (Hidden Harbour Estates vs. Basso, Fla. Ct. App. [1981]).
Hay varias situaciones, sin embargo, en las que los propietarios no tendrían ninguna libertad de elección. Primero, es posible que las únicas viviendas nuevas disponibles para los compradores estuvieran en CIC, es decir, que los emprendedores ya no construyan viviendas fuera de asociaciones. Efectivamente, un informe reciente concluyó que en 2003 el 80 por ciento de todas las viviendas en construcción en ese momento eran en asociación (Fundación para la Investigación de Asociaciones Comunitarias, 2014). Además, un gobierno municipal podría requerir que los emprendedores crearan asociaciones como condición para la aprobación de una subdivisión. (La reciente legislación promulgada en Arizona que prohíbe esta práctica es señal de que todavía ocurre.) Finalmente, algunos tribunales han sugerido que, si bien las reglas en vigor al momento de la compra se deben hacer cumplir, una regla promulgada posteriormente por la asociación o junta bajo una competencia reservada no se tiene que hacer cumplir si un propietario puede demostrar que “no es razonable”. Otros tribunales no están de acuerdo: No se debe considerar la reclamación de un propietario cuando la asociación de propietarios enmienda la declaración conforme a una cláusula registrada en la declaración de convenio inicial. Cuando un comprador adquiere una unidad en dicha comunidad, la compra se efectúa no sólo sujeta a los convenios expresos en la declaración, sino también sujeta a las disposiciones de enmienda… Y, por supuesto, un comprador potencial que esté preocupado por el gobierno de la asociación comunitaria tiene la opción de comprar una vivienda que no esté sujeta al gobierno de una asociación… Por esta razón, declinamos someter dichas enmiendas… a la prueba de “racionalidad” (Hughes vs. New Life Development Corp., Tenn.Sup.Ct. [2012]).
Directrices para la protección de la autonomía personal
Las restricciones impuestas por las asociaciones de propietarios generan una preocupación cuando amenazan la autonomía personal y los derechos individuales fundamentales de sus miembros. Las restricciones de este tipo podrían incluir la prohibición de carteles o mensajes políticos, y la restricción de ocupación a familias “tradicionales”.
Los tribunales deberían hacer cumplir las restricciones si limitan los efectos colaterales (también llamados “secuelas” o “externalidades”) de un propietario hacia el resto de la comunidad. Sin embargo, no deberían dejar cumplir las restricciones que limitan la naturaleza o el estado de los ocupantes o el comportamiento dentro de una unidad que no cree externalidades. Esta metodología se basa en la teoría de que el propósito fundamental de los regímenes de las CIC es aumentar el valor económico y fomentar los intercambios eficientes. Por lo tanto, si el propietario no genera externalidades, los tribunales no deberían hacer cumplir prohibiciones de ciertos comportamientos. Más aún, algunos valores de autonomía personal son demasiado importantes y tienen prioridad sobre las reglas usuales de contrato. Por ejemplo, no permitimos contratos de esclavitud o la venta de órganos humanos.
Según este norma, una regla que limite el ruido o prohíba fumar (debido a la propagación de olores) en unidades multifamiliares sería legítima, pero las restricciones basadas en el estado civil de los residentes no. Algunas situaciones son más complicadas: por ejemplo, las restricciones sobre mascotas. Según las directrices sugeridas, en general sería legítimo prohibir las mascotas debido al ruido potencial y la renuencia de algunos residentes a compartir áreas comunes con ellas. No obstante, en el caso de animales de servicio, la salud del propietario de la unidad puede tener prioridad sobre las preocupaciones comunitarias.
Los temas relacionados con la Primera Enmienda presentan desafíos especiales. La libre expresión –por ejemplo, los carteles políticos o sobre un tema conflictivo, la distribución de volantes, demostraciones u otro tipo de manifestación– puede causar efectos colaterales, como ruido, interferencia estética y perturbación del ambiente general de la comunidad. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, la libre expresión es fundamental para nuestra forma republicana de gobierno, ya sea en el ámbito mayor del gobierno público o del gobierno privado. En casos de expresión, los tribunales podrían tener en cuenta la doctrina de larga tradición que prohíbe convenios que violen políticas públicas, y rechazar las prohibiciones totales de libertad de expresión a favor de restricciones razonables de horario, lugar y modo. De esa manera, se podría permitir la expresión pero limitar, pero no eliminar, sus efectos colaterales sobre la comunidad.
Otro valor fundamental para los estadounidenses es la libertad de culto. Las restricciones a la colocación de una mezuzá en el marco de la puerta o la exposición de pesebres, figuras de santos y luces de Navidad limitan la libre expresión del culto. Ponerse a hacer equilibrios para determinar la importancia religiosa de las luces de Navidad de colores frente a las blancas, en contra de las normas de la CIC, abriría una caja de Pandora, y sería apropiado que los tribunales impusieran una norma general de adecuación razonable sobre los reglamentos de la CIC que afecten a prácticas religiosas.
Finalmente, en el desarrollo y cumplimiento de los reglamentos de asociaciones, los propietarios de las CIC tienen el derecho a esperar cierto comportamiento por parte de las asociaciones y juntas. Esta expectativa deriva de la obligación de que todas las partes de un contrato actúen de buena fe y de forma ecuánime. Por lo tanto, un propietario debería tener el derecho a procedimientos imparciales, con las notificaciones pertinentes y la oportunidad de ser escuchado; de ser tratado de la misma manera que otros propietarios en circunstancias similares; y a no sufrir prejuicios, animadversión y decisiones de mala fe por parte de la junta y sus miembros.
Conclusión
Las comunidades de interés común cubren una gran parte de la superficie residencial de los Estados Unidos, y actualmente alojan a un cuarto de la población del país. Aunque las CIC ofrecen grandes ventajas económicas a sus residentes y a la sociedad en general, estos tipos de modalidad de vivienda requieren interacciones cuidadosas entre la asociación comunitaria y el gobierno municipal, y el reglamento de la asociación puede afectar la autonomía personal de sus miembros. No obstante, hay estrategias disponibles para mitigar, si no superar, estos problemas. Estas estrategias pueden hacer que la propiedad de una vivienda en una CIC sea menos ilusoria y más real.
Sobre el autor
Gerald Korngold es profesor de derecho en la Facultad de Derecho de Nueva York y visiting fellow del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. Enseña y escribe sobre temas de propiedad y derecho inmobiliario.
Referencias
De Tocqueville, Alexis. 1835. Democracy in America. London: Saunders and Otley.
Ellickson, Robert C. y Vicki L. Been. 2005. Land Use Controls. New York, NY: Aspen Publishers, 3rd edition.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2014. “Best Practices. Report #7: Transition.” www.cairf.org/research/bptransition.pdf.
Foundation for Community Association Research. 2013. “National and State Statistical Review for 2013.” www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf.
Grubel v. McLaughlin Gunnels v. No. Woodland Community Ass’n, 17013, Texas Court of Appeals (1978).
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, Florida Court of Appeals (1981).
Hughes v. New Life Development Corp., Tennessee Superior Court (2012).
Low, Setha. 2004. Behind the Gates: Life, Security, and the Pursuit of Happiness in Fortress America. London: Routledge.
McKenzie, E. 1996. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Private Residential Governments. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.
Nelson, R. H. 2009. “The Puzzle of Local Double Taxation: Why Do Private Communities Exist?” The Independent Review. 13 (3) (Invierno) 345–365.
Public Opinion Strategies. 2014. “Verdict: Americans Grade Their Associations, Board Members and Community Managers.” Falls Church, Virginia: Community Associations Institute.
Reich, Robert. 1991. “Secession of the Successful.” The New York Times Magazine. 20 de enero.
Treese, C. J. 2013. Association Information Services, Inc., compiled from National Association of Realtors data. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1I_2LgTIYSqR4nLPRxN-HtCV-oOFK_QqN1AcO5JJTw-g/edit.
Ziegler, J. 1984. The New Yorker. 3 de septiembre.
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Is urban spatial segregation a consequence of the normal functioning of urban land markets, reflecting cumulative individual choices? Or, is it a result of the malfunctioning of urban land markets that privatize social benefits and socialize private costs? Is it the result of class bias, or racial bias, or both? Does public housing policy create ghettos? Or, do real estate agents and lending officers substitute personal bias for objective data, thereby creating and reinforcing stereotypes about fellow citizens and neighborhoods? Can changes in land policy lead to changes in intra-metropolitan settlement patterns? Or, do such changes come about only from deep social changes having to do with values such as tolerance, opportunity and human rights?
Thirty-seven practitioners and academics from thirteen countries struggled with these and other related questions at the Lincoln Institute’s “International Seminar on Segregation in the City” in Cambridge last July. The seminar organizers, Francisco Sabatini of the Catholic University of Chile and Martim Smolka and Rosalind Greenstein of the Lincoln Institute, cast a wide net to explore the theoretical, historical and practical dimensions of segregation. Participants came from countries as diverse as Brazil, Israel, Kenya, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland and the U.S., and they brought to the discussion their training as lawyers, sociologists, economists, urban planners, regional scientists and geographers. As they attempted to come to terms with the meaning of segregation, the various forces that create and reinforce it, and possible policy responses, it became apparent that there are no simple answers and that many viewpoints contribute to the ongoing debate. This brief report on the seminar offers a taste of the far-reaching discussion.
The papers presented by all participants in this seminar are posted on the Lincoln Institute website.
What is Segregation and Why Is It Important?
Frederick Boal’s (School of Geography, Queen’s University, Belfast) work is informed by both the rich sociological literature on segregation and his own experience of living in the midst of the troubles between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Boal suggested that segregation was best understood as part of a spectrum that ranged from the extreme approach of ethnic cleansing to the more idealistic one of assimilation (see Figure 1). As with so many policy issues, segregation will not be solved by viewing it as a dichotomy but rather as a continuum of degrees or levels of separateness, each with different spatial manifestations.
For Peter Marcuse (Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation and Planning, Columbia University, New York) segregation implies a lack of choice and/or the presence of coercion. When racial or ethnic groups choose to live together, he calls that clustering in enclaves. However, when groups are forced apart, either explicitly or through more subtle mechanisms, he calls that segregation in ghettoes. It is the lack of choice that distinguishes these patterns and invites a public policy response.
The meaning and importance of segregation varies with the historical context. For William Harris (Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Jackson State University, Mississippi), who writes about spatial segregation in the U.S. South, segregation can be neither understood nor addressed without fully appreciating the role that race has played and continues to play in American history and public policy. Flavio Villaça (School of Architecture and Urbanism, University of São Paulo, Brazil) understands segregation within a class framework, where income level and social status, not race, are the key factors influencing residential patterns. In Brazil and many other countries with long histories of authoritarian regimes, urban services are generally provided by the state. In these countries, urban residential patterns determine access to water and sewer facilities (and therefore health) as well as transportation, utility infrastructure and other urban services.
In many cases, Villaça and others assert, land market activity and urban codes and regulations have been used, both overtly and furtively, to create elite, well-serviced neighborhoods that segregate the upper classes from the rest of society, which is largely ignored. This view has parallels in the U.S., where access to high-quality schools and other valued amenities is largely determined by residential patterns that are closely associated with segregation by income level, ethnic background and other demographic characteristics. Seminar participants also cited the correlation between disadvantaged communities and the location of environmental hazards. People segregated into low-income ghettoes or neighborhoods comprised primarily of people of color confront the downsides of modern urban living, such as hazardous waste sites and other locally unwanted land uses.
Ariel Espino (Department of Anthropology, Rice University, Texas) presented an analysis of how distance is used to reinforce social, political and economic inequality in housing. When social and economic differences are clear and understood, ruling elites tolerate physical proximity. For example, servants can live close to their employers, even in the same house, because economic relations and behavioral norms dictate separation by class.
Why Does Segregation Persist?
Prevalent throughout the seminar was an assumption that all residents of the city (i.e., citizens) ought to have access to urban services, at least to a minimum level of services. However, Peter Marcuse challenged the participants to think beyond a minimum level and to consider access to urban amenities in the context of rights. He questioned whether wealth or family heritage or skin color or ethnic identity ought to determine one’s access to public goods—not only education, health and shelter, but also other amenities directly related to physical location. In language reminiscent of Henry George’s views on common property in the late-nineteenth century, Marcuse asked whether it was fair or right, for example, for the rich to enjoy the best ocean views or river frontage or other endowments of nature while the poor are often relegated to the least attractive areas.
Robert Wassmer (Department of Public Policy and Administration, California State University) described the economic processes involved in residential location, as they are understood by public choice economists. In this view, house buyers do not choose to buy only a house and a lot; they consider a diverse set of amenities that vary from place to place. Some buyers may choose an amenity bundle that includes more public transit and less lakefront, while others may choose greater access to highways and higher-quality public education. However, not all citizens have equal opportunities to make such choices. Several seminar participants added that this debate is part of a larger conversation about access and choice in society, since nearly all choices are constrained to some extent, and many constraints vary systematically across social groups.
Other participants drew attention to the ways that government policy (e.g., tax codes, housing legislation) and private institutions (e.g., real estate agents, lending institutions) interact to influence the behavior of land markets, and thus the effects of land policies on public and private actions. Greg Squires (Department of Sociology, George Washington University) reported on a study of the house-hunting process in Washington, DC. His research findings emphasize the role of real estate agents in steering buyers and renters into same-race neighborhoods. As a consequence, blacks simply do not enjoy the same opportunities as whites and are far less likely to obtain their first choice of housing, thus challenging the public choice model. Squires also found that housing choice is determined by social or economic status. For example, priorities for neighborhood amenities among black house-hunters tended to differ from those of whites, in part because they had fewer private resources (such as an automobile) and were more dependent on a house location that provided centralized services such as public transportation.
John Metzger (Urban and Regional Planning Program, Michigan State University) examined the role of the private market in perpetuating segregation. He presented research on the demographic cluster profiles that companies like Claritas and CACI Marketing Systems use to characterize neighborhoods. These profiles are sold to a range of industries, including real estate and finance, as well as to public entities. The real estate industry uses the profiles to inform retailing, planning and investment decisions, and, Metzger argues, to encourage racial steering and the persistence of segregation. Mortgage lenders use profiles to measure consumer demand. Urban planners—both private consultants and those in the public sector—use profiles to determine future land uses for long-range planning and to guide planning and investment for central business districts. Real estate developers use profiles to define their markets and demonstrate pent-up demand for their products. The profiles themselves are often based on racial and ethnic stereotypes and in turn reinforce the separation of racial and ethnic groups within regional real estate markets.
Xavier de Souza Briggs (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) brought the idea of “social capital” to the discussion. As the term is being used today by sociologists and social theorists, social capital embodies the social networks and social trust within communities that can be harnessed to achieve individual and group goals. Briggs argued that social capital is both a cause and an effect of segregation in the U.S., but it can be leveraged to create positive change. Others challenged the extent to which social capital theory and research helps to address urban spatial segregation. These participants argued that it tended to frame the policy question as “How do we improve poor people?” rather than addressing the structural and institutional mechanisms that contribute to residential segregation and income inequality. Yet, the sociologists’ view is that social capital is the very element that communities need to exert some element of control over their immediate environments, rather than to be simply the recipients of the intended and unintended consequences of the political economy.
Social Justice and Land Policy
Seminar participants from around the world shared examples of spatial segregation enforced as a political strategy through the power of the state.
The connections between these extreme forms of spatial segregation and the land policies and market forces at work in most cities today are complex and challenging to articulate. One link is in the ways that land policies and the institutions that support land markets continue to be used to legitimize discriminatory practices.
By envisioning cities where citizens have real freedom to choose their residential locations, the planners in the seminar focused on government policies and programs to facilitate integration, such as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity Program. However, Stephen Ross (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut) questioned the assumed benefits of resettlement or integration policies by asking, “What if you dispersed high-income people across the city? What would change? Does this idea help us to think more carefully about why space matters?”
Another query from Xavier Briggs challenged participants to think about where the most meaningful social interactions actually occur. Specifically, what needs to happen, and in what circumstances, to move from the extreme of ethnic cleansing on Boal’s urban ethnic spectrum toward assimilation? Briggs suggested that institutions such as schools and workplaces might be better suited to foster more diversity in social interactions than are residential neighborhoods.
Ultimately, the urban planners wanted the tools of their trade to be used for shaping a city that offered justice for all. Haim Yacobi (Department of Geography, Ben-Gurion University, Israel), while referring to the status of the Arab citizens in the mixed city of Lod, touched the foundations of western democratic ideals when he asked, “If a citizen does not have full access to the city, if a citizen is not a full participant in the life of the city, is he or she living in a true city?”
Allegra Calder is a research assistant at the Lincoln Institute and Rosalind Greenstein is a senior fellow and cochairman of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development.
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Cities in Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe are being virtually transformed by inflows of capital in ways that urban land use planners never thought possible. These cities desperately need to develop and implement urban land management systems to maximize the social as well as private benefits of globalization. This article looks at globalization trends, identifies urban land management issues and opportunities, and discusses how Buenos Aires, as a case example, could strengthen its urban land management systems to better accommodate globalization-induced economic growth.
Globalization Trends
Over the past 20 years the world economy has become more and more integrated. International trade and investment have increased and the spatial distribution of industrial activities has become more diffused. Advances in communications, computer technology and logistics have revolutionized how business is conducted and how financial capital is invested. Many cities and regions that were once off the beaten track are now on the world’s main street, and those that once dominated certain markets, such as Glasgow in shipbuilding, Birmingham in textiles and Pittsburgh in steel, have lost ground.
Globalization, that is the international integration of product, service and financial markets, poses enormous opportunities and challenges. In the best of circumstances, globalization can lead to significant increases in non-agricultural employment, increasing wages, improved living conditions and better environmental quality. In other cases it may mean plant closures, unemployment, declining incomes and worsened living conditions
Because globalization requires foreign direct investment in plants and facilities, the internationalization of industrial activities is profoundly altering the world’s urban economic landscape. Over the past two decades, cities benefiting from global structuring have grown rapidly, while less economically competitive cities have stagnated. Given their plentiful supplies of cheap labor and permissive regulatory environments, cities in developing countries have become important actors in global manufacturing.
Multinational manufacturing corporations have been the principal driving force of globalization. These firms have increasingly shifted production from developed to developing countries to exploit the advantages of inexpensive labor. As they restructure their networks of production, they invest in plants and equipment in the host countries and generate significant increases in employment. According to the World Bank, five of the eight million jobs created by multinationals between 1985 and 1992 were generated in developing countries. The total number of jobs created by multinationals in developing countries stands at 12 million, but when subcontracting is included the true total is likely to be 24 million jobs. Multinationals account for more than 20 percent of the total manufacturing employment in such countries as Argentina, Barbados, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka.
Urban Land Management Issues and Opportunities
As cities strive to become centers of global production, trade and development, they are increasingly concerned with improving their attractiveness for foreign direct investment and employment generation. For example, cities must have efficient spatial structures, adequate infrastructure and urban services, affordable housing and healthy environments. Effective urban land management is required to promote urban regeneration and development of new industrial and commercial districts, investments to upgrade and expand critical infrastructure systems, programs to enhance and protect the environment, and initiatives to upgrade social overhead capital (housing, education, healthcare).
To implement these initiatives globalizing cities need to develop urban land management strategies to provide land for industrial and commercial development, to facilitate the formation of public-private partnerships, and to finance the provision of infrastructure and social overhead capital investments. Unfortunately, in many cities around the world such strategies do not exist and foreign investment is either stifled or, if it does take place, causes significant adverse side effects. Several examples highlight the consequences of poor urban land management.
In Ho Chi Minh City, planners have not carefully assessed the land use and transportation impacts of foreign investment. The city administration has approved dozens of high-rise office projects in the Central District but they have not adequately assessed the traffic and infrastructure impacts of these projects. As a result traffic congestion and infrastructure problems with the water supply and sewerage treatment are mounting. To make matters worse, planners have approved the development of Saigon South, a massive 3,000-hectare commercial, industrial and residential project, without assessing its impacts on the city’s transportation system.
Getting access to land for factories and commercial facilities is problematic, particularly in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Decades of inefficient allocation of land for industrial uses have literally blighted inner-city areas in Warsaw, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Derelict industrial belts that desperately need regeneration surround these cities. Unfortunately, a lack of clarity over land rights, corruption and bureaucratic inertia are impeding redevelopment. To compound matters, land use plans in many transition economy cities have not been adjusted to reflect the new land use requirements necessary to support post-industrial development.
The globalization of economic activity is literally transforming the urban landscapes of developing countries. To effectively exploit the benefits of inward investment flows and to insure that social and environmental goals are met, the public sector needs to take the lead in planning and formulating urban land management strategies to promote sustainable urban economic development.
The Case of Buenos Aires
A recent Lincoln Institute seminar in Buenos Aires offered some ideas on what actions are needed to more effectively manage the challenges of globalization-induced investment and urban economic development in that city. Participants agreed that Buenos Aires needs to strengthen its land management and economic development capabilities. The city should foster the formation of agglomeration economies and define and strengthen its comparative advantage in the global marketplace. The public sector should also foster the formation of social overhead capital and facilitate the development of critical infrastructure, social services and other investments that cannot be provided by the private sector.
Government needs to remove market imperfections and internalize externalities so that the social benefits of urban development are maximized and social costs minimized. This requires having in place sound and appropriate land use and environmental planning controls and regulations. Government should also provide information about the city’s demographic and economic projections and its land and property market so that developers and investors are well informed about urban development trends. This effort includes developing an inventory and assessment of public land holdings that can be used to foster strategic planning objectives.
At the same time, government should work with community and business leaders to improve social equity in real estate market transactions by increasing the supply of affordable housing and seeing that infrastructure and urban services are provided to all neighborhoods regardless of social or economic status. This may include preparing a capital budget for critical infrastructure and real estate development projects, as well as strategies for financing these investments.
The private sector is challenged with developing the city by providing businesses and residents with shops, offices, factories and housing. To the fullest extent possible, the government should enable the private sector to develop real estate to match the changing requirements of households and businesses. In some cases, such activities require partnerships between the public and private sector. For its part, the private sector needs to be more cautious and systematic about the formation and promotion of real estate projects by paying more attention to land market research on occupancy demand and supply for offices, retail, industrial and residential sectors.
To facilitate the implementation of these actions, the seminar participants encouraged Buenos Aires officials to build awareness about the linkages between globalization, urban land management and economic development. One important step would be to form a partnership with the private sector to develop a land market database of real estate transactions in the city. In addition, the participants identified the need for training courses on such topics as strategic planning; public-private partnerships; financing urban development and infrastructure; developing affordable housing; linking urban land management with economic development; and promoting urban revitalization and regeneration.
David E. Dowall is professor of city and regional planning at the University of California at Berkeley.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Bajo condiciones de rápido crecimiento urbano, la concentración de la propiedad de la tierra y las leyes que regulan su uso contribuyen con frecuencia a la escasez de tierras dotadas de servicios públicos. Esta escasez, a su vez, lleva a grandes aumentos de los precios de la tierra e increíbles ganancias especulativas. Cuando los marcos legales y administrativos no se pueden cambiar fácilmente (para permitir que los mercados operen ajustes graduales del precio que puedan ser tasados por medio de los impuestos existentes a la propiedad y las ganacias de capital) la captura de la plusvalía es una intervención apropiada para obtener un desarrollo urbano sostenible, eficiente y equitativo.
A principios de la década de 1990, dos ciudades colombianas, Bogotá y Cali, adoptaron reglamentos del uso de la tierra orientados a la expansión de la oferta de tierras para el uso residencial. Bogotá abrió al mercado el acceso a una zona reservada en el medio de la ciudad, llamada “El Salitre”, con el propósito de proveer servicios urbanos y establecer normas especiales para asegurar el desarrollo de viviendas para la población de bajos y medianos ingresos. Cali extendió su perímetro urbano para incluir un área de tierras pantanosas conocida como la “Ciudadela Desepaz”, la cual necesitaba grandes inversiones en servicios públicos. La ciudad planeaba suministrar los servicios básicos como incentivo para que su propio departamento de vivienda y los promotores privados construyeran viviendas para grupos de bajos ingresos.
El simple anuncio de que los respectivos concejos estaban a punto de promover desarrollos aumentó significativamente los precios de las tierras. En el caso de Cali, las transacciones registradas en la Ciudadela Desepaz reflejaron aumentos de los precios de más del 300 por ciento, aun antes de que el Concejo Municipal tomara una decisión formal. La tierra pasó rápidamente de manos de un grupo disperso de hacendados de ganado relativamente desconocidos (y, según fue documentado posteriormente, algunos traficantes de drogas extranjeros y locales) a manos de especuladores y promotores urbanos. Una serie de decisiones administrativas durante un período de 30 meses impulsó el valor prácticamente nulo en el mercado de ciertas tierras a precios de más de 14.000 pesos colombianos por metro cuadrado (aproximadamente 18 dólares estadounidenses en 1995). Tales decisiones dieron como resultado ganancias generales de más de 1.000 veces el precio original de la tierra, una vez considerada la inflación.
El Salitre, en Bogotá, siguió un proceso similar de toma de decisiones por parte de la administración urbana que aumentó sustancialmente el precio de la tierra. No es sorprendente que los proyectos de vivienda en ambos casos se encuentren ocupados por grupos de medianos y altos ingresos, en lugar de los sectores de bajos ingresos anticipados originalmente.
Puesto que casos como los de Desepaz y El Salitre ocurren regularmente en las principales ciudades colombianas, el gobierno nacional preparó una propuesta de ley para permitir que las ciudades capturen la mayor parte de los aumentos en el precio de la tierra que puedan atribuirse primordialmente a cambios de uso autorizados. Tales cambios incluyen zonificación, variaciones de densidad o conversión del uso de la tierra de agrícola a urbano. La propuesta –inspirada por medidas de las leyes españolas y brasileñas, similares aunque menos estrictas– fue aprobada por el Congreso Colombiano como la Ley No 388 de 1997.
Las leyes colombianas del impuesto sobre la renta –incluyendo la exitosa Contribución de Valorización, una tasa a las mejoras de la propiedad limitada a la recuperación del costo de la inversión pública– no resultan eficaces para capturar el tipo de ganancias de capital extremas registradas en Desepaz o El Salitre. La Ley No 388 de 1997, conocida como la Ley de Desarrollo Territorial, ofrece varias opciones para que las autoridades locales puedan “participar de las plusvalías” a través de la recaudación de una nueva “contribución al desarrollo territorial”. Las ciudades y los propietarios pueden negociar pagos en efectivo, en especie (por medio de la transferencia de parte de las tierras), o a través de la combinación de pagos en especie (tierras) y la formación de una sociedad de desarrollo urbano entre los propietarios, la ciudad y los promotores, por ejemplo.
La implementación de este nuevo instrumento de captura de la plusvalía constituye un desafío formidable para los administradores urbanos colombianos, quienes se ven obligados a identificar los aumentos del valor que se deben primordialmente a decisiones administrativas. Entre las dificultades a superar se incluyen la medida del aumento relevante del valor de la tierra, la negociación de las formas de pago y el establecimiento de sociedades de desarrollo urbano.
Como parte de su programa de investigación y educación en Latinoamérica, el Instituto Lincoln ha estado colaborando con representantes oficiales colombianos desde 1994 a fin de suministrar el entrenamiento y apoyo técnico durante etapas sucesivas de preparación e implementación de la Ley No 388 de 1997. El Instituto contempla trabajar con otros países que experimenten problemas con los precios de la tierra y deseen considerar medidas de captura de la plus-valía similares a la ley colombiana.
Fernando Rojas, abogado de Colombia, fue visitante asociado del Instituto Lincoln en 1997-1998. Junto con Víctor M. Moncayo, actual Presidente de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, preparó la propuesta que posteriormente se convirtió en la Ley No 338. También participó en ella Carolina Barco de Botero, miembra de la Directiva del Instituto Lincoln, quien en ese entonces se encontraba dirigiendo el Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas, entidad que supervisó la preparación de la propuesta de ley para el gobierno colombiano. Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y director de programas Latinoamericanos y del Caribe del Instituto Lincoln.
* La captura de la plusvalía se refiere a medidas fiscales o de otro tipo utilizadas por los gobiernos para identificar y asignar la parte de los aumentos del valor de la tierra atribuíble al esfuerzo comunitario más que a las acciones de los propietarios. En Latinoamérica, estos aumentos en el valor de la tierra se denominan con frecuencia plusvalías.
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Within the framework of economic restructuring, privatization and globalization, the issue of urban land and conflicts over its use is a top priority for El Salvador. Numerous factors contribute to the critical status of land management in the country:
The Lincoln Institute is working with the Salvadoran Program for Development and Environmental Research (PRISMA) to present a series of seminars for high-level municipal and national government officials, private development agents and representatives of non-governmental organizations. Last spring the two groups cosponsored a course on the functioning of the urban land markets and this fall will follow up with a course on “Regulatory Instruments for the Use of Urban Land.”
This program addresses the urgent need to create economic and regulatory instruments to promote strategic urban land management, contribute to the ongoing process of democratization and support sustainable development. The course is particularly timely because El Salvador is in the process of establishing a Ministry of the Environment and drafting legislation to address issues of territorial organization.
Mario Lungo Ucles is a researcher affiliated with PRISMA, the Salvadoran Program for Development and Environmental Research, in San Salvador.
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Gated communities are residential areas with restricted access designed to privatize normally public spaces. These developments occur in both new suburban developments and older inner city areas retrofitted to provide security. We estimate that at least three or four million and potentially many more Americans are seeking this new form of refuge from the problems of urbanization.
This rapidly growing phenomenon has become ubiquitous in many areas of the country since the late 1980s. While early gated communities were restricted to retirement villages and the compounds of the super rich, the majority found today are middle to upper-middle class. Along with the trend toward “forting up” in new developments, existing neighborhoods of both rich and poor are using barricades and gates with increasing frequency to isolate themselves.
Gated communities can be classified in three main categories based on the primary motivation of their residents. Two types of “lifestyle” communities provide security and separation for the leisure activities and amenities within. These include retirement communities and golf or country club leisure developments as one subgroup and suburban new towns as another.
In “elite” communities the gates symbolize distinction and prestige. Through both creating and protecting a secure place on the social ladder, these communities become enclaves of the rich and famous, developments for the very affluent, and executive home developments for the middle class.
The third type is the “security zone,” where fear of crime and outsiders is the key motivation for defensive fortifications. This category includes middle-class areas where residents attempt to protect property and property values; working-class neighborhoods, often in deteriorating sections of the city; and low-income areas, including public housing complexes, where crime is acute.
Urban Problems Stimulate Trend to Gating
High levels of foreign immigration, a growing underclass and a restructured economy are changing the face of many metropolitan areas and fueling the drive for separation, distinction, exclusion and protection. Gated communities are themselves a microcosm of America’s larger spatial pattern of segmentation and separation by income, race and economic opportunity. Suburbanization has not meant a lessening of segregation, but only a redistribution of the old urban patterns. Minority and immigrant suburbanization is concentrated in the inner ring and old manufacturing suburbs. At the same time, poverty is no longer concentrated in the central city, but is suburbanizing rapidly.
Gated communities are not yet the normal pattern in the nation. They are primarily a metropolitan and coastal phenomenon, with the largest aggregations being in California, Texas and Florida. However, gates are being erected in almost every state. Real estate developers suggest that the demand for homes in gated communities is increasing, and there is evidence that housing appreciation in such developments is higher than outside the gates.
Fear of crime is the strongest rationale for this new form of community. According to recent reports in Miami and other areas where gates and barricades have become the norm, some forms of crime, such as car theft, are reduced. On the other hand, some data indicate that the crime rate inside the gates is only marginally altered by barricades. Nevertheless, residents report less fear of crime in such settings. This reduction in fear is important in itself, since it can lead to increased neighborly contact, which can reduce crime in the long run.
Policy Issues for Community Life
The development of gated areas is related to the uncoupling of industry from cities and of professionals from the industrial core. Geography compounds current trends toward fragmentation and privatization by undercutting the old foundation of community and providing a new rationale for the lifestyle enclave or gated community based on shared socioeconomic status. This narrowing of social contact is likewise narrowing the social contract.
Privatization- the replacement of public government and its functions by private organizations which purchase services from the market- is promoted as a “benefit” of gated communities, but it may have serious impacts on the broader community. Private communities provide their own security, street maintenance, parks, recreation, garbage collection and other services, thus relieving taxpayers of additional burdens. However, they may also have the unintended consequence of reducing voter interest in participating in tax programs or voluntary efforts to deal with community problems or additional public services such as schools, streets, police or other city and county government programs.
The resulting loss of connection between citizens in privatized and traditional communities loosens social contact and weakens the bonds of mutual responsibility that are a normal part of community living. As a result, there is less and less talk of citizenship. The new lexicon of civic responsibility is that of the taxpayers who take no active role in governance but merely exchange money for services. Residents of privatized gated communities say they are taking care of themselves and lessening the public burden, but this perspective has the potential for redistributing public costs and benefits.
Walled and gated communities are a dramatic manifestation of the fortress mentality growing in America. As citizens divide themselves into homogenous, independent cells, their place in the greater polity and society becomes attenuated, increasing resistance to efforts to resolve municipal, let alone regional, problems.
The forting-up phenomenon has enormous policy consequences.What is the measure of nationhood when neighborhoods require armed patrols and electric fencing to keep out other citizens? When public services and even local governments are privatized and when the community of responsibility stops at the subdivision gates, what happens to the function and the very idea of democracy? In short, can this nation fulfill its social contract in the absence of social contact?
Edward J. Blakely, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is dean and Lusk Professor of Planning and Development for the School of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Southern California. Mary Gail Snyder is a doctoral student in the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of California at Berkeley.
Additional information in printed newsletter:
1. Map of the United States showing concentrations of Gated Communities.
2. Table showing Social Dimensions of Gated Communities.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
La ejecución de cualquier programa nacional de planeación a escala regional o local puede ser un reto, incluso en las circunstancias más propicias. Colombia enfrenta muchos problemas sociales, políticos y económicos que bien podrían haber desvirtuado la expansión de su iniciativa principal de planeación: el programa nacional de catastro. Algunos de estos problemas tienen su origen en el gobierno descentralizado, los cambios de mando en la gestión pública local, la inestabilidad de la economía y las dificultades generalizadas vinculadas a la pobreza, el narcotráfico y la intervención internacional. No obstante esta situación, el Departamento Administrativo de Catastro Distrital de Bogota (DACD) está recibiendo un reconocimiento cada vez mayor como un precedente exitoso para los países en desarrollo de América Latina y más allá.
Aunque las transferencias legales, la política de suelos y la planeación han sido aspectos significativos en toda la historia de los catastros, la gestión fiscal ha sido el principal centro de atención en Bogotá para sus ciudadanos y el sector empresarial por igual. El proceso administrativo de los avalúos abarca el mantenimiento de una base de datos que se alimenta de la información aportada por las divisiones encargadas del modelo econométrico, los sistemas de información geográfica (SIG), la creación de códigos y normatividad, la cartografía, el análisis socioeconómico de sectores homogéneos, la matrícula inmobiliaria y la zonificación. Como se señaló en el artículo anterior, los números de inmuebles incorporados (formación catastral) y actualizados (actualización catastral) han aumentado considerablemente (véase la Figura 1).
El gran volumen de predios y mejoras ha podido manejarse en un lapso tan corto gracias a un plan administrativo minucioso e integral. El proceso reglamentario de participación pública no puso en riesgo la eficiencia con la cual se llevaron a cabo las actualizaciones y la certificación de inmuebles. Durante el año fiscal pasado, el modelo econométrico tomó en cuenta las variables típicas del avalúo y también consideró un elemento clave en el catastro de Bogotá, el “autoavalúo”. De conformidad con la Ley 44 de 1990, se utiliza un proceso de declaración y revisión públicas para actualizar y mantener la cédula catastral de cada inmueble. El propietario u ocupante presenta un estimado del valor del inmueble y su depreciación o apreciación, según lo estipulado en la Ley de Reforma del Impuesto Predial Unificado. Esta legislación busca simplificar la administración tributaria territorial y evitar la posibilidad de gravar los mismos factores dos veces. Si bien es importante recurrir a los ciudadanos para que suministren la información más actualizada con respecto a las condiciones del inmueble, también es imprescindible la verificación. De esta manera, un grupo de peritos profesionales debidamente capacitados han realizado inspecciones de todos los inmuebles registrados en el sistema catastral. Los ciudadanos han tenido muy buena disposición para suministrar información sobre las mejoras en terrenos desocupados, puesto que la tasa del impuesto sobre suelo no urbanizado es mayor que la tasa sobre suelo con mejoras. Este enfoque de planeación integral ha limitado la especulación y por ende ha estimulado la inversión de la comunidad.
El uso de SIG ha sido un factor determinante para la integración y evaluación en todo el departamento de las revisiones de inmuebles, actualizaciones del sistema y la administración general del programa. El IGAC está en el proceso de desarrollo de un programa basado en el software ArcCadastre en coordinación con la Universidad de Bogotá. El objetivo es vincular todos los catastros regionales con la base de datos nacional. En el área de Bogotá un SIG central proporciona a los funcionarios catastrales una base de datos valiosa que incluye un inventario interactivo y multifuncional que se utiliza durante el proceso de disminución del impuesto predial. El SIG se ha ampliado recientemente para ofrecer al público general una herramienta de consulta de datos de los registros históricos de los inmuebles, además de listados de los bienes raíces de todos los vecindarios. Con el uso propuesto para el SIG y el aumento del número de terminales públicos, se tendrá un acceso mayor al sistema catastral. Mientras tanto, la página Web del DACD es una creativa herramienta educativa que mantiene a los usuarios informados a la vez que controla este complejo proceso.
El catastro de Bogotá ha logrado avances novedosos y tangibles en la creación, desarrollo y mantenimiento de un sistema catastral considerado por muchos una imposibilidad teórica. La visión y la tenacidad de los administradores públicos, la empresa privada y los ciudadanos contribuyeron a crear un catastro que debiera cumplir e incluso superar las metas previstas en el Catastro 2014 de la FIG (Van der Molen 2003). Este plan requiere que un catastro tenga “derechos inclusivos y restricciones sobre el suelo en los registros cartográficos, modelos integrales de mapas catastrales, colaboración continua entre los sectores público y privado y un catastro que permita la recuperación de costos”. En vista de sus retos políticos, administrativos, financieros, técnicos y prácticos, el catastro de Bogotá ha logrado convertir un sueño en una realidad innovadora.
Michelle Thompson es consultora de bienes raíces e investigación y dicta clases de sistemas de información geográfica en el Departamento de Planeación de Ciudades y Regiones de la Universidad de Cornell. Además pertenece al cuerpo docente asociado del Instituto Lincoln; participó en la conferencia sobre catastros realizada en Bogotá en noviembre de 2003.
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The Pawcatuck Borderlands illustrates what is fast becoming one of the major puzzles in land use policy—how to plan across boundaries. Countless examples across the country (and arguably the world) demonstrate two fundamental points (Foster 2001; Porter and Wallis 2002; McKinney et al. 2002). First, the territory of many land use problems transcends the legal and geographic reach of existing jurisdictions and institutions (public, private, and other). In the Borderlands area, the spatial dimension of the problems created by increasing population growth and demand for municipal services cuts across multiple jurisdictions.
This mismatch between the geography of the problem and the geography of existing institutions leads to the second point: the people affected by such problems have interdependent interests, which means that none of them have sufficient power or authority to adequately address the problems on their own, yet self-interest often impedes cooperation.
These observations are not new. The history of regionalism in America dates back to at least the mid-nineteenth century and the writing of John Wesley Powell (McKinney et al. 2004). As we move into the twenty-first century, there seem to be two basic responses to this planning puzzle. The first is to create new regional institutions or realign existing institutions to correspond to the territory of the problem, and the second is to start with more informal, ad hoc regional forums.
Some of the more notable examples of regional land use institutions include the Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Authority (1969), Adirondack Park Agency (1971), New Jersey Pinelands Commission (1979), and the Cape Cod Commission (1990). The impetus to establish such entities requires a significant amount of political commitment upfront, or sometimes legal pressure from influential court cases. Once the regional organizations are established, they tend to require a great deal of effort to sustain. This largely explains why there have been so few proposals to create such institutions in the past few decades (see Jensen 1965; Derthick 1974; Robbins et al. 1983; and Calthorpe and Fulton 2001).
Rather than create new institutions, leaders in more than 450 regions across the country have realigned existing institutions to form regional councils, which generally do not have the authority to make and impose decisions per se, but are designed to foster regional cooperation and the delivery of services. In New England, these organizations have evolved to fill the vacuum left by weak county government, and their boundaries often follow county boundaries, which may or may not correspond to the territory of the problem.
The second response, which is more common these days, is to bring together the “right” people with the best available information in tailor-made, ad hoc forums. This approach, which might be termed “regional network governance,” is more bottom-up than top-down, and depends largely on the ability of the participants to build and sustain informal networks to get things done. In some cases these ad hoc forums lay the groundwork to create more formal regional institutions in the future.
Obstacles to Regional Networks
Of course, building and sustaining regional networks is easier said than done. Our research and experience suggest there are four primary obstacles to planning across boundaries. First, the very nature of thinking and acting like a region raises questions about the participants and scope of the problem: Who should take the lead in organizing and convening regional conversations, and who else should be involved? What issues should be on the agenda? How should the region be defined? How can multiple parties—public, private, and nonprofit—share the responsibilities and costs to achieve identified goals? Even where regional planning councils exist, the rules governing or guiding such efforts are not clear.
Second, the value of working together is not always apparent or shared. As with other forms of multiparty negotiation, it is difficult to mobilize and engage people unless and until they believe that they are more likely to achieve their objectives through regional collaboration than by acting independently. Public officials may be reluctant to engage for fear that such efforts will undermine their authority, and business leaders and real estate developers may view collaboration as something not worth their time. Local citizens often cringe at the idea of regional planning, thinking that someone who does not live in the local area will be making decisions about their land. Other stakeholders may simply have different priorities or a better alternative to satisfy their interests.
Third, many people are unfamiliar with the process of regional collaboration, and that uncertainty makes them feel uncomfortable and reluctant. In addition, people may lack the skills to organize and represent their constituency, deal with scientifically complex issues, and negotiate effectively in a multiparty setting. Others may be uneasy with the organic nature of ad hoc regional forums, and how they should be linked to formal decision-making processes.
Even if participants can overcome these obstacles, their effectiveness at regional collaboration is often limited by a fourth factor: lack of resources. In an assessment of about 75 established regional initiatives in the West, nearly all participants said that “limited resources” was the primary obstacle to more effective collaboration (McKinney 2002). Among the resources cited were time, money, information, and knowledge. People trying to initiate and support regional land use projects in three recent projects (in the San Luis Valley in south-central Colorado, the Flathead Valley in northwestern Montana, and the Upper Delaware River Basin) reported struggling due to a lack of financial resources and staffing capabilities.
In sum, the challenge of addressing multijurisdictional land use issues is not primarily a scientific or technical challenge, nor is it simply about managing land use more effectively and efficiently. At its core, regional land use is a sociopolitical challenge. It is a question of whether we can integrate the needs, interests, and visions of multiple jurisdictions, sectors, and interests. It is also a question of how society addresses shared and competing interests—in this case, land use.
An Emerging Framework
During the past few years, the Lincoln Institute has taken a leadership role in studying and evaluating regional collaboration on land use issues through policy and research reports, educational programs, and regional land use clinics. This collective body of work suggests at least three overarching lessons.
First, regional initiatives vary greatly in terms of who leads the project, as well as its scale, purpose, issues, activities, and structure, including funding and time frame. While some initiatives augment existing government institutions, others are more ad hoc in nature, filling gaps in governance at different levels. Whether formal or ad hoc, regional initiatives create public opportunities that would not otherwise exist to address land use issues that cut across multiple jurisdictions.
Second, regional collaboration includes both a procedural element (how to plan across boundaries) and a substantive element (policies, programs, activities, and other outcomes to address a particular regional land use issue). The Lincoln Institute’s work on the procedural aspects of regional collaboration complements and builds on its land use dispute resolution program, although it is different in two fundamental ways: regional collaboration deals primarily with multiple jurisdictions, which raises the key question of convening diverse stakeholders; and it has more to do with designing new systems of governance (both formal and informal) than with resolving disputes per se.
Third, there is no single model for planning across boundaries, but rather a set of principles to guide regional collaboration (see Figure 1). This “theory of change” posits that the implementation of something like this set of principles leads to better informed, more widely supported, and more effective solutions to multijurisdictional land use issues (see www.umtpri.org).
Guiding Principles for Regional Collaboration
Some Outstanding Questions
Who should take the lead in organizing and convening regional conversations?
In many professional circles there is an ongoing debate about the role and ability of government to convene effective collaborative processes. Many people argue that government cannot successfully organize and convene such efforts given its built-in institutional resistance and lack of responsiveness. Citizens, by contrast, often can provide more effective forums through organic, grassroots initiatives. Throughout the West, there is a growing movement where citizens, frustrated by government’s lack of responsiveness, are convening place-based groups to address a variety of land use issues—ranging from growth management to endangered species to water allocation (Kemmis 2001). In the Northeast, citizens in adjacent towns and states are recognizing their shared resources, values, threats, and opportunities. They are committing to joint planning projects, regional economic development campaigns, and applications for official designation for their regions.
Recent studies indicate, however, that participation by one or more levels of government is essential to the effectiveness of the more ad hoc, citizen-driven processes (Kenney 2000; Susskind et al. 1999; Susskind et al. 2000). Governments not only provide financial and technical assistance, but also become critically important if the intent of a regional initiative is to shape or influence land use policy. Official government institutions, after all, constitute the formal public decision-making processes in our society.
Neither top-down nor bottom-up approaches are inherently superior, and in the final analysis the two ends of the spectrum need to come together to facilitate positive change. Whether a regional initiative is catalyzed and convened by citizens, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, or public officials, it is most effective when the people initiating the process exercise collaborative leadership. Such leaders facilitate development of a shared vision by crossing jurisdictional and cultural boundaries; forging coalitions among people with diverse interests and viewpoints; mobilizing the people, ideas, and resources needed to move in the desired direction; and sustaining networks of relationships. In this respect, regional collaboration is more like organizing a political campaign than preparing a regional plan.
Three vignettes—the first two based on regional clinics sponsored by the Lincoln Institute—illustrate the need to have the right convener and to employ the characteristics of collaborative leadership. In the Upper Delaware River Basin, two government agencies initiated a regional conversation, but they framed the problems and solutions prior to consulting with other stakeholders or citizens. Not surprisingly, many people who were not part of the initial process criticized both the definition of the region and the scope of the project.
In the San Luis Valley in Colorado, citizens and interest groups tried to organize a regional land use planning effort, but the local elected officials dragged their feet and characterized the participants as “rabble rousers.” This experience shows what can happen when citizens get ahead of decision makers, that is, when civic will outpaces political and institutional will.
On a more encouraging note, leaders from the public, private, and nonprofit sectors, as well as academics, the media, and others, have jointly convened Billings on the Move—a conversation on what is needed to promote and sustain the economic vitality of the region in and around Billings, Montana. One of the primary reasons for this project’s success is that all of the key stakeholders bought into the project from the beginning, and they jointly identified problems and framed solutions.
Is it possible to mobilize and engage people “upstream” in a proactive, preventive way, rather than “downstream” after a crisis, threat, or regional land use dispute has emerged?
In the San Luis Valley, citizens and leaders from all walks of life came together some years ago to fight and defeat a proposal to export precious groundwater out of the valley. This effort clearly demonstrated sufficient civic will and political capacity to organize regionally in response to a real external threat. However, the same people are now struggling to organize around land use issues when there is no immediate crisis. Some observers believe that if they do not act soon, however, the valley will eventually become another expensive tourist destination like Aspen, Sun Valley, or Jackson Hole.
In response to this concern, we are working with the Orton Foundation to determine if the use of technology—in particular the visualization and scenario-building software known as Community Viz—may provide the necessary leverage to mobilize and engage people, to help them see what is at stake, and to evaluate how regional collaboration can help to address issues of common interest. The challenge here is not only to focus on a tangible problem, but also to build the social and political capacity of the region to think and act more proactively.
How do we measure the success of regional collaboration?
The question of what criteria or metrics should be used to evaluate efforts to plan across boundaries takes us back to the distinction between the procedural and substantive aspects of regional collaboration. If one agrees with this distinction, then any framework to evaluate success should include metrics that focus on both process and outcomes.
A recent study evaluated the success of 50 community-based collaborative initiatives in the Rocky Mountain West that were regional in nature, encompassing two or more jurisdictions (McKinney and Field 2005). Twenty-seven indicators measured participants’ satisfaction with the substantive outcome of the effort, its effect on working relationships, and the quality of the process itself. The evaluation framework also allowed participants to reflect on the value of community-based collaboration relative to other alternatives.
The people who responded to the survey were generally satisfied with the use of community-based collaboration to address issues related to federal lands and resources. Seventy percent of the respondents said that all 27 indicators were important contributors to their satisfaction with both the process and its outcomes. Eighty-six percent of participants stated they would recommend a community or regional process to address a similar issue in the future.
Participants tended to rank “working relationships” and “quality of the process” as more important than “outcomes,” suggesting that people are at least as interested in opportunities for meaningful civic engagement and deliberative dialogue as in achieving a preconceived outcome. These results also support the value of community-based or regional collaboration—particularly when compared to other forums to shape land use policy and resolve land use disputes. Future evaluation research is necessary to affirm or refine these findings, and to clarify the impact of regional collaboration on various social, economic, and environmental objectives.
Conclusion
Planning across boundaries—or regional collaboration—is slowly emerging as an essential component of land policy and planning in the twenty-first century. For example, the 2005 White House Conference on Cooperative Conservation—only the fourth White House conference ever held on conservation—convened several sessions on reaching across boundaries to promote shared governance. Whether the issues to be addressed in such forums focus on rapid growth and its consequences or the need to retain and expand the local economic base, these problems are often best addressed by planning across the boundaries created by government jurisdictions, economic sectors, and academic disciplines. Indeed, in many cases, this is the only way these problems will be resolved effectively.
The Pawcatuck Borderlands
The Pawcatuck Borderlands on the Connecticut and Rhode Island state line is part of a largely undeveloped region within the megalopolis that stretches from Boston to Washington, DC. This landscape is one of the largest intact, forested areas in southern New England, and its abundant wildlife ranges from bears to songbirds. The remarkable diversity of the Borderlands includes hardwood forests, pitch-pine woodlands, wetlands, lakes, and rivers, as well as numerous small, rural communities where people have lived and worked for centuries.
Nearly 40 percent of the Borderlands is protected by the Pachaug State Forest and the Arcadia Management Area, and the relatively undisturbed natural character of the region creates a high quality of life for its residents. However, this open space in the heart of the northeastern megalopolis is also popular with visitors for its recreational opportunities and world-class tourist attractions. Located between Providence and Hartford, the Borderlands faces increasing demands for housing, roads, and shopping centers. Unlike many other rural areas, the opportunities for employment and investment are good, making this a financially attractive location for families and businesses.
Between 1960 and 2000, the population of Borderlands towns grew by more than 95 percent. Traffic is escalating on local roads and highways, and finite water resources are being overused, impacting both the quality and quantity of water in local watersheds. This increasing activity is eroding the existing infrastructure and requiring local residents to pay for additional roads, schools, and other essential services. All of these trends threaten longstanding social, historic, and environmental values.
Choices about the rate and pattern of future land conservation and development in the Borderlands must be addressed by decision makers in two states and ten towns. As in much of New England, each town retains land use authority and is governed through town meetings and the decisions of numerous local commissions and boards. Each of these jurisdictions has historically tackled land use issues independently, but the nature of existing trends and emerging challenges calls out for a different approach.
About the Authors
Matthew McKinney is director of the Public Policy Research Institute at the University of Montana, Helena. He was founding director of the Montana Consensus Council and has taught many courses for the Lincoln Institute on both regional collaboration and land use dispute resolution.
Kevin Essington is director of the Pawcatuck Borderlands Program for the The Nature Conservancy in Connecticut and Rhode Island. He works on land acquisition, land and watershed restoration, planning, and consensus building.
References
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———. 2004. Working across boundaries: A framework for regional collaboration. Land Lines 16(3): 5–8.
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Emerging concerns about climate change impacts along with changing preferences for housing options are shaping the debate over growth patterns and sustainability. Climate modeling experts expect Arizona’s Sun Corridor to become hotter, drier, and more prone to extreme weather events. In a region where summer temperatures top 110°, annual precipitation is only 9 to 10 inches, and flood events already can be extreme, adaptation to and mitigation of climate change impacts will be of paramount importance. The response will require significantly changing prevalent land use planning and development patterns in the region.
