The lack of affordable serviced land for the urban poor is one of the most important issues on the Latin American land policy agenda.1 This shortage of serviced land and the subsequent illegal occupation of unserviced land are characteristic features of Latin American cities, especially in the urban peripheries and in areas unsuited to or restricted from the formal property market by topographic and environmental conditions.

An immediate consequence of this shortage is the overvaluation of land that is serviced. In effect, the provision of services usually increases the price of land by more than the cost of the services. Typically, raw land at the fringe, when designated as urban, is valued at US$5-10 per square meter. The provision of all services costs about US$20-30 per square meter, but the market price may be as much as US$50-100 per square meter. At this price, a 150-square-meter lot of serviced land is equivalent to at least three times the annual income of the majority of poor urban families. In most Latin American cities at least 25 percent of the population falling below the poverty line can barely survive, let alone pay for overpriced land.

Poor people in illegal settlements thus pay a higher price for land than residents in other parts of the city, and they pay more for services such as water, which they have to acquire from private vendors, as well as food, building materials and other consumer goods. Furthermore, their risk for disease is higher due to poor sanitation and limited access to medical facilities.

The Problem of Irregular Occupancy

It should be no surprise that 60 to 70 percent of land in Latin American cities is occupied irregularly, illegally or even clandestinely, with most housing stock being self-built incrementally over decades. In Mexico, the phenomenon of irregularity in land tenure can be seen as a way of life, given its important political and even cultural context. Low-income families find that the only way they can settle in the cities is by acquiring or invading illegal or irregular land.

The message transmitted to younger generations and others who seek housing has been clear: settle wherever you can, and don’t worry because some day the state will regularize your lot.2 This cultural attitude reinforces the perversity of the vicious cycle: the higher the expectation regarding the eventual regularization of irregular settlements, the higher the price that land sub-dividers may charge to sell unserviced or partially serviced land. The mere act of parceling the land raises the price two or three times, so again the poor pay more for land than buyers in the formal market.

Two important policy corollaries relate to this anticipation of land appreciation resulting from future regularization. First, public actions to regularize land have not solved the problem of access to land for the urban poor; rather, regularization is part of the problem because it feeds into the “industry of irregularization.” We must consider a serious restructuring or even the termination of this perverse policy and create other ways to offer serviced land to those who need it.

Second, this process also exposes a fallacy regarding the (in)capacity of the poor to pay for some urban services. They are already paying for at least part of their services, albeit to the landowner/sub-divider as a private “land tax” that could otherwise be collected publicly. The focus of the discussion is therefore misplaced. The issue is not so much whether the poor should pay or not, but rather how they should pay and the limits of such payments. For example, should low-income families benefiting from regularization programs pay for services directly, or should the land value increment generated by the improvements be captured from the landowners through taxation and other fiscal policies? The latter point sheds new light on the problems with some conventional subsidy schemes.

Challenging Current Regularization Programs

The traditional frameworks for studying the phenomenon of irregularity-regularization of land tenure in low-income urban colonies in Mexico (as for the rest of Latin America) need to be reevaluated. This was the motivation behind the March 1999 Lincoln Institute seminar cosponsored with the Colegio Mexiquense AC in Toluca, State of Mexico. Although the seminar could not resolve the conundrum indicated above, or even provide the means to break the vicious cycle, it generated some important conclusions.

First, it is important to recognize that the problem of how to supply land to the poor in Latin American countries cannot be resolved within the prevailing regularization programs. Besides the perverse feedback effects of these programs, there are serious questions regarding their financial sustainability. Regularization programs tend to be more curative than preventive, and they often depend on extra-budgetary government allocations unless the funds are provided by multilateral agencies, NGOs or other organizations.

In Mexico, CORETT, a federal commission for land tenure regularization of “ejidal” land, and CRESEM, a state commission for land tenure regulation and regularization of private land, have worked mainly on the legal side of the problem. Neither commission has achieved its program objectives of providing serviced land for the poor or creating land reserves. They have not focused on the basic problem of land irregularity but rather on one of its manifestations or consequences: illegal tenure.

Second, the problem with current regularization programs exposes the weakness of dissociating such programs from a broad-based fiscal policy, particularly property taxation, with its obvious implications for a healthier land market. As noted in the seminar, successful urban land management cannot be achieved solely through regulatory means. Greater fiscal discipline of land markets is needed, principally at the local level. This should be a pre-condition for an effective mobilization of land value increments to generate urbanized land, rather than a surrogate for the absence of a more comprehensive tax on land values. The same difficulties in obtaining adequate land value assessments, updated land records and other information usually attributed to the implementation of land value taxes also apply, sometimes even more dramatically, to most value capture instruments.

Third, existing fiscal instruments governing land in Mexico, although quite diverse and rigorous, are quite sensitive politically and thus, in reality, very weak. For example, land property taxes (mainly “impuesto predial”) face serious practical limitations in being able to capture land value increments because they were not designed for that purpose. However, fiscal reform may not be as insurmountable an obstacle as once thought when one considers that changes in other sensitive areas, such as privatization of state-owned assets or of ejido lands, have been accomplished.

Over and above these technical and political constraints, one should not neglect the importance of cultural and managerial obstacles. Planners must work with the fiscal administrators to overcome the lack of communication that has long characterized these two groups. Some promising steps have already been taken, and many public employees are aware of the urgent need to integrate fiscal policies and urban planning within the framework of a global strategy.

Finally, there is the broader context in which the issue must be placed. The government and the private sector have to understand that land has become the strategic issue in the dynamic process of urbanization. The main concern is the need to regulate land markets to meet the huge demand for serviced land in new ways and to make significant changes in the priority of this issue within Mexican politics and urban policy.

In sum, the seminar exposed the multifaceted need for a more effective policy to provide serviced land for the poor, including better coordination of existing policies relating to finance, territorial reserves, regularization and land market dynamics. We have also learned that many fiscal and regulatory instruments are sufficient in theory but not in practice. The problem is not so much a lack of resources as the capacity to mobilize the resources that do exist into a comprehensive program that links regularization with fiscal policy, including the exploration of value capture mechanisms.

While we studied various proposals and offered alternatives for future working agendas on the topic, several issues must be addressed before we can begin to understand the phenomenon in a different way. One key question is, If servicing the land adds so much value, why is it so hard to find private agents or developers in the formal market who are willing to invest in the informal market? Why is it deemed unprofitable in spite of such handsome mark-ups?

There is no easy answer, other than imprecise indications regarding risks due to complicated judicial and legal problems, unclear rules of the game, the high cost of approval licenses, lack of information about procedures, and concerns about low profitability over time. Because of the complex institutional issues involved in this dilemma, it will continue to be the focus of attention in collaborative efforts by the Lincoln Institute and its cosponsors in Mexico and other countries of Latin America.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Latin American Program at the Lincoln Institute.

Alfonso Iracheta Cenecorta is president of El Colegio Mexiquense AC, an institution of research and postgraduate education in social sciences and the humanities, in the State of Mexico.

Notes

1. Serviced land is land designated for urban use and provided with basic public services (water, sewerage, paved roads, electric and telephone utilities, and the like), and with access to municipal functions such as employment, education and public transport.

2. Regularization means not only the provision of legal title but, more importantly, the provision of the urban infrastructure, services and other changes needed to integrate the “informal/illegal yet real” settlement into the fabric of the “legal” city.

Some Definitions

Illegal – land occupation that expressly contradicts existing norms, civil codes and public authorization

Informal – economic activity that does not adhere to and is not protected by institutional rules, as opposed to formal activity that operates within established procedures

Irregular – subdivisions that are officially approved but are not executed in accordance with the law

Clandestine – subdivisions that are established without any official recognition

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Bajo condiciones de rápido crecimiento urbano, la concentración de la propiedad de la tierra y las leyes que regulan su uso contribuyen con frecuencia a la escasez de tierras dotadas de servicios públicos. Esta escasez, a su vez, lleva a grandes aumentos de los precios de la tierra e increíbles ganancias especulativas. Cuando los marcos legales y administrativos no se pueden cambiar fácilmente (para permitir que los mercados operen ajustes graduales del precio que puedan ser tasados por medio de los impuestos existentes a la propiedad y las ganacias de capital) la captura de la plusvalía es una intervención apropiada para obtener un desarrollo urbano sostenible, eficiente y equitativo.

A principios de la década de 1990, dos ciudades colombianas, Bogotá y Cali, adoptaron reglamentos del uso de la tierra orientados a la expansión de la oferta de tierras para el uso residencial. Bogotá abrió al mercado el acceso a una zona reservada en el medio de la ciudad, llamada “El Salitre”, con el propósito de proveer servicios urbanos y establecer normas especiales para asegurar el desarrollo de viviendas para la población de bajos y medianos ingresos. Cali extendió su perímetro urbano para incluir un área de tierras pantanosas conocida como la “Ciudadela Desepaz”, la cual necesitaba grandes inversiones en servicios públicos. La ciudad planeaba suministrar los servicios básicos como incentivo para que su propio departamento de vivienda y los promotores privados construyeran viviendas para grupos de bajos ingresos.

El simple anuncio de que los respectivos concejos estaban a punto de promover desarrollos aumentó significativamente los precios de las tierras. En el caso de Cali, las transacciones registradas en la Ciudadela Desepaz reflejaron aumentos de los precios de más del 300 por ciento, aun antes de que el Concejo Municipal tomara una decisión formal. La tierra pasó rápidamente de manos de un grupo disperso de hacendados de ganado relativamente desconocidos (y, según fue documentado posteriormente, algunos traficantes de drogas extranjeros y locales) a manos de especuladores y promotores urbanos. Una serie de decisiones administrativas durante un período de 30 meses impulsó el valor prácticamente nulo en el mercado de ciertas tierras a precios de más de 14.000 pesos colombianos por metro cuadrado (aproximadamente 18 dólares estadounidenses en 1995). Tales decisiones dieron como resultado ganancias generales de más de 1.000 veces el precio original de la tierra, una vez considerada la inflación.

El Salitre, en Bogotá, siguió un proceso similar de toma de decisiones por parte de la administración urbana que aumentó sustancialmente el precio de la tierra. No es sorprendente que los proyectos de vivienda en ambos casos se encuentren ocupados por grupos de medianos y altos ingresos, en lugar de los sectores de bajos ingresos anticipados originalmente.

Puesto que casos como los de Desepaz y El Salitre ocurren regularmente en las principales ciudades colombianas, el gobierno nacional preparó una propuesta de ley para permitir que las ciudades capturen la mayor parte de los aumentos en el precio de la tierra que puedan atribuirse primordialmente a cambios de uso autorizados. Tales cambios incluyen zonificación, variaciones de densidad o conversión del uso de la tierra de agrícola a urbano. La propuesta –inspirada por medidas de las leyes españolas y brasileñas, similares aunque menos estrictas– fue aprobada por el Congreso Colombiano como la Ley No 388 de 1997.

Las leyes colombianas del impuesto sobre la renta –incluyendo la exitosa Contribución de Valorización, una tasa a las mejoras de la propiedad limitada a la recuperación del costo de la inversión pública– no resultan eficaces para capturar el tipo de ganancias de capital extremas registradas en Desepaz o El Salitre. La Ley No 388 de 1997, conocida como la Ley de Desarrollo Territorial, ofrece varias opciones para que las autoridades locales puedan “participar de las plusvalías” a través de la recaudación de una nueva “contribución al desarrollo territorial”. Las ciudades y los propietarios pueden negociar pagos en efectivo, en especie (por medio de la transferencia de parte de las tierras), o a través de la combinación de pagos en especie (tierras) y la formación de una sociedad de desarrollo urbano entre los propietarios, la ciudad y los promotores, por ejemplo.

La implementación de este nuevo instrumento de captura de la plusvalía constituye un desafío formidable para los administradores urbanos colombianos, quienes se ven obligados a identificar los aumentos del valor que se deben primordialmente a decisiones administrativas. Entre las dificultades a superar se incluyen la medida del aumento relevante del valor de la tierra, la negociación de las formas de pago y el establecimiento de sociedades de desarrollo urbano.

Como parte de su programa de investigación y educación en Latinoamérica, el Instituto Lincoln ha estado colaborando con representantes oficiales colombianos desde 1994 a fin de suministrar el entrenamiento y apoyo técnico durante etapas sucesivas de preparación e implementación de la Ley No 388 de 1997. El Instituto contempla trabajar con otros países que experimenten problemas con los precios de la tierra y deseen considerar medidas de captura de la plus-valía similares a la ley colombiana.

Fernando Rojas, abogado de Colombia, fue visitante asociado del Instituto Lincoln en 1997-1998. Junto con Víctor M. Moncayo, actual Presidente de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, preparó la propuesta que posteriormente se convirtió en la Ley No 338. También participó en ella Carolina Barco de Botero, miembra de la Directiva del Instituto Lincoln, quien en ese entonces se encontraba dirigiendo el Programa de Desarrollo de las Naciones Unidas, entidad que supervisó la preparación de la propuesta de ley para el gobierno colombiano. Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y director de programas Latinoamericanos y del Caribe del Instituto Lincoln.

* La captura de la plusvalía se refiere a medidas fiscales o de otro tipo utilizadas por los gobiernos para identificar y asignar la parte de los aumentos del valor de la tierra atribuíble al esfuerzo comunitario más que a las acciones de los propietarios. En Latinoamérica, estos aumentos en el valor de la tierra se denominan con frecuencia plusvalías.

Lavea Brachman is a lawyer and a city planner who has worked and taught in the area of community involvement in brownfields redevelopment projects for the last decade. She is currently director of the Ohio office and associate director of the Chicago-based nonprofit, the Delta Institute, which engages in the policy and practice of improving environmental quality and promoting community and economic development in the Great Lakes region. She is also an adjunct professor at The Ohio State University in the City and Regional Planning Department. Last year, pursuant to passage of legislation and approval of a statewide bond bill, Ohio Governor Bob Taft appointed Brachman to serve on the Clean Ohio Council, which is charged by the legislature with selecting and disbursing $200 million for brownfield projects throughout the state.

Brachman developed and taught a new course at the Lincoln Institute last spring, called “Reusing Brownfields and Other Underutilized Land: A Seminar for Senior Staff of Community-Based and Non-profit Development Agencies,” and she will teach a similar course in 2003. She also wrote an article on “Key Success Factors in Brownfield Property Redevelopment” for a forthcoming Lincoln publication on redevelopment of vacant land.

Land Lines: How did you become involved in and concerned about brownfield redevelopment?

Lavea Brachman: Brownfield redevelopment was just emerging as a special focus of urban planning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I was working on my master’s degree in city planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). As a student, I joined a student-professor team on an early brownfields project for the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) to determine what it could do with some previously utilized property it owned in Quincy, Massachusetts, just south of Boston. We assessed three primary aspects (social, legal and physical) to determine the site’s redevelopment potential.

That experience and the challenge of dealing with multiple parties and multiple issues that brownfield redevelopment entails peaked my interest intellectually, and I recognized that changing land uses could have profound and positive implications for social change. Previously, as an attorney with a Washington, DC, law firm, I had practiced in the environmental and land use areas, so the interdisciplinary nature of brownfields redevelopment seemed to bring together my legal and planning training with my professional skills and areas of knowledge and expertise.

LL: What are the primary obstacles to brownfield redevelopment and how have these changed over time?

LB: Contrary to general public misperceptions, the primary obstacle to brownfield redevelopment today is not environmental contamination per se, even though the prior use and associated environmental conditions of these properties distinguish them from other underutilized properties. The primary obstacle to redevelopment remains the threat of liability that by statute arises from acts that cause or contribute to contamination and/or to those with an ownership interest in the property. A second major obstacle is financing, since brownfields are many times more expensive to redevelop than regular real estate projects. The liability threat also has dampened interest from investors or banks that might be perceived as being in the chain of title.

A third obstacle can be lack of local support. The need for public involvement in brownfield redevelopment, from financing, to regulatory oversight, to local zoning and planning, means that community support is instrumental to making brownfield redevelopment work. The potential fear and lack of understanding about the impact of contamination on a community can also interfere with local support. A fourth obstacle is obtaining site control or clear title to the property. Many brownfield properties are tax delinquent or burdened with liens, and the title may remain in the name of a defunct company. Of all the obstacles, the solutions to title problems vary most widely from state to state.

A final obstacle is location, because many of these properties are found in areas that are littered with multiple vacant properties or they are not readily accessible to all-important interstate highways or rail networks. Sometimes brownfield sites with a long history of use were at one time accessible to key transportation lines, but those roads or rails have been superseded by new highways located several miles or more away, leaving the abandoned sites isolated from current development activity.

LL: How has the brownfield redevelopment practice evolved over the last decade?

LB: A decade ago, brownfields were not identified or defined as such. They were the legacy of a manufacturing and industrial economy that left behind vacant properties and blighted urban areas and the remnants of laws that, through the nature of the liability schemes, provided disincentives for cleanup. The federal government had not formally recognized the value of redeveloping these properties, and those of us who were involved in the field early on worked with regulators to convince them to pay more attention. Also, the fear of another Love Canal (that is, illness among residents arising from property contamination) was still fresh, so there was little flexibility in cleanup standards. Brownfields were redeveloped, if at all, outside the regular, legal constructs or under special agreements between owner and regulator, or by using special contracts such as prospective purchaser agreements, which prevented a future buyer from being held liable for previous contamination.

Now brownfield redevelopment has been increasingly streamlined, approached by developers as a real estate deal with a twist—the environmental cleanup. Many of the primary obstacles mentioned above remain, although they have been somewhat diminished over time, as new state and federal policies, laws and regulations have been passed and implemented to address the specific issues with brownfields liability, provide new funding sources, alter title processes for expunging tax delinquent and other liens, and even require community involvement. Last December, for example, Congress passed the “Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,” which provides for additional grants and loans for certain activities as well as clarifications on liability.

Brownfields offer an interesting case study of how informal processes that originally emerged out of necessity outside the legal, policy and financing mainstream have been increasingly institutionalized. For instance, where once a property would remain unremediated and fenced off because the cleanup was too burdensome and expensive, or the cleanup would be the subject of years of litigation, now a property that is marketable can act as an incentive for all parties to proceed rapidly.

In the strong market of the 1990s, the real estate pressures allowed even some hard-to-develop properties, like long-abandoned brownfields, to be redeveloped, although it was primarily the “low hanging fruit” or the brownfields that were already either well-located, had minimal contamination, or were not complicated by multiple parties contributing to past contamination. The liability on these properties could be capped and financial institutions thus could reduce their risk. Also the regulatory climate has become less aggressive with the passage of “voluntary cleanup statutes,” which allow cleanups to be accomplished without regulatory oversight in many states. The ultimate carrot is a government agreement not to hold future owners liable (that is, a covenant not to sue) if they meet certain standards. To date, fewer cleanups that predicted have actually been accomplished under these new state laws, but they create a climate ultimately more conducive to redevelopment. Nevertheless, in the weaker economic market of 2002, with greater risk, more uncertainty and less development generally, there will be less brownfield redevelopment, particularly of those sites that do not have the easily marketable attributes.

LL: Who are some of the key players involved in successful brownfield redevelopment projects?

LB: Like most real estate deals, brownfield redevelopment inherently involves multiple parties. Public-private partnerships are particularly crucial to the success of brownfield redevelopment projects, because of the quasi-regulated nature of the cleanup and the complicated financing arrangements. The list of potential key players is a long one. It includes state and or federal regulators, elected community officials and other community leaders, private developers (both for-profit and not-for-profit), past and future property owners, private financial institutions or investors and public funding sources. Often those essential parties are traditional adversaries. For instance, designating the future use of a brownfield property must involve a state (and sometimes federal) regulatory agency, which can approve the cleanup standard for the particular use (normally higher for residential and lower for industrial) and plan to remove the contamination, as well as previous and/or future owners who under previous legal standards would have been held liable by the regulatory agency.

Funding for the cleanup and redevelopment inevitably comes from a variety of sources. Notably, up to 70 to 80 percent of funding for brownfield projects can be from public funding sources, but usually those public monies are predicated on private (often local) institutional financing as well, making the public-private nexus very important.

LL: What is the role of community-based organizations in brownfield redevelopment and to what extent is this type of redevelopment an extension of broader community planning efforts facing many urban neighborhoods?

LB: Community support and leadership from the local government are essential to the successful redevelopment of a brownfield property. For instance, localities often must be the applicant for the essential public (state or federal) funds needed to accomplish the project. If zoning or subdivision changes must be made through local boards, local support and leadership is crucial. Community-based organizations such as community development corporations should play an active role in brownfield redevelopment as well, particularly in areas that are not as naturally attractive to private market actors, either due to location and limited access of the properties or to general neighborhood blight and lack of economic activity. In these areas, broader community planning efforts undertaken by community groups, such as community-wide master plans, are often productive starting points if multiple brownfield and other underutilized properties need to be addressed. Master plans encompassing these properties should take into account neighborhood and community needs, such as local stores, recreational areas, and other facilities. The biggest barrier to brownfield redevelopment in these areas is the market and the physical and economic condition of the surrounding area.

Nevertheless, to many community groups these sites remain intimidating for several reasons: the technical aspects of the contamination; the stigma attached to the properties by their condition; their negative impacts on surrounding properties; and, as mentioned, their location in generally blighted and hard-to-market areas. Furthermore, brownfield sites present more upfront barriers not present in the kinds of housing development projects traditionally undertaken by community-based organizations, such as site remediation, title issues, the assembly of multiple parcels, and the complex financing that is necessary from multiple sources. Getting community organizations past these threshold issues through capacity building and training in technical skills will position them to address more strategic brownfield redevelopment challenges.

Given recent state and federal statutory changes and multiple sources of public funding, the redevelopment of single brownfield properties in stable or improving markets now involves fewer legal and financial barriers. It also requires a very different strategy from developing properties in declining markets where there are other non-brownfield barriers to be overcome. The challenge for addressing brownfield properties in these latter areas remains to be solved, but community involvement is certainly a key aspect to its resolution.