The annual rate of urbanization in China has increased rapidly from 17.9 percent in 1978 to 39.1 percent in 2002, accompanied by rural-to-urban migration on a massive scale. More than 70 million rural migrants were working and living in urban areas at the end of 2000.

This influx of population has created a unique urban form—villages within cities, also referred to as “urbanizing villages” or ChengZhongCun in Chinese. For example, in the city of Shenzhen, with an official population of around 9 million in 2000, approximately 2.15 million inhabitants lived in 241 urbanizing villages with a land area of almost 44 square kilometers. In the city of Guangzhou, with a population of more than 8 million, there were 277 urbanizing villages with approximately one million inhabitants in 2000.

At the end of 2009, the United States faced an economic disaster of major proportions, with trillions of dollars of asset value lost, more than 16 million people unemployed, and four consecutive quarters of rapidly falling GDP. These events were the direct and indirect result of extreme volatility in the value of residential property that had served as collateral for the nation’s huge stock of home mortgages.

Between 2000 and 2005, the value of residential land and buildings increased from about $14 trillion to $24 trillion. About half of this increase reflected new construction, and half was due to rising land values, primarily on the coasts (Case 2007). But in late 2006 prices began to decline, and by mid-2009 they had fallen roughly 30 percent.

Measuring House Price Appreciation and Depreciation

The S&P/Case-Shiller repeat sales home price indexes were developed 25 years ago to track changes in the market value of existing homes. Based on observed values of properties that changed hands more than once, the indexes were proposed as an alternative to the prevailing measure of home price appreciation or depreciation, which was the median price of homes sold in a city or region. A simple median price will move up or down over time with changes in the mix of properties that sell, as well as with changes in the price or value of houses. This can cause the median price to shift even if no appreciation or depreciation occurs, particularly when new, higher-valued properties are part of the sales base.

In the repeat sales methodology we collect all available data on home sales and then determine if the same house has been sold in the past 20 years or so. Each pair of sales provides information on appreciation or depreciation. We then eliminate sales where the property has been changed significantly, or the sale was not arm’s length, such as purchases by a financial institution or sales where the buyer and seller have the same name.

Finally, we reduce the weight assigned to paired sales that are far apart in time, in part because there is a greater chance that those properties have undergone physical changes. We also eliminate paired sales that are less than six months apart, because they may represent purely speculative activity. We publish only results that are supported by strong statistical tests of confidence.

Home Prices: 1990–2010

Between 1975 and 2006 no measure of home prices showed a national decline. The S&P/Case-Shiller and OFHEO (Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) national house price indexes both show a continuous rise, accelerating around the year 2000 and peaking between 2006 and 2007 (figures 1a and 1b). However, Case and Shiller (2003) found that in 43 states the ratio of house prices to income remained low and constant between 1985 and 2002, even as house prices rose, suggesting that it was changes in per capita income that explained the increase in home values.

Figure 2 shows the ratio of home price to per capita income for 17 of the more volatile metropolitan areas between the first quarters of 1987 and 2009. After 2000, this ratio began to increase in virtually all of these metropolitan areas, with steep acceleration after 2002. The data suggest four distinct submarkets. The first consists of Las Vegas, Miami, and Phoenix, with a virtually constant price/income ratio until 2000, followed by a rapid increase in 2003 and 2004.

The California submarket was even more explosive. San Diego doubled its ratio from below 8 to above 16, with San Francisco and Los Angeles close behind. New York and Boston, in the third group, experienced accelerating ratios, but they were not as dramatic as those in the first two subgroups. In the Midwestern cities of Chicago, Charlotte, Portland, and Minneapolis, the increases were much lower than those observed on the coasts.

Figure 3 shows the volatility of home prices in the same 17 metropolitan areas based on sales in the lower third tier of sales prices. The number of these sales tripled in Miami, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, San Diego, and Las Vegas. In September 2005, Boston saw a price drop that later spread to every metropolitan area in the country.

Table 1 shows the S&P/Case-Shiller Index through September 2009, when prices began to stabilize and then rise. The bottom two lines show composite indexes for two sub-samples of the 20 available metropolitan areas. Both have fallen nearly 30 percent since the summer of 2006.

How Did It Happen?

Needless to say, a credit expansion of this magnitude had a major impact on the housing market. As noted earlier, between 2000 and 2006 prices in the bottom tier of the market increased the most—by 241 percent in Miami, 249 percent in Los Angeles, and 200 percent in Washington, DC, Las Vegas, and San Diego. The S&P/Case-Shiller composite indexes more than doubled, and the national index increased by nearly 90 percent.

At the end of 2005 and into 2006, the housing market began to soften. Interest rates rose, and the 30-year mortgage interest rate was back to 6.6 percent by the last half of 2006. Gluts of speculative building slowed markets in Florida, Arizona, and Nevada. Homes in California and in the Northeast had become very expensive relative to incomes, and the manufacturing base of the Midwest fell into recession. As expectations turned gloomy in 2006, 16 of the 20 S&P/Case-Shiller metropolitan areas showed price declines, and by 2007 all were declining. This had never happened before.

Then inventories of houses for sale began to increase. In the past, when markets rose too quickly, prices were slow to change and adjustment was orderly. With house prices falling nationally, and with the bulk of the newly written mortgage debt carrying high loan-to-value ratios, mortgage default rates rose sharply.

Underwriting standards changed over this period as well. Statistical models of default and foreclosure seemed to “explain” defaults as a function of borrower and loan characteristics. These models were used by all market participants, sometimes even without their knowledge. The most widely known underwriting tools were Loan Prospector and Desktop Underwriter, developed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac respectively. Their low cost and ease of operation made them the industry standard. As these models spread throughout the market, mortgage lenders and insurers that did not accept their results garnered little new business. The rating agencies also fell victim to the same statistical methods, which suggested a very low likelihood of rapidly rising defaults.

The stated goal of the new model of underwriting was to transform a patchwork risk-allocation process into a more efficient and accurate pricing system. But this proved to be not only difficult, but ultimately impossible. Analysts seeking to predict the likelihood of default had little choice but to look to the past: at what rate did mortgages with the same characteristics fail in the past?

But past experience dealt with a 30-year period of rising prices in which the collateral was in most cases sufficient to cover claims. Thus, outside of a few regional downturns, no experience provided data that could accurately measure the impact of falling house prices on delinquency, default, and foreclosure.

The historic housing boom of 2000–2005, together with the change in underwriting standards and credit market operations, made the period of 2000–2008 one of the truly important economic episodes of the last century. Its legacy is a flood of bad mortgages with millions of homes headed for foreclosure.

The Government Has Played a Big Role

One additional factor clearly played a role in all of this: the federal government’s strong efforts to promote home ownership for rich and poor alike. In 1977 Congress passed the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), designed to increase bank lending to low-income and minority households. Even today, banks have a CRA exam every year to determine whether they are meeting the credit needs of their entire CRA area, which in almost all cases includes low-income neighborhoods that in previous years might have been rejected (“redlined”) for loans or insurance.

These programs reflect a belief that the nation has an interest in promoting home ownership as the American Dream, which is thought by many to lead to meritorious behavior. A homeowner is considered likely to be a better citizen, and more involved in local affairs. Home ownership was also thought to be a way of building wealth for low-income households, part of the social safety net (Case and Marynchenko 2002).

Home ownership was encouraged in a variety of ways. The federal subsidy in the income tax treatment of home ownership (the mortgage interest deduction, the capital gains exclusion, the property tax deduction, and the nontaxation of imputed rent on owner-occupied housing) amounts to about $140 billion annually. The Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginny Mae), and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were all set up to channel capital into home mortgages.

The national housing boom had its roots in unprecedented events that unfolded in U.S. financial markets beginning in 2000. The rapid decline of high tech industries, the stock market collapse in 2000 and 2001, the slow level of technology investment resulting from Y2K, and finally, of course, the events of 9/11 led to a relaxed monetary policy as the Federal Reserve continually reduced interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy and prevent recession. In January 2001 the Fed cut the federal funds rate (the interest rate banks charge one another for the use of federal funds) from 6.5 percent to 6 percent, and by the end of 2002 had reduced the rate 11 times, to 1.75 percent.

When the easing of credit began, the 30-year fixed rate for a conventional mortgage was 7.17 percent, down slightly from the 8.3 percent average rate over the first nine months of 2000. By the time the federal funds rate fell to 1.75 percent in the fourth quarter of 2002, the conventional fixed mortgage rate was 6.39 percent. The federal funds rate continued its downward trend until it hit 1 percent in July 2003 and remained there for over a year. By that time, the conventional 30-year fixed-rate mortgage carried an interest rate of 4.6 percent. This easing of credit was the result of a massive injection of liquidity. The dramatic drop in interest rates reduced returns on many investments, placing pressure on yields around the world.

The expansionary monetary policy pursued during this short period reduced the cost of buying a home by almost a third. If its purpose had been to stimulate the mortgage and housing markets, the policy certainly worked, as lower interest rates reduced mortgage costs. Housing production and sales of existing homes boomed. In October 2001 there were about 1.52 million housing starts annually. By the end of 2003 housing starts had increased by a third, to well over 2 million.

Existing home sales were 5.2 million annually at the beginning of 2001 and 6.5 million by the third quarter of 2003. By 2005 they reached 7 million and stayed at about 6 million until 2007. There is little doubt that the housing market kept the economy out of recession through the turbulent early years of the decade.

Figure 4 shows the explosion in home sales and mortgage volume at the end of 2002 and into 2003. Low interest rates stimulated demand for refinancing, and between the fourth quarters of 2002 and 2003, $5.5 trillion in mortgages were originated, and $3.7 trillion were paid off. Over five quarters, the total value of new mortgages was about the same as the entire stock of mortgage debt outstanding in 2001. Seventy-five percent of the new mortgages were written for refinancings rather than purchases of new homes.

By bundling large numbers of mortgages into securities, Wall Street could offer an investment vehicle that combined the implicit government guarantees of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) with a history of very low default rates. As a result, much of the liquidity that drove the economic expansion was channeled directly into mortgages.

In June 2003, mortgage rates began to rise, moving from 4.60 percent to 5.97 percent by August. The third quarter of 2003 saw the highest volume of refinancings, with originations of $942 billion. The refinancing boom ended with the rise in interest rates, dropping 56 percent in the fourth quarter.

During this expansion of credit, the mortgage industry became highly profitable, collecting fees of about 2.5 percent of the $4 trillion in total originations in 2003 alone—over $100 billion. Greenspan and Kennedy (2008) estimate that fees for refinancings and home equity loans in 2004 reached $200 billion. With default and foreclosure rates low and housing prices high, lenders competed vigorously for the business of homebuyers.

Mortgages for home purchases doubled from $239 billion in 2004 to $478 billion in 2005. Much of this business was directed at low-income neighborhoods and sub-prime borrowers. Between 2002 and 2006, the market originated $14.4 trillion in mortgages, retired $10.3 trillion in debt, and increased the stock of outstanding mortgage debt to $10.3 trillion from $6.2 trillion.

This not-so-subtle pressure from the Congress was clearly accepted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as the price they needed to pay to maintain the implicit guarantee of their debt, which they enjoyed as a result of their government franchises. There can be no precise division of responsibility between the GSEs and the private sector in expanding the housing bubble.

Several factors played a role in the ultimate collapse: the competitive battle for market share waged by Wall Street investment banks, the private securities markets, and some highly leveraged specialty firms; the high credit ratings that were distributed by the rating agencies; and the fact that default and foreclosure rates remained low. In fact, it took a partnership between public legislation, governmental regulation, private market exuberance, and an extreme increase in liquidity to bring the markets down.

Where Do We Go From Here?

By late 2009, housing markets seemed to be approaching a bottom with prices stabilizing, but many forecasts anticipate declines extending well into 2010. If that were to happen, numerous mortgages written in 2008 and 2009 would not be fully secured and could turn unprofitable.

A prolonged period of falling prices would prevent a significant increase in housing construction. Despite record low interest rates, housing starts have been in uncharted territory for more than a year, having fallen below levels seen in prior downturns. The last four recessions began with large declines in housing starts. At the end of 2008, starts were down from a peak of 2.27 million in 2006 to around 500,000, where they stayed for more than a year, well below the typical bottom of one million starts per year. This represents a decline of approximately $600 billion in aggregate demand.

Two market-clearing processes are currently underway in the housing market, operating side by side, often neighborhood by neighborhood, within metropolitan areas. First, there is the traditional search for a new equilibrium. Inventories remain high as risk-averse sellers seek to avoid sharp price reductions. Sellers without access to liquid capital can actually be among the most reluctant to sell, because they cannot afford to incur high transactions costs. Homeowners do not like to sell at a loss, and may postpone sales in hope of a rising market. This type of market-clearing process is slow and usually results in a long and costly period of quantity adjustment with relatively little change in sale prices.

Second, banks, loan servicers, and other market participants are left holding properties because of defaults and foreclosures. These houses are typically sold at auction, often at very low prices. In every past regional decline these two processes worked together to clear the market. The final result will be the product of a battle between them.

At the end of 2009, homes were selling at a rate of about 6 million per year, 5.5 million existing and 500,000 new homes, including between 1 and 1.5 million sales at foreclosure auctions. The bad news is that new properties are entering the foreclosure process faster than older cases are being resolved, suggesting that the portion of all sales accomplished through the auction process is likely to grow.

But a number of facts suggest that the current bottom could hold and eventually turn upward. First, prices have fallen substantially. In Boston, they have been falling for some time, and in California they are down over 50 percent. Eventually, when prices get low enough, people will start buying again. Furthermore, interest rates are remaining at all-time low levels, with the conventional 30-year fixed-mortgage rate below 5 percent.

In short, all housing market indicators are improving. Pending home sales, existing home sales, new home sales, and housing starts were all up during 2009; and prices actually stopped falling. The OFHEO price index and the S&P/Case-Shiller indexes for 18 of the 20 cities analyzed were up for several months in a row. New home inventories fell to 251,000 (7.4 months of inventory) in September, after having fallen for 13 consecutive prior months.

California represents about 25 percent of all the land value in the United States, and events there have major implications for the rest of the country. The good news is that for the last three months, the indexes for San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles have led the nation in price appreciation. The California Association of Realtors reports substantial increases in home sales volumes except in the Central Valley.

It is important to remember that it takes only a relatively small number of buyers to move the market. Our measures of home values are based on observed sales, but only 5 to 7 percent of the total housing stock changes hands annually. Even with an unemployment rate near 10 percent, homebuyers continue to be very optimistic, and now there may be enough of them to change the market’s direction.

But, we are by no means out of the woods. Unemployment remains very high and jobs are still being lost. In addition, the foreclosure pipeline is moving very slowly, and foreclosures are spreading from the sub-prime market to the presumably more secure A-, Alt A, and prime loans. If the jobs picture does not brighten, and the market does not speed up the process of resolving foreclosures, the housing market could face a long period of stagnation and even a return to falling prices.

References

Case, Karl E. 1986. The Market for Single-family Homes in Boston. New England Economic Review May/June: 38–48.

———. 2007. The Value of Land in the United States: 1975–2005. In Land Policies and Their Outcomes, ed. Gregory K. Ingram and Yu-Hung Hong, 127–147. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Case, Karl E., and Maryna Marynchenko. 2002. Home Appreciation in Low and Moderate Income Markets. in Low Income Homeownership: Examining the Unexamined Goal, ed. Nicolas Retsinas and Eric Belsky. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Case, Karl E., and Robert J. Shiller. 1987. Prices of Single-family Homes since 1970. New England Economic Review September/October: 45–56.

———. 1989. The Efficiency of the Market for Single-family Homes. The American Economic Review 79(1): 125–137.

———.2003. Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. September 5.

Greenspan, Alan, and James Kennedy. 2008. Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes. Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Working Paper Series 2007-20, October. http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf

About the Author

Karl E. “Chip” Case is the Katharine Coman and A. Barton Hepburn Professor of Economics at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. With Robert J. Shiller he developed the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices. Case is a former member of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy board of directors.

With more than 25,000 local governments in the United States involved in the review and approval of proposed changes in zoning, planning, and property development, the number of local land use decisions made annually likely runs into the millions. While the vast majority of such determinations proceed in a routine fashion, more complex and contentious changes in land use and zoning frequently involve lengthy and acrimonious conflicts. Excess development entitlements in the Intermountain West (p. 4) exemplify such a challenging land use issue.

Land use and real estate development disputes are ranked among the most common types of civil disagreements in the United States, and they generally include multiple parties, properties, and interests. These contests produce costs for all parties directly involved as well as for the public more generally. Yet long experience with the resolution of land use disputes indicates that changes in the land use decision-making process can produce better outcomes at lower cost.

Local governments normally have a board charged with making decisions about changes in land use, and such boards employ a four-step process. First, the party seeking a change or permission to develop a property files an application with the board. Second, the board reviews the submission and may seek responses or modifications from the applicant. Third, there is an opportunity for public comment, which may lead to an additional dialog between the board and the applicant and further modifications in the application. Finally, the board renders a decision. This process works well for the majority of applications that are processed reasonably quickly. However, most of the board’s time is spent on the minority of cases that involve many interests and numerous rights that can be overlapping, contradictory, or imprecise.

The typical four-step process focuses on adjudicating rights; when the issues are few and simple, and the rights are well defined for the properties in question, this method works well. For more complex cases, however, an expanded approach that focuses on mutual gains for all concerned parties is more promising. The mutual gains approach is most productive when: there are many interested stakeholders; the deciding board has some discretion in the particular decision; the impacts of the decision are long-term and far-reaching; and a non-collaborative outcome is likely to be challenged by one or more of the involved stakeholders. The mutual gains approach should not be viewed as an alternative to the usual four-step process but as an expansion of it—essentially through the addition of extra steps or the expansion of existing steps in the standard procedure.

The key to successful use of the mutual gains approach is to discover stakeholders’ underlying interests—behind their publicly announced positions—and then to develop new options or solutions that are responsive to those interests. It is ideal if this step occurs early in the process when positions are still flexible.

This process of investigation and discovery is an element of the first stage of the mutual gains approach, which involves identifying the stakeholders, listening carefully to their concerns, and building on their interests. In the usual four-step process, this would likely occur in a pre-application phase addressing development and design concepts before final proposals are formulated. The second stage of the mutual gains approach is to design a process for collaboration that involves all stakeholders and offers opportunities for them to share information and learn from each other. The third stage is to promote successful deliberation among the stakeholders—typically by using a good facilitator who can build relationships and trust among those involved. The final stage is to implement the agreements that have been forged, ensuring that the proposed solutions incorporate the accords reached by the participants while also meeting the requirements of the decision-making board.

A much more detailed description of the mutual gains approach, along with informative case studies, is available in the recent Lincoln Institute book, Land in Conflict, authored by Sean Nolon, Ona Ferguson, and Pat Field. This title is available in both print and ebook formats.

Liz Wood quería comprar una casa. Corría el año 2006, había estado alquilando por una década y sus pagos mensuales le estaban resultando muy altos. Tenía 43 años de edad y un empleo estable como educadora familiar en el que ganaba US$34.000 al año más beneficios. No quería nada lujoso; simplemente un lugar donde pudiera “crear amor y tener estabilidad”. No quería vivir más allá de sus recursos.

De todas maneras, las cuentas no le cuadraban. Wood vive en Duvall, Washington, un pueblo de aproximadamente 7.500 habitantes al pie de las Montañas Cascade. Duvall, inmerso en un bosque frondoso, se encuentra a alrededor de 48 kilómetros de Seattle y apenas 13 kilómetros de la ciudad de Redmond, sede de Microsoft. La mediana de ingresos en Duvall es casi el doble de la del estado de Washington en general, y las viviendas de la zona son caras. En 2010, la mediana del valor de las viviendas ocupadas en Duvall era de US$373.500, en comparación con US$262.100 del estado, según la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU.

Entre las pocas opciones que tenía, Wood se decidió finalmente por una casa prefabricada de segunda mano de US$55.000 en Duvall Riverside Village, una comunidad de dos hectáreas con 25 viviendas prefabricadas, ubicada en el centro de Duvall. “Vivir aquí es increíble”, declaró. “Mi propiedad da sobre el río, así que cuando salgo de mi casa veo agua, pinos y un sendero por el cual puedo caminar hasta el pueblo vecino. Me despierto por la mañana escuchando a los pájaros. Conozco a todos mis vecinos; estoy conectada con mi comunidad. Estoy a una cuadra de la comisaría. Me siento segura”.

Pero aun así, su situación era complicada. Wood era dueña de su casa, pero no del terreno donde estaba ubicada. Alquilaba el terreno por US$450 mensuales, más el pago del agua y los demás servicios públicos, como el resto de los residentes de Duvall Riverside Village. Por lo tanto, Wood y sus vecinos estaban básicamente a merced del dueño de la propiedad, y no gozaban de la autonomía y seguridad legal asociadas con los modelos de propiedad de vivienda más tradicionales.

El propietario prohibía la construcción de garajes, limitando las opciones de almacenamiento de los residentes. Cobraba US$25 al mes por cada automóvil o persona adulta adicional que no se hubiera registrado en el momento de la mudanza. Cobraba US$5 al mes por cada mascota y los perros no podían quedar sueltos en ningún momento. Había que pagar una cuota mensual de US$5 por cada dos metros cúbicos de leña extra, que Wood necesitaba para alimentar su estufa. Aunque el propietario había contratado un empleado de mantenimiento, no había instalado alumbrado exterior ni mantenía las calles de la comunidad, que estaban llenas de baches y grietas.

En 2012, Wood y sus vecinos recibieron un aviso por escrito de que el propietario estaba vendiendo el suelo. A diferencia de otros propietarios, que preferían vender su terreno a un emprendedor inmobiliario, este propietario estaba dispuesto a vendérselo a los residentes. Había aceptado organizar una reunión entre los inquilinos, un corredor de bienes raíces y el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste (Northwest Cooperative Development Center), una organización sin fines de lucro que apoya a las cooperativas. Las partes consideraron la posibilidad de establecer una cooperativa de residentes sin fines de lucro para comprar la propiedad. De esa manera podrían conservar el suelo para las casas prefabricadas, seguir viviendo en comunidad y administrar colectivamente un lugar seguro, económico y de alta calidad.

Los residentes votaron a favor de esta propuesta. El propietario tenía dos demandas. Quería vender su propiedad a un valor justo de mercado, y quería completar la venta antes del fin del año. Estaban ya en agosto. Tenían cinco meses.

Además de colaborar con el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste, los residentes también comenzaron a trabajar con ROC USA, una organización sin fines de lucro de Nueva Hampshire que ofrece a los residentes de comunidades de casas prefabricadas una combinación de asistencia técnica y financiamiento asequible para comprar su suelo alquilado cuando se pone a la venta. Desde su fundación en 2008, ROC USA ha facilitado con éxito 80 transacciones de este tipo en todo el país y consiguió préstamos de financiamiento por más de 175 millones de dólares.

ROC USA trabaja con una red de ocho filiales regionales, una de las cuales es el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste. En Duvall, las organizaciones sin fines de lucro trabajaron con los residentes para hacer un análisis económico de la oferta y confirmar que era una buena oportunidad para que los residentes fueran propietarios de la comunidad. A continuación, las organizaciones ayudaron a los residentes a contratar a un abogado independiente y establecer su cooperativa, que funcionaría como una democracia, en la que los residentes elegirían a sus propios dirigentes. ROC USA ayudó a los residentes a contratar a un ingeniero independiente para realizar la diligencia debida de la propiedad; a conseguir financiamiento a través de la subsidiaria de préstamo de ROC USA, llamada ROC USA Capital; a comprar la propiedad y realizar las reparaciones indispensables; y a organizar la transferencia inmobiliaria.

El 27 de diciembre de ese año, la nueva cooperativa compró Duvall Riverside Village con US$1,3 millones en financiamiento de ROC USA Capital, y Wood y los demás propietarios pasaron a controlar sus propias viviendas y a preservar de forma permanente 25 viviendas económicas en un pueblo donde la oferta de este tipo de viviendas es escasa.

Los residentes continuaron pagando US$450 mensuales para alquilar el terreno, pero ahora votan para establecer las reglas de la comunidad, y usan el pago del alquiler para realizar mejoras y pagar la hipoteca, los impuestos y los gastos de comunidad.

“Ahora puedes tener un garaje si quieres”, explica Wood, que es la presidente de la cooperativa de residentes de Duvall y miembro de la junta directiva de ROC USA. “E invertimos US$35.000 para arreglar las calles. Ya no tenemos que vivir con temor, así que la gente está dispuesta a invertir en sus casas. Tenemos reuniones anuales para votar sobre proyectos. Si en el presupuesto hay cosas que no necesitamos, podemos reducir nuestro alquiler mensual. En última instancia, controlamos nuestro propio destino”.

Después de completar la venta, ROC USA y el Centro de Desarrollo Cooperativo del Noroeste han seguido proporcionando a los residentes asistencia técnica para garantizar el buen funcionamiento de la comunidad.

“Si simplemente nos hubieran prestado dinero y nos hubieran dicho: ‘Estas son las pautas, y esto es lo que tienen que hacer’, hubiéramos fracasado”, explica Wood. “Pero son un recurso constante. Nos ayudan en situaciones difíciles o cuando no sabemos hacer algo de forma legal. Nuestra meta es independizarnos y poder administrar nuestra comunidad como un negocio. Pague sus cuentas y su casa puede quedarse donde está. Punto. Para siempre”.

Beneficios

Más de 18 millones de estadounidenses viven en casas prefabricadas, lo cual representa el 5 por ciento del inventario de viviendas en las áreas metropolitanas de los Estados Unidos, y un 15 por ciento en las comunidades rurales. Su calidad tiene variaciones significativas. Aproximadamente el 25 por ciento de las casas prefabricadas son las casas rodantes frágiles desvencijadas de la década de 1960 y comienzos de la de 1970, fabricadas antes de que el gobierno federal introdujera controles de calidad en 1976. El 75 por ciento restante cumple con las normas federales, y muchas son viviendas agradables y térmicamente eficientes, que a simple vista no se pueden distinguir de las viviendas tradicionales construidas sobre el terreno. Si bien las casas prefabricadas han sido despreciadas durante mucho tiempo como el último recurso para vivienda, los modelos actuales son robustos, eficientes y atractivos, con el potencial de aliviar la carencia de viviendas seguras y económicas en el país.

Las casas prefabricadas modernas cuestan aproximadamente la mitad que las construidas sobre el terreno, y se pueden construir cinco veces más rápido, convirtiéndose en una opción realmente viable para los consumidores de bajos ingresos. El proceso de producción es menos costoso y los modelos que cumplen con las normas Energy Star del gobierno federal ofrecen a los propietarios un importante ahorro de energía. Y son duraderas. Mientras que las casas prefabricadas construidas antes de las regulaciones de 1976 fueron diseñadas para ser portátiles, como vehículos recreativos, los modelos modernos están construidos con materiales más fuertes y diseñados para ser permanentes. Las casas prefabricadas de hoy pueden sustentarse en los mismos tipos de cimientos que se usarían para una estructura construida sobre el terreno, ofreciendo flexibilidad para usarlas en una amplia gama de geografías y ambientes.

“El inventario de casas prefabricadas es un componente fundamental de las viviendas económicas del país”, dice George McCarthy, presidente y Director Ejecutivo del Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo. “Supera fácilmente dos o tres veces el inventario de viviendas subsidiadas en casi todos los mercados”.

Las casas prefabricadas son más baratas de producir que las casas construidas sobre el terreno, debido a su proceso de manufactura. Andrea Levere, presidente de Corporation for Enterprise Development, ha escrito en The Huffington Post que “el término ‘casa prefabricada’ tiene menos que ver con la calidad que con el proceso de producción, que deriva de las cadenas de montaje creadas por Henry Ford. Este modelo permite construir las casas prefabricadas en un ambiente de trabajo más controlado, con costos más predecibles, mayor eficiencia y menos residuos” (Levere 2013).

En 2013, el costo de una nueva casa prefabricada térmicamente eficiente era de US$64.000, en comparación con los US$324.500 de una nueva casa construida sobre el terreno, según el Censo de los Estados Unidos, si bien el precio de la segunda incluye el suelo. Pero incluso cuando se descuenta el costo del suelo, las casas prefabricadas siguen siendo significativamente más baratas, con un promedio de US$4 por metro cuadrado, en comparación con US$8,7 por metro cuadrado para las casas construidas sobre el terreno. Y no son viviendas subsidiadas, lo cual es una ventaja cuando se tiene en cuenta la oferta extremadamente escasa de viviendas subsidiadas en comparación con la demanda. En la actualidad, sólo una de cuatro familias que reúne los requisitos debido a sus bajos ingresos recibe una vivienda subsidiada, de acuerdo a la Comisión Bipartidista de Políticas, dejando al 75 por ciento restante en necesidad de una alternativa económica sin subsidiar. Al ayudar a cubrir ese vacío, las casas prefabricadas pueden aliviar algo esta demanda de casas subsidiadas que los gobiernos estatales y el gobierno federal tienen tanta dificultad para ofrecer debido a la reducción de sus presupuestos. “La mayoría de las familias que viven en casas prefabricadas serían elegibles para viviendas subsidiadas, pero en su lugar eligen esta opción más barata y sin subsidio”, dice McCarthy.

El inventario es también muy versátil, señala McCarthy, citando el papel que las casas prefabricadas cumplieron en el periodo inmediatamente posterior al Huracán Sandy. “Los trabajadores de emergencia instalaron 17 casas prefabricadas en Nueva Jersey a pocas semanas del huracán. Estas eran casas permanentes para inquilinos desplazados, no los problemáticos ‘tráileres Katrina’. Y lo hicieron antes de que la mayoría de las organizaciones elaborara siquiera un plan de vivienda. Esto es una muestra de la eficiencia y flexibilidad de las casas prefabricadas. Los plazos de producción son aproximadamente 80 por ciento más cortos que los de las casas construidas sobre el terreno, convirtiéndolas en la mejor opción de vivienda como respuesta a las catástrofes”.

De todas maneras, las casas prefabricadas con frecuencia tienen mala reputación, debido en gran medida a la percepción equivocada de que los modelos de hoy en día son los mismos que los de las primeras generaciones de casas móviles, antes de la introducción de normas de control de calidad por el Departamento de Vivienda y Desarrollo Urbano en 1976. Hoy en día hay aproximadamente 2 millones de casas construidas antes de 1976; muchas de ellas apenas se sostienen erguidas, y alojan a la población más vulnerable, como los ancianos y discapacitados. Si bien el inventario de viviendas anteriores a 1976 no tiene casi relación con sus contrapartes de la actualidad, estas viviendas más viejas y deterioradas dominan la percepción pública de las casas prefabricadas en los Estados Unidos.

La reputación del inventario de estas viviendas es aún menor por las vulnerabilidades que tienen los residentes que no son dueños del terreno donde viven. Aproximadamente 3 millones de personas viven en una de las 50.000 comunidades de viviendas prefabricadas del país, mientras que otros 3 millones alquilan una casa prefabricada en terrenos privados. Hay comunidades de casas prefabricadas en todos los estados del país. Como en el caso de Duvall Riverside Village, muchas se encuentran en terrenos privilegiados, y los propietarios de esos terrenos reciben habitualmente ofertas de emprendedores inmobiliarios.

Los promotores de casas prefabricadas y de su viabilidad como alternativa de vivienda económica se han enfocado en tres áreas fundamentales de innovación: conservar los parques de casas móviles; reemplazar las unidades anteriores a 1976 por casas térmicamente eficientes; y aumentar el acceso a financiamiento asequible para los compradores potenciales, ya que es prácticamente inaccesible en el mercado actual, y es imperativo para acumular un patrimonio neto y preservar el valor de reventa de la casa.

Conservación de las comunidades de casas prefabricadas

La conversión de una comunidad de casas prefabricadas de propiedad privada a una cooperativa de residentes, como se hizo en Duvall Riverside Village, no es frecuente. Por cada comunidad que se ofrece a la venta y se preserva satisfactoriamente como vivienda económica, hay muchas más que se terminan vendiendo para realizar emprendimientos inmobiliarios, desplazando a los residentes, quienes quizás no tengan ninguna otra buena alternativa.

“No es tan sencillo como sólo mover la casa”, dice Ishbel Dickens, presidente de la Asociación Nacional de Propietarios de Casas Prefabricadas. “Primero está la cuestión de si la casa se puede mover. Puede ser demasiado vieja o inestable para moverse. Y aunque se pueda mover, esta operación es cara, y es muy difícil encontrar un espacio en otra comunidad. En la mayoría de los casos, cuando un parque de casas cierra, los residentes probablemente van a perder la casa y todos sus recursos. Lo más probable es que nunca puedan ser propietarios de una vivienda. Probablemente terminarán en una lista de viviendas subsidiadas, o acabarán viviendo en la calle”.

Hasta cierto punto, es un accidente histórico que tantos parques de casas móviles ocupen terrenos valiosos, dice Paul Bradley, presidente de ROC USA. En las décadas de 1950 y 1960, los estadounidenses comenzaron a comprar casas rodantes, en parte debido al surgimiento de una cultura de recreación al aire libre, y en parte debido a que las fábricas comenzaron a producirlas para utilizar la capacidad de manufactura excedente después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, haciéndolas atractivas y asequibles. A medida que las unidades se fueron haciendo más populares, pasaron de ser estructuras transitorias a permanentes, y la gente comenzó a agregar garajes provisionales para sus automóviles y solarios. En ese momento, los planificadores urbanos aceptaron la evolución hacia la permanencia. Desde su punto de vista, la mayoría de las casa rodantes se encontraban en terrenos periféricos que no se usaban para emprendimientos inmobiliarios. ¿Qué tenía de malo dejar estas casas móviles por un tiempo hasta que las ciudades se expandieran hasta llegar allí, y en ese momento desarrollar el suelo?

“Estas comunidades originales se construyeron con un plan en mente para eliminarlas”, dice Bradley. “En ese entonces, nadie contempló las consecuencias de crear un inventario de viviendas donde los propietarios no podían controlar el suelo donde se encontraban. Nadie anticipó que estas comunidades se llenarían de propietarios de bajos y moderados ingresos, quienes invertían su dinero para comprar estas casas y tenían muy pocas alternativas viables. Y hoy en día todavía estamos tratando de resolver este problema. Esta falta de control del suelo significa que los propietarios de las viviendas viven con una profunda sensación de inseguridad, y de que es absurdo efectuar inversiones en su vivienda, porque nunca las van a poder recuperar. ¿Cuál es la consecuencia para un propietario que no puede invertir racionalmente en su casa? ¿Qué significa esto para el inventario de viviendas? ¿Para los barrios?”

Las políticas de corto plazo para el uso del suelo no son el único problema para preservar las comunidades de casas prefabricadas. Otro obstáculo igualmente oneroso es la falta de protección legal para los residentes. En 34 estados y el Distrito de Columbia, el propietario puede vender el terreno sin dar a los residentes la oportunidad de comprarlo. De hecho, en la mayoría de los estados el propietario no tiene siquiera que notificar a los residentes que la comunidad está a la venta; puede esperar hasta que la propiedad se haya vendido antes de informar a los residentes de la transacción, dejándolos de golpe en una situación muy frágil. Incluso los 16 estados que exigen al propietario la notificación previa a la comunidad de la venta de viviendas prefabricadas no brindan necesariamente las protecciones que requieren los inquilinos. “En la mayoría de los estados con notificación previa, hay tantas limitaciones en los requerimientos de la notificación que pocas veces sirve de algo a los residentes”, dice Carolyn Carter, directora de promoción en el Centro Nacional de Derecho del Consumidor (National Consumer Law Center).

Para proteger mejor a los promotores respaldan reformas legislativas a las leyes estatales e incentivos tributarios para que los propietarios vendan el suelo a los residentes. La estrategia más efectiva consiste en promulgar leyes estatales que requieren al dueño que dé un aviso anticipado de la venta a los residentes (idealmente de 60 días) junto con la oportunidad de comprar la propiedad, señala Carter. Según ella, hay seis estados que tienen leyes que “funcionan en la práctica, y brindan oportunidades reales para que los residentes compren sus comunidades”: Nueva Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, Vermont y Delaware. Dice también que Oregón promulgó una legislación prometedora en enero de 2015. “En estos estados con avisos efectivos y leyes que brindan la oportunidad de comprar, está tomando fuerza el que los residentes se conviertan en propietarios”, explica Carter.

Aproximadamente el 46 por ciento de las 80 comunidades respaldadas por ROC USA se encuentra en Nueva Hampshire o Massachusetts, dos estados pequeños con algunas de las protecciones más efectivas del país para los residentes. Hay 89 cooperativas de residentes adicionales en Nueva Hampshire anteriores al lanzamiento de ROC USA.

Para comprender el valor de las leyes de protección firmes para los residentes, basta con contar la historia de Ryder Woods, un parque de 174 casas móviles en Milford, Connecticut, a 18 kilómetros al sur de New Haven, pegado a una carretera principal. Connecticut es uno de 19 estados que ofrecen incentivos tributarios o brindan a los residentes “algunas” protecciones cuando se vende la comunidad, aunque también presenta “importantes vacíos”, según Carter. En 1998, el dueño de Ryder Woods vendió su propiedad a emprendedores inmobiliarios. Informó a los residentes por medio de avisos de desalojo, en contravención de las leyes estatales, que le exigían no sólo dar un aviso por adelantado de la venta pendiente sino también ofrecerles la oportunidad de ser los primeros en comprar el suelo. Ryder Woods tenía una asociación de propietarios activa y rápidamente se organizaron protestas, peticiones y campañas ante la legislatura estatal para cancelar la venta. Finalmente, los medios de comunicación se hicieron cargo de la historia, y una abogada de Milford ofreció sus servicios de forma voluntaria para ayudarlos. A medida que profundizaba en el caso, se dio cuenta de que la ley estaba del lado de los residentes, y que la comunidad necesitaba más respaldo legal que el que ella podía ofrecer por sí sola. Pidió ayuda a un amigo y colega, socio de una importante compañía de Hartford, que aceptó tomar el caso pro bono y asignó la tarea a un equipo de abogados. El caso finalizó en un juicio y en última instancia llegó hasta la corte suprema estatal. El comprador original, que no estaba interesado en este embrollo legal, vendió la propiedad a un segundo emprendedor.

Cuatro años después de la venta original, el tribunal falló a favor de los residentes. En un pacto sin precedentes, y como parte del acuerdo, el segundo emprendedor compró un nuevo terreno a un kilómetro y medio de la parcela original y reconstruyó completamente allí la comunidad. El emprendedor compró 174 casas móviles nuevas y se las vendió a los residentes a un precio significativamente reducido, con hipotecas más favorables que cualquier otro financiamiento convencional del mercado. Construyó un centro comunitario y un estanque que completó con cisnes. Y como parte del acuerdo dio a los residentes la oportunidad de formar una cooperativa y comprar el terreno, lo cual hicieron en 2009 con un financiamiento de compra de US$5,4 millones de ROC USA Capital. La escritura de compra se firmó en las oficinas de la mencionada compañía de Hartford, la cual siguió prestando sus servicios de forma voluntaria a los residentes hasta que se completó la venta. Hoy, en el suelo que ocupaba la comunidad original de Ryder Woods, hay una tienda de Walmart.

“A veces, cuando recordamos lo que pasó, pensamos que fue una locura. Contratamos un autobús, fuimos a Hartford, hablamos con la legislatura, y luchamos. Nos juntamos y ganamos contra dos emprendedores multimillonarios”, explica Lynn Nugent, de 68 años de edad, vendedora a tiempo parcial en una tienda de Sears, y una de los residentes que ayudó a organizar la campaña junto con su marido, cerrajero jubilado. “Yo siempre digo: Antes pertenecíamos a otra persona; ahora nos pertenecemos a nosotros mismos”.

Mejor acceso a casas prefabricadas económicas y de calidad

A diferencia de los residentes de Ryder Woods, muchos propietarios de casas prefabricadas tienen problemas para conseguir una unidad de calidad con un financiamiento asequible. De nuevo, el principal responsable es la legislación. Según la ley federal, las casas prefabricadas se consideran una propiedad personal, como un automóvil o una embarcación, y no una propiedad inmueble como las casas tradicionales. Por lo tanto, los compradores no pueden acceder a préstamos hipotecarios. En cambio, el financiamiento se realiza por medio de préstamos personales. Estos préstamos son más caros que las hipotecas, con un promedio de tasas de interés 50 a 500 puntos básicos mayor, y con menores protecciones al consumidor. Más del 70 por ciento de los préstamos para la compra de casas prefabricadas es de este tipo, considerado un sustituto de productos subprime.

“Esta situación de pertenecer a un segundo nivel es una de las mayores limitaciones para aumentar el inventario de casas prefabricadas permanentemente asequibles”, dice McCarthy. “Es un obstáculo al financiamiento de las casas, incrementando su costo y reduciendo el potencial de acumulación de patrimonio neto, porque reduce la demanda efectiva de unidades existentes”.

Si bien la solución ideal sería cambiar las leyes federales de la titulación, no es probable que ocurra. En cambio, Next Step, una organización sin fines de lucro de Kentucky, ha establecido el concepto de “Viviendas Prefabricadas Hechas Correctamente” (Manufactured Housing Done Right o MHDR)”. Esta estrategia innovadora pone casas prefabricadas asequibles de alta calidad —junto con el financiamiento correspondiente— a disposición de consumidores de ingresos bajos a moderados, por medio de una combinación de casas térmicamente eficientes, educación a los compradores y financiamiento barato. Funciona de la siguiente manera.

Primero, Next Step brinda a los compradores de bajos ingresos acceso a casas prefabricadas de alta calidad. La organización creó una cartera de modelos sólidos y asequibles. Cada casa de Next Step cumple o excede las normas Energy Star, reduciendo tanto los costos de los servicios públicos para el propietario como la huella medioambiental. De acuerdo a Next Step, las pruebas han demostrado que estas casas son un 30 por ciento más eficientes que una casa básica que cumple con el código de edificación, y 10 a 15 por ciento más eficiente que una casa Energy Star básica. En promedio, esto genera un ahorro de energía de US$1.800 al año por cada casa móvil anterior a 1976 reemplazada, y US$360 al año por cada casa nueva establecida.

Además, las casas de Next Step están “diseñadas para garantizar que sean económicas al tiempo que cumplen con las normas de calidad”. Se instalan sobre cimientos permanentes, proporcionando un mayor soporte estructural contra el viento y reduciendo los problemas de asentamiento. Las casas tienen pisos y aislamiento de alta calidad, lo cual ayuda a aumentar su durabilidad y reducir los gastos de energía. Y como el problema principal de los cimientos es el agua, las casas de Next Step tienen protecciones adicionales contra la humedad.

Mejor acceso a financiamiento sostenible

Next Step también asegura a los compradores de vivienda un financiamiento seguro, sostenible y económico. “Uno de los problemas de esta industria es que los mercados de capital no participan de forma importante”, explica Stacey Epperson, Directora Ejecutiva de Next Step. “No hay un mercado secundario significativo, de manera que hay muy pocos prestamistas en el mercado y muy pocas opciones para los compradores. Nuestra solución es preparar a nuestros prestatarios para que sean propietarios, y después conseguirles buenos préstamos”.

Next Step trabaja con una combinación de prestamistas con y sin fines de lucro, aprobados por la organización, que proporcionan un financiamiento seguro a precios razonables. Como contrapartida, Next Step reduce el riesgo de los prestamistas. Las casas están diseñadas para cumplir con los requisitos de los prestamistas, y los compradores reciben capacitación financiera integral para que puedan tener éxito como compradores. Por lo tanto, los compradores de casas de Next Step no sólo obtienen una mejor hipoteca inicial, sino que tienen la capacidad para acumular patrimonio neto y obtener un buen precio de reventa cuando decidan vender su casa.

Además, cada casa de Next Step se instala sobre un cimiento permanente para que el propietario pueda cumplir con los requisitos de ciertos programas hipotecarios con garantía gubernamental, que son menos onerosos que un préstamo personal. Next Step estima que ha ahorrado a sus 173 propietarios aproximadamente US$16,1 millones en pagos de interés.

“En estos momentos, cerca del 75 por ciento del financiamiento de casas prefabricadas se hace con préstamos personales. Pero el 70 por ciento de casas nuevas prefabricadas se instala en suelos privados donde, en muchos casos, la casa se podría colocar sobre un cimiento permanente, y el dueño podría obtener una hipoteca de largo plazo con una baja tasa de interés”, dice Epperson.

El modelo de MHDR es innovador en parte porque es escalable. Next Step capacita y depende de una red de organizaciones miembros sin fines de lucro para implementar el modelo en sus comunidades respectivas. Next Step vende casas a sus miembros a precios competitivos, y después las organizaciones miembros supervisan el proceso de identificar y educar a los compradores, ayudando a conseguir el préstamo y administrando la instalación.

“En el modelo tradicional de la industria, no había manera de que una organización sin fines de lucro pudiera comprar una casa prefabricada a precios de mayorista. Esto es lo que hemos diseñado, y como resultado podemos ofrecer una vivienda mucho más económica que si la organización sin fines de lucro o el propietario tratara de comprarlas por sí mismos”, explica Kevin Clayton, presidente y Director Ejecutivo de Clayton Homes, uno de los productores más grandes de casas prefabricadas del país, y uno de los proveedores de largo plazo de Next Step.

“El programa Next Step funciona porque prepara a la gente para tener éxito”, dice Clayton. “Next Step les ofrece asesoramiento para ser propietarios y les brinda apoyo si tienen problemas económicos en el futuro. Pueden comprar su casa por mucho menos dinero, acumular patrimonio neto y pagar una cuota mensual baja por su préstamo y sus costos de energía”.

Cyndee Curtis, una propietaria de Next Step, está de acuerdo. Curtis tenía 27 años de edad, era soltera y estaba embarazada cuando compró una casa móvil usada modelo Fleetwood de 1971 por US$5.000 en 2001. La colocó en un lote de su propiedad en las afueras de Great Falls, Montana.

“No tenía dinero, no tenía un título universitario, y no tenía opciones”, dice Curtis. “El viejo tanque séptico de acero tenía agujeros por el óxido, era como una bomba de tiempo. La alfombra estaba completamente gastada, el linóleo debajo de la alfombra tenía agujeros de quemaduras, y el cielorraso tenía fugas donde se había colocado una extensión de la casa. Todos los años compraba libros de construcción, iba a Home Depot y preguntaba cómo arreglar esa fuga. Y todos los años me encontraba en la situación de arreglarla sola. Había moho en el umbral de la puerta debido a esa fuga, y tenía un recién nacido viviendo en la casa”.

En 2005, Curtis volvió a la universidad por dos años, obtuvo su título de enfermera y comenzó a trabajar como enfermera práctica registrada, ganando US$28.500 por año. “Ahora que estaba ganando un sueldo decente, podía explorar mis opciones”, dijo Curtis, madre soltera de dos hijos. “Quería conseguir un lugar donde mis hijos pudieran crecer con orgullo, y aprovechar el lote al máximo”.

Pero su historial de crédito no era bueno, y finalmente recaló en NeighborWorks Montana, un miembro sin fines de lucro de Next Step, que le informó sobre el programa de Next Step. En los dos años y medio siguientes, Curtis trabajó con el personal de NeighborWorks Montana para reparar su historial de crédito. Con su ayuda, consiguió una hipoteca y compró una casa de Next Step por US$102.000, que incluía no sólo la casa sino también la extracción, eliminación y recambio de su viejo sistema séptico. Como la casa de Next Step está instalada sobre un cimiento permanente que reúne ciertas calificaciones, y debido a haberse mejorado el historial de crédito, los ingresos y las condiciones de vivienda de Curtis, pudo conseguir una hipoteca del programa de Desarrollo Rural del Departamento de Agricultura de los EE.UU., mucho menos onerosa que los préstamos personales comunes. Además, mientras que la casa móvil anterior de Curtis tenía un título equivalente a un automóvil, su casa de Next Step tiene una escritura similar a la de una casa construida sobre el terreno. Por lo tanto, un futuro comprador también estará en condiciones de solicitar una hipoteca tradicional.

Curtis dice que su casa de Next Step le ha proporcionado ahorros de energía significativos. “Tengo 40 metros cuadrados más que antes. Antes tenía un baño; ahora tengo dos. Y sin embargo, mis gastos de gas y electricidad se han reducido en dos tercios”.

Dice además: “Mi casa es mil por ciento mejor que donde vivía antes. Si una persona entra a mi casa, no se da cuenta de que es prefabricada. Tiene lindas puertas, con paredes texturizadas. Se parece a cualquier otra casa nueva donde uno quisiera vivir. A veces la gente cree que tiene que sufrir con una vivienda en malas condiciones. Yo sé lo que es vivir así, y les quiero decir que si trabajan con dedicación pueden mejorar su vida y la de su familia”

Loren Berlin es escritora y consultora de comunicaciones del área metropolitana de Chicago.

Referencias

Levere, Andrea. 2013. “Hurricane Sandy and the Merits of Manufactured Housing.” Huffington Post. 8 de enero. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrea-levere/hurricane-sandy-manufactured-housing_b_2426797.html

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Uno de los más formidables retos para los líderes políticos y sociales de este siglo radica en poder crear condiciones económicas e institucionales que conduzcan a una gestión ambiental urbana eficaz, y que al mismo tiempo estén comprometidas a consolidar la democracia, promover la justicia social y erradicar la pobreza urbana. Este desafío de promoción de la inclusión socioespacial resulta todavía más significativo en los países en vías de desarrollo y con economías en transición, dada la complejidad de los problemas resultantes de la urbanización intensiva, la degradación ambiental, las crecientes desigualdades socioeconómicas y la segregación espacial. Merece especial atención el debate sobre las condiciones jurídico-políticas del desarrollo y la gestión ambiental urbana.

La discusión sobre ley e ilegalidad en el contexto del desarrollo urbano ha cobrado impulso en años recientes, especialmente desde que el Programa Hábitat1 de la ONU destacó la importancia fundamental del Derecho Urbanístico. En los talleres de trabajo facilitados por el Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano (IRGLUS) de los últimos ocho años, los investigadores han señalado la necesidad de realizar un análisis crítico del papel de las instituciones y de las estipulaciones jurídicas en el proceso de urbanización. Según lo sugiere la Campaña Mundial de Gobernabilidad Urbana del Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (CNUAH)2, la promoción de la reforma jurídica ha sido considerada por organizaciones nacionales e internacionales como una de las condiciones principales para cambiar la naturaleza excluyente del desarrollo urbano en países en desarrollo y en transición, y para confrontar eficazmente el problema cada vez mayor de la ilegalidad urbana.

Las prácticas ilegales han proliferado de formas variadas, especialmente en el contexto cada vez más extenso de la economía informal. Un número creciente de personas han tenido que ponerse al margen de la ley para poder tener acceso a tierra y viviendas urbanas, y se ven forzadas a vivir sin seguridad de tenencia en condiciones muy precarias, generalmente en zonas periféricas. Este proceso tiene muchas repercusiones serias —sociales, políticas, económicas y ambientales— y requiere confrontación por parte del gobierno y de la sociedad. Generalmente se reconoce que la ilegalidad urbana debe entenderse no sólo en términos de la dinámica entre sistemas políticos y de mercados del suelo, sino también en función de la naturaleza del orden jurídico en vigor, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la definición de los derechos de propiedad inmobiliaria urbana. La promoción de la reforma urbana depende principalmente de una reforma comprensiva del orden jurídico, que modifique los reglamentos de los derechos de propiedad del suelo y el proceso general de desarrollo, legislación y gestión del suelo urbano. Se ha concedido especial importancia a las políticas de regularización de la tenencia, dirigidas a promover la integración socioespacial del pobre urbano, tales como las propuestas por Campaña Mundial de Tenencia Segura del CNUAH.

Comparación entre enfoques conservadores e innovadores

Este complejo debate jurídico-político tiene serias repercusiones socioeconómicas en el mundo entero, y debe considerarse bajo tres enfoques político-ideológicos, conservadores pero influyentes, del derecho y la reglamentación jurídica.

En primer lugar, la función de la ley en el desarrollo urbano no puede cifrarse a los términos simplistas propuestos por quienes sugieren —a pesar de los resultados históricos— que el capitalismo de por sí permite distribuir ampliamente la riqueza, y quienes defienden un estilo “no intervencionista” a la regulación estatal para controlar el desarrollo urbano. Considerando que la globalización es sin duda irreversible y en cierto modo independiente de la acción gubernamental, no hay justificación histórica para la ideología neoliberal que supone que al maximizarse el crecimiento y la riqueza, el mercado libre también optimiza la distribución de ese incremento (Hobsbawn 2000).

Varios indicadores de la creciente pobreza social, especialmente los que guardan estrecha relación con las condiciones precarias del acceso al suelo y a la vivienda en áreas urbanas, demuestran que, incluso si el mundo se ha enriquecido como resultado del crecimiento económico y financiero mundial, la distribución social y regional de esta nueva riqueza dista de ser óptima. Aún más, el desarrollo industrial exitoso de muchos países (por ejemplo Estados Unidos, Alemania o incluso Brasil y México) se logró adoptando medidas de regulación y rechazando la aceptación incondicional de la lógica del mercado libre. Quizás más que nunca es de importancia capital redefinir la acción estatal y la regulación económica en países en desarrollo y en transición, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la promoción del desarrollo urbano, la reforma del suelo, el control del uso del suelo y la gestión de la ciudad. No se puede pasar por alto el papel central de la ley en este proceso.

En segundo lugar, el efecto de la globalización económica y financiera sobre el desarrollo de los mercados del suelo ha presionado a los países en desarrollo y en transición para que reformen sus leyes nacionales del suelo y homogenicen sus sistemas jurídicos a fin de facilitar la gestión internacional de los mercados del suelo. Este énfasis en una reforma globalizada orientada al mercado de la tenencia de la tierra y del derecho, con la resultante “americanización de las leyes comerciales y la expansión de bufetes anglo-estadounidenses mundiales”, se basa en un enfoque del suelo “puramente como un activo económico que debería estar a la disposición de cualquiera que pueda aprovecharlo para lograr los más altos y mejores beneficios económicos”. Este punto de vista está encaminado a facilitar las inversiones extranjeras en el suelo, más que a reconocer “el papel social del suelo en la sociedad” y que dicho suelo es “parte del patrimonio social del Estado” (McAuslan 2000).

Un tercer y cada vez más influyente punto de vista se ha basado mayoritariamente, y a veces imprecisamente, en las ideas del economista Hernando de Soto. Él defiende la noción de que se puede resolver el problema de la pobreza global si se incorpora la creciente economía extralegal informal a la economía formal, particularmente en áreas urbanas. En su opinión, los pequeños negocios informales y viviendas marginales de los pobres son esencialmente activos económicos (“capital muerto”), que deberían ser revitalizados por el sistema jurídico oficial y convertidos en un capital líquido que permita a sus dueños el acceso al crédito formal y la posibilidad de invertir en sus viviendas y negocios, y de esa manera fortalecer la economía como un todo. Ahora bien, en vez de cuestionar la naturaleza del sistema jurídico que generó la ilegalidad urbana en primer lugar, varios países han propuesto la total —y frecuentemente incondicional— legalización de los negocios informales y el reconocimiento incondicional de títulos de propiedad absoluta para los habitantes urbanos de algunos asentamientos informales como método “radical” para transformar las economías urbanas.

Contrario a estos enfoques conservadores, varios estudios recientes han señalado que, en ausencia de planes urbanos bien estructurados, coherentes y progresistas, el enfoque del (neo)liberalismo jurídico no hará más que agravar el ya serio problema de la exclusión socioespacial. Tanto legisladores como organismos públicos deben tomar conciencia de las muchas y a veces malignas repercusiones de sus propuestas, especialmente las relativas a la legalización de los asentamientos informales. El tan esperado reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del Estado por suministrar derechos de vivienda social no puede reducirse al reconocimiento de los derechos de propiedad. La legalización de actividades informales, particularmente a través del reconocimiento de los títulos individuales de propiedad, no garantiza automáticamente la integración socioespacial.

Y si no se formulan dentro del ámbito de políticas socioeconómicas comprensivas y no se asimilan a una estrategia ampliada de gestión urbana, las políticas de legalización de la tenencia podrían tener efectos indeseados (Alfonsin 2001), entre ellos: nuevas cargas financieras no intencionales a los pobres urbanos, poco efecto en la reducción de la pobreza urbana, y, lo más importante, el refuerzo directo de los poderes económicos y políticos que han sido los causantes tradicionales de la exclusión socioespacial. Las nuevas políticas deben integrar cuatro factores principales:

• instrumentos jurídicos adecuados que creen derechos eficaces;
• leyes de planificación urbana con sesgo social;
• organismos político-institucionales de gestión urbana democrática; y
• políticas socioeconómicas dirigidas a crear oportunidades de empleo y aumentar los niveles de ingreso.

La búsqueda de soluciones jurídico-políticas novedosas de tenencia para los pobres urbanos debe integrar la promoción de la tenencia individual con el reconocimiento de los derechos sociales de vivienda, incorporar esa dimensión siempre olvidada del papel de la mujer e intentar reducir los impactos de tales soluciones en el mercado del suelo, para que los beneficios de las inversiones públicas estén a disposición de los pobres urbanos y no de los promotores inmobiliarios privados. Perseguir esos objetivos es de fundamental importancia dentro del contexto de la promoción de una estrategia de reforma urbana más amplia y de carácter inclusivo (Payne). Varias ciudades, como Porto Alegre, Ciudad de México y Caracas, han tratado de materializar planes urbanos progresistas con la reforma de sus sistemas jurídicos tradicionales. Entre las medidas significantes que se han tomado para democratizar el acceso al suelo y a la propiedad, figuran normas y regulaciones de naturaleza menos elitista, zonificación residencial especial para los pobres urbanos y cambios en los mecanismos fiscales de captura de plusvalías del suelo, para tornarlos menos regresivos.

Para ampliar el debate

Dentro del contexto de estos acalorados debates sobre Derecho Urbanístico, el Instituto Lincoln prestó su apoyo a tres conferencias internacionales recientes:

• Séptima Conferencia de Ley y Espacio Urbano sobre Ley y Gobernabilidad Urbana, presentada por IRGLUS, Cairo, Egipto, junio de 2000;
• Conferencia Preparatoria Regional de América Latina y el Caribe, del CNUAH/iu, en Santiago, Chile, octubre de 2000;
• Primera Conferencia de Derecho Urbanístico de Brasil, en Belo Horizonte, Brasil, diciembre de 2000.

Ley y gobernabilidad urbana

En vista del énfasis relativamente nuevo en establecer vínculos entre los estudios urbanos y los estudios jurídicos, es necesario que la dimensión jurídica del proceso de desarrollo urbano se convierta en el centro de la investigación de una forma más explícita. Para ello se requiere un abordaje más coherente al lenguaje, de manera que conceptos claves, como los derechos de propiedad, puedan discutirse adecuadamente tanto en términos políticos como jurídicos. La mayoría de los artículos presentados en esta conferencia de IRGLUS se centraron en la regularización del suelo. La regularización se ha convertido en la respuesta política más frecuente al problema general de los asentamientos ilegales, pero el término es usado de muchas maneras y con diferentes significados por diferentes organismos e investigadores. Para implementar la dimensión física de las políticas de regularización se impone actualizar infraestructuras e introducir servicios, como también destacar puntos de sensibilidad cultural. Por ejemplo, para que las políticas de regularización aporten seguridad de tenencia, se deberá prestar más atención al impacto del proceso sobre la mujer.

Los participantes también señalaron los efectos de las políticas de regularización en los mercados de suelo formales e informales. Algunos perciben la regularización como un “mercadeo” de los procesos operativos de los antiguos asentamientos ilegales. Un punto de preocupación fue la posibilidad de “elitización” (gentrification) la cual en este caso no se refiere a restaurar y cambiar el uso de las edificaciones, sino más bien al proceso mediante el cual grupos de medianos ingresos “invaden” asentamientos recientemente regularizados para fines residenciales u otros, hasta desalojar a los inquilinos originales. No hay duda de que al definir las políticas de regularización, es importante considerar una amplia gama de aspectos económicos y políticos. En particular, hay que incluir a los habitantes de los asentamientos ilegales en la vida económica y política de la ciudad, para así evitar mayor segregación socioeconómica y sus peligros asociados.

Dar respuestas adecuadas a los problemas complejos de los asentamientos ilegales es difícil, aparte de que las soluciones particulares no siempre funcionan en todos los casos. A la hora de la verdad, el éxito de un programa de regularización depende de acciones gubernamentales y de costosos programas y reformas jurídicas. Sin embargo, hay una brecha significativa entre las preguntas planteadas y la práctica real. Debido a la urgencia de adelantarse a los procesos de los asentamientos ilegales, los organismos públicos se están concentrando en la cura, y no en la prevención.

¿Cómo pueden los gobiernos municipales detener el proceso de los asentamientos ilegales? Aportando soluciones más eficaces de suelo y vivienda. Los participantes de la conferencia defendieron la legitimidad de los programas de tenencia, pragmáticamente en algunos casos, como un derecho fundamental en otros. Dado el enfoque de direccionamiento “desde arriba” que suele aplicarse a este asunto, se debe ampliar el círculo de participantes con capacidad decisoria para que incluya la voz de los pobres urbanos.

Conferencia del CNUAH/CEPAL

América Latina fue la única región que elaboró un plan de acción para el programa Hábitat II, señal de que, a pesar de las diferencias fundamentales de tipo lingüístico, histórico y cultural de la región, existe un plan común que debería facilitar la colaboración. La estructura urbana de la región está pasando por cambios profundos como resultado de varios procesos combinados, entre ellos:

• nuevas fronteras económicas;
• pobreza social y segregación espacial crecientes;
• degradación del medio ambiente;
• el impacto de desastres naturales en la precaria infraestructura urbana;
• cambios en el número de integrantes de las familias y en las relaciones familiares;
• desempleo generalizado e incremento de los empleos informales; y
• aumento vertiginoso de la violencia urbana, frecuentemente relacionado con el tráfico de drogas.

Todos estos problemas han empeorado debido a la expansión de la globalización económica, las políticas de liberalización inapropiadas y los esquemas de privatización carentes de regulación. Pese a su rápida integración al creciente mercado global, América Latina ha experimentado una explosión de pobreza social en la última década. Las proyecciones del Banco Mundial sugieren que, de no confrontarse este problema, 55 millones de latinoamericanos podrían estar viviendo con menos de US$1 al día en la próxima década.

La Declaración de Santiago producto de esta conferencia estableció la meta de un plan ambiental urbano para poner en marcha diálogos político-institucionales y gestiones conjuntas. El objetivo es crear las condiciones necesarias para salvar los obstáculos de gobernabilidad política que siguen oponiéndose a los esfuerzos de las dos décadas pasadas para promover reformas económicas y democratización en la región. A fin de desarrollar una estructura urbana más competitiva y eficiente, tal plan de acción regional debe:

• requerir reformas políticas amplias que faciliten adoptar políticas de descentralización que favorezcan la acción de los gobiernos municipales;
• redefinir las relaciones intergubernamentales y la cooperación financiera en los ámbitos nacional, regional e internacional;
• modernizar el sistema institucional;
• combatir la corrupción endémica y generalizada; y
• crear mecanismos de participación democrática efectiva en la gobernabilidad urbana.

Como parte de una estrategia de reforma urbana más amplia, debe prestarse atención urgente a la necesidad de suministrar condiciones habitacionales mejores y más accesibles para los pobres urbanos. Dada la reciente disminución de las inversiones públicas habitacionales en la mayor parte de América Latina, es crítico comenzar ya a proporcionar nuevas unidades habitacionales, mejorar las existentes y regularizar los asentamientos informales.

Igualmente, la Declaración de Santiago adelantó una variedad de propuestas, entre ellas nuevos marcos normativos para políticas urbanas y habitacionales; políticas de organización territorial y mecanismos de control del uso del suelo; y políticas públicas para integración social e igualdad de los géneros. Sin embargo, no confrontó el hecho de que muchos de los problemas sociales, urbanos y ambientales de la región son consecuencia de los sistemas jurídicos nacionales de carácter conservador, elitista y mayormente obsoleto que siguen vigentes en muchos países. Cualquier propuesta para un nuevo equilibrio entre estados, mercados y ciudadanos para apoyar el proceso de reforma urbana, requiere no sólo cambios económicos y político-institucionales, sino también una completa reforma jurídica, especialmente la gestión jurídico-política de los derechos de propiedad.

Conferencia de Derecho Urbanístico de Brasil

La constitución brasileña de 1988 introdujo un capítulo pionero sobre política urbana al consolidar la noción de la “función social de la propiedad y de la ciudad” como el principal marco conceptual para el Derecho Urbanístico brasileño. Si bien es cierto que las constituciones brasileñas desde 1934 establecían nominalmente que el reconocimiento del derecho individual de propiedad estaba condicionado a la realización de una “función social”, hasta 1988 no se había definido claramente este principio ni se había podido ejecutar con los mecanismos de observancia en vigor. La Constitución de 1988 reconoce el derecho individual de propiedad en áreas urbanas únicamente si el uso y desarrollo del suelo y de la propiedad satisfacen las estipulaciones con sesgo social y ambiental del Derecho Urbanístico, especialmente de los planes maestros formulados en los ámbitos municipales. Como resultado, se ha decretado un sinnúmero de leyes municipales urbanas y ambientales para apoyar una amplia variedad de políticas y estrategias de gestión urbana progresista.

Algunas de las experiencias internacionales más innovadoras de gestión urbana están teniendo lugar en Brasil, como el proceso del presupuesto participativo adoptado en varias ciudades (Goldsmith y Vainer, 2001). La inminente aprobación de la Ley Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (el llamado “Estatuto de la ciudad”) debe contribuir a consolidar el nuevo paradigma constitucional de planificación y gestión urbana, especialmente por el hecho de reglamentar instrumentos de observanción constitucional tales como edificación obligatoria, transferencia del derecho de construir, expropiación mediante tributación progresista y derechos de prescripción adquisitiva.

Proceder a ese cambio en el paradigma jurídico es de importancia fundamental. La tradición incipiente de estudios jurídicos urbanísticos en Brasil tiende a ser esencialmente legalista, pero refuerza las nociones tradicionales del derecho individual de propiedad especificadas en el Código Civil de 1916. Este Código obsoleto considera el suelo y los derechos de propiedad casi exclusivamente en función de las posibilidades económicas ofrecidas a los propietarios individuales, sin dejar mucho campo para una intervención estatal con sesgo social, dirigida a conciliar los diferentes intereses existentes sobre el uso del suelo y de la propiedad. Tan importante es decretar nuevas leyes como lo es consolidar el marco conceptual propuesto por la Constitución de 1988, y de esa manera sustituir las estipulaciones individualistas del Código Civil, las cuales todavía sientan las bases para una interpretación judicial conservadora sobre el desarrollo del suelo. Gran parte de la resistencia ideológica a las políticas urbanas progresistas que sostienen grandes grupos conservadores de la sociedad brasileña tiene su origen en el Código, que no considera el papel de la ley y la ilegalidad en el proceso de desarrollo urbano y de gestión urbana.

Los artículos presentados en esta conferencia exploran las posibilidades jurídicas, políticas e institucionales creadas por el nuevo marco constitucional para ejecutar acciones estatales y sociales en el proceso de desarrollo urbano y control de uso del suelo. Los participantes recalcaron que la discusión de leyes, instituciones jurídicas y decisiones judiciales debe estar respaldada por un entendimiento de la naturaleza del proceso legislativo, las condiciones de cumplimiento de la ley, y la dinámica del proceso de producción social de ilegalidad urbana.

Los participantes también advirtieron que si el tratamiento jurídico del derecho de propiedad se saca del ámbito restrictivo del Derecho Civil, de forma que pueda ser interpretado a partir de los criterios más progresistas del redefinido Derecho Urbanístico público redefinido, entonces las posibilidades ofrecidas por el Derecho Administrativo brasileño tampoco son satisfactorias. Las estipulaciones existentes y en vigor, limitadas y formalistas, carecen de suficiente flexibilidad y competencia para manejar y garantizar la seguridad jurídica y las relaciones político-institucionales que están transformándose rápidamente en varios niveles: dentro del entorno estatal, entre niveles gubernamentales, entre Estado y sociedad, y dentro de ésta. Las nuevas estrategias de gestión urbana se basan en ideas tales como plusvalías, asociaciones público-privadas, operaciones “urbanas” e “interligadas”, privatización y terciarización de la prestación de servicios públicos y presupuesto participativo; el problema es que dichas estrategias carecen de un soporte pleno del sistema jurídico. Además, la nueva base constitucional del Derecho Urbanístico brasileño todavía requiere consolidarse como el primer marco jurídico para la gestión urbana.

Conclusión

Todavía quedan sin contestar muchas preguntas importantes sobre ley e ilegalidad urbana, y antes de que puedan contestarse adecuadamente, se necesitarán muchos más trabajos, investigaciones y debates. Sin embargo, formular las preguntas correctas es a veces tan importante como dar las respuestas acertadas. Por esa razón, el debate de la dimensión jurídica del proceso de desarrollo urbano y de gestión urbana continuará explorando las interrogantes para América Latina y el resto del mundo.

Notas

1) Programa Hábitat: Plan de acción global adoptado por la comunidad internacional en la Conferencia Hábitat II en Estambul, Turquía, en junio de 1996

2) CNUAH: Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (Hábitat). Consulte los sitios www.unchs.org/govern y www.unchs.org/tenure para obtener información sobre la Campaña Mundial de Gobernabilidad Urbana y la Campaña Mundial de Tenencia Segura del CNUAH.

Referencias

Alfonsin, Betania de Moraes. 2001. “Politicas de regularizacao fundiaria: justificacao, impactos e sustentabilidade”, in Fernándes, Edésio (org) Direito Urbanistico e Politica Urbana no Brasil. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey.

de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.

1989. The Other Path. London: I.B.Tauris & Co.

Fernandes, Edésio. 1999. “Redefinición de los derechos de propiedad en la era de la liberalización y la privatización”, Land Lines (noviembre) 11(6):4-5.

Goldsmith, William W., and Carlos B. Vainer. 2001. “Participatory budgeting and power politics in Porto Alegre”. Land Lines (January) 13(1):7-9.

Hobsbawn, Eric. 2000. The New Century. London: Abacus.

McAuslan, Patrick. 2000. “From Greenland’s icy mountains, from India’s coral strand: the globalisation of land markets and its impact on national land law”. Trabajo presentado en la Conferencia de Derecho Urbanístico de Brasil.

Payne, Geoffrey. “Innovative approaches to tenure for the urban poor”. United Kingdom Department for International Development.

Sobre el autor

Edésio Fernandes, abogado brasileño, es profesor de la Unidad de Planificación para el Desarrollo del University College de Londres. También se desempeña como coordinador de IRGLUS (Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano). Fernándes desea expresar su agradecimiento a los participantes del taller de trabajo del IRGLUS en Cairo quienes compartieron sus notas, especialmente Ann Varley, Gareth A. Jones y Peter Marcuse.

Scholars and practitioners involved with the regularization of low-income settlements in Latin America shared their experiences in a forum sponsored by the Lincoln Institute last March and hosted by the City of Medellín and its regularization office, PRIMED (Integrated Program for the Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellín). Participants included representatives from PRIMED, Medellín city officials, and observers from multilateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, AID and GTZ (Germany).

Twelve major presentations reported on the most significant case studies from eight countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Perú and Venezuela. The forum proved to be a landmark meeting whose findings, summarized below, are expected to have important implications for Latin American policymakers.

Comparative Perspectives on Regularization

Several different approaches to regularization are illustrated in the country case studies. The two primary approaches are juridical regularization, i.e., legal land entitlement procedures to convert from de facto to de jure property ownership, as in Perú, Ecuador and Mexico; and physical regularization (urbanization), including the extension of infrastructure into irregular settlements, as in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and other countries. A third approach, which has been emphasized only recently, puts priority on the social and civic integration of low-income settlements and their populations into the urban fabric by a combination of measures.

While most countries have elements of all three forms of regularization, they usually focus on one direction or another. In Mexico all three approaches are used simultaneously. In most other countries the emphasis depends on the relative strengths of the actors, organizations and politics on the one hand, and on the way the regularization problem is conceived (“constructed”) by federal and local authorities on the other.

Juridical Regularization: Land Title Programs

The regularization of land titles has become accepted practice by governments, international agencies and NGOs alike. (see Figure 1.) In fact, the question “Why Regularize?” that was raised at the beginning of the forum seemed to catch everyone by surprise. Yet, posing this question goes to the heart of the matter about who defines the problems regarding land tenure and who establishes policies in favor of regularization. Most of the legal titling programs examined in the case studies were lengthy and expensive, and, by the time they came on-line, did little to significantly affect the level of security or to systematically provide services in the settlements.

Figure 1 Common Arguments in Favor of Land Regularization

• Provide security against evictions
• Provide incentives to stimulate investments in home improvements and consolidation
• Facilitate and provide for the introduction of services such as electricity and water
• Generate access to credit using the home as collateral
• Incorporate residents into the property-owning citizenry and the democratic process
• Integrate settlements and property into the tax and regulatory base of the city

As far as the poor are concerned, however, several of the arguments in favor of regularization would appear to be spurious. Established households generally have de facto security and rarely prioritize the need for full legal title, the latter being a need more associated with middle-classes value systems. Moreover, once settlements are well-established, home improvements and consolidation occur at a rate that is closely tied to available resources, not to title security. As for the introduction of services, most providers follow their own internal rules for timing and procedures; rarely is legal title an important criterion.

Furthermore, low-income households do not like falling into debt and are uneasy about entering formal credit systems, even though NGOs and governments are moving towards micro-credit support. In short, where low-income groups want regularization of tenure it appears to be because the state wants them to want it and then constructs demand accordingly.

One may conceive of tenure regularization as both an end in itself and a means to an end. Regularization as an “end” emerged clearly in the Lima case, where access to land and land titling programs substitute for a systematic housing policy. The most recent round of land titling (since 1996) even includes a retitling of previously regularized lots as an arena of political patronage serving the central government at the expense of the city’s political leaders. (1) A similar situation prevailed in Mexico with the multiplex regularization agencies created during the 1970s. In both countries the commitment to tenurial regularization is clearly indicated by active programs, usually providing a large number of titles each year at low cost.

Elsewhere, regularization may also be an “end,” but it is of secondary importance. In Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador and Ecuador, for example, titling is at best only a minor part of the physical regularization package. Even so, the absence of legal tenure and the need for regularization may be used to good political effect by regulating the flow and order of infrastructure provision.

Regularization of titles as a means to an end is promoted widely by international agencies as part of the World Bank’s New Urban Management Program. Mexico is a good example of the process whereby land titling is a prerequisite to urban land management, planning and public administration. Regularization incorporates the population into the system of land registry, tax base, planning controls, construction permissions, consumption charges, and recovery of services and infrastructure. Regularization becomes the means to urban sustainability and management, and this more than any other reason explains its widespread espousal and adoption today.

One notable feature in several case studies was the apparent reluctance to regularize on private lands unless the initiative had the support of the original landowner. As a result, the settlements most likely to be regularized are those occupying public land or land whose ownership is unchallenged. With the exception of Mexico, governments are reluctant to expropriate in the social interest. Several countries have a system of land occupancy rights that permits transfer of ownership after a certain number of years of proven and appropriate use. In Brazil this usucapión system has been extended recently to allow for title transfer on privately owned urban lots of less than 250m2 that have been occupied continuously for five years.

Issues in juridical regularization programs:

• Extent of resident demand and priority for full land title: A high priority for titling emerges only when there is high insecurity associated with illegal lot holding (Costa Rica), or where the state promotes the association of insecurity with lack of titling (Mexico).
• Procedures and administration in the titling programs: Examples range from very rapid, efficient and lost-cost practices (Peru and Mexico) to interminable and inefficient procedures. Most of the case studies fell at the latter end of the spectrum (Brazil and Colombia especially), in large part because this arena of regularization is not a high priority.
• The nature and functioning of property registry and cadastre offices: Almost all case studies pointed to major shortcomings in land registry and land valuation assessment institutions. Even where satisfactory institutional arrangements existed, relations and liaison between the two offices were invariably poor.
• The form and “weight” of land titles: The power and importance of titles ranged from “hard” titles, such as registered titles and full property titles that could only be challenged through eminent domain or expropriation procedures, to “soft” titles, which represented little more than certificates of possession, registration of occupancy or contracts of purchase. Somewhere in the middle, and parallel to this legal dimension, are the customary titles of social property rights, such as use rights, common rights, usos y costumbres, etc. The latter will hold force only to the extent that they are supported by the state.

Physical Regularization: Urbanization and Infrastructure Provision

The second principal arena of regularization reported by many of the case studies at the forum focused on the physical regularization process in different forms of irregular settlements. In Medellín, for example, approximately 12 percent of the total population is estimated to live in fast-growing barrios, which are often built on steep slopes like their hillside counterparts in Rio or Caracas. There are undoubted problems and dangers in these areas, but most of the participants who visited the PRIMED settlements were more encouraged by their level and rate of consolidation than the local officials appeared to be. (The discussion did not address upgrades and interventions in inner-city tenements-conventillos, vecindades, cortiços.)

It is impossible to do justice to the many innovative programs that were described at the forum, but one major success story is the Favela/Bairro program in Rio de Janeiro. This project is predicated on close collaboration with local residents to open up favela streets to vehicular access in combination with service installation. However, it is important to recognize that its success has only been possible at considerable cost: the total expenditure between 1994 and 1997 has been US$300 million, in large part provided by the IDB. This raises important questions about the replicability of such programs.

Issues in physical regularization programs:

• Legal instruments: In many cases legal instruments are not required to effect urban regularization projects and public intervention. Moreover, expropriation in the public interest is not attractive to most local authorities. The creation of special social interest zones (ZEIS and PREZEIS in Brazil) is one mechanism to help neighborhoods by providing greater flexibility of intervention outside of city codes and norms. Many other legal instruments were found to be rather weak, especially those with a large degree of discretion in their application (Ley novena in Colombia, for example).
• The costs of regularization and population displacement: Physical intervention brings additional costs associated with installation and consumption of services, and may also introduce higher tax contributions. In order to meet these costs, families may be obliged to find savings elsewhere (by slowing the rate of home consolidation, for example) or engage in rent-seeking behaviors such as renting or sharing lots or dwellings. Inevitably some will choose or be forced to sell and move out. Little is known about displacement levels, but generally low-income owner households remain settled; population stability, not mobility, is the norm.
• Financial mechanisms for regularization: Several of the most notable and successful projects rely on external funding, and many projects appear to carry explicit and implicit subsidies. In order for projects to be replicable, more agile financial methods are required, such as fiscal resources (land/property taxes, as in Mexico) or user charges (as in Medellín, for example). Another mechanism captures capital gains taxes on improvements (plusvalia and valorization charges, as in Colombia), but generally does not apply to low-income housing. (See page 5.)
• Administrative and governmental responsibilities for regularization: Almost without exception the trend has been towards decentralization with a lessening of power at the central government level and a strengthening at the municipal level. The role of the state/department/province level has weakened greatly. This trend means that an increasing responsibility for regularization falls on city authorities, and in turn raises other important issues: institutional capacity; learning and dissemination of best practices; the development of fiscal capacity and responsibility; program continuity across administrations; program coordination and implementation in metropolitan jurisdictions (where cities overlap more than one municipality); and the role of unelected NGOs.
• Popular (public) participation in regularization: While popular participation in neighborhood development projects is widely espoused and desired, it is often non-existent or purely nominal (Ecuador). Elsewhere, it was seen to be genuine and quite intensive (Costa Rica and Brazil). Popular participation involves residents instrumentally in project implementation and offers opportunities to take account of so-called plural (parallel) justice systems (Venezuela), customary laws, usos y costumbres (Mexico), etc.
• Regularization and citizens’ rights: The rising public awareness of citizens’ rights was apparent in many of the case studies. These include rights to housing (Mexico, but unfulfilled); rights of access to housing (Peru and El Salvador); and rights to infrastructure and urbanization benefits. It is also important to recognize that citizens’ rights also carry citizens’ obligations, particularly as taxpayers and consumers.

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Regularization as a Means of Social Integration

It became apparent in the deliberations that an increasingly explicit goal of regularization is to achieve social integration by bringing low-income populations into the societal mainstream and into the urban fabric. This is most frequently observed in reference to the “rescue” of low-income populations and other marginal groups and their incorporation into the urban citizenry. This was one of the important goals in Brazil’s favela/bairro program, which, in part at least, aimed to break up the drug and delinquent youth gangs and to rescue the local population from their influence.

A potential problem with this approach is that concepts of “good citizen” and the societal mainstream are social constructions that are often highly value-laden and may derive from within a particular class and dominant power group. Regularization to achieve integration into the wider set of social opportunities such as public education and health care is one thing; regularization for social convergence and conformity is another. However, this theme remains incipient in the literature, and the whole notion of citizenship with its bundles of rights and responsibilities is part of an agenda still largely unconsidered.

Conclusion

This international forum emphasized the need to be aware of the different underlying rationales for juridical and physical regularization in individual countries, and to be aware that they are closely tied to the political and planning process. In order for regularization to work well there has to be genuine political commitment such that all departments and officials who intervene do so with greater integration, cooperation and empowerment. Policymakers should also think imaginatively about alternative, “parallel” ownership systems and opportunities for genuine public participation in decisionmaking at all stages in the regularization process.

Important, too, are financial commitment and sustainability. Unless regularization is tied to medium- and long-term cost recovery through taxes, user charges and deferred assessments, programs will continue to depend on major external funding and subsidies, which will severely limit the extent and scale of their application.

An exciting last session of the forum allowed participants to reflect on future directions for research and policy analysis on land market regularization. Five major areas emerged. First, we recognized the need to identify the various actors and interest groups involved in promoting irregular or illegal land development in the first place, and to make explicit the differences between land invasions, owner subdivisions, company subdivisions and other actions. The point here is that irregularity is produced by various actors and interests groups as a for-profit business, and is not just a result of dysfunctional urbanization.

Second, we discussed moving away from dualist thinking and breaking with the idea of conceptualizing the land market in terms of the formal and informal city, the parallel city, or normal and subnormal barrios, all of which implicitly assume that the poor are locked into a separate land market. In fact, there is a single land market that is segmented, not separated, along a continuum in terms of access and affordability.

Third, we need to confront the issue of financial replicability and the ways in which finance might be leveraged through cross-subsidies, plusvalia, valorization charges, tax-and-spend, progressive consumption charges, and other mechanisms. Fourth, we need to be less gender-blind. It is important to think more imaginatively about regularization priorities with respect to gender and to explore innovative titling schemes that address the need for women’s settlement and housing rights.

Finally, we need to be much more precise in our terminology, and, more importantly, to recognize that there is a “social construction” embedded within language. The terms adopted in any society are revealing about how that society views and diagnoses housing and related social issues. Terminology may lead to punitive or patronizing policy solutions; it may even “criminalize” local populations. Most of the differences and variations in the case studies stem from the way each society constructs its understanding of the housing problem and how it presents that vision to its people-through its terminology, through its laws, procedures and policies, and through the bureaucratic and administrative organization of the state itself.

1. Julio Calderon, “Regularization of Urban Land in Peru,” Land Lines, May 1998.

Peter M. Ward is professor of sociology and of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. Among his many books is Methodology for Land and Housing Market Analysis, coedited with Gareth Jones and published by the Lincoln Institute in 1994.

Value capture is an increasingly popular concept that seeks to capture for public benefit all or part of the increments in land value resulting from community, rather than private, investments and actions. Yet, based on the Lincoln Institute’s experience in sponsoring many educational and research programs dealing with value capture policies in Latin America, it is also quite controversial.

This article addresses some of the contentious and persistent issues that have engaged participants in the ongoing debate over value capture, ranging from basic concerns, such as the proper understanding of the legal basis for land property rights, to larger political questions raised by new or higher charges on real estate property. Technical issues also are involved, such as distinguishing land value increments (or plusvalías) attributed to specific public investments or planning decisions from other more general sources or factors that influence land markets, as well as pragmatic challenges that arise in selecting the right instrument for the right circumstances at the right time.

To gain a better understanding of value capture, one cannot rely simply on technical arguments or expert authorities. At the same time, one cannot dismiss the issue on purely political grounds by attributing the main obstacles to the implementation of value capture policies to well-positioned interest groups. Rather, a considerable share of the “unexplained variance” in the application of value capture seems to be the result of inadequate information or misunderstanding held by major stakeholders in the debate.

Figure 1 summarizes 10 contentious value capture issues; items 1, 2 and 3 are discussed briefly below.

Unfair Charges for the Poor

Although support for direct subsidies or grants to the poor is waning in Latin America, many still believe that the poor should not pay for urban services, or should be exempted from taxes and other charges on their land, as is required by many of the more progressive value capture policies and laws.

A common argument in favor of exempting the poor from such charges raises an intergenerational dilemma: since wealthy residents for many years have enjoyed urban services that they did not pay for, why should the poor be charged now for services that they need and deserve? Another argument centers on the idea that most land value increments in poor areas have in fact been generated by the poor themselves, through sweat equity or private schemes to access basic services in their areas, not through public intervention. Some recognize that urban upgrading programs simply bring poor settlements to the first stage of the urbanization process, which is a bare minimum for participation in regular land markets. Others believe that even a socially neutral value capture instrument may produce a regressive result, perpetuating the disparity between the rich and the poor in the context of inequitable access to urban facilities and services, as is the case in most Latin American cities (Furtado 2000).

On the other end of the spectrum are those who argue that value capture payments are part of the poor sector’s claim to full citizenship, including the right to demand attention from the government. There are many examples where the poor have been eager to pay for receiving services (such as water systems, public lighting and flood control) since the cost of not accessing them is perceived to be higher than the actual payment. This was the case in Lima, Peru, in the early 1990s when more than 30 poor communities participated in a public service program that included payment for the cost of the services provided.

A more theoretical and perhaps less intuitive argument considers the capitalization effect of any charge on land prices. That effect is the reduction (or increase) of the current market price of land by the capitalized or discounted sum of the costs (or benefits) affecting the future earnings the property is expected to generate. To the extent that value capture charges on regularized or upgraded areas are integrated in the expectations regarding the future burden imposed on unserviced land bought from illegal or pirate subdividers, they would tend to be capitalized in the price that buyers would be willing to pay or the subdivider was able to charge (Smolka 2003). Although the poor would end up paying the same amount over time, the money would go to the local public treasury rather than the subdivider’s pocket.

Incidently, a common but mistaken view holds that such charges (value capture or land value taxes) are inflationary or increase the market price of land. Although the capitalization effect is complicated, most people can understand a situation comparing two otherwise identical apartments, where the one located in a building with a higher condo fee would get a lower rent in the marketplace than the apartment with a smaller fee. The same line of reasoning may be used to explain why there is no double taxation between value capture and the property tax. The relevant land value increment resulting from some public intervention accumulates or adds to an observed base market price that already is net of the capitalized effect of any anticipated future benefits or burdens, including the property tax.

Acquired Rights When Changing Land Uses

Although few would argue that expectations play a crucial role in determining land prices, it is widely considered unfair if price compensation falls below current market prices. This idea is now beginning to change, as reflected in recent legislation. For example, Law 388 of 1997 in Colombia allows for public acquisition of land at fair market prices, but not including the increment of land value resulting from previous public investments or changes in regulatory land uses (see article by Maldonado and Smolka, page 15). The same principle is stated in Brazil’s new City Statute (Law 10.257 of 2001) when land expropriation is used as a sanction against a landowner who is not complying with social uses of the land. Many lawyers agree that expectations do not create rights; therefore, expectations not realized should not be compensated. The social unrest around public land acquisition that led to the postponement of Mexico City’s proposed new airport mega-project vividly illustrates this problem.

It is hard for the typical landowner who in good faith bought a piece of land with the expectation of using its development potential to understand why he should not be compensated for the loss of that land at the current market price or at least the acquisition price, even if the development rights had not been exercised. However, the result often depends on the extent to which the new policy is actually implemented. In practice, prices reflect expectations regarding the (usually weak) enforcement of existing legislation, including legal variances or loopholes in the relevant fiscal and regulatory environment. This has been the case in most court decisions regarding fair compensation on public land acquisition processes and on claims from landowners (or developers) on whom local administrations impose plusvalías charges. A more pragmatic argument is that rights may indeed be restricted by a new legislation or zoning code, as long as it is accompanied by adequate transition rules to protect the rights of those who had previous legitimate claims. Others defend the transition process as an indispensable step toward allowing the market to gradually absorb such changes.

Economists struggle to convey the importance of expectations in determining the structure of current observed land prices. How the future affects current land prices is in fact harder to express to the general public than the notion that current prices reflect rights as realized in comparable properties in the past. In Latin America expectations associated with land uses are not always related to zoning or building codes, but rather to land speculation. It may be of interest to note that whereas speculation in Latin America is associated with long-term retention of land, in North America it is associated more with rapid turnover of properties. The phenomenon of land retention for future development, with the consequent private appropriation of unearned increments in land values, has stymied urban planning and development ever since cities began expanding rapidly over many decades.

Asymmetrical Compensation for Wipeouts

The debate over value capture (i.e., capturing land value increments, windfalls or plusvalías) inevitably raises the question: What about the wipeouts (minusvalías)? The common perception is that governments are more eager to approve legislation to capture land value increments than to provide legal protections for citizens against takings or arbitrary compensation for equally predictable losses (minusvalías). The Latin American record has shown, however, that the balance between the plusvalías captured and the minusvalías paid for is clearly negative. The amount paid in compensation to landowners surpasses by far the small and sporadic gains the public has been able to recover from the direct benefits it generates for private properties.

All rents, and land prices for that matter, are in essence nothing more than accumulated plusvalías, or land value increments, over time, echoing Henry George’s argument for full confiscation of land rents. Thus, the alleged minusvalías are considered incidental and just part of a value to which individual rights are not (or should not be) absolute. The debate on this asymmetry bears directly on the proper definition of wipeouts and on how those losses are understood, which raises the issue of development rights. While some are willing to restrict the compensation for land and building improvements that the owner may lose, others argue that development rights are permanently built in as an inherent attribute of the land.

In practice it is not easy to make these arguments. What may be valid in the aggregate does not necessarily hold true for the part, since individual landowners consider it a loss in land value when, for example, a walled expressway cuts across their back yard or a viaduct blocks their view and produces noise and pollution. The average citizen is not easily convinced by the above arguments. The quest for symmetrical treatment is too socially and culturally sensitive to be ignored.

Transfer of development rights (TDRs)—an instrument originally conceived for compensating minusvalías from historical, architectural, cultural or environmental preservation ordinances for plusvalías somewhere else—has now been extended to mitigate other legitimate claims for minusvalías compensation. Some argue that regular compensation for wipeouts is a guarantee, making it easier to accept payments for windfalls. Under the equity principle, planning decisions including zoning schemes are recognized as potentially unfair with regard to the distribution of values in land markets. However ingenious the TDR instrument may appear, it does not help clarify the issues at stake. On the contrary, it adds to the debate since it simultaneously recognizes the right for minusvalías to be compensated and sanctions the right of individuals to plusvalías, reintroducing the question of private appropriations of community values.

Final Comments

The complex debates over value capture policies and instruments in Latin America indicate that much remains to be researched and learned. If the issues do not necessarily have a single answer, the arguments discussed here demonstrate that a significant portion of the resistance to such ideas may be attributed to misconceptions and insufficient information. Although the positions taken by different groups are not as clear-cut or coherent as expected, perceptions and attitudes do change, as the accompanying article indicates.

Martim O. Smolka is a senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Fernanda Furtado is a fellow of the Institute and a professor in the Urbanism Department at the Fluminense Federal University in Niteroi, Brazil.

References

Furtado, Fernanda. 2000. Rethinking value capture policies for Latin America. Land Lines 12 (3): 8–10.

Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informality, urban poverty and land market prices. Land Lines 15 (1): 4–7.

Figure 1: Contentious Propositions and Commentaries on Value Capture

Proposition Commentary

1. It is unfair to charge the urban poor who benefit from regularization or upgrading programs. Evidence shows that expectations regarding publicly funded future upgrading programs lead to higher markups or premiums on current land prices in irregular or illegal settlements. Charging for such benefits would simply switch the recipient of a payment burden that is already being imposed on the poor from the subdivider to the government collecting the charge.

2. Urban land policy must take into account previous development rights, for they are acquired rights. Although expectations are an important part of land market prices, they do not create rights. Zoning designations or development rights, when not realized, are not acquired rights and therefore they can be taken without compensation.

3. Minusvalías are not compensated for; the asymmetry between plusvalías and minusvalías is unfair. Minusvalías are the exception in Latin American cities where land value increments are much higher than the cost of servicing land. In practice, however, public compensation to private owners usually far surpasses collection through value capture policies.

4. Land value capture policy is “communist.” Paying for “free rides” is certainly not a communist idea. One is reminded of mainstream economic theories regarding the merits of a system where individuals and social costs and benefits converge at the margin.

5. Value capture over and above the property tax implies double taxation. In effect, observed land prices to which land value increments apply are already net of the capitalization effect of property tax on land values.

6. Value capture distorts the functioning of the land market. In actuality, it’s the opposite: uncontrolled land value increments distort the behavior of agents. The presence of plusvalías is as distorting a factor for urban development as inflation is for economic development in general.

7. Private appropriation of land value increments is no more objectionable than similar windfalls obtained in capital markets. There is a fundamental conceptual difference. In capital markets equity and bonds are issued against productive investments as collateral for increases in productivity in individual businesses. In the land market, by contrast, land value increments result from the community effort, not individual effort.

8. Value capture is technically impractical because it is impossible to measure the land value increment. With the technical resources available today it is ludicrous to think it “can’t be done.” Ingenious and practical solutions have been developed in Cartagena, Colombia, and Porto Alegre, Brazil, for example.

9. Value capture is overwhelmingly rejected by the citizens, and therefore is politically impractical. The privileged few are the main source of rejection, not the poorer majority of the population who often are charged higher prices in order to access public services through informal arrangements.

10. The amount that can be collected with supplementary value capture instruments is a negligible amount in the public budget. Because of limited collection of the property tax in Latin America, value capture resources can assume an important role in financing urban development. Besides, use of value capture brings to light plusvalías, which has traditionally been a key source of corruption, and thus contributes to a healthier fiscal environment.

Thomas A. Jaconetty is the chief deputy commissioner of the Board of Review (formerly the Board of Appeals) of Cook County, Illinois. During the past 24 years he has been involved in the disposition or review of taxes on more than 600,000 parcels of real estate. He is a member of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO); the Chicago, Illinois State (ISBA) and American Bar Associations; the Justinian Society of Lawyers; and many other professional associations. He has served as a member and chair of the ISBA State and Local Taxation Section Council and contributed to the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Recodification Project.

A certified review appraiser and formerly an arbitrator for the Circuit Court of Cook County, Jaconetty has authored numerous articles and chapters for legal and taxation publications, edited three books and is working on a fourth. He has lectured at or moderated many educational programs on property taxation and assessment administration, and has published over a dozen articles on those topics. In 1998 he was appointed to the Planning Committee of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, and he served as conference chairman for the past two years.

Land Lines: How did you first become involved with the Lincoln Institute?

Thomas Jaconetty: I was familiar with the Institute’s work through its presentations at the annual conferences of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) and various other educational seminars. In 1994 the chairman of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, Ignatius MacLellan of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals, invited me to attend the conference after reviewing articles I had written on “Highest and Best Use” and “Valuation of Federally Subsidized Housing.” I found the experience invigorating, challenging and intellectually stimulating. The conference was and continues to be the best seminar in which I am involved each year, and I attend quite a few.

LL: As the past chairman, how do you see the role of the National Conference?

TJ: For 25 years the conference has functioned as a clearinghouse of ideas for officials exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers over tax cases for statewide or regional jurisdictions. Noted authorities in the field, state tax court judges and officials of established tax courts are drawn together in an informal, collegial environment. The conference encourages improved decision making, the exchange of data and resources, the analysis of complex legal issues, and an avenue for a free-flowing interchange of ideas. The personal and professional relationships are open, friendly and dynamic, and there is plenty of room for divergent opinion, eclectic thought and agreement to disagree.

The Planning Committee of about 15 regular participants develops annual programs, and the rest of the members are actively involved with making presentations, offering suggestions, working on committees, attending the sessions and contributing to the overall educational experience. The annual fall conference is the most significant opportunity for formal interaction, but ongoing discussions are supported by the use of e-mail, the Lincoln Web site and the members’ professional involvement in other organizations.

LL: Why is it important for tax adjudicators to have this forum?

TJ: We are surrounded by ever-changing ideas and theories that we must balance against time-honored principles of taxation, complex economic relationships and the expectations of government. Each state has individual statutes and case law, but there is a high level of commonality among basic tax principles and a finite number of responses to factual situations. In spite of the many recurring and vexing issues that confront us, regular communication offers an opportunity to encourage consistency and consensus on the one hand and divergent opinion and reasoned dissent on the other. Members actively seek suggestions, advice and even help from their colleagues, who eagerly and generously respond.

LL: How have you seen the National Conference evolve during the years of your involvement?

TJ: Actually, there has been a remarkable level of consistency. There has been a core group of representatives from about 15 states and another dozen or so that change over time. Many members predate my involvement and others are very new. The most significant changes have been the enhanced communication offered by e-mail and the willingness of the group to probe into ethical, theoretical, decision-making and policy-based questions. There also has been a noticeable increase in volunteerism and in the number of women who are active participants.

I think there is a growing awareness that the deference given to any fact-finding agency (such as the state tax courts from whence our members come) creates a complementary responsibility to evaluate tax controversies within a framework that addresses all of the pertinent legal, valuation, philosophical and public policy issues. From all of that we hope to attain “justice,” which James Madison argued “is the end of government.”

LL: What do you see as the greatest challenges to the conference?

TJ: Remaining timely and relevant, and maintaining a cutting-edge outlook. Not every ascendant theory is always supportable or reasonable, but we seek to remain receptive, open and flexible while respecting the basic principles of state and local taxation that have stood the test of time. As issues become more complex and multi-jurisdictional, there is always a tug-of-war between local control and innovation versus national consistency and uniformity. This era of enormous budgetary constraints on state and local agencies places a premium on knowing where to go for expertise.

We face new challenges and are learning every day, and the conference presents the opportunity to encourage that growth. As John Quincy Adams said, “To furnish the means of acquiring knowledge is . . . the greatest benefit that can be conferred upon mankind.” We are also working to increase our membership and recruit more participation from states not currently represented. The optimum goal is to have around 55 to 60 active participants at any one time.

LL: What role does the Lincoln Institute play?

TJ: It is the heart and the soul of the conference. Especially in these trying economic times, without the Institute’s support many of our members would not have the local funding and financial wherewithal to attend the conference. And, without the organizing ability of the Institute staff, there would be no conference. The Lincoln Institute is uniquely qualified to create the healthy intellectual environment that brings the tax policy, legislative, academic, practitioner and administrative points of view before those very persons who decide the cases and, in so doing, “make the law.”

LL: You alluded to policy. Should judges and tax adjudicators be involved in considering public policy?

TJ: I can only suggest my own view. How judges and adjudicative bodies rule is almost inevitably a reflection of what they learn, know, believe, have proven before them, sense and comprehend, as well as what appears to be just. Everything must be taken against the backdrop of the purposes of the law and the ends that the law seeks to achieve. The more informed, eclectic, analytical and open the decision maker, the better the outcome.

The valuation of contaminated property (brownfields) and subsidized housing are two real property tax areas that immediately come to mind. These are technical issues, but they require an appreciation of the larger context and policy implications, as well as the proper balance between legislation and its interpretation.

The Lincoln Institute has had a significant and salutary impact on the development of sound tax policy. Henry George, whose writings inspire the Institute’s work, addressed these issues in The Land Question “[Taxation] must not take from individuals what rightfully belongs to individuals.” In Progress and Poverty he stated, “It is the taking by the community, for the use of the community, of that value which is the creation of the community.” But, as an exercise of power, it “must not repress industry . . . check commerce . . . [or] punish thrift . . .”

LL: What are some of the major tax issues facing tribunals today?

TJ: On the real property taxation side there is the taxation of contaminated property; the use and misuse of the cost approach; valuation of subsidized housing; the effect of low-income housing tax credited property; and the changing face of charitable and nonprofit entities. There are so many other issues: the application of traditional sales, use, gross receipts and income tax principles to an ever-expanding and global economy; related questions of nexus jurisdiction and extraterritorial power; the impact of e-commerce; the clash and interrelationship of the due process and commerce clauses; local autonomy challenged by movements to adopt model acts.

Other more general concerns include alternative dispute resolution; pro se litigants; ethics (appraiser, assessor, judicial); regulation versus deregulation; court management; and the role of policy in decision making. Added to these are the routine daily determinations that must be made by tribunals and agencies that form the grist of the taxation process, which is the lifeblood of government—that which Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized as “what we pay for civilized society.”

LL: How does the National Conference of State Tax Judges interact with other professional associations?

TJ: Many members of the conference are active at the state and local level with continuing legal education (CLE), appraisal or assessment organizations, such as seminars offered with the Appraisal Institute. Others take part in presentations sponsored by local directors of revenue or bar-related symposia on tax issues. Some sit on advisory commissions, boards, panels and task forces. Still others, including myself, have a continuing relationship with the IAAO, which offers an especially valuable and practical access to the assessment side of the real property world.

LL: Any final thoughts on the conference and its future?

TJ: Having just completed my two-year term as chairman, I hope it can be said that the conference maintained the high standards set by my immediate predecessors—Ignatius MacLellan, Joseph Small and Blaine Davis. I certainly feel that the future is in capable hands with our new chair, Arnold Aronson. With the biannual rotation of the conference to different locations around the U.S., it returns to Cambridge next year to celebrate its twenty-fifth year. I will simply echo what many of us say every year when we convene: This conference is the finest and most beneficial professional education endeavor in which any of us are engaged.

Compulsory purchase, expropriation, eminent domain, or simply “taking” are different names for the legal institution that allows governments to acquire property against the will of its owner in order to fulfill some public purpose. This tool has been used for a long time as a major instrument of land policy, but now it is subject to a number of criticisms and mounting social resistance in many parts of the world. Campaigns for housing rights, movements for the defense of property rights, and legislative and judiciary activism are among the factors changing the conditions under which governments exercise their power of eminent domain.

Across the country, decision makers at the local and state levels increasingly are turning to new methods for resolving conflicts that arise during land use decision making processes. For disputes over permitting or enforcement of local and state land use regulations, mediation is considered a reasonable alternative to at least some litigation. Although mediation has successfully resolved many land use disputes, its use typically has been applied ad hoc as inclination and resources determine.

To better understand the use of mediation across a land use decision-making system within a single state, the Consensus Building Institute (CBI) and Green Mountain Environmental Resolutions (GMER) conducted an 18-month screening and evaluation study in Vermont.

Mediation and Land Use Disputes

Previous studies by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the Consensus Building Institute have demonstrated that negotiation and mediation can be effective in resolving land use disputes. A successful mediation program requires selecting suitable cases for mediation at the right time in the process, and matching them with appropriate forms of mediation assistance.

Although mediation is widely used in some areas of law, such as family or employment cases, its application in land use law has been limited. There is no systematic program or set of programs that integrates mediation into the land use permitting process at all levels, from local planning boards to state courts. Increasing the use of mediation and integrating it into the land use permit application and appeal process can reduce the burden on valuable judicial resources, save the parties time and money, and, perhaps most important, resolve disputes that otherwise could divide a community into opposing camps. This study of Vermont aimed to identify lessons that can inform the land use decision-making process in other states.

Methodology

Vermont’s manageable size, its diversity of small cities and rural towns, and the frequent use of mediation, especially at the court level, made it an ideal laboratory in which to learn how mediation might be better integrated into different levels of land use decision making. Vermont also has a strong land use planning law, Act 250, passed in 1970 to protect the environment, balance growth and development needs, and provide a forum for neighbors, municipalities, and other interest groups to voice their concerns. Depending on the nature of a proposed development project, an applicant may need to obtain permits from a local board, a regional commission, various state agencies, or federal agencies.

As in most states, land use disputants in Vermont may utilize mediation via one of two routes: when there is consensus to try it, or in court when a judge orders mediation or a hearing officer suggests mediation at a prehearing conference.

This study investigated two methods for identifying cases that might be appropriate for mediation. First, we sought to better understand action at the state court level, after other opportunities for consensus building and mediation had failed. In collaboration with the Vermont Environmental Court, CBI developed a screening and evaluation process for 285 active land use cases in the court between July 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007. Judges were asked to fill out a form to identify why and how they screened each case for mediation, and the parties were asked to complete an evaluation form after the mediation ended.

Second, GMER and CBI developed a protocol to determine whether it was possible to identify cases appropriate for mediation at both local and Act 250 levels prior to the appeal stage. Over the 18-month study period, GMER screened 54 contested Act 250 permit applications. Most cases that make their way to the Act 250 and Vermont Environmental Court dispute systems start at the local level. However, despite many efforts by GMER to identify local-level cases to be screened, only 13 local cases were reviewed.

Nine Lessons Learned

1: Screening for mediation assists with settlement.

Mediation screening—that is, evaluation of the appropriateness of mediation for a particular case—prior to proceeding with traditional avenues of land use conflict resolution is an effective tool for encouraging settlement as a general approach; encouraging mediation specifically; and distinguishing among cases that are more amenable to resolution and those that require more formal quasi-judicial or judicial decision making. Given the current barriers to mediation—lack of knowledge about mediation, jointly finding a mediator, and simply communicating with the opposing party—screening is an effective tool to increase its use.

In the Act 250 cases, the act of screening itself seemed to encourage informal negotiations and settlement in some instances (figure 1). Many of the screenings were essentially informal phone mediations that included discussions of the parties’ interests and possible options to satisfy those interests.

2: Screening criteria are useful but not fully determinative.

There is no simple formula or correlation between key factors in a case and the parties’ willingness to mediate as a way to successfully resolve issues. However, the data on screening do suggest a few key criteria that are important in determining if a case is more likely to be recommended for mediation.

• Does the case turn on a particular issue of law?
• The type of case matters. Permitting cases tend to be more amenable to mediation than enforcement cases, and general commercial and residential cases are more amenable than industrial cases, especially those involving major public health or nuisance issues (e.g., noise, odor).
• The parties’ willingness to explore options and ideas is a key indicator for whether mediation is more or less appropriate.
• Timing is important. Screening is generally best done after filing (of an application or appeal) but before any formal proceedings have occurred (an administrative hearing or court hearing).

The data also suggest that some criteria are not important in determining whether mediation is appropriate for a specific case.

• Whether the parties have talked or not, or even tried to settle informally, does not indicate that the parties should not consider mediation. Surprisingly, parties in many cases had simply not communicated with one another once the case was filed, but when encouraged by a mediator or screener, they were amenable to doing so.
• The need or desire for future relationships is not an important criterion, at least as practiced in this context in this state. Most parties appear to be seeking an end to litigation and a settlement or agreement, not necessarily desiring to repair or maintain a relationship.
• The kind of issue, such as traffic, noise, visual impact, or odor, does not seem to be as important for considering mediation as the intensity and breadth of the issue’s impacts on abutters and other interested stakeholders.
• The number of parties does not appear to be a factor. A case with two parties is as likely to be mediated as one with many parties.

3: The screener’s qualifications and credibility do matter.

A mediation screener for land use disputes requires a specific skill set, knowledge base, and credibility. At the Environmental Court level, a judge’s expertise in land use issues, law, and regulatory structure allows a more informed assessment of cases amenable to mediation. Analysis of the court’s screening data concluded that the two most important factors in determining the appropiateness of mediation were the issue of law at stake and the judge’s “sense” of settlement potential. Both are professional judgments rather than more formulaic means of determining appropriateness. Furthermore, the judge’s authority gives the resulting determination legitimacy.

In a nonjudicial setting such as a permitting body, a screener without legal authority or stature can also be effective. Most parties will participate and take seriously the recommendations of the screener, as long as the screener has the express support and legitimacy provided by an official governing body.

4: Screening program design is also important for legitimacy.

As part of the research, we established and implemented the screening program for the District Commissions, entities that provide review under Act 250. This program was highly instructive because it raised several key issues. The primary question was whether screeners should be part of or separate and independent from an appropriate government agency (table 1). A secondary concern was whether a screener might also later mediate the case. Protocols can be used to avoid or minimize the perception of any potential conflict of interest.

A few survey respondents raised concern that the Act 250 screener was also available to mediate the cases screened, though the screener always provided the parties a roster of mediators from which to choose. The concerns were about ethics (Can one conduct a fair and neutral screening when one has both the economic and professional incentive to recommend mediation in order to then mediate?) and the marketplace (Is it fair to and competitive for other mediators if the screener has an “inside track” on certain cases?).

We assume that screeners as mediators may be influenced by the opportunity to mediate, if they are eligible. We would argue that this incentive is not merely financial, but also professional in the sense that one wishes to practice one’s craft. Nonetheless, countervailing arguments suggest that a strict separation of screening and mediation poses an equally difficult set of problems.

• Though mediators perhaps should not judge their professional performance by the number of cases settled, many do. As a result, there is an incentive to not recommend mediation for cases that will lower one’s success rate of settlements. No mediator likes to recommend mediation only to later fail in resolving the case.
• Screeners are likely to become better seasoned if they actually experience the results of some of their choices by later mediating them.
• Parties are likely to gain trust in a capable screener, and this allows a quicker entry into the mediation process. A screener who either provides mediation if desired or offers assistance in identifying a mediator is more efficient and can help overcome the reluctance of parties to proceed simply due to the effort of having to collaborate with the “other side” to select a mediator jointly.
• In the current practice of public policy mediation, a screener as mediator is standard practice in many cases.

5: Land use mediation may be more effective in helping parties reach a settlement than in restoring relationships.

Data gathered through the court mediation evaluation forms offer a somewhat surprising reflection on how participants value their mediation experience. While mediation is often lauded for its contributions to improving relationships among parties, evaluation survey results suggest that parties valued mediation more for its ability to make them consider options than for its impact on their relationship with other parties.

Sixty-six percent of participants reported that the mediation process encouraged them to consider various options for resolving the dispute (59 percent [154] agreed and 7 percent [18] strongly agreed). On the other hand, 42 percent of respondents felt that at the end of the mediation process they were better able to discuss and seek to resolve problems with other parties on this project (39 percent [102] agreed and 3 percent [8] strongly agreed). While one might wish, optimistically, for a mediation program that restores relationships and rebuilds social capital, it seems that participants are more interested in exploring various options for settlement than in broader social or relational goals.

6: Land use mediation may not always result in satisfying agreements, but it generally results in satisfaction with the process.

Parties support mediation and are willing to participate again, despite indications by many that their most recent experience did not result in an agreement that satisfied them. Figure 2 shows that 40 percent agreed that mediation resulted in an agreement that was satisfying to them (88 agreed and 15 strongly agreed), while 35 percent disagreed (55 strongly disagreed and 36 disagreed).

Despite these findings, when asked if they would participate in a mediation again, respondents show more varied results (figure 3). More than 50 (131) agreed and 17 percent (45) strongly agreed to participate again, while only 19 percent (30) disagreed and 7 percent (19) strongly disagreed.

We interpret these data to mean that the agreement reached was tolerable, given their constrained choices. The mediation process more often than not seems to have offered enough benefits, cost or time savings, or some other advantage that many respondents would be willing to participate again.

The evaluation process did reveal some concerns about the role of pro se parties (who represent themselves without an attorney). Some pro se parties expressed frustration with the mediation process, which they felt did not provide an adequate forum for exploring and resolving the full range of issue that concerned them. Other parties expressed their own frustration with the pro se parties, whom they felt slowed down the process and demanded too much time from the mediator. Additional research on best practices for defining and communicating the role of pro se parties could improve overall satisfaction with the mediation process.

7: Mediation of particular issues does not relieve the larger burden on municipalities to make complex decisions on land use projects.

Lower levels of satisfaction were expressed by town officials than other parties, which suggests that mediation in and of itself is not assisting local officials to the extent one might hope. Town representatives were more likely to disagree or strongly disagree (56 percent) that the mediation resulted in an agreement that was satisfying to them than were applicants (36 percent), agencies (36 percent), and interested parties (35 percent).

By the time cases, especially enforcement cases, reach the Environmental Court, town officials may feel they have already tried to accommodate applicants and thus are less enthusiastic about mediation with parties who, in their perspective, have been “recalcitrant.” A court decision, even if it adopts a mediated settlement, may not resolve an entire dispute. Mediation may resolve issues pending before the court, but does not resolve all barriers to implementation of an agreement at the local level. This finding suggests that municipalities may need more assistance, not only in mediation of narrowed issues, but also in more comprehensive consensus building or public participation efforts.

8: Encouraging mediation at the municipal level remains challenging.

The research team was not successful in instituting any systematic local approaches to screening and mediation, despite an intensive outreach effort; a no-cost screening service; the support of mediation at the Act 250 and Court levels; a state generally amenable to alternative forms of dispute resolution; and a relatively vigorous development climate during the study.

Various factors may explain this resistance. The single largest obstacle on the local level is that in most cases the permitting bodies do not know if an application will be opposed until the hearing begins. Furthermore, most applications have only one hearing day, so there is little opportunity for mediation screening. Hearings that last multiple days clearly have other options.

Other obstacles include the fact that mediation as commonly understood may be introduced too early for parties wishing to see how they might fare in the standard administrative process. Local officials may view mediation as usurping their role. The status quo of existing administrative processes may simply be considered “good enough.” Town budgets may account for potential litigation, but not be flexible enough to fund mediation. Some officials may not know enough about mediation or simply be uninformed about its benefits. There may be too few cases in most municipalities in a rural state like Vermont to establish any programmatic approach.

In any case, this study reinforced the assumption that administering mediation at the local level is difficult, however promising the “idea” of mediation may be in assisting communities and their citizens.

9: The Environmental Court can influence attitudes toward mediation.

The Environmental Court’s embrace of mediation as a key tool to its proceedings appears to have an interesting effect on municipal land use decisions, despite the challenges at the local level. It is widely perceived (though inaccurately) among local and regional land use professionals across the state that if a case proceeds to the Environmental Court it “almost always” will be ordered into mediation. The court, in fact, is quite careful about referrals. During our study period, the court referred fewer than half of its cases to mediation.

This finding points to at least two interesting implications for a more rigorous, system-wide approach to mediation and dispute resolution. First, the data suggest that a powerful land use body’s support of mediation has a meaningful impact on perceptions of mediation across the system. Second, the active support of mediation by a body such as the court has likely salutary effects on settlements that can occur earlier in the process. This also suggests that when enough of a land use system’s regulatory bodies support and encourage mediation, a culture of settlement and dispute resolution may take hold.

Conclusions

This study supports the assertion that mediation is useful in land use conflicts. Upon evaluation of nearly 300 Vermont land use cases at the local, Act 250, and Environmental Court levels, this study found that mediation screening and actual mediation are effective tools for targeting and resolving many cases. As disputes become more complex, and resources, time, and money for resolving land use disputes become scarcer, it will be important to find efficient and reliable methods for settling cases. Mediation and mediation screening hold great potential for meeting those goals.

Related Publications

Susskind, Lawrence, Ole Amundsen, and Masahiro Matsuura. 1999. Using Assisted Negotiation to Settle Land Use Disputes: A Guidebook for Public Officials. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Susskind, Lawrence, Mieke van der Wansem, and Armand Ciccarelli. 2000. Mediating Land Use Disputes: Pros and Cons. Cambridge, MA; Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

About the Authors

Patrick Field is managing director of the Consensus Building Institute in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as well as associate director of the MIT-Harvard Public Disputes Program and senior fellow at the Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy of the University of Montana in Missoula.

Kate Harvey is an associate at the Consensus Building Institute.

Matt Strassberg is an director of the Environmental Mediation Center and principal of Green Mountain Environmental Resolutions based in Moretown, Vermont.

This research was made possible by the generous support of the JAMS Foundation and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.