Governments have often intervened in land markets in Asian cities, but with limited effects. In recent decades, economic globalization and political democratization have created even stronger demands for more efficient and equitable land use policies. Rapid economic growth in cities with scarce land resources has generated a wave of new thinking on land values and land markets among scholars and policymakers.

The GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations are stimulating new production structures in much of Asia, which consequently shift demand from agriculture into manufacturing and other urban land uses. At the same time, local governments are struggling with more financial autonomy and are becoming dependent on revenues from increased land values to subsidize the costs of development.

Three countries illustrate emerging land and tax policy issues raised by these complex interactions of international and local economies.

In Taiwan, land values for urban and agriculture uses are extremely divergent. The immediate issues are: 1) how to better use the 40,000 hectares of agricultural land that are no longer needed for production as a result of the GATT agreements; and 2) how to distribute the development benefits created by this conversion of agricultural land.

In Korea, the challenge concerns the legality of taxation to capture excessive increases in land value and gains from land speculation. Faced with builders’ pressure to develop greenbelts and open spaces in metropolitan areas and with local politicians’ concerns over fiscal autonomy, the central government is preparing a major tax reform to capture these increments in land value.

In Japan, land values have changed dramatically over the past ten years, but the reasons for these fluctuations are not always clear. Land speculation, unpredictable market forces and government regulation all play a part. Analysis of failed attempts to control land prices will be valuable in developing future policies.

Land Value and Speculation

The perception of land value in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan may not be significantly different from that in other capitalist countries. The problem is in the speculative value, also known as “unearned income” or the “unearned increment” in land value. This value can be so high that it distorts all the legal, administrative, political and social measures designed to manage the use of land. In Japan, for example, land value in major cities tripled from 1983 to 1989. In Korea, land value increased 13 times between 1975 and 1990, while the national income increased only 5 times in the same period. In Taiwan, the value of farm land increased 155 percent from 1986 to 1990, compared to the GDP’s 36 percent growth during the same period.

Policies intended to control land values during periods of high speculation are unlikely to succeed. During the boom times of the 1980s in all three Asian countries, special interest groups and politicians dependent on economic growth failed to anticipate any negative downturn effects. Land policies became disorganized, and conflicts arose among different government departments. For example, some local governments subsidized farmland owners who had already sold their land for conversion to urban uses and had benefited financially from this speculation. Financial institutions provided loans to corporations which depended on land speculation for their corporate earnings. The results were devastating: farmers who wished to farm could not afford to buy farm land; manufacturers could no longer compete when 60 percent of their investments were spent on land costs; and average citizens had an even more difficult time owning a house.

Reevaluating Land and Tax Policy

As land values have dropped in recent years, there is a new opportunity to revise land policies. Special interest groups and land value speculators have softened their opposition to government intervention on land markets. The GATT and WTO (World Trade Organization) negotiations are requiring countries to better coordinate their land policies and general economic policies in the interests of industrial readjustment. Future policies in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan will likely incorporate the following measures:

New regulations will be designed to convert some farmland and environmentally less-sensitive land for housing and mixed-use urban development. The goals are to continue sustainable development and to assist the conversion of the agricultural sector.

Tax reform and exaction-like laws will be introduced to capture the “unearned income” from land speculation. A capital gains tax, land value tax and land value increment tax will be the hallmarks of tax reform. Local government will be given more autonomy to require private developers to share benefits with the community.

Land use planning systems will be coordinated at all levels of government to manage growth. New land use controls will be designed to cope with new economic activities derived from the economic readjustments.

To help advance these land and tax policy reforms, the Lincoln Institute research staff is working with colleagues in each country. The Council of Agriculture in Taiwan, Republic of China, and the Institute are conducting a three-year joint study (1994-97) on land value capture and benefit distribution mechanisms. A team of researchers from the Lincoln Institute and the Korea Tax Institute is researching tax reform for the Korea Ministry of Finance during the 1995-1996 academic year. Both American and Japanese scholars are examining land values in Japan from a macroeconomic perspective.

Alven Lam in a Lincoln Institute fellow whose current research focuses on land value capture and property rights in Asia.

Additional information in the printed newletter.

Chart: Indices of Korea Land Values and Major Economic Indicators: 1980, 1985 and 1990. Land prices, housing prices, national income and wholesale prices are charted. Source: Office of National Statistics, Korea Statistical Yearbook, each year, and Kim, Dai-Young, “Choices for Future Land Policy,” in Land Policy Problems in East Asia, 1994.

Large-scale urban redevelopment projects (termed grandes projectos urbanos or GPUs in Spanish) raise many questions about the impacts of subsequent urban development induced by the intervention. GPUs are characterized by an impact in a significant part of the city, often with the use of some new fiscal or regulatory instruments and the involvement of a large network of agents and institutions. These projects are expected to affect land prices, recycle existing or create new infrastructure and facilities, and attract other new buildings.

GPUs as an urban policy instrument have been the object of considerable controversy and debate throughout Latin America. It is often argued that they promote social exclusion and gentrification, have limited effects in stimulating real estate activities, and require large (sometimes hidden) public subsidies that often draw fiscal resources from other urban needs. In spite of their increasing popularity in Latin America, there is little empirical evidence to support these criticisms.

This article presents the case of a GPU introduced in São Paulo, Brazil, in 1996 as an “urban operation” to redevelop a middle-income area of mostly single-family homes that was to be traversed by the extension of the Faria Lima Avenue. The project is known as the Faria Lima Urban Operation Consortium (OUCFL). We examine economic principles that affect the fiscal performance of the project and its opportunity for value capture, evaluate changes in residential density, and analyze changes in income distribution and ownership structure. Finally, we offer some policy suggestions on how and when to use this kind of instrument based on these assessments.

What is an Urban Operation?

An urban operation is a legal instrument that seeks to provide local governments with the power to undertake interventions related to urbanistic and city planning improvements in association with the private sector. It identifies a particular area within the city that has the potential to attract private real estate investments to benefit the city as a whole. The proper city planning indexes (i.e., zoning and other regulations on construction coefficients, rates of occupation, and land uses) are redefined in accordance with a master plan, and investments are made in new or recycled infrastructure.

An urban operation allows the municipality to capture (through negotiated or mandatory means) the land value increments associated with the subsequent land use changes. In contrast to other value capture instruments, these funds are earmarked or internalized within the perimeter of the project to be shared between government and the private sector for both investments in urban infrastructure and subsidies to private real estate investments to support the project itself.

Each urban operation in Brazil is proposed by the executive and approved by the legislative branch of the jurisdiction. In the case of São Paulo, this authority was created in the Lei Organica Municipal (Constitution of the City) in 1990, which was later inserted in the new Brazilian urban development law (Statute of the City of 2001). The first proposed projects were the Operation Anhangabaú (subsequently expanded as a part of the Downtown Operation and renamed Center Operation) and Água Branca, followed by the Água Espraiada and Faria Lima operations. After the approval of the city’s new Master Plan in 2001, nine other urban operations were generated. These thirteen projects are expected to affect 30 to 40 percent of the buildable area of the City of São Paulo.

Financing Faria Lima

The Faria Lima urban operation (OUCFL) was proposed and approved in 1995 with the aim of obtaining private resources to fund the public investments necessary to purchase land and install infrastructure in order to extend Faria Lima Avenue. These costs were deemed at the time to be approximately US$150 million, two-thirds for land acquisitions and one-third for the avenue itself. The project was heavily contested by many stakeholders on grounds ranging from the source of the funds (i.e., advanced out of the local budget through new debt) to neighborhood concerns (one of which managed to keep the floor-area-ratios [FARs] unchanged and legally excluded from the OUCFL zoning) and technical design issues.

Technical studies carried out at the time indicated that it would be possible to take advantage of an additional potential 2,250,000 square meters beyond what was already permitted by the city’s zoning legislation, and the FARs were changed accordingly. These additional building rights were granted against a payment of a minimum of 50 percent of their market value using the existing “Solo-Criado” (Selling of Building Rights) instrument. OUCFL aroused great interest on the part of real estate entrepreneurs. This instrument nevertheless was also questioned for its lack of transparency, its project by project approach, and the arbitrariness in the way relevant prices were established and then used to calculate the value of the additional building rights.

By August 2003 a total of 939,592 square meters, or nearly 42 percent of the available total of these 2,250,000 square meters, had already been licensed. More than 115 real estate projects were approved, including nearly 40 percent commercial buildings and 60 percent high-quality residential buildings. Nevertheless, the resources (approximately US$280 million) obtained from these approved projects had not fully compensated for the expenditures (US$350 million, including principal plus interest) associated with the expansion of the avenue, considering the high interest rates prevailing in Brazil for the nearly eight years since the realization of expenditures. Thus, about 80 percent of the cost (albeit more than anticipated) has been recovered through the Selling of Building Rights process. Since July 2004 the compensation for these advance funds was obtained through an ingenious new value capture mechanism known as CEPAC, an acronym for a Certificate of Additional Potential of Construction. One CEPAC represents one square meter.

The Introduction of CEPACs

Although CEPACs were defined in Brazil’s Statute of the City of 2001, they were not approved by the CVM (Brazilian equivalent to the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission) as freely tradable in the Brazilian Stock Exchange until December 2003. The regulation establishes that the price of each certificate is defined by public auction and that the corresponding square meters of building rights (which also include use changes and occupation rates) expressed in each certificate may be executed at any time. The regulation also states that new batches of certificates can be issued (and sold through auction) only upon confirmation that the resources captured by the previous sale have been effectively earmarked to the project. To ensure this designated use, the revenues are deposited in a special account, not in the municipal treasury. From the perspective of the private investors this designation ensures the acceptability of this value capture instrument at its own valorization. By issuing a lower number of certificates than potential building rights—that is by managing their scarcity—the public sector may benefit from the valorization and thus be able to capture value “ex-ante” (Afonso 2004, 39).

The final approval of CEPACs for OUCFL and all the necessary steps for launching them in the financial market occurred in mid-2004, and the first auction at the end of December 2004 generated nearly R$10 million (about US$4 million), corresponding to the sale of approximately 9,000 CEPACs out of an authorized stock of 650,000 square meters. The OUCFL certificates were sold at a face value of R$1,100 (about US$450) per square meter with no observed premium pricing as a result of the bidding process.

This situation contrasts with that of the Água Espraiada urban operation, which was expected to be fully funded by CEPACs from its start. In its third auction, the certificates were already capturing R$370 per certificate against a face value of R$300 set for this operation. A more recent auction in Água Espraiada sold 56,000 CEPACs and captured R$21 million ($US9.5 million), reflecting a certificate price of R$371. This pricing contrast reflects the different original face values in the two projects. In the case of OUCFL developers bought (and stocked) building rights in advance, to benefit from the more flexible rules prior to the CVM approvals. The certificate price in Faria Lima started at more than R$1,100 because it is a more valued area. In Água Espraiada developers were willing to pay more than the original face value because the certificates were less expensive and thus in greater demand.

Land Price Implications

The prices of vacant land and developed areas experienced a considerable increase in some blocks within the perimeter of OUCFL during the 1990s, but decreased in other blocks. Yet, the average square meter price of new real estate development fell throughout the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo (RMSP) in all price bands, when comparing the average price from 1991 to 1996 with those of 1996 to 2000.

After controlling for a number of attributes associated with the changing character of the developments and their location, the price estimations showed an unequivocal relative increase after the operation was launched. The average price per square meter within the OUCFL perimeter increased from R$1.68 thousand in the 1991–1996 period to R$1.92 thousand in the 1996–2001 period, a 14 percent increase, while prices in RMSP decreased from R$1.21 thousand to R$1.06 thousand, a 12 percent decrease in the same period (R$1.95/US$1.00 in December 2000). Thus, the price per square meter in OUCFL was higher than that of RMSP by around 26 percent. The price per square meter in OUCFL was 38 percent higher than the average price in the RMSP in 1991–1996, and it increased to 81 percent higher in 1996–2001.

Was this increase captured by the municipality as anticipated? Considering that the cost of construction in average is around R$1,000 per square meter, the 2004 auction (the only one so far) captured almost all of the value added at current prices. The previous pre-CEPAC system captured about 50 percent or more, depending on the capacity and success of municipal negotiators, and the correctness of the reference price. CEPAC now changes this percentage and the face value of the instrument may capture all the value increment or even more, depending on the relation of this face value to market prices, and on the results of future auctions. Comparing a redevelopment project financed totally by construction bonds (like CEPACs) and one financed totally with general property taxes, there is no doubt that the former is less regressive than the latter. Even with a progressive property tax, with rates increasing according to values, part of the costs would be paid by poorer households.

This evidence that about 80 percent of the total cost of the project has already been recovered, combined with the auctioning of the remaining building rights through CEPACs and the impact of the property appreciation on the current property tax revenues, indicates that the project should not only pay its own way but actually generate a fiscal surplus for the city as a whole over the next five or seven years.

In effect, the changes caused by substituting older single-family houses with new residential and commercial buildings resulted in a substantial change in property tax collection in the OUCFL area. Many lots and even entire blocks had been occupied by single- and two-story houses constructed since the 1950s. Many of these structures were eligible for a discount coefficient for obsolescence of up to 30 percent of the property tax. They were replaced with new, taller and higher-quality buildings for which the discount was null. Our estimates indicate that the differences in property tax collection by square meters constructed may have increased by at least 2.7 times and up to 4.4 times. That is, the average property tax per square meter increased to a minimum of R$588.50 up to R$802.50 from R$220.95 if the house was 25 years old, or from R$179.70 if the house was 30 years old.

Social Implications

The OUCFL case offers a unique opportunity to quantify changes in resident characteristics before and after the intervention, since data at the census track level is available for 1991 and 2000, and the intervention began in 1996. Our analysis of gentrification and displacement of poorer residents mainly confirms the findings of Ramalho and Meyer (2004) that the average income has increased relatively in most of the blocks inside the OUCFL perimeter. By Brazilian standards, the upper-middle class was displaced from the region by the richest 5 percent of households in the metropolitan area. The census data also showed that residential density fell between 1991 and 2000, from 27 to 22 residences per hectare, although these figures may be distorted because they reflect the ratio of total residences in the entire area, not an average of the ratios per plot where land use was converted.

The data from 1991 indicated that the population was already leaving the OUCFL area before the approval of the urban operation, but this exodus intensified after 1996, generating vacant plots in the process of site-assembly to accommodate the new high-rise developments. At the same time, building density increased. The average number of floors per new building in the area increased from 12.6 in the 1985–1995 period to 16.7 in the 1996–2001 period. The number of housing units per building increased from 37.1 to 79.6 over the same periods.

This apparent contradiction between decreased residential density and increased numbers of housing units is explained in part by the construction of commercial buildings that replaced many single-family residencies on small and average-sized lots. OUCFL induced considerable real estate concentration as the new commercial and residential buildings replaced the houses and required greater land areas for high-class architectural projects. The 115 projects approved between 1995 and August 2003 that requested increases in the utilization coefficients required a total of 657 lots, or an average of 5.7 lots per project.

The combination of the increase in income level and the reduction in household density indicates that the gentrification process advanced in and around the OUCFL region during the 1990s. Nevertheless, this is not a classic case of gentrification, where poor families are driven out of an area due to various socioeconomic pressures. In this case mostly upper-middle classes were displaced. Except for the small nucleus of remaining favelados (Favela Coliseu), the region was already occupied by people belonging to the richest segments of society.

Some Policy Observations

This article contributes to the debate about the social management of land valuation by furnishing real data assessments and economic elements. These elements have been missing from most analysis, and we believe that this gap in the literature has contributed to an incomplete interpretation of the implications of an urban operation and to mistaken public policy recommendations.

Our conclusion is that the CEPAC funding mechanism itself does not increase the regressive characteristic of urban operations, since without those building rights bonds all the investment in redevelopment would be financed by general taxes. If the OUCFL project were inadequate in terms of income distribution, it would have been even worse without the value capture mechanism. Instead, CEPAC and the value capture mechanism used previously offered two desirable characteristics of any public investment: charging the new landowners is at least neutral in terms of income distribution; and the primary beneficiaries end up paying for the project.

Furthermore, the urban operation mechanism offers incentives for redevelopment. Given that most projects increase land prices and drive out the poor from the region, it would be better to invest the entire municipal budget in small-scale projects. This is the opposite of what happened with the redevelopment of the adjacent high-end Berrini area where developers decided how to concentrate their investment, resulting in even more income concentration than in the OUCFL area. Because of inaction by policy makers in that case, the municipality did not capture any value from Berrini, yet paid the entire cost of infrastructure.

The use of building rights bonds may diminish the regressive aspect of land development, but to make a project truly progressive requires attention on the expense side, by funding all the investment through instruments like CEPACs. The main limitation on distributing benefits to the poor is that the law establishes that all funds collected through value capture (CEPACs or other instruments) must be invested within the perimeter of the intervention. One way to make these interventions more progressive is to invest in activities that will furnish spillovers to the poor, such as public transit, education, and health. Moreover the relevant legislation allows the administration to select an area inside the perimeter of an urban operation and declare it a zone of special social interest (ZEIS) where lots can be used only for low-income social housing.

Another alternative is to establish social housing areas within the perimeter of the urban operation. By subsidizing low-income housing with money from developers and new landowners, there would be no distortion in prices outside of the housing industry. The subsidy results from segmenting the market and transferring the extra rent to poor households. This is real social management of land valuation.

Ciro Biderman is affiliated with the Center for Studies of Politics and Economics of the Public Sector (Cepesp) at the Economic and Business School at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil. He is a visiting fellow in international development and regional planning in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.

Paulo Sandroni is an economist and professor at the Economic and Business School at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Photograph Credit: wsfurlan via iStock / Getty Images Plus.

References

(These publications are available only in Portuguese.)

Afonso, Luis Carlos Fernandes. 2004. Financiamento eh desafio para governantes (Financing is a challenge to government). Teoria ane Debate No. 58, Maio-Junho: 36–39.

Ramalho, T., e R.M.P. Meyer. 2004. O impacto da Operação Urbana Faria Lima no uso residencial: Dinâmicas de transformação (The impact of the Faria Lima Urban Operation on residential use: Transformation dynamics). Mimeo. São Paulo: Lume/FAUUSP.

Biderman, Ciro, e Paulo Sandroni. 2005. Avaliação do impacto das grandes intervenções urbanas nos precos dos imoveis do entorno: O caso da Operação Urbana Consorciada Faria Lima (Evaluation of property price impacts near large-scale urban interventions: The case of Faria Lima Urban Operation Consortium). Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Report (April).

How will local government finances be affected by the large and increasing burden to pay for previously obligated pension costs? How, in particular, will these pension legacy costs change residents’ perceptions of the local property tax and their willingness to pay? As a first step in a larger Lincoln Institute of Land Policy research agenda on these questions, we ask: What is known–and just as importantly, what is not known–about the magnitude of unfunded local government pension liabilities in the United States? (see Gordon, Rose, and Fischer 2012)

It is a first principle of public finance that current services should be paid with current revenues and that debt finance should be reserved for capital projects that provide services to future taxpayers. This principle is violated when pension liabilities associated with current labor services are not funded by current purchases of financial assets and instead have to be paid for by future taxpayers.

Alas, principles of prudence in public finance are not always observed, and local governments in the United States have accumulated substantial unfunded pension liabilities in recent years. This situation breaks an important link in the relationship between taxpayers and the services they receive–the rough correspondence between the overall value of public services and the resources taken from the private sector. There is considerable debate about the strength of this correspondence and how price-like the relationship is between value paid and value received for individual taxpayers, but there can be little question that using current revenues to pay for past services weakens the link.

Growing Public Awareness

State and local government employee pensions are in the headlines almost daily (box 1). Only a few years ago, they were the nearly exclusive province of a few elected officials, appointed boards, investment advisors, actuaries, and credit rating agencies. What changed? The most immediate answer is the Great Recession, which sapped not only state tax revenue but also the value of pension plan assets. In particular, state and local pension fund equity holdings lost nearly half of their value, dropping from a peak of $2.3 trillion in September 2007 to a low of $1.2 trillion in March 2009 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2012).

———–

Box 1: Where Are Local Pensions in Trouble?

To understand where local pensions were experiencing particular difficulties, Gordon, Rose, and Fischer (2012) used media monitoring software to conduct a search of all U.S. domestic news outlets for the first three months of 2012. To satisfy the query, articles had to include the word “pension” in conjunction with terms that identify local governments (e.g., municipality, city, or county) and descriptions of funding problems (e.g., liability, deficit, underfunded, cut, default, reform, or problem). The search yielded over 2,000 separate articles from places all over the country.

Their analysis suggests several types of places are experiencing pension troubles. One group consists of jurisdictions that have been losing people and jobs over time. A prominent example is Detroit, Michigan, which has twice as many retirees as active workers. Also in this category is Prichard, Alabama, which has lost more than 45 percent of its population since 1970 and by 2010 had fewer than 23,000 residents. It simply stopped sending pension checks to its former employees in September 2009 and declared bankruptcy one month later. For such communities, pension problems may also be a symptom of larger fiscal distress or political dysfunction.

Another group of jurisdictions rode the housing boom and bust. Examples include fast-growing California cities like Stockton, which just entered bankruptcy proceedings this year, the largest city ever to do so. More puzzling are relatively affluent places, such as New York’s Suffolk or Nassau Counties, which appear unable to make tough spending cuts or raise taxes because of political gridlock. Instead, many of these jurisdictions have turned to borrowing to meet their pension obligations.

Only two recent municipal bankruptcies (Vallejo, California, and Central Falls, Rhode Island) stemmed from public pensions and employee compensation pressures together with falling revenues. Other places such as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Jefferson County, Alabama, are struggling with poor investment decisions. Also, major cities such as Atlanta, San Francisco, and New York have taken steps to limit pension growth, often with cooperation from local public employee unions. Central Falls managed to extract concessions from active police officers and fire fighters as well as current retirees, but even this was insufficient to stop the slide toward bankruptcy.

Although stock markets have largely recovered and state and local plan equity holdings have climbed back over $2 trillion, public pensions remain under scrutiny. Credit rating agencies increasingly are taking unfunded pension liabilities into account when developing their assessments of state and local government borrower risk. In addition, analysts are growing more vocal in their criticisms of methods commonly used to evaluate pension funding levels.

The federal government is also paying attention. Alarmed by the prospect of defaults, Congress held a series of hearings into state and local government finances in early 2011. More recently, the Republican staff of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) has issued reports raising the specter of a Eurozone-like crisis due to unfunded state pension liabilities (JEC 2011; JEC 2012).

In light of these criticisms and concerns about growing pension costs, 43 states enacted significant reforms to their pension systems between 2009 and 2011 (Snell 2012). The most common changes were: increased employee contribution requirements (30 states); raised age and service for eligibility (32); adjusted formulas for calculating benefits (17); and reduced cost of living increases (21). In some states the changes applied to new employees only, but in others they affected active workers and current retirees. The latter actions have proven especially controversial, prompting lawsuits in Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey, and South Dakota.

Most of the heightened attention to government employee pensions has concentrated on state government plans, while local public employee pensions remain relatively unexplored. Although local plans represent a modest share of total public pension membership (10 percent) and assets (18 percent), their failures could be devastating. Mobile residents and businesses could flee communities that levy higher taxes to rebuild pension assets rather than to provide basic services. A shrinking tax base would leave the fund even worse off and potentially less able to pay promised benefits. The result could be more cities like Prichard, Alabama.

Looking at State and Local Pension Plans Together

State and local pensions are an important part of the nation’s retirement system. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the total of $15.3 trillion in retirement assets at the end of 2011 by type of plan. State and local public employee retirement funds held a combined $2.8 trillion in assets, or almost one-fifth of the total.

Every state has at least one public employee pension plan and some have many. There are more than 220 state plans—some of which are state-administered plans that cover local government workers—and almost 3,200 local government plans (table 1). Together these plans cover 14.7 million current workers, 8.2 million current beneficiaries, and 4.8 million people eligible for future benefits but not yet receiving them.

State and local pensions are all the more important because 27.5 percent of government employees do not participate in Social Security (Nuschler, Shelton, and Topoleski 2011). These uncovered public employees are highly concentrated in a handful of states. Figure 2 ranks the 16 states with the highest concentrations of government workers not covered by Social Security. Almost all state and local government employees in Ohio and Massachusetts and more than half in Nevada, Louisiana, Colorado, California, and Texas are not covered.

Another key feature of state and local pensions is that they are mostly defined benefit (DB) plans. Benefits are calculated by a formula, typically something like:

(Average salary in final 3 years) x
(Years of service) x
(2% for each year of service) =
Benefits

Most state and local government pensions also include a cost of living adjustment. A minority of public sector workers are enrolled in defined contribution (DC) plans where a specified amount is put in a retirement fund for each year of work. Compared to DC plans, DB pensions protect employees from investment, inflation, and longevity risks. As of 2009, nearly 80 percent of state and local workers were enrolled in DB plans and just over 20 percent were in DC plans. Private sector workers had the opposite mix: 20 percent in DB plans and 80 percent in DC plans (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).

DB plans used to be more prevalent in the private sector but have been disappearing partly because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) imposed minimum funding standards, required insurance contributions, and other administrative burdens on them.

The weaker funding and reporting requirements that apply to public pensions allow governments to shift labor costs into the future. This is an implicit form of borrowing that can evade balanced budget rules and avoid the voter approval usually required for issuing bonds.

Funding and Reporting Requirements for State and Local Pensions

For most of their history, state and local pensions were financed out of general revenues on a pay-as-you-go basis. The current practice of prefunding state and local pension plans began in the 1970s and 1980s. While public sector plans were not covered by ERISA, the act did mandate a report on their practices. The 1978 report found a “high degree of pension cost blindness . . . due to the lack of actuarial valuations, the use of unrealistic actuarial assumptions, and the general absence of actuarial standards” (Munnell et al. 2008, 2).

This wake-up call led to voluntary increases in funding levels by many plans and increased attention to actuarial and accounting standards. The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) was formed in 1984, issued its first rules for pension plans in 1986, and extensively revised its actuarial valuation standards in 1994. Compliance with these rules is voluntary, but is rewarded by credit rating agencies, auditors, and other data consumers. Unlike ERISA rules that require specific valuation methods for all private plans, GASB sets out criteria that allow some latitude as to which specific methods are used by public plans. As a consequence there are serious transparency and comparability concerns with the self-reported data on state and local pension plan liabilities.

Employer Contribution

The calculation of a plan’s Actuarial Accrued Liability (AAL) requires the following information: ages and salary histories of members; assumptions for salary growth, retirement ages, asset earnings, and inflation; longevity probability tables; and a discount rate to translate estimated future values into present values. Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAA L) equals AAL minus plan assets.

The “Normal Cost” of a pension plan is the increase in AAL due to the current year of service by existing employees. ERISA requires that normal cost be covered by employee and employer contributions. GASB specifies an “Annual Required Contribution” (ARC) of normal cost plus a 30-year amortization of UAA L. The problem is that, contrary to its name, payment of ARC is not strictly required in most jurisdictions.

Choice of Discount Rate

The issue that has received the most recent attention is the choice of discount rate. Current GASB rules allow discounting future liabilities based on projected investment returns, which averaged 8 percent per year prior to the recession. But most economists and financial theorists would agree with Brown and Wilcox (2009, 538) that “the discount rate used to value future pension liabilities should reflect the riskiness of the liabilities,” not the assets. Constitutional and other legal guarantees make government pensions of low risk, while historical investment returns include a risk premium.

State and local governments cannot avoid longterm risks such as a protracted productivity slump or a decade-long down market. Therefore, the historical long-term rate of return on an equity-heavy portfolio–before risk adjustment–is too high a discount rate. Higher discount rates can make pensions appear better funded than they truly are. This reduces contribution requirements and imposes unwarranted obligations on future taxpayers if the high rates of return are not achieved. Worse, there is an incentive for plan managers to seek high-risk portfolios in order to get a higher discount rate and lower ARC.

There are strong arguments that the 8 percent discount rate used by many public pension plans is too high, but there is less agreement on just how much lower the appropriate rate should be. Rather than review the arguments, we report one estimate of just how much of an impact a lower rate would have. Munnell et al. (2012) calculate the would-be change in reported liabilities if all plans used a 5 percent rather than an 8 percent discount rate. They estimate that state and local liabilities would increase from $3.6 trillion to $5.4 trillion and aggregate funding ratios (Assets/AAL) would fall from 75 to only 50 percent. This is a huge change, and represents a doubling of unfunded liabilities (UAA L = AAL – Assets).

Recent Changes in GASB Standards

GASB (2012) has released new accounting standards to take effect in 2013 and 2014. The key change requires state and local governments to apply different discount rates to the funded and unfunded portions of liabilities. An earnings-based rate will still be applied to the funded portion, but a lower, riskless rate will be applied to UAA Ls. The impact of this change on reported liabilities depends on how well funded a plan is: no change for fully funded plans; a small change for well funded plans; and large increases in reported liabilities and decreases in funding ratios for poorly funded plans. The new standards also require that the UAA L be shown on the government’s balance sheet, which will increase the visibility of unfunded liabilities to voters.

What Do We Know About Local Pensions?

Despite mounting concerns about the fiscal health of local pension plans, systematic knowledge about them is rare. The best available information comes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2012) Annual Survey of State and Local Public Employee Retirement Systems. Detailed data for each government entity is reported every five years. Plan-level data for a sample that includes roughly half of the 3,200 local plans is reported each year and is used to create estimates of totals for each state by type of government. Tables 1 and 2 exemplify the types of information in the survey.

The main virtues of the Census Bureau’s employee retirement survey are its quality and comprehensiveness. A key disadvantage is lack of timeliness, since the most recent local data available is for fiscal year 2010. Another problem is that the Bureau only recently began reporting plan liabilities, and it does so only for state plans. Like other pension data sources, the Census Bureau does not collect information on DC plans or other post-employment benefits (OPEBs).

Nevertheless, the employee retirement survey provides some insights into local pensions. For example, the number of local plans per state varies greatly: 7 states have no local plans; 20 states have fewer than 10; Florida and Illinois have over 300 each; and Pennsylvania has over 1,400. The number of active members per beneficiary is a crude measure of how well employee contributions can fund the plan. Table 1 indicates the national average for local plans is 1.4 workers per retiree, but there is considerable variation across states. This support ratio is less than 1 in 12 states; between 1 and 2 in 31 states; and over 2 in 7 states, with Utah having the highest ratio at 6.8.

Neither of these pieces of information tell us how well funded local pensions are. For this information, we must turn to independent surveys. Most have good coverage of state plans, but they generally survey only a few of the larger local plans: e.g., the National Association of State Retirement Administrators’ (NASRA ) annual survey of member plans. A small number of national studies have focused on local, as opposed to state, pension liabilities. For example, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011) analyze local pension finances using data from Consolidated Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs) for city and county plans holding more than $1 billion in assets as of 2006.

The Boston College Center for Retirement Research (CRR) maintains a Public Plans Database (PPD) for the largest state and local plans with data from individual plan actuarial reports and local government CAFRs. Using the PPD plus information on some additional local plans, CRR recently issued a report with data for 2010 from a sample of 97 plans in 40 states (Munnell et al. 2011). This is a modest sample relative to the total of 3,200 local plans, but by concentrating on large plans it covers 59 percent of local pension assets and 55 percent of participants.

An important finding is the wide dispersion around the average funding ratio of 77 percent in 2010 (figure 3). Of 95 large plans in the CRR sample with usable information, only 16 had assets covering more than 90 percent of liabilities. At the other tail are 9 plans with below 50 percent funding (Munnell et al. 2011). This study also shows the ARC as a percent of local government payroll. The overall average for 2010 is 22 percent, and again there is wide dispersion (figure 4). Of 91 large plans in the CRR sample with usable information, more than half (49) have ARC below 20 percent of payroll, but 16 have shares in the less manageable 30 to 80 percent range. Five plans have such large pension obligations that if paid in full they would cost more than 100 percent of payroll.

Keep in mind that local governments in most states are not required to pay the full amount of the ARC. We do not have data at the local level, but a state-level study reported wide variation in the percent of ARC actually paid across plans, across years, and across states (State Budget Crisis Task Force 2012). Munnell et al. (2011) calculate pension payments actually made as a share of local budgets and again find considerable variation, with 14 percent of the sample governments devoting more than 12 percent of their budgets to pay for pensions.

Conclusions

Local government pensions are on average significantly underfunded. The key reason is that, absent a legal compulsion to do so, many governments have not set aside enough funds each year to cover the extra pension liabilities incurred in that year, much less to amortize unfunded liabilities from earlier years. In effect, they are borrowing to pay for current labor services and shifting the burden to future taxpayers.

We know much less about the 3,200 locally administered plans that we do about the 220 state plans. The best information on local plans comes from researchers who review the detailed financial reports of the plans and local governments. Of necessity, these studies concentrate on the larger plans. We do know that there is wide variation across plans on key measures: the share of liabilities that are covered by assets; the would-be full contribution to cover both current year pension costs and amortization of unfunded liabilities (ARC) relative to payroll or annual revenues; the share of ARC that is actually paid; and the share of the current budget that goes to pension costs. A significant fraction of local governments are in trouble by one or more of these measures.

Worse, what we know about liabilities comes from municipalities’ self-reported data and their own choice of discount rate. In almost all cases this discount rate is inappropriately high, and the use of a lower discount could more than double unfunded liabilities. The result is a big problem with local pension liabilities that threatens local government finances, but we do not know how big, and we do not know how unequally it is distributed.

About the Authors

Richard F. Dye is a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. He is also a professor at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Chicago, and professor of economics emeritus at Lake Forest College.

Tracy Gordon is a fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Her research focuses on state and local public finance, political economy, and urban economics.

References

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 2012. Flow of funds accounts of the United States, June 7. http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm

Brown, Jeffrey R., and David W. Wilcox. 2009. Discounting state and local pension liabilities. American Economic Review 99(2): 538–542.

Gordon, Tracy M., Heather M. Rose, and Ilana Fischer. 2012. The state of local government pensions: A preliminary inquiry. Working Paper. Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB). 2012. GASB Improves Pension Accounting and Reporting Standards. Press Release. June 25. http://www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c=GASBContent_C&pagename=GASB/GASBContent_C/GASBNewsPage&cid=1176160126951

Joint Economic Committee (JEC). 2011. States of bankruptcy, part I: The coming state pensions crisis. Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, December 8.

Joint Economic Committee (JEC). 2012. States of bankruptcy, part II: Eurozone, USA? Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, May 15.

Munnell, Alicia H., Jean-Pierre Aubry, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quimby. 2011. An update on locally administered pension plans. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, July.

Munnell, Alicia H., Jean-Pierre Aubry, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quimby. 2012. The funding of state and local pensions: 2011–2015. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, May.

Munnell, Alicia H., Kelly Haverstick, Steven A. Sass, and Jean-Pierre Aubry. 2008. The miracle of funding by state and local pension plans. Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Policy Brief, April.

Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh. 2011. The crisis in local government pensions in the United States. In Growing old: Paying for retirement and institutional money management after the financial crisis, Robert Litan and Richard Herring, eds., 47–74. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Nuschler, Dawn, Alison M. Shelton, and John J. Topoleski. 2011. Social Security: Mandatory coverage of new state and local government employees. Congressional Research Service, July. http://www.nasra.org/resources/CRS%202011%20Report.pdf

Snell, Ronald K. 2012. State pension reform, 2009–2011. Washington, DC: National Council of State Legislatures, March.

State Budget Crisis Task Force. 2012. Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force. http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2011. Employee benefits survey, retirement benefits: access, participation, and take-up rates. March.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2012. 2010 annual survey of state and local public employee retirement systems. http://www.census.gov/govs/retire

Uno de los argumentos principales para justificar la tributación del valor del suelo es que no crea ningún incentivo para alterar el comportamiento con el objeto de evadir el pago del impuesto. En contraste, un impuesto sobre la propiedad convencional, que se grava sobre los edificios, puede frenar la intención de los propietarios de erigir estructuras en su terreno que de otra manera serían deseables. Por ejemplo, los propietarios pueden dejar un sótano sin terminar o no agregar un segundo baño, porque ello aumentaría su obligación tributaria. Por lo tanto, un impuesto sobre la propiedad convencional llevaría a relaciones de capital/suelo excesivamente bajas y un ‘carga excedente’, es decir un costo para los contribuyentes mayor que el mero pago monetario efectuado a las autoridades fiscales. Este artículo informa sobre un estudio reciente de carga excedente al antecesor británico del impuesto moderno sobre la propiedad: el impuesto sobre la ventana, del siglo XVII.

El caso del impuesto sobre la ventana

En 1696, el Rey Guillermo III de Inglaterra, en apremiante necesidad de recursos adicionales, introdujo un impuesto sobre la unidad de vivienda que gravaba la cantidad de ventanas de una morada. El impuesto fue diseñado como un impuesto sobre la propiedad, tal como se deduce del debate en la Cámara de los Comunes en 1850: “El impuesto sobre la ventana, cuando se lo concibió, no tenía intención de tributar una ventana sino una propiedad, ya que se consideraba que una casa era una estimación segura del valor de los bienes de una persona, y se suponía que la cantidad de ventanas era un buen índice del valor de la casa” (HCD, 9 de abril de 1850).

En su forma inicial, el impuesto consistió en una tasa única de 2 chelines por cada casa y un cargo adicional de 4 chelines sobre casas que tenían entre 10 y 20 ventanas, u 8 chelines sobre casas que tenían más de 20 ventanas. La estructura tarifaria se fue enmendando a lo largo de los años; en algunos casos, las tasas crecieron significativamente. En respuesta, los dueños de las moradas intentaron reducir sus facturas de impuestos tapando ventanas o construyendo casas con muy pocas ventanas. En algunas viviendas había pisos enteros sin ventanas, lo que causaba efectos adversos muy graves para la salud. En un caso, la falta de ventilación causó la muerte de 52 personas en el pueblo circundante, según el informe de un médico local que fue llamado a una casa ocupada por familias pobres:

“Para reducir el impuesto sobre la ventana, todas las ventanas de las que todavía podían prescindir los pobres habían sido clausuradas, y por lo tanto se eliminaron todas las fuentes de ventilación. El olor dentro de la casa era sobrecogedor y nauseabundo hasta un extremo insoportable. No había ninguna evidencia de que se hubiera importado la fiebre a esta casa, sino que más bien se propagó de la misma a otras partes del pueblo, y 52 moradores murieron” (Guthrie 1867).

La gente protestó y presentó numerosas peticiones ante el Parlamento. Pero a pesar de sus efectos perniciosos, el impuesto duró más de 150 años, hasta que fue finalmente revocado en 1851.

Para la mayor parte de las familias, el impuesto sobre la ventana representaba una suma sustancial. En Londres, oscilaba entre aproximadamente el 30 por ciento del valor de renta en “casas más pequeñas de la calle Baker” hasta el 40 al 50 por ciento en otras calles, según un debate en la Cámara de los Comunes de 1850 (HCD, 9 de abril de 1850). El impuesto era particularmente oneroso para familias pobres que vivían en conventillos, donde los tasadores tributaban el impuesto a los residentes en forma colectiva. Por lo tanto, si un edificio contenía 2 apartamentos, cada uno de ellos con 6 ventanas, el impuesto se cobraba sobre 12 ventanas. En contraste, en las casas muy grandes de los ricos, el impuesto normalmente no excedía del 5 por ciento del valor de renta.

La tasa de impuestos sufrió varios cambios importantes antes de ser finalmente revocada. En 1784, el Primer Ministro William Pitt aumentó las tasas tributarias para compensar la reducción del impuesto sobre el té. Después, en 1797, la Ley de Triple Tributo de Pitt triplicó la tasa tributaria para ayudar a financiar las guerras napoleónicas. Al día siguiente de esta nueva ley, los ciudadanos cubrieron miles de ventanas y escribieron con tiza en los espacios cubiertos: “Ilumina nuestra oscuridad, ¡te rogamos oh Pitt!” (HCD, 24 de febrero de 1848).

Inglaterra y Escocia estaban sujetas al impuesto sobre la ventana, pero Irlanda estaba exenta debido a su estado de pobreza. Un miembro del Parlamento bromeó: “Al abogar por la extensión del impuesto sobre la ventana a Irlanda, el honorable caballero parece haber olvidado que una ventana inglesa y una ventana irlandesa son cosas muy distintas. En Inglaterra, la ventana es para dejar que entre la luz; pero en Irlanda, la ventana se usa para dejar que se vaya el humo” (HCD, 5 de mayo de 1819).

El impuesto sobre la ventana, dicho sea de paso, era considerado una mejoría con respecto a su antecesor, el impuesto sobre el hogar. En 1662, Carlos II (después de la Restauración) impuso un tributo de 2 chelines sobre cada hogar y estufa en Inglaterra y Gales. El impuesto generó una gran indignación, sobre todo por el carácter entrometido del proceso de tasación. Los “chimeneros”, como llamaban a los tasadores y cobradores de impuestos, tenían que entrar en la casa para contar la cantidad de hogares y estufas. El impuesto sobre la ventana, en contraste, no exigía acceso al interior de la morada; los “mirones de ventanas” podían contar los vanos desde el exterior sin invadir la privacidad del hogar.

El impuesto sobre la ventana, sin embargo, creó algunos problemas administrativos propios, sobre todo con respecto a la definición de ventana con fines tributarios. La ley era vaga y frecuentemente no quedaba claro qué era una ventana para el cobro de impuestos. En 1848, por ejemplo, el profesor Scholefield de Cambridge pagó impuestos por un agujero en la pared de su depósito de carbón (HCD, 24 de febrero de 1848). El mismo año, el Sr. Gregory Gragoe de Westminster pagó impuesto por una trampilla de entrada a su sótano (HCD, 24 de febrero de 1848). Todavía tan tarde como en 1850, los contribuyentes urgían al Secretario del Tesoro que aclarara cuál era la definición de ventana.

Las tallas y sus efectos sobre el comportamiento

A lo largo de su historia, el impuesto sobre la ventana consistía en una serie de “tallas (notches)”. Se produce una “talla” en una estructura tributaria cuando un pequeño cambio de comportamiento, como el agregado de una ventana, provoca un gran cambio en la obligación tributaria.

Las tallas son poco comunes (Slemrod 2010) y no se deben confundir con las discontinuidades o “pliegues” (kinks), que son mucho más comunes, incluso en la actualidad. Una discontinuidad en la estructura tributaria se produce cuando un pequeño cambio de comportamiento lleva a un gran cambio en la tasa tributaria marginal, pero sólo un pequeño cambio en la obligación tributaria. El impuesto sobre los ingresos en los Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, tiene varias discontinuidades. Las parejas casadas con ingresos tributables de US$17.850 a US$72.500 están en el segmento tributario marginal del 15 por ciento; las parejas con ingresos tributarios de US$72.500 a US$146.400 están en el segmento tributario marginal del 25 por ciento. Si una pareja con ingresos de US$72.500 ganara un dólar más, su tasa tributaria marginal saltaría al 25 por ciento, pero su obligación tributaria sólo aumentaría 25 centavos.

Los registros de microfilm de datos tributarios locales en el Reino Unido entre 1747 y 1830 permiten examinar de manera más sistemática el impacto del impuesto sobre la cantidad de ventanas y las tallas. Este artículo utiliza el conjunto de datos de 1747 a 1757, con información de 493 moradas en Ludlow, un pueblo comercial en Shropshire, cerca del límite con Gales. En este período, la estructura del impuesto sobre la ventana contenía 3 tallas. Durante este período, un propietario:

• no pagaba impuestos si la casa tenía menos de 10 ventanas;
• pagaba 6 peniques por ventana si la casa tenía entre 10 y 14 ventanas;
• pagaba 9 peniques por ventana si la casa tenía entre 15 y 19 ventanas;
• pagaba un chelín por ventana si la casa tenía 20 ventanas o más.

Los propietarios que compraban una 10a ventana, por lo tanto, pagaban un impuesto de 6 peniques sobre la 10a ventana y también sobre las 9 ventanas restantes, que antes eran libres de impuestos. O sea, el impuesto total sobre la 10a ventana era de 60 peniques, equivalente a 5 chelines. Si el impuesto sobre la ventana distorsionara las decisiones tributarias y llevara a una carga excedente, podríamos esperar que muchas casas tuvieran 9, 14 ó 19 ventanas, pero muy pocas con 10, 15 ó 20. A continuación se ensaya esta hipótesis.

Durante la primera mitad del siglo XVIII, la administración del impuesto había sido problemática, ya que los propietarios frecuentemente camuflaban o cubrían las ventanas hasta que el cobrador de impuestos se había ido, o se aprovechaban de vacíos legales o ambigüedades en el código tributario. En consecuencia, la recaudación de impuestos fue mucho menor de lo esperado. En 1747, sin embargo, el Parlamento revisó el impuesto elevando las tasas e introduciendo medidas para mejorar su administración. En particular, prohibió la práctica de cubrir y luego reabrir ventanas para evadir el impuesto; los infractores tenían que pagar una multa de 20 chelines (1 libra) por cada ventana que reabrieran sin notificarlo al inspector de impuestos (Glantz 2008).

La ley de 1747 redujo la evasión tributaria significativamente, así que los datos para los 10 años subsiguientes deberían brindar una estimación razonable de la cantidad de ventanas de una morada. Si el impuesto sobre la ventana distorsionara el comportamiento, se podría esperar un pico en la cantidad de moradas al límite de la talla, con 9, 14 ó 19 ventanas. Y esto es precisamente lo que demuestran los datos. La figura 1 es un histograma que muestra la cantidad de ventanas por vivienda de la muestra. El patrón es claro: hay aumentos bruscos en la cantidad de casas con 9, 14 ó 20 ventanas:

• El 18,4 por ciento de las casas tiene 9 ventanas, el 3,9 por ciento tiene 8 y el 4,6 por ciento tiene 10 ventanas;
• El 16,6 por ciento tiene 14 ventanas, el 6,0 por ciento tiene 13 ventanas y el 1,8 por ciento tiene 15 ventanas;
• El 7,1 por ciento tiene 19 ventanas, el 3,4 por ciento tiene 18 ventanas y el 0,7 por ciento tiene 20 ventanas.

Los ensayos estadísticos estándar rechazan la hipótesis de que hay una cantidad igual de casas con 8, 9 ó 10 ventanas; con 13, 14 ó 15 ventanas; o con 18, 19 ó 20 ventanas. Es obvio que la gente respondió al impuesto sobre la ventana quedándose en una de las tallas para reducir al mínimo su obligación tributaria.

Los datos de una muestra de 170 casas en el período de 1761 a 1765 explican la respuesta del público a las revisiones parlamentarias del impuesto en 1761. Además de un aumento de tasas, las revisiones de 1761 ampliaron la cobertura del impuesto a casas con 8 ó 9 ventanas. En las estructuras impositivas anteriores, las casas con menos de 10 ventanas no pagaban ningún impuesto sobre la ventana. Para esta segunda muestra, en la figura 2 se observa un pico pronunciado en 7 ventanas: el 28,2 por ciento de las casas tiene 7 ventanas, pero sólo el 5,2 por ciento tiene 6 ventanas y sólo el 2,9 por ciento tiene 8 ventanas. Una vez más, es fácil rechazar la hipótesis de que había una cantidad igual de casas con 6, 7 u 8 ventanas.

En resumen, la evidencia de nuestras dos muestras demuestra claramente que había una amplia tendencia a alterar el comportamiento para reducir el pago de impuestos. La gente decidía cuántas ventanas poner, no para satisfacer sus propias preferencias, sino para no tener que pagar impuestos más altos. El impuesto sobre la ventana, en pocas palabras, generaba una “carga excedente”.

¿Cuán grande fue la carga excedente del impuesto sobre la ventana?

Como ya explicamos, el impuesto sobre la ventana era sustancial e indujo a un comportamiento generalizado para evitar el impuesto. De acuerdo a algunas técnicas estándar de análisis económico, nuestro modelo de simulación genera una estimación de lo que la gente hubiera estado dispuesta a pagar por su cantidad deseada de ventanas. El modelo captura la demanda de cada consumidor por ventanas con y sin el impuesto, la cantidad de impuestos pagada y la pérdida de bienestar al ajustar la cantidad de ventanas como respuesta al impuesto.

En la muestra de 1747 a 1757, las pérdidas estimadas de bienestar fueron muy grandes para los hogares que estaban al límite de la talla. Para ellos, la pérdida de bienestar (es decir, la carga excedente) es del 62 por ciento de los impuestos que pagaron. O sea, por cada dólar recaudado bajo nuestra versión simulada del impuesto sobre la ventana, el tributo impuso una carga o costo adicional de 62 centavos sobre dichos hogares. No es de sorprender que la carga excedente es particularmente grande para los hogares que eligieron tener 9 ventanas Uno de los criterios utilizados por los economistas para evaluar un impuesto es la carga excedente relativa a los impuestos pagados. Utilizando este criterio, un buen impuesto es aquel que recauda ingresos significativos pero produce cambios muy pequeños en las decisiones de los contribuyentes. Los consumidores que compraron 9 ventanas están por lo tanto en el peor de los casos. Estos consumidores no pagaron ningún impuesto; para ellos, entonces, toda la carga tributaria es excedente.

Para nuestra muestra completa de 1.000 hogares simulados, la carga excedente como fracción de los impuestos pagados es de alrededor del 14 por ciento. Por lo tanto, por cada dólar recaudado por el impuesto sobre la ventana, nuestra simulación sugiere la existencia de un costo adicional de 14 centavos para los contribuyentes como resultado de la distorsión en sus decisiones.

Algunos comentarios para concluir

El impuesto sobre la ventana representa un caso muy claro y transparente de carga excedente: un tributo que impuso costos altos sobre los contribuyentes además de sus obligaciones tributarias, debido a los ajustes de comportamiento que deben realizar para evitar el impuesto. Pero, como se mencionó anteriormente, los impuestos modernos sobre la propiedad también crean una carga excedente, si bien las consecuencias son menos drásticas que en el caso del impuesto sobre la ventana.

Es importante considerar este tema al diseñar un sistema tributario. Lo ideal, en principio, sería un impuesto neutral que incremente los ingresos deseados pero no distorsione el comportamiento del contribuyente creando cargas adicionales. Dicho impuesto es un tributo puro sobre el valor del suelo, gravado sobre el valor del suelo de una propiedad, es decir su valor sin mejoras. Por lo tanto, el valor de tasación del suelo (y por lo tanto la obligación tributaria del propietario) es completamente independiente de las decisiones efectuadas por el propietario de la parcela. A diferencia del impuesto sobre la ventana, que brinda un ejemplo convincente de los costos adicionales que surgen cuando la obligación tributaria depende del comportamiento del dueño de la propiedad, un impuesto sobre el valor del suelo no crea ningún incentivo de comportamiento para evadir su pago.

Sobre los autores

Wallace E. Oates es profesor universitario distinguido de Economía, emérito, de la Universidad de Maryland, y fellow universitario en Resources for the Future.

Robert M. Schwab es profesor de Economía en la Universidad de Maryland.

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Because many brownfield sites are located in areas with depressed property values, the cost of remediation and redevelopment can be greater than the expected resale value. These sites, referred to here as low-to-no market value brownfields, are rarely addressed under current policies and programs. Rather, the current practice of many brownfield redevelopment projects is to select only the most marketable sites for remediation and redevelopment, essentially perpetuating the age-old “creaming” process. Private and public developers’ avoidance of the lowest market value parcels typically excludes disadvantaged neighborhoods from programs aimed at redeveloping brownfields and creates the potential for widening existing inequalities between better-off and worse-off neighborhoods.

The Role of Land Banks

In a recently completed project supported by the Lincoln Institute, I examined the barriers to brownfield redevelopment and focused on promising approaches for improving the prospects of the least marketable sites. The specific research goal was to identify land transfer procedures and processes through which land bank authorities and other community land development entities would be willing to receive vacant brownfield property that is tax-delinquent and environmentally contaminated, and then arrange for its remediation and sale.

A local land bank authority is typically a nonprofit entity established by either a city or county to address the problems of urban blight and to promote redevelopment. The original motivation for this project was to seek a solution to the problem of land banks being unwilling to accept some tax-delinquent brownfield properties due to fears of becoming liable for the contamination on these properties. Removing that barrier improves the prospects for promoting productive land redevelopment and reducing property vacancies to enhance a community’s economic development.

Over the course of this project, the nature of the original problem shifted in a positive way when recent federal guidelines clarified that land bank authorities that are part of a local government and acquire brownfield properties involuntarily (e.g., because they are tax-delinquent) are not liable for any contamination. With removal of this legal liability, it became clear that the real problem land banks face in taking on tax-delinquent, low-to-no market value properties is a lack of financial resources to arrange for their subsequent remediation, sale or redevelopment.

For example, the Atlanta/Fulton Country Landbank operates on a model of clearing title on properties to allow for private redevelopment, since it does not have the financial resources to act as the redeveloper itself. The Landbank, like most of the public or quasi-public entities we have identified as engaging in brownfield redevelopment, is promoting a market-based, creaming process of redevelopment. While there is validity in employing such processes, to do so exclusively poses a serious public policy issue. It serves to widen the inequality between the most depressed neighborhoods, where the low-to-no market value properties are most likely to be found, and the neighborhoods experiencing revitalization and brownfield cleanup.

Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment

Our review of current land bank activity in other cities has revealed that, overall, land bank authorities do not take a pro-active stance on brownfield redevelopment for several reasons: operational limitations, fear of legal liability, and/or lack of funds to cover remediation costs. Our national search yielded only two exceptions: the Cleveland Land Bank and the Louisville/Jefferson County Land Bank Authority. But of these two, only the Louisville/Jefferson County Land Bank has pursued brownfield properties actively and has made the required changes in its by-laws to effectively acquire, remediate and redevelop contaminated properties. The Cleveland Land Bank experience in brownfield redevelopment was with a donated parcel that was suspected of being contaminated.

Operational Limitations

The two major operational requirements that currently deter land banks from entering into brownfield redevelopment are the need to identify an end user for a property before the property can be acquired by the land bank and the limited scope of activity for which the land banks were established originally. For example, the Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard land banks in Massachusetts were established for conservation purposes; they rarely deal with properties that would be considered brownfields, although their organizational structure makes them ideal candidates to do so.

Fear of Legal Liability

As with any owner of contaminated property, land banks are concerned about the legal liability associated with brownfields. Although most state volunteer cleanup programs offer liability exemptions for municipalities, the issue of federal liability still has to be addressed when land banks choose to acquire contaminated properties.

Federal legal liability arises from the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as Superfund, but both federal and state governments have developed programs and guidelines aimed at eliminating that barrier. As a point of clarification, it is not the intent of federal or state programs to release responsible parties from their legal obligation to clean up property that they have contaminated, but, rather, to facilitate brownfield remediation and redevelopment by reducing the fear of unwarranted legal liability.

Landowners who are not responsible for contaminating the property, who did not know, and had no reason to suspect contaminants were present on the property are not liable under CERCLA sections 107(b) and 101(35). This is often referred to as the “innocent landowner defense.” Sections 101(20)(D) and 101(35)(A) protect federal, state and local governments from owner/operator liability if they acquire contaminated property involuntarily as a function of performing their governmental duties, including acquisition due to abandonment, tax delinquency, foreclosure, or through seizure or forfeiture authority. This process was further clarified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in June 1997 to facilitate the work of state and local brownfield redevelopment programs.

For land bank authorities that are a part of local government, the above-mentioned program should protect the acquisition of contaminated properties through the land bank’s normal operational functions. However, any land bank seeking to acquire contaminated properties should contact its regional EPA office for further legal clarification and assistance with the redevelopment process.

Lack of Funds for Remediation Costs

The often costly remediation process is another significant problem for land banks seeking to redevelop brownfields. Even when the mission of the land bank is to eliminate blight and spur revitalization, both of which are directly related to brownfield reuse, limited budgets prevent interested and willing land banks from acquiring brownfields for remediation and redevelopment. Therefore, while the land bank authority could be helpful in forgiving the property taxes owed on the parcel as an incentive for reuse, the property’s redevelopment potential is still thwarted by its having little-to-no market desirability.

Promising Alternatives for Low-value Sites

When the focus of this research project became the identification of promising approaches for improving the redevelopment prospects of low-to-no market value brownfield sites, we began to examine different kinds of roles for land banks. These included identifying possible ways of raising revenues for land banks and other community development agencies to use in financing the remediation and redevelopment of low-to-no market value sites, and considering potential reuses of such sites, including open space, residential or commercial/industrial uses.

One alternative is found in community land trusts, which generally are private non-profit corporations in both urban and rural areas engaged in social and economic activities, such as to acquire and hold land for affordable housing development. While traditionally they have not focused on conservation issues, their model could be adapted for brownfield redevelopment efforts. One approach for solving the problem of low-to-no market value brownfields is a community land trust modeled after Boston’s Dudley Neighbors, Inc., which received from the city the power of eminent domain to acquire vacant land and buildings in its neighborhood. This strategy provides an alternative mechanism to a citywide land bank for acquiring brownfield properties, and it can be used to target geographic areas in greatest economic decline.

Another promising alternative to the traditional land bank is modeled after Scenic Hudson, an environmental advocacy organization and land trust located in Poughkeepsie, New York. It has an urban initiative to acquire, remediate and develop environmentally friendly reuses for derelict riverfront sites. Among its projects has been the redevelopment of a twelve-acre abandoned industrial waterfront for a public park, the Irvington Waterfront Park. Scenic Hudson has proven that, with cooperation from public and private organizations, land trusts can be effective vehicles for brownfield redevelopment.

The most popular form of land trust is one founded to protect natural areas and farmlands. Such land trusts most often operate at the local or regional level to conserve tracts of land that have ecological, open space, recreational or historic value. If land trusts choose to expand their conservation goals to include urban open space, they could become very helpful partners in public/private projects to create green space and parks from remediated brownfields. The Scenic Hudson land trust model specifically addresses brownfield redevelopment for the stated purpose of stemming greenfield development.

To address the needs for financing the redevelopment of low-to-no market value brownfields, the Louisville Land Bank Authority’s approach is promising. It established a fund that uses the profits from the sale of remediated brownfields to fund future remediation projects. Another possibility for raising funds for land banks is suggested by the two-percent transfer fee the state of Massachusetts authorized for its Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard land banks to purchase open space. The transfer fee idea could be adapted by land banks to create a fund for brownfield remediation.

The research project also sought to identify municipalities that did not have a specific land bank authority, but did have a municipal office or program that dealt with tax-delinquent properties and their redevelopment. Two municipalities found to be engaging in noteworthy and innovative brownfield redevelopment are Kalamazoo, Michigan, and, Emeryville, California. Kalamazoo’s brownfield pilot approach of creating brownfield redevelopment districts emphasizes community development over traditional, market-based economic development goals. The city uses stakeholder groups to design brownfield projects and to plan for redevelopment.

Emeryville has determined, through surveying its property owners and developers, that offering financial assistance for site assessment alone is not effective; it must be backed up by financial assistance for remediation. The city’s brownfield program is based on the principle that “sharing of risks should lead to sharing of rewards.” That is, if a community bears the residual risk for permitting the private sector to conduct risk-based cleanup, a portion of the private sector’s savings on remediation expenses should be shared with the community. The Emeryville approach to brownfield redevelopment also recognizes that smaller sites and projects require proportionately more loans, grants and technical assistance than do larger sites and projects.

Conclusion

At the present time, there is a paucity of programs and strategies to address tax-delinquent, low-to-no market value brownfield properties in marginal urban neighborhoods. If this deficiency persists, the current brownfield redevelopment movement will likely lead to a widening of intraurban inequalities. If municipalities, land bank authorities, and community development organizations will recognize the need for, and move towards, promoting more equitable brownfield redevelopment, the approaches presented in this article hold promise for correcting this deficiency and preventing wider inequalities. Further, such actions could remove potential polution sources and health hazards from the neighborhood, provide much-needed open space, and hold the remediated property until the surrounding area increases in value and the site can be redeveloped through traditional market processes.

References

City of Emeryville, Project Status Report, Emeryville Brownfields Pilot Project. Emeryville, California. November 1998. See also

Rosenberg, Steve. “Working Where the Grass Isn’t Greener: Land Trusts in Urban Areas.” Land Trust Alliance Exchange. Winter: 5-9, 1998.

U.S. EPA. Handbook of Tools for Managing Federal Superfund Liability Risks at Brownfields and Other Sites. Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. November 1998.

Nancey Green Leigh, AICP, is associate professor of city planning in the Graduate City and Regional Planning Program at the Georgia Institute of Technology. She teaches and conducts research on urban and regional development, industrial restructuring, local economic development planning, and brownfield redevelopment.

Like the other New Independent States of Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia is striving to adapt complex social and economic systems to changing conditions. To help Estonian policymakers enhance their understanding of land economics, taxation and related policy issues, the Lincoln Institute has embarked on a far-reaching collaborative education program with the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER).

Of special significance to both institutes is Estonia’s position as one of only a few countries where real estate taxes are applied solely to land, and where buildings and other improvements to land are not taxed. In addition, the country has already made dramatic progress toward establishing a market economy and a system of land taxation based on land value as an incentive for productive use of land and a means of discouraging speculation.

In making the transition to a market economy, Estonian policymakers are constrained by the lack of up-to-date information in the Estonian language on the fiscal and political implications of democratic government or on basic theory and research on land economics. Moreover, as the Estonian Parliament moves the country toward decentralization and land reforms, officials have recognized the need for practical assistance in developing procedures to determine land values and to administer tax assessment and collection systems.

The Lincoln Institute’s Role

For the Lincoln Institute, the current situation offers an opportunity to contribute knowledge about the economics of land markets and taxation based on a broad view of land policy. This approach includes examining the principles expounded by Henry George in his book Progress and Poverty that might be relevant in a country at the early stages of developing land markets.

“Estonia is a model environment for the Lincoln Institute to develop seminars in an economic development framework that analyzes land policy, taxation and valuation,” says Lincoln Institute faculty associate David A. Walker, professor of finance and director of the Center for Business-Government Relations at Georgetown University.

The Institute’s work with Estonia began in September 1993, when senior fellow Joan Youngman and fellow Jane Malme were invited to a conference in Tallinn to discuss the design of a property taxation system. The conference, sponsored and supported by the Paris-based Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Danish Ministry of Taxation, was organized by Tambet Tiits, then director of the Estonian National Land Board and responsible for implementing the land assessment project.

Malme and Youngman subsequently invited Tiits to participate as a faculty member in a Lincoln Institute course on the interaction of land policy and taxation. Designed for government officials from Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, the course was presented in cooperation with OECD at their training centers in Copenhagen and Vienna.

In December 1994, a delegation composed of Malme, Youngman, Robert Gilmour, president of AIER, and C. Lowell Harriss, professor of economics, emeritus, at Columbia University, went on a fact-finding mission to explore research and education opportunities in Estonia. They recommended that the Institute organize educational programs in Estonia with Tiits, and in May 1995 Walker and Tiits cochaired an intensive three-day seminar. More than 20 senior level public policymakers attended, representing academia, business, three city governments, and various ministries and agencies of the national government.

The program focused on three key goals: studying the role of land taxation to promote efficient land use and to finance local government; learning about legal and administrative systems that support the development of efficient land markets; and understanding the relationships among land policies, land taxes, and land utilization, and their effective application to the economy of Estonia.

Other Lincoln Institute faculty associates participating in the May program were Gilmour; Roy Kelly, deputy director of the International Tax Program at Harvard University and research associate at Harvard Institute for International Development; Malme; Anders Muller, project manager for the Property Valuation and Tax Management Department for the Ministry of Taxation in Denmark; Jussi Palmu, director of Huoneistomarkkinointi Oi, a leading real estate agency in Finland; and Vincent Renard, director of research of CNRS for the Ecole Polytechnique, Laboratoire d’Econometrie, in Paris, France.

“We are pleased to be working with Tambet Tiits and other business and government leaders in Estonia,” says Lincoln Institute president Ronald L. Smith. “We believe the Institute can provide the kind of expertise their policymakers can use to develop the best approaches to land and tax reform, and to strengthen their ability to establish viable programs in a new and still changing economic climate.”

Primer on Land Issues in Estonia

The most northern of the Baltic States, Estonia has a strong tradition of family farming and land ownership. Unlike many other former Soviet bloc countries, its history included a period of independence from 1920 to 1940. In 1939 an estimated 145,000 small farms dotted the land area of 45,200 sq. km., and only about 30 percent of the population lived in urban areas. By the early 1990s, more than 70 percent lived in cities, with one-third of the country’s 1.6 million people inhabiting the capital of Tallinn.

During 50 years of Soviet rule from 1940 to 1990, Estonia experienced intense industrialization and urbanization, nationalization of land and mineral resources, and consolidation of its small farms into huge agricultural collectives. Demographic losses due to deportations, emigration and World War II reduced the number of farm workers and shifted the remaining population away from the land. Land use patterns and environmental integrity were further compromised by Soviet agricultural policies, causing much of the traditional farm land to become forested and moving farm activity to more marginal grasslands.

Restitution began in 1991 but it has been a slow process. The lack of up-to-date knowledge and technology, coexisting with bureaucratic inefficiencies and past agricultural policies, are challenging the effective use of land. However, new land use legislation and taxation have been created to solve these problems in a democratic way.

In only a few years, Estonia has become one of the most progressive and stable of the New Independent States. It has a high level of education and its people are eager to catch up with the “information age.” Its business and government leaders have established significant monetary reforms and pursued foreign trade and investment with the west, particularly Finland, other Scandinavian countries, and its former primary trading partner, Russia. Through the privatization of state enterprises such as textiles and forest products, and the growth of new private businesses in the service sector, Estonia is rapidly becoming a strong economic force in the region.

Current Research on Land Taxation in Estonia

Attiat F. Ott, Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute for Economic Studies at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts is conducting a research project titled “Land Taxation in the Baltic States: A Proposal for Reform,” with support from the Lincoln Institute. Over the next two years, Ott will conduct an assessment of the land taxation law introduced in 1994 by the Republic of Estonia. This law was developed in conjunction with the privatization and restoration of land to former owners, as stipulated in the 1992 Constitution. During this period of transition, the interrelationship between public ownership and private rights during the transition period is of primary importance. However, as in other countries, the Estonian property rights structure also affects and ensuing patterns of land use and development. These issues are at the core of the first phase of Ott’s research.

In the second phase, Ott will evaluate the land taxation law as an element of Estonia’s new, overall tax structure. The law defines both state and local land taxes using the same bases (sale price or use value of the land), but a different rate of taxation is levied at each level of government. Ott will review the strengths and weaknesses of the existing land tax system as a basis for offering and offer a comprehensive land taxation proposal for Estonia and the other Baltic States. She will incorporate ideas on the use of a site value tax and concerns about the undesirable effects of land speculation, which is occurring such as those occurring in some urban areas of Estonia.

While Ott’s research is directly related to the Institute’s interest in land value taxation, she will also be making methodological contributions as her quantitative work will extend the area of hedonic pricing models from their common application in housing to the area of land valuation.

Additional information in printed newsletter:
Map: Share of Agricultural Land in the Counties of Estonia: 1939, 1955 and 1992. Source: Adapted from Ulo Mander, “Changes of Landscape Structure in Estonia during the Soviet Period,” GeoJournal, May 1994, 33.1, pp 45-54.

The development of new land and tax systems in countries in political and economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe reflects a unique array of historical, social, political, and economic circumstances. While all transitional countries seeking admission to the European Union (EU) have initiated comprehensive reforms to encourage free markets and democratic governments, the three Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—made privatization and restitution of property rights a prime objective immediately after their independence in the early 1990s. These actions, together with a desire to stimulate real estate markets and capture tax revenues for improved public services, made them the first of the transitional countries to introduce value-based taxation of real property.

Karl E. Case es profesor emérito de Economía en la universidad Wellesley College, donde ocupó la cátedra en economía Katherine Coman y A. Barton Hepburn y enseñó durante 34 años. Actualmente, es senior fellow en el Centro Conjunto de Estudios sobre Vivienda de la Universidad de Harvard.

El profesor Case es, además, socio fundador de Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss, Inc., empresa de investigaciones inmobiliarias, y miembro del directorio del Depositors Insurance Fund de Massachusetts. Es miembro del Comité Asesor del Índice Standard & Poors, de la Junta Asesora Académica del Banco de la Reserva Federal de Boston y de la Junta Asesora del Instituto Rappaport para el Gran Boston de la Universidad de Harvard. Se ha desempeñado como miembro de los directorios de Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC), del Banco Century, del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy y de la Asociación Estadounidense de Economía Urbana e Inmobiliaria. Asimismo, fue editor asociado de las revistas Journal of Economic Perspectives y Journal of Economics Education.

Después de recibir su título de grado de la Universidad de Miami en Ohio en 1968, el profesor Case se desempeñó durante tres años en el servicio activo del ejército y luego recibió su título de doctor en Economía por la Universidad de Harvard en 1976. Sus trabajos de investigación están relacionados con el área inmobiliaria, de vivienda y de finanzas públicas. Es autor o coautor de cinco libros, tales como Principles of Economics, Economics and Tax Policy y Property Taxation: The Need for Reform, y ha publicado numerosos artículos en revistas profesionales. Principles of Economics, un texto básico con la coautoría de Ray C. Fair y Sharon Oster, se encuentra ya en su décima edición.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró usted con el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?

Chip Case: Supe del Instituto Lincoln en la década de 1970, cuando este patrocinaba conferencias para el Comité de Recursos Tributarios y Desarrollo Económico (TRED, por sus siglas en inglés). Yo había escrito mi tesis de doctorado sobre impuestos a la propiedad y me habían invitado a asistir a una de estas conferencias. En el otoño de 1980, comencé mi primer año sabático en el Wellesley College y necesitaba encontrar alguna forma de financiar mis investigaciones. Organicé una reunión con Arlo Woolery, quien, en ese entonces, era director ejecutivo del Instituto, y él estuvo de acuerdo con apoyar mi trabajo.

Desde entonces, mi relación con el Instituto Lincoln ha continuado durante estas cuatro décadas. Fui miembro del directorio a mediados de la década de 1990 y me desempeñé en los comités de búsqueda ejecutiva para H. James Brown, ex presidente del Instituto Lincoln, y Gregory K. Ingram, actual presidente y gerente general. Dicté clases en varios programas patrocinados por el Instituto Lincoln en el Instituto de Capacitación sobre Reforma del Suelo (actualmente denominado Centro Internacional de Estudios y Capacitación sobre Políticas de Suelo) en Taiwán durante 15 años, y además participé en una gran cantidad de programas en Cuba y China.

La mayor parte de mis investigaciones se encuentra en línea con el espíritu del Instituto, por lo que continúo realizando presentaciones en forma regular en diferentes conferencias y seminarios. Una conferencia especial en la que tuve el agrado de participar fue “La vivienda y el entorno construido: Acceso, finanzas y políticas”, que se llevó a cabo en Cambridge en diciembre de 2007. Posteriormente, el Instituto publicó los artículos y comentarios respectivos bajo el título “Ensayos en honor a Karl E. Case” en un volumen titulado Housing Markets and the Economy: Risk, Regulation, and Policy, editado por Edward L. Glaeser y John M. Quigley.

Land Lines: ¿Qué tipo de trabajo ha realizado usted recientemente para el Instituto Lincoln?

Chip Case: A principios de este año intervine como panelista en la conferencia “Economía Urbana y Finanzas Públicas”, organizada por Daniel McMillen, visiting fellow del Instituto Lincoln, junto con el Departamento de Valuación y Tributación. Este programa anual reúne a académicos líderes en los ámbitos de economía urbana y finanzas públicas con el fin de presentar y debatir sus investigaciones. Es un gran foro y una muy buena oportunidad para exponer nuevos trabajos de corte empírico.

Asimismo, hace poco regresé de un programa del Instituto Lincoln en Beijing, en donde dicté una serie de conferencias dirigidas a planificadores y economistas en el Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Política de Suelo de la Universidad de Pekín y el Instituto Lincoln. Mi función allí fue ayudar a descifrar lo que ha estado ocurriendo en el mercado de la vivienda de los Estados Unidos y brindar una perspectiva acerca de la relación existente entre el colapso del mercado de la vivienda y la crisis financiera actual.

Los funcionarios chinos se encuentran muy interesados en aprender de la experiencia de mercado de los Estados Unidos. Decir que el mercado de la vivienda en China está pasando por un período fructífero sería quedarse cortos. En la mayoría de las ciudades, el mercado se encuentra en tensión debido a la cantidad limitada de suelo disponible y a una infraestructura insuficiente. El gobierno ha reconocido que el rápido crecimiento supone un desafío para las autoridades que controlan el mercado y, a la vez, es consciente de que este crecimiento puede aprovecharse como una fuente de posibles ingresos para las ciudades de este país.

Land Lines: ¿Qué aprendió usted acerca del problema de las finanzas del gobierno municipal en China?

Chip Case: Los gobiernos municipales en China poseen todo el suelo dentro de sus respectivas jurisdicciones y, tradicionalmente, han recaudado fondos mediante la celebración de contratos de usufructo a largo plazo sobre dichos terrenos con asociaciones de empresas y otras compañías de negocios que, posteriormente, desarrollan el suelo. Los ingresos provenientes de estos contratos de usufructo han permitido a las jurisdicciones municipales proveer de la infraestructura y bienes públicos necesarios sin haber recaudado nunca ningún tipo de impuesto.

Últimamente, algunas jurisdicciones se están quedando sin terrenos nuevos y sin desarrollar para ceder en usufructo y, por lo tanto, están perdiendo la fuente de ingresos que necesitan para financiar las escuelas, la infraestructura y los servicios de salud en sus jurisdicciones. China nunca aplicó impuestos a la propiedad, aunque la solución recomendada para la actual reducción de los ingresos municipales es, justamente, un sistema de impuestos a la propiedad. No obstante, la tarea de convencer a los funcionarios municipales para que implementen un impuesto a la propiedad ha resultado un desafío político por varias razones.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera se relaciona su investigación con el trabajo realizado por el Instituto Lincoln?

Chip Case: Me he dedicado al estudio de las cuestiones relacionadas con el impuesto sobre el suelo y la propiedad durante mucho tiempo. Publiqué mi tesis doctoral bajo el título de “Tributación a la propiedad: Necesidad de una reforma”. Mi interés en el impuesto a la propiedad desde mis primeros años de investigación me llevó a pensar acerca del mercado de la vivienda y sus ineficacias y fallas. He escrito sobre la eficacia del impuesto a la propiedad y de los efectos distributivos de los precios del suelo y sus aumentos.

Una parte importante de mi investigación trata sobre la forma de medir el valor del suelo y evaluar de qué manera el valor del suelo afecta a la ubicación de los mercados laborales y a la distribución de los recursos y bienes públicos. Al comprar una casa, la persona está comprando el acceso a un paquete de derechos que se encuentran enlazados a la porción de terreno donde se encuentra su casa. El valor de este paquete de derechos se capitaliza en el costo de la casa y se somete a tributación como un componente del valor tasado de la propiedad. Dicho paquete de derechos (lo que incluye y de qué manera varía según su ubicación) es, hoy en día, un tema candente, debido en gran parte a la situación actual del mercado de la vivienda y su impacto sobre la estabilidad financiera de la economía del país.

Land Lines: Cuéntenos un poco más acerca de su interés en el impuesto a la propiedad.

Chip Case: Soy un acérrimo defensor del impuesto a la propiedad. Este tributo tiene el potencial de ser un medio claro y transparente para recaudar ingresos. El valor justo de mercado de una propiedad no es un mal índice para medir la capacidad de pago de los contribuyentes, si lo comparamos con el impuesto a las ganancias federal, el cual se ha vuelto tan complejo que se ha convertido en una forma extraña de distribuir el costo del gobierno y que demuestra una conexión muy poco intuitiva con la capacidad de pago de impuestos.

Los impuestos deberían ser neutrales e, idealmente, no deberían afectar al comportamiento económico. Cuando los contribuyentes modifican su conducta para evitar impuestos, en realidad empeoran su situación y, al mismo tiempo, el gobierno pierde ingresos. Los costos ocultos derivados de estos cambios son, por ejemplo, precios más altos y salarios más bajos. La porción del impuesto a la propiedad correspondiente al terreno es uno de los pocos tributos que no distorsionan la actividad económica y, por lo tanto, es una herramienta extremadamente valiosa para las finanzas públicas.

El impuesto a la propiedad constituye un apoyo a las jurisdicciones municipales, al gobierno autónomo y a la democracia directa. Los gobiernos municipales experimentan muchos obstáculos al imponer tributos independientes a las ventas o a las ganancias si los contribuyentes pueden encontrar una tasa menor en una ciudad o pueblo cercano. Los bienes raíces se definen como inmuebles, lo que representa una buena base para aplicar un impuesto municipal.

El impuesto a la propiedad siempre se encuentra en la mira de sus detractores debido a su alta visibilidad. Casi nadie sabe cuánto paga en términos de impuesto a las ventas en un año y, en el caso de muchos contribuyentes, el impuesto a las ganancias se deduce de sus salarios. No obstante, extender un cheque por un abultado monto en concepto de impuesto a la propiedad llama la atención del contribuyente. Esto da como resultado cierto nivel de controversia, aunque también significa tener la responsabilidad de rendir cuentas y permite al electorado municipal decidir si los impuestos que paga tienen una correlación con los servicios públicos que recibe. Y esto resulta casi imposible de juzgar a nivel estatal o federal.

El impuesto a la propiedad siempre puede mejorarse, lo que representa una parte de la importante misión que tiene el Instituto Lincoln. Sin embargo, se necesitan personas que defiendan este impuesto mostrando sus puntos fuertes, por lo que siempre estaré encantado de cumplir esa función.

Land Lines: ¿Cuál es el tema de su actual investigación?

Chip Case: Estoy trabajando en un artículo junto con Robert Shiller sobre el efecto de las expectativas de la gente en cuanto al mercado de la vivienda en 1988 y durante el período que va de 2003 a 2012. Shiller y yo realizamos cuestionarios a personas que habían comprado o vendido una casa en algún momento de esos años calendario. Recabamos más de cinco mil cuestionarios para generar una base de datos que nos permitiera comprender mejor la naturaleza de la reciente burbuja inmobiliaria e identificar cuándo comienzan los cambios en las expectativas de la gente. Esta base de datos nos brinda una manera de cuantificar y analizar las diferentes expectativas en cuanto al mercado de la vivienda y determinar de qué forma dichas expectativas influyen en la toma de decisiones.

Por ejemplo, podemos observar que, en el año 2005, la meta de ser propietarios fue desapareciendo del sueño americano. Este tipo de cambio es significativo desde el punto de vista cultural y económico. Cuando, junto con este cambio, se da una inercia en las expectativas de la gente, comenzamos a observar una volatilidad en el mercado de la vivienda. Y si el cambio es lo suficientemente fuerte, observaremos también que la volatilidad puede llegar a afectar la economía nacional.

Debido a que el precio de una casa incluye todos los derechos y recursos relacionados con dicha porción de suelo, las expectativas acerca del mercado y al acceso a futuros derechos y recursos cumplen una función a la hora de determinar el valor de mercado de la casa. El valor de mercado, a su vez, afecta al monto de impuesto que se gravará sobre la propiedad. La relación entre las expectativas del mercado y el impuesto a la propiedad es compleja; no obstante, la investigación que Shiller y yo estamos llevando a cabo arrojará un poco de luz sobre este tema.

Land Lines: ¿Qué piensa usted que ocurrirá en el mercado de la vivienda de los Estados Unidos en el futuro?

Chip Case: Soy moderadamente optimista en cuanto al futuro del mercado de la vivienda. Las cifras parecen indicar que el sector de la vivienda se está estabilizando y está mostrando signos de un crecimiento lento pero positivo. El sector de la vivienda representa solamente cerca del 6 por ciento del PIB del país, pero ha tenido una gran importancia en el pasado. La reactivación de este sector seguramente contribuiría a que la economía se recuperara de los efectos devastadores de la recesión.

David Vetter (Ph.D., Universidad de California) ha trabajado por más de cuatro décadas en temas de financiamiento y economía urbana en América Latina. He ejercido la docencia y dirigido investigaciones urbanas en Brasil durante 17 años en el Instituto Brasileño de Geografía y Estadísticas (IBGE), el Programa de Ingeniería para Graduados (COPPE), el Instituto de Planificación y Estudios Urbanos y Regionales (IPPUR) y la Fundación Getúlio Vargas. En 1990 se incorporó al Banco Mundial, donde desarrolló programas de inversión y reformas subnacionales para Argentina, Brasil, Chile y Ecuador. A fin de fomentar una mayor participación del sector privado en el financiamiento urbano, ingresó en Dexia Credit Local en 1998 en calidad de vicepresidente, y estableció programas de préstamo en Argentina, Brasil y México. Desde su regreso a Brasil en 2004, ha trabajado como consultor e investigador para varios clientes, como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo y el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, donde ha sido visiting fellow desde julio de 2014. Ha escrito recientemente dos artículos para Land Lines: “Residential Wealth Distribution in Rio de Janeiro” (Distribución de la riqueza residencial en Rio de Janeiro, enero de 2014) y “Land-Based Financing for Brazil’s Municipalities” (Financiamiento basado en el suelo para los municipios brasileños, octubre de 2011).

Land Lines: ¿Cómo se involucró en el Instituto Lincoln?

David Vetter: Por muchos años, ya sea en mis trabajos de investigación y consultoría, o en el Banco Mundial o el sector privado, encontré con frecuencia información sólida del Instituto Lincoln que me ayudó. Más recientemente, el Instituto financió mis investigaciones sobre riqueza residencial y finanzas municipales en Brasil.

Land Lines: ¿Qué investigará como visting fellow y por qué?

David Vetter: Me concentraré en estrategias de financiamiento de infraestructura urbana en Brasil. Como otros países latinoamericanos, Brasil necesita realizar inversiones sustanciales en forma continua para poder mantenerse al día con el rápido crecimiento de nuevos hogares y reducir la cantidad de hogares que no tienen acceso a infraestructura urbana. Entre 2000 y 2010, la cantidad de hogares en Brasil creció en más de 12 millones, o sea, casi 7 veces más que los 1,8 millones de hogares del área metropolitana de Boston-Cambridge en 2010. Dada esta presión demográfica, la cantidad absoluta de hogares de Brasil sin acceso a infraestructura urbana siguió siendo alta en 2010, a pesar de las considerables inversiones efectuadas en la década anterior. Y los déficits de algunos tipos de infraestructura en realidad han aumentado. Entre 2000 y 2010, por ejemplo, la cantidad de hogares urbanos en Brasil sin un sistema adecuado de alcantarillado creció aproximadamente en 2 millones, que es más que la cantidad total de unidades de vivienda en el área metropolitana de Boston en 2010.

El Ministerio de las Ciudades de Brasil estimó que los sistemas de sanidad básicos (agua potable, aguas residuales, residuos sólidos, y alcantarillado) costarían más de US$80.000 millones sólo entre 2014 y 2018. Las carreteras, pavimentación de calles, seguridad pública, salud y educación demandan inversiones de similar magnitud, y estos montos frecuentemente exceden con mucho las fuentes de financiamiento existentes.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo se podría recuperar las plusvalías de estas inversiones en infraestructura para poder financiarlas?

David Vetter: Los beneficios de las inversiones en infraestructura se capitalizan en los precios del suelo y los edificios. Los foros del Instituto Lincoln sobre instrumentos notables de intervención urbana de 2013 demostraron que muchos gobiernos de América Latina están utilizando eficazmente una amplia variedad de herramientas de recuperación de las plusvalías creadas por sus inversiones de infraestructura, como puede comprobarse en el minucioso repaso de la bibliografía realizado por Martim O. Smolka (2013): venta de derechos de desarrollo; contribución por mejoras para pavimentación de calles, alcantarillado y otras mejoras; y alianzas público-privadas (APP) de recuperación de plusvalías, como en el caso de la estructuración financiera de la renovación masiva del puerto de Rio (Porto Maravilha). También sería útil contar con una cobranza más efectiva del impuesto sobre la propiedad y de los impuestos de transmisión de propiedades.

La recuperación de plusvalías puede generar una realimentación positiva, creando un círculo virtuoso que genera recursos adicionales para más inversiones. Por ejemplo, el aumento del valor generado por las inversiones aumentaría la base gravable del impuesto sobre la propiedad, suponiendo que las valuaciones se mantengan actualizadas, y los ingresos resultantes se podrían usar para financiar otras obras.

Land Lines: ¿Hasta qué punto podrían las municipalidades de Brasil aumentar la recuperación de plusvalías?

David Vetter: Según la teoría económica, el valor generado por las inversiones de infraestructura debería ser aproximadamente igual a su costo. Como la oferta de infraestructura parecería ser poco elástica, debido a las restricciones de financiamiento público, el valor de mercado generado podría exceder en realidad el costo de las inversiones.

Por ejemplo, las municipalidades de Brasil invirtieron más de US$82.000 millones en infraestructura y equipos entre 2006 y 2010 (alrededor de US$16.000 millones por año). Pero solamente en 2010, el gobierno nacional y los gobiernos estatales invirtieron también más de US$50.000 millones. La recuperación de aunque sea un pequeño porcentaje de las plusvalías creadas podría proporcionar recursos de inversión significativos. Por ejemplo, la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro está recibiendo inversiones de infraestructura masivas del gobierno nacional, estatal y municipal, y también de socios privados, para varios proyectos como el cinturón vial Arco Metropolitano y una nueva línea de metro. Algunas son concesiones o APP que reciben un financiamiento significativo a tasas de interés inferiores a las del mercado por parte de los bancos de desarrollo públicos (BNDES y CAIXA).

Land Lines: ¿Qué papel debería cumplir la recuperación de plusvalías en la política de viviendas?

David Vetter: La inversión en infraestructura crea riqueza residencial, ya que su valor se capitaliza en la venta de viviendas. Las estructuras residenciales representan alrededor de un tercio del capital fijo neto de Brasil en las cuentas de riqueza nacional, como es habitual en otros países del mundo. Dada su importancia, nos preguntamos en nuestro trabajo sobre la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro: ¿Qué genera la riqueza residencial? ¿Cuánta riqueza residencial existe? ¿Quién la tiene? Descubrimos que hay ganadores y perdedores. Por ejemplo, el aumento en el valor generado por la inversión en infraestructura incrementa la riqueza residencial de los propietarios de vivienda, pero también aumenta los precios para los inquilinos en el área beneficiada y los costos de vivienda para personas que se quieren reubicar en esa zona.

Land Lines: ¿Una política de vivienda enfocada a la generación de riqueza residencial y la equidad de su distribución sería muy distinta de la mayoría de los programas de viviendas de bajos ingresos?

David Vetter: Sería bastante distinta. La mayoría de los programas de viviendas de bajos ingresos reduce sus costos construyendo en suelo de bajo valor. El precio del suelo es bajo cuando no tiene acceso a empleo y servicios urbanos básicos, así que las unidades de vivienda social frecuentemente están en estas áreas carentes de servicios. Una política de vivienda enfocada en la riqueza residencial enfatizaría el acceso a empleo y servicios básicos, que son los determinantes clave del valor de una vivienda.

Land Lines: ¿Pero no es esto una utopía? ¿Cómo podríamos recuperar las plusvalías para ayudar a aumentar la riqueza residencial de familias de bajos ingresos?

David Vetter: Sin duda el desafío es grande. Pero la recuperación de plusvalías de familias de mayores ingresos podría subsidiar a las de ingresos menores, sobre todo a los inquilinos que se quieran reubicar en zonas que se benefician de inversiones en infraestructura.

Le voy a dar un ejemplo. La cantidad de hogares en la Región Metropolitana de Rio de Janeiro aumentó en más de 600.000 entre 2000 y 2010 (esto es el doble de la cantidad de hogares en Washington, DC en 2010). Como consecuencia, los déficits de infraestructura urbana de la región siguen siendo altos a pesar de la gran cantidad de inversiones realizadas. Un reciente estudio de impacto del nuevo cinturón vial de Rio de Janeiro (Pontual et al., 2011) exploró la posibilidad de desarrollar nuevos vecindarios completos, socialmente integrados y con todos los servicios de infraestructura, para albergar a la enorme cantidad de hogares que se esperan a lo largo del cinturón. Este desarrollo podría financiarse en parte con la recuperación de las plusvalías generadas por las inversiones masivas en infraestructura planificadas y en proceso de implementación. Parte de las plusvalías recuperadas de familias de mayores ingresos se podría usar para financiar a las familias de menores ingresos.

El estudio de impacto analizó cuál sería la mejor ubicación para estos vecindarios. ¿Qué instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías funcionarían mejor en este caso? Es interesante señalar que el sector privado ya está desarrollando lo que se describen como “barrios verdes” en las regiones aledañas al Río metropolitano. ¿Tiene sentido planificar proyectos de vivienda individuales cuando se va a producir un aumento tan grande en la cantidad de hogares?

Land Lines: ¿Las familias de bajos ingresos estarían en condiciones de pagar por la infraestructura?

David Vetter: En América Latina, los criterios de elegibilidad de programas de recuperación de plusvalías casi siempre incluyen una prueba de capacidad de pago. Por supuesto, la recuperación de plusvalías sólo se debería aplicar a familias que estén en condiciones de pagarla.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo respondería a los profesionales de Brasil dedicados a temas urbanos que argumentan que es imposible recuperar las plusvalías por razones legales o culturales?

David Vetter: Si bien la constitución de Brasil concede amplios poderes para recuperar plusvalías, sólo las municipalidades más grandes, como São Paulo y Rio de Janeiro, parecen usarlos. Otros gobiernos subnacionales y nacionales dedican mucho menos esfuerzo para recuperar las plusvalías de sus considerables inversiones públicas.

Ello probablemente se deba, en parte, a resistencia de aquellos que creen que la recuperación de plusvalía es legalmente imposible. Aun cuando la contribución por mejoras encuentra una resistencia similar, Silva y Pereira (2013) estiman que los ingresos totales por dicho concepto superaron los US$300 millones en las municipalidades de São Paulo, Paraná y Santa Catarina entre 2000 y 2010, a pesar de que relativamente pocas municipalidades utilizaron este instrumento. Esta cantidad no es muy significativa para estados de este tamaño, pero demuestra que las contribuciones por mejoras son viables.

Una de las razones por las que las contribuciones por mejoras fueron exitosas en Paraná y Santa Catarina fue que el Banco Mundial y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo exigieron medidas de recuperación de costos en sus proyectos de desarrollo municipal desde la década de 1980. Este éxito respalda la idea de que los incentivos de un programa nacional o estatal pueden fomentar el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías a nivel municipal.

Además, hay muchos casos de recuperación de plusvalías que pasan desapercibidos. En la ciudad de Rio de Janeiro, por ejemplo, la venta de suelo excedente del sistema de metro existente se usó parcialmente para financiar una nueva línea completa, y los desarrolladores instalan agua corriente y alcantarillado como condición para la aprobación de un proyecto en un vecindario de mayores ingresos, Barra de Tijuca.

Land Lines: ¿De qué manera podrían fomentar el uso de la recuperación de plusvalías los programas gubernamentales nacionales y estatales?

David Vetter: Una de las maneras sería proporcionar acceso a financiamiento como un incentivo para que las municipalidades hagan uso de la recuperación de plusvalías. El banco de desarrollo de Ecuador (Banco del Estado) utiliza este tipo de acceso para alentar a las municipalidades a usar las contribuciones por mejoras. El acceso a financiamiento se podría usar para implementar una gama más amplia de instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, como la venta de derechos de desarrollo y aranceles de impacto, además de las contribuciones por mejoras.

Land Lines: ¿Cómo puede estimular el Instituto Lincoln el financiamiento de infraestructura por medio de la recuperación de plusvalías?

David Vetter: Lincoln ha hecho un trabajo excelente para generar el conocimiento de la recuperación de plusvalías, por medio de investigaciones, foros, programas de capacitación y publicaciones. El Instituto podría ampliar su trabajo sobresaliente en recuperación de plusvalías en la región por medio de más foros y publicaciones, y asesorando en forma directa a los dirigentes políticos en lo que al diseño y ejecución de programas se refiere.

Since first holding democratic elections at the national and provincial levels in 1994, South Africa has undertaken far-reaching constitutional changes. Arguably, the most fundamental transformation is taking place at the local government level, where the divisions created by apartheid were most severe. These changes were set in motion by the Local Government Transition Act of 1993, and during 1994-1995 the formerly racially segregated urban local authorities were amalgamated into a variety of non-racial transitional councils:

• in metropolitan areas, transitional metropolitan councils (TMCs) with constituent transitional metropolitan local councils (TMLCs);
• in secondary cities and towns, transitional local councils (TLCs); and
• in rural areas where no primary municipalities existed in the past, transitional representative councils (TRepCs) or transitional rural councils (TRCs).

In non-metropolitan areas, the former regional services councils were transformed into district councils, thereby retaining a secondary tier of local government in rural areas.

In March 1998 the national government published the White Paper on Local Government, which set out its vision for the future of local government. The White Paper resulted in passage of the Local Government Demarcation Act and the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act. Under the Demarcation Act, the Municipal Demarcation Board was established to assign new boundaries for the different categories of municipal governments throughout the country. The present 843 transitional municipalities are to be severely reorganized after the local elections in November 2000 into 284 newly demarcated municipalities (see Table 1).

Within the six metropolitan areas to be established, single-tier metropolitan municipalities will replace the TMCs and TMLCs. In the non-metropolitan areas 47 district municipalities will replace the present 42 district councils. Each district municipality will consist of two or more (primary-tier) local municipalities to replace the present local and rural councils. A typical future local municipality will consist of a number of neighboring towns and their rural hinterland. In sparsely populated rural areas where the establishment of a local municipality is not viable (designated as district management areas), a district municipality will be the only form of local government.

Municipal Finance Reform

The structural reforms at the local government level also require reform of municipal finances. The government is currently preparing two important pieces of legislation in this regard, the Local Government: Property Rates Bill (dealing exclusively with property taxation) and the Municipal Finance Management Bill.

Section 229 of South Africa’s Constitution guarantees “rates on property” (i.e., the property tax) as an autonomous source of revenue for municipalities. It states that the “power of a municipality to impose rates on property…may be regulated by national legislation.” National framework legislation regarding the property tax is indeed needed for the following reasons:

• Property tax is currently levied in terms of four outdated provincial ordinances retained from the apartheid era (e.g., it is not presently possible to utilize computer-assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) because physical inspections of each rateable property is legally required).
• Property tax is presently levied only by urban municipalities.
• The future amalgamation of urban and rural councils (i.e., the structural changes to date and still to be effected) necessitates change.
• The amalgamation of racially segregated urban municipalities has resulted in a number of constitutional challenges.
• It is the most important own-tax instrument at the local government level, accounting for 19 percent of total local government operating income (Budget Review 2000).

Therefore, the Local Government: Property Rates Bill, currently in its 10th draft, is to be welcomed, at least in principle. It has not yet been published for public comment and may be further amended. However, when this bill is eventually passed into law, it will regulate the levying, assessing and collection of property taxes by municipalities.

Policy Issues in the Property Rates Bill

Diversity of Tax Bases

Urban municipalities generally have a choice between three tax bases, which are spread remarkably evenly throughout the country:

• Site rating (rating land values only) is prevalent in at least three of South Africa’s nine provinces (Gauteng, Northern Province and Mpumalanga);
• Flat rating (rating improved capital values) is dominant in the Western Cape; and
• Composite rating (rating land values and the value of improvements, but at different tax rates) is most commonly used in KwaZulu-Natal.

Earlier drafts of the Property Rates Bill retained this diversity as well as local choice. However, clause 5(1) of the 10th draft of the bill now states that a rate levied on property “must be…an amount in the Rand (South Africa’s currency) determined by the municipality on the improved value of the property.” Although it seems that government has opted for a single tax base (i.e., improved capital value), the bill goes on to provide that a rate levied on the “improved value of property may be composed of separate amounts on the site value of the property and the value of the improvements.” By implication, therefore, composite rating and site rating have been retained (if the amount in the Rand on improvements is set at zero).

Extension of the Tax Base and Possible Exclusions

In principle a municipality may tax “all property in its municipal area,” including areas where the property tax has not been levied before, such as agricultural and tribal land. However, the bill also allows a municipality to exclude a category or categories of property from rating. These excluded properties need not be reflected in the valuation roll.

McCluskey and Franzsen (2000) suggest several reasons why municipalities should include all properties in the valuation roll, and then allow specific exemptions rather than exclusions from the taxing process. First, it can be difficult to justify and defend exclusions constitutionally; second, it is politically easier to phase out an exemption than to introduce a tax on formerly excluded properties; and third, if properties are not valued and thus not reflected in the valuation roll, the extent of the tax base relinquished through exclusions is not known.

“Public infrastructure” is to be excluded from the tax base. This will have significant implications, particularly for municipalities with large tracts of land owned by public utility companies, and may need to be reconsidered in light of privatization. International practice suggests that public utilities should be rated at least on their operational land.

Differentiation and Phasing-in of Rates

Current legislation only provides for rate uniformity throughout a municipal area. However, municipalities sometimes achieve effective differentiation by granting arbitrary rebates to certain properties on the basis of zoning. For example, all improved residential properties in the Pretoria TMLC are presently granted a 35 percent rebate.

The bill provides that different rates may be levied for different categories of property according to use, status or location-a critical point in light of the extension of municipal boundaries into rural areas. For example, it would be possible for a future local municipality (comprising various small towns, commercial farmland and tribal land) to have the following different property categories (and therefore different tax rates):

• residential properties in a formal township in town A (consisting of generally low-value properties);
• residential properties in a formal township in town B (consisting of generally high-value properties);
• residential properties in an informal (squatter) settlement;
• commercial properties;
• industrial properties;
• commercial farmland;
• tribal land.

However, a municipality will have to justify its differential rate schedule in an annually revised rates policy document presented to all taxpayers. Although municipalities may be permitted to treat ratepayers differently, they must justify this action. The bill also allows for the phasing-in of rates over a three-year period with respect to property not subject to property taxation before 1 July 1999 (e.g., tribal land). In certain instances the period may be extended for a further three years.

Tax Rates

The bill (clause 5(2)) states that municipalities may set their own tax rates. However, the Minister for Local Government, in concurrence with the Minister of Finance, may set a limit or rate cap on the amount. Apart from reducing municipalities’ fiscal autonomy, rate caps set nationally may not reflect differences in taxing capacity that exist between municipalities (see Table 2).

An alternative, and more practical, “capping” measure that has been inserted in the 10th draft (clause 5(3)(a)(ii)) is to limit the annual tax rate increases, not unlike one part of Proposition 13 in California.

Extension of Property Tax to Tribal Land

Extending property taxation to tribal land is an area of major political concern and is fraught with practical problems. “Ownership” of tribal land is not uniform, and some tribal authorities are not prepared to accept any form of local government within their area of jurisdiction, let alone any form of taxation of “their” land. Identifying the taxpayer may be problematic. Furthermore, formal ownership of tribal land seldom reflects the complex system of tenure rights of the individuals entitled to the use of that land. Even if it were possible to identify a taxpayer and establish an assessed value for (tribal) “property,” the abject poverty and inability of residents in many tribal areas to pay any tax will have to be considered. In fact, few tribal areas presently receive municipal services that could justify the introduction of a property tax.

Rates Policy

Clause 13 of the bill requires municipalities to adopt a rates policy and then levy rates accordingly. This is a welcome change. The rates policy, which is to be reviewed annually, must explain and justify the provision of exemptions, rebates, reductions and relief for the poor. This policy should significantly enhance the transparency, efficiency and accountability of municipal councils, and perhaps encourage compliance.

Valuation Quality Control

Another welcome aspect in the bill concerns monitoring valuation quality for equity and consistency across the country. However, the bill (clause 64) confers this responsibility on the Minister responsible for local government. McCluskey and Franzsen (2000) suggest that an independent and professional valuation agency, preferably at the national level, should be established for this highly technical task. Such agencies exist in Australia, New Zealand and Canada. In South Africa, this type of agency should perform the following primary tasks:

• provide technical advice to government on valuation issues and the regulation of the valuation services sector;
• set minimum quality standards and specifications necessary to meet government outcomes;
• monitor and audit the valuations submitted by valuation providers (e.g., municipal valuers) against certain minimum standards; and
• certify to municipalities (and through them to ratepayers) that the resulting valuations meet the minimum standards for a fair and consistent property tax system.

The monitoring service could well be expanded to provide valuation advice, expertise and data to municipalities. Such an agency could also undertake valuations of property for other taxes levied at the national level, such as estate and gift taxes.

Conclusion

The Local Government: Property Rates Bill should provide a solid framework for property taxation as South Africa begins to implement its new local government structure. If municipalities adhere to the principles articulated in the bill, a more uniform, equitable and efficient property tax system will play an even more important role in the future.

Riël C.D. Franzsen is professor in the Department of Mercantile Law at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, South Africa. His research on property tax reform in South Africa has been supported in part by the Lincoln Institute.

References

Budget Review 2000: Chapter 7. South Africa Department of Finance. http://www.finance.gov.za/b/budget_00/default.htm

Franzsen, R.C.D. 1999. Property taxation in South Africa. In W.J. McCluskey (ed.) Property Tax: An International Comparative Review. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 337-357.

Local Government: Property Rates Bill. 2000. 10th draft. South Africa Department of Provincial and Local Government.

McCluskey, W.J., and R.C.D. Franzsen. 2000. Some policy issues regarding the Local Government: Property Rates Bill. SA Mercantile Law Journal 12: 209-223.