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Mark Skidmore is professor of economics at Michigan State University, where he holds the Morris Chair in State and Local Government Finance and Policy, with joint appointments in the department of agricultural, food and resource economics and the department of economics. He received his doctorate in economics from the University of Colorado in 1994, and his bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Washington in 1987. He serves as coeditor of the Journal of Urban Affairs.
Professor Skidmore’s research has focused on public economics and urban/regional economics. Current research interests include state and local government tax policy, intergovernmental relations, the interrelationship between public sector decisions and economic activity, and the economics of natural disasters. His work has been funded by the Fulbright Program, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, the National Science Foundation, the Urban Institute, and USAID.
His articles have appeared in journals such as Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics, and the Southern Economic Journal. His research also has been cited in prominent news outlets such as the BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times, and PBS News Hour.
Land Lines: This year, you are a Visiting Fellow at the Lincoln Institute. What issues are you working on?
Mark Skidmore: About two years ago, my colleague Gary Sands and I were invited by City of Detroit Councilman Kenneth Cockrel to evaluate Detroit’s ailing property tax environment. Councilman Cockrel wondered what gains might result if Detroit were to shift to a land-based tax. We were given access to detailed data for more than 400,000 property parcels within the city, in order to conduct an evaluation, and we are grateful for the Institute’s support to pursue that project. Our report identified significant erosion of the property tax base and explored options for expanding the base, including a shift to a land-based tax. Our evaluation showed that a land-based tax would serve to broaden the tax base but also would produce substantial shifts in the tax burdens of residential, commercial, and industrial property owners.
In 2013, Detroit’s fiscal challenges came to a head when Governor Rick Snyder appointed an emergency financial manager who subsequently set in motion a filing for bankruptcy. On December 3, 2013, Judge Rhodes ruled that the City of Detroit is eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. Despite the near-complete collapse of the real estate market within the city during the Great Recession, the property tax remains an important revenue source, and its administration can help or hinder economic and fiscal recovery. This year, I plan to use the parcel-level data set to examine important issues such as tax delinquency, the over-assessment of property, the value of vacant land, and policies related to transfer of property ownership from the private sector to the public sector due to tax foreclosure, and transfers back to the private sector.
Land Lines: What are some of the underlying factors behind Detroit’s current problems?
Mark Skidmore: About 48 percent of Detroit property owners are delinquent on their tax bills, a fact that reflects the erosion of the social contract between citizens and the city. This extraordinarily high delinquency rate is the result of a confluence of factors. First, the city has failed to enforce tax compliance, particularly for low-valued properties. Second, many citizens perceive the tax to be unfair because of the over-assessment of their property. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests citizens are not paying taxes because local authorities are failing to provide basic public services such as street lighting, snow plowing, and public safety.
One key cause of the high delinquency rate is the over-assessment of property for tax purposes. The real estate crisis hit Detroit particularly hard. In 2010, the average selling price of a residential parcel with a structure was less than $10,000, yet the average assessed value of such properties for tax purposes was $54,000. According to state guidelines, the ratio of assessed value to sales price should be close to one. In September 2013, city officials announced that over the next three to five years all properties within the city would be reassessed.
Second, Detroit has a history of tearing down dilapidated tax-foreclosed structures. As a result, it is one of the few large cities in the United States with frequent sales of vacant land. The value of vacant land is often difficult to ascertain in highly urbanized areas, but accurate valuations are essential if one wants to impose a land tax or a two-tier tax on land and structures. The large number of sales transactions of vacant land in Detroit provides an opportunity to estimate land value. Interestingly, the average value of an unimproved parcel in 2010 based on sales data was $34,000—much higher than the average price of residential parcels with structures, which, as mentioned, was less than $10,000.
The city government now owns and manages more than 25 percent of the city’s land area, and public ownership continues to grow because tax foreclosures have outpaced the transfer of publicly owned parcels back into private hands. Some of the questions I am investigating are: What are the appropriate policies in a market-oriented society for managing low-valued urban land transactions? Why is the delinquency rate so high, and what can be done to improve property tax compliance in the context of a nearly collapsed urban real estate market? What role does the perception of “unfair” assessments play in tax delinquency?
Land Lines: What is the long-term prognosis for Detroit?
Mark Skidmore: The city’s fiscal challenges are a symptom of deep underlying issues. Whether one considers the redevelopment of a declining urban area or reconstruction in the wake of a major natural disaster, the most important elements in any recovery are human capital and social/cultural attributes. If one accepts the premise that they are essential building blocks for redevelopment, and if these elements are lacking, then a top priority is to consider policies and actions that can develop them. In 2011, the high school graduation rate in Detroit was 62 percent. The percentage of households headed by a single parent was 62 percent. By some measures, the functional literacy rate among adults is just 53 percent. It is difficult to build a dynamic and robust urban economy upon such a weak foundation.
Clearly, policy makers must address the immediate fiscal challenges, but the longer-term prognosis for Detroit will depend on actions aimed at improving the underlying economic base—human and social capital. Without addressing these deep challenges, Detroit will continue to flounder. There is no quick fix. In order for Detroit to have a chance to prosper once again, Michigan needs to make a long-term commitment to improving these underlying conditions.
Land Lines: Is Detroit a harbinger for other U.S. cities?
Mark Skidmore: Yes and no. A number of other local governments face significant fiscal challenges—Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland, and Providence, to name a few. Underfunded retiree compensation promises are often cited as a major issue. Yet, many of these cities stand a reasonable chance of re-emerging and potentially prospering in the not-too-distant future because they suffer from acute crises brought on by the recession, but not necessarily from chronic fiscal challenges. However, cities with chronic challenges due to significant deficits in social and human capital can look to Detroit as an indicator of their future. My hope is that state and local policy makers from around the country can learn from the Detroit experience and begin making the necessary long-term investments in their most important asset—people, particularly children— so they can avoid the chronic economic and fiscal challenges seen in Detroit.
Land Lines: How does the Detroit project fit into your larger research agenda?
Mark Skidmore: Much of my research has addressed the interrelationship between public decision making and economic activity. Over the years, I have examined issues such as the effectiveness of tax increment finance, the implications of imposing impact fees to cover the infrastructure costs associated with development, and the effects on development of property taxation, tax abatements, and other subsidies. I have also considered other public finance issues such as state lotteries, sales taxes, and income taxation. I am particularly interested in the spatial-dynamic-competitive relationships between adjacent and overlying taxing jurisdictions.
Land Lines: Much of your research has focused on government policy and finance in the United States. What other work have you done internationally?
Mark Skidmore: In recent years, I have partnered with my MSU colleagues on a USAID-funded grant in Mali. My role has been to consider how Mali’s recently decentralized governmental system can be utilized more effectively in food security and land use management. Climate change is affecting Mali in very tangible ways—as the land in the north has become more arid, there has been significant migration to areas in the south, which has better access to water. This migration is resulting in increased violence due to ineffective land tenure and property rights. Now that democratic rule has been re-established, we are again working with our Malian partners to develop systems that involve local authorities in managing food security, land access, property rights, and land-related conflicts. Interestingly, the issue of what to do with all the publicly owned land in Detroit has informed our work in Mali, and vice versa.
I also have ongoing research in the economics of natural disasters. One of my recently published articles (with coauthor Hideki Toya) used thousands of disaster events from all over the world to show that countries with more decentralized governmental systems have significantly fewer disaster-induced fatalities. Our research provides evidence that decentralized governments provide essential services more effectively than more centralized systems.
A third recently completed project shows that societal trust tends to increase in countries in the years following climatic disasters. The relationship we observe is robust, and we hypothesize that such disasters require and provide opportunities for people to work across social classes to address their challenges, thus building trust and social capital. While natural disasters can have devastating human and economic impacts, a potential spillover benefit of greater disaster exposure may be a more tightly knit society.
Land Lines: How does your research reflect the interests and values of the Lincoln Institute?
Mark Skidmore: The Lincoln Institute is recognized worldwide as a leading organization concerning the use, regulation, and taxation of land—property taxation, tax abatements, economic development policies, decentralized fiscal systems—and all of these are topics of my research. Over the years, the Institute has supported my work on Wisconsin tax increment finance, Michigan local government fiscal stress, and my ongoing evaluation of the Detroit property tax environment. The U.S. system of national and largely autonomous subnational governments provides fertile ground for researchers to study and learn about which policy “experiments” lead to better, or worse, outcomes. I really love doing this work and am thankful to have the Institute as a partner.
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As part of its ongoing education program in Latin America, the Lincoln Institute, with the Porto Alegre (Brazil) City Council, organized the “International Seminar on Property Taxation” in April 2001, to discuss equity and efficiency in property tax administration. More than 200 delegates came from 12 countries, 14 Brazilian states and 45 local authorities. Internationally recognized experts and public officials in government, academia, public finance and taxation represented such institutions as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Property Tax Institute (IPTI), the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO), the Brazilian Association of Secretariats of Finance of Capitals (ABRASF) and the Brazilian School of Fiscal Administration (ESAF). This article draws on the issues and experiences discussed at that seminar.
As in the United States, there is an ongoing debate in Latin America over the replacement of the property tax with alternative revenue sources, such as fees and charges, that might be easier to administer, less influenced by political factors and more efficient. Nevertheless, the property tax remains the predominant option for raising revenue to finance public services at the local government level in Latin America.
An important characteristic of the property tax is the great diversity found in its administration. For example, the property tax is a purely local tax in Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, but it is administered at the province level of government in Argentina. In Mexico, the role of the local authorities has been reduced to primarily tax collection. In Chile, the property tax is an important revenue source for local governments, although the central government is responsible for administering the cadastral, assessment and collection systems. El Salvador is the only country in Central America that has never introduced the property tax, although currently there is strong pressure for establishing new taxes, since tax revenue represents only about 11 percent of GDP.
Insights on Property Tax Administration
In general the property tax is recognized as a ‘good tax’; its role is essential in the process of recovering revenue, funding public services and promoting social development. The unique nature of the property tax provides important links among wealth and income, social development, and land use and occupation. However, the property tax must be administered fairly to avoid inefficiency and inequity in the distribution of the tax burden. Concerns mentioned in several seminar sessions included the need for an adequate cadastre, as complete as possible in terms of coverage and containing basic attributes needed for assessing different types of properties. One discussion group recommended integrating the community in the continual process of updating cadastral data. Others emphasized the need for performing a careful cost and benefit analysis before implementing geographic information systems.
In countries where the cadastre is not administered by the central government, there is no standard model or system. Depending on the development level of the municipality and/or financial resources available, the cadastre technology can vary enormously from a simple list of properties to a cadastre based on a geographic information system with multiple purposes. Diverse valuation approaches are also observed: self-assessment is used in Colombia and Bolivia, whereas the cost approach is commonly used in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico. Some local authorities in Brazil are engaged in a movement to use the sales comparison approach for residential property. In applying the cost approach, the land value is determined using the sales comparison approach. Although based on market information, the land value is also estimated in different ways, causing concerns over how to reduce assessment inequities.
Valuation is primarily a technical task that requires assessment uniformity and short valuation cycles, and should not be used for political purposes. Capping systems, which limit tax increases between consecutive periods for each individual property up to an overall adjustment based on annual inflation rates, are seen as a major source of assessment inequity. Transparency in the valuation results is considered fundamental for guaranteeing the taxpayers’ confidence in and acceptability of the tax system. Other basic premises include fiscal accountability, fairness, democratization of information, and translation of technical language into a form that is understandable to community members and leaders. Furthermore, community members should take part in making decisions on public revenue collection and expenditures.
A recent development of interest in this regard is the increasing use of Internet facilities by taxpayers to receive and pay tax bills, review statistical data on their property and update cadastral information. Chile is considered the benchmark in Latin America in the use of these technologies.
Experiences with Fiscal Reform
Several seminar presenters shared their experiences with property tax reform and revisions, which often include investments in cadastral systems. For instance, the improvement in the collection performance of the property tax in Colombia increased as a percentage of GDP from 0.22 percent in 1970 to 0.91 percent in 1994. This improvement was attributed in part to legislation that demanded the implementation and updating of the cadastre throughout the country. The strong pressure against updating assessed values, as well as administrative difficulties in undertaking valuations, resulted in the establishment of a self-assessment procedure. Taxpayers are now responsible for declaring the assessed value of their properties, but the value cannot be less than the recorded cadastral value. To reduce underassessment, the assessed value is also used as the basis for expropriation.
Fiscal reform initiatives in Argentina during the 1990s were strongly motivated by financial crises in the public sector. The reform project relating to the property tax was divided into two main areas, cadastres and fiscal administration. The equivalent of over US$ 120 million has been invested in these reforms, yet the project has been completed in only about 50 percent of the jurisdictions. In another example, Mexicali, the capital city of Baja California, pioneered the adoption of land value as the property tax base in the 1990s. Although this was a successful experience with property tax reform, current challenges in Mexico include achieving fiscal balance between public expenditure and revenue raised and recovering the importance of the property tax as a revenue source.
Property Taxation in Brazil
Political, legal and practical obstacles have contributed to the continuation of inequities and inefficiencies in the property tax in Brazil. Frequently there is no common interpretation of tax regulations among major branches of government (the judiciary, legislature and executive), creating a pervasive lack of confidence in the tax system. Primary concerns in property tax administration include incomplete and out-of-date cadastres, resulting in irreplaceable losses in revenue; poor assessment practices that generate a low degree of uniformity; the strong influence of historical assessed values, because valuation is infrequent and approval of a new valuation list in the Chamber of Councilors is often difficult; and low performance in tax collection.
The validity and feasibility of adopting progressive (sliding) rates for the property tax, was largely used adopted in Brazil during the 1990s, was reexamined. The basic idea had been to establish progressive rates according to classes of assessed value and to insert an element of ability-to-pay into the system, simultaneously making high-value properties pay more proportionally and alleviating the tax burden on low-value properties. In 1996, the Supreme Court declared the use of progressive rates for the property tax unconstitutional. However, a recent constitutional amendment authorized progressivity in the property tax rates based on the value of properties, as well as different rates based on property location.
Arguments expressed in the seminar against the application of progressive rates for the property tax were based on the principle of keeping the tax simple, and concerns about the measure’s effectiveness. Arguments in favor of progressivity included the concentration of income disparities in Brazil and the fact that the poor are likely to spend more proportionally in housing expenditures than are the wealthy. The majority of seminar participants believed that the progressive rates might promote a fairer distribution of the tax burden. However, progressivity should be gradual; that is, a higher rate should be applied only over the part of property value that exceeds the limit established in each class of assessed value, to avoid a large difference in tax burden for properties with values slightly above and below the boundaries of each class.
At the national level in Brazil, inefficient use of the property tax as a revenue source is widely recognized. Revenue from property taxes represents less than 0.4 percent of GDP. Indeed, the tax actually collected is only symbolic in many parts of the country. A recent survey of municipalities investigated several aspects of local government performance, including tax evasion. In only 13 percent of the municipalities was the tax evasion rate less than 20 percent. In one out of five municipalities, the revenue collected represented less than 20 percent of the properties included in the cadastre.
Table 1 demonstrates the relative importance of property tax revenue in Brazil, according to the size of the municipality. Small municipalities are financed largely by transfers from other government levels and larger municipalities are more dependent on the property tax as a revenue source. However, the performance of property tax administration depends directly on political will, which varies enormously among cities. For instance, due to an extensive updating of its cadastre, the city of Santana de Parnaíba, with 60,000 inhabitants in the State of São Paulo, collects approximately R$ 212.00 per inhabitant, while the average revenue collected from property tax for cities of its size (10,000 to 100,000 population) is R$ 10.04 per inhabitant. That performance is even better than in São Paulo, the capital of the state, which collects less than R$ 80.00 per inhabitant. Similarly, a participatory approach involving local community and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) allows critical issues of property tax assessment and administration to be discussed, resulting in actions to improve the system. In the city of Ribeirão Pires, for example, measures that increased revenue by 40 percent included an ample review of the property tax legislation that allowed the adoption of better assessment practices, new property tax rates and more efficient procedures for tax collection. Furthermore, the tax reform has contributed to increasing the local government’s popularity.
Case Study of Porto Alegre
Inspired by the April seminar and previous research and analysis, the local government of Porto Alegre has prepared a proposal for a property tax reform aimed at increasing fiscal equity, enhancing the importance of the property tax as a revenue source, and creating more efficient administration of the tax. The project was presented on September 28 to the City Council, the entity in charge of either approving or rejecting the measures, which must be decided before the end of 2001.
A multidisciplinary team worked actively on the project, composed of local authority members, such as valuers, property tax experts, and urban and environmental planners, as well as a group of statisticians and information technology experts from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. The measures being proposed have been discussed thoroughly with representatives of public associations, community leaders, the media and, of course, city councilors (See Table 2).
Conclusion
The participation of several hundred delegates at the seminar is evidence of the importance of property taxes in their countries. Although there is still an ample need for improving the overall performance of property tax systems, the debate demonstrated progress in the way the tax is administered and perceived in many parts of the region. Several independent experiences made it clear that political will is the principal element for explaining differences in the performance of property taxes in Latin America. Recent technological advances, now accessible to any country, have been able to provide better solutions in data management, valuation and assessment. Challenges are gradually moving from the technical to the political sphere. More than ever learning how to implement tax reforms and revisions is essential for pursuing more effective property tax systems. A trend toward using a participatory approach when undertaking such revisions is also evident, since public acceptance is likely to facilitate the reform process.
Claudia M. De Cesare is a property tax advisor to the Secretariat of Finance for the municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil. She also conducts research and teaches courses on valuation and property taxation at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and the Lincoln Institute. She is a member of the advisory board of the International Property Tax Institute (IPTI) and is active in other professional organizations.
Sidebar: Latin America Network On Property Taxation
The Lincoln Institute has recently formed informational networks of scholars and policy makers focused on several key issues in land and tax policy in Latin America. Led by Martim Smolka, senior fellow and director of the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, the first meeting of the property taxation network took place in conjunction with the seminar in Porto Alegre in April 2001. Network rpresentatives came from Argentine (Hector Serravalle), Brazil (Claudia M. De Cesare, Cintia E. Fernandes, Mauro Lunardi and Sol G. Pinto), Chile (Carlos Acuña), Colombia (Maria Camila Uribe and Claudia Puentes), Ecuador (Mario R. Maldonado), El Salvador (Roberto Cañas) and Mexico (Sergio Flores).
The network’s mission is to pursue more effective property tax systems in Latin America and to reinforce the role of the property tax as an alternative for local government revenue. The network will promote professional development, identify relevant themes for comparative research and educational programs, and disseminate information and experiences. The members of the network have prioritized the following projects:
Although isolated initiatives at national or state levels have improved cadastral systems, valuation procedures and communication skills in some countries, the network members agree there is still great potential for improving efficiency and equity in current tax systems. The members also wanted more accessible information and better communication on property tax issues in Latin America. Innovative experiences and lessons like those cited in the following article can be shared within the group. Future educational programs may be a source of inspiration for other municipalities, like Porto Alegre, facing challenges in property tax administration.
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The introduction of a market-oriented economic policy in Estonia after independence in 1991 set the stage for a plethora of reforms to restore property rights and establish a price system for goods, labor, capital and land. Land and ownership reforms had two goals: the restoration to former owners of land “unlawfully expropriated” during the Soviet regime, and the treatment of land as a valuable and scarce economic resource. As one might expect, these tasks have not been easy to accomplish, and frequent revisions in the laws and methods governing restitution and valuations have been made.
Historical Overview
Despite the far-reaching reforms taking place in Estonia today, the transformation of land ownership and the patterns of land use still reflect 55 years of history, including wars, occupation and annexation. In the first of three working papers I analyze the impact of these historical developments on land use, population structure and farm wealth in pre-Soviet Estonia. Prior to annexation to the Soviet Union in 1940, Estonia had a flourishing farm sector. Land was used mostly for agriculture, with the majority of the population residing in rural communes or municipalities.
Research also shows that a market for land was well established and reflected site specific characteristics. A distinguishing feature of this market was the coexistence of a sale-purchase price determined by the forces of supply and demand and other prices reflecting the “social” character of land use. For example, land acquisition for use by landless farmers (communal land) had a much lower price than the market price. This feature, although it may have served a social purpose, impacted the value of land for compensating former owners.
Another significant finding relates to the taxation of farms in pre-Soviet Estonia. Land and improvements on land (fixed assets) were subject to taxation, although the effective rate of taxation was quite small. This tax was a local tax with the receipts allocated to local government budgets.
Land Reform
The second paper provides a framework for the analysis of valuation formulae used by the Estonian Land and Tax Boards for the valuation of land for tax purposes. It includes a brief overview of the current land stock and land use, a discussion of land and ownership reforms, including valuation laws and methods, and a statistical analysis of the valuation model used by the Land Board.
Estonia’s experience with privatizing its economy is without a doubt at the forefront of liberalization efforts undertaken by the new independent states. The transformation of collective rights to land into individual rights took place in Estonia by means of legislation. First, the new Constitution in 1992 restored to citizens the rights of ownership of productive assets, including land, and property and land reform laws established a system for the restitution of land to former owners. Second, principles for establishing land value for compensation and privatization were spelled out by the valuation law(s).
A land market, especially for urban land, is likely to develop quickly, offering the Land Board useful information for adjusting their valuation models. Once a sufficient number of observations on land transactions becomes available, a hedonic price model or present value model can be developed to provide information on the marginal valuation of each land attribute, as well as the significance of other land characteristics not included in the current model. Using the Estonia Base Map, the spatial aspect of land and other amenities (GIS variables) may be incorporated in the model to yield good estimates of the marginal product of land in both urban and rural municipalities.
Given that land value is used as a tax base, it is incumbent upon public sector officials to assess it fairly and accurately. A land tax yield hinges on the size and distribution of the base. If the tax model neglects this, revenue will suffer and land use will be suboptimal. Economies in transition can ill afford this road.
Land Taxation and Tax Reform
The third paper integrates the two aspects of land reform, valuation and taxation, beginning with an historical overview of land taxation in Estonia leading up to the current (1995) land tax. It addresses the assignment of tax sources between the state and local governments, and the significance of land taxation as a revenue source for local governments. The paper also offers a statistical model for estimating land tax revenues based on the Estonian Land Board valuation maps, the land cadastre and tax rates selected by local municipalities and then contrasts the estimates with actual data obtained from the Estonian National Tax Board.
After independence in 1991, the Estonian government introduced a new tax system that replaced the Soviet system, and the state budget was completely “decoupled” from the USSR’s All-Union budget. On May 10, 1993, the Estonian parliament passed the Law on Land Tax as part of a reform agenda dealing with budgetary reform in general and land reform in particular. The path followed by Estonia is similar to that prescribed by the World Bank for many former Soviet republics. Guided by “western” principles of taxation, the Estonian tax system was designed to achieve efficiency in resource use as well as to meet national and local budgetary needs.
The land tax is one of several revenue sources collected from people and enterprises in Estonia. Although the land tax was established as a state tax with shared revenues between the state and local governments, it was quickly designated as a local tax with its proceeds dedicated for local budgets. Estonia also recognizes the efficiency of a special tax on land value, even though at the time of this study it accounted for only seven percent of local revenues.
Several conclusions emerge from this part of the study. First, a tax on land offers special efficiency benefits, although its implementation needs to be considered carefully. Second, for land to be a viable tax source serious attempts should be made to enhance the efficiency of financial and insurance markets, especially in rural areas. Third, land valuation should reflect two elements: the value of present attributes and the value of these attributes in the future, because a parcel of land valued at the best use of these attributes today may not capture their full value in the future.
Finally and perhaps most importantly for economies in transition, valuation and taxation of land should be viewed in the context of a “learning curve.” With the progress of the economy in general and land markets in particular, land taxation should be strengthened through annual valuation to enhance the tax capacity of municipal governments and to encourage the optimal development of land use over time.
Attiat F. Ott is professor of economics and director of the Institute for Economic Studies at Clark University in Worcester, MA. This article is adapted from three new working papers resulting from research supported by the Lincoln Institute.
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Property taxes based on market value have many features that recommend them as a source of local government revenue. They promote visibility and accountability in public spending by providing property owners with a means of evaluating the costs and benefits of local government services. They can provide stable, independent local revenue that is not at the mercy of state budget surpluses or deficits. They are now considered to be proportional or even mildly progressive, in contrast to earlier economic views that presumed the tax to be regressive.
Against these strengths, the greatest challenge to a value-based property tax is political: taxpayers’ strong and completely understandable resistance to sharp increases in tax payments that reflect rising markets but not necessarily rising incomes with which to pay the tax increases. The best known and most dramatic response to this situation was rejection of the value-based tax system in California in 1978. When voters approved Proposition 13, they changed the tax base to the value of the property at the time of purchase or construction, with a maximum 2 percent annual inflation adjustment. For property held by the same owner since 1978, the inflation adjustment is applied to its value on the 1975–1976 tax roll.
This change has greatly altered California’s fiscal landscape. It has restricted the role of local governments, centralized service provision and decision making, and redistributed the tax burden from long-time residents to new property owners. Local governments now have an incentive to seek sales tax revenue by encouraging large retail establishments, such as auto malls, in what has been termed the “fiscalization of land use.” Can the property tax achieve greater stability and predictability without such drastic social and governmental costs? Table 1 illustrates the wide range of residential property tax levies in large metropolitan areas, a factor that presents additional challenges to formulating uniform policies or practical recommendations.
A Lincoln Institute seminar in April 2005 brought together public finance and assessment officials, policy analysts and scholars to consider alternate approaches to the recurrent problems that volatile real estate markets pose for value-based property taxes.
Problems Related to Market-Value Assessment
Discussion began with the incontrovertible observation, “Taxpayers do not like unpredictability.” In theory, reductions in tax rates could balance increases in property prices to maintain stability in actual tax payments under market-value assessments. This approach faces two obstacles. The first and most straightforward is governmental reluctance to reduce tax rates and forego increased revenues when rising values provide a cover for greater tax collection. The second is nonuniform price appreciation in different locations and for different types of property. When one segment of the tax base experiences a disproportionate value change, a corresponding change in the tax rate applied to the entire property class will not maintain level tax collections. California faced both difficulties in the years preceding adoption of Proposition 13. There, rapid residential appreciation was not matched by the lagging commercial sector, and a $7.1 billion state surplus fueled taxpayer cynicism as to the actual need for increased government revenues.
While rapid market shifts are the most challenging source of unpredictable tax changes, taxpayer “shocks” can also be caused simply by long delays in reassessment. Maintaining outdated values on the tax rolls achieves short-term predictability in tax bills, but at the expense of uniformity, accuracy and even legality. Long-postponed reassessments have been followed by tax revolts in many jurisdictions, both in this country and overseas.
Options for Addressing Value Shifts
Seminar participants reviewed the benefits and drawbacks of various measures to address these problems.
Circuit breakers, as their name implies, attempt to reduce a property tax “overload” by providing a refund or credit for taxes that exceed a set percentage of the property owner’s income. When funded by the state and administered as part of the state tax system, they have the dual benefit of protecting local revenue and targeting aid to the most needy taxpayers. At the same time, they require state funding and administration, and taxpayers must file tax returns to order to obtain these benefits. Like all programs that require income information, they sometimes encounter taxpayer resistance and consequent underutilization.
Homestead exemptions, available in most states, reduce assessments on the taxpayer’s primary residence. These exemptions are often granted without regard to taxpayer income, and so are not targeted to the most needy. In predominantly residential communities, this results in a significant loss of municipal revenues unless the tax rate is increased or the tax burden is shifted to other taxpayers. Like all preferential programs for homeowners, these exemptions fail to benefit renters, who bear a portion of the property tax burden and generally are less affluent than homeowners.
Tax deferral measures, often available to low-income elderly homeowners, permit unpaid taxes to accumulate as a lien against the property, to be paid after the residence changes hands. However, the desire to retain property clear of encumbrances has traditionally led homeowners to avoid making use of this option.
“Truth in taxation” legislation requires local governments to take various measures, such as publishing voter information and requesting ballot approval, to treat increases in tax collections in the same manner whether they are the result of growth in the tax base or increases in the tax rate. These enactments seek to counter the temptation to allow rates to remain constant while market values rise, thus increasing taxes and spending without budgetary accountability.
Limitations on annual total property tax collection increases, such as Proposition 2½ in Massachusetts, restrict overall levy growth but do not address unpredictable tax bill changes for specific taxpayers. For example, after several decades of tax stability, Boston taxpayers are now facing assessment shifts that reflect a downturn in the commercial property market with simultaneous explosive growth in certain residential values.
Limitations on annual tax increases for individual properties have enormous political appeal, but face three hazards. First, there is often pressure to make the phase-in period as long as possible, or even longer than possible. Montana provided for an extended 50-year phase-in of new assessments. Second, initial success at limiting increases to a certain percentage may lead to efforts to reduce that limit again. Oklahoma instituted a 5 percent limit and now faces pressure to reduce it to 3 percent. Finally, the “catch-up” of tax assessments when values stabilize or even drop elicits opposition of its own as taxpayers face increasing assessments while property values are flat or falling.
Assessment “freezes” take limitations on increases to their ultimate conclusion, prohibiting any increases despite changes in market values. They often are restricted to specific groups of taxpayers, such as elderly homeowners. Proposition 13 is a type of assessment freeze for all property, with only a 2 percent annual inflation adjustment in the tax base. These measures are in many respects equivalent to the long delays in reassessments that lead to nonuniformity and resistance to new valuations. After values are frozen taxpayers may seek to transfer that value to other family members, as they do in California, or to new residences, as in Texas.
Possible New Approaches
Seminar participants discussed methods for utilizing these and other measures to address the problems of unpredictability while minimizing the problems of inequitable distribution of the tax burden and maintenance of collections. A major distinction was drawn between approaches that moderate tax bill shifts but maintain a market-value base and those that alter assessments themselves. Altering assessments by limiting increases in value can result in situations where owners of similar properties pay very different tax bills. Furthermore, over time properties with average or lesser value appreciation can experience an increasingly greater share of taxes compared with properties that have had larger market increases. As a result wealthier taxpayers are more likely than those of moderate or low incomes to benefit from assessment limits.
To maintain a market-value tax base, with its benefits of uniformity, understandability and administrative efficiency, participants offered suggestions to stabilize rapid increases in tax payments due to significant shifts in the assessment base.
Even significant increases in assessed value, if relatively uniform across the jurisdiction, do not result in increased taxes for most property owners if the municipal budget requires no additional property tax revenues and the tax rate is reduced proportionately. Better information about the relationship between assessed value and the tax rate will make it less likely that taxpayers will place the blame for their higher taxes on the assessors and their assessments. They may consider instead the adequacy of funding sources available to local governments, the effect of exemptions that reduce the property tax base, and unfunded mandates that require additional local expenditures.
The property tax, as the most important source of autonomous local revenue, often bears the brunt of criticism for the social, economic and fiscal pressures on local communities. Among these pressures are increased costs of new educational, environmental and security requirements, reductions in state and federal assistance, changing demographics and economic conditions, and increasing numbers of exemptions. Attention to these issues can clarify the debate over the role and burden of property taxes and the effectiveness of various tax relief measures.
Improving Educational Resources
There is an urgent need to provide government officials, lawmakers and the public with better information on property tax policy choices. Tax revolts and anti-tax initiatives make compelling news stories, but they should be balanced by concise and accessible information that sheds light on the problem and its solution. There is also a need for periodic research on such topics as:
The Institute will be collaborating with the seminar participants and others in continuing these discussions and will undertake further research and the preparation of publications on these property tax issues in the coming year.
Joan Youngman is senior fellow at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, where she chairs the Department of Valuation and Taxation. Her writings include Legal Issues in Property Valuation and Taxation (1994), and two books co-edited with Jane Malme, An International Survey of Taxes on Land and Buildings (1994) and The Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition (2001). She is a contributing author on the property taxation chapter of Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein’s State and Local Taxation (7th ed. 2001), and writes on property taxation for State Tax Notes.
Jane Malme, fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is an attorney, author and consultant on property tax policy, law and administration in the U.S. and internationally. She directed the Massachusetts Department of Revenue’s Bureau of Local Assessment as it implemented major property tax reforms from 1978 to 1990.
The Lincoln Institute seminar on Property Taxes and Market Values—Responding to Post-Proposition 13 Challenges in April 2005 included participants from many states, including California, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York and Oklahoma. The discussion leader was Alan Dornfest, property tax policy supervisor in the Idaho State Tax Commission.
The Institute will continue this discussion at the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) Annual Conference in Anchorage, Alaska, in September. Jane Malme will moderate a policy seminar on Property Tax Viability in Volatile Markets with speakers Alan Dornfest; Mark Haveman, director of development for the Minnesota Taxpayers Association and project director for its Center for Public Finance Research; and Andrew Reschovsky, professor of public affairs at the University of Wisconsin’s LaFollette School of Public Affairs.
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More than 50 years ago, a slowly unfolding but fundamental process began to transform property taxation in the United States. Because this process took place at the state and local, not federal, levels of government, and because the almost universal adoption of preferential assessment spanned several decades, most citizens are unaware that owners of rural parcels often enjoy such treatment of their properties. As a result, millions of acres of rural land are now assessed far below fair market value for purposes of local property taxation.
These modifications of the property tax began in Maryland in 1957, when the General Assembly enacted an agricultural use assessment law. This statute provides that farm fields and pastures can be assessed below market value as long as they are being “actively used” for agricultural purposes. As evidence of active agricultural use, an owner can document that the property had generated $2,500 or more of annual gross revenue from the sale of agricultural products during recent years.
Several factors prompted dozens of state governments to emulate Maryland and enact use value assessment (UVA) programs during the 1960s and 1970s. First was the massive expansion of U.S. metropolitan regions after World War II, which led to the conversion of tens of millions of acres of farm, ranch, forest, and other rural lands to residential and other nonagricultural uses. Alig et al. (2003) estimate that the nation’s developed area more than doubled between 1960 and 1997, from 25.5 to 65.5 million acres. Rapid urbanization of rural land had come earlier to Maryland than other states because its populations in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties, near the fast-growing nation’s capital in Washington, DC, quadrupled from 1940 to 1960.
Second, agricultural land on the fringe of metropolitan regions escalated in price during the postwar decades because of its development potential, causing some farmers to face escalating property tax bills because of higher land value assessments. From 1950 to 1971, for example, there was a 330 percent increase in the ratio of farmland prices to net farm income in Maryland (Gloudemans 1974). A study of the two-state, seven-county Kansas City region in the early 1960s found that the proportion of gross farm income absorbed by the property tax in the most urbanized county was four times greater than in the metropolitan region as a whole (Blase and Staub 1971). Hence, adoption of preferential assessment of rural land was often justified as a policy measure to protect family farmers and ranchers from financial stress or even ruin.
A third and more subtle reason for the adoption of UVA programs reflects how the property tax had been administered in many states before 1957. Until that moment in U.S. history, county and municipal assessors had frequently given de facto tax preferences to farmers despite state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation. These informal assessment practices were intended to provide property tax relief to “deserving citizens,” but often resulted in dramatic differences in assessment ratios among taxable properties within the same community.
The expansion of state aid programs for local governments after World War II exposed some of these discrepancies. Property wealth per resident or pupil often played a major role in determining the formulas used to allocate state grants. Thus, pressure mounted at the state level for uniform local assessment practices to ensure an equitable distribution of state grants. The elimination of de facto tax preferences that had been granted by tax assessors to farmers and ranchers within their communities fueled efforts to gain de jure tax preferences for rural land via state statutes or constitutional amendments.
California was one of the early adopters of use value assessment of rural land. In 1965, its legislature passed the California Land Conservation Act, commonly known as the Williamson Act. The goals of this statute are to preserve agricultural land in order to ensure adequate food supply, to discourage premature conversion of farmland to urban uses, and to preserve agricultural properties for their open-space amenity values.
The Williamson Act enables counties and cities to offer preferential assessment of agricultural land to an owner in return for a contract barring land development for a minimum of ten years. After the first decade of the contract, an automatic extension continues every year unless the owner files a notice of contract nonrenewal. If such a notice is filed, the property’s assessment rises annually until it reaches fair market value and the contract finally terminates after nine years.
Diversity and Extent of Use Value Assessment Programs
With little fanfare in the national media, preferential assessment of rural land has become a central feature of local property taxation across the United States. In California, for example, over 16.5 million acres of agricultural land were subject to Williamson Act contracts in 2008–2009. According to the California Department of Conservation, Williamson Act properties comprised nearly one-third of the state’s privately owned land at the beginning of 2009.
More than 16 million acres of Ohio farmland had been enrolled in that state’s current agricultural use value (CAUV) program by 2007. On average, those acres had been lightly assessed at only 14.2 percent of market value. In December 2011 the Ohio House of Representatives voted unanimously to expand the state’s CAUV program to include land used for biomass and biodiesel energy production.
In New Hampshire, 2.95 million acres were enrolled in the state’s current use assessment program in 2010. These preferentially assessed parcels comprised over 51 percent of the Granite State’s total land area. Since agriculture plays a minor role in the New Hampshire economy, over 90 percent of this undeveloped acreage consisted of forests and wetlands, not farm fields and pastures.
Because economic, political, and legal circumstances vary substantially among the 50 states, it is not surprising that state governments have adopted diverse UVA programs. By 1977, eleven states had implemented programs in which eligible parcels enjoyed automatic enrollment. In another 38 states these programs required owners to file applications for preferential assessment. Nearly all states offered assessments below market value to agricultural land, but only 21 states extended preferential assessment to timberlands and forests.
From a land conservation perspective, the most important difference among the states is that 15 do not collect a penalty if a landowner converts his property to an unqualified use (figure 1). Another seven states levy a percent payback penalty on development of enrolled land parcels. That is, the owner has to pay the state or town a percentage of the parcel’s market value during the year of property development.
Far more common is the rollback penalty, a development deterrent that requires the landowner to pay the difference between property taxes actually paid during recent years of use value assessment and the taxes that would have been paid during those years with market-value assessment (plus accrued interest on that difference in some cases). Twenty-six states utilize this form of development penalty. Economic research has demonstrated that failure to levy a development penalty severely weakens the capacity of a UVA program to delay development of rural land at the edge of metropolitan regions (England and Mohr 2006).
The practice of use value assessment sometimes creates political tension within a community and can even damage the legitimacy of property taxation as a local revenue source. In November 2011, a Wisconsin TV station reported that owners of vacant lots in an upscale residential subdivision had harvested weeds from their parcels and successfully applied for agricultural assessment of their house lots pending construction. This allegation led at least one state representative to call for legislative hearings about abuses of the state’s use value assessment program. According to Rep. Louis Molepske, “It should upset every Wisconsinite because they are being duped by those who… [want] to shift their property taxes to everybody else, unfairly” (Polcyn 2011).
Saving Family Farmers and Rural Landscapes
Have UVA programs “saved the family farmer” as some proponents had originally predicted? Not exactly. During the 1980s, the U.S. farm population fell dramatically by 31.2 percent. From 1991 to 2007, the number of small commercial farms continued its decline, from 1.08 million to 802,000. During that same time period, very large farms (with at least $1 million of gross cash income) increased their share of national farm production from nearly 28 percent to almost 47 percent (USDA Economic Research Service n.d.).
If preferential assessment of rural land has not prevented the decline of family farming, has it slowed the rate of land development in rural America? The evidence on this question is positive, but modestly so. A study of land use change in New Jersey from its adoption of use value assessment in 1964 to 1990 found that the program had a very modest impact on the rate of conversion of agricultural land to urban uses (Parks and Quimio 1996). After her 1998 study of nearly 3,000 counties across the U.S., Morris (1998) concluded that, on average, UVA programs resulted in roughly 10 percent more of the land in a county being retained in farming after 20 years of program operation. After their detailed study of land use changes in Louisiana, Polyakov and Zhang (2008) concluded that an additional 162,000 acres of farmland would have been developed during the five years after 1992 if there had been no UVA program in the state. It seems, then, that UVA programs have slowed down metropolitan sprawl somewhat during recent decades.
Shifting the Tax Burden to One’s Neighbors
Although slowing the rate of land development is an environmental and public benefit of UVA programs, it entails a social cost. When the properties of farmers, ranchers, and forest owners are assessed far below market value, local governments collect fewer property tax receipts unless they raise the tax rate that is levied on all taxable properties. If they raise their property tax rates to maintain public expenditure levels, rural towns and counties increase the tax bills of non-UVA owners, primarily homeowners.
This potentially regressive impact of UVA programs has been known for decades. In its 1976 report on preferential assessment of farms and open space, the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (1976, 6–8) stated clearly that these state programs result in tax expenditures of significant magnitude that redistribute income among taxpayers:
“All differential assessment laws . . . [entail] ‘tax expenditures,’ by means of which the tax bills of some taxpayers are reduced. . . . In most cases, the cost of this reduction is spread over all the other taxpayers. . . . The effect of a tax expenditure is precisely the same as if the taxpayers who receive the benefit were to pay taxes at the same rate as other, non-preferred taxpayers, and then were to receive a simultaneous grant . . . in the amount of the tax benefit.”
The magnitude of this tax shift among property owners can be quite substantial. Anderson and Griffing (2000) report estimates of the tax expenditures in two Nebraska counties associated with the state’s UVA program. The average tax expenditure is approximately 36 percent of revenue in Lancaster County and 75 percent of revenue in Sarpy County.
Dunford and Marousek (1981) have studied the impact of the 1970 Open Space Tax Act (OSTA) in Washington State on the distribution of the property tax burden in Spokane County. Eight years after enactment of the OSTA program, roughly 444,000 acres in Spokane County had been enrolled—about 40 percent of the county’s total land area.
The authors calculate that the revenue-neutral increase in property taxes paid by nonparticipating properties to offset the tax cuts enjoyed by owners of enrolled parcels would equal 1.3 percent. Hidden within this countywide average, however, are huge differences among communities. Although the tax shift to nonparticipating properties would be 1–2 percent in many localities, it would range as high as 21.9 percent in one community. The implication of this and other studies is that granting preferential assessment to rural landowners might help to delay development of their properties, but it might also impose a fiscal burden on homeowners as well as owners of commercial and industrial properties.
Reform of Use Value Assessment Programs
Because many states have had nearly half a century of experience with their UVA programs, this is a good time for state legislatures and tax departments to pause and ask whether this feature of their state and local tax system should be reformed or not. The shift in property tax burden caused by UVA programs in many communities can be justified only if this tax preference serves the broader public interest. The case for reform seems stronger when one realizes that 94 percent of farm households have a net worth greater than the median for all U.S. households.
After the severe downturn in residential and commercial real estate markets in 2008–2010, the rate of conversion of rural land to urban uses slowed in many states, at least for the moment. It might be easier for communities to consider and adopt reforms of UVA programs during this period when many owners of rural land do not expect to sell to real estate developers in the near future. After an extensive review of the research literature on state UVA programs, I recommend the following set of reforms (England 2011).
Those states that do not yet levy a penalty when land is removed from their UVA programs should do so. Unless the owner of rural land faces a penalty at the moment of development, he or she will simply collect the property tax saving offered by the UVA program until the market price of developed land is attractive enough. On the other hand, enactment of a high penalty per acre that declines with years of enrollment in the program could induce the owner of rural land to defer development for years. During those years, land trusts and state agencies have an opportunity to place conservation easements on those rural parcels that deserve permanent protection from development. In an era when few owners of rural land are poor working farmers, UVA programs should help to protect rural landscapes and conserve ecosystem services, not subsidize wealthy landowners.
States should also reconsider three categories of rural land that are eligible for use value assessment. (1) Farm and ranch land should not be enrolled automatically, as is the practice in some states. Rather, landowners should be required to document substantial net income from the sale of agricultural commodities during the previous tax year. This would prevent the owner of idle land that is about to be developed from receiving a property tax break. (2) Agricultural parcels should not be eligible for use value assessment if subdivision plans have already been filed or if the parcels have been rezoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use. If there is substantial evidence that a landowner will soon develop a parcel, there is no reason to continue the UVA tax preference. (3) Forest, wetland, and other nonagricultural parcels should be eligible for use value assessment if they generate public goods such as flood protection, wildlife habitats, and scenic views. On the other hand, barren land with great development potential on the fringe of a metropolitan region should be assessed at market value if it does not produce ecosystem services that benefit society at large.
States should carefully review the income capitalization methods they employ to estimate the agricultural use value of rural properties. The guidelines for estimating the net income of agricultural land and for selecting the discount rate that capitalizes that income stream should be based on sound economic principles and should be presented to taxpayers in a transparent fashion. Because income capitalization calculations are so sensitive to choice of discount rate, that choice needs to be justified and should not be ad hoc. In principle, the risk-free rate of discount needs to be adjusted for inflation, default risk, maturity risk, and liquidity constraints.
State governments should acknowledge that, although their UVA programs generate environmental benefits for the general public, they also impose fiscal burdens on those localities in which private owners of rural land enjoy preferential assessment. For example, California enacted its Open Space Subvention Act in 1972 to mitigate the impact of the Williamson Act on local government budgets by providing state grants to partially replace foregone local property tax revenues. From 1972 through 2008, those subvention payments from Sacramento to the cities and counties totaled $839 million. (Subvention payments were suspended during 2009, however, because of the state’s mammoth budget deficit.)
Since preferential assessment of rural land has become such a central feature of property taxation in the United States, governors and state legislatures need to pause and consider whether these types of reforms would improve the performance of and increase popular support for their UVA programs.
About the Author
Richard W. England is a professor of economics and natural resources at the University of New Hampshire. He is also a visiting fellow with the Department of Valuation and Taxation at the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
References
Alig, Ralph J., Andrew J. Plantinga, SoEun Ahn, and Jeffrey D. Kline. 2003. Land use changes involving forestry in the United States: 1952 to 1997, with projections to 2050. Technical Report. Portland, OR: U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station.
Anderson, John E., and Marlon F. Griffing. 2000. Measuring use-value assessment tax expenditures. Assessment Journal (January/February): 35–47.
Blase, Melvin G., and William J. Staub. 1971. Real property taxes in the rural-urban fringe. Land Economics (May): 168–174.
Council on Environmental Quality. 1976. Untaxing open space: An evaluation of the effectiveness of differential assessment of farms and open space. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Dunford, Richard W., and Douglas C. Marousek. 1981. Sub-county property tax shifts attributable to use-value assessments on farmland. Land Economics (May): 221–229.
England, Richard W. 2002. Current-use property assessment and land development: A theoretical and empirical review of development penalties. State Tax Notes, 16 December: 795.
———. 2011. Preferential assessment of rural land in the United States: A literature review and reform proposals. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
England, Richard W., and Robert D. Mohr. 2006. Land development and current use assessment. In Economics and contemporary land use policy: Development and conservation at the rural-urban fringe, ed. S.K. Swallow and R.J. Johnston. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Gloudemans, Robert J. 1974. Use-value farmland assessments: Theory, practice, and impact. Chicago: International Association of Assessing Officials.
Morris, Adele C. 1998. Property tax treatment of farmland: Does tax relief delay land development? In Local government tax and land use policies in the United States, ed. Helen F. Ladd, 144–167. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Parks, Peter J., and Wilma Rose H. Quimio. 1996. Preserving agricultural land with farmland assessment: New Jersey as a case study. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review (April): 22–27.
Polcyn, Bryan. Lawmaker calls for hearing after farmland tax loophole exposed. WITI–TV, Twin Lakes, Wisconsin, 22 November 2011.
Polyakov, Maksym, and Daowei Zhang. 2008. Property tax policy and land-use change. Land Economics (August): 396–408.
USDA Economic Research Service. n.d. Washington, DC. U.S. Department of Agriculture. http://www.ers.usda.gov
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Más que cualquier otra variable, el cambio en los valores del suelo a través del tiempo y del espacio brinda una perspectiva importante sobre la evolución de la estructura espacial de una ciudad. Mientras que la venta normal de una propiedad refleja el valor combinado del suelo y los edificios, el valor del suelo solo representa el valor real de una ubicación y sugiere expectativas sobre su futuro. Incluso si una parcela soporta la carga de un edificio anticuado, el precio del suelo refleja el valor actual descontado del flujo de retorno a la inversión que se podría obtener con un uso más intenso y óptimo de la parcela. El aumento rápido del precio del suelo en un área de la ciudad es una indicación clara de que la gente espera una alta demanda en el barrio durante un período de tiempo, lo cual es señal de oportunidades de inversión para los emprendedores inmobiliarios. Los cambios en el valor del suelo también pueden advertir a funcionarios municipales que es necesario efectuar cambios de zonificación e inversiones de infraestructura en una determinada área.
El valor del suelo es también un componente importante en el método de valuación de propiedades por costo, que es uno de los tres métodos utilizados comúnmente (junto con la comparación de ventas y el nivel de ingreso). El método de costo tiene tres componentes principales: (1) el costo de edificar la infraestructura existente como si fuera nueva en el momento de la tasación; (2) la depreciación del edificio a su condición actual; y (3) el precio de la parcela de suelo. Si se suma (1) a (3) y se resta (2), en general se obtiene una buena estimación del valor total de la propiedad. En las transacciones estándar de propiedades, sin embargo, no se pueden separar fácilmente el valor del suelo del valor de las estructuras. Las ventas de suelo vacante, que pueden indicar con mayor claridad el valor de un sitio, son relativamente raras en áreas urbanas grandes y edificadas, y por lo tanto hay pocos estudios existentes de ventas de suelo vacante (ver Ahlfeldt y Wendland 2011; Atack y Margo 1998; Colwell y Munneke 1997; Cunningham 2006). A veces se pueden usar las demoliciones para medir los valores del suelo, ya que cuando el edificio existente se demuele inmediatamente después de una venta, el suelo representa el valor total de la propiedad (McMillen 2006; Dye y McMillen 2007). No obstante, las demoliciones se tienden a concentrar en ciertos barrios de alto valor, y puede ser difícil obtener datos sobre demoliciones.
De todas las ciudades de los EE.UU., Chicago tiene la fortuna de contar con una fuente de datos, el Libro azul de valores del suelo de Chicago (Land Values Blue Book of Chicago) de Olcott, que reporta las estimaciones de los valores del suelo por cada manzana de la ciudad y por manzanas de muchos suburbios del condado de Cook durante la mayor parte del siglo XX. Olcott proporciona datos críticos para el procedimiento de tasación por costo. Después de determinar el costo y depreciación del edificio, el valor total de una propiedad se puede estimar multiplicando el tamaño de la parcela por el valor del suelo proporcionado en la serie del Libro azul. Este artículo se basa en un muestreo de datos de los volúmenes de Olcott (recuadro 1). Incluye una serie de mapas que proporcionan una imagen clara de la evolución espacial de Chicago durante el siglo XX, similar en espíritu al libro clásico Cien años de valores del suelo en Chicago (One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago) (Hoyt 1933).
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Recuadro 1: Fuentes de datos para los valores del suelo en Chicago
El Libro azul de valores del suelo de Chicago (Land Values Blue Book of Chicago) cubre la ciudad y gran parte del condado suburbano de Cook con una serie de 300 mapas, cada uno impreso en una página del libro. A la ciudad propiamente dicha se le dedican 160 mapas individuales con un impresionante nivel de detalle. La mayoría de lotes que dan a la calle tienen un valor que representa el precio por pie cuadrado para un lote estándar de 125 pies de profundidad. También se indica el uso dado al suelo. Los lotes grandes y la mayoría de los suelos industriales tienen precios cotizados por acre (0,4 hectárea), u ocasionalmente por pie cuadrado (0,98 m2, para una profundidad de lote sin especificar. Los datos representan los valores del suelo para cuadrículas de 1/8 x 1/8 de milla (alrededor de 200 x 200 metros), que siguen de cerca la disposición de las calles de Chicago y por lo tanto se asemejan a manzanas urbanas. El conjunto de datos de cada año incluye 43.324 observaciones para toda la ciudad.
El Lincoln Institute of Land Policy ha proporcionado financiamiento para digitalizar los datos contenidos en el Libro azul de Olcott para una serie de años que cubre gran parte del siglo XX: 1913, 1926, 1932, 1939, 1949, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1981 y 1990. Se presenta una descripción más minuciosa del procedimiento en Ahlfeldt et al. (2011). La digitalización de mapas consiste en incorporarlos a un entorno SIG. Se calculan los valores promedio del suelo para cuadrados de 1/8 x 1/8 de milla (alrededor de 200 x 200 metros) superpuestos sobre los mapas. El conjunto completo de datos tiene más de 600.000 puntos para cada uno de los 10 años.
El libro de Olcott se dejó de publicar a comienzos de la década de 1990, y el último año de datos digitalizados es 1990. Para suplementar los registros de Olcott en años recientes, los autores obtuvieron datos de todas las ventas de suelo vacante en la ciudad entre 1980 y 2011. Se geocodificaron exitosamente más de 16.000 ventas, las cuales demuestran el enorme aumento en los precios del suelo durante el período anterior al colapso del mercado inmobiliario al final de 2006. Estos conjuntos combinados de datos brindan una oportunidad única para analizar el cambio de estructura espacial de una ciudad completa durante un período de tiempo prolongado.
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Variación espacial en los valores del suelo
A pesar de su terreno plano, Chicago nunca fue una ciudad verdaderamente monocéntrica. El lago Michigan ha sido siempre una atracción, dado su valor panorámico, su efecto de moderación climática y la serie de parques que lo bordean. El río Chicago también ha tenido una influencia significativa sobre la ubicación de comercios y residencias. El desarrollo al norte del Distrito Comercial Central (Central Business District, o CBD) se demoró porque los puentes sobre el brazo principal del río se tenían que abrir con tanta frecuencia para dejar pasar el tráfico fluvial que el viaje a la zona comercial del Loop (bucle del tren elevado) era impredecible y largo. Los brazos norte y sur del río atrajeron tanto compañías industriales como desarrollos residenciales de bajo precio para los obreros, al tiempo que repelían las viviendas de alto precio diseñadas para los trabajadores del CBD. La ubicación de las calles principales, carreteras y líneas ferroviarias también tuvo un efecto significativo sobre los patrones de desarrollo. Por tanto, existen muchas razones para esperar una variación en la tasa de cambio en los valores del suelo a través de la ciudad.
Los mapas de la figura 1 (página 20) muestran esta variación espacial en los valores del suelo en Chicago a lo largo del tiempo. En 1913, los valores del suelo eran mayores en la gran zona que rodeaba el CBD y también eran bastante altos a lo largo del lago y algunas de las avenidas principales y bulevares que irradiaban de la zona céntrica. En 1939, este patrón era generalmente similar, junto con el crecimiento del lado norte en relación al lado sur de la ciudad. Los valores del suelo eran muy altos a lo largo de la ribera norte del lago, extendiéndose bien hacia adentro en la zona norte. El área del borde de la ciudad al oeste del CBD (el barrio de Austin) también tenía valores del suelo relativamente altos en 1939.
Para 1965, el patrón de valores del suelo había cambiado notablemente. Los valores del suelo muy altos estaban confinados a un área relativamente pequeña del CBD. El área de valor alto del barrio occidental de Austin era mucho más pequeña en 1965 que en 1939, y casi todas las áreas que anteriormente tenían un valor alto habían disminuido de tamaño.
Hacia 1990, sin embargo, la situación había cambiado drásticamente. El área con valores muy altos se extendía mucho más al norte y hacia adentro que antes. Las áreas del lado sur tenían valores del suelo relativamente altos en 1990, particularmente en la parte sur del Loop (cerca del CBD) y Hyde Park (a lo largo del lago Michigan, al sur del CBD).
Después de 1990, el patrón de revitalización continua de la ciudad se basa en un análisis de las ventas actuales de suelo vacante. La expansión del área de alto valor hacia el norte y el oeste del CBD es notable, y el lado sur cercano también gozó de un resurgimiento durante este tiempo.
La figura 2 (página 21) muestra cómo la reciente recesión afectó el crecimiento de los valores del suelo en Chicago cuando se lo expresa en función de la distancia del CBD. Las gráficas muestran el cambio en el valor promedio (logarítmico) del suelo a lo largo del tiempo para circunferencias con centroides a 2, 5, y 10 millas (3,2, 8 y 16 kilómetros) del CBD. En 1913, los valores promedio del suelo eran mucho menores a 10 millas (16 km) del CBD que en los anillos más cercanos al mismo. En la década de 1960, en contraste, había poca diferencia en los valores del suelo a estas distancias. Desde entonces, los valores promedio crecieron mucho más en el anillo a 2 millas (3,2 km) que en ubicaciones más distantes. Durante la Gran Recesión, los valores del suelo disminuyeron rápidamente en el anillo de 2 (3,2 km) millas, menos rápidamente en el anillo de 5 millas (8 km), y no disminuyeron en absoluto en el anillo de 10 millas (16 km). Por lo tanto, las áreas que tuvieron las mayores tasas de apreciación durante el período de crecimiento extendido también tuvieron las mayores tasas de depreciación durante la recesión.
La figura 3 ofrece una perspectiva distinta de la variación espacial de los valores del suelo a lo largo del tiempo. Los tres paneles muestran superficies promediadas de valores del suelo en 1913, 1990 y 2005. Las superficies de 1913 y 1990 se estimaron con los datos de Olcott, mientras que las estimaciones de 2005 se basan en ventas de suelo vacante. En cada uno de los tres años, los valores del suelo son mucho más altos en el CBD que en cualquier otro lado. En 1913, hay una gran cantidad de picos locales de valores del suelo en las intersecciones de las calles principales. Estas zonas eran distritos comerciales relativamente pequeños que atendían a los residentes locales antes de que el uso del automóvil se hiciera habitual. En 1990, el pico de valor del suelo en el CBD está acompañado por una meseta mucho más baja justo al norte, a lo largo de la ribera del lago. En 2005, esta meseta se había ampliado a un área grande que se extiende muy hacia el norte y hacia adentro de la ribera del lago. La región de altos valores del suelo también se ha extendido al sur a lo largo del lago, con un aumento local mucho más al sur en Hyde Park.
Persistencia de patrones espaciales
Los valores históricos del suelo son interesantes no sólo porque revelan cómo un área urbana ha cambiado con el tiempo, sino también porque el pasado sigue ejerciendo una influencia sustancial sobre el presente. Las ciudades no se reconstruyen a partir de cero en cada período. Los edificios están en pie mucho tiempo antes de ser demolidos, y los sitios que eran atractivos en el pasado tienden a ser deseables por mucho tiempo. Una de las características únicas del conjunto de datos de Olcott es que nos permite comparar valores del suelo de 100 años atrás con valores y usos del suelo en la actualidad.
La figura 4 (página 24) muestra la fecha promedio de construcción de los cuadrados de 1/8 x 1/8 de milla (alrededor de 200 x 200 metros). Se puede observar la reciente recentralización de Chicago en la forma de “rosquillas” de las edades de los edificios en torno al CBD. Los edificios más nuevos están cerca del CBD, mientras que los más viejos están en el siguiente anillo externo. Los edificios en la región más distante son los que tienen mayor probabilidad de haber sido construidos entre 1940 y 1970.
La figura 5 (página 24) resume esta relación comparando la media de la fecha de construcción con la distancia al CBD. Los edificios más viejos están en un anillo a solo 5 millas (8 km) del CBD.
Una buena medida de la densidad estructural es la relación entre el área edificada y el tamaño del lote. La teoría económica predice que las densidades estructurales serán altas en lugares donde los valores del suelo son altos. Las estructuras duran un tiempo largo. ¿Qué tan bien pueden los valores pasados predecir la densidad estructural actual? La figura 6 (página 24) compara la densidad estructural de los edificios en los padrones de tasación del condado de Cook en 2003 con los valores del suelo en 1913 y 1990. Este conjunto de datos incluye el área construida de cada estructura residencial pequeña (seis unidades o menos) en Chicago.
La altura de las barras indica las densidades estructurales: Las barras altas tienen relaciones relativamente altas de área construida por tamaño del lote. El color de las barras indica los valores del suelo: Las barras rojas tienen valores relativamente altos del suelo. Por lo tanto, deberíamos esperar una gran cantidad de barras rojas altas y barras verdes bajas. En general, los dos paneles indican una correlación positiva entre densidad estructural y valores del suelo. La correlación es particularmente evidente en el lado norte y en la ribera del lago. La correlación con 1990 es menos clara en los lados sur y oeste. Hay varias elevaciones en la superficie de densidad que no tienen una contraparte de valores altos del suelo. Una explicación de estos resultados, que coinciden con la reorientación de áreas de precios altos hacia el lado norte, es que las densidades relativamente altas en estas áreas son manifestaciones de un pasado en el que estas manzanas eran relativamente más valiosas y había un mayor incentivo para usar el suelo de manera más intensiva. El panel de 1913 de la figura 6 sugiere que los valores del suelo tienen en realidad mayor correlación con las densidades de edificios en 2003 que los valores de 1990. La causa de esta aparente anomalía se debe a que la densidad de edificios es un reflejo de las condiciones económicas en el momento de su construcción, y la mayoría de los edificios en esa parte de la ciudad fueron construidos hace mucho tiempo. El pasado sigue ejerciendo una influencia importante sobre el presente.
Conclusión
Los datos de Olcott proporcionan una imagen clara de los cambios en la estructura espacial de Chicago durante la mayor parte del siglo XX. Chicago, que nunca fue una ciudad monocéntrica, comenzó el siglo con valores del suelo muy altos en el CBD, a lo largo del lago y junto a las avenidas y bulevares principales que irradiaban del centro. Los valores también fueron altos en áreas de comercios minoristas ubicadas en las intersecciones de las calles principales. Para 1939, el lado norte de Chicago ya había comenzado a mostrar su hegemonía económica. Después, en la década de 1960, la ciudad sufrió un largo período de decadencia en el cual el CBD era la única concentración importante de valores altos del suelo. Desde entonces, la ciudad ha experimentado un resurgimiento notable. Los valores altos del suelo ya se extienden a casi todo el lado norte, y han repuntado en partes del lado sur. Nuestro análisis también muestra el importante papel del pasado en la estructura espacial actual de la ciudad. Una consecuencia de esta persistencia es que los valores del suelo de hace un siglo predicen mejor la densidad del inventario de viviendas actual que los valores presentes.
Agradecimientos
Los autores agradecen al Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelos su generoso financiamiento y su apoyo. Asimismo agradecen al Centro de Estudios Metropolitanos de TU-Berlin por alojar al equipo de investigadores durante el proyecto. Quieren dar las gracias a Kristoffer Moeller and Sevrin Weights por su importante contribución en el diseño y coordinación de la recopilación del conjunto de datos. Philip Boos, Aline Delatte, Nuria-Maria Hoyer Sepulvedra, Devika Kakkar, Rene Kreichauf, Maike Rackwitz, Lea Siebert, Stefan Tornack y Tzvetelina Tzvetkova brindaron una ayuda inestimable en investigación.
Sobre los autores
Gabriel M. Ahlveldt es profesor asociado de la Escuela de Economía y Ciencias Políticas de Londres (LSE) en el Departamento de Geografía y Medio Ambiente, y del Centro de Investigaciones Económicas Espaciales (SERC).
Daniel P. McMillen es profesor del Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Illinois en Urbana-Champaign.
Recursos
Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M., Kristoffer Moeller, Sevrin Waights y Nicolai Wendland. 2011. “One Hundred Years of Land Value: Data Documentation.” Centre for Metropolitan Studies, TU Berlin.
Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. y Nicolai Wendland. 2011. “Fifty Years of Urban Accessibility: The Impact of the Urban Railway Network on the Land Gradient in Berlin 1890–1936.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 41: 77–88.
Atack, J.y R. A. Margo. 1998. “Location, Location, Location! The Price Gradient for Vacant Urban Land: New York, 1835 to 1900.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics 16(2) 151–172.
Colwell, Peter F. y Henry J. Munneke. 1997. “The Structure of Urban Land Prices.” Journal of Urban Economics 41: 321–336.
Cunningham, Christopher R. 2006. “House Price Uncertainty, Timing of Development, and Vacant Land Prices: Evidence for Real Options in Seattle.” Journal of Urban Economics 59: 1–31.
Dye, Richard F.y Daniel P. McMillen. 2007. “Teardowns and Land Values in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.” Journal of Urban Economics 61: 45–64.
Hoyt, Homer. 1933. One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McMillen, Daniel P. 2006. “Teardowns: Costs, Benefits, and Public Policy.” Land Lines, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 18(3): 2–7.
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Thomas J. Nechyba is professor of economics at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, where he also serves as director of undergraduate studies for the Department of Economics. In addition, he is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and he serves as associate editor for the American Economic Review and the Journal of Public Economic Theory. His research and teaching focus on the field of public economics, in particular primary and secondary education, federalism and the function of local governments, and public policy issues relating to disadvantaged families.
Professor Nechyba has lectured and taught in courses at the Lincoln Institute for several years, and he recently completed a working paper based on Institute-supported research, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” This conversation with Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, explores his interest in land taxation and his research findings.
Joan Youngman: How is a land tax different from a conventional property tax?
Thomas Nechyba: It’s really a question of tax efficiency. Any tax has two effects, which economists call the income and substitution effects. The income effect of a tax is the change in the choices made by the taxpayer because payment of the tax has reduced the taxpayer’s real income. The substitution effect arises because the very existence of the tax changes the relative prices of the taxed goods, and therefore gives an incentive to taxpayers to substitute non-taxed goods for taxed goods. The income effect does not give rise to any efficiency problems; it simply implies that some resources are transferred from taxpayers to the government, and we hope the government will do something useful with the money. But, the change in behavior from the substitution effect causes an economic distortion that does not benefit anyone. That is, when the higher price of a taxed good causes me to substitute to a different non-taxed good purely because of the distorted prices, then I am worse off and the government gets no revenue. This is the source of the loss of economic efficiency from taxation, because people are worse off than they were previously, and by a larger amount than the tax collections themselves. This phenomenon is sometimes called a deadweight loss.
Once I asked my students to react to the following statement on an exam: “People hate taxes because of income effects, but economists hate taxes because of substitution effects.” One student wrote that it was undeniably true because it showed that economists aren’t people! Well, I think at least some economists are also people. However, it is true that people dislike taxes primarily because they don’t like paying money to the government. Economists especially dislike those taxes that cause greater deadweight losses, i.e., taxes that have greater substitution effects.
A land tax is a very unusual tax. It does not carry this deadweight loss because it does not give rise to a substitution effect. No one can make a decision to produce more land or less land, and the fact that land is taxed will not distort economic decisions. If we think of the price of land as the discounted present value of future land rents, a tax that reduces expected future rents will cause the price of land to drop. But the total cost of the land, which is the purchase price plus the tax, remains unchanged. Those who are considering the purchase of land therefore face the same cost before and after the tax: before the tax, they simply pay a single price up front; after the tax, they pay a lower price up front but they know they will also have to pay all the future taxes. There is no substitution effect, only an income effect for those who currently own land, because now they can sell it for less than before. Property taxes that tax both land and buildings, on the other hand, do give rise to substitution effects because they distort the cost of making improvements to the property.
A revenue-neutral shift to land value taxation would reduce other, distortionary taxes. A shift to a more efficient tax can improve economic welfare without a loss in tax collections. This much is well known. What is not well known is the magnitude of this benefit and of the cost to landowners in terms of lower land prices. Conventional wisdom predicts that a shift to an efficient land tax would increase income and output but reduce land prices. This kind of general statement isn’t much help to policy makers. If one is suggesting major changes in a tax system, policy makers need to know whether the benefits and the costs are going to be large or small. My recent Lincoln Institute working paper, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform,” constructs a model of state economies in the U.S. to help us think about the effects of such changes.
JY: How did you become interested in developing an economic model for land taxation?
TN: A few years ago, Dick Netzer, professor of economics and public administration at New York University, suggested that I look at the implications for the U.S. economy of replacing capital taxes with land value taxes. Most economists know of the Henry George Theorem and recognize that land taxation is efficient, but they associate his ideas with nineteenth-century economic thought. We assume that all the changes in the economy since then, and changes in the economic role of land, have left these ideas inapplicable to contemporary tax systems. So I was quite surprised that my model indicated that substituting a land value tax for capital taxes on a national level would not only be efficient, as expected, but would actually raise the value of many types of land. However, property taxes are state and local taxes, and the U.S. constitution places special impediments to a national property tax, so a land tax would not be possible on a national level. Further, since each state economy is different, the results of substituting land value taxes for other taxes will also vary from state to state.
JY: How can a tax on land increase land prices?
TN: In and of itself, a tax on land does not increase land prices; it actually reduces land prices, because it reduces the discounted present value of land rents. My research does not consider a land value tax in isolation, but as part of a revenue-neutral tax reform that replaces other, distortionary taxes with a land value tax. Lower taxes on capital will increase capital usage, and more intensive use of capital will raise land prices. For example, if constructing a building becomes more profitable because the tax on the building is lowered or eliminated, an investor may be willing to pay a higher price for its components, including the land.
JY: How did you go about estimating the magnitude of these effects?
TN: I developed a general equilibrium model of an economy that uses land, man-made capital and labor in production. A general equilibrium model is one that examines how changes in one kind of market affect all other markets. This model is then applied to different states, as well as to one hypothetical “average” state, to see how various tax reforms that substitute land value taxes for taxes on capital or labor would affect prices and production. The division of capital into land and man-made capital is a departure from standard analysis, which generally looks at capital as a single category.
One critical element is the elasticity of substitution among these factors; that is, the ease with which one can be substituted for another. Technically, it is the percentage change in one factor that results from a 1 percent change in the other. This is the key to efficiency gains from reducing the tax on man-made capital and on labor and increasing the tax on land. A lower tax on man-made capital will increase the use of that capital, which in turn will produce greater output and more hiring of labor. The easier it is to substitute man-made capital and labor for land, the greater the benefit from a switch to land value taxation.
JY: Where do the elasticity numbers come from?
TN: I use a range of estimates drawn from the economic literature. For example, most studies of the substitution between capital and land give elasticity estimates between 0.36 and 1.13. My paper uses the relatively conservative estimates of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25 as high, medium and low values, and looks at the result under each assumption. This number is then adjusted to reflect the amount of land in the state devoted to farming, on the assumption that farmland is less easily substituted for capital in the production process. I also ask similar questions with regard to substitution between land and labor.
The elasticities of the actual supplies of man-made capital and labor are also crucial. If taxes on them are reduced, how much extra capital and labor will be available as a result of the increased after-tax return? Often in studies of this sort we make what is called a “small open economy assumption.” We assume that the economy we are looking at is small in relation to the rest of the world, and that capital and labor flow freely into and out of the jurisdiction. In that case, the elasticity of supply is infinite. The opposite extreme would be an economy with the equivalent of closed borders, where no capital could enter or leave. In that case the elasticity of supply would be zero. In looking at U.S. states, the small open economy assumption is not completely accurate, and zero elasticity is not accurate either. The right number is somewhere in between. Neither capital nor labor is as mobile internationally as within the U.S., and labor in particular is less mobile across state boundaries than within a state or a small region. The small open economy assumption may be appropriate in some circumstances for smaller states, but we have to introduce more complex assumptions in other cases.
JY: How does your model compute taxes on land and labor and man-made capital? This isn’t a standard classification of taxes.
TN: This is complicated, because it involves payroll taxes, federal and state corporate taxes, federal and state income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and so on. So the model looks at all these taxes and makes assumptions about who is paying them to estimate an overall tax rate on labor from all sources—federal, state and local. Similarly, the model estimates an overall tax rate on land and on man-made capital. This allows us to move from an illustrative example in which taxes on labor and capital are replaced by land value taxes to considering changes in real-world taxes, which of course are never based solely on labor or capital.
JY: How do you represent the shift in taxes from labor and man-made capital to land?
TN: This is a hypothetical policy experiment in the model. Suppose, for example, you wanted to eliminate all sales taxes in a revenue-neutral way, making up the lost collections through a land value tax. Sales taxes are the average state’s largest revenue source, so this shift would be quite ambitious. The model shows what would happen under various elasticities of substitution and elasticities of supply, as described above. The tables in the paper show what land tax would be necessary to maintain revenue, and the changes in capital investment and land prices that would result.
JY: How do you move from the hypothetical average state to the 50 individual states?
TN: You have to begin by asking what factors might cause states to have different experiences with land value taxation. We consider each state’s taxes, because the benefits of shifting to a more efficient system will vary according to how much current taxes distort economic choices. Some states have no income taxes. Some states tax property heavily, while others tax sales heavily. The other critical component concerns the state’s sources of income—how they are divided among land, labor and man-made capital. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports income from various sources by state, but does not account separately for income from land. For that information we draw on the Census of Agriculture data on the amount and market value of farmland to estimate an income figure.
JY: What kinds of results did you obtain?
TN: Since taxation of land is always economically efficient, and since taxation of other factors is always economically inefficient, a shift to land taxes always increases capital, income and labor use. For the “typical” state it seems that most of the simulated tax reforms are feasible, particularly those that reduce taxes on capital. A 20 percent cut in the sales tax, for instance, requires a nearly 24 percent increase in the tax on land, while a similar cut in property taxes requires virtually no change (0.2 percent) in the tax on land. Even a complete elimination of the state and local property tax calls for only a 23 percent increase in the tax on land, while an elimination of the sales tax would require a whopping 131 percent increase. Landowners would be deeply and adversely impacted by reforms that cut the sales tax (losing up to two-thirds of their wealth under a complete elimination of the sales tax), while they would barely feel the impact of most reforms focused on the property tax. They would experience at most a 7 percent decline in their wealth under the complete elimination of the property tax, and an actual increase in their wealth for less dramatic property tax reforms.
But these results differ substantially by state. For instance, the percentage change in the tax on land required to maintain constant state and local government revenues as taxes on capital are eliminated ranges from -1.91 percent to over 104 percent. Similarly, the impact on land prices varies greatly, with prices barely declining (or even increasing) in some states while falling by as much as 85 percent in others. While the elimination of all state and local taxes on capital is therefore technically feasible in all states, it is clearly politically more feasible in some states than in others. Overall, of course, replacing distortionary taxes with nondistortionary taxes on land always brings growth in the employment of capital and labor and increases output—but the size of these impacts also varies greatly. Given that the main political hurdle to land taxation is the expected adverse impact on landowners, these results seem to indicate that, as in the case of the “typical” state, such reforms should emphasize the simultaneous reduction in taxes such as the corporate income tax or the property tax.
JY: What do you take as the central lessons of this work?
TN: Several broad lessons emerge from the analysis of a typical state. First, elasticity assumptions are crucial to the exercise of predicting the likely impact of tax reforms. Second, under elasticity assumptions that are both plausible and relatively conservative, this model predicts that some types of tax reforms are more likely to succeed than others. In particular, tax reforms that reduce taxation of capital in favor of land taxation will have more positive general welfare implications while minimizing the losses to landowners. So policy makers might consider reforming corporate income and property taxes rather than sales and personal income taxes. Third, since elasticities tend to be lower in the short run, it is likely that some of the positive gains of tax reforms that reduce distortionary taxes in favor of land taxes will emerge only with time.
The most striking lesson from simulating tax reforms for the 50 different states is how greatly results can vary depending on underlying economic conditions and current tax policies in those states. Thus, far from arriving at “the answer” regarding the impact of land tax reforms, this study suggests that such answers are likely to differ greatly depending on the context in which the reforms are undertaken. Reforms that raise the tax on land are likely to be more effective the larger the size of the reform, the higher the initial distortionary taxes in the state, and the lower the current level of state income. And, reforms are more likely to be politically feasible (in the sense of not causing great declines in land values) when they involve reductions in taxes on capital.
The idea that land value taxation is unrealistic or would drive land prices into negative numbers is based on a static view of the economy, where no one responds to tax changes by substituting one factor for another. Once you accept that behavior will change in response to taxes, that static view no longer applies. Under these fairly conservative assumptions, tax reforms that use land taxes to eliminate entire classes of distortionary taxes are economically feasible in virtually all states. This work shows that, far from being quaint or outmoded, the idea of taxing land value is quite relevant to the contemporary policy debate.
Working Paper Information: Thomas Nechyba. 2001. “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” 70 pages. The complete paper is posted on the Lincoln Institute website at www.lincolninst.edu and may be downloaded for free.
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If cynics know the price of everything but the value of nothing, then they may have something in common with contemporary American planners. Constrained by the courts, the planning fraternity sometimes appears to have spent the last decade rationalizing nexuses and quantifying costs without really addressing the social and environmental values that should underpin the planning process. Under assault from those criticizing government, as well as from the property rights movement, the profession seems to have retreated into the land of that dismal science, economics. This allegation has been made in a number of ways over the past few years by critics as diverse as New Urbanist architects and, in England, the Royal Family. Is it really justified?
This article is written from an English perspective and is based on research into the types of planning tools used in the United States to minimize the adverse effects and costs of development or to maximize public benefits. The intention is to adapt the best American practices for future use in the United Kingdom.
A broad analysis of the types of policy processes presently being used highlights an amazing breadth and depth of local policy innovation. The accompanying table outlines the range of policies found, broken down either by the way they have been justified or the process that has been used. This “family” grouping may help in suggesting other types of policies that can be used to achieve similar goals. It may also provide a useful reminder that the policies are always supposed to achieve aims, and that those aims should always be in a constant state of review.
The policies span a wide range. Some are not traditionally thought of as land use or planning policies. Indeed, in many cases the policies are not promoted with any explicit intention of achieving specific land use goals. They are, however, all capable of directly affecting land use patterns and, properly used, can all realize benefits to the community.
Purpose Policies
Harm, quality of life and control policies are all well-accepted planning tools. They work to prevent development in inappropriate areas–on wetlands or in congested districts, for example–or to require development in certain places. For the most part these policies do not offer any new lessons to UK planners. However, their scope is widening. New harms are being defined, such as air quality, lack of public transit accessibility and effects on the water table.
In addition, new, more limited types of land interests, such as easements and deed restrictions, are being used as controls, and new actors are becoming involved. For example, in South Florida the Water Management District is now a major purchaser of land and development rights, working in loose alliance with planning authorities. School boards, forest preserve districts and private utility companies have also become more interventionist.
Nevertheless, the main areas of experimentation are in other family groups. Cost policies are being used more proactively and are being expanded in scope. Fees are being used to either encourage or discourage development in particular locations. In San Diego impact fees in outlying zones have been set at economically prohibitive levels to deter development. In Dade County, Florida, road impact fees are banded and fees increase towards the urban fringe. In Montgomery County, Maryland, certain fees are waived when affordable housing is provided.
Cost policies can also be used to raise revenue to meet off-site costs for nontraditional “infrastructure.” In Boston and San Francisco linkages have been identified between the construction of new offices and the need for housing, justifying the extraction of money sums. In principle the range of these fees could be expanded. The City of San Diego already charges developers for new libraries, fire stations and other community facilities, and includes some future maintenance costs. In rapidly growing areas, the public costs of new health infrastructure, hospitals and clinics might also be considered.
Some municipalities have considered the possibility of charging “disassociation fees” that recognize the cost to the community of development away from central cities. “Historic investment” or “recoupment” fees could account for the cost of past provision of infrastructure. In the case of schools or hospitals, a charge could also be made to reflect the cost of wasted desk and bed capacity in the area from which migration has occurred. Alternatively, fees could be charged for the “softer” social costs of increasing the distance that citizens need to travel to reach open space or to reflect the additional stress that occurs from lengthy journeys through strip development.
Process Policies
Market policies have been described as creating “a currency in the public domain that [can] then be traded.” Unsurprisingly, new markets have developed swiftly, responding to local conditions. These policies generally require zoning that sets limits on development at lower levels than the market would otherwise build. A release from that limitation can then be “sold” or transferred for use either on or off site. Seattle, New York state, Maryland and New Jersey lead the way with policies of this type, creating the necessary currency in the form of bonus floor areas and transferable rights. They also provide “market” infrastructure such as credit banks in some cases. In Florida the private sector has set up profitable “mitigation banks” that reclaim damaged land to create mitigation credits for future use by developers whose projects would threaten wetlands. Private sector sales of “utility credits” also occur.
Fiscal policies are all too often seen as intended simply to raise revenue. Yet they can also guide land uses and capture public benefits from increases in the development value of private land. In some Business Improvement Districts, such as those in Miami Beach and Chicago, increased tax assessment streams have been bonded and the proceeds spent on capital works achieving planning aims. In San Diego’s special assessment areas the cost of new social infrastructure, such as parks and libraries, is borne in this way.
In some areas it is possible to secure contributions towards public works that lead to private benefits, for example when major new transport links or services are provided. In downtown Miami, businesses that benefit from a transit system pay a property assessment that meets the county’s share of the original infrastructure cost.
The final two categories of policies are important for different reasons. Adequate transitionary policies are essential. Politically and legally it is difficult to introduce new policies unless careful attention is paid to minimizing or mitigating the immediate costs. Providing for a lengthy period of introduction, or providing compensating credits, as in Montgomery County, may offer some comfort. In some areas “reversionary” permits have been proposed, where development rights revert back to an earlier or less valuable use if they remain unimplemented for a period of time. The miscellaneous policies provide clear means for enforcement. All too often well-intentioned policies are not rigorously applied. Agreements may allow easier control and greater certainty.
Conclusion
It is clear that a large number of policy tools are available to and used by American planners. The opening criticism questioned their fixation with economics. While economic issues are and always should be part of the planning process, the scope of planning policies itself shows that planning is about more than economics. However, it has also become apparent that planners tend to use only a limited range of instruments, even when alternative approaches might better achieve their policy goals.
For a variety of legal and institutional reasons, municipalities understandably concentrate on those policies that they have already used and that have worked. Notwithstanding that, to an English planner the American system as a whole offers a mouthwatering array of policy feasts. It is a shame that so many planners operating within the system only nibble at the corners of a table that is groaning with the weight of possible delights.
Stephen Ashworth is a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute and a Harkness Fellow in a program sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund of New York. In the United Kingdom he is a partner in the firm of Denton Hall, Lawyers. This article is drawn from his research on “Harnessing Land and Development Values for Public Benefit.”
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Los proyectos de reurbanización a gran escala (denominados grandes proyectos urbanos o GPU) plantean muchas dudas sobre las consecuencias de la urbanización subsiguiente provocada por la intervención. Los GPU se caracterizan por el impacto que tienen en una parte significativa de la ciudad, a menudo con el uso de algunos nuevos instrumentos fiscales o reguladores y la participación de una amplia red de agentes e instituciones. Se espera que estos proyectos afecten los precios del suelo, reciclen la infraestructura y las instalaciones existentes o creen otras nuevas, y atraigan otras construcciones nuevas.
Los GPU como instrumento de política urbana han sido objeto de controversia y debate considerable en toda América Latina. Se argumenta a menudo que promueven la exclusión social y la renovación de edificios para aspiraciones de la clase media, tiene efectos limitados en la estimulación de actividades inmobiliarias y requieren grandes subsidios públicos (a veces ocultos) que a menudo quitan recursos fiscales de otras necesidades urbanas. A pesar de su creciente popularidad en América Latina, existe poca evidencia empírica para apoyar estas críticas.
Este artículo presenta el caso de un GPU introducido en São Paulo, Brasil, en 1996 como una “operación urbana” para reurbanizar un área de ingresos medios que constaba en su mayor parte de hogares unifamiliares que iba a ser atravesada por la prolongación de la Avenida Faria Lima. El proyecto es conocido como el Consorcio de Operaciones Urbanas de Faria Lima (OUCFL). Examinamos los principios económicos que afectan el rendimiento fiscal del proyecto y su oportunidad para recuperar plusvalías, evaluamos los cambios en densidad residencial y analizamos los cambios en la distribución de ingresos y la estructura de la propiedad. Por último, ofrecemos algunas sugerencias de políticas sobre cómo y cuándo usar esta clase de instrumento en función de estas evaluaciones.
¿Qué es una operación urbana?
Una operación urbana es un instrumento legal que trata de proporcionar a los gobiernos locales el poder de llevar a cabo intervenciones relacionadas con mejoras urbanísticas y de planificación municipal en asociación con el sector privado. Identifica un área particular dentro de la ciudad que tenga el potencial de atraer inversiones inmobiliarias privadas para beneficiar a la ciudad en su totalidad. Los índices de planificación municipal apropiados (es decir, zonificación y otros reglamentos sobre coeficientes de construcción, índices de ocupación y usos del suelo) se redefinen según un plan maestro, y las inversiones se hacen en infraestructura nueva o reciclada.
Una operación urbana permite a la municipalidad recuperar (a través de medios negociados u obligatorios) los incrementos del valor del suelo relacionados con los subsiguientes cambios de uso del suelo. En comparación con otros instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, estos fondos están destinados o justificados dentro del perímetro del proyecto y serán compartidos entre el gobierno y el sector privado para inversiones en infraestructura urbana y subsidios de las inversiones inmobiliarias privadas para apoyar el proyecto mismo.
Cada operación urbana en Brasil es propuesta por el poder ejecutivo y aprobada por el poder legislativo de la jurisdicción. En el caso de São Paulo, esta autoridad fue creada en la Ley Orgánica Municipal (Constitución de la Ciudad) en 1990, que se incluyó más adelante en la nueva ley de urbanización brasileña (Estatuto de la Ciudad de 2001). Los primeros proyectos propuestos fueron la Operación Anhangabaú (más tarde ampliada como parte de la Operación Centro de la Ciudad y denominada Operación del Centro) y Água Branca, seguida por las operaciones de Água Espraiada y Faria Lima. Después de aprobar el nuevo Plan Maestro de la ciudad en 2001, se generaron otras nueve operaciones urbanas. Se espera que estos trece proyectos afecten del 30 al 40 por ciento del área edificable de la ciudad de São Paulo.
Financiación de Faria Lima
La operación urbana de Faria Lima (OUCFL) fue propuesta y aprobada en 1995 con el objetivo de obtener recursos privados para financiar las inversiones públicas necesarias para comprar suelo e instalar infraestructura con el fin de ampliar la Avenida Faria Lima. Se estimó que estos costos ascendían a aproximadamente US$150 millones, dos tercios para adquisición de suelo y un tercio para la avenida en sí. Al proyecto se opusieron muchos interesados por motivos que iban desde el origen de los fondos (es decir, avanzados del presupuesto local a través de una deuda nueva) hasta preocupaciones del vecindario (una de las cuales pudo mantener sin cambios los coeficientes de edificabilidad [floor area ratio o FAR] y excluirlos legalmente de la zonificación de OUCFL) y problemas de diseño técnico.
Los estudios técnicos realizados en su momento indicaban que sería posible aprovechar 2.250.000 metros cuadrados potenciales más de los ya permitidos por la legislación de zonificación de la ciudad y consecuentemente se modificaron los FAR. Estos derechos de construcción adicionales fueron garantizados contra un pago mínimo del 50 por ciento de su valor de mercado usando el instrumento existente Solo-Criado (venta de derechos de construcción). La OUCFL despertó gran interés por parte de empresarios inmobiliarios. No obstante, este instrumento también fue cuestionado por su falta de transparencia, su enfoque de “proyecto a proyecto”, y la arbitrariedad en la forma en que se establecieron precios relevantes que después se usaron para calcular el valor de los derechos de construcción adicionales.
En agosto de 2003 ya se había autorizado un total de 939.592 metros cuadrados, o casi el 42 por ciento de los 2.250.000 metros cuadrados totales posibles. Se aprobaron más de 115 proyectos inmobiliarios, incluidos casi el 40 por ciento de edificios comerciales y el 60 por ciento de edificios residenciales de alta calidad. No obstante, los recursos (aproximadamente US$280 millones) obtenidos de estos proyectos aprobados no habían compensado completamente los gastos (US$350 millones, incluidos el capital más los intereses) relacionados con la ampliación de la avenida, teniendo en cuenta los elevados intereses reinantes en Brasil durante los casi ocho años desde la ejecución de los gastos. Así, aproximadamente el 80 por ciento del costo (aunque mayor que el anticipado) se ha recuperado mediante el proceso de Venta de Derechos de Construcción. Desde julio de 2004, la compensación de estos fondos de avance se obtuvo mediante el ingenioso y nuevo mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías conocido como CEPAC, siglas que significan Certificado de Potencial Adicional de Construcción. Un CEPAC representa un metro cuadrado.
La introducción de CEPAC
Aunque los CEPAC se definieron en el Estatuto de la Ciudad de 2001 de Brasil, no fueron aprobados por el CVM (equivalente brasileño de la Comisión de Bolsa y Valores de EE. UU.) como libremente comerciables en la Bolsa de Valores Brasileña hasta diciembre de 2003. El reglamento establece que el precio de cada certificado sea definido por una subasta pública y que puedan ejecutarse en cualquier momento los metros cuadrados correspondientes de derechos de construcción (que también incluyen cambios de uso e índices de ocupación) expresados en cada certificado. El reglamento indica también que se pueden emitir nuevos lotes de certificados (y venderse en subastas) sólo después de confirmarse que los recursos capturados por la venta previa han sido destinados de forma efectiva al proyecto. Para asegurar este uso designado, los ingresos se depositan en una cuenta especial, no en el tesoro municipal. Desde el punto de vista de los inversores privados, esta designación asegura la aceptabilidad de este instrumento de recuperación de plusvalías a su propia valorización. Al emitir un número menor de certificados que el número de derechos de construcción potenciales —es decir, al gestionar su escasez— el sector público puede beneficiarse de la valorización y poder así recuperar la plusvalía “ex-ante” (Afonso 2004, 39).
La aprobación final de los CEPAC para la OUCFL y todos los pasos necesarios para lanzarlos al mercado financiero se produjo a mediados de 2004, y la primera subasta a finales de diciembre de 2004 generó casi 10 millones de reales (unos US$4 millones), correspondientes a la venta de unos 9.000 CEPAC de un grupo autorizado de 650.000 metros cuadrados. Los certificados de OUCFL se vendieron a un valor nominal de 1.100 reales (unos US$450) por metro cuadrado sin un precio adicional como resultado del proceso de licitación.
Esta situación contrasta con la operación urbana de Água Espraiada, que se esperaba que fuera completamente financiada por CEPAC desde su inicio. En su tercera subasta, los certificados ya estaban alcanzando los 370 reales por certificado en vez del valor nominal de 300 reales fijado para esta operación. Una subasta más reciente en Água Espraiada vendió 56.000 CEPAC y alcanzó 21 millones de reales (US$9,5 millones), reflejando un precio por certificado de 371 reales. Este contraste de precios refleja los distintos valores nominales originales en los dos proyectos. En el caso de OUCFL los urbanizadores de compraron (y acumularon) derechos de construcción por adelantado, para beneficiarse de las reglas más flexibles antes de las aprobaciones de la CVM. El precio de los certificados en Faria Lima empezó siendo de más de 1.100 reales porque es un área más valorada. En Água Espraiada los urbanizadores estaban dispuestos a pagar un precio mayor que el valor nominal original, ya que los certificados eran menos caros y había una mayor demanda.
Implicaciones de los precios del suelo
Los precios del suelo sin ocupar y de las áreas urbanizadas experimentaron un aumento considerable en algunos bloques dentro del perímetro de OUCFL durante los años 90, pero disminuyó en otros bloques. No obstante, el precio promedio del metro cuadrado de nueva urbanización descendió en toda la región metropolitana de San Paulo (RMSP) en todas las franjas de precios, cuando se comparan los precios promedio de 1991 a 1996 con los de 1996 a 2000.
Después de controlar una serie de atributos relacionados con el carácter variable de las urbanizaciones y su ubicación, las estimaciones de precios mostraron un aumento relativo inequívoco después de haber dado comienzo a la operación. El precio promedio por metro cuadrado dentro del perímetro de OUCFL aumentó de 1.680 reales en el período de 1991–1996 a 1.920 reales en el período de 1996–2001, lo que representa un aumento del 14 por ciento, mientras que los precios en la RMSP disminuyeron de 1.210 a 1.060 reales, lo que representa un descenso del 12 por ciento en el mismo período (1,95 reales/1,00 dólares estadounidenses en diciembre de 2000). Así pues, el precio por metro cuadrado en OUCFL era aproximadamente un 26 por ciento mayor que el de RMSP. El precio por metro cuadrado en OUCFL fue un 38 por ciento mayor que el precio promedio en la RMSP en 1991–1996, y aumentó a un 81 por ciento en 1996–2001.
¿Fue este aumento capturado por la municipalidad el previsto? Considerando que el costo de la construcción es en promedio aproximadamente igual a 1.000 reales por metro cuadrado, la subasta de 2004 (la única hasta ahora) capturó casi todo el valor añadido a los precios actuales. El sistema previo anterior a CEPAC capturó aproximadamente el 50 por ciento o más, dependiendo de la capacidad y del éxito de los negociadores municipales, y de la exactitud del precio de referencia. CEPAC ahora cambia este porcentaje y el valor nominal del instrumento puede recuperar todo el incremento del valor o incluso más, dependiendo de la relación de este valor nominal con los precios del mercado, y de los resultados de futuras subastas. Al comparar un proyecto de reurbanización financiado completamente por bonos de construcción (como CEPAC) y otro financiado totalmente por tributos inmobiliarios generales, no existe ninguna duda de que el anterior es menos regresivo que este último. Incluso con un tributo inmobiliario progresivo, con tasas que aumenten según los valores, parte de los costos serían pagados por hogares más pobres.
Esta evidencia de que aproximadamente el 80 por ciento del costo del proyecto ya se ha recuperado, en combinación con la subasta de los derechos de construcción restantes mediante CEPAC y el impacto de la apreciación de la propiedad en los ingresos de tributos inmobiliarios actuales, indica que el proyecto no sólo debe pagarse por sí mismo sino que realmente genera una plusvalía fiscal para la ciudad en general en los siguientes cinco o siete años.
En efecto, los cambios causados al sustituir casas unifamiliares más antiguas por nuevos edificios residenciales y comerciales produjeron un cambio sustancial en la recaudación de tributos inmobiliarios en el área de la OUCFL. Muchas parcelas e incluso bloques enteros habían sido ocupados por casas de uno o dos pisos construidas en los años 50. Muchas de estas estructuras tenían derecho a un coeficiente de descuentos por obsolescencia de hasta un 30 por ciento del tributo inmobiliario. Fueron reemplazadas por edificios nuevos, más altos y de mayor calidad para los que el descuento era nulo. Nuestras estimaciones indican que las diferencias en recaudación de tributos inmobiliarios por metros cuadrados construidos puede haber aumentado al menos 2,7 veces y hasta 4,4 veces más. Es decir, el tributo inmobiliario promedio por metro cuadrado aumentó a un mínimo de 588,50 reales hasta un máximo de 802,50 reales desde 220,95 reales si la casa tenía más de 25 años, o desde 179,70 reales si la casa tenía más de 30 años.
Implicaciones sociales
El caso de la OUCFL ofrece una oportunidad única para cuantificar cambios en las características de residentes antes y después de la intervención, ya que hay datos disponibles a nivel de seguimiento del censo para 1991 y 2000, y la intervención empezó en 1996. Nuestro análisis de renovación y desplazamiento de residentes más pobres confirma principalmente las conclusiones de Ramalho y Meyer (2004) de que los ingresos promedio han aumentado relativamente en la mayoría de los bloques dentro del perímetro de la OUCFL. En lo que se refiere a las normas brasileñas, la clase media-alta fue desplazada de la región por el 5 por ciento más rico de hogares en el área metropolitana. Los datos del censo también mostraron que la densidad residencial descendió entre 1991 y 2000, de 27 a 22 residencias por hectárea, aunque estas cifras pueden estar distorsionadas porque reflejan la razón de residencias totales en todo el área, no un promedio de las razones por parcela donde se convirtió el uso del suelo.
Los datos de 1991 indicaron que la población ya estaba abandonando el área de la OUCFL antes de la aprobación de la operación urbana, pero este éxodo se intensificó después de 1996, generando parcelas desocupadas en el proceso de configuración del sitio para acomodar a las nuevas urbanizaciones de edificios altos. Al mismo tiempo, aumentó la densidad de construcción. El número promedio de pisos por nuevo edificio en el área aumentó de 12,6 en el período de 1985–1995 a 16,7 en el período de 1996–2001. El número de viviendas por edificio aumentó de 37,1 a 79,6 en los mismos períodos.
Esta contradicción aparente entre la menor densidad residencial y el mayor número de viviendas se explica en parte por la construcción de edificios comerciales que reemplazaron muchas residencias unifamiliares en parcelas pequeñas o de tamaño promedio. La OUCFL provocó una concentración inmobiliaria considerable, ya que los nuevos edificios comerciales y residenciales reemplazaron las casas y requirieron áreas de suelo más grandes para proyectos arquitectónicos de clase alta. Los 115 proyectos aprobados entre 1995 y agosto de 2003 que solicitaron aumentos en los coeficientes de utilización requerían un total de 657 parcelas, o un promedio de 5,7 parcelas por proyecto.
La combinación del aumento en nivel de ingresos y la reducción en densidad de hogares indican que el proceso de renovación avanzó dentro y fuera de la región de la OUCFL durante los años 90. No obstante, éste no es un caso clásico de renovación para la aspiración de clases medias, donde las familias pobres son expulsadas de un área debido a diversas presiones socioeconómicas. En este caso fueron mayormente las clases medias-altas quienes fueron desplazadas. Excepto en lo que se refiere al pequeño núcleo de favelados restantes (Favela Coliseu), la región estaba ya ocupada por personas que pertenecen a los sectores más ricos de la sociedad.
Algunas observaciones de política
Este artículo contribuye al debate sobre la gestión social de valoración del suelo proporcionando evaluaciones de datos reales y elementos económicos. Estos elementos faltaban en la mayoría de los análisis, y creemos que este vacío en las publicaciones ha contribuido a una interpretación incompleta de las implicaciones de una operación urbana y a recomendaciones de política pública equivocadas.
Nuestra conclusión es que el mecanismo de financiación de CEPAC por sí mismo no aumenta la característica regresiva de las operaciones urbanas, ya que sin esos bonos de derechos de construcción toda la inversión en reurbanizaciones sería financiada por impuestos generales. Si el proyecto de la OUCFL fuera inadecuado en términos de distribución de ingresos, hubiera sido aún peor sin el mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías. En vez de eso, CEPAC y el mecanismo de recuperación de plusvalías usado previamente ofrecieron dos características deseables en cualquier inversión pública: cobrar a los nuevos terratenientes es al menos neutro en términos de distribución de ingresos; y los beneficiarios principales terminan por pagar el proyecto.
Además, el mecanismo de operación urbana ofrece incentivos para la reurbanización. Dado que la mayoría de los proyectos aumentan los precios del suelo y echan a los pobres de la región, sería mejor invertir todo el presupuesto municipal en proyectos a pequeña escala. Esto es lo opuesto a lo que ocurrió con la reurbanización de la rica área adyacente de Berrini donde los urbanizadores decidieron la forma de concentrar su inversión, resultando en una concentración aún mayor de ingresos que en el área de la OUCFL. Debido a la falta de acción de los gestores de política en ese caso, la municipalidad no capturó ningún valor de Berrini, pero pagó el costo completo de la infraestructura.
El uso de bonos de derechos de construcción puede disminuir el aspecto regresivo de la urbanización, pero hacer que un proyecto sea verdaderamente progresivo requiere atención en el lado de los gastos, financiando toda la inversión a través de instrumentos como CEPAC. La limitación principal sobre la distribución de beneficios a los pobres es que la ley establece que todos los fondos recogidos mediante la recuperación de plusvalías (CEPAC u otros instrumentos) deben invertirse dentro del perímetro de la intervención. Una forma de que estas intervenciones sean más progresivas es invertir en actividades que suministren extras a los pobres, como transporte público, educación y salud. Además, la legislación importante permite que la administración seleccione un área dentro del perímetro de una operación urbana y la declare zona especial de interés social (ZEIS) donde las parcelas se pueden usar exclusivamente para vivienda social de bajos ingresos.
Otra alternativa es establecer áreas de vivienda social dentro del perímetro de la operación urbana. Al subsidiar viviendas de bajos ingresos con dinero de urbanizadores y nuevos terratenientes, no habría una distorsión de precios fuera de la industria de la vivienda. El subsidio resulta de la segmentación del mercado y de la transferencia de la renta adicional a hogares pobres. Se trata de una gestión social real de valoración del suelo.
Ciro Biderman está afiliado al Centro de Estudios de Política y Economía del Sector Público (Cepesp) en la Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Fundación Getúlio Vargas de São Paulo, Brasil. Es profesor visitante de desarrollo internacional y planificación regional en el Departamento de Estudios y Planificación Urbanos del Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge.
Paulo Sandroni es economista y profesor en la Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales de la Fundación Getúlio Vargas.
Martim O. Smolka es Senior Fellow y director del Programa sobre América Latina y el Caribe del Lincoln Institute.
Referencias
(Estas publicaciones sólo se encuentran en portugués).
Afonso, Luis Carlos Fernandes. 2004. Financiamento é desafio para governantes (La financiación es un desafío para los gobernantes). Teoria e Debate Nº 58, Mayo-Junio: 36–39.
Ramalho, T., e R.M.P. Meyer. 2004. O impacto da Operação Urbana Faria Lima no uso residencial: Dinâmicas de transformação (El impacto de la Operación Urbana Faria Lima en el uso residencial: dinámicas de transformación). Mimeo. São Paulo: Lume/FAUUSP.
Biderman, Ciro y Paulo Sandroni. 2005. Avaliação do impacto das grandes intervenções urbanas nos precos dos imoveis do entorno: O caso da Operação Urbana Consorciada Faria Lima (Evaluación del impacto de los precios en la propiedad cerca de intervenciones urbanas a gran escala: El caso del Consorcio de la Operación Urbana Faria Lima). Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Report (Abril).
¿De qué manera se verán afectadas las finanzas del gobierno municipal por la enorme y creciente carga de pagar los costos de pensión contraídos previamente? En particular, ¿de qué manera estos costos de pensión heredados cambiarán la percepción de los residentes respecto al impuesto municipal sobre la propiedad y su intención de pagarlo? como primer paso de un programa de investigación del lincoln institute of land policy mucho más amplio sobre estas cuestiones, cabe preguntarse: ¿Qué sabemos –e igualmente importante, qué no sabemos– acerca de la magnitud de las deudas por pensiones sin fondos del gobierno municipal en los estados unidos? (ver Gordon, rose y Fischer 2012).
Es un principio fundamental de las finanzas públicas que los servicios del presente deberían pagarse con ingresos del presente, y que el financiamiento de deudas debería reservarse para proyectos de capital que brinden servicios a los futuros contribuyentes. este principio se viola cuando las deudas por pensiones relacionadas con los servicios de los trabajadores en el presente no son financiadas con compras de activos financieros en el presente y, en su lugar, deben pagarlas los futuros contribuyentes.
Desafortunadamente, no siempre se observan los principios de la prudencia en las finanzas públicas, y los gobiernos municipales en los estados unidos han acumulado una importante cantidad de deudas por pensiones sin fondos en los últimos años. esta situación genera un quiebre en la importante relación entre los contribuyentes y los servicios que reciben: la correspondencia desigual entre el valor total de los servicios públicos y los recursos tomados del sector privado. existe un importante debate sobre la solidez de dicha correspondencia y cuánta es la similitud de la relación de precios entre el valor pagado y el valor recibido para los contribuyentes particulares; casi no quedan dudas de que utilizar los ingresos corrientes para pagar servicios prestados en el pasado debilita esta relación.
Una conciencia pública creciente
La cuestión de las pensiones para empleados del gobierno estatal y municipal aparece en los titulares casi a diario (recuadro 1). Hasta hace sólo unos pocos años, estas pensiones eran competencia casi exclusiva de unos pocos funcionarios elegidos, juntas designadas, asesores en inversiones, actuarios y agencias calificadoras de crédito. ¿Qué cambió? La respuesta más inmediata es la gran recesión, que condicionó no solamente los ingresos fiscales del estado sino también el valor de los activos de los planes de pensión. En particular, la tenencia de capital proveniente de fondos de pensión estatales y municipales perdió casi la mitad de su valor, ya que cayó del pico de US$2,3 billones alcanzado en septiembre de 2007 a sólo US$1,2 billones en marzo de 2009 (Junta de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva Federal 2012).
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Recuadro 1: ¿En dónde se encuentran en peligro las pensione municipales?
A fin de comprender cuáles son los lugares donde las pensiones municipales estaban experimentando dificultades en particular, Gordon, Rose y Fischer (2012) utilizaron un software de monitoreo de medios de comunicación para realizar una investigación de todas las agencias de noticias nacionales de los EE.UU. durante los tres primeros meses de 2012. La búsqueda se centró en artículos que incluían la palabra “pensión” junto con otros términos que identificaban a los gobiernos municipales, como “municipalidad”, “ciudad” o “condado”, y descripciones de problemas de financiamiento, como, por ejemplo, “pasivo”, “déficit”, “sin fondos”, “recorte”, “mora”, “reforma” y “problema”. Los resultados de la búsqueda produjeron más de 2.000 artículos separados de diferentes lugares en todo el país.
Según este análisis, varios tipos de lugares están experimentando problemas con la cuestión de las pensiones. Un grupo lo forman las jurisdicciones que han estado perdiendo gente y empleos con el transcurso de los años. Uno de los ejemplos más notorios es Detroit, Michigan, en donde la cantidad de jubilados es el doble de los trabajadores activos. En esta categoría también entra la ciudad de Prichard, Alabama, que perdió más del 45 por ciento de su población desde 1970 y, el año 2010 tenía menos de 23.000 residentes. En septiembre de 2009, este municipio sencillamente dejó de enviar los cheques de pensión a sus exempleados y, un mes más tarde, se declaró en quiebra. Para dichas comunidades, los conflictos relacionados con las pensiones también pueden ser un síntoma de mayores problemas fiscales o de disfunciones políticas.
Otro grupo de jurisdicciones pasó del auge inmobiliario a el posterior derrumbe del mercado de la vivienda. Algunos ejemplos son las ciudades de rápido crecimiento en California, como Stockton, que este año se declaró en quiebra, siendo la ciudad más grande que se haya declarado en quiebra en la historia. Mucho más desconcertante es la situación de jurisdicciones relativamente acaudaladas, como los condados de Suffolk o Nassau, en Nueva York, que parecen no ser capaces de aplicar recortes estrictos en los gastos o aumentar los impuestos debido a la paralización política. En lugar de ello, muchas de estas jurisdicciones han recurrido al préstamo para cumplir con sus obligaciones de pago de pensiones.
Solamente dos de las recientes bancarrotas municipales (Vallejo, California, y Central Falls, Rhode Island) fueron resultado de presiones de las pensiones públicas y la compensación de empleados junto con una reducción de la recaudación. Otras jurisdicciones, como Harrisburg, Pensilvania, y el condado de Jefferson, Alabama, están en apuros debido a malas decisiones en las inversiones. Además, algunas ciudades importantes, como Atlanta, San Francisco y Nueva York, han tomado medidas para limitar el crecimiento de las pensiones, con frecuencia gracias a la cooperación de los sindicatos de empleados públicos municipales. Central Falls logró obtener concesiones de oficiales de policía y bomberos en activo, así como de jubilados, pero aun esta medida resultó insuficiente para detener la caída hacia la quiebra.
Aunque el mercado de valores se ha recuperado en gran medida y las tenencias de capital derivadas de planes estatales y municipales se han incrementado nuevamente a más de US$2 billones, las pensiones públicas siguen estando bajo estrecha vigilancia. Las agencias calificadoras de crédito están tomando cada vez más en cuenta las deudas por pensiones sin fondos a la hora de llevar a cabo sus evaluaciones de riesgo crediticio de los gobiernos estatal y municipal. Además, los analistas están haciendo oír cada vez más sus críticas sobre los métodos que comúnmente se utilizan para evaluar los niveles de financiamiento de las pensiones.
El gobierno federal también está prestando atención a este tema. El congreso, alarmado por la posibilidad de que los gobiernos entren en mora, celebró una serie de audiencias sobre las finanzas de los gobiernos estatal y municipal a principios de 2011. Hace poco, los miembros republicanos del comité conjunto económico (JEC, por sus siglas en inglés) emitieron informes en los que se vislumbraba el espectro de una crisis similar a la de la eurozona debido a las deudas por pensiones estatales sin fondos (JEC 2011; JEC 2012).
A la luz de estas críticas y de los motivos de preocupación en torno a los crecientes costos derivados de las pensiones, 43 estados promulgaron reformas importantes en sus sistemas de pensión entre 2009 y 2011 (Snell 2012). Las modificaciones más comunes fueron las siguientes: aumento de los requisitos en la aportación por parte de los empleados (30 estados), aumento de la edad y años de servicio para la elegibilidad (32), ajuste de fórmulas para calcular los beneficios (17), y reducción en los aumentos del costo de la vida (21). En algunos estados, las modificaciones se aplicaron solamente a los nuevos empleados, aunque en otros estados, estos cambios afectaron a los trabajadores activos y a los ya jubilados. Estas medidas han generado una gran controversia y han dado como resultado el inicio de juicios en colorado, Minnesota, Nueva Jersey y Dakota del Sur.
La mayor parte de esta creciente atención hacia las pensiones de empleados del gobierno se ha concentrado en los planes del gobierno estatal, mientras que las pensiones de empleados públicos municipales relativamente no han sido sometidas a análisis. Aunque los planes municipales representan un porcentaje modesto del total de afiliados a las pensiones públicas (10 por ciento) y del total de activos de pensiones públicas (18 por ciento), su quiebra puede ser devastadora. Los residentes y las empresas con posibilidades de mudarse podrían abandonar aquellas comunidades en las que se aplican impuestos altos para reconstruir los activos derivados de pensiones en lugar de brindar servicios básicos. Una base imponible reducida podría empeorar aún más el fondo, con menos posibilidades de pagar los beneficios prometidos. El resultado podría ser el surgimiento de más ciudades como Prichard, Alabama.
Una mirada conjunta a los planes de pensión estatales y municipales
Las pensiones estatales y municipales son una parte importante del sistema de jubilación de la nación. La figura 1 muestra la distribución del total de us$15,3 billones en activos para la jubilación a finales de 2011 por tipo de plan. Los fondos de jubilación de empleados públicos estatales y municipales poseían, en conjunto, us$2,8 billones en activos, o casi un quinto del total.
Todos los estados tienen al menos un plan de pensión para empleados públicos y, en algunos estados, varios planes. Existen más de 220 planes estatales (algunos de los cuales son planes gestionados por el estado que ofrecen cobertura a trabajadores del gobierno municipal) y cerca de 3.200 planes municipales (tabla 1). En total, estos planes dan cobertura a 14,7 millones de trabajadores, 8,2 millones de beneficiarios actuales y 4,8 millones de personas elegibles para obtener beneficios en el futuro pero que aún no los reciben.
Las pensiones estatales y municipales son importantes, además, porque el 27,5 por ciento de los empleados de gobierno no está integrado en el seguro social (Nuschler, Shelton y Topoleski 2011). Estos empleados públicos sin cobertura se encuentran concentrados en unos pocos estados. La figura 2 ofrece una clasificación de los 16 estados que presentan las mayores concentraciones de trabajadores gubernamentales sin cobertura del seguro social. Casi todos los empleados de gobierno, tanto estatal como municipal, de Ohio y Massachusetts y más de la mitad de los empleados públicos estatales y municipales de Nevada, Louisiana, Colorado, California y Texas no están cubiertos por el seguro social.
Otra característica fundamental de las pensiones estatales y municipales reside en que, en su mayoría, consisten en planes de beneficios definidos (DB, por sus siglas en inglés). Los beneficios se calculan utilizando una fórmula que, por lo general, sigue este patrón:
(Salario promedio de los 3 últimos años) x
(Años de servicio) x
(2 por ciento por cada año de servicio) =
Beneficios
La mayoría de las pensiones de gobierno estatal y municipal también incluyen un ajuste según el costo de la vida. Una minoría de trabajadores del sector público se encuentra inscrita en planes de aportes definidos (DC, por sus siglas en inglés), según los cuales se coloca un monto específico en un fondo de jubilación por cada año de trabajo. Si se las compara con los planes dc, las pensiones dB protegen a los empleados de los riesgos derivados de inversiones, inflación y longevidad. Hasta el año 2009, cerca del 80 por ciento de los trabajadores estatales y municipales se encontraba inscrito en planes DB, y sólo poco más del 20 por ciento de los empleados estatales y municipales estaba en planes DC. Los trabajadores del sector privado presentaban la composición opuesta: el 20 por ciento estaba inscrito en planes DB y el 80 por ciento, en planes DC (Oficina de Estadísticas Laborales de los EE.UU. 2011).
Los planes DB predominaban en el sector privado, pero han ido desapareciendo, en parte debido a que la Ley de Seguridad de Ingresos de Jubilación para Empleados de 1974 (ERISA, por sus siglas en inglés) impuso normas mínimas de financiamiento y estableció el requisito de realizar aportaciones para seguros y otras cargas administrativas en relación con estos planes.
La menor cantidad de requisitos de financiamiento y de presentación de reportes que se aplican a las pensiones públicas permite a los gobiernos trasladar los costos de los trabajadores al futuro. Esta es una forma implícita de pedir préstamos, ya que se pueden evadir las normas presupuestarias calculadas y evitar la aprobación del electorado que generalmente se requiere para emitir bonos.
Requisitos de financiamiento y de presentación de reportes para las pensiones estatales y municipales
Históricamente, la mayoría de las pensiones estatales y municipales se financiaron con recaudaciones generales a plazo. La práctica actual de prefinanciar los planes de pensión estatales y municipales comenzó en las décadas de 1970 y 1980. Aunque los planes del sector público no se encontraban sujetos a la ERISA, esta ley sí requería emitir informes sobre sus prácticas. El informe de 1978 indicaba un “alto nivel de ceguera sobre el costo de las pensiones (…) debido a la falta de valuaciones actuariales, la utilización de suposiciones actuariales irreales y la ausencia general de normas actuariales” (Munnell y otros 2008, 2).
Esta señal de alarma llevó a varios planes a incrementar voluntariamente los niveles de financiamiento y prestar más atención a las normas actuariales y contables. En 1984 se creó la Junta de Normas Contables del Gobierno (GASB, por sus siglas en inglés), que emitió las primeras normas para planes de pensión en 1986 y realizó una profunda revisión de sus normas de valuación actuarial en 1994. El cumplimiento de dichas normas es de carácter voluntario, pero tiene el reconocimiento de las agencias calificadoras de crédito, los auditores y otros profesionales encargados de recopilar datos. A diferencia de las normas de la ERISA, que requieren métodos de valuación específicos para todos los planes privados, la GASB establece criterios que permiten cierta flexibilidad en la utilización de métodos específicos por parte de los planes públicos. En consecuencia, existen serios motivos de preocupación en lo referente a la transparencia y la comparabilidad de los datos sobre los que informan los propios planes de pensión estatales y municipales en relación con sus deudas.
Aportaciones de los empleadores
El cálculo del Pasivo Actuarial Devengado (AAL, por sus siglas en inglés) de un plan requiere la siguiente información: edad e historial salarial de los afiliados; proyecciones de incremento salarial, edades de jubilación, ganancias por activos e inflación; tablas de probabilidad de longevidad; y una tasa de descuento para convertir valores futuros estimados en valores en curso. El Pasivo Actuarial Devengado Sin Fondos (UAAL, por sus siglas en inglés) es equivalente al AAL menos los activos del plan.
El “costo normal” de un plan de pensión es el aumento del AAL debido al año de servicio en curso de los empleados existentes. La ERISA requiere que el costo normal se salde con las aportaciones de los empleados y empleadores. La GASB especifica una “Aportación Anual Obligatoria” (ARC, por sus siglas en inglés) de costo normal más una amortización a 30 años del UAAL. El problema reside en que, contrariamente a lo que su nombre indica, en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones no es obligatorio el pago del ARC.
Elección de la tasa de descuento
La cuestión que recientemente ha recibido más atención es la elección de la tasa de descuento. Las normas actualmente aplicables de la GASB permiten el descuento de las deudas futuras en base al rendimiento por inversiones proyectado, lo que dio un promedio del 8 por ciento anual antes de la recesión. No obstante, la mayoría de los economistas y especialistas en teoría financiera estarían de acuerdo con Brown y Wilcox (2009, 538) cuando afirman que “la tasa de descuento utilizada para valuar las futuras deudas derivadas de las pensiones debería reflejar el grado de riesgo de dichas deudas”, no de los activos. Las garantías constitucionales y legales consideran a las pensiones gubernamentales de bajo riesgo, mientras que el rendimiento histórico por inversiones incluye una prima de riesgo.
Los gobiernos estatales y municipales no pueden evitar los riesgos a largo plazo, como son una prolongada caída en la productividad o una caída de la bolsa durante una década. Por lo tanto, la tasa histórica de rendimiento a largo plazo en una cartera con gran composición patrimonial (antes de aplicar ajustes por riesgos) resulta una tasa de descuento demasiado alta. Las tasas de descuento más altas pueden hacer que las pensiones parezcan tener mayores fondos que los que verdaderamente poseen. Esto reduce los requisitos de aportaciones e impone obligaciones sin garantía a los futuros contribuyentes si no se logran las altas tasas de rentabilidad. Lo que resulta aún peor es que los administradores de los planes tienen de esta manera un incentivo para buscar carteras de alto riesgo con el fin de obtener una mayor tasa de descuento y un menor ARC.
Existen sólidos argumentos a favor de que la tasa de descuento del 8 por ciento que utitilizan muchos de los planes de pensión pública es demasiado alta, aunque existe un consenso menor en lo que respecta a cuánto debería reducirse dicha tasa para ser apropiada. En lugar de analizar estos puntos de vista, obtuvimos una estimación del impacto que podría tener una tasa más baja. Munnell y otros (2012) calculan los posibles cambios que se producirían en las deudas reportadas si en todos los planes se utilizara una tasa de descuento del 5 por ciento, en lugar del 8 por ciento. Dichos autores estiman que las deudas estatales y municipales aumentarían de US$3,6 billones a US$5,4 billones, y que las proporciones de financiamiento totales (activos/AAL) disminuirían de 75 por ciento a sólo 50 por ciento. Este es un cambio enorme, ya que representa el doble de las deudas sin fondos (UAAL = AAL – activos).
Últimas modificaciones en las normas de la GASB
La GASB (2012) emitió nuevas normas contables que entrarán en vigencia en 2013 y 2014. Según la modificación principal, los gobiernos estatales y municipales deberán aplicar diferentes tasas de descuento sobre las partes de las deudas que tienen fondos y las que no los tienen. Se seguirá aplicando una tasa basada en los ingresos en la parte del pasivo que posea financiamiento, mientras que se utilizará una tasa más baja y sin riesgos respecto del UAAL. El impacto de este cambio sobre el pasivo reportado depende de cuántos fondos tenga un plan: los planes totalmente financiados no sufrirán modificación alguna, los planes con fondos suficientes experimentarán unos pocos cambios, y los planes con escasos fondos estarán sujetos a grandes aumentos en las deudas reportadas y reducciones en el financiamiento. Según las nuevas normas, los estados contables del gobierno deberán incluir el UAAL, lo que incrementará la visibilidad del pasivo sin fondos para el electorado.
¿Qué sabemos sobre las pensiones municipales?
A pesar de los crecientes motivos de preocupación respecto a la salud fiscal de los planes de pensión municipales, no se tiene un conocimiento sistemático de los mismos. La mejor información disponible proviene de la Encuesta Anual de Sistemas de Jubilación para Empleados Públicos Estatales y Municipales, llevada a cabo por la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. (2012). Cada cinco años se ofrece información detallada sobre cada organismo de gobierno. Cada año se da información de datos a nivel de planes para una muestra que incluye casi la mitad de los 3.200 planes municipales, y estos datos se utilizan para generar estimaciones de totales para cada estado por tipo de gobierno. Las tablas 1 y 2 muestran ejemplos de los tipos de información que presenta la encuesta.
Las principales virtudes de la encuesta sobre jubilaciones de empleados de la Oficina del Censo son la calidad de los datos y el hecho de que son exhaustivos. Una desventaja importante es la falta de relevancia temporal, ya que los últimos datos municipales disponibles son los correspondientes al ejercicio de 2010. Otro problema reside en que hace muy poco que la Oficina comenzó a informar acerca de las deudas de los planes, y sólo incluye estos datos respecto de los planes estatales. Al igual que otras fuentes de datos sobre pensiones, la Oficina del Censo no recaba información sobre los planes DC u otros beneficios posteriores al empleo (OPEB, por sus siglas en inglés).
No obstante, la encuesta sobre jubilación de empleados arroja cierta luz sobre las pensiones municipales. Por ejemplo, la cantidad de planes municipales por estado varía significativamente: 7 estados no poseen planes municipales, 20 estados tienen menos de 10, Florida e Illinois tienen más de 300 cada uno, y Pensilvania posee más de 1.400. La cantidad de afiliados activos por beneficiario es una medida rudimentaria para saber de qué manera los aportes de los empleados sirven para financiar el plan. La tabla 1 muestra que el promedio nacional en los planes municipales es de 1,4 trabajadores por jubilado, aunque la variación entre estados es considerable. Esta proporción de respaldo es menor que 1 en 12 estados; de entre 1 y 2 en 31 estados; y de más de 2 en 7 estados (Utah posee la proporción más alta: 6,8).
Ninguno de estos datos nos dice cuán suficientemente financiadas se encuentran las pensiones municipales. Para obtener esta información, debemos recurrir a encuestas independientes. La mayoría de estas encuestas ofrecen una buena cobertura sobre los planes estatales, aunque, por lo general, incluyen sólo información sobre algunos de los planes municipales más grandes, como, por ejemplo, la encuesta anual de planes de afiliados de la Asociación Nacional de Administradores de Jubilación Estatal (NASRA, por sus siglas en inglés). Unas pocas investigaciones nacionales se han centrado en las deudas por pensiones municipales, en lugar de estatales. Por ejemplo, Novy-Marx y Rauh (2011) analizan las finanzas de las pensiones municipales utilizando datos de los Informes Financieros Anuales Consolidados (CAFR, por sus siglas en inglés) respecto de los planes de ciudades y condados que poseen más de US$1.000 millones en activos a partir de 2006.
El Centro de Investigaciones sobre Jubilación (CRR, por sus siglas en inglés) de la universidad Boston College mantiene una Base de Datos de Planes Públicos (PPD) para los mayores planes estatales y municipales, con datos provenientes de informes actuariales individuales sobre los planes y CAFR del gobierno municipal. Mediante el uso de la PPD más otros tipos de información sobre planes municipales adicionales, el CRR recientemente emitió un informe con datos para 2010 en base a una muestra de 97 planes en 40 estados (Munnell y otros 2011). Esta es una muestra modesta en relación con el total de 3.200 planes municipales; no obstante, debido a que se concentra en los planes grandes, cubre el 59 por ciento de los activos de pensiones municipales y el 55 por ciento de los afiliados.
Un resultado importante de esta investigación es la amplia dispersión que existe en la relación promedio de financiamiento del 77 por ciento en 2010 (figura 3). De los 95 planes grandes de la muestra del CRR con información utilizable, sólo 16 poseían activos para cubrir más del 90 por ciento del pasivo. En el extremo opuesto, hay 9 planes con un financiamiento menor al 50 por ciento (Munnell y otros 2011). Además, este estudio muestra al ARC como un porcentaje de la nómina gubernamental municipal. El promedio general para 2010 es del 22 por ciento, y en este caso también existe una amplia dispersión (figura 4). De los 91 planes grandes en la muestra del CRR con información utilizable, más de la mitad (49) tienen un ACR por debajo del 20 por ciento de la nómina, aunque 16 planes poseen participaciones en el rango menos manejable de entre 30 por ciento y 80 por ciento. Cinco planes poseen un pasivo por pensiones de tal magnitud que, de pagarse por completo, costaría más que el 100 por ciento de la nómina.
Debe tenerse en cuenta que los gobiernos municipales en la mayoría de los estados no están obligados a pagar la cantidad total de ARC . No poseemos datos a nivel municipal; sin embargo, según un informe a nivel estatal, existe una amplia variación en el porcentaje de los ARC efectivamente pagados en todos los planes, todos los años y en todos los estados (Equipo de Trabajo para la Crisis Presupuestaria Estatal 2012). Munnell y otros (2011) calculan los pagos de pensión efectivamente realizados como un porcentaje de los presupuestos municipales, y en este caso también obtienen como resultado una variación considerable: el 14 por ciento de los gobiernos de la muestra destinan más del 12 por ciento de sus presupuestos al pago de las pensiones.
Conclusiones
Las pensiones del gobierno municipal se encuentran, en promedio, significativamente escasas de fondos. La razón fundamental reside en que, ante la falta de una obligación legal, muchos gobiernos no han reservado los suficientes fondos cada año para cubrir las deudas por pensión adicionales contraídas en ese año, y mucho menos para amortizar el pasivo sin fondos de años anteriores. En efecto, estos gobiernos piden préstamos para pagar los servicios de los trabajadores en el presente y trasladar la carga a futuros contribuyentes.
Tenemos muchos menos datos acerca de los 3.200 planes administrados a nivel municipal que los que tenemos sobre los 220 planes estatales. La mejor información respecto de los planes municipales proviene de investigadores que analizan los informes financieros detallados de los planes y los gobiernos municipales. Forzosamente, estos estudios se concentran en los planes más grandes. Lo que sí sabemos es que existe una amplia variación entre los diferentes planes respecto de ciertas medidas clave: el porcentaje del pasivo que se encuentra cubierto por los activos; la aportación completa que debería cubrir tanto los costos de pensión del año en curso como la amortización del pasivo sin fondos (ARC ) relativo a la nómina o a la recaudación anual; el porcentaje del ARC que se paga efectivamente; y el porcentaje del presupuesto en curso que se destina a los costos de pensión. Una importante cantidad de gobiernos municipales está en dificultades por una o más de estas medidas.
Lo que empeora aun más la situación es que lo que sabemos acerca del pasivo proviene de los datos reportados por los propios municipios y la tasa de descuento que estos gobiernos eligen. En casi todos los casos, la tasa de descuento es inadecuadamente alta, y la utilización de una tasa de descuento menor podría aumentar el pasivo sin fondos a más del doble. El resultado es un grave problema con respecto a las deudas por pensiones municipales que amenaza las finanzas del gobierno municipal, aunque no conocemos su magnitud ni el nivel de desigualdad de su distribución.
Sobre los autores
Richard F. Dye es visiting fellow del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Asimismo es profesor en el Instituto de Gobierno y Relaciones Públicas de la Universidad de Illinois en Chicago, y profesor emérito de Economía en el Lake Forest College.
Tracy Gordonfellow en Estudios Económicos en el Instituto Brookings, Washington, DC. Su campo de investigación se centra en las finanzas públicas estatales y municipales, la economía política y la economía urbana.
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