Housing is an important component of both a household’s net worth and aggregate national wealth or stock of residential capital. Aggregate residential wealth is the sum of the values of all housing units. In Brazil, residential structures represent about one-third of total net fixed capital, so their value is important for economic and social policy. This analysis asks: What variables determine the stock values of residential property? How do location and neighborhood conditions affect these values? What is the aggregate residential wealth in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region (Metro Rio)? What is its distribution among household income and housing value groups? In other words, what generates residential wealth? How much residential wealth is there? Who holds it? Where is it located? (Vetter, Beltrão, and Massena 2013.)
Methodology for Estimating Residential Wealth
To address these questions, we first calibrated a hedonic residential rent model with sample microdata from the 2010 population census conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The units of analysis are households living in private, permanent housing units in urban areas of Metro Rio. The total number of households in 2010 was 3.9 million, and our sample is 223,534 (5.7 percent). We used the 41,396 renters in the sample to calibrate our model and then estimated the rents for homeowners and the landlords of rent-free units. Finally, we transformed the actual and imputed rents into housing values by dividing them by the monthly discount rate of 0.75 percent (9.38 percent annual rate), as is standard practice for Brazilian residential wealth studies (Cruz and Morais 2000, Reiff and Barbosa 2005, and Tafner and Carvalho 2007).
The underlying assumption in these studies is that the hedonic prices of the characteristics in the model and the discount rate are similar for rental and nonrental units. These are strong but necessary assumptions for the application of the methodology with the existing census microdata. The sum of estimated housing values is our measure of residential wealth. The objective is to estimate the aggregate value of all housing units and their average values.
In calculating average housing prices for these groups, we do not control for housing size or other characteristics, as would be done for hedonic housing price indices. Using census microdata, we can also estimate the residential wealth by household income as well as for smaller spatial units within municipalities, such as neighborhoods or districts. Even though the sample of rental units is relatively large, sample size drops rapidly as rents and household incomes rise, and the variances are particularly high for the open group at the top end of the distribution. Because we do not have data on the value of mortgages, our measure is of gross rather than net residential wealth.
Using rents from the census or a household survey compares favorably with other commonly used methods for estimating residential wealth for the Brazilian national accounts and related studies (Garner 2004), such as asking homeowners to estimate the selling price or monthly rent of their homes, using the asking prices for home sales, or using the prices registered when recording the sale. Whereas renters know their monthly rent payment, the informants may have little understanding of current trends in housing prices, and the original asking price is often higher than the final sale price. In Rio de Janeiro, the municipal government uses its own estimates of the sale prices based on asking prices, rather than the value registered in calculating the real estate transfer tax, because buyers and sellers often register lower prices.
In our hedonic residential rent model, the dependent variable is a vector of residential rents, and the independent variables are matrices of the structural characteristics of the housing unit, access to employment, and neighborhood characteristics, including indicators of access to urban infrastructure and services. The variables used are for the household per se and also for the census area in which it is located. Figure 1 shows Metro Rio’s 336 census areas and the larger municipal boundaries grouped into six subregions based on indicators analyzed in this and previous studies (Lago 2010).
The indicator for access to employment measures the average commute time to work for residents in each of the census areas. Figure 2 (p. 16) shows that the average commute time increases with distance from the center, but not by as much as one might expect—partly due to increased traffic congestion in all areas and to the fact that Metro Rio is polycentric with many subordinate centers.
The indicators of the quality of neighborhood infrastructure and services include the household`s access to the public sewer and water systems, garbage collection, and block conditions (e.g., street paving and drainage). As these indicators are highly intercorrelated, the component scores from a principal components analysis serve as the independent variables in the hedonic model. Component 1 explains 46.6 percent of the variance and shows high positive loadings on adequate block conditions and infrastructure, and high negative loadings on inadequate block conditions (e.g., garbage in the street and open sewers), indicating which areas have a higher level of attractiveness or desirability (figure 3). Although the lowest scores are clearly concentrated in the outlying areas, the patterns of attractiveness vary considerably. As with commute times, the distribution pattern of the attractiveness scores reveals the complexity of Metro Rio’s spatial structure.
Our hedonic model explains 73 percent of the variance of residential rent. The key independent variables are statistically significant; neighborhood quality and access to employment explain nearly two-thirds of the variance, while the structural characteristics of the housing explain only about one-third of the variance. In other words, the bulk of housing value is the capitalized value of access to employment and to neighborhood infrastructure and services, all of which are determined in large part by public expenditures. Figure 4 (p. 18) shows the distribution of average estimated housing values for census areas in US$ determined by our methodology. (The average exchange rate for 2010 is US$1=R$1.76.) These values tend to be highest in areas affording relatively low commute times and good access to urban infrastructure and services.
Distribution of Residential Wealth
How much residential wealth is the property of homeowners versus the landlords of rental properties and rent-free units used by employers, family members, or others? Our estimate of Metro Rio’s aggregate residential wealth of both occupied and unoccupied units in 2010 is US$155.1 billion (94.2 percent of Metro Rio’s 2010 GDP of US$164.4 billion) and US$140.2 billion for occupied units only (84.2 percent of Metro Rio’s GDP). Among total occupied units, 74.8 percent of this residential wealth (about US$105 billion) belongs to owner-occupied units, and the rest belongs to landlords of rented and rent-free units. In the case of lower-income households, the landlords could be another lower-income family.
Table 1 shows that the percent of homeowners is quite similar for all household income groups. For example, homeowners occupy nearly three-quarters of the households in the lowest household income group (with fewer than two minimum salaries or an average annual income of only US$4,407). A key reason for these high homeownership levels is that those living in favelas, squatter settlements, or other types of informal housing can declare themselves homeowners, even if they do not legally own the land on which their home is located. The 2010 Census showed more than 520,000 households (more than 15 percent of the total private permanent urban households) living in these types of settlements in Metro Rio. Land ownership in these settlements is a complex legal question on which even lawyers may not agree, since the chances of removal (at least removal without compensation) are quite low, and those living on land without a legal title may be eligible for squatter’s rights after five years under Brazilian law.
Although 25.3 percent of total households earned less than two minimum salaries (US$ 6,960 per year), the homeowners in this group held only 15.3 percent of the aggregate residential wealth of all homeowners. By contrast, only 15.6 percent of households earned 10 or more minimum salaries (US$34,800 per year), but homeowners in this income group held 34.5 percent of the aggregate residential wealth. Nonetheless, lower income households have more residential wealth than one might expect, in part because they are often homeowners in informal settlements.
Figure 5 (p. 19) shows the Lorenz Curve for the distribution of aggregate residential wealth of homeowners by housing value groups. This distribution is quite unequal, because the nearly 23.7 percent who are not homeowners have no such wealth (as shown where the Lorenz curve runs along the bottom of the axis) and because those living in higher-priced housing have greater residential wealth.
Distribution of Residential Wealth by Subregions
The bulk of aggregate residential wealth is held by those living in the suburbs and periphery around Metro Rio, although the average value of their housing units is lower. Table 2 shows that those subregions (4 and 6) together represent 79 percent of Metro Rio’s total households (3.1 million) and 58.1 percent of aggregate residential wealth (US$80.9 billion). Subregion 2 (the older, higher-income neighborhoods along the bay and coast) holds only 6.3 percent of Metro Rio’s households (about 242,000) and 19.0 percent of its residential wealth.
The percentage of renters is highest in the large squatter settlements (subregion 5), at 28.6 percent, with an additional 2.7 percent of rent-free units. Homeownership rates are highest (80.4 percent) in the periphery (subregion 6), where many owners live on land for which they do not have full legal title, though these areas generally are not squatter settlements as defined by IBGE.
Spatial Distribution of Household Income
One result of the interplay of market forces that shape residential rent and housing prices is that the distribution of aggregate household income tends to mirror the distribution of aggregate residential wealth. In other words, there is a relatively high residential segregation by income groups, with lower-income families concentrated in the large squatter settlements and in the suburbs and periphery (subregions 4, 5, and 6). High spatial concentration of higher-income households generates higher aggregate income and demand in areas that support higher-level services—in turn making these areas more attractive to higher-income homebuyers and renters. Figure 6 (p. 20) shows that the average annual household incomes for the census areas in 2010 reflect to a large extent the distribution of average housing values (figure 4), commute times (figure 2), and neighborhood attractiveness (figure 3).
In 2010, the high-income Barra da Tijuca area (subregion 3) held only 2.1 percent of total households in Metro Rio but 8.1 percent of aggregate household income and 7.6 percent of aggregate residential wealth. By comparison, the four large squatter settlements of subregion 5 held 2.5 percent of total households but only 1.0 percent of aggregate household income and 1.4 percent of residential wealth. Nonetheless, the aggregate residential value in these four squatter settlements was nearly US$2 billion, and the average housing value was almost US$21,000. These results show a relatively high spatial concentration of both aggregate household income and residential wealth that is tempered slightly by the home-ownership rate in squatter settlements.
Implications for Methodology and Policy Decisions
The methodology used in this analysis provides interesting insights into the macroeconomic and social importance of residential wealth; the variables that generate it; its distribution among household tenure, income, and housing value groups; and its allocation among subregions ranging from high-income neighborhoods to squatter settlements. The strong assumptions required in using the methodology must be taken into account when interpreting the results. Data from property registries or other sources with more detailed information on unit size could eventually be used to complement this methodology.
Government services, investments, and regulatory actions can result in benefits (e.g., access to employment, urban services, and amenities) and costs (e.g., taxes, fees, and negative environmental impacts) that are capitalized into the value of housing in the affected neighborhoods. For homeowners, positive net benefits from government actions increase their residential wealth, because they are capitalized in the value of their housing. However, for renters and new homebuyers, these same government actions can cause rents and housing prices to rise along with the net benefits. Some households, especially the lower-income renters and homebuyers, may have to leave the benefited area, and other potential new owners may be unable to locate in the area. Thus, housing tenure is important in determining whether or not a household receives the net benefits of government investments and regulatory actions.
Capitalization of the net benefits of government actions would clearly be an issue for the more than 30 percent of households in the four large squatter settlements that are not homeowners, as well as for those entering the housing market. Although there are no reliable data on housing turnover, we know that the total number of urban households in Metro Rio increased more than 20 percent, by almost 657,000, between 2000 and 2010. This increment was 14 percent higher than the total number of households in the Municipality of Curitiba (the state capital of Paraná) in 2010 and well over twice the number in Washington, D.C. All these new households, plus all the renters (about one-fifth of total households) and homeowners wishing to move, would be subject to increased rents and housing prices generated by the net benefits of government actions.
These results demonstrate a need for policies to ensure that rising rents and housing prices do not exclude some households from areas where public services and infrastructure are being improved. For example, financial assistance for home purchases could be part of the improvement program. One way of financing the needed lower-income housing and investment programs would be to capture part of the value being generated by infrastructure investments from higher-income households. Capturing part of the value generated by urban investments could help finance additional housing subsidies for lower-income families, as well as added investment, thereby providing a kind of investment multiplier.
About the Authors
David M. Vetter (Ph.D. University of California) has worked for more than four decades on urban finance and economics issues in Latin America for Brazilian entities, at the World Bank and Dexia Credit Local, and also as a consultant.
Kaizô I. Beltrão (Ph.D. Princeton University) was the dean and a senior researcher at the National Statistics School (an entity of IBGE) and is now a full professor and senior researcher at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas.
Rosa M. R. Massena (Doctorate, Université de Bordeaux) was a senior researcher at the IBGE for 23 years and since then has worked as a consultant on social indicators programs for Habitat, the World Bank, UNDP, and other entities.
Resources
Cruz, Bruno. O. and Maria P. Morais. 2000. Demand for Housing and Urban Services in Brazil: A Hedonic Approach. Paper presented at the European Network for Housing Research Conference, Gavle, Sweden (June).
Garner, Thesia I. 2004. Incorporating the Value of Owner-Occupied Housing in Poverty Measurement. Prepared for the Workshop on Experimental Poverty Measures, Committee on National Statistics. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies.
Lago, Luciana C. 2010. Olhares Sobre a Metrópole do Rio de Janeiro: Economia, Sociedade e Território. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Observatório das Metrópoles, FASE, IPPUR/UFRJ.
Reiff, Luis. O. and Ana L. Barbosa. 2005. Housing Stock in Brazil: Estimation Based on a Hedonic Price Model. Paper No. 21. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Tafner, Paulo and Marcia Carvalho. 2007. Evolução da Distribuição Familiar da Riqueza Imobiliária no Brasil: 1995–2004. Revista de Economia 33(2) (Julho-Dezembro): 7–40.
Vetter, David M., Kaizô I. Beltrão, and Rosa R. Massena. 2013. The Determinants of Residential Wealth and Its Distribution in Space and Among Household Income Groups in the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region: A Hedonic Analysis of the 2010 Census Data. Working Paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
It is with great sadness that we announce that Arlo Woolery passed away on February 28, 2002, at his home in Sun City West, Arizona.
Arlo brought zest, courtesy and unfailing curiosity to all of his endeavors over 82 years. Even before graduation from Luther College in Decorah, Iowa, in 1943, he turned his gift for public speaking to early success as a radio broadcaster. He provided play-by-play radio descriptions of baseball games, complete with sound effects for hits and cheering crowds, guided only by wire service score reports. Later he held several executive positions in radio and television, dealing both with broadcasting, equipment manufacturing and the first development of cable television networks.
He became an expert on public utility regulation and valuation, earning the Certified Assessment Evaluator (CAE) designation from the International Association of Assessing Officers and serving as chairman of its education committee. He was an expert witness in numerous utility valuation cases and taught in the annual Wichita State University program on railroad and utility valuation for many years. The Supreme Court of Utah reflected the respect with which he was regarded when it described him as a “well-educated, long experienced and highly qualified appraiser.” From 1967 to 1976 he served as director of the Property Tax Program for the state of Arizona, dealing with issues of valuation and tax administration and taking the lead in the development of computer-assisted mass appraisal.
Arlo was the first executive director of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, from 1974 to 1986, and upon retirement was named the Archibald M. Woodruff Fellow. He led the Institute’s move to Cambridge and its establishment as a center for education on land use and land-related tax issues. He organized and participated in numerous international symposiums on property taxation, land policy and computer-assisted valuation. He assisted in the development of the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training (formerly the Land Reform Training Institute) in Taiwan and served on its Board of Directors from 1975 to 2000. He also wrote and edited many books, including The Art of Valuation (1978); Introduction to Computer Assisted Valuation (1985); Property Tax Principles and Practice (1989); and Valuation of Railroad and Utility Property (1992).
“Arlo’s legacy to the Lincoln Institute is its solid academic underpinnings,” notes Kathryn J. Lincoln, Chairman of the Board. “Even after his official retirement, Arlo remained involved with the Lincoln Foundation, and his continuing leadership and teaching at the International Center for Land Policy Studies and Training were instrumental in the development of that Lincoln program. We shall miss his wisdom and guidance.”
The interactions between land and property markets and the broader economy of cities and nations are central to the Lincoln Institute’s concerns. Two key objectives of our work in this area are (1) to raise awareness about the stakes of good land policy for creating well-functioning land and property markets and for improving the performance of financial markets, labor markets, the fiscal affairs of local and national governments, and ultimately the economic health of both cities and countries; and (2) to indicate the need for high quality data and an appropriate analytical framework to aid in understanding the importance of good land policy, monitoring the effects of land policies throughout the economy and facilitating policy reforms. In November 1997, the Lincoln Institute held a conference on the theme of “Land Prices, Information Systems, and the Market for Land Information” to explore these issues.
Land Values and Land Policy
How important are the stakes of good land policy? Hee-Nam Jung of the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements reported on the importance of land markets in the economies of five countries (see Table 1). The value of land in mature economies such as Canada, France and the United States ranged from about one-third to three-quarters of GNP during the mid-1980s, and represented from 8 to 21 percent of estimated national wealth. In the more rapidly growing economies of Japan and Korea, land values were from three to six times as high as GNP in the 1980s, and represented half or more of estimated national wealth. In the mature economies these figures illustrate the importance of land as a source of wealth, but in rapidly growing economies land has an even more significant role in determining economic welfare and a host of incentives for the performance of the economy.
In Japan, for example, booming land and property values during the 1980s served as collateral to fund credit expansion throughout the economy and, indeed, throughout the world. Land prices in Japan’s six largest cities increased dramatically from 1980 to 1991, at a compound rate of about 12 percent annually (see Figure 1). By 1990, the estimated price of land being developed for residential purposes in Tokyo was estimated to be about $3,000 per square meter, compared to figures of roughly $110 in Toronto and Paris and $70 in Washington, D.C.
Between 1991 and 1996, however, Japanese land prices fell by nearly half, taking down the Japanese economy and a host of financial institutions in its wake. The cumulative losses of the Japanese banking system associated with the collapse of the property market and associated businesses are estimated around $1 trillion, making the U.S. Savings and Loan “crisis” seem comparatively insignificant. Analysis of Japanese land policy suggests some of the causes of the boom and bust cycle in land prices: policies that have severely restricted conversion of agricultural land to urban uses; an especially complex land development system that requires exceptionally long times for approvals; and a fiscal system that places little emphasis on the taxation of land and property values.
Land prices in Korea also rose at a tremendous rate during the 1980s-over 16 percent annually from 1981 to 1991. Remarkably, in most years nominal capital gains on Korean land were greater than Korea’s GNP. Jung explained that these gains had profound implications for the distribution of wealth and income in Korea, and for economic incentives. Not surprisingly, the recent collapse of Korean property markets has had tidal effects throughout the economy. As in the case of Japan, the Korean land policy framework has been seen as highly questionable. Government intervention in land and property markets over the years has been responsible for severely distorted markets that represent a major structural imbalance in the Korean economy.
Using Land Market Data for Policy Analysis
Other speakers at the conference presented information on the importance of land market performance for a variety of stakeholders throughout the economy: consumers and taxpayers; land developers and builders of residential and non-residential properties; banks and financial institutions; and both local and central governments. In the case of Cracow, Poland, Alain Bertaud from the World Bank indicated that policies embodied in master plans and zoning regulations were highly inconsistent with the nominal objectives of the regulations, and would lead to inefficient and costly spatial patterns within the city. His paper illustrated the value of having good data on land prices, regulations and the spatial distribution of the population in order to evaluate the effects of policies involving land use, infrastructure and property taxation.
Paul Cheshire from Oberlin College and Stephen Sheppard from the London School of Economics illustrated how data on land and housing prices, land and housing characteristics, and regulations can be used to evaluate the effects of government policies such as the preservation of urban open space. Jean-Paul Blandinieres of the French Ministry of Equipment, Transportation and Housing discussed an ambitious program of the French government to establish “Urban Observatories” to collect and analyze information on land and property markets and the effects of government policies.
Data Collection on Land and Property Markets
Recognition of the costs of land policy failures or, conversely, of the benefits associated with implementing good policies, has given rise to a number of systematic efforts to collect and analyze high quality data on land and property markets within various institutional settings. Pablo Trivelli discussed land and property information systems in Latin America that serve the needs of public and private stakeholders. Perhaps the most impressive of these is an effort in Brazil called EMBRAESP, which monitors key indicators of urban property market performance along with urban legislation, land regulations and major public works projects that might have an impact on the behavior of property markets. Data and analyses from EMBRAESP are of interest to many institutions throughout Brazil. The distribution of the information is self-sustaining through contracts with major newspaper chains, sales of periodic bulletins, disks containing standard data, and special reports responding to individual demands. Much of this information can also be accessed through the Internet.
Another major data collection and analysis effort was reported by David Dowall from the University of California-Berkeley. He developed the “Land Market Assessment,” a tool for analysis of land and housing markets that has been applied in over 30 developing countries and transitional economies. At comparatively modest cost, data are collected through aerial photos and satellite images, surveys of land brokers, and secondary sources on population, infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. Dowall’s analysis of the experience with these assessments documents a number of generic policy findings, especially concerning the costs of inappropriate land policies. His work also suggests that even more cost-effective versions of the tool can be developed that will illustrate the workings of land markets and beneficial policy reforms.
Romeo Sherko, David Stanfield and Malcolm Childress from the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, addressed the issue of designing a strategy for the creation and dissemination of land information in transitional economies, where information has historically been tightly held, thus frustrating both the evolution of property markets and opportunities for policy analysis. Their conclusions regarding the role of the public and private sectors, the scope of data collection, and pricing and dissemination strategies help to explain why land market information is often not provided or is poorly provided by either the government or the private sector. On the other hand, their analysis suggests that the benefits of good land market information are considerable. Some of these benefits were illustrated by David Dale-Johnson from the University of Southern California and Jan Brzeski from Jagellonian University, Cracow, who discussed efforts to document rapidly evolving market prices of property in Cracow and to inform property tax reform efforts.
Samu Kurri, Seppo Laakso, and Heikki Loikkanen of the Finnish Government Institute of Economic Research discussed the land price information system in Finland, suggesting that it is only now beginning to catch up with the needs of many different potential users of the data. These users include those concerned with implementation of a new property tax and macro-economic and financial sector policymakers concerned with the interaction of the Finnish property market and national economic performance. Karl (Chip) Case of Wellesley College presented findings from a preliminary analysis of 100 years of land prices in Boston, which was designed, among other things, to highlight some of the methodological difficulties of measuring land prices in a way that facilitates policy analysis and reform.
Stephen K. Mayo is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute.
Land value is determined primarily by external factors, mainly changes that occur in the neighborhood or other parts of the city rather than by direct actions of the landowner. This observation is especially valid for small lots whose form or type of occupancy do not generate sufficiently strong externalities to increase their own value retroactively; that is, a small lot generally does not have a significant impact on those very external factors that could affect its own value. However, large urban projects (grandes proyectos urbanos or GPUs) do influence those factors, and also the value of the land that supports them. Herein lies the essence the Lincoln Institute’s interest in such projects.
We propose two perspectives for analyzing GPUs that complement and contrast with others that formerly predominated in this debate. First, these projects can be a stimulating force for immediate urban change that is capable of affecting land values, and therefore land use, for large areas if not an entire city region. This view is focused more on urban design or urbanism and stresses the study of the physical, esthetic and symbolic dimensions of large urban projects. A second approach, covering the field of regulation, attempts to understand the land value appreciation generated by the implementation and operation of these projects as a potential means for self-support and economic feasibility. It analyzes the role of GPUs in providing a new function for certain areas of the city. Both perspectives require a more holistic understanding that includes the diversity and levels of complexity of the projects, their relation to the city plan, the type of regulatory framework they require, the role of the public and private sectors in managing and financing them, land taxation and fiscal policies, and other factors.
These large projects are not new to Latin America. In the early twentieth century, many cities were impacted by programs that used public-private management arrangements, including outside players (national and international) and complex financial structures. Some projects had the potential to trigger urban processes capable of transforming their surroundings or even the city as a whole, as well as accentuating the preexisting socio-spatial polarization. Often the projects were layered over existing regulations, contributing to questions about the urban planning strategies in force at the time. Large urban developers and utility companies (English, Canadian, French and others) coordinated the provision of services with complex real estate development operations in almost all the major cities of Latin America.
Today large projects attempt to intervene in especially sensitive places to reorient urban processes and create new urban identities on a symbolic level. They also aim to create new economic areas (sometimes territorial enclaves) able to foster an environment protected from urban poverty and violence, and more favorable to domestic or international private investment. When describing the motives that justify these programs, the rhetoric focuses on their instrumental role in strategic planning, their alleged contribution to urban productivity, and their effectiveness in boosting their intercity competitive position.
In a context marked by transformations due to globalization, economic reforms, deregulation and the introduction of a new focus on urban management, it is not surprising that these programs have been the subject of much controversy. Their scale and complexity often spur new social movements; redefine economic opportunities; put into question urban development regulatory frameworks and land use rules; strain local finances; and expand political arenas, thus altering the roles of urban stakeholders. An additional complication is the long time frame for executing large urban projects, which usually exceeds the terms of municipal governments and the limits of their territorial authority. This reality presents additional management challenges and formidable dilemmas within the public and academic debate.
The Lincoln Institute’s contribution to this debate is to underscore the land component in the structure of these large projects, specifically the processes associated with urban land management and the mechanisms for land value capture or the mobilization of land value increments for the benefit of the community. This article is part of a broader, ongoing effort to systematize recent Latin American experience with GPUs and to discuss the relevant aspects.
A Wide Range of Projects
As in other parts of the world, large urban projects in Latin America comprise a wide range of activities: restoration of historic downtown areas (Old Havana or Lima); renovation of neglected downtown areas (São Paulo or Montevideo); redevelopment of ports and waterfronts (Puerto Madero in Buenos Aires or Ribera Norte in Concepción, Chile); reuse of old airports or industrial zones (the Tamanduatehy artery in Santo Andre, Brazil, or the Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile); expansion zones (Santa Fé, Mexico, or the former Panama Canal zone); residential or neighborhood improvement projects (Nuevo Usme in Bogotá or Favela Bairro in Rio de Janeiro); and so on.
Land management is a key component in all of these projects, and it presents diverse sets of conditions (Lungo 2004; forthcoming). One common trait is that the projects are managed by a government authority as part of a city project or plan, even though they enjoy private participation in several respects. Thus exclusively private programs, such as shopping centers and gated communities, are a different category of development project not included in this discussion.
Scale and Complexity
The minimum threshold of scale, in terms of surface area or amount of financial investment, for a project to meet the GPU criteria depends on the size of the city, its economy, social structure and other factors, all of which help define the complexity of the project. In Latin America projects often combine large scale and a complex set of players associated with key roles in land policy and management, including various levels of government (national, provincial and municipal), private entities and community leaders from the affected area. Even relatively small upgrading projects are often formidably complex with regard to the land readjustment component.
There is obviously a huge difference between a project proposed by one or a few owners over a large area (such as ParLatino, an abandoned industrial site in São Paulo) and a project involving the cooperation of many owners of small areas. The latter requires a complex series of actions capable of generating synergies or sufficient external economies to make each action economically viable. Most projects fall between the two extremes. They often involve the prior acquisition of rights over smaller parcels by a few agents in order to centralize control over the type and management of the development.
The key to analysis and design of GPUs in Latin America lies in the ability of the institutional organization in charge of project management to incorporate and coordinate scale and complexity appropriately. Governmental corporations have been created in some cases, but they operate autonomously (as in Puerto Madero) or as special public agencies attached to the central or municipal governments (as in the housing program being developed in the city of Rosario, Argentina, or the Nuevo Usme program in Bogotá). The case of the failed project to build the new Mexico City airport demonstrates the negative consequences of not correctly defining this fundamental aspect of GPUs.
Relationship of GPUs to the City Plan
What is the point of developing GPUs when the city has no comprehensive urban development plan or socially shared vision? It is possible to find situations where execution of GPUs may stimulate, enhance or strengthen the city plan, but in practice many such projects are established without any plan. One of the main criticisms aimed at GPUs is that they become instruments for excluding citizen participation in decision making about individual elements of what is expected or supposed to be part of an integrated urban project, as is normally provided for in a city’s master plan or land use plan.
This is an interesting debate within the framework of urban policies in Latin America, since urban planning itself has been criticized as being elitist and exclusionary. Some authors have concluded that urban planning has been one if not the main cause of the excesses of social segregation typical of cities in the region. In this context the recent popularity of GPUs can be seen as a reaction of the elite to redemocratization and participatory urban planning. Others may view GPUs as an advanced (and perverse) form of traditional urban planning; a yielding to the failures or ineffectiveness of urban planning; or even a lesser evil because at least they ensure that something is done in some part of the city.
There are many challenges for GPUs regarding their relationship to a city plan. They can help build a city plan where none exists, alter traditional plans, or do what we might call “navigating through the urban fog” if the former paths are not viable. In any case, land management proves to be a critical factor, both for the plan and for the projects, because it refers to the fundamental role of the regulatory framework covering urban land use and expansion.
Regulatory Framework
The preferred regulatory solution would be a two-part intervention: on one hand, maintaining general regulations for the whole city but changing the conventional criteria to be more flexible in absorbing the constant change taking place in urban environments; and on the other, allowing specific regulations for certain projects but avoiding regulatory frameworks that may contradict the stated goals of the city plan. Urban Operations, a specific and ingenious instrument devised under the Brazilian urban development legislation (Statute of the City Act of 2001), has been used widely to accommodate these dual needs. The city of São Paulo alone has 16 such operations in effect. Another version of this instrument is the so-called “partial planning” provision to readjust large tracts of land, which is included in Colombia’s equally innovative Law 388 of 1997.
Again in practice we see that exceptions are often granted in an apparently arbitrary manner, and regulatory restrictions are frequently ignored. The point is that neither type of regulation is submitted to any assessment of its socioeconomic and environmental value, thus losing a significant portion of its justification. Given the financial and fiscal fragility of cities in Latin America, what prevails is an extremely low capacity for public discussion of the requests made by the proponents of GPUs. The absence of institutional mechanisms that would make these negotiations transparent makes them more venal, insofar as they expose the capacity to discuss other, less prosaic legal challenges.
Public or Private Management and Financing
What is the desirable combination of public and private management of these projects? To guarantee that public management of a large urban project fulfills its function, land use must be monitored and regulated, although the degree to which the control should be exercised, and on which specific components of land ownership rights, is unresolved. Ambiguity in the courts and the uncertainties associated with the development of GPUs often result in public frustration over unanticipated outcomes favoring private interests. The proper balance between effective ex ante (GPU formulation, negotiation and design) and ex post (GPU implementation, management, operation and impacts) controls over land uses and rights is at the heart of the problem. Typically in the Latin American experience with GPUs there is a huge gap between original promises and actual outcomes.
In recent years the management of GPUs has been confused with the utility and feasibility of public-private partnerships, such as those set up in many countries to carry out specific projects or programs. Some stakeholders even propose the possibility of privatizing urban development management in general. If the private sector has complete control over the land, however, GPUs are severely limited in their ability to contribute to socially sustainable urban development, despite the fact that in many cases the projects contribute significant taxes to the city (Polese and Stren 2000).
The preferred public management system should call on the greatest social participation possible and include the private sector in the financing and implementation of these projects. The large urban programs that seem to contribute the most to the development of a city are those based on public management of the land.
Land Value Appreciation
There is consensus around the fact that GPUs generate an appreciation in land value. Differences emerge when we try to assess the real amount of this appreciation, if it is to be redistributed and, if so, how it should be shared and whom it should benefit, both in social and territorial terms. Again we have the public-private conundrum, wherein this redistribution formula often leads to the appropriation of public resources by the private sector.
The appreciation of land value as a resource that can be mobilized for self-financing the GPU or transferred to other areas of the city could be a way to measure whether or not public management of these projects is a success. However, we rarely have an acceptable estimate of this land value increment. Even in the Puerto Madero project in Buenos Aires, which is considered to be a success, to date there is no evaluation of the land value increment associated with either the properties within the project itself or those in neighboring areas. As a result, the discussion of possible redistribution has not gone beyond a few educated guesses.
GPUs conceived as instruments for achieving certain strategic urban goals are generally registered as successes when they are executed according to plan. The question regarding to what extent these goals were actually reached is not fully answered, and it is often conveniently forgotten. The hypothesis that best seems to fit Latin American experiences with GPUs is that the apparent lack of interest in goals has little to do with any technical inability to make the source of the increased value transparent. Rather, this inattention comes from the need to hide the role of public management in facilitating the private sector’s capture of the land value increment in general, if not its capture of public resources used to develop the construction project itself.
We are not feigning ignorance of or trying to minimize the difficulties in advancing knowledge about how land value appreciation is formed and in measuring its size and circulation. Indeed, there are many technical obstacles to overcome when faced with complicated land rights, the vicissitudes or permanent flaws in cadastres and property registers, and the lack of an historical series of geo-referenced real estate values. Even the smallest plan must distinguish between the appreciation generated by the project itself and that generated by urban externalities that almost always exist despite the scale of the project, the different sources and rates of appreciation, and so forth. Some encouraging work has been done on measuring and evaluating the land value increment associated with development, but technical obstacles seem to be less relevant than the lack of political interest in knowing how these projects are being managed.
When land value increments are created, they are usually distributed in the immediate project area or nearby. This principle is based on the need to finance a specific project within the area, to offset certain negative impacts, or to implement actions such as relocating precarious housing sited on the land or its surroundings that may detract from the image of the new project. Given the socioeconomic conditions found in the typical Latin American city, it is not hard to see that the preferred use of the captured value is to earmark it for projects of a social nature in other parts of the city, such as housing complexes. In fact a significant part of the generated land value increment results exactly from the removal of negative externalities produced by the presence of low-income families in the area. Needless to say, this strategy raises conflicting opinions.
There is certainly a need to devise better legislation and instruments to overcome the trade-off between socially mobilized land value increment and gentrification through displacement. Despite the lack of hard empirical studies, there are reasons to believe that a broader understanding of the impacts of these projects will show that some of the compensatory intracity transfers may actually prove to be counterproductive. For example, the resulting higher land price differences and social residential segregation may involve higher social costs that will need to be addressed by additional public resources in the future (Smolka and Furtado 2001).
Positive and Negative Impacts
On the other hand, the negative impacts caused by GPUs often obscure the varied positive impacts. The challenge is how to reduce the negative impacts produced by this type of urban intervention. It soon becomes clear, whether directly or indirectly, that the role of land management is critical to understanding the effects of large interventions in urban development, planning, regulation, socio-spatial segregation, and the urban environment and culture. Scale and complexity have a role as well, depending on the type of impact. For example, scale is more relevant to environmental and urban development impacts, while complexity is more critical in terms of social impact and urban policy.
As already mentioned, the gentrification that these projects generally produce encourages the displacement of the existing, usually poor, inhabitants from the new project area. However, gentrification is a complex phenomenon that requires further analysis of its own negative aspects, as well as how it could help to raise living standards. It could be more useful to move on from simple mitigation of unwanted negative impacts to better management of the processes that create these risks.
Any GPU can have positive or negative effects, depending on the way urban development is managed, the role of the public sector, and the existing level of citizen participation. We have emphasized that one of the central issues is management of the land and of the land value increment associated with these projects. Large urban projects can not be analyzed in isolation from the entire development of the city. Likewise, the land component must be evaluated with respect to the combination of scale and complexity that is appropriate for each project.
Mario Lungo is a professor and researcher at the Central American University (UCA José Simeón Cañas) in San Salvador, El Salvador. He formerly served as executive director of the Office of Planning for the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador.
Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, cochairman of the Department of International Studies and director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.
References
Lungo, Mario, ed. 2004. Grandes proyectos urbanos (Large urban projects). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.
Lungo, Mario (forthcoming). Grandes proyectos urbanos. Una revisión de casos latinoamericanos (Large urban projects: A review of Latin American cases). San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.
Smolka, Martim and Fernanda Furtado. 2001. Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina (Value capture in Latin America). Santiago, Chile: EURE Libros.
Polese, Mario and Richard Stren. 2000. The social sustainability of cities. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Sonia Rabello de Castro has a Ph.D. in law and is a professor of administrative law and urban law at the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ). She was elected in 2008 as a member of the Municipal Legislative Council of the City of Rio de Janeiro, representing the Green Party. She is also a member of the Ethics and Mores Parliamentary Committee and represents the Legislative Municipal Council at the Environmental Municipal Council.
From 1992 to 1996 she was attorney general for the Municipality of Rio de Janeiro, where she collaborated in the development of several far-reaching urban projects, including the Favela-Bairro program. She has also worked as director of legal services for a number of public entities and has published numerous articles on urban development, housing, governance, public administration, and preservation of the cultural patrimony. Her book on Preservation of the Brazilian Cultural Patrimony (Preservação do Patrimônio Cultural Brasileiro) is considered a basic reference for administrative and juridical decisions on this topic.
Land Lines: How did you become associated with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy?
Sonia Rabello: I met Martim Smolka, the director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, in the late 1990s, when I was researching how the traditional concept of property rights based upon civil law could be transformed in the context of urban law. The development of new urban laws could lead to conceptual changes in the way the right to property was originally understood, given the need to adapt the concept to meet the social and economic requirements of urban development. At that time, Brazil had not yet approved the federal urban development law known as the City Statute (Estatuto da Cidade), although the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988 had introduced the principle of urban development as a social function subject to public policy.
As a visiting fellow at Lincoln House in 2000 I became convinced of the need to create a new, more modern concept of property rights that would reflect the current urban reality in Latin America and allow for the use of the city by all citizens, whether they are property owners or not.
Land Lines: Can you explain this property rights concept further?
Sonia Rabello: It is the need to distinguish the right to own land from the right to build on that land. The Civil Code in Latin American countries follows the French model, which defines real estate property rights as having three components guaranteed to the owner: the right to use the property; the right to receive income accruing from the property; and the right to dispose of the property. Only the owner can exercise these rights. The right to build is not in itself an inherent component of this property right, but a condition for the owner to use the property, without which the utility of the property would be voided—and in this case the very meaning of the property right would be lost.
For the owner to exercise her ownership right to use the property, the public authority, through established urban planning regulations, must allocate a minimum building coefficient to that land. The building coefficient refers to the amount of development allowed on a parcel, also known as floor-area-ratio (FAR). The allocation of an equitable and free minimum building coefficient applied to all properties uniformly has a double function. First, it guarantees to all owners and possessors an economic use of their property. Second, it precludes the occurrence of unjust differences in the allocation of building coefficients among owners.
Land Lines: Why is this concept important for Latin America?
Sonia Rabello: All Latin American countries, including Brazil, have been addressing urban regulation and land policy at the national level, especially since the economic stabilization and redemocratization during the 1990s, when the need to consider the so-called accumulated social debt became a prominent issue. At the time, Latin American cities were experiencing acute problems due to the lack of basic infrastructure services such as sewer systems, public spaces, transportation, and access to affordable housing, as well as the challenge of creating a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits in the urbanization process.
Land Lines: How relevant is Brazil’s City Statute in this process?
Sonia Rabello: The City Statute, which was approved in 2001, confirms the distinction between the right to own land and the right to build, a distinction that had been discussed and implemented since the 1970s in São Paulo and other Brazilian cities. The expression “right to build” as used in the Brazilian Civil Code had led many landowners to assume that their right to own land also included the right to build on the land, in keeping with urban legislation and norms.
How much and what can be built is reflected in the price of land. That is, parcels with a higher building coefficient than others, or parcels where commercial use is permitted as well as residential use, sell at prices that incorporate the benefits freely given to landowners by the public authorities. When this happens, landowners appropriate as their private good the building rights provided by urban law, even though they had not invested in the infrastructure or services needed to support the land development. As a result, the costs of urbanization fall entirely on the public authority while private citizens profit, contradicting the general legal principle barring enrichment without just cause.
Land Lines: What does the principle of “enrichment without just cause” mean?
Sonia Rabello: This general principle of law, accepted in most Latin American countries, deems unacceptable an increase in private wealth that does not result from the person’s own labor or investment—that is, a legitimate cause pertaining to the person who benefits financially. In Brazil this principle is explicit in the legislation, specifically in the Civil Code, and is applicable to the entire juridical system.
Land Lines: How does the City Statute provide for the separation of the right to own land from the right to build?
Sonia Rabello: This concept was introduced through the instrument known as “charge for awarded building rights” (outorga onerosa do direito de construir) in Art. 28: “The master plan may delineate areas where the building right can be exercised above the basic coefficient adopted, given a counterpart payment by the beneficiary.” It is important to emphasize that the City Statute is a federal law that addresses the content of real estate property rights and has the same hierarchical standing as the Civil Code. Thus, if the law states that the public authority shall charge for a given right, then that right does not belong to the person to whom it is given.
Land Lines: In what way does the “charge for awarded building rights” help to preclude enrichment without just cause?
Sonia Rabello: The charge extracts the corresponding value of such rights from the land price. In other words, without that charge, the land price would include the value of the building rights freely granted to the landowner by the urban planning legislation. Without the charge, when the landowner sold the land he would be paid according to its market value, which includes the maximum use permitted on that land.
Land Lines: However, if I buy land expecting to build at a given floor-area-ratio that exceeds the basic coefficient and the public authority charges for these awarded building rights, wouldn’t that imply paying twice for the land?
Sonia Rabello: No, as long as the system of acquiring building rights from the public authority is well-established. Under the new law, building rights above the minimum coefficient belong to the city as a whole and must be purchased separately from the public authority. As a result, when paying the landowner, the buyer discounts from the land price the value of the additional awarded building rights.
Land Lines: In what other ways is this charge implemented to benefit society?
Sonia Rabello: In addition to addressing unjust enrichment, the principle concerns the legitimacy of recovering the added land value generated by public sector interventions in the urbanization process, and to prevent the added value accruing to the landowner. This principle is also reflected in the compensation paid for urban land expropriation. When not recovered by the public authority, the value of the additional building rights becomes an integral part of the market price. If the public authority expropriates that land, the landowner will receive compensation equivalent to the market price, which includes the land value plus the value of the building coefficient granted by the public authority free of charge.
Land Lines: Since the property tax is imposed on real estate property, wouldn’t this charge constitute double-taxing?
Sonia Rabello: To understand why this is not the case we need to look at the important distinction between the Colombian and Brazilian legislation. The Colombian law classifies the value capture charge as a tax, but in Brazil it is defined as an instrument for the public authority to recover a good that belongs to society. That is, the nature of the charge is a responsibility relative to the costs of urbanization. A decision by the Brazilian Supreme Court (RE509422 STFSC of 2008) resolved this issue by ruling that the charge for awarded building rights is not a tax but a payment for which the landowner is responsible.
I think this juridical opinion is coherent given that a tax corresponds to a contribution to the public treasury from one’s private assets, but, as noted, awarded building rights are not privately owned but are a public good that belongs to the city as a whole. To classify the value capture charge as a tax suggests a juridical inconsistency, since taxation is a form of assessing private wealth to finance public goods and services. This is not the case in Brazil, since the charge is levied on an essentially public asset.
Land Lines: Does the judiciary in Latin America accept and implement these concepts?
Sonia Rabello: Not uniformly or consistently. These juridical concepts fundamentally change the traditional understanding of property rights. Because of that, the principles upon which they are based and the logic behind them must be disseminated and assimilated more broadly. This is a judicial evolution that has to happen in order to reduce the exacerbated social exclusion that characterized Latin American cities.
Land Lines: How has the Lincoln Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean contributed to this new vision of land policy in the region?
Sonia Rabello: The Institute has been a very important influence in clarifying land policy issues among public officials and politicians in Latin America, especially through its training programs in which participants can be exposed to such principles, concepts and ideas, exchange experiences, and build a new land policy culture. The Institute has developed a critical mass of people committed to improving the quality of land policies and promoting new strategies to finance urban development. Understanding that individual property rights can coexist with social rights to the city has been a critical factor driving the evolution of urban thinking in the region.
Mark Skidmore es profesor de Economía en la Universidad Estatal de Michigan, donde también es titular de la cátedra Morris en Finanzas y Políticas del gobierno estatal y municipal; también colabora en el Departamento de Agricultura, Economía de Alimentos y Recursos y en el Departamento de Economía. Recibió su título en Economía por la Universidad de Washington en 1987, y un doctorado en Economía por la Universidad de Colorado en 1994. Se desempeña como coeditor del Journal of Urban Affairs.
Las investigaciones del profesor Skidmore se han centrado en la economía pública y la economía urbana y regional. Sus intereses de investigación actuales son los siguientes: política tributaria del gobierno estatal y municipal, relaciones intergubernamentales, relación entre las decisiones al nivel del sector público y la actividad económica, y la economía de las catástrofes naturales. Sus trabajos han recibido el financiamiento del Programa Fulbright, el Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, la National Science Foundation, el Urban Institute y USAID.
Los artículos del profesor Skidmore han aparecido en revistas profesionales tales como Economic Inquiry, Economics Letters, Journal of Urban Economics, Kyklos, Land Economics, National Tax Journal, Public Choice, Regional Science and Urban Economics y Southern Economic Journal. Asimismo, sus investigaciones han sido objeto de citas en medios noticiosos importantes, tales como la BBC, China Post, The Economist, Europe Intelligence Wire, Forbes, International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Business Journal, MSNBC, Newsweek, The New Yorker, The New York Times y PBS News Hour.
Land Lines: Durante este año, usted se desempeña como investigador visitante en el Instituto Lincoln. ¿Sobre qué temas está trabajando?
Mark Skidmore: Hace aproximadamente dos años, junto con mi colega Gary Sands recibimos una invitación del concejal Kenneth Cockrel de la ciudad de Detroit para evaluar el deteriorado entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en dicha ciudad. El concejal Cockrel se preguntaba qué ganaría Detroit si se volcara a un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nos dieron acceso a información detallada sobre más de 400.000 parcelas inmobiliarias dentro de la ciudad a fin de llevar a cabo una evaluación. En este sentido, estamos agradecidos al Instituto por el apoyo que nos brindó para realizar dicho proyecto. En nuestro informe identificamos una importante erosión de la base del impuesto sobre la propiedad y analizamos distintas opciones con el fin de expandir dicha base imponible, tal como cambiar el enfoque hacia un impuesto basado en el suelo. Nuestra evaluación mostró que un impuesto basado en el suelo serviría para ampliar la base imponible, aunque también generaría cambios significativos en las cargas fiscales de los propietarios de inmuebles residenciales, comerciales e industriales.
En el año 2013, los problemas fiscales de Detroit llegaron a un punto crítico cuando el gobernador Rick Snyder designó a un gerente financiero de emergencia, quien, a su vez, inició el proceso de declaración de quiebra. El 3 de diciembre de 2013, el juez Rhodes emitió un fallo en el que establecía que la ciudad de Detroit era elegible para recibir la protección ante quiebras establecida en el capítulo 9. A pesar del colapso casi completo del mercado inmobiliario dentro de la ciudad durante la Gran Recesión, el impuesto sobre la propiedad continúa siendo una importante fuente de ingresos y, según cómo se lo administre, puede ayudar u obstaculizar la recuperación económica y fiscal. Durante el año en curso, mi idea es utilizar los datos a nivel de parcelas para analizar algunos problemas importantes, tales como la evasión impositiva, la sobrevaluación de propiedad, el valor de terrenos vacantes y las políticas relacionadas con la transferencia de títulos de propiedad del sector privado al sector público debido a las ejecuciones fiscales y la posterior transferencia de los mismos nuevamente al sector privado.
Land Lines: ¿Cuáles son algunos de los factores subyacentes tras de los problemas actuales que enfrenta Detroit?
Mark Skidmore: Cerca del 48 por ciento de los propietarios de inmuebles en Detroit son evasores fiscales, lo que refleja la erosión del contrato social entre los ciudadanos y la ciudad. Esta tasa de evasión fiscal tan alta es el resultado de una confluencia de factores. En primer lugar, la ciudad no ha logrado hacer cumplir las obligaciones tributarias, particularmente en lo relacionado con las propiedades de bajo valor. En segundo lugar, muchos ciudadanos perciben que el impuesto es injusto debido a la sobrevaluación de sus propiedades. Finalmente, la experiencia indicaría que los ciudadanos no pagan sus impuestos porque las autoridades municipales no les brindan los servicios públicos básicos, tales como la iluminación de calles, el barrido de nieve y la seguridad pública.
Una de las causas principales de la alta tasa de evasión de impuestos es la sobrevaluación de las propiedades para fines fiscales. La crisis inmobiliaria fue particularmente grave para Detroit. En 2010, el precio de venta promedio de una parcela residencial con una estructura era de menos de US$10.000; no obstante, el valor tasado promedio de dicha propiedad para fines fiscales era de US$54.000. Según las pautas del estado, la relación entre el valor tasado y el precio de venta debería ser aproximadamente de 1:1. En septiembre de 2013, los funcionarios municipales anunciaron que, en el plazo de los 3 a 5 años siguientes, todas las propiedades de la ciudad se someterían a una revaluación.
En segundo lugar, Detroit ha tenido la costumbre de demoler estructuras deterioradas sujetas a ejecución fiscal. En consecuencia, es una de las pocas grandes ciudades de los Estados Unidos que presenta una gran cantidad de ventas de terrenos vacantes. Por lo general, resulta difícil establecer el valor de los terrenos vacantes en áreas altamente urbanizadas, aunque resulta esencial determinar valuaciones exactas si se desea imponer un tributo al suelo o un impuesto de dos niveles sobre el suelo y sobre las estructuras. La gran cantidad de operaciones de venta de terrenos vacantes en Detroit brinda una oportunidad para estimar el valor del suelo. Curiosamente, en 2010, el valor promedio de una parcela sin mejoras según los datos de venta era de US$34.000, es decir, un valor mucho mayor que el precio promedio de parcelas residenciales con estructuras, el cual, según se mencionó anteriormente, era inferior a los US$10.000.
En la actualidad, el gobierno municipal posee y administra más del 25 por ciento de la superficie del suelo de la ciudad, y la titularidad de propiedades por parte del gobierno continúa creciendo debido a que las ejecuciones fiscales han superado en rapidez a la transferencia de parcelas públicas a manos privadas. Algunas de las cuestiones que me encuentro investigando son las siguientes: ¿Cuáles son las políticas apropiadas que deben tomarse en una sociedad orientada al mercado con el fin de administrar las operaciones inmobiliarias urbanas de bajo valor? ¿Por qué es tan alta la tasa de evasión fiscal, y qué puede hacerse para mejorar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones fiscales en cuanto al impuesto sobre la propiedad en el contexto de un mercado inmobiliario urbano al borde del colapso? ¿Qué rol desempeña la percepción de valuaciones “injustas” por parte de los contribuyentes en la evasión fiscal?
Land Lines: ¿Cuál sería el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit?
Mark Skidmore: La problemática fiscal de la ciudad es un síntoma de problemas subyacentes más profundos. Ya sea que consideremos el redesarrollo de un área urbana en franco deterioro o la reconstrucción posterior a una catástrofe natural de grandes proporciones, los elementos más importantes en cualquier recuperación son el capital humano y los atributos sociales y culturales. Si aceptamos la premisa de que estos elementos son los factores esenciales de cualquier redesarrollo, y si dichos elementos escasean, la prioridad principal será entonces considerar la adopción de políticas y medidas que faciliten su desarrollo. En el año 2011, la tasa de graduación de la escuela secundaria en Detroit fue del 62 por ciento. El porcentaje de hogares conformados por sólo uno de los padres fue del 62 por ciento. Según algunas mediciones, la tasa de alfabetización funcional entre los adultos es de solamente el 53 por ciento. Resulta difícil construir una economía urbana dinámica y sólida sobre un fundamento tan débil.
Queda claro entonces que los encargados de elaborar políticas deben tratar los problemas fiscales inmediatos, pero el pronóstico a largo plazo para Detroit dependerá de las medidas que se tomen para mejorar la base económica subyacente, es decir, el capital humano y social. Si no se abordan estos profundos desafíos, Detroit continuará tambaleándose. No existe una solución rápida. Para que Detroit tenga una oportunidad de prosperar nuevamente, Michigan deberá comprometerse a largo plazo a mejorar dichas condiciones de fondo.
Land Lines: ¿Puede considerarse a Detroit como un indicador para otras ciudades de los EE.UU.?
Mark Skidmore: Sí y no. Otros gobiernos municipales también enfrentan problemas fiscales significativos, como Chicago, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Oakland y Providence, por nombrar sólo algunos. Uno de los principales problemas es el de los planes de aportaciones para el futuro pago de jubilaciones sin suficientes fondos. Aun así, muchas de estas ciudades tienen una probabilidad razonable de resurgir y, posiblemente, prosperar en un futuro no muy lejano, debido a que las agudas crisis que están atravesando son un resultado de la recesión y no necesariamente de problemas fiscales crónicos. No obstante, las ciudades que presentan problemas crónicos debido a déficits importantes en su capital social y humano podrán considerar a Detroit como un indicador de su propio futuro. Espero que los encargados de elaborar las políticas estatales y municipales en todo el país puedan aprender de la experiencia de Detroit y comenzar así a realizar las inversiones a largo plazo que sean necesarias en su activo más importante -las personas y, en particular, los niños- a fin de evitar los problemas económicos y fiscales crónicos que se han observado en Detroit.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera el proyecto de Detroit encaja en sus tareas de investigación en general?
Mark Skidmore: Una gran parte de mi investigación tiene que ver con las relaciones entre la toma de decisiones en el ámbito público y la actividad económica. Con el correr de los años he analizado cuestiones como la efectividad de las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos, las implicaciones que conlleva imponer tarifas de impacto a fin de solventar los costos de infraestructura asociados con el desarrollo, y los efectos que los impuestos sobre la propiedad, las reducciones impositivas y otros subsidios tienen sobre el desarrollo. También he estudiado otras cuestiones relacionadas con las finanzas públicas, como las loterías estatales, los impuestos a las ventas y los impuestos a las ganancias. En particular, me interesan las relaciones espaciales, dinámicas y competitivas entre jurisdicciones tributarias adyacentes y superpuestas.
Land Lines: Una gran parte de su investigación gira en torno a las políticas y finanzas gubernamentales en los Estados Unidos. ¿Qué otros trabajos ha realizado usted a nivel internacional?
Mark Skidmore: En los últimos años, recibí, junto con mis colegas de la Universidad Estatal de Michigan (MSU), una subvención financiada por la Agencia Estadounidense para el Desarrollo Internacional (USAID) en Mali. Mi tarea ha sido analizar de qué manera el sistema de gobierno recientemente descentralizado de Mali puede utilizarse en forma más efectiva en los ámbitos de seguridad de los alimentos y gestión del uso del suelo. El cambio climático afecta a Mali en formas muy tangibles: debido a que el suelo en el norte se ha vuelto más árido, se ha observado una migración significativa hacia el sur, que posee un mejor acceso al agua. Esta migración ha dado como resultado una violencia cada vez mayor debido a que los derechos de posesión y propiedad del suelo son ineficaces. Ahora que se ha reestablecido el gobierno democrático, estamos trabajando nuevamente junto con nuestros socios de Mali a fin de desarrollar sistemas que involucren a las autoridades municipales para gestionar la seguridad de los alimentos, el acceso al suelo, los derechos de propiedad y los conflictos relacionados con el suelo. Curiosamente, el problema relativo a qué hacer con todos los terrenos de propiedad pública en Detroit ha dado forma a nuestro trabajo en Mali y viceversa.
Por otro lado, actualmente también estoy investigando sobre la economía de las catástrofes naturales. En uno de mis artículos publicados recientemente (cuya autoría comparto con Hideki Toya), se utilizaron miles de catástrofes ocurridas en todo el mundo para demostrar que los países con sistemas gubernamentales más descentralizados sufren una cantidad significativamente menor de muertes por dichas catástrofes. Según nuestra investigación, existen pruebas de que los gobiernos descentralizados brindan servicios esenciales de manera más efectiva que los sistemas más centralizados.
Un tercer proyecto recientemente concluido demuestra que, en diferentes países, la confianza de la sociedad tiende a aumentar en los años posteriores a las catástrofes climáticas. La relación que observamos es sólida, por lo que podemos sugerir la hipótesis de que dichas catástrofes requieren y brindan oportunidades para que las personas trabajen salvando las barreras de las clases sociales a fin de superar sus desafíos, lo que genera confianza y capital social. Aunque las catástrofes naturales pueden tener un terrible impacto humano y económico, un posible efecto beneficioso derivado de la exposición a una catástrofe de grandes magnitudes podría ser una sociedad mucho más unida.
Land Lines: ¿De qué manera su investigación refleja los intereses y valores del Instituto Lincoln?
Mark Skidmore: El Instituto Lincoln es reconocido en todo el mundo como una organización líder en temas del uso, regulación y tributación del suelo (impuestos sobre la propiedad, reducción de impuestos, políticas de desarrollo económico y sistemas fiscales descentralizados), temas todos que son el centro de mi investigación. A lo largo de los años, el Instituto Lincoln ha apoyado mi trabajo relacionado con las finanzas basadas en el aumento de los impuestos en Wisconsin, el estrés fiscal del gobierno municipal de Michigan y mi actual investigación sobre el entorno del impuesto sobre la propiedad en Detroit. El sistema estadounidense de un gobierno nacional y varios gobiernos subnacionales en gran medida autónomos brinda un campo fértil a los investigadores que desean estudiar y aprender qué “experimentos en política” obtienen mejores o peores resultados. De verdad me encanta este trabajo y estoy agradecido por tener al Instituto como socio en mis investigaciones.
Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 3 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Con el objetivo de analizar la equidad y eficacia del sistema fiscal de tributación inmobiliaria, el Instituto Lincoln desarrolló, en conjunto con el Ayuntamiento de Porto Alegre (Brasil), el Seminario Internacional sobre Tributación Inmobiliaria en abril de 2001, el cual formó parte de su programa educativo en América Latina. Asistieron al seminario más de 200 delegados de 12 países, 14 estados brasileños y 45 autoridades municipales. Expertos reconocidos en el ámbito internacional, funcionarios gubernamentales y personalidades del sector académico, de finanzas públicas y de materias impositivas representaron instituciones tales como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), el Instituto Internacional de Tributación Inmobiliaria (IPTI), la Asociación Internacional de Funcionarios de Tasación (IAAO), la Asociación Brasileña de Secretarías de Finanzas de Capitales (ABRASF) y la Escuela de Administración Hacendaria (ESAF). En este artículo se analizan los temas y experiencias tratados en el seminario.
Así como en los Estados Unidos, en América Latina hay un debate continuo sobre la mayor eficacia, la simplificación en los procesos de administración y la menor influencia de factores políticos que derivarían de la sustitución del tributo inmobiliario por otras fuentes de ingreso, tales como recargos y tarifas. No obstante, el tributo inmobiliario continúa siendo la opción predominante de financiamiento de los servicios públicos de los gobiernos municipales de América Latina.
Una característica importante del tributo inmobiliario es la gran diversidad que hay en su administración en cada país. Por ejemplo, en Brasil, Colombia y Ecuador es un impuesto exclusivamente municipal, mientras que en Argentina es administrado por el gobierno provincial. En México, el papel de las autoridades municipales se ha reducido principalmente a la recaudación de los impuestos. En Chile, el tributo inmobiliario es una importante fuente de ingreso para los gobiernos municipales, aunque el gobierno central es el responsable por la administración de los sistemas catastrales, de tasación y recaudación. El Salvador es el único país centroamericano que no ha impuesto nunca una tributación sobre la propiedad, aunque cada vez más se discute sobre la necesidad de establecer nuevos impuestos, dado que los ingresos tributarios constituyen apenas un 11 por ciento del producto bruto interno (PIB).
Reflexiones sobre el sistema fiscal de tributación inmobiliaria
En general, el tributo inmobiliario está reconocido como un impuesto “bueno” que tiene una función esencial en el proceso de recuperación de ingresos, financiamiento de servicios públicos y promoción del desarrollo social. Su naturaleza única establece vínculos importantes entre riqueza e ingresos, desarrollo social y uso y ocupación del suelo. Sin embargo, es fundamental administrarlo con justicia para evitar ineficacias y desigualdades en la distribución de la carga impositiva. En varias sesiones del seminario se mencionó la necesidad de contar con un catastro que tenga cobertura completa y adecuada, además de los atributos básicos para la tasación de diferentes clases de propiedades. Un grupo de participantes recomendó integrar la comunidad al proceso de actualización continua de los datos catastrales, mientras que otros enfatizaron la necesidad de realizar un cuidadoso análisis de costo-beneficio antes de implementar sistemas de información geográfica.
En países donde el catastro no es administrado por el gobierno central, no existe un sistema o modelo estándar. Según el nivel de desarrollo de la municipalidad o de los recursos financieros disponibles, la tecnología catastral puede exhibir grandes variaciones, desde una simple lista de propiedades hasta un catastro multifinalitario basado en un sistema de información geográfica. También se observan diferencias en los sistemas de tasación; por ejemplo, en Colombia y Bolivia se utiliza la autotasación, mientras que en Brasil, Chile, Ecuador y México es común el método de tasación por costos. Algunas autoridades municipales de Brasil están trabajando activamente para instituir el método de comparación de ventas para la propiedad residencial. Al aplicar el método de tasación por costos, el valor del suelo se determina mediante el método de comparación de precios de venta. El valor del suelo, si se basa en la información del mercado, también se calcula de maneras diferentes, lo cual genera preocupación sobre cómo reducir las desigualdades en la tasación.
Por encima de todo, la valuación es una tarea técnica que requiere tasación uniforme, realizada a intervalos cortos, y que no debe utilizarse para fines políticos. Los sistemas que establecen límites de los aumentos impositivos entre periodos consecutivos para cada propiedad individual, hasta un ajuste general basado en la tasa de inflación anual, son vistos como una fuente principal de inequidad de tasación. Para poder ganar la aceptación del sistema tributario y la confianza de los contribuyentes, es imprescindible que haya transparencia en los resultados de las valuaciones además de características básicas tales como responsabilidad fiscal, justicia, democratización de la información y simplificación del lenguaje técnico a fin de facilitar el entendimiento de los miembros y líderes de la comunidad. Además, estos últimos deben participar en la toma de decisiones referentes a la recaudación de impuestos y gastos públicos.
Una tendencia reciente es el uso creciente de Internet por parte de los contribuyentes para recibir y pagar sus facturas impositivas, revisar los datos estadísticos de sus propiedades y actualizar la información catastral. En este particular se considera a Chile como punto de referencia en el uso de estas tecnologías en América Latina.
Experiencias con la reforma fiscal
Varios ponentes del seminario hablaron de sus experiencias con la reforma fiscal a la propiedad inmobiliaria, las cuales suelen incluir inversiones en sistemas catastrales. En Colombia, por ejemplo, la mejora en la recaudación del tributo inmobiliario se tradujo en un aumento en el porcentaje del PIB, de un 0,22 por ciento en 1970 al 0,91 por ciento en 1994. Esta mejora se atribuyó en parte a leyes que exigieron la implementación y actualización del catastro en todo el país. La fuerte oposición hacia la actualización de los valores de tasación, así como las dificultades administrativas para realizar las valuaciones, llevaron a establecer un procedimiento de autotasación. Ahora los contribuyentes son responsables por declarar el valor de tasación de sus propiedades, pero dicho valor no puede ser inferior al valor catastral registrado. Para reducir la subtasación, el valor de tasación se usa también como base para la expropiación.
Las iniciativas de reforma fiscal que hubo en Argentina durante la década de 1990 estuvieron fuertemente motivadas por las crisis financieras del sector público. El proyecto de reforma del tributo inmobiliario fue dividido en dos áreas principales: administración catastral y fiscal. A pesar de que en estas reformas se ha invertido el equivalente a más de US$120 millones, el proyecto ha sido completado en apenas un 50 por ciento de las jurisdicciones. En otro ejemplo, Mexicali, la ciudad capital de Baja California, fue la primera en adoptar un sistema basado en el valor del suelo como base impositiva predial en la década de 1990. Si bien se trató de una exitosa experiencia de reforma fiscal a la propiedad inmobiliaria, actualmente México se enfrenta a una serie de retos, entre ellos lograr un equilibrio fiscal entre el gasto público y los ingresos recaudados, además de recuperar la importancia del tributo inmobiliario como fuente de ingresos.
La tributación inmobiliaria en Brasil
Varias barreras políticas, jurídicas y prácticas han contribuido a mantener la inequidad e ineficacia del tributo inmobiliario en Brasil. Las ramas principales del gobierno (el poder ejecutivo, el legislativo y el judicial) suelen diferir en su interpretación de las regulaciones impositivas, lo cual crea una perenne falta de confianza en el sistema tributario. Entre los problemas principales que afectan el sistema fiscal de tributación inmobiliaria cabe mencionar: 1) catastros obsoletos e incompletos que derivan en pérdidas irrecuperables de los ingresos; 2) prácticas de tasación deficientes que conducen a una falta de uniformidad generalizada; 3) fuerte influencia de los valores de tasación históricos, no sólo porque los avalúos son poco frecuentes sino también porque la aprobación de cualquier nueva lista de valuación por la Cámara de Concejales suele ser difícil; y 4) deficiencias en el proceso de recaudación de impuestos.
Se reexaminó la validez y factibilidad de adoptar tasas progresivas (móviles) para el tributo inmobiliario, las cuales habían sido utilizadas ampliamente en Brasil durante la década de 1990. La idea básica había sido establecer tasas progresivas según las clases de valores de tasación e introducir un elemento de “capacidad de pago” en el sistema, en el que la carga impositiva de las propiedades más costosas fuera mayor que las de propiedades de menos valor. Si bien en 1996 la Corte Suprema declaró como inconstitucional el uso de tasas progresivas para el tributo inmobiliario, una reciente enmienda constitucional autorizó la progresividad de las tasas de tributo inmobiliario según el valor de las propiedades, así como también diferentes tasas según la ubicación de la propiedad.
Durante el transcurso del seminario, los argumentos en contra de la aplicación de tasas progresivas para el tributo inmobiliario apuntaron a la necesidad de mantener un impuesto sencillo y eficaz, mientras que aquéllos a favor de la progresividad hicieron énfasis en la concentración de la disparidad de los ingresos en Brasil y en el hecho de que los gastos de vivienda de la población pobre son proporcionalmente mayores que los de la población adinerada. La mayoría de los participantes del seminario estuvieron de acuerdo en que las tasas progresivas podrían conducir a una distribución más justa de la carga impositiva. No obstante, la progresividad debe ser gradual, es decir, se debe aplicar una tasa mayor únicamente a la parte del valor de la propiedad que excede el límite establecido en cada clase de valor de tasación, a fin de evitar grandes diferencias en la carga impositiva para aquellas propiedades cuyos valores estén ligeramente por encima o por debajo de los límites en cada categoría.
En el ámbito nacional, en Brasil es ampliamente conocida la ineficacia del tributo inmobiliario como fuente del ingreso público. Los ingresos provenientes del tributo inmobiliario representan menos del 0,4 por ciento del PIB —de hecho, la cantidad realmente recaudada es puramente simbólica en muchas partes del país. En una encuesta reciente de las municipalidades se investigaron varios aspectos del desempeño gubernamental municipal, entre ellos la evasión de impuestos. Los resultados demostraron que la evasión de impuestos es menor del 20 por ciento en apenas un 13 por ciento de las municipalidades. En una de cada cinco municipalidades, el ingreso fiscal representa menos del 20 por ciento de las propiedades incluidas en el catastro.
Nota: La divisa brasileña es el real (R$). En 1996, R$1 equivalía aproximadamente a US$1.
En la tabla 1 se muestra la importancia relativa del ingreso del tributo inmobiliario en Brasil, según el tamaño de la municipalidad. Las municipalidades pequeñas obtienen su financiamiento mayormente por transferencias de otros niveles gubernamentales, mientras que las grandes tienen una mayor dependencia del tributo inmobiliario como fuente de ingreso. Sin embargo, el funcionamiento del sistema fiscal de tributación inmobiliaria depende directamente de la voluntad política, la cual muestra grandes variaciones entre una ciudad y otra. Por ejemplo, debido a una extensa actualización de su catastro, Santana de Parnaíba, una ciudad de 60.000 habitantes en el estado de São Paulo, recauda aproximadamente R$212,00 por habitante, mientras que la recaudación promedio del tributo inmobiliario para ciudades con población similar (10.000 a 100.000 habitantes) es de R$10,04 por habitante. Las cifras de Santana de Parnaíba son incluso mejores que las de São Paulo, la capital del estado, donde se recaudan menos de R$80,00 por habitante. Igualmente, un modelo participativo en el que actúa la comunidad local y organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) facilita la discusión de asuntos críticos de la evaluación y administración del tributo inmobiliario, lo cual ha llevado a medidas de mejoramiento del sistema. En la ciudad Ribeirão Pires, por ejemplo, se logró aumentar el ingreso en un 40 por ciento gracias a la adopción de medidas tales como una exhaustiva revisión de la legislación del tributo inmobiliario que permitió adoptar mejores prácticas de tasación, nuevas tasas de tributo inmobiliario e implementación de procedimientos más eficaces para la recaudación de impuestos. Aún mejor: la reforma fiscal ha contribuido a incrementar la popularidad del gobierno municipal.
Caso de estudio: Porto Alegre
Inspirado por el seminario de abril y por trabajos de investigación y análisis previos, el gobierno municipal de Porto Alegre elaboró una propuesta para una reforma fiscal a la propiedad inmobiliaria con el objetivo de promover la equidad fiscal y la importancia del tributo inmobiliario como fuente de ingreso, así como también crear una administración más eficaz del impuesto. El proyecto se presentó el 28 de septiembre ante el Ayuntamiento —entidad encargada de aprobar o rechazar las medidas—, y deberá haber una decisión final antes de finalizar el año 2001.
Se encomendó el proyecto a un equipo multidisciplinario formado por miembros de la autoridad municipal, entre ellos asesores, expertos en tributo inmobiliario y planificadores urbanos y ambientales, como también un grupo de profesionales de estadística y tecnología de información de la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul. Las medidas propuestas fueron discutidas ampliamente con representantes de asociaciones públicas, líderes de la comunidad, representantes de los medios de comunicación, y, por supuesto, con los concejales (véase la tabla 2).
Conclusión
La participación de varios cientos de delegados pone en evidencia la importancia del tributo inmobiliario en sus países. Si bien es cierto que todavía hay mucho por hacer para mejorar el desempeño general de los sistemas de tributación inmobiliaria, el debate demostró que ha habido progreso en la manera como el impuesto se administra y se percibe en muchas partes del continente. Varias experiencias independientes demostraron claramente que la voluntad política es la causa principal de las diferencias observadas en los resultados del tributo inmobiliario en América Latina. Gracias a los recientes avances tecnológicos (ahora accesibles a cualquier país), se han podido poner en práctica mejores técnicas de valuación, tasación y manejo de la información. Poco a poco los retos se están desplazando de la esfera técnica a la política. Hoy más que nunca es esencial aprender a implementar las reformas y revisiones fiscales a fin de lograr sistemas de tributación inmobiliaria de mayor eficacia. También se evidencia la tendencia al uso de métodos participativos durante las revisiones, dado que es probable que la aceptación del público facilite el proceso de reforma.
Claudia M. De Cesare es consultora en tributación inmobiliaria de la Secretaría de Finanzas de la municipalidad de Porto Alegre, Brasil; investigadora e imparte clases de valuación y tributación inmobiliaria en la Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul y en el Instituto Lincoln, forma parte del consejo consultivo del Instituto Internacional de Tributación Inmobiliaria (IPTI) y participa activamente en otras organizaciones profesionales.
Sidebar: Red Latinoamerica Sobre Tributación Inmobiliaria
Recientemente el Instituto Lincoln creó un grupo de redes formadas por expertos y legisladores, cuya misión es el estudio de los fundamentos de la política impositiva y del suelo en América Latina. Bajo la dirección de Martim Smolka, Senior Fellow y director del Programa para América Latina y El Caribe, la primera reunión de la red de tributación inmobiliaria se realizó durante el seminario en Porto Alegre en abril de 2001, siendo sus participantes Hector Serravalle (Argentina), Claudia M. De Cesare, Cintia E. Fernandes, Mauro Lunardi y Sol G. Pinto (Brasil), Carlos Acuña (Chile), Maria Camila Uribe y Claudia Puentes (Colombia), Mario R. Maldonado (Ecuador), Roberto Cañas (El Salvador) y Sergio Flores (México).
La red está a la búsqueda de sistemas de tributación inmobiliaria de mayor eficacia en América Latina y de reforzar la función del tributo inmobiliario en los ingresos gubernamentales municipales. Sus miembros buscan promover el desarrollo profesional, identificar temas apropiados para proyectos educativos y trabajos de investigación comparativa y diseminar información y experiencias.
Los proyectos clasificados como principales son los siguientes:
Si bien es cierto que algunos programas nacionales o estatales han mejorado los sistemas catastrales, los procedimientos de valuación y la comunicación en algunos países, los miembros de la red están de acuerdo en que todavía falta un largo camino para poder mejorar la eficacia y la equidad de los sistemas impositivos actuales. Los miembros también aspiran tener mayor comunicación y acceso a la información relacionada con asuntos de tributación inmobiliaria en América Latina. Los programas de capacitación futuros podrían ser una fuente de inspiración para otras municipalidades, que al igual que Porto Alegre, enfrentan dificultades en sus sistemas fiscales de tributación inmobiliaria.
The potential for sharp and unpredictable assessment increases is an important source of dissatisfaction with the property tax. Rapid price rises that are accurately and promptly reflected in assessed valuations can leave homeowners responsible for cash payments on paper gains that are unexpected, uncontrollable, and possibly short-lived. Two decades ago, this situation paved the way for adoption of California’s Proposition 13, which rejected fair market value as a basis for assessment.
Increasing valuations do not necessarily produce a corresponding rise in property tax bills, since a higher assessment base could raise equivalent revenue with a smaller tax rate. This solution is not feasible, however, when prices increase disproportionately only in particular neighborhoods or for particular types of property.
What other means are available to address price volatility and its impact on property tax rates? A number of states have recently introduced limitations on annual valuation increases. These measures avoid extreme assessment increases but may still allow assessments to match fair market values at some point in the future. They substitute a non-market value basis for assessment and diminish uniformity by distinguishing between those properties that are assessed on the basis of current values and those that are not.
Assessment Limitations in Washington and Texas
In the November 1997 elections, voters in Washington state approved a referendum generally limiting increases in assessed valuation to 15 percent a year on all classes of taxable property. If a property’s market value rises more than 60 percent, one year’s assessment may reflect no more than one-quarter of that increase. A similar measure strongly supported by business representatives was passed by the Republican legislature but vetoed by Gov. Gary Locke (D), who would have limited it to homeowners.
This case raises an important point concerning uniformity and distribution of the tax burden. Phase-in provisions ease the burden on owners of rapidly appreciating property but correspondingly increase the relative share of the tax borne by owners experiencing slower growth, or no growth, in property value. While tax limitations are generally promoted as protection for homeowners, residential benefits may pale in comparison to commercial gains.
Supporters of the Washington referendum urged passage “to soften a tax blow that could be devastating to a homeowner on a fixed income.” Yet major funding for the campaign came from industrial giants, including Microsoft, Intel, Hewlett Packard, Boeing and Weyerhaeuser. Opponents, including King County assessor Scott Noble, argued that the tax benefits “will go disproportionately to the large corporations that are bankrolling the campaign because of their much higher property values.” On the other hand, restricting such provisions to residential property introduces another level of non-uniformity to the tax.
Texas voters chose this split valuation alternative in November, approving a measure that limits increases in assessed values of residential homestead property, but not business property, to 10 percent a year. The president of the Texas Taxpayers and Research Association said this provision will “keep a terribly hot neighborhood from getting sort of a sticker shock.”
Critics saw the irony of this action. One wrote, “If the Texas Legislature had offered voters a chance to cap appraisal increases on their homes a few years ago, lawmakers would have been lauded as heroes. Angry homeowners were storming the offices of appraisal districts in the early and mid-1990s, demanding relief from double-digit increases in the appraised value of their homes and the prospect of significant property tax hikes. . . Nothing happened. Now that appraisal increases have fallen to three percent or so, the Legislature is offering voters a chance to cap the increases by changing the state Constitution. . . .” Ironically, before the price rises of the 1990s, Texas tax protests centered on whether assessments reflected falling property values quickly enough in the regional recession of the 1980s. For example, Harris County, which includes Houston, saw challenges to one-quarter of all its tax valuations in 1984 and 1985.
A Legislative Approach in Montana
Annual increases of 10 or 15 percent do not necessarily prevent assessed valuations from reaching full market levels. However, Montana lawmakers responded this year to dramatic value increases with an even more drastic measure. After studies reported that residential and commercial property values had increased by an average of 43 percent statewide since the last reassessment, the legislature required this change to be phased in at a rate of only two percent annually-taking 50 years to enter the tax rolls completely. Court challenges to this provision could raise an interesting question as to how long a phase-in period is compatible with state constitutional provisions requiring uniformity in assessment.
Assessment Reform in Ontario
Large valuation increases may be due to assessment lags as well as to price rises. One of the most startling examples of outdated tax valuation is found in Toronto-a surprise to U.S. observers who normally expect a high level of administrative efficiency from their northern neighbor. At the September conference of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) in Toronto, a panel of speakers brought together by the Lincoln Institute explored this situation. The potential for huge valuation increases stems not so much from extraordinary market activity as from extraordinary assessment inactivity. Metropolitan Toronto has not had a full-scale reassessment since1954-and that was based on 1940 market values.
Attorney Jack Walker described the public as generally supportive of current tax reform efforts, which encompass the entire province of Ontario. By contrast, a 1992 reassessment proposal for Metropolitan Toronto alone sparked such protest from residential and small business taxpayers that the proposal was abandoned. As a result, the 1997 measure explicitly addresses the concerns of many taxpayers groups. Professor David Amborski of Ryerson Polytechnic University explained that it would ensure current value assessments and regular updates. In addition, it will eliminate the business occupancy tax, permit different tax rates for different classes of property, provide special treatment for senior citizens and disabled taxpayers, and reduce taxes on agricultural and open space lands.
Thus, Toronto has also chosen to soften the impact of large assessment increases at the expense of uniformity. In this case, where municipal valuations were so out of date, the net effect may be judged an improvement in assessment equity. It will be important to evaluate the experiences of other jurisdictions struggling with the challenge of balancing uniformity and acceptability to see if they can make the same claim.
Joan Youngman is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Program in the Taxation of Land and Buildings. An attorney specializing in property tax issues, she also writes a column for State Tax Notes, published by Tax Analysts.
Notes
Joseph Turner, “Ref. 47 Debate: Do Tax Savings Justify Change?” Takoma News-Tribune, October 23, 1997, p. A1 (quoting Rep. Brian Thomas (R-Renton))
2 Tom Brown, “Big Guns Back Property-Tax Lid,” Seattle Times, October 24, 1997, p. B3.
3Clay Robison, “Measure Would Cap Hike in Residential Appraisals,” The Houston Chronicle, November 2, 1997, p.2.
4Michele Kay, “Tax Appraisal Cap on Ballot,” Austin American-Statesman, October 20, 1997, p. A1.
Thomas A. Jaconetty is the chief deputy commissioner of the Board of Review (formerly the Board of Appeals) of Cook County, Illinois. During the past 24 years he has been involved in the disposition or review of taxes on more than 600,000 parcels of real estate. He is a member of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO); the Chicago, Illinois State (ISBA) and American Bar Associations; the Justinian Society of Lawyers; and many other professional associations. He has served as a member and chair of the ISBA State and Local Taxation Section Council and contributed to the Illinois Department of Revenue’s Recodification Project.
A certified review appraiser and formerly an arbitrator for the Circuit Court of Cook County, Jaconetty has authored numerous articles and chapters for legal and taxation publications, edited three books and is working on a fourth. He has lectured at or moderated many educational programs on property taxation and assessment administration, and has published over a dozen articles on those topics. In 1998 he was appointed to the Planning Committee of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, and he served as conference chairman for the past two years.
Land Lines: How did you first become involved with the Lincoln Institute?
Thomas Jaconetty: I was familiar with the Institute’s work through its presentations at the annual conferences of the International Association of Assessing Officers (IAAO) and various other educational seminars. In 1994 the chairman of the National Conference of State Tax Judges, Ignatius MacLellan of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals, invited me to attend the conference after reviewing articles I had written on “Highest and Best Use” and “Valuation of Federally Subsidized Housing.” I found the experience invigorating, challenging and intellectually stimulating. The conference was and continues to be the best seminar in which I am involved each year, and I attend quite a few.
LL: As the past chairman, how do you see the role of the National Conference?
TJ: For 25 years the conference has functioned as a clearinghouse of ideas for officials exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers over tax cases for statewide or regional jurisdictions. Noted authorities in the field, state tax court judges and officials of established tax courts are drawn together in an informal, collegial environment. The conference encourages improved decision making, the exchange of data and resources, the analysis of complex legal issues, and an avenue for a free-flowing interchange of ideas. The personal and professional relationships are open, friendly and dynamic, and there is plenty of room for divergent opinion, eclectic thought and agreement to disagree.
The Planning Committee of about 15 regular participants develops annual programs, and the rest of the members are actively involved with making presentations, offering suggestions, working on committees, attending the sessions and contributing to the overall educational experience. The annual fall conference is the most significant opportunity for formal interaction, but ongoing discussions are supported by the use of e-mail, the Lincoln Web site and the members’ professional involvement in other organizations.
LL: Why is it important for tax adjudicators to have this forum?
TJ: We are surrounded by ever-changing ideas and theories that we must balance against time-honored principles of taxation, complex economic relationships and the expectations of government. Each state has individual statutes and case law, but there is a high level of commonality among basic tax principles and a finite number of responses to factual situations. In spite of the many recurring and vexing issues that confront us, regular communication offers an opportunity to encourage consistency and consensus on the one hand and divergent opinion and reasoned dissent on the other. Members actively seek suggestions, advice and even help from their colleagues, who eagerly and generously respond.
LL: How have you seen the National Conference evolve during the years of your involvement?
TJ: Actually, there has been a remarkable level of consistency. There has been a core group of representatives from about 15 states and another dozen or so that change over time. Many members predate my involvement and others are very new. The most significant changes have been the enhanced communication offered by e-mail and the willingness of the group to probe into ethical, theoretical, decision-making and policy-based questions. There also has been a noticeable increase in volunteerism and in the number of women who are active participants.
I think there is a growing awareness that the deference given to any fact-finding agency (such as the state tax courts from whence our members come) creates a complementary responsibility to evaluate tax controversies within a framework that addresses all of the pertinent legal, valuation, philosophical and public policy issues. From all of that we hope to attain “justice,” which James Madison argued “is the end of government.”
LL: What do you see as the greatest challenges to the conference?
TJ: Remaining timely and relevant, and maintaining a cutting-edge outlook. Not every ascendant theory is always supportable or reasonable, but we seek to remain receptive, open and flexible while respecting the basic principles of state and local taxation that have stood the test of time. As issues become more complex and multi-jurisdictional, there is always a tug-of-war between local control and innovation versus national consistency and uniformity. This era of enormous budgetary constraints on state and local agencies places a premium on knowing where to go for expertise.
We face new challenges and are learning every day, and the conference presents the opportunity to encourage that growth. As John Quincy Adams said, “To furnish the means of acquiring knowledge is . . . the greatest benefit that can be conferred upon mankind.” We are also working to increase our membership and recruit more participation from states not currently represented. The optimum goal is to have around 55 to 60 active participants at any one time.
LL: What role does the Lincoln Institute play?
TJ: It is the heart and the soul of the conference. Especially in these trying economic times, without the Institute’s support many of our members would not have the local funding and financial wherewithal to attend the conference. And, without the organizing ability of the Institute staff, there would be no conference. The Lincoln Institute is uniquely qualified to create the healthy intellectual environment that brings the tax policy, legislative, academic, practitioner and administrative points of view before those very persons who decide the cases and, in so doing, “make the law.”
LL: You alluded to policy. Should judges and tax adjudicators be involved in considering public policy?
TJ: I can only suggest my own view. How judges and adjudicative bodies rule is almost inevitably a reflection of what they learn, know, believe, have proven before them, sense and comprehend, as well as what appears to be just. Everything must be taken against the backdrop of the purposes of the law and the ends that the law seeks to achieve. The more informed, eclectic, analytical and open the decision maker, the better the outcome.
The valuation of contaminated property (brownfields) and subsidized housing are two real property tax areas that immediately come to mind. These are technical issues, but they require an appreciation of the larger context and policy implications, as well as the proper balance between legislation and its interpretation.
The Lincoln Institute has had a significant and salutary impact on the development of sound tax policy. Henry George, whose writings inspire the Institute’s work, addressed these issues in The Land Question “[Taxation] must not take from individuals what rightfully belongs to individuals.” In Progress and Poverty he stated, “It is the taking by the community, for the use of the community, of that value which is the creation of the community.” But, as an exercise of power, it “must not repress industry . . . check commerce . . . [or] punish thrift . . .”
LL: What are some of the major tax issues facing tribunals today?
TJ: On the real property taxation side there is the taxation of contaminated property; the use and misuse of the cost approach; valuation of subsidized housing; the effect of low-income housing tax credited property; and the changing face of charitable and nonprofit entities. There are so many other issues: the application of traditional sales, use, gross receipts and income tax principles to an ever-expanding and global economy; related questions of nexus jurisdiction and extraterritorial power; the impact of e-commerce; the clash and interrelationship of the due process and commerce clauses; local autonomy challenged by movements to adopt model acts.
Other more general concerns include alternative dispute resolution; pro se litigants; ethics (appraiser, assessor, judicial); regulation versus deregulation; court management; and the role of policy in decision making. Added to these are the routine daily determinations that must be made by tribunals and agencies that form the grist of the taxation process, which is the lifeblood of government—that which Oliver Wendell Holmes characterized as “what we pay for civilized society.”
LL: How does the National Conference of State Tax Judges interact with other professional associations?
TJ: Many members of the conference are active at the state and local level with continuing legal education (CLE), appraisal or assessment organizations, such as seminars offered with the Appraisal Institute. Others take part in presentations sponsored by local directors of revenue or bar-related symposia on tax issues. Some sit on advisory commissions, boards, panels and task forces. Still others, including myself, have a continuing relationship with the IAAO, which offers an especially valuable and practical access to the assessment side of the real property world.
LL: Any final thoughts on the conference and its future?
TJ: Having just completed my two-year term as chairman, I hope it can be said that the conference maintained the high standards set by my immediate predecessors—Ignatius MacLellan, Joseph Small and Blaine Davis. I certainly feel that the future is in capable hands with our new chair, Arnold Aronson. With the biannual rotation of the conference to different locations around the U.S., it returns to Cambridge next year to celebrate its twenty-fifth year. I will simply echo what many of us say every year when we convene: This conference is the finest and most beneficial professional education endeavor in which any of us are engaged.
Hace más de 50 años, un proceso lento pero fundamental comenzó a transformar el impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos. Como este proceso se desarrolló a nivel estatal y local, y no a nivel federal, y dado que la adopción casi universal del avalúo preferencial tomó varias décadas, la mayoría de los ciudadanos no son conscientes de que los dueños de parcelas rurales a menudo reciben un tratamiento preferencial. En consecuencia, hoy millones de hectáreas de suelo rural se avalúan muy por debajo de su valor justo de mercado a efectos del impuesto local sobre la propiedad.
Estas modificaciones del impuesto sobre la propiedad comenzaron en Maryland en 1957, cuando la Asamblea General promulgó una ley de avalúo de suelos de uso agrícola. Esta ley estableció que los campos y pastizales se podían avaluar por debajo del precio del mercado, siempre y cuando se “utilizaran activamente” con fines agrícolas. Como prueba de uso agrícola activo, un dueño sólo tiene que demostrar que la propiedad generó US$2.500 o más de ingresos brutos anuales por la venta de productos agrícolas en los últimos años.
Varios factores impulsaron a docenas de gobiernos estatales a emular a Maryland y crear programas de avalúo por valor de uso (use value programs, o UVA) en las décadas de 1960 y 1970. El primero fue la expansión masiva de las regiones metropolitanas de los EE.UU. después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que provocó la conversión de decenas de millones de hectáreas de suelos agrícolas, ganaderos, forestales y otros suelos rurales a uso residencial y a otros usos no agrícolas. Alig et al. (2003) estima que el área desarrollada del país aumentó más del doble entre 1960 y 1997, de 10,3 a 26,5 millones de hectáreas. La rápida urbanización del suelo rural había llegado antes a Maryland que a otros estados debido a que la población de los condados de Montgomery y Prince George, cerca de la rápidamente creciente capital del país, Washington, DC, se cuadruplicó entre 1940 y 1960.
El segundo factor fue que el suelo agrícola que se encontraba al borde de las áreas metropolitanas aumentó significativamente de precio en las décadas posteriores a la guerra debido a su potencial de desarrollo inmobiliario, por lo que algunos productores rurales se vieron obligados a pagar facturas de impuestos mucho mayores debido al mayor valor de sus suelos. Entre 1950 y 1971, por ejemplo, se produjo un incremento del 330 por ciento en la relación de precios de suelos agrícolas con ingresos agrícolas netos en Maryland (Gloudemans 1974). Un estudio en dos estados y siete condados de la región de Kansas City a comienzos de la década de 1960 encontró que la proporción de ingresos brutos agrícolas absorbida por el impuesto sobre la propiedad en el condado más urbanizado era cuatro veces mayor que en la región metropolitana en su totalidad (Blase y Staub 1971). Por lo tanto, la adopción de un avalúo preferencial para el suelo rural se justificó frecuentemente como una medida política para proteger a las familias de agricultores y ganaderos de penurias económicas o, incluso, la ruina.
Una tercera razón, más sutil, de la adopción de programas UVA, tiene que ver con la manera en que el impuesto sobre la propiedad había sido administrado en muchos estados antes de 1957. Hasta ese momento en la historia de los EE.UU., los valuadores municipales y de condado habían otorgado preferencias tributarias de facto a los agricultores, a pesar de que las cláusulas constitucionales estatales exigían uniformidad y equidad en la tributación. Estas prácticas informales de avalúo tenían como objetivo proporcionar alivio tributario a “ciudadanos que se lo merecían”, pero producían como efecto secundario diferencias considerables en los avalúos de propiedades dentro de la misma comunidad.
La expansión de los programas de ayuda estatal a los gobiernos locales después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial puso al descubierto algunas de estas discrepancias. La cantidad de propiedades por residente o estudiante era frecuentemente un factor importante para determinar las fórmulas utilizadas para la asignación de subsidios estatales. Por lo tanto, creció la presión a nivel estatal para adoptar prácticas locales uniformes de avalúo, con el fin de asegurar una distribución equitativa de subsidios estatales. La eliminación de las preferencias tributarias de facto otorgadas por los valuadores a los agricultores y ganaderos dentro de sus comunidades aceleró los esfuerzos para obtener preferencias tributarias de jure para los suelos rurales, por medio de leyes estatales o enmiendas constitucionales.
California fue uno de los estados que adoptó inicialmente el avalúo por valor de uso para los suelos rurales. En 1965, el poder legislativo aprobó la Ley de Conservación de Suelos de California, comúnmente llamada la Ley Williamson. El objetivo de esta ley era la preservación del suelo rural para poder asegurar un suministro adecuado de alimentos, desalentar la conversión prematura de suelos rurales a uso urbano, y preservar las propiedades agrícolas debido a su valor como espacio abierto.
La Ley Williamson permite a condados y ciudades ofrecer un avalúo preferencial al dueño de un suelo agrícola, condicionado a un contrato que prohíbe el desarrollo del suelo por un mínimo de diez años. Después de la primera década del contrato, este se prolonga automáticamente cada año a menos que el dueño presente una notificación de no renovación de contrato. Una vez presentada esa notificación, el avalúo de la propiedad aumenta anualmente hasta que alcance su valor justo de mercado, y el contrato vence finalmente después de nueve años.
Diversidad y alcance de los programas de avalúo por valor de uso
Con poca repercusión en los medios de comunicación nacionales, el avalúo preferencial de los suelos rurales se ha convertido en una característica fundamental de los impuestos locales sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos. En California, por ejemplo, más de 6,7 millones de hectáreas de suelo agrícola se acogieron a los contratos de la Ley Williamson en 2008-2009. Según el Departamento de Conservación de California, las propiedades sujetas a la Ley Williamson constituían casi un tercio de todos los suelos privados a comienzos de 2009.
Más de 6,5 millones de hectáreas de suelos agrícolas en Ohio estaban inscritas en el programa de Valor de Uso Agrícola Actual (CAUV, por sus siglas en inglés) para 2007. En promedio, estos suelos se habían valuado en sólo un 14,2 por ciento de su valor de mercado. En diciembre de 2011, la Sala de Representantes de Ohio votó por unanimidad a favor de ampliar el programa CAUV del estado para incluir suelos utilizados para la producción de energía por biomasa y biodiésel.
En Nueva Hampshire, se inscribieron 1,2 millones de hectáreas en el programa estatal de avalúo por uso vigente en 2010. Estas parcelas valuadas en forma preferencial constituían más del 51 por ciento del área total de suelos del estado. Como la agricultura desempeña un papel menor en la economía de Nueva Hampshire, más del 90 por ciento de estos suelos sin desarrollar son bosques y humedales, no campos agrícolas ni pasturas.
Dado que las circunstancias económicas, políticas y legales varían sustancialmente entre los 50 estados, no es sorprendente que los gobiernos estatales hayan adoptado programas UVA diversos. En 1977, once estados ya habían creado programas en los cuales las parcelas elegibles quedaban inscritas automáticamente. En otros 38 estados, los programas requerían que los propietarios presentaran solicitudes de avalúo preferencial. Casi todos los estados ofrecían avalúos por debajo del valor de mercado para suelos agrícolas, pero sólo 21 estados extendían avalúos preferenciales para suelos madereros y bosques.
Desde el punto de vista de la conservación de suelos, la diferencia más importante entre los estados es que 15 de ellos no imponen penalizaciones si un dueño convierte su propiedad a un uso no calificado (ver figura 1). Otros siete estados exigen la devolución de un porcentaje del desarrollo inmobiliario efectuado en parcelas inscritas en el programa. Es decir, el propietario tiene que pagar al estado o al municipio un porcentaje del valor de mercado de la parcela en el año en que se desarrolla la propiedad.
Mucho más común es la penalización de reversión, un disuasión del desarrollo que exige al dueño que pague la diferencia entre el impuesto sobre la propiedad efectivamente pagado en los últimos años gracias al avalúo por valor de uso, y el impuesto que hubiera pagado en esos años si el avalúo hubiera sido efectuado al valor de mercado (más los intereses acumulados por dicha diferencia, en algunos casos). Veintiséis estados utilizan esta forma de penalización al desarrollo inmobiliario. Las investigaciones económicas han demostrado que la falta de penalizaciones al desarrollo inmobiliario debilita significativamente la capacidad de un programa UVA para demorar el desarrollo de suelos rurales que se encuentran en el borde de las regiones metropolitanas (England y Mohr 2006).
La práctica de avalúo por valor de uso a veces crea tensiones políticas en la comunidad e incluso puede dañar la legitimidad de la tributación sobre la propiedad como fuente de ingresos locales. En noviembre de 2011, una estación de televisión de Wisconsin reportó que los dueños de lotes vacantes en una subdivisión residencial de lujo habían cosechado malas hierbas en sus parcelas y solicitado con éxito un avalúo agrícola para sus lotes, mientras la construcción estaba pendiente. Este alegato hizo que por lo menos un representante estatal solicitara la realización de audiencias legislativas por abuso del programa de avalúo por valor de uso del estado. Según el representante Louis Molepske, “Esto debería molestar a todos los habitantes de Wisconsin porque han sido engañados por aquellos que… [quieren] transferir injustamente la carga de los impuestos sobre la propiedad a todos los demás” (Polcyn 2011).
Cómo salvar a los agricultores familiares y los paisajes rurales
Los programas UVA, ¿han “salvado al agricultor familiar”, como predijeron originalmente algunos de sus defensores? En realidad, no. Durante la década de 1980, la población agrícola de los Estados Unidos descendió drásticamente un 31,2 por ciento. Desde 1991 a 2007, la cantidad de granjas comerciales pequeñas continuó disminuyendo, de 1,08 millones a 802.000. En ese mismo período de tiempo, las granjas muy grandes (con 1 millón de dólares en ingresos brutos por lo menos) aumentaron su participación en la producción agrícola nacional desde casi el 28 por ciento hasta casi el 47 por ciento (Servicio de Investigación Económica del Departamento de Agricultura de los Estados Unidos, sin fecha).
Si el avalúo preferencial de los suelos rurales no ha prevenido la disminución de las actividades agrícolas familiares, ¿ha reducido la tasa de desarrollo del suelo rural en los Estados Unidos? Existen pruebas positivas al respecto, pero son modestas. Un estudio sobre el cambio en el uso del suelo desde que Nueva Jersey adoptó el avalúo por uso del suelo en 1964, hasta 1990, encontró que el programa tuvo un impacto muy modesto en la tasa de conversión de suelos agrícolas a usos urbanos (Parks y Quimio, 1996). Después de su estudio en 1998 de casi 3.000 condados de los Estados Unidos, Morris (1998) concluyó que, en promedio, los programas UVA tuvieron como resultado el mantenimiento de aproximadamente un 10 por ciento más de suelos agrícolas en un condado después de 20 años de funcionamiento del programa. Después de su estudio detallado sobre el cambio de uso del suelo en Luisiana, Polyakov y Zhang (2008) concluyeron que se hubieran desarrollado 65.000 hectáreas más de suelos agrícolas durante los cinco años posteriores a 1992 si no hubiera existido un programa UVA en el estado. Parece, entonces, que los programas UVA han ralentizado algo la expansión metropolitana durante las últimas décadas.
Transfiriendo la carga tributaria a nuestros vecinos
Si bien la reducción en la tasa de desarrollo del suelo constituye un beneficio medioambiental y público de los programas UVA, viene acompañado de un costo social. Cuando las propiedades de agricultores, ganaderos y dueños forestales reciben un avalúo muy por debajo del valor de mercado, los gobiernos locales recaudan menos impuestos, a no ser que suban la tasa de impuestos de todas las demás propiedades gravables. Al elevar las tasas tributarias para mantener los niveles de gasto público, los pueblos y condados aumentan las facturas de los impuestos sobre la propiedad de los propietarios no sujetos al UVA, que principalmente son los dueños de viviendas.
Este impacto potencialmente regresivo de los programas UVA se conocía desde hacía décadas. En su informe de 1976 sobre el avalúo preferencial de suelos agrícolas y espacios abiertos, el Consejo sobre Calidad Medioambiental del Presidente (1976, 6-8) expresó claramente que estos programas estatales tienen un costo tributario de magnitud significativa, afectando la redistribución de ingresos entre los contribuyentes:
Todas las leyes de avalúo diferencial… [generan] ‘gastos tributarios’, porque las facturas de cobro de algunos contribuyentes se reducen…. En lamayoría de los casos, el costo de esta reducción se distribuye entre todos los demás contribuyentes… El efecto de un gasto tributario es precisamente el mismo que si los contribuyentes que reciben el beneficio debieran pagar sus impuestos a la misma tasa que los contribuyentes no preferenciales, y al mismo tiempo recibieran un subsidio… por el valor del beneficio tributario.
La magnitud de esta transferencia de impuestos entre los dueños de propiedades puede ser considerable. El informe de Anderson y Griffing (2000) estima los gastos tributarios de dos condados de Nebraska asociados con el programa UVA del estado. El gasto tributario promedio es aproximadamente el 36 por ciento de los ingresos del condado de Lancaster y el 75 por ciento de los ingresos del condado de Sarpy.
Dunford y Marousek (1981) han estudiado el impacto de la Ley de Impuestos sobre Espacios Abiertos (OSTA, por sus siglas en inglés) del estado de Washington sobre la distribución de la carga tributaria en el condado de Spokane. Ocho años después de la creación del programa OSTA, se han inscrito aproximadamente 180.000 hectáreas del condado de Spokane, es decir, alrededor del 40 por ciento del área total de suelos del condado.
Los autores calculan que el aumento de impuestos de las propiedades no participantes para compensar la reducción de impuestos a los dueños de las parcelas inscritas ascendería al 1,3 por ciento, si se deseara mantener los ingresos constantes. No obstante, oculto en este cálculo promedio para el condado, se encuentran enormes diferencias entre las distintas comunidades. Aun cuando la transferencia tributaria a las propiedades no participantes sería sólo del 1-2 por ciento en muchas localidades, esta alcanzaría hasta el 21,9 por ciento en una comunidad. La conclusión de este y otros estudios es que el otorgamiento de avalúos preferenciales a los terratenientes rurales podría ayudar a retrasar el desarrollo inmobiliario de sus propiedades, pero también podría imponer una carga fiscal sobre los propietarios de viviendas así como también sobre los dueños de propiedades comerciales e industriales.
Reforma de los programas de avalúo por valor de uso
Como muchos estados han tenido casi medio siglo de experiencia con sus programas UVA, este es un buen momento para que los legisladores estatales y los departamentos tributarios hagan una pausa y se pregunten si esta característica de su sistema tributario estatal y local debería ser reformada o no. La transferencia de la carga del impuesto sobre la propiedad causada por los programas UVA en muchas comunidades sólo se puede justificar si dicha tasa tributaria preferencial sirve al más amplio interés público. El argumento a favor de la reforma cobra más impulso si se considera que el 94 por ciento de las unidades familiares agrarias tienen un patrimonio neto mayor a la mediana de todos los hogares de los Estados Unidos.
Después de la brusca caída de los mercados inmobiliarios residenciales y comerciales en 2008–2010, la tasa de conversión de suelos rurales a uso urbano disminuyó en muchos estados, al menos por el momento. Para las comunidades, puede ser más fácil considerar la adopción de reformas a los programas UVA durante este período, cuando muchos dueños de suelos rurales no tienen expectativas de vender sus propiedades a emprendedores inmobiliarios en un futuro cercano. Después de una amplia revisión de la literatura de investigación sobre los programas UVA estatales, recomiendo las siguientes reformas (England, 2011).
Aquellos estados que no imponen todavía una penalización cuando un suelo se retira del programa UVA deben comenzar a hacerlo. A menos que el propietario de suelos rurales tenga que pagar una multa en el momento en que su parcela se desarrolle, solamente se aprovechará del ahorro en el impuesto sobre la propiedad ofrecido por el programa UVA hasta que el precio de mercado del suelo desarrollado sea suficientemente atractivo. Por otro lado, la imposición de una penalización alta por hectárea, que disminuya con la cantidad de años de inscripción en el programa, podría inducir al propietario de suelos rurales a retrasar su desarrollo inmobiliario por años. Durante estos años, los fideicomisos de suelos y agencias estatales tendrían la oportunidad de imponer servidumbres de conservación sobre las parcelas rurales que merecen protección permanente contra el desarrollo inmobiliario. En una era en que pocos propietarios de suelos rurales son agricultores pobres, los programas UVA deberían ayudar a proteger los paisajes rurales y preservar los servicios de ecosistemas, en vez de subsidiar a los terratenientes ricos.
Los estados también deberían reconsiderar tres categorías de suelos rurales que son elegibles para el avalúo por valor de uso. (1) Los suelos agrícolas y ganaderos no deberían inscribirse automáticamente, como es la práctica en algunos estados. En lugar de ello, se debería obligar a los propietarios rurales a documentar los ingresos netos considerables recibidos por la venta de productos agrícolaganaderos durante el año fiscal precedente. Esto evitaría que el propietario de suelos ociosos a punto de ser desarrollados recibiera un descuento en su impuesto sobre la propiedad. (2) Las parcelas agrícolas no deberían ser elegibles para el avalúo por valor de uso si ya se presentaron planes de subdivisión o si las parcelas han sido reasignadas para uso residencial, comercial o industrial. Si existen pruebas consistentes de que un terrateniente va a comenzar pronto a desarrollar una parcela, no hay ninguna razón para continuar dándole el tratamiento tributario preferencial del programa UVA. (3) Los bosques, humedales y otras parcelas de uso no agrícola deberían ser elegibles para el avalúo por valor de uso si generan beneficios públicos tales como protección contra inundaciones, hábitat silvestre y vistas panorámicas. Por otro lado, los suelos áridos con gran potencial de desarrollo que se encuentran en el borde de las áreas metropolitanas se deberían avaluar al valor del mercado si no producen servicios de ecosistemas que beneficien a la sociedad en su conjunto.
Los estados deberían revisar cuidadosamente los métodos de capitalización de ingresos empleados para estimar el valor de uso agrícola de las propiedades rurales. Las pautas para estimar los ingresos netos de suelos agrícolas y para seleccionar la tasa de descuento que capitaliza el flujo de ingresos se debe basar en principios económicos sólidos, y se debería presentar a los contribuyentes de manera transparente. Debido a que los cálculos de capitalización de ingresos son muy sensibles a la elección de la tasa de descuento, dicha elección se debe justificar apropiadamente, y no puede tomarse arbitrariamente. En principio, la tasa de descuento libre de riesgo se tiene que ajustar según la inflación, el riesgo de incumplimiento, el riesgo de vencimiento y las restricciones de liquidez.
Los gobiernos estatales deberían reconocer que, si bien sus programas UVA generan beneficios medioambientales para el público en general, también imponen cargas fiscales sobre las localidades en que los dueños privados de suelos rurales se benefician de un avalúo preferencial. Por ejemplo, California promulgó su Ley de Subvención de Espacios Vacíos en 1972 para mitigar el impacto de la Ley Williamson sobre los presupuestos de los gobiernos locales, proporcionando subsidios estatales para reemplazar en parte los ingresos tributarios perdidos del impuesto a la propiedad. Entre 1972 y 2008, estos subsidios de Sacramento a las ciudades y condados ascendieron a 839 millones de dólares. (Estos subsidios fueron suspendidos en 2009, sin embargo, debido al enorme déficit presupuestario del estado.)
Como el avalúo preferencial del suelo rural se ha convertido en una característica fundamental del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos, los gobernadores y los legisladores estatales deberían hacer una pausa y reconsiderar si estos tipos de reformas podrían mejorar tanto el desempeño de sus programas UVA como el apoyo popular a los mismos.
Sobre el autor
Richard W. England es profesor de Economía y Recursos Naturales de la Universidad de Nueva Hampshire. También es visiting fellow del Departamento de Valuación y Tributación del Instituto Lincoln.
Referencias
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Anderson, John E., and Marlon F. Griffing. 2000. Measuring use-value assessment tax expenditures. Assessment Journal (January/February): 35–47.
Blase, Melvin G., and William J. Staub. 1971. Real property taxes in the rural-urban fringe. Land Economics (May): 168–174.
Council on Environmental Quality. 1976. Untaxing open space: An evaluation of the effectiveness of differential assessment of farms and open space. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Dunford, Richard W., and Douglas C. Marousek. 1981. Sub-county property tax shifts attributable to use-value assessments on farmland. Land Economics (May): 221–229.
England, Richard W. 2002. Current-use property assessment and land development: A theoretical and empirical review of development penalties. State Tax Notes, 16 December: 795.
———. 2011. Preferential assessment of rural land in the United States: A literature review and reform proposals. Working paper. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
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Polcyn, Bryan. Lawmaker calls for hearing after farmland tax loophole exposed. WITI–TV, Twin Lakes, Wisconsin, 22 November 2011.
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