The largest of the post-World War II suburbs were the size of cities, with populations between 50,000 and 80,000, but they looked like overgrown subdivisions. In Levittown, Lakewood and Park Forest, model houses on curving streets held families similar in age, race and income whose suburban lifestyles were reflected in the nationally popular television sitcoms of the 1950s. The planning of these suburbs was often presented in the popular press as hasty, driven by the need to house war heroes returned from the Battle of the Bulge or Bataan; any problems could be excused by the rush. But, haste was not the case. Political lobbying during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s shaped postwar housing and urban design. The postwar suburbs were constructed at great speed, but that is a different part of their story.

Postwar suburbs represented the deliberate intervention of the federal government into the financing of single-family housing across the nation. For the first time, the federal government provided massive aid directed to developers (whose loans were insured by the Federal Housing Administration, FHA) and white male homeowners (who could get Veterans’ Administration guarantees for mortgages at four percent, with little or nothing down, and then deduct their mortgage interest payments from their taxable income for 30 years). The federal government came to this policy after fierce debates involving architects, planners, politicians, and business and real estate interests.

Herbert Hoover, as secretary of commerce (1921-1928) and then as president (1929-1933), drew the federal government toward housing policy to promote home building as a business strategy for economic recovery from the Depression. Working closely with the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), Hoover’s Commerce Department had established a Division of Building and Housing in 1921, and went on to establish and support Better Homes in America, Inc. By 1930, this coalition had over 7,000 local chapters composed of bankers, real estate brokers, builders, and manufacturers who lobbied for government support for private development of small homes to boost consumption.

In 1931, Hoover ran a National Conference on Homebuilding and Home Ownership that explored federal investment, discussing not only financing and construction of houses, but also building codes, zoning codes, subdivision layout, and the location of industry and commerce. President Franklin D. Roosevelt followed Hoover and launched numerous New Deal programs in planning and housing. The National Housing Act created the FHA in 1934; the Resettlement Administration, created by Executive Order in 1935, sponsored the Greenbelt Towns; the U.S. Housing Act (Wagner Act) created the U.S. Housing Authority to sponsor public housing in 1937. Which of these programs would be the most influential?

The RPAA and the Labor Housing Conference

Housing activists such as Catherine Bauer and Edith Elmer Wood were members of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), along with planners Lewis Mumford, Clarence Stein, and Benton MacKaye. They advocated federal support for public housing through the Wagner Act. Bauer, an architectural critic and author of Modern Housing, was also executive secretary of the Labor Housing Conference, which campaigned for the design of multi-family housing with child care centers and recreational amenities. Projects such as the Hosiery Workers Housing in Philadelphia and the Harlem River Houses for African Americans in New York, designed by teams of noted architects in the 1930s, demonstrated the excellence possible for multi-family urban projects. Nevertheless, conservative Republicans refused to vote for the Wagner Act in 1935 and 1936, passing it in 1937 with severe cost restrictions, means testing for tenants, and slum clearance provisions to protect private landlords. These provisions meant that design would be minimal and residents would be poor. The Labor Housing Conference members bemoaned the final result as the “Anti-Housing Act.”

The Realtors’ Washington Committee

Many of NAREB’s members, large-scale land subdividers of the 1920s, were originally real estate brokerage firms, not homebuilders. (They left the home building to small contractors or mail order house companies.) By the 1930s, many of these subdividers realized they could enhance profits by erecting houses on some of their lots to enhance the image of community and stability they were selling. They renamed themselves “community builders.” Herbert U. Nelson, NAREB’s chief lobbyist, became executive director of the Realtors’ Washington Committee, which lobbied hard for the FHA, so that federal sources of capital and guarantees of mortgages would provide a safety net for the subdividers’ building operations. Both the Urban Land Institute (ULI) and the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) formed in the early 1940s as spin-offs from NAREB.

Beginning in 1934, the FHA insured bank loans to developers so they could purchase land, subdivide it, and construct houses on it with very little of their own capital involved. These loans of 80 or 90 percent of project cost eliminated risk and were made long before the developers had buyers. In return, the developers had to agree to submit site plans and housing plans for review by the FHA, which issued booklets offering conservative advice about architecture and site design. Meant to correct the worst abuses of corrupt builders, these manuals on small houses and on “planning profitable neighborhoods” rejected regional styles, scorned modern architecture and, according to architect Keller Easterling, instituted mediocre “subdivision products.” Kenneth Jackson has documented that the FHA’s concern for resale value also led it to refuse loans for racially mixed neighborhoods. Only all-white subdivisions, enforced by deed restrictions, would qualify.

The Realtors’ Washington Committee supported the FHA. It also lobbied against federal government funding for any other approaches to housing, including complete towns planned by the Resettlement Administration, wartime housing for workers constructed by the government that might provide competition for private efforts, and public housing in the cities. Allied with NAREB were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. League of Savings and Loans, the National Retail Lumber Dealers Association, and others.

Housing Hearings of 1947-1948

After the war ended, demand for housing was intense. People were doubled up with relatives, friends and strangers. Veterans lived in converted chicken coops and camped out in cars. The need for shelter was only expected to grow as waves of demobilized veterans, wartime savings at the ready, married and formed new households.

Although they were deeply disappointed by some aspects of the 1937 housing legislation, Catherine Bauer and other advocates of multi-family housing in urban residential neighborhoods did not retreat. They campaigned for expanded public housing through better legislation in the form of the bipartisan Taft Ellender Wagner housing bill first introduced in 1945 and supported by such groups as the AFL, the CIO and the Conference of Mayors.

These advocates found themselves in a shouting match with NAREB lobbyists who were busy discrediting public construction of shelter as “un-American” and promoting government subsidies for private housing development. Historians Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen, in their book Picture Windows, document the hearings on housing dominated by Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1947 and 1948. McCarthy hassled proponents of public housing and planned towns. Attacking one federally funded multi-family project for veterans, he claimed the government had paid for “a breeding ground for communists.” NAREB’s Herbert U. Nelson also believed public housing was communistic, whereas public support for private businesses was fine. He argued that “public credit can properly be used to help sustain home ownership and private enterprise,” and he railed against the women housing activists trying to promote affordable housing for workers. McCarthy’s committee also attacked building workers in the AFL’s traditional craft unions as incompetents who produced “slack” work and would impede the postwar housing process.

McCarthy found in developer William Levitt an ally who testified that only federal aid to large private builders, coupled with abolition of zoning codes, building codes and union restrictions, could solve the postwar housing shortage. Levitt and Sons, of Long Island, became the nation’s largest home building firm by 1952, creating its first postwar suburb of over 70,000 inexpensive houses on small lots. Levitt followed FHA restrictions on race, refusing to sell to African Americans, so Levittown became the largest all-white community in the nation. There was never an overall town plan for Levittown, which spanned two existing Long Island towns, Hempstead and Oyster Bay, in Nassau County. Levitt and Sons provided no sewers, relying instead on individual septic tanks, and built residential streets that failed to connect with county and state highways. The project was all about selling houses, not about the basics of sheltering tens of thousands of people according to professional standards of housing or urban design.

By October 1952, Fortune magazine gushed over “The Most House for the Money” and praised “Levitt’s Progress,” publishing his complaints about government interference through too-strict FHA and VA inspections and standards. With a straight face, and despite receiving hundreds of millions of dollars of FHA financing, Levitt said, “Utopia in this business would be to get rid of the government, except in its proper function of an insurance agency.”

Meanwhile, Catherine Bauer and her allies faced the same kind of opposition they had confronted on the earlier housing bill. The 1949 Housing Act did not meet their expectations, and its provisions for demolition began the neighborhood destruction pattern that would later become “urban renewal.” With each succeeding year, fewer units of new public housing construction were authorized.

The Two-Tier Legacy

In Modern Housing in America, historian Gail Radford defines the 1930s and 1940s as the time when Americans developed a “two-tier” policy to subsidize housing. Cramped multi-family housing for the poor would be constructed by public authorities, while more generous single-family housing for white, male-headed families would be constructed by private developers with government support. This policy disadvantaged women and people of color, as well as the elderly and people of low incomes. It also had profound implications for urban design. Inadequate financial resources hampered multi-family housing complexes, while material resources were wasted in single-family housing production without proper urban planning. Worst of all, federal policy mystified many working-class and middle-class Americans, who saw minimal visible subsidies helping the poor but never understood that their own housing was being subsidized in a far more generous way through income-tax deductions that grew with the size of their mortgages.

Despite the greater scope for urban public amenities suggested by New Deal legislation enabling federal involvement in town building and public housing, it was the FHA’s mortgage insurance for private subdivisions that proved to have the greatest long-term effect on American urbanization patterns. As real estate historian Marc A. Weiss has stated: “This new federal agency, run to a large extent both by and for bankers, builders, and brokers, exercised great political power in pressuring local planners and government officials to conform to its requirements.” Between 1934 and 1940, Weiss concludes that “FHA had fully established the land planning and development process and pattern that a decade later captured media attention as ‘postwar suburbanization.'” Barry Checkoway notes that accounts of subdivisions “exploding” often attributed their growth to consumer choice, but in fact consumers had little choice. The well-designed urban multi-family projects Bauer and others had envisioned were not available as alternatives to the large subdivisions of inexpensive houses constructed by the big builders who now controlled the housing market.

The distrust and anger generated by the two-tier housing solution endure today. Public policy has separated affluent and poor, white and black, male-headed households and female-headed households, young families and the elderly. Advocates of affordable housing and urban amenities often see white suburbs and their residents as the enemy, while many affluent white suburban homeowners and successful builders don’t want to deal with city problems. The two-tier solution also dampened idealism in the planning and design professions. Architects lost the chance to build large amounts of affordable multi-family housing with sophisticated designs. Regional planners lost the chance to direct the location and site design of massive postwar construction. Sixty years later, metropolitan regions are still shaped by the outcome of these old debates.

Dolores Hayden is professor of architecture, urbanism and American studies at Yale University. With support from the Lincoln Institute, she is working on a new history of American suburbia, Model Houses for the Millions: Making the American Suburban Landscape, 1820-2000.

Her new working paper, Model Houses for the Millions: Making the American Suburban Landscape, 1820-2000, is currently available from the Lincoln Institute.

References

Catherine Bauer. 1934. Modern Housing. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Rosalyn Baxandall and Elizabeth Ewen. 2000. Picture Windows: How the Suburbs Happened. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Barry Checkoway. 1986. “Large Builders, Federal Housing Programs, and Postwar Suburbanization,” in Rachel G. Bratt, Chester Hartman, and Ann Meyerson, Critical Perspectives on Housing. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 119-138.

Keller Easterling. 1999. Organization Space. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Dolores Hayden. 1984. Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.

Kenneth T. Jackson. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Gail Radford. 1996. Modern Housing in America: Policy Struggles in the New Deal Era. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Marc A. Weiss. 1987. The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land Use Planning. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

The excessively high price of serviced land in Latin America is one of several explanations for the extent and persistence of informal land markets. Contrary to popular beliefs, informality is expensive and therefore is not the best or even an advantageous alternative to combating poverty, but it is usually the only one available to the urban poor. A more consistent policy to reduce informality, and in so doing reduce poverty, should be at least neutral or contribute to reducing high land prices.

Poverty Alone Cannot Explain Informality

Although the map of illegality corresponds to a great degree with that of poverty, the extent and persistence of informality cannot be explained by poverty alone. Not all occupants of informal settlements are poor, as many empirical studies in Latin America have proved in recent years. The rate of new irregular land occupations is much higher than the rate of increase in the number of new poor families. In Brazil, for example, the total number of favela residents has increased at five times the rate of poor residents, and a similar trend is seen in most large Latin American cities.

This spectacular growth in informal settlements has occurred through expansion on the peripheries and densification in “consolidated” irregular urban areas, even though the birth rate and the number of rural-to-urban migrants have declined substantially and the percentage of poor citizens has remained relatively stable. Other explanations for this growth in informality include the lack of sufficient social housing programs, inadequate public investment in urban infrastructure for public amenities and services (such as drainage and sewage systems) and, last but not least, the reality that informal arrangements are profitable for those who promote them.

The High Cost of Serviced Land

Conventional economics argues that free market prices reflect the level at which a buyer’s ability and willingness to pay matches a supplier’s ability and willingness to sell, but in practice no assurance is given with respect to meeting social needs. That is, the market for serviced land may be functioning well, even though many families (even non-poor ones) are unable to access such land, and some existing urbanized lands are being kept vacant intentionally.

On the peripheries of many Latin American cities, the price of a square metre (m2) of serviced land made available by private agents can vary between US$32 and US$172. These figures are close in absolute terms to those found in cities in the developed world, where the per capita income is typically 7 to 10 times higher than in Latin America. Even a family above the poverty line saving up to 20 percent of its monthly wages (US$200) would need 12 to 15 years to save enough to acquire an urbanized plot of 150 m2. These indicators suggest that the difficulty of gaining access to serviced land may be one of the factors that actually contribute to poverty.

The price of serviced land, like prices in other markets, is determined by supply and demand. The supply of land depends on the amount that is newly serviced (produced) per year, the amount that is retained from the market, and the intensity of the use of the existing serviced land. The demand depends on the annual rate of formation of new households, adjusted by their income and/or purchasing power, their preferences and the prices of other items in their budgets. It is difficult to provide a full discussion of all factors affecting the behavior of land prices (see Smolka 2002), but it suffices to mention certain determinants that are emblematic to understanding some apparent idiosyncrasies of the functioning of urban land markets in Latin America.

On the supply side, property taxes, a major potential source of revenue to finance the production of serviced land, are ridiculously low. Typically property taxes represent less that 0.5 percent of GDP, compared to 3 to 4 percent in the U.S. and Canada. Overall there is a sense that Latin America underspends on infrastructure and services compared to its per capita GDP. The substantive observed land value increments resulting from investments in urban infrastructure and services are basically neglected as a revenue source to finance such investments, due to weak sanctions on capturing land value increments or simply holding improved land from the market (Smolka and Furtado 2001).

In addition, the disposition of considerable amounts of land is controlled by agents that do not follow strict economic rules (e.g., some public agencies, the Army, the Church or even state-owned enterprises like the railroads for whom some statutory restrictions preclude the disposition of land according to the market’s highest and best use criteria). Furthermore, the limited amount of available land that is fully serviced is often subject to overtly elitist urbanistic norms and regulations (zoning) designed to “protect” those serviced neighborhoods by making it difficult for low-income families to comply.

On the demand side, many families, even those with relatively high incomes, work in the informal sector and are excluded from the market because they lack the credentials required by financial agencies to apply for a loan. The need to self-finance housing production on a piecemeal basis through nontraditional funding sources extends the time between acquisition and occupation of land, thereby adding to both the cost of financing and the overall demand for land. Further, the legacy of high inflation, ill-developed or inaccessible capital markets, and limited participation in the social security system are responsible for nurturing a well-established culture and preference by lower-income sectors to use land as a reserve of value and as a popular means of capitalization, which also adds to the demand for land. In other words, holding undeveloped land and the culture of land speculation are not exclusive to high-income areas.

Prices for Informal Plots

Beyond these conventional arguments about supply and demand, one may also consider the dynamics or interdependency of formal and informal urban land markets as a factor contributing to high land prices. Specifically, the high prices for serviced land in the formal market seem to affect the relatively high prices of unserviced land in the informal market, and vice versa.

Land prices reveal the difference that the purchaser has to pay to avoid falling into a worse situation (that is, farther from work; fewer or worse services, lower environmental quality, and the like). Thus, if the “best” alternative is a plot in an unserviced settlement, one would expect a premium on the existing serviced land, which would also reflect the value of the legal title that comes with serviced land. On the other hand, if the minimum price for serviced land (raw land plus the cost of urbanization) is still unaffordable, then whatever land one could have access to would represent an alternative. This alternative could range from outright squatter settlement, to invasion through the mediation of “pirate” operators or organized movements (both of which involve fees and other payments), to the more prevalent land market for irregular subdivision of large parcels into small plots with inadequate services.

The price of land in the informal market is, therefore, higher than the price of raw land but normally less than the sum of the raw land price plus the cost of providing services. At the same time, it tends to be lower (though not necessarily on a per square-metre basis) than the minimum price of fully serviced and commercialized land in the formal market. In effect the market values more “flexible” means to access land, such as plots smaller than the minimum lot size, or construction without building codes, or even the possibility of selling the roof of a house as buildable space.

Most low-income families do not choose an informal arrangement because it provides the best price option, but simply because it is often their only option. The “choice” of acquiring an informal plot is still expensive. Conservative estimates obtained from an informal survey of 10 large Latin American cities show the average price of land on a commercialized illegal plot was US$27 for one square metre (see Table 1).

Table 1: Prices and Profitability of Informal and Formal Land Markets (US$)

1- Rural land designated for urban use
Informal market: $4
Formal market: $4

2- Cost of urbanization
Informal market: minimal = $5
Formal market: full = $25

3- Final price in the market
Informal market: $27
Formal market: $70

4- Profit over advanced capital=(3-1-2)/(1+2)
Informal market: 200%
Formal market: 141%

The profit figure (4) explains at least in part the question (an apparent paradox): Why, in spite of a significant mark-up in the provision of urbanized land in the informal market, does one find so little interest in development from the private sector? As Table 1 indicates, the provision of informal land is more profitable than the provision of formally developed land. In fact, the figures for the formal market are largely underestimated since there are higher risks associated with financial, security and marketing costs, and other costs borne by the developer that are not incurred in informal developments. These data also help explain why formality begets informality and exposes the fact that the advantages of informal arrangements are not necessarily perceived by the low-income occupants, but by the subdivider or informal developer.

Unexpected Effects of Regularization

Let us turn now to the question of policy responses to this state of affairs. Given the apparent impossibility or impracticality of adopting any other policy, the prevailing notion has been that tolerating informal “solutions” to gain access to land and then regularizing the settlements after they are established is cheaper in the long run for public finances, and better for the low-income occupants (Lincoln Institute 2002).

The public finance argument claims that the existing arrangement is cheaper because it capitalizes on private (self-) investments in the consolidated settlements, thus relieving public agencies of social responsibility and expenditures otherwise associated with one’s full “right to the city.” This view is questionable on two accounts. First, the physical conditions and existing housing are often unacceptable as human shelter, in spite of the ingenuity and imagination of informal solutions under extremely unfavorable conditions. The poor standards of land use and density in these settlements are only tolerated because the damage has already been done. Second, with regard to infrastructure, some of the alternative technologies that look promising are ultimately shown to perform poorly and to require overly expensive maintenance.

The impacts on low-income occupants are also worse than expected. Not only are land prices much too high but there are additional costs: those without an official address (because they live in an irregular settlement) are often discriminated against when looking for a job or social services; rents as a percentage of property value are higher than the rates observed in the formal market; access to water from a truck or other temporary source is much more expensive than piped water; and the cost of insecurity is greater because of living in a more violent environment.

Regularization policies evaluated in a broader urban context may actually contribute to aggravating the problem it is supposed to remedy. That is, as a curative approach these policies may instead have perverse or counter-productive preventative effects, as noted below.

Price Signals

The expectation that an area of land will eventually be regularized allows the developer to raise the price. A purchaser often obtains a lot with written evidence that the developer does not yet have the services required by urban planning norms. At the same time the developer promises that as soon as enough lots are sold the services or infrastructure will be provided, even though such promises are often unfulfilled. At best, a relationship of complicity is established between buyer and seller. At worst, and this is quite common, the purchaser is tricked by the existence of services, such as pipes put into the ground, which the developer claims are part of the infrastructure network. Other problems in these arrangements that can harm poor residents are doubtful rights of tenure, payment terms that disguise the full amount of interest to be paid, and confusing or inaccurate details in the contract.

As in any other segment of the land market, the actual prices reflect, or absorb, expectations about the future use of the lot. The informal sector is no exception. The greater the expectation that the plot of land that is currently without services will get them eventually, either from the developer or, as is more likely, from the government through some regularization program, the higher the price at which the land is sold.

Regularization as an Attraction for More Irregularity

Research on the first arrival dates of inhabitants in informal settlements suggests that in many cases more people moved in just when some regularization program (such as the granting of titles or urbanization improvements) was announced or implemented (Menna Barreto 2000).

The idea that expectations about regularization have an effect on informality is also corroborated by the large number of invasions or occupations that take place either just before or just after electoral periods, when candidates promise new regularization programs. The victory of Miguel Arraes as governor of Pernambuco, Brazil, in 1986 led to 13 land invasions in just over a month (Rabaroux 1997, 124), and the Latin American historiography of the effects of the expectations created by populist promises is rich in other examples. Many of the existing settlements that need to be regularized today owe their origin to the irresponsible complacency of politicians turning a blind eye to the irregular occupation of public or unsuitable areas, or, which is worse, who ceded public land for electioneering purposes.

The Opportunity Costs of Regularization

Regularization programs, which are normally of a remedial or curative nature, have a high opportunity cost compared to the cost of providing urbanized land in a preventative manner. The rule of thumb cost per benefited family of a typical upgrading or regularization program has been in the range of $3,000 to $4,000. Taking the size of a plot to be around 50 m2 and adding 20 percent to account for streets and other public services, the cost works out to US$50 to US$70 per m2. This is considerably higher than the cost for servicing new land, which is less than US$25 per m2, and is similar to the price charged by private developers, even when allowing for a handsome profit margin. ECIA, a private developer operating west of Río de Janeiro, offered completely urbanized plots for US$70 to US$143 per m2 at 1999 prices (Oliveira 1999). The Municipal Secretariat of Urbanism in Río de Janeiro has a technical study, from 1997, which demonstrates that it is possible to commercialize urbanized plots for less than US$55 per m2. Along the same lines, Aristizabal and Gomez (2001) in Bogotá estimate that the cost of correction (“reparation”) of an irregular settlement is 2.7 times the cost of planned areas.

These figures suggest the limitations of preventative programs in favor of curative ones. It is also relevent that permission to develop a regular, formal subdivision may take from three to five years, whereas the decision to regularize an informal settlement often takes less than six months.

The “Day After” of Regularization

A well-executed regularization program (that is, one that effectively integrates the informal area with the urban fabric) would ideally result in the improved quality of life for all occupants and a stronger community. In particular, one would expect an appreciation of property values, causing some residential mobility as families with below-average incomes are forced to move. However, when the program is badly executed the area may be consolidated as a low-income irregular settlement.

The Favela-Bairro upgrading program in Rio de Janeiro is often used to exemplify the most comprehensive and successful experience of its kind. Abramo’s (2002) study of the impact of regularization programs found a relatively small increase in property values in the affected areas (28 percent). Applying this average figure to typical or modest houses with an ex-ante value estimated at US$12,000, the added value is about US$3,400, a number close to the average per-family cost of regularization programs. This result contrasts with the mark-up of more than 100 percent obtained in the process of servicing raw land through the market by private agents. This intriguing piece of information seems to show how little notice the “market” takes of the increased value of these regularized settlements. At the same time, full integration into the urban fabric turns out to be less frequent than had been expected. Many of the favelas that received important upgrading investments remain stigmatized as favelas even 15 years later.

Conclusions

Informality is expensive, and it exacerbates the conditions of living in poverty. The diagnoses of such agencies as the UNCHS (Habitat), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and others would seem to be correct in regarding upgrading programs as an essential ingredient of any policy to deal with urban poverty. However, because of the piecemeal and limited approach of such programs, there is no guarantee that the regularization of settlements alone will contribute to reducing urban poverty. In effect these programs not only reiterate and keep intact the land market “rules of the game” that contribute to informality, but they also generate some perverse effects. This situation poses both a dilemma and a challenge. The dilemma is that not regularizing simply is not a political option (nor is it a humanitarian option). The challenge is how to interrupt the vicious cycle of poverty and informality through interventions in the land market. The task ahead is formidable, but there are places in Latin America where local governments are beginning to set new ground rules.

Martim O. Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean at the Lincoln Institute.

References

Abramo, Pedro. 2002. Funcionamento do mercado informal de terras nas favelas e mobilidade residencial dos pobres. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.

Aristizabal, Nora, and Andrés Ortíz Gomez. 2002. Are services more important than titles in Bogotá?” in Land, Rights and Innovation: Improving Tenure Security for the Urban Poor, Geoffrey Payne, ed. 100-113. London: Intermediate Technology Development Group Publishing.

Lincoln Institute. 2002. Access to Land by the Urban Poor: 2002 Annual Roundtable. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Menna Barreto Silva, Helena. 2000. Programas de urbanização e desenvolvimento do mercado em favelas brasileiras. São Paulo: University of São Paulo: LAB-Hab.

Oliveira, Fabrício L. de. 1999. Valorização fundiária e custos de urbanização na XVII R.A. – Campo Grande: uma primeira aproximação com o caso do Rio de Janeiro. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.

Rabaroux, Patrice. 1997. La Regularizacion en Recife (Brasil). In El acceso de los pobres al suelo urbano. Antonio Azuela and François Tomas, eds. México: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos del Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la UNAM.

Smolka, Martim O. 2002. The High and Unaffordable Prices of Serviced Land. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Research Paper.

Smolka, Martim O., and Fernanda Furtado, eds. 2001. Recuperación de plusvalías en América Latina: Alternativas para el desarrollo urbano. Santiago, Chile: EURELIBROS.

Many historic centers in Latin America have been the focus of government and private initiatives seeking to rehabilitate the building stock and position the areas to serve the tourism industry. In most cases these efforts have led to the displacement of lowincome residents or of residential activities altogether, due to gentrification and commercialization of the district (Scarpaci 2005). More recently, the rehabilitation of these historic cores has been framed as part of broader debates and efforts that pursue the recovery of the city centers (historical or otherwise) because of their key role as collective symbols or spaces of social interaction, or because of their potential efficiency as dense, well-serviced urban districts (Pérez, Pujol, and Polèse 2003; Rojas 2004).

This article seeks to advance this discussion based on the experience in Panama City’s historic center, “Casco Antiguo.” It describes some recent, innovative policies that have explored the intersections of tourism, affordable housing, employment, and culture in a historical context, and draws some general insights and lessons.