The current state of global urban development is unsettling and plagued with man-made and natural disasters. In many developing countries, the government does not have the fiscal and institutional capacity to build affordable housing and basic infrastructure for the growing urban population, resulting in a proliferation of informal settlements and slums. At the same time, natural disasters in some of these distressed regions have destroyed homes, roads, water and sewage systems, and other public facilities, exacerbating the already limited basic services available to the urban poor.

In response to these problems, many international aid agencies such as UN-HABITAT and the World Bank, as well as governments, scholars, and practitioners, are looking for new ideas or repackaging existing ways to rebuild cities. This article discusses a long-established land management tool that has attracted recent attention—land readjustment (LR)—and describes how selected elements of this tool are being adopted to assist post-earthquake reconstruction efforts in Chile.

The LR approach emphasizes the integration of the urban economy, city planning, law, and governance with land management to form a comprehensive urban development or upgrading strategy. It requires an interdisciplinary team of experts with different perspectives to work on a concrete land development project. Although many scholars such as Doebele (1982) and Hong and Needham (2007) have emphasized the importance of this integrated approach, some practitioners perceive it as merely a tool to facilitate land transactions. This narrow view has limited opportunities in some developing countries to resolve urban upgrading and development problems in a more comprehensive way.

The recent resurgence of interest in LR is due to the recognition of the importance of coordinating economic, legal, political, and social institutions in the design and implementation of urban (re)development plans. Practitioners are also contemplating the possibility of extending LR from management of peri-urbanization and post-disaster reconstruction to slum upgrading, for example in some rapidly urbanizing African cities. The application of this LR approach to countries where the technique has never been used is still at an experimental stage. Potential pilot projects are being designed, but have not been fully implemented, so further research is needed to test the validity of assertions about this approach.

Challenges of Urbanization

In 2010, about 50.7 percent of the world’s population (3.5 billion people) lived in urban areas (World Bank 2011). The percentage is expected to increase to 70 percent by 2050, mostly in the periphery of secondary cities in developing countries. According to UN-HABITAT (2011), one-third of the urban population in developing countries (1.2 billion people) lives in slums and, despite substandard living conditions, these populations are increasing, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Asia-Pacific region. Between 2000 and 2010, the number of slum dwellers increased by six million annually (Cities Alliance 2011).

Unfortunately, infrastructure and basic service development in most African countries have not increased at the same rate. Cities where sanitation, roads, water, and other services were already underdeveloped have limited fiscal resources and struggle with accommodating the unprecedented increase in population. Two major problems that hinder urban upgrading are holdouts in land assembly and lack of public funds to finance infrastructure—issues to which we will return.

Natural disasters also have taken a toll on urban populations. According to a United Nations estimate, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, floods, and volcano eruptions caused economic damage totaling $109 billion in 2010, three times more than in 2009 (Reuters 2011). Cities in developing countries with poor infrastructure and fiscal health are particularly vulnerable and are facing increasing price tags for both post-disaster reconstruction and adaptation to future calamities. Again, solving the problems associated with land assembly and infrastructure financing are crucial.

Conventional solutions for dealing with land assembly problems, such as compulsory purchase (eminent domain) and market transactions, are onerous. With increasing global demands for democratic governance and the realization of human rights to adequate housing, secure tenure, and protection from forced eviction, the traditional approach of relying on coercive measures that take land from owners or occupants for urban expansion and redevelopment is encountering strong legal opposition and public protests (table 1).

Using the market to facilitate voluntary land transfers is also problematic. Holdouts by individual landowners could thwart the redevelopment project and increase compensation costs for land acquisition. In some African countries where market mechanisms are not yet fully developed, unequal access to information has led to land grabs and speculation by local elites. As a result, the urban poor were either forced out or bought out from their neighborhoods and were relocated to remote areas where access to employment, public transportation, and basic services are limited.

To make matters worse, the fiscal outlook for cities in developing countries is bleak, and the opportunities to speed up the construction or repair of housing and basic infrastructure are limited. The 2008 subprime mortgage market meltdown in the United States has had adverse repercussions for municipal finances around the world. The decline in demand for imports in industrialized nations and the tightening of liquidity in the financial markets has slowed global economic growth. As exports to developed countries decrease, income-tax and value-added-tax collections in less developed nations also drop. The reduction in tax revenues exacerbates the already tight local budgets and further undermines the ability of municipalities to repair disaster-damaged infrastructure or build new facilities to accommodate rapid population growth.

Land Readjustment as an Alternative

LR has been practiced in many countries to achieve policy goals ranging from farmland consolidation to inner-city revitalization (Doebele 1982; Hong and Needham 2007). Its basic principle is to organize landowners to act collectively—in cooperation with a municipality and/or private developer—to pool their land in order to accomplish a redevelopment project.

LR is often used to re-parcel land when existing parcel boundaries are in conflict with the current land use plan. One important outcome is that a portion of the readjusted land can be retained by the development agency for construction of necessary infrastructure and basic services. If LR is not used, this land would have to be acquired by the local government, which could entail a huge upfront cost.

In return for the owners’ or occupants’ land contribution to the project, each participant receives, upon completion of the program, a new parcel proportionate in size or value to the original one. The size of the parcel may be smaller, but the value is greater due to land improvements and infrastructure created by the project. In this way, LR generates desirable urban development patterns, increases land values, allocates these increments to the involved parties, and limits displacement.

What is important about the recent interest in LR is its renewed emphasis as a mechanism for building legal and social institutions to govern urban development. The major goal is to combine job creation, land use planning, urban densification, public-private partnerships, and value capture for public infrastructure financing in one comprehensive policy package.

Potential Advantages and Disadvantages

Different elements of this unified goal can be emphasized depending on the context. For instance, in the design of a LR project for urban upgrading in an African city where residents do not have legal property rights, policy makers can legitimatize the occupants’ claims to land and allow them to exercise their right to participate in the project. After land is pooled, readjusted, and serviced, the residents will be invited back to the neighborhood to rebuild their homes or receive an apartment unit with legal title. This is a win-win approach because it allows squatters to improve their living conditions and tenure security, and it increases development densities to enable the city to obtain much-needed land for urban expansion.

LR can also help implement citywide land use regulation incrementally. To ensure that individual LR projects add up to a coherent whole, they must be conducted as part of a comprehensive urban planning process. In situations where local governments lack the capacity to execute a large-scale master plan, related LR projects can be implemented in an orderly sequence and at a manageable scale to put into action a coordinated, long-term development strategy.

In addition, LR can engender democratic governance. The core principle of LR is to build consensus and cooperation among the parties involved in land development. These parties include formal landowners, informal landholders, renters, NGOs, national government agencies, city officials, and private developers. The process entails grassroots mobilization by giving the urban poor real bargaining power to approve LR proposals. Agreement from the supermajority of landowners and renters is required before LR can proceed, thus ensuring that the government (or a private organizing agency) will pay special attention to the needs of the underprivileged groups and avoid confrontation caused by the threat of forced eviction at the very beginning of the project.

Finally, LR can facilitate land value capture for financing local infrastructure and social services. In readjusting the land boundaries, land space is created by increasing development densities. This land space can then be sold in the market to raise funds to defray a portion of the infrastructure costs. This technique creates a clear connection between the development benefits received by landholders and the price that they need to pay to make the program financially viable.

Despite these potential advantages of LR over conventional land assembly methods, it is hardly quick or uncomplicated. LR is particularly difficult to implement in developing countries where public participation is not integrated into urban planning or where there is limited capacity to maintain ownership records and resolve competing land claims. When property owners do not recognize their obligation to pay for basic infrastructure and services, requests to give up a portion of their land to cover the project costs will be strongly resisted.

Another concern is that LR reduces plot sizes, causing problems in many informal settlements where people often rely on extra space to earn rental income or conduct agricultural and business activities. In some cases, urban legislation is often too rigid for facilitating LR. Furthermore, different stakeholders may value real assets in diverse ways, making consensus building difficult. Some see possible improvements in living conditions, neighborhood amenities, social networks, and cohesiveness of community as the predominant factors. Others may make their decision based solely on monetary gains.

The integrated LR approach is designed to target all of these issues by focusing on institutional design and development. It emphasizes learning from past LR experiences to illustrate the importance of local context and enhancing this tool to accommodate a wide range of variables and situations. In addition, future adoption of the technique will search for a good fit rather than a single best practice. Most fundamentally, the design of LR projects must be based on multiple perspectives ranging from political economy and anthropological approaches to legal investigation.

Designing Land Readjustment in Chile

On February 27, 2010, a massive earthquake and tsunami destroyed a large part of Central Chile. Three regions—O’Higgins, Maule, and Bio-Bio—comprising 5 major cities and 45 small towns were seriously damaged; more than 80,000 homes were destroyed, and about 108,000 units were severely damaged (figure 1).

In response to this unprecedented disaster, the Chilean government expanded its National Reconstruction Plan to include new mandates and more flexible policies to speed up its post-earthquake reconstruction efforts. This plan offers four types of assistance in the form of vouchers to affected families: (1) US$24,144 for rebuilding a new home on existing land; (2) US$19,083 for buying a new home in another neighborhood; (3) US$3,761 for repairing houses that were partially destroyed; and (4) a special bonus of US$4,200 if the destroyed house is located in a heritage zone (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 2011).

Despite this financial assistance from the government, affected property owners are facing two major problems. First, because the reconstruction program gives priority to low-income households, the money provided by the state to middle-income families is insufficient for them to rebuild homes of the same size and quality or in the same neighborhood. Property owners without insurance coverage who want to build a similar house must sell their land and move to another neighborhood where the land price is lower. Those who live in tsunami-damaged areas now considered unsafe for redevelopment must resettle further inland, yet that may limit their access to jobs and public services.

Second, selling their land to finance reconstruction may not be a viable option for all affected residents. Some landowners refuse to sell to private developers who offer a low price because the property is so badly damaged. Others who are unable to sell their land may not have sufficient financial resources to rebuild. This persistence of unlivable houses and vacant lots covered with debris further dampens the private incentive to reinvest in the neighborhood.

To assist the post-earthquake reconstruction effort, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and the ProUrbana Program in the Public Policy Center at the Catholic University of Chile (the team) put forward a joint proposal to the Chilean government to experiment with LR.

The Pilot Project: Las Heras, Talca

The team decided to conduct its first pilot in the Las Heras neighborhood in Talca for four reasons.

First, Las Heras was ripe for redevelopment even before the earthquake. It is a middle-class neighborhood with large old houses and a beautiful main square. Good social networks exist among its residents, organized by the church and local NGOs, although its development had stagnated for many years due to economic restructuring of the Chilean economy. The central government was offering Las Heras assistance in developing affordable housing through the national voucher program, and these housing subsidies later became an important potential funding source for the proposed LR project.

Second, the Public Policy Center has another program called Puentes (Bridges) that conducts collaborative research projects with local municipalities, including a preexisting work agreement with Talca, which facilitated prompt support and cooperation from city officials.

Third, Talca has a master plan that allowed the team to design a series of related LR projects to be implemented step-by-step, so it could fulfill the city’s long-term development plan. Preliminary land ownership and demographic information, land use data, and property damage assessments in different neighborhoods are also available.

Fourth, the local government and private developers in Talca were interested in increasing urban densities. Densification provided the much-needed profit incentive for the private sector to redevelop damaged sites, and it could help the local government achieve its objective of increasing and upgrading the housing supply.

Buy-In from All Involved Parties

Following the integrated LR approach, the team recognized the importance of gaining support from the central government. It organized a seminar in Santiago in May 2010 to present the concept of LR and exchange views with top officials from the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MHUD). After several rounds of follow-up discussions, the director of the National Program of Housing Reconstruction agreed to purchase reserved land generated from the proposed LR project, thus providing a guarantee for one of the funding sources, and agreed to go to Talca with the team to encourage property owners to participate.

To obtain critical local government involvement, the team travelled to Talca in September 2010 to present the LR ideas to city officials. The team also met with selected property landowners to determine if they might be interested in contributing all or part of their land as capital to finance the reconstruction of their homes and neighborhood. In another visit, some team members also met with school and community leaders, emphasizing the need for broad community support for the project’s success.

The team next began to gather detailed data about the area by conducting a survey of residents in eight blocks comprising 217 lots near the main plaza of Las Heras (figure 2). Team members completed 135 questionnaires over the telephone and then interviewed selected residents. The survey results indicated that 77 percent of the respondents trusted their neighbors, and the majority of them (65 percent) wanted to stay in the neighborhood and were willing to work with their neighbors to rebuild the community. Only 12 percent of respondents planned to sell their property and relocate to another area. This information revealed that organizing property owners for LR was feasible.

Project Design

Because the majority of residents in Las Heras are unfamiliar with the concept of LR, the strategy started with a small pilot project to demonstrate the applicability of this method. The team chose a block near the plaza and proposed three scenarios for combining 8 to 12 sites for LR. The number of lots included in the proposed project would depend on the levels of difficulty involved in negotiating with affected property owners. To facilitate the participation process, the team prepared visual images of what the neighborhood environment might look like after the project (figure 3).

The team also conducted detailed financial and legal feasibility studies for the project. A tentative plan for financing the pilot included a careful calculation of the amount of land that each owner would need to contribute based on the availability of government subsidies, estimated building costs, compensation for temporary relocation, and a projected land price at the completion date of the project. The financial study also revealed that constructing housing units at an estimated future price of US$46,000 per unit would allow the project to be self-financing and provide the developer with a 10 percent profit margin—under the assumption that MHUD would purchase the reserved land to build affordable housing for low- and low-to-middle-income households after LR. It was also estimated that 24 percent of the housing units within the block would be affordable for low-income households. This would help the MHUD attain its policy goal of social integration through the provision of subsidized housing.

The Real Estate Co-ownership Law in Chile requires all participating owners of the LR project to sign a legal document specifying their rights and liabilities. For example, any sale of land held by the designated organizing agency would require the consensus of all participating owners. A legal contract signed by the agency and each participating owner would specify explicitly the number of housing units that the owner would receive at the end of the project and the date of the delivery. The contract would also guarantee compliance by requiring the agency to pay compensation to owners in case of failure to transfer properties in a timely manner and of acceptable quality. The agency also needs to submit the proposed plan to the city. The Municipal Works Department would review the project, approve the building plan, and authorize the transfer of land. The approved plan would then be recorded by the registrar.

Although the research conducted by the team shows that LR is feasible in Las Heras, progress in convincing landowners to participate has been slow due to five key challenges.

First, most property owners are unfamiliar with LR, and there is no existing example in Chile to show how the idea could work. The lack of precedents makes community organizing difficult.

Second, city officials have not provided sufficient support in organizing community meetings or interacting with property owners directly about the proposed project.

Third, many affected property owners who received assistance from their extended families or friends have already relocated to other areas. These owners are in no hurry to rebuild their homes and are delaying the transfer of their land until they receive a higher offer from a private developer or the government. In Chile, there is no LR law that can force these owners to transfer their real assets.

Fourth, not all buildings in the neighborhood were destroyed by the earthquake, and the owners of the unaffected homes are not willing to give up their existing plots for a neighborhood-wide redevelopment.

Fifth, although the survey shows that many owners are willing to work on rebuilding with their neighbors, solving local problems through collective action is not a social norm in Chile. Some property owners have a strong sense of entitlement to receive public resettlement assistance, which contradicts the idea of community self-help.

Interim Assessment

Although the LR approach in Las Heras is still a work-in-progress and it is too soon to predict if the team will be able to overcome local challenges, the project has already generated several observable impacts on Chile’s post-earthquake reconstruction policy (Public Policy Center 2011).

First, LR gives property owners in Las Heras an additional option for reconstructing their homes. Before the proposal, they had to either sell their properties to a private developer and move to another area or take the government’s subsidies and rebuild a house of smaller size and lower quality. LR provides residents with the opportunity to remain in the neighborhood and to attain the highest possible living standard by using their land as capital for home reconstruction.

Second, LR opens a new channel for the central government to work with local communities on reconstruction projects. The main reasons that the LR proposal for Las Heras could go forward are MHUD’s willingness to buy land, provide assistance in encouraging landowners to participate in LR, and give participating landowners the first priority to receive government housing vouchers to finance reconstruction.

Third, the introduction of LR has influenced the government’s overall post-earthquake reconstruction strategy. Through this holistic approach, public officials are designing a comprehensive reconstruction plan to rebuild the entire neighborhood coherently, rather than giving subsidies to individual homeowners to rebuild their houses separately. The MHUD has also invited the team to assist its reconstruction effort in the earthquake-damaged city of Constitución, indicating that the government has taken LR seriously as a viable option for other projects.

Fourth, all discussions among the central and local governments, landowners, NGOs, developers, scholars, and urban designers about LR have engendered an environment of mutual learning and understanding, which in turn is reshaping the governance structure for post-earthquake reconstruction. The involved parties have begun to realize that neither a top-down nor a bottom-up approach is sufficient to generate satisfactory solutions. Cooperation among all interested parties is paramount. The LR experiment has fostered a social discourse that helps all segments of society learn how to solve their problems collectively.

Conclusion

Like all policy experiments, the current proposals to test the integrated LR approach for urban upgrading and post-disaster reconstruction in countries where the idea is new will face uncertainties and challenges. Yet, given the mixed outcomes of conventional land assembly methods in many (re)development situations, LR could offer another option for policy makers, practitioners, and other interested parties to consider.

About the Authors

Yu-Hung Hong is a senior fellow of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and a visiting assistant professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Isabel Brain, a sociologist, coordinates the ProUrbana Program (Program of Urban and Land Policy) at the Public Policy Center, Catholic University of Chile in Santiago.

References

Cities Alliance. 2011. World statistics day: A look at urbanisation. Washington, DC. http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/node/2195

Doebele, William A. 1982. Land readjustment: A different approach to financing urbanization. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Hong, Yu-Hung, and Barrie Needham. 2007. Analyzing land readjustment: Economics, law, and collective action. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Government of Chile. 2011. Reconstruction Plan (English version). Santiago, Chile: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

Public Policy Center. 2011. Land readjustment project, second report. Santiago: Catholic University of Chile. May.

Reuters. 2011. Cost of natural disasters $109 billion in 2010. January 24. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/24/us-disasters-un-idUSTRE70N26K2…

UN-HABITAT. 2011. State of the world’s cities 2010/2011–Cities for all: Bridging the urban divide. Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Human Settlements Program.

World Bank. 2011. Data: Urban population. Washington, DC. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the other members of the LR project team for their contributions to this article: Armando Carbonell, Department of Planning and Urban Form, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; Pia Mora, ProUrbana, Public Policy Center, Catholic University of Chile; Julio Poblete, DUPLA/Urban Design and Planning; Alejandra Rasse, Catholic University of Maule; Francisco Sabatini, Institute of Urban and Territorial Studies, Catholic University of Chile; and Martim Smolka, Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Como consecuencia del colapso en el mercado inmobiliario y la Gran Recesión –que provocaron un aumento sustancial de ejecuciones hipotecarias residenciales y a menudo abruptas caídas de los precios de las viviendas, lo cual probablemente dio lugar a ejecuciones hipotecarias adicionales– muchos observadores especularon sobre si los gobiernos locales iban a sufrir consecuentemente pérdidas significativas en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Si bien las pruebas anecdóticas sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias, en especial en los lugares donde estaban espacialmente concentradas, redujeron los precios de las viviendas y los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad, las investigaciones existentes no proporcionan ninguna prueba empírica que justifique esta conclusión (recuadro 1). Con datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias de la empresa RealtyTrac, que proporciona información sobre las ejecuciones hipotecarias anualespor código postal para el período de 2006 a 2011 (período que tanto precede como sucede a la Gran Recesión), este informe es el primero en examinar el impacto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales. Después de presentar información sobre la correlación entre ejecuciones hipotecarias y los precios de viviendas en todo el país, nos concentramos en Georgia, para explorar cómo las ejecuciones hipotecarias afectaron a los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los distritos escolares a lo largo del estado. Nuestro análisis empírico indica que, en efecto, las ejecuciones hipotecarias probablemente redujeron los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Si bien aún preliminares, estas conclusiones sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias han tenido una serie de efectos sobre los sistemas fiscales de los gobiernos locales.

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Recuadro 1: Investigaciones existentes sobre el impacto de factores económicos en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad

Si bien existen investigaciones que examinan los diversos impactos de factores económicos sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, dichos estudios usan datos que reflejan sólo una recesión previa (por ejemplo, la recesión de 2001) o cubren solamente el inicio de la crisis inmobiliaria de la Gran Recesión. Doerner e Ihlanfeldt (2010), por ejemplo, han estudiado directamente los efectos de los precios de las casas sobre los ingresos de los gobiernos locales usando datos del panel de precios detallados de las viviendas en Florida durante la década del año 2000. Concluyen que los cambios en el precio real de las viviendas unifamiliares de Florida tuvieron un efecto asimétrico sobre los ingresos gubernamentales. Los aumentos de precio no aumentan la recaudación real per cápita, pero los descensos de precio tienden a reducirla. Doerner e Ihlanfeldt también concluyen que las respuestas asimétricas se deben en gran parte a los límites impuestos sobre los aumentos y el monto del gravamen, las demoras positivas o negativas entre los cambios en los precios de mercado y la valuación tributaria, y la reducción de las tasas tributarias en respuesta a un aumento de los precios de las viviendas. Alm, Buschman y Sjoquist (2011) documentan las tendencias generales en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en los Estados Unidos entre 1998 y 2009 inclusive, cuando los gobiernos locales, en promedio, pudieron evitar en gran medida los impactos significativos y negativos sobre el presupuesto sufridos por el gobierno federal y los gobiernos estatales, por lo menos hasta 2009, si bien se produjeron variaciones regionales sustanciales en dichos efectos. Alm, Buschman y Sjoquist (2009) también examinan la relación entre los gastos en educación y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad para el período entre 1990 y 2006. En un estudio relacionado, Alm y Sjoquist (2009) examinan el impacto de otros factores económicos sobre las finanzas de los distritos escolares de Georgia, como las respuestas estatales a las condiciones de los distritos escolares locales. Finalmente, Jaconetty (2011) examinó temas legales relacionados con las ejecuciones hipotecarias, y la Fundación MacArthur ha financiado un proyecto sobre ejecuciones hipotecarias en el condado de Cook, Illinois.

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Vínculos potenciales entre los precios de las viviendas, las ejecuciones hipotecarias y los valores inmobiliarios

Los gobiernos locales en los Estados Unidos dependen de varias fuentes de ingresos propios, tales como impuestos locales sobre los ingresos, sobre la propiedad y generales sobre las ventas, e impuestos específicos sobre el consumo, aranceles y cargos sobre el usuario. De éstos, la fuente de ingresos dominante es, con mucho, el impuesto sobre la propiedad. En 2011, los impuestos locales sobre la propiedad generaron aproximadamente tres cuartos de los ingresos tributarios totales de los gobiernos locales y casi la mitad de los ingresos locales totales propios (incluyendo aranceles y cargos).

Algunos impuestos locales, como los impuestos sobre el ingreso y las ventas, tienen bases tributarias que varían de acuerdo a los niveles de actividad económica, y la Gran Recesión deprimió seriamente los ingresos derivados de dichos impuestos. La base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad es el valor de tasación, que no cambia automáticamente en respuesta a las condiciones económicas; a falta de un cambio formal y deliberado en la tasación, una reducción en el valor de mercado no se traduce necesariamente en una reducción del valor de tasación. Los límites de tasación, las demoras en las revaluaciones y la posibilidad de efectuar cambios deliberados en el tributo unitario o la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad se combinan para que las fluctuaciones económicas que influyen en los valores de las viviendas no afecten a la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad o los ingresos debido a este impuesto de manera inmediata u obvia. Con el tiempo, sin embargo, los valores de tasación tienden a reflejar los valores de mercado, y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad puede verse afectada.

Un mercado inmobiliario debilitado –con valores de la vivienda más bajos y mayor cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias– puede reducir los ingresos tributarios de los gobiernos locales procedentes de distintas fuentes (Anderson, 2010; Boyd, 2010; Lutz, Molloy y Shan, 2010), como los impuestos a la transferencia inmobiliaria, los impuestos sobre las ventas de materiales de construcción de viviendas, y los impuestos sobre la renta de los trabajadores de las industrias de la construcción de viviendas y de mobiliario para el hogar. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad suponen una proporción importante de la recaudación tributaria local, sin embargo, los cambios en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad frecuentemente son mayores que los cambios debidos a dichos otros impuestos relacionados con las viviendas.

Actividad de ejecución hipotecaria en todo el país durante y después de la Gran Recesión

La figura 1 (pág. 26) presenta la cantidad total de ejecuciones hipotecarias a nivel de código postal de 5 dígitos como porcentaje de la cantidad de viviendas ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010. Esta figura demuestra la clara concentración geográfica de las ejecuciones hipotecarias. Arizona, California y Florida fueron afectadas especialmente por el colapso de la burbuja inmobiliaria. No obstante, otras áreas también experimentaron una actividad significativa de ejecuciones hipotecarias.

La Agencia Federal de Financiamiento de Viviendas (FHFA) produce un índice de precios de viviendas para cada área estadística metropolitana (MSA). Cotejamos los datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias de RealtyTrac con el índice de precios de viviendas de la FHFA en 352 áreas estadísticas metropolitanas. La figura 2 (pág. 26) presenta un simple diagrama de dispersión que relaciona las ejecuciones hipotecarias totales entre 2006 y 2011 como porcentaje de la cantidad de unidades de vivienda ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010, con el cambio del índice de precios de las viviendas en el período de 2007 a 2012 en las 352 áreas metropolitanas. El simple coeficiente de correlación entre las ejecuciones hipotecarias por unidades de viviendas ocupadas por sus dueños y el cambio del índice de precios de viviendas es de -0,556; si consideramos solamente aquellas MSA con ejecuciones hipotecarias no nulas a lo largo del período, el coeficiente de correlación es de -0,739. Este simple análisis sugiere que las ejecuciones hipotecarias tienen una correlación negativa significativa con los valores de la vivienda. El próximo paso es explorar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad y sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad propiamente dicho. En la próxima sección examinaremos este tema para el estado de Georgia.

Análisis más detallado: Ejecuciones hipotecarias, valores de la propiedad e ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad en Georgia

Al examinar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad en un solo estado, eliminamos la necesidad de controlar las muchas maneras en que los factores institucionales pueden diferir entre estados. Georgia es un lugar adecuado para concentrarse porque de alguna manera es un estado “promedio”. Por ejemplo, los gobiernos locales de Georgia dependen del impuesto sobre la propiedad sólo un poco menos que el promedio nacional; en 2008, los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad como porcentaje de los impuestos totales de los gobiernos locales fue del 65,1 por ciento en Georgia, en comparación con el 72,3 por ciento en los Estados Unidos en general. (Bourdeaux y Jun 2011).

Medimos la actividad de ejecución hipotecaria con datos de RealtyTrac, agregando las observaciones por código postal en los condados correspondientes. El Departamento de Ingresos de Georgia suministró la base tributaria anual del impuesto sobre la propiedad (que en Georgia se denomina “resumen neto”) y las tasas del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad y los ingresos locales totales de los distritos escolares fueron suministrados por el Departamento de Educación de Georgia. La base tributaria corresponde al 1 de enero del año respectivo. La tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad se determina en la primavera, las facturas del impuesto se pagan en el otoño, y su recaudación se reporta en el siguiente año fiscal. Los distritos escolares tienen un año fiscal que va del 1 de julio al 30 de junio, de manera que la base tributaria y las tasas unitarias de 2009, por ejemplo, aparecerían en los ingresos del año fiscal 2010. También usamos varios datos demográficos y económicos (ingresos, empleo y población) medidos a nivel de condado para ayudar a explicar los cambios en la base tributaria. Debido a que estas variables se reportan a nivel de condado, para el análisis siguiente agregamos las variables de base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad y su recaudación en los distritos escolares urbanos a los sistemas escolares de condado correspondientes a dichas ciudades para obtener los totales para los 159 condados. Para condados que incluyen todo o parte de un sistema escolar urbano, la tasa tributaria es el promedio de las tasas tributarias escolares del condado y la ciudad, ponderadas por sus bases tributarias respectivas.

En Georgia, las tasaciones de las propiedades con fines tributarios son responsabilidad exclusiva de los gobiernos de condado, pero el estado evalúa todas las bases tributarias del impuesto sobre la propiedad anualmente, comparando ventas reales de parcelas mejoradas durante el año con los valores de tasación, y determina si el nivel de tasación es apropiado con relación al valor justo de mercado, que se fija legalmente en el 40 por ciento. Los “estudios de razón de ventas” resultantes reportan una cifra de base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad ajustada al 100 por cien para cada distrito escolar del estado, junto con una razón calculada. Podemos usar estas bases tributarias ajustadas del impuesto sobre la propiedad, cubriendo los períodos de 2000 a 2011 inclusive, para medir el valor de mercado de la propiedad residencial.

Georgia tiene muy pocas limitaciones institucionales al impuesto sobre la propiedad. Las juntas de distritos escolares pueden fijar generalmente sus tasas del impuesto sobre la propiedad sin aprobación de los votantes, la cual solamente es necesaria si la tasa del impuesto sobre la propiedad en un distrito escolar de condado excede de 20 milésimas del valor de tasación. En la actualidad, solamente cinco sistemas escolares han alcanzado este límite. Además, no hay un límite general en el valor de tasación, si bien un condado ha congelado las tasaciones sobre bienes de familia. En 2009, el estado de Georgia impuso una congelación temporal sobre las tasaciones en todo el estado, que potencialmente afectaba a los ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad sólo en el año académico/año fiscal 2010; sin embargo, al disminuir las bases netas y ajustadas del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita en la mayoría de los condados de 2009 a 2011 inclusive, es poco probable que esta congelación haya recortado las tasaciones.

Ejecuciones hipotecarias

La tabla 1 muestra la media y mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias en todo el estado por código postal entre 2006 y 2011 inclusive. La cantidad total de ejecuciones hipotecarias casi se duplicó de 2006 a 2010, disminuyendo en 2011. La media de ejecuciones hipotecarias es mucho mayor que la mediana, lo cual es señal de que la distribución es extremadamente asimétrica.

La tabla 2 muestra la distribución de los códigos postales de Georgia por la cantidad de años que el código postal tuvo alguna ejecución hipotecaria. Más del 65 por ciento de los códigos postales tuvieron ejecuciones hipotecarias en cada uno de los seis años, mientras que sólo el 7 por ciento no tuvo ninguna ejecución hipotecaria en ninguno de los seis años. Esta distribución sugiere que sólo una porción muy pequeña del estado quedó inmune a la crisis de ejecuciones hipotecarias.

La figura 3 (pág. 27) muestra la distribución de ejecuciones hipotecarias en el estado durante el período de 2006 a 2011 inclusive. Como los códigos postales difieren en tamaño y densidad de viviendas, también se muestra un mapa de las ejecuciones hipotecarias por unidades de vivienda ocupadas por sus dueños en 2010 en la figura 4 (pág. 28). Nótese que los códigos postales marcados en blanco no tienen ninguna ejecución hipotecaria o no se tienen datos de ejecuciones hipotecarias. Como era de esperar, los condados urbanos y suburbanos (particularmente en el área metropolitana de Atlanta) sufrieron la mayor cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias. No obstante, hay también una gran cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias en muchos de los códigos postales menos urbanos.

La figura 5 muestra la distribución anual de ejecuciones hipotecarias por cada cien unidades de vivienda en cada uno de los 159 condados de Georgia. Nótese que la barra del recuadro representa el valor medio, el recuadro captura las observaciones en el segundo y tercer cuartil, los “bigotes” representan 1,5 veces la diferencia entre los porcentiles veinticinco y setenta y cinco, y los puntos son los valores extremos. La mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias por condado aumentó de 0,17 por 100 unidades de vivienda en 2006 a 1,18 por 100 unidades en 2010, un aumento en la mediana de más de seis veces. Hay una alta correlación positiva entre la actividad de ejecuciones hipotecarias en 2006 y 2011 en todos los condados. Esta correlación es de 0,78 cuando se mide en relación a las unidades de vivienda y 0,74 cuando se mide per cápita, lo que indica que los condados con actividad de ejecución hipotecaria mayor (menor) que el promedio antes de la crisis inmobiliaria siguiron estando por arriba (abajo) del promedio en su pico.

Valores de la propiedad,/b>

En cuanto a los cambios en los valores de la propiedad, las figuras 6 y 7 muestran la distribución de cambios anuales, respectivamente, en la base tributaria neta del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita y en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad per cápita en los 159 condados entre 2001 y 2011 inclusive. Los estudios sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias pueden tener un efecto de contagio sobre los valores de mercado de otras propiedades en la jurisdicción (Frame, 2010). Intentamos estimar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de mercado en función de la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad.

Nuestros resultados son preliminares, porque el análisis solamente incluye datos de Georgia. Aun así, sugieren significativos efectos negativos de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre los valores de la propiedad, controlando por los cambios porcentuales de año a año en ingresos, empleo y población. Las estimaciones de coeficientes de la variable ‘ejecuciones hipotecarias’ sugieren que un aumento marginal de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 100 viviendas (o aproximadamente el aumento en la mediana de ejecuciones hipotecarias de 2006 a 2011) está asociado con aproximadamente una disminución del 3 por ciento en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad en cada uno de los dos años subsiguientes. De igual manera, un aumento de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 1.000 habitantes está asociado con casi el 1 por ciento de disminución en la base tributaria 100 por ciento ajustada del impuesto sobre la propiedad después de un año, y una disminución porcentual ligeramente menor en el año subsiguiente.

Ingresos del impuesto sobre la propiedad

También exploramos el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. La figura 8 representa la distribución de cambios nominales por condado de los ingresos totales de mantenimiento y operaciones del impuesto sobre la propiedad desde 2001, que muestra una variación considerable de un sistema escolar a otro en los cambios anuales de recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Aun en los últimos tres años de disminución de los valores de la propiedad, por lo menos la mitad de los condados tuvo un crecimiento nominal positivo anual en la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad. Para comprender el efecto de la actividad de ejecución hipotecaria sobre los ingresos del gobierno local por impuestos sobre la propiedad, estimamos las regresiones que relacionan las ejecuciones hipotecarias con los gravámenes del impuesto sobre la propiedad y la recaudación de dicho impuesto.

Encontramos que un aumento en las ejecuciones hipotecarias está asociado a una reducción en el monto del gravamen, después de controlar por los cambios en la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad como también en las fluctuaciones de ingresos, empleo y población. Un aumento de una ejecución hipotecaria por cada 100 unidades de vivienda se asocia con alrededor del 1,5 por ciento de disminución subsiguiente en el gravamen, manteniendo constante el resto de las variables. También encontramos que las ejecuciones hipotecarias tienen un impacto negativo sobre la recaudación, manteniendo constante el resto de las variables. Como en nuestras estimaciones anteriores, estos resultados son para Georgia solamente, pero identifican una relación negativa significativa entre las ejecuciones hipotecarias y los gravámenes y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales. Puede ser que una mayor actividad de ejecución hipotecaria haga vacilar a las autoridades locales sobre la posibilidad de aumentar las tasas tributarias para compensar el efecto de las ejecuciones hipotecarias sobre la base tributaria.

Conclusiones

¿Las ejecuciones hipotecarias causadas por la Gran Recesión afectaron a los valores de la propiedad y la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad por parte de los gobiernos locales? Nuestros resultados sugieren que las ejecuciones hipotecarias han tenido un impacto negativo significativo sobre los valores de la propiedad y, por esta vía, un efecto similar sobre la recaudación del impuesto sobre la propiedad, por lo menos en el estado de Georgia. Nuestros resultados también sugieren la presencia de efectos adicionales sobre los gravámenes y la recaudación de dicho impuesto, después de controlar por los cambios en la base tributaria. Hacen falta más investigaciones para saber si estos resultados se extienden a otros estados.

Sobre los autores

James Alm es profesor y director del Departamento de Economía de Tulane University.

Robert D. Buschman es asociado de investigación senior en el Centro de Investigaciones Fiscales de la Escuela Andrew Young de Estudios Políticos de la Universidad Estatal de Georgia.

David L. Sjoquist es profesor y titular de la cátedra Dan E. Sweat en Política Educativa y Comunitaria en la Escuela Andrew Young de Estudios Políticos.

Recursos

Alm, James y David L. Sjoquist. 2009. The Response of Local School Systems in Georgia to Fiscal and Economic Conditions. Journal of Education Finance 35(1): 60–84.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, y David L. Sjoquist. 2009. Economic Conditions and State and Local Education Revenue. Public Budgeting & Finance 29(3): 28–51.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, y David L. Sjoquist. 2011. Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax. Regional Science and Urban Economics 41(4): 320–331.

Anderson, John E. 2010. Shocks to the Property Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Bourdeaux, Carolyn y Sungman Jun. 2011. Comparing Georgia’s Revenue Portfolio to Regional and National Peers. Report No. 222. Atlanta, GA: Fiscal Research Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

Boyd, Donald J. 2010. Recession, Recovery, and State and Local Finances. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Doerner, William M. y Keith R. Ihlanfeldt. 2010. House Prices and Local Government Revenues. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (Mayo).

Frame, W. Scott. 2010. Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature. Economic Review 95(3): 1–9.

Jaconetty, Thomas A. 2011. How Do Foreclosures Affect Real Property Tax Valuation? And What Can We Do About It? Working paper presented at National Conference of State Tax Judges, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA (Septiembre).

Lutz, Byron, Raven Molloy, y Hui Shan. 2010. The Housing Crisis and State and Local Government Tax Revenue: Five Channels. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, DC (Mayo).

As interest in urban living grows, the cost of residential real estate in many hot markets is skyrocketing. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS 2015), in 2014 rental vacancy rates hit their lowest point in two decades; rents rose in 91 out of 93 metropolitan areas studied; and the consumer price index for contract rents climbed at double the rate of inflation—and 10 percent or more at the top end, in Denver, San Jose, Honolulu, and San Francisco. Despite some interruption from the mortgage crisis, asking prices for homes for sale have continued to rise as well, often beyond the reach of potential home buyers (Olick 2014); in Washington, DC, the median home value nearly tripled from 2000 to 2013 (Oh et al. 2015). As housing activists look for effective tools to prevent displacement of lower-income families from gentrifying neighborhoods and create inclusive communities, many are turning to community land trusts (box 1) as a way to help build the nation’s stock of permanently affordable housing.

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Box 1: The CLT Model

Under the CLT model, a community-controlled organization retains ownership of a plot of land and sells or rents the housing on that land to lower-income households. In exchange for below-market prices, purchasers agree to resale restrictions that keep the homes affordable to subsequent buyers while also allowing owners to build some equity. The CLT also prepares home buyers to purchase property, supports them through financial challenges, and manages resales and rental units.

CLTs thus bring sustainable home ownership within the reach of more families, supporting residents who want to commit to their neighborhoods for the long term. In gentrifying areas, they provide an effective way for lower-income families to retain a stake in the neighborhood because they take a single initial subsidy (which could come from a variety of sources, often public programs such as the HOME Investment Partnerships Program or Community Development Block Grants) and attach it to the building, keeping the units affordable over time without new influxes of public money. In weak housing markets, they are beneficial as well (Shelterforce 2012), providing the financial stewardship that ensures fewer foreclosures, better upkeep, and stable occupancy. In 2009, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) loans were 8.2 times more likely to be in the foreclosure process than CLT loans, despite the fact that CLT loans were uniformly made to low-income households (Thaden, Rosenberg 2010), and MBA loans included all income brackets. Of the very few CLT homes that did complete foreclosure, none were lost from the CLT’s portfolio.

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Much like community development corporations (CDCs), many CLTs grew from grassroots neighborhood organizations. Traditional community organizing (distinct from broader “resident outreach”) creates a base of residents who are empowered to determine for themselves what they need and mobilize to get it; as a united front, these individuals are better able to counter-balance corporate or governmental opponents and other forms of institutional power. Strategic collaboration and strength in numbers are essential to the successful formation of a CLT. But the skills required to organize politically around local concerns are very different from the skills required to manage real estate. While both sets of skills are required to implement and sustain a CLT, growing these core competencies under the same roof might hamper the neighborhood-based organization’s ability to pursue or achieve its core founding mission.

How have community organizations that created CLTs navigated the challenge of building two seemingly incompatible skill sets? We examined the experience of five established CLTs in locations across the country to see how they addressed this challenge and how their focus evolved as a result. From Boston to Los Angeles, community organizers faced a range of conditions, from high-vacancy neighborhoods with almost no housing market to booming areas where displacement was the top concern. Yet all five organizations had remarkably similar reasons for starting a community land trust: each CLT director spoke of wanting community control of land to prevent residents from either losing a home or being unable to afford one. Even those CLTs that began in weak housing markets were located near downtowns, university districts, or other popular areas, and recognized the potential for displacement as conditions in the neighborhoods improved. All agreed that a clear community vision is essential to the success of a CLT, but some groups take direct responsibility for creating and implementing that vision, while others are devoted to housing work on behalf of a parent organization charged with shepherding the larger vision. Approaches to organizing and housing development varied as well, but all agreed that these two activities can be a difficult mix.

Dudley Neighbors Inc., Boston, MA

The oldest organization in our study, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), formed in a cold market in the 1980s to fight illegal dumping on broad swaths of vacant land left behind by a wave of arson. The city was proposing a master plan for the area without seeking input from residents, and community members responded by organizing DSNI to assert the community’s right to direct decisions about land use within its boundaries. They won that right and through DSNI decided that a CLT was the best tool to help the organization implement the community’s vision. “A lot of times, groups want to jump into creating a CLT thinking it will magically solve a neighborhood’s problems,” says Harry Smith, director of DSNI’s CLT, Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI). “But first we say: ‘Have you written down a vision of development in your community, and can you say how a CLT fits into that?’”

Founded in 1984, DNI is an independent organization, but it maintains close ties to its parent organization. The two groups share staff, and DSNI appoints a majority of the CLT’s board. The CLT is responsible only for providing affordable housing and community control of land, freeing DSNI to make organizing and community planning its main priority. Neither DSNI nor DNI carry out development directly, but instead partner with local affordable housing developers.

Because of its long history and established relationships, DSNI engages in less confrontational organizing than it did in its earliest days. But it doesn’t shy away from it if necessary. In fact, Smith reports that maintaining a CLT can be a unique political strength. When DSNI organizes around the fate of a particular parcel of land, “Having a land trust gives us an extra level of impact,” he says.

Sawmill Community Land Trust, Albuquerque, NM

Located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sawmill CLT was born in 1996 when, after a decade of community organizing, low-income residents banded together to fight a nearby factory that polluted their air and threatened their health. They wanted to assert control over future use of the space. After leaders attended a conference to learn more about CLTs, they held a series of community meetings on the topic. Though some residents aired concerns about the lack of land ownership in the CLT model, a community elder reminded them that they didn’t truly have ownership of their property in any case, either because they were renting or were ill-equipped to control what happened on their land. Former executive director Wade Patterson says, “The fact that the work was specifically geared toward controlling housing costs assuaged concerns about gentrification and displacement. The fact that we got a house instead of another factory was something we couldn’t argue with.”

Sawmill CLT was created as a standalone organization dedicated to housing development, stewardship, and property management. It’s one of the largest CLTs in the country, with 34 acres, which includes rental, ownership, and senior housing. Recently, it won an RFP issued by the city of Albuquerque to revitalize an old motel in a new neighborhood in the city, and the CLT is figuring out how to enter the community respectfully from outside.

Albuquerque’s Sawmill-area neighborhood associations, including the Sawmill Advisory Council, which launched the CLT, focus on “community building” through cultural events, says Patterson. The CLT supports neighborhood organizing by offering meeting space in one of its buildings and other support. Patterson says, “Our goal isn’t to lead but to be behind them.”

San Francisco Community Land Trust, San Francisco, CA

SFCLT was launched in 2003, at a time when the city was already one of the hottest real estate markets in the country, and low-income residents were concerned about soaring rents and illegal evictions for condo conversions. Housing organizers were seeking a model that could prevent evictions and give lower-income residents more control over their living situations.

The CLT is a standalone entity, but it maintains a close relationship with the housing organizers who founded it. When its partner groups organize to prevent evictions or condo conversions in an at-risk building (generally small apartment buildings), SFCLT steps in as a preservation purchaser and converts them to co-ops on CLT-owned land. SFCLT has in-house real estate expertise, but does not develop new buildings, and it contracts out any needed rehabilitation. It handles the financial aspects of the acquisition and the conversion, the stewardship of the land, and the training and support that helped residents form a co-op board and carry out co-op governance. “Housing groups refer everyone to us; we’re the only housing organization that can help stabilize a multi-unit apartment building by buying it,” says director Tracy Parent. SFCLT organizes its member base to support the broader issues that its coalition partners push for, but it doesn’t “initiate organizing” on issues, according to Parent.

T.R.U.S.T. South LA, Los Angeles, CA

When T.R.U.S.T. South LA was formed in 2005, its target neighborhoods were filled with vacant lots and deteriorated housing, while surrounding areas were under increasing development pressures. While the founders—Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Strategic Actions of a Just Economy, and Abode Communities—originally envisioned the CLT as primarily a housing tool, it has taken on a broader role in implementing a community vision. “Originally, we formed as a land acquisition group. Then our members wanted to organize,” says executive director Sandra McNeill. The CLT has, for example, organized against a slumlord who was trying to evict residents from a building he had strategically let deteriorate in order to cash in on expiring section 8 affordability restrictions. It has also organized to raise funding for transportation and green space improvements in its neighborhood and participated in coalitions to support broader citywide policies such as increased funding for affordable housing.

The group now describes itself as “a community-based initiative to stabilize the neighborhoods south of downtown Los Angeles.” T.R.U.S.T. South LA is a standalone organization that considers itself part of the development team on housing projects, partnering with others to purchase, finance, and construct or rehabilitate housing.

Although T.R.U.S.T. South LA does a lot of organizing, nearly all of its policy work is conducted in collaboration with other groups, including its founding partners. “Affordable housing developers generally aren’t risk takers,” says McNeill. “They may be involved in political work to ensure that funding streams are in place for affordable housing, but that’s as far as most of them go.”

Community Justice Land Trust, Philadelphia, PA

Community Justice Land Trust in Philadelphia formed in Northeast Philadelphia in 2010 amid combined cold and hot market challenges. Although the neighborhood suffered from a large number of vacant and abandoned properties, it was surrounded on all sides by booming markets, and those rising prices and development pressures seemed likely to spread. The Women’s Community Revitalization Project (WCRP), along with a coalition of local civic organizations, held dozens of public meetings to help the community members understand what forming a CLT would mean and to explore their concerns about resale restrictions. Attendees voted in favor.

Community Justice CLT is set up as a program of WCRP, which has its own in-house development and organizing expertise, including an entire department devoted to organizing.

But as WCRP’s executive director Nora Lichtash warns, “Sometimes you lose relationships when you’re organizing. . . . Sometimes people don’t like to be pushed to do the right thing.” Indeed, WCRP apparently pressured its local council person enough on certain issues that she declined to give the CLT vacant land it had hoped to secure for its first development. In the end, however, the council person helped the group establish a citywide land bank (Feldstein 2013–14), which furthers some of the same goals as the land trust.

Despite potential tensions like these, Lichtash believes that organizing and CLT functions should stay closely related. “It’s important to remember that organizing and building affordable housing fit together,” she says. “Your funders think you should be doing one or the other, but it’s not good for CLTs to be separated from organizing. You’re building your capacity for present and future work. When you organize, you’re respected because you have people power.”

To Develop or Not to Develop: A Big Decision

Affordable housing development is a complicated and expensive business that no community organization should take lightly if it is thinking about starting a CLT. As DNI’s Smith says, “If you do development work, it will take time away from organizing, which is cumulative. It takes time and a lot of sacrifice to form a truly representative, neighborhood-based organization. If you cut corners, you risk jeopardizing a lot of the power you’ve built up over the years.”

The Boston experience, for example, begins with a cautionary tale. DSNI stepped in when the original developer for the CLT’s first project backed out of the deal. It was “traumatic” for staff and board, says Smith. “It took so much time. It distracted DSNI from its core functions.”

The idea of controlling development resources and accessing developer fees can be seductive to grassroots groups, says WCRP’s Lichtash. But they should proceed with extreme care. “Becoming a developer can muddy the waters,” she says. “You have to focus on every detail in million-dollar deals. It takes you away from educational work.”

“Real estate work is very hard, speculative,” Lichtash continues. “You think you’re getting one thing and instead you get another. I tell people to partner for a long time first. It’s hard to keep both tenants and funding sources happy.”

Patterson of Sawmill agrees and adds that it’s particularly difficult “to meet all the deadlines and reporting requirements on funding [for development]. I’m always shocked by the amount of administrative overhead that’s required.” He also advises that if you can’t make the numbers work, “it’s important to know you can pull out of a project if needed.”

T.R.U.S.T. South LA’s McNeill says, “Development definitely has its own language. It’s complex stuff. Nonprofits that do it have large budgets and tend to have sizable staffs. I respect the skill it takes to pull off these deals. It’s a very different skillset from what we do.”

Another consideration is that affordable housing development is not an easy industry to break into these days. In the current funding environment, many of the subsidies that CLTs have traditionally used to develop and steward their units are being slashed, and mortgages for potential CLT home buyers are harder to find. McNeill says, “We’ve gone through enormous shifts in the housing industry. The reality is that there isn’t an opening now for new organizations to get into the development business. It’s definitely not the time.”

Even the ongoing stewardship of a CLT requires a different kind of relationship with residents than an organizer would have. “Developer fees and rent collection could impact the relationship with residents and the power dynamic,” says Smith of DNI. “You’re responsible to leaseholders and non-leaseholders in your community, so there are tensions,” according to Lichtash of WCRP. And as SFCLT’s Parent comments, “Organizers often paint issues as clear moral choices,” but when you are involved as a property manager, “there are nuances.”

Eyes on the Prize

Once a community group has determined that a CLT is an appropriate tool for keeping housing affordable to local residents, the next questions should be: How will the roles be divided up? Who is taking the lead on implementing the broader vision? Is there an organization already in place that’s committed and able to take that on, or does one need to be created? Are there groups serving the community that already have development expertise and access to funding that could partner with a CLT or even fold one into their work? How can the new CLT partner with and support the community’s organizing work rather than distract from it?

Many newer CLTs are following the lead of groups like DSNI and T.R.U.S.T. South LA by setting up a separate organization to manage the stewardship and land ownership functions, and then drawing on the capacity of existing affordable housing developers through partnerships. While every locality is different, this approach seems like a wise place for groups to start, especially if they want to preserve their energy for the important work they started with: fighting for vibrant, equitable communities.

Miriam Axel-Lute is the editor of Shelterforce, a magazine devoted to the field of community development. She has written extensively on both organizing and community land trusts.

Dana Hawkins-Simons is an award-winning journalist who has published groundbreaking investigations in U.S. News & World Report. She is also the former director of the Opportunity Housing Initiative at the National Housing Institute.

References

Beckwith, Dave, with Cristina Lopez. 1997. “Community Organizing: People Power from the Grassroots.” http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers97/beckwith.htm

Feldstein, Jill. 2013/14. “Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust.” Shelterforce. Fall/Winter 2013/14. www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning_a_land_bank_we_can_trust2/

Horwitz, Staci. 2011. “It’s All About Choice.” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/article/2313/its_all_about_choice/

Joint Center for Housing Studies. 2015. State of the Nation’s Housing 2015. Harvard University. www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing

Oh, Seunghoon, Josh Silver, Annelise Osterberg, and Jaclyn Tules. 2015. Does Nonprofit Housing Development Preserve Neighborhood Diversity? An Investigation into the Interaction Between Affordable Housing Development and Neighborhood Change. Manna, Inc. www.mannadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Final_Neighborhood_Impact_Analysis_7_1.pdf

Olick, Diana. 2014. “Housing Still Too Expensive Despite Positive Signs.” CNBC.com, July 10. www.cnbc.com/2014/07/10/housing-still-too-expensive-despite-positive-signs.html

Shelterforce. 2012. “What’s the Point of Shared-Equity Homeownership in Weak Market Areas?” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/images/uploads/theanswer171-2.pdf

Schutz, Aaron and Marie G. Sandy. 2011. “What Isn’t Community Organizing.” In Collective Action for Social Change: An Introduction to Community Organizing, London: Palgrave McMillan. pp. 31–44.

Thaden, Emily and Greg Rosenberg. 2010. “Outperforming the Market: Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in Community Land Trusts.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1846_1154_LLA10102%20Foreclosure%20Rates.pdf

Few low-income urban settlements in Venezuela are located on land owned by their occupants. As a result, the occupants cannot register the structures they have built and are entitled to only a substitute title (“título supletorio”) granting them limited rights. A legal interpretation handed down by the Supreme Court in the early 1970s has been upheld by repeated court decisions: transactions involving structures on land not owned by the builder cannot be registered without the landowner’s express consent (Pérez Perdomo and Nikken 1979, 38). This is a general legal principle, applicable not only to urban shacks but to all structures.

It could be said, however, that the inhabitants of houses built in the country’s squatter settlements enjoy possession of the land they occupy, though strictly speaking it is what former Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera and others have called a “precarious possession.” These settlements have considerable stability in some cases, less stability in others, and in certain cases there is no stability at all; occupants are evicted and their structures are demolished.

Peaceful occupations of land, and occasionally more aggressive invasions, are by no means a new development in Venezuela; such settlements have been prevalent since the 19th century. As a result, Venezuelan cities are characterized by their physical and social diversity:

• varied materials and structures that reflect the country’s rapid urbanization (especially in the 20th century);
• the lack of access to standard housing for lower-income families arriving in the major cities;
• forms of urban government that have accepted unauthorized occupation of land de facto though not de jure;
• extreme socioeconomic inequality; and
• the Venezuelan people’s talent for building.

Changing Conditions

Many observers wonder, when considering the legal status of the squatter settlements, why it has become “normal,” and to a substantial extent accepted, for Venezuelans to build houses or take up residence on lands assumed to be owned by others. Reactions to this complex situation can vary. It is striking that, in many instances, neither the presumed landowners nor the occupiers of these lands have taken the extreme responses available to each party-demands for eviction or expropriation by the owners or purchase of the land and legalization of its ownership by the occupiers. The presence of a parallel official law has permitted the establishment of settlements and improvement of housing conditions on “invaded” lands (Ontiveros & Bolívar 2000, 128-139). Furthermore, this pattern has become a chronic condition whose end is not demanded by any of the parties involved.

However, this tacit understanding has broken down in recent years, chiefly due to new requirements by banks, which refuse to lend to anyone who does not have registered ownership of the land. The World Bank’s involvement as a co-financier of urban renewal projects has also changed the status of the urban squatter settlements. The national Housing Policy Act (Article 14) now provides for the legalization of land holdings in the squatter settlements, and a team of specialists, mainly lawyers, is drafting a bill that would help make it possible to end the illegal status of Venezuelan urban squatter settlements. Some lower-income neighborhoods with commercially built housing would also be legalized by this action.

Obstacles to Legalization

In spite of these recent developments, procedures and mechanisms relating to urban squatter settlements have been created and modified over many years. The state’s inability to legalize these entrenched settlements can be attributed to a number of interacting factors.

Unclear Land Ownership

Former President Caldera has argued that the main reason for the continuing illegal status of squatter settlements is a lack of clarity as to who actually owns the invaded lands. He argues that, given this prevailing doubt and uncertainty about land ownership, the most important and urgent need is to provide public utilities and other basic public services to the occupiers. Legalization has not been a top priority in the process of consolidating squatter settlements. Nevertheless, there are other causes for the continuing absence of legalization, causes that are deeper and less visible.

Acceptance of the Status Quo

Since the expansion of urban squatter settlements in the 1940s and 1950s, it has been commonly assumed that eventually they would be controlled and demolished, though that has not occurred; they have simply been banished from city maps. The replacement of self-built settlements with standard housing developments has not gone beyond political rhetoric or electoral promises. Proof of this assertion is that half the residents of Venezuelan cities continue to live in these informal settlements.

A kind of official but informal law has emerged for the squatter settlements. Pérez Perdomo & Nikken explain “… how the State itself has contributed to the creation of a kind of informal legal order to meet the squatter settlements’ legal needs in relation to the ownership of housing” (1979, 2). This is a de facto, but not a de jure, acceptance of squatter settlements.

Does this mean that the residents of these settlements do not want legalization of ownership? We know that is not entirely true because they treat the land they possess as if it were their own. When the owner appears and wants to evict them, they fight back until the eviction order is stopped. As long as mere possession poses no risk of eviction, the residents remain satisfied and make no effective distinction between ownership and possession in their settlements. Furthermore, some are afraid of having to pay taxes and accept other obligations that would come with legalization of their status.

Provision of Services and Infrastructure

Further evidence of this acceptance of squatter settlements is the provision of public utilities, services and infrastructure by state agencies, though in most cases the services are considered “precarious” investments. This official attention to the settlements is convincingly illustrated in the work of Josefina Baldó (1996), although it is well known that such attention is provided only to a minimal degree and only in exchange for votes.

Researchers and policy makers from other countries, especially in Latin America, express surprise at the range of public services provided in Venezuelan urban squatter settlements that do not have legal recognition. Even more surprising is the progressive improvement of housing units as they are transformed from shacks into solid houses and even multistory buildings made of appropriate materials (Bolívar et al. 1994). This pattern is not unique to Venezuela, but it reflects the path chosen by the country’s leadership decades ago: a consistent policy of providing “precarious” public services for settlements whose occupation has been accepted, rather than first settling the issue of ownership. This policy has prevented, or at least slowed down, the legalization of the squatter settlements. In addition, improvements built by the residents are paid for by the government if the land is ever expropriated.

Bureaucratic and Legal Procedures

Venezuela is a country characterized by unequal access to the legal and administrative systems. Bureaucratic procedures consume a great deal of energy and are very costly. Accordingly, until a legal deed to property is required of them, most occupants appear content without it, and may even forget that such an option exists. It should also be noted that technical experts are not always available to determine ownership status and that incorrect diagnoses are not unusual.

Furthermore, legalization initiatives run up against the need to identify the true owners. It is necessary to specify the legal tradition of ownership and resolve questions of legally undivided plots (“tierras indivisas”), which traditionally have been dispersed among multiple owners by inheritance. However, there is a prevailing lack of sensitivity and ignorance of the law among court employees and the professionals retained resolve these cases. The laws are very strict, and hence very difficult to apply. The situation is further complicated by unprepared and sometimes corrupt bureaucrats, who may be prejudiced against and resent the “beneficiaries” of land cases, especially when they are illegal occupants of self-built neighborhoods.

Still another obstacle expressed by government officials has to do with the diverse sizes and shapes of land plots in the squatter settlements (Bolívar et al. 1994, 53-100). Some plots may be only 20 m2 in size, while others may cover thousands of square meters, making legalization extremely complicated. A land survey of each settlement would have to be taken, and in many cases their maps would have to be redrawn, implying a highly detailed and difficult challenge to city or state agencies.

Conclusions

Peaceful struggles by settlement residents to occupy land are seldom publicized, although some fights have resulted in the loss of human lives. Most of these battles are not recorded officially, but for those who work in this field they comprise indispensable documentation for the study of the legalization issue.

Given these obstacles and other factors, the political will to launch a legalization process is also lacking in many Venezuelan cities. The politicians who depend on patronage to remain in office have no interest in “resolving” the problem, since that would “kill the goose that lays the golden egg.” To date the occupation of land and subsequent acceptance of possession has been the prevailing pattern, but many observers believe it is imperative to overcome that pattern. To continue relying on the ambiguous position that only possession counts and that ownership is irrelevant is to condemn both the possessors and the owners to a permanent legal vacuum. In time this posture leads to urban chaos and a daily life for the inhabitants characterized by uncertainty, fear and violence.

REFERENCES

Baldó, J. 1996. “Urbanizar los barrios de Caracas.” En: Bolívar, T. y Baldó, J. (comps.), La cuestión de los barrios. Homenaje a Paul-Henry Chombart de Lauwe. Caracas: Monte Ávila Editores Latinoamericana, Fundación Polar y Universidad Central de Venezuela.

Bolívar, T., Guerrero, M., Rosas, I., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 1994. Densificación y vivienda en los barrios caraqueños. Contribución a la determinación de problemas y soluciones. Caracas: Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano/Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda.

Bolívar, T., Ontiveros, T., y De Freitas, J. 2000. Sobre la cuestión de la regularización jurídica de los barrios urbanos. Caracas: SEU/FAU/UCV e Instituto Lincoln (mimeo).

Ontiveros, T., y Bolívar, T. 2000. Vivienda y acceso al suelo urbano. ¿Institucionalización de un derecho oficial paralelo. En: Edesio Fernandes (coordinador), Derecho, espacio urbano y medio ambiente. Madrid: Instituto Internacional de Sociología.

Pérez Perdomo, R., y Nikken, P. 1979. Derecho y propiedad de la vivienda en los barrios de Caracas. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela y Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Teolinda Bolívar Barreto is an architect and professor in the Department of Architecture, Central University of Venezuela, Caracas. The Lincoln Institute is supporting her research and educational programs on this topic. Translator Richard Melman contributed to this article.

As part of the American Planning Association (APA) 2003 national conference held in Denver in March, the Lincoln Institute assembled a group of planning directors from large and small western cities to discuss a set of topics they had previously identified as being important, including infill housing, maintaining the core vs. sprawling at the edge, paying for infrastructure, and transportation and land use. To explore these issues and exchange case histories, the planners met for a weekend retreat organized by Peter Pollock, Boulder’s planning director, before presenting their findings at an APA session titled “Urban Challenges and Opportunities in the Rocky Mountain West.” This report highlights key discussion points raised during both the retreat and the APA panel.

The West remains one of the fastest growing regions in the country. Not surprisingly, the liveliest discussions among western city planners center on issues of infill housing and the need to protect and maintain the viability of the urban core in the face of continued regional growth. As Chris Knight of Las Vegas noted, “protecting the core is important to the health of the entire region.” Louis Zunguze of Salt Lake City emphasized that “the core area has a real responsibility for the pace of sprawl,” adding that there is a practical need “to keep the area attractive from many perspectives.”

Neighborhood Responses to Infill Development

Part of that challenge has to do with neighborhood resistance to change and increased density. In Billings, Montana, for example (metro population approximately 100,000; county population 140,000), sprawl is becoming a significant issue, according to Ramona Mattix. Yet, despite substantial capital support for downtown revitalization and favorable zoning densities, the city faces considerable resistance from its residents, many of whom are attached to their traditional wide-open spaces.

Bill Healy of Colorado Springs (population 368,000) spoke of his earlier experience as a planner in Salem, Oregon (population 137,000), when he addressed the problem of how to “sell density” in older neighborhoods. As in Billings, the greatest opposition to infill housing in Salem, which involved rezoning established neighborhoods to accommodate multifamily housing, came from existing residents who would grow increasingly vocal if growth was slated to occur in their “back yard.” Healy explained, “The way we sold density [in Salem] was to couple it with better design standards.” People there found density much more acceptable if new development was designed compatibly with existing neighborhoods. A further benefit was that the city obtained new design standards. “Public acceptance of infill is like a sine curve,” Healy explained. “In urban areas there is great acceptance. But as you get out to the first-ring suburbs, there is a real fear of density. Way out where populations are sparce it’s not an issue.” In Colorado Springs, Healy noted, there is little economic incentive for infill. “Half our land area is vacant, so that is a disincentive for infill development. It’s an issue from a planning standpoint.”

Not all western city planners cited neighborhood opposition to infill development as a major obstacle to accommodating growth, however. Ellen Ittleson, for example, discussed Denver’s (population 555,000) recent success in “planning around resistance” in the city’s most recent plan, Blueprint Denver. While preparing the plan, the city looked at growth projections over the next 20 years and devised a way to accommodate the addition of 132,000 predicted new residents and 109,000 new jobs to the city and county. The metro area is expected to receive an additional 760,000 new residents over the same period. “Once we accepted the growth,” remarked Ittleson, “the real task became figuring out where to put it, because where the market or zoning would have put it was not acceptable.”

The Blueprint Denver plan identifies two types of infill areas. “Areas of change” are those parts of the city that would benefit from increased population densities, such as areas of economic need where land use change and transportation initiatives could go hand-in-hand with realizing mixed-use, pedestrian-oriented and transit-oriented development. The only strictly residential area of change is Cherry Creek, which is being transformed from a single-family neighborhood to one with single-family and attached housing. “Areas of stability” are represented primarily by traditional residential neighborhoods, but also include small commercial and even industrial districts where the effort will focus on how to protect the character of these areas rather than adding new households or jobs.

“There has been great consensus on where growth should be and where it should not be,” Ittleson remarked. Yet, there remains considerable controversy “at the edge, that is, how to transition from areas of change to areas of stability,” she continued. Another major obstacle facing the city’s housing initiative is land assembly. “We have the Denver Urban Renewal Authority, but it’s a politically supercharged thing to use. It’s expensive and politically complicated,” she added. Another difficulty is Denver’s “archaic legislation,” which offers far less acceptance of inclusionary zoning than in the East.

Salt Lake City (population 182,000; metro population 1 million) also has demonstrated considerable acceptance of the need for more infill and density downtown. Renowned for its abundant natural amenities, the city has a thriving tourist industry and has become a magnet for growth. As a result, land costs are very high to accommodate the new population, and there are serious discussions between the mayor, the city council and the development community on how to make the city more viable in the face of this challenge. Louis Zunguze remarked that the city is keenly aware that “what happens around us has a lot to do with what we do in the core.”

As part of its efforts to contain the pace of sprawl and attract new development to the downtown, Salt Lake City is putting together a major housing initiative and has studied downtown sites suitable for infill. With the ambitious goal of creating 40,000 new housing units in and around the downtown area, amounting to a three-fold increase in density, a considerable challenge will be to “strike a balance” with more traditional neighborhoods. Strategies include block consolidations for small subdivisions and amending the zoning ordinance to allow for more height in certain appropriate areas, “so more density can be accommodated gradually.”

Salt Lake City has considerable assets working in its favor, notably the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the Mormon Church), whose world headquarters is located downtown. “The Church is a significant entity from both a social and financial standpoint,” Zunguze noted. In addition to complementing the city on key housing and economic initiatives, the Church works hard to induce corporations to relocate downtown near the Church’s own headquarters. The Church partners with new development and redevelopment in other ways as well. For example, it has built a new conference center and recently bought the Crossroads Mall located downtown (that is still taxable) and other projects as additions to Church facilities.

Cheyenne (population 53,000; county population 81,000) is the largest community in Wyoming but the smallest city represented on the APA panel and it does not have issues with infill housing. “We’re a landlocked, small community,” notes Mike Abel. “Residential areas are close by, so residential development downtown is not a huge issue right now. We’re more interested in community development issues . . . our infill focus is on commercial redevelopment.”

Regional Planning

According to John Hester, Reno (population 200,000; metro population 550,000) relies heavily on regional planning. The city has a state-mandated regional plan, updated every five years and designed to account for growth and development over a 20-year period. The recently revised plan promotes the objective of directing development to existing areas and infrastructure. It also introduces a new conceptual framework for identifying and prioritizing those districts and transit corridors most suitable for infill and development. On a broad scale the plan presents the idea of Municipal Service Areas designed to capture what has already been built and approved. Urban and suburban land uses are allowed only in these service areas. Then, within these areas, the plan identifies activity centers and auto-dependent transit corridors most suitable for high-intensity land use and development. One specific target for the city, noted Hester, “is to capture 35 percent of all regional metro housing over the next 20 years within the McCarran Ring, a four-mile radius from downtown.”

For David Richert, the cities of Phoenix (population 1.4 million; metro population 3 million) and Reno appear to share similar planning approaches toward managed growth. The Phoenix plan identifies six growth areas as overall targets for development and infill. To alleviate traffic congestion within and among the designated growth areas, the plan also recommends redirecting growth to certain strategic perimeter areas. “They become edge cities within a village system,” he explained. “There are one hundred years worth of growth in the Phoenix plan. We’re putting in infrastructure where we think growth is going to occur.” Richert noted, however, that it was important to keep in mind that “getting the infill requires getting the people who want it, too. . . . Among our goals is to get a fair share of everything that happens in the valley and to set a good example.”

Las Vegas (population 500,000; metro population 1.5 million) has been the nation’s fastest growing region for more than 60 years. But, according to Chris Knight, “the city is still young, with an outward focus and large expanses of vacant land. We tear things down if we don’t like them. If it’s bad, we just blow it up and move elsewhere. Redevelopment is difficult because some of the more prominent redevelopment tools such as eminent domain are taboo.” Downtown Las Vegas is perceived to be in trouble, and its revitalization is at the top of the mayor’s agenda. “One obstacle is that the private owners of downtown properties need to buy in on fixing the problem,” Knight explained. Another problem he noted is that “a number of downtown property owners believe they own the site of ‘the next big casino,’ so land prices are very inflated.”

The mayor of Las Vegas has been a champion of regional planning and recognizes that protecting the core is vital to the health of the region. “The mayor wants to leave the legacy of a new downtown,” Knight added. Part of that legacy would include the introduction of new medical research facilities and 40,000 units of housing to the downtown area. “Big retailers are already coming in,” added Knight, and the city is “looking for tall buildings.” The city is also beginning to investigate transportation-related development to support the existing monorail system, “but our zoning standards may be archaic and will be in the way. We have to figure out how to remove them,” he explains.

Infrastructure and Land Management

Maintaining control of a city’s services and proper fiscal strategies may help in managing growth. Salt Lake City is well endowed with transportation facilities: light rail, bus (local and Greyhound) and train (Amtrak) services, and an airport that is within ten miles of downtown. Moreover, the streets in Salt Lake are so wide that it’s easy to install new rail lines down the center for new transit services. The city also has three large malls within the downtown area, which help keep the city viable. In addition, there is considerable willingness on the part of developers “to look at the barriers in the way of the kind of the development we want downtown (i.e., mixed-use along transit),” Louis Zunguze noted. In Salt Lake, “the city development and finance communities are beginning to come to the table together to discuss what type of housing should be developed and how to finance it. . . .The banks are willing to look at new ways to finance mixed-use developments,” he noted. While work still needs to be done in terms of putting the most viable financing tools together, Zunguze cited land use regulations as the city’s major obstacle to its infill efforts. The city is faced with “contradictions of wanting to do things but the process being very slow. . . . Developers seem to have no problem assembling land, but projects are seriously challenged by the review and permitting processes,” he explained.

Reno has less than half the population of Las Vegas, but as the second largest city in the nation’s fastest growing state, growth management is a high priority. John Hester cited two other factors, in addition to strong regional planning, that have been instrumental in shaping the city’s response to growth. First is the need to work within the limitations imposed by the city’s physical constraints: Reno is landlocked and must also contend with limited water supplies. Second is the city’s concern for fiscal equity and accountability. Taxpayers subsidize growth, and the city, in consultation with outside fiscal consultants, has made concerted efforts to ensure that only those who receive municipal services pay for them, and that taxpayers in one area are not subsidizing the provision of municipal services elsewhere. “A lot of what we try to do is use the fiscal system to make people realize they can’t keep building out,” says Hester. He also noted that the city has a unique tax structure that enables depreciation.

David Richert considers the situation in Phoenix to be very similar to that in Reno only on a bigger scale. “We have our land constraints—the Indian reservations . . . and the state trust lands. Only 13 percent of the State of Arizona is in private hands,” he explained. However, the city itself has no constraints on water. “Phoenix is in the business. It sells water to other communities,” he noted. But controlling the allocation of water “provides a measure of growth control in other areas. In Arizona, you need a 100-year water supply for everything you do.”

Phoenix is also trying to achieve “a balance of transportation,” with efforts to enhance existing transportation rather than building new. Greenspace planning is also becoming increasingly important within the Phoenix region. As an example, Richert cited the recent introduction of special zoning for drainage washes and meanders. The city also passed a bill to collect taxes to pay for park acquisition. “It won’t be enough,” he added, “because once you start buying land you create a market. Land values go up and you can’t buy as much.”

Cheyenne is a city poised for change. As the “northern anchor” of the Colorado Rocky’s Front Range, Cheyenne is only 90 miles from urban Denver. Because of its strategic location on north-south and east-west highways and railroad lines, the city is looking to capitalize on its potential as a major regional transportation hub. “Regionally, we have a lot going for us as a transportation center. Businesses are looking at Cheyenne because of its proximity to other major centers,” Abel explained. Moreover, for businesses Wyoming has a very attractive tax structure, and Cheyenne is also proving popular for commercial development because it is “ready to build.” The city has many greenways, and the strong pedestrian orientation within the community is appealing to new development and infill initiatives. Already, Abel stated, “once-vacant city blocks are beginning to change, and there’s a new parking structure downtown.” Growth is not without obstacles, however. Specifically, water will be the limiting factor in the city’s growth cycle. Like many western cities, noted Abel, “we’re dependent on our water resources and future enhancements. Without sufficient snowpack to balance out the high mountain reservoirs during a drought situation such as we have now, Cheyenne could be out of water in less than three years.”

Despite this sobering prospect, the city remains more than optimistic about its future. Recently, a local property owner offered the city a massive 17,000-acre ranch that appears to have several water sources, and with them significant development capability. The city has taken the option to purchase the ranch for its water rights, but the city would acquire both the land and its water. “With this purchase, we could double the size of Cheyenne overnight,” exclaimed Abel, adding that “it will force the city to look differently at land use in the area for commercial and urban development. It’s an opportunity to develop the next generation of Cheyenne.” David Richert commented, “17,000 acres is huge. . . . You’ll need a lot of expertise from the private sector. But you’re doing a very progressive thing; your government has a chance to control development.”

Armando Carbonell is a senior fellow and cochairman of the Lincoln Institute’s Department of Planning and Development, and Lisa Cloutier is a research assistant in the department.

photo:

Participants in the Lincoln Institute-sponsored retreat for planning directors of western cities: Top row, from left: Mike Abel, Cheyenne; Bill Healy, Colorado Springs; Chris Knight, Las Vegas; John Hester, Reno. Middle row: Louis Zunguze, Salt Lake City; Ramona Mattix, Billings; Ellen Ittleson, Denver. Bottom row, from left: Armando Carbonell, Lincoln Institute; David Richert, Phoenix; Peter Pollock, Boulder. Photo credit: Lisa Cloutier

The sound of electricity hums deep inside the Tate Modern, the power plant turned art sanctuary on the south bank of London’s River Thames. Despite the 4 million visitors per year now streaming inside since the galleries opened in 2000, the switching plant is still generating 2 megawatts of power for its neighborhood, making the Tate one of the most unusual mixed-use urban redevelopments ever concocted.

But an even more far-reaching hum is reverberating all around the Tate—that of regeneration. Connected to central London by the arching spine of Lord Norman Foster’s Millennium Bridge and further magnetized by the whirling mega-folly of the London Eye Ferris wheel nearby, the Tate has catalyzed well over $200 million worth of other redevelopments to the area. Yet, even as it joins other high-end arts institutions in the “Bilbao effect” of high art sparking higher-end gentrification, the Tate is working hard to nurture an economically and ethnically diverse live/work/play urban neighborhood.

“We’ve had impacts,” says Donald Hyslop, head of education for the Tate and coordinator of its community initiatives. “We attract 4 million visitors a year, and 12 million now move between the Tate and the London Eye. The question for us became, ‘How do we spread that wealth?’”

Such models of urban regeneration lured the 2006 Loeb Fellows from Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design to London for their annual study trip abroad, cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute. Aided by Jody Tableporter’s connections as the former director of regeneration for London Mayor Ken Livingston, the group gained a first-hand look at the leaps, stumbles, and lessons to be learned from one of the world’s most rapidly redeveloping cities.

“London has proven the relationship between transportation planning and economic growth,” observed Luis Siqueiros, a planner who has worked in Juarez/El Paso, Guadalajara, and other Mexican cities. “They are mixing all kinds of activities together in their buildings. In North America, we talk about these things a lot, but they are showing us how to do it and why.”

The Beginnings of London’s Regeneration

The story of London’s regeneration is long and complicated. It begins in the Thatcher years with a bold refocusing of government aid to cities that created urban redevelopment agencies and enterprise zones to assemble land and better focus new development and transportation infrastructure projects. The most conspicuous early success was Canary Wharf, the sleek, steel-and-glass commercial new town that became the first major project in the Royal Docklands, and in the Thatcher government’s vision for a larger, regional corridor of redevelopment, dubbed the Thames Gateway, stretching all the way to the North Sea.

Despite the misfortunes of Canary Wharf’s original developer, Olympia & York, the larger Docklands redevelopment agency and enterprise zone resulted in the Jubilee Line tube extension and the first phase of the Docklands light rail line. Today, with more than 100,000 workers, Canary Wharf is competing with downtown London to be the center of the financial services sector, decidedly shifting the momentum of the city’s growth to the east.

While Margaret Thatcher’s free-market programs—particularly the release of huge tracts of government-owned land for redevelopment—broke a long freeze on urban redevelopment, subsequent Labor Party policies have guided recent successes. In the 1980s, forecasts of 4 million new households by 2020 led John Major’s government to create the Urban Task Force overseen by architect Richard Rogers. The resulting 2000 Urban White Paper made urban renaissance official national policy.

The reverberations have been widespread, stretching from Leeds to Norwich, but the epicenter is London. Projects like Canary Wharf and the Tate established momentum that gained further steam with the city’s election of its first mayor, Ken Livingston, to set policy for the metropolitan region’s 24 boroughs. Livingston has unleashed a panoply of internationally attention-getting initiatives, from the much-lauded “congestion pricing” of automobiles traveling into the core to a series of bold, new buildings and public spaces by top-rung architects like Rogers and Norman Foster. Now, with the Olympics scheduled for 2012, London has succeeded Barcelona as the “It girl” of European cities, while luring other English cities onto the dance floor.

“Having an architect like Richard Rogers involved in the destiny of cities was a major force,” Tableporter says. “His work with the Urban White Paper spawned a whole batch of English cities that all of a sudden are attuned to design standards and urban principles via master planning.”

But for all the excitement and the dozens of major projects underway, the Loeb Fellows agreed that London’s growth will live or die in the details. As Jair Lynch, a developer from Washington, DC, put it, “The question is, can they give these new places soul.”

Guiding Land Use Principles

While far more modest than some of the huge redevelopments that have been and are being completed, the Tate Modern offered the kind of careful instrumentality that attracted the Loeb Fellows, by both seeding major new development in the long-dormant south bank and spreading the benefits to the existing community.

Under Hyslop’s guidance, the Tate joined a national pilot program to create one of England’s first Business Improvement Districts (BIDs). This initiative developed an employment training program called START, helping to bring more than 40 percent of the museum’s employees from the nearby, and historically downtrodden, South London districts. It started a new community group now boasting 450 members who wanted more open space, meeting places, and a movie theater. Their efforts moved the Tate to open up rooms for public use, develop a community garden, and host a new neighborhood film club.

“The Tate is trying to create a dual function for an arts institution,” noted Lisa Richmond. A long-time arts administrator and activist who has worked on community development projects for the Atlanta Olympics and the Seattle Arts Commission, Richmond says most major U.S. cultural institutions focus solely on audience development. “On the one hand, the Tate has a major global impact, representing the U.K. to the world, but it is also taking responsibility for its immediate community,” she observed. “I don’t know of any U.S. arts institution trying anything like it.”

By combining a major attraction, top-notch architecture, public space, and transportation infrastructure, the Tate became an early standard setter. But, it is rapidly gaining many potential equals, from the centrally located King’s Cross, where a new Channel Tunnel station designed by Norman Foster is triggering a 50-acre redevelopment with 1,800 new homes plus retail and commercial uses, to the outlying Wembly Stadium, the building and master plan designed by Rogers, including a plaza and grand boulevard lined with shops, bars, and restaurants, as well as 4,200 homes.

The primacy of the pedestrian is another common denominator. With Michael Jones, a director at Foster and Partners, the Loeb Fellows toured the newly renovated British Museum. There, the breathtaking glass roof—gently domed in a Fibonacci sequence of diamond-patterned steel structure—covering the 2½-acre Queen Elizabeth II courtyard has garnered all the headlines. But the restoration of the museum’s forecourt—ripped out in the 1960s for a road—has transformed the area into a new magnet for lunching, lounging, and strolling tourists and locals alike.

Nearby, Jones pointed out the similarly transformed Trafalgar Square. This traffic-choked cameo player has set the scene of “busy London” in so many movies. But it is now costarring in Livingston’s remake of the city through a “World Squares for All” campaign that will link Trafalgar with Westminster Abbey and Parliament Square as a major pedestrian corridor.

“For too long London’s public realm has been neglected and ignored,” Livingston said in a 2005 speech, as he unveiled plans to build 100 new public spaces for the Olympics. “Now we have an opportunity to get things right by rebalancing the spaces of the city for people and cars. I believe that the street is the lifeblood of city life.”

The Loeb Fellows also saw some of the method behind Livingston’s Midas touch in the work of Space Syntax, a dynamic new studio pioneering techniques of measuring and shaping traffic—both on wheels and on foot. Growing out of research at University College London by Professor Bill Hillier in the 1970s, and now a four-year-old company with offices in Sydney, Tokyo, Brussels, and South Africa, Space Syntax has developed new software to algorithmically model impacts on congestion and movement. It is based on a simple principle: people’s urge to take the shortest route.

In early studies of the potential impact of the Millennium Bridge, for instance, the city’s planners guessed it would be crossed by 2 million pedestrians annually. Space Syntax’s formulas predicted at least 4.4 million, but already more than 9 million are crossing the bridge each year. Jones added that similar studies eased planners’ minds about the benefits and impacts of removing streets at the British Museum and Tralfalgar Square.

“Space Syntax is using the traffic engineer’s language for the urban designer’s goals,” noted Etty Padmodipoetro, a Boston urban designer who designed several key open spaces for the Big Dig highway project. “In the United States, we could learn a lot from how they have harvested academic research for use in the profession.”

Challenges to Redevelopment Goals

Such innovations, however, only mitigate some of the risks in London’s bold experiments in regeneration. So far, London’s greatest successes have been catalytic projects within the existing city fabric that humanize the public realm while generating new developments that attract new residents and jobs. On the horizon are dozens of larger-scale projects that will determine whether London’s mastery of regeneration is a moment or an era. Some are widely considered to be mirages, like the Battersea Power Station, where an all-star cast of designers—Cecil Balmond, Nicholas Grimshaw, Ron Arad, and Kathryn Gustafson among them—has teamed up for a Tate-like power station to arts remodel as part of a proposed $1.5 billion transformation of 40 acres into hotels, offices, retail spaces, and flats. But other projects, like the soon-to-break-ground Silvertown Quays, teeter precariously in the gusts of London’s transformation.

Land Ownership

As the Loeb Fellows learned from Timothy Brittain-Catlin, a historian and lecturer at the Architectural Association, enormous swaths of London’s land base are owned by a small number of families who first gained control when King Henry VIII abolished church land ownership, handing the land over to his cronies whose descendants, like the Duke of Marlborough, still control it. In short, most of central London’s land is leased rather than sold. Most of these areas are also protected under the city’s strict historic preservation policies. With Livingston’s hopes of building 120,000 new units of housing in the next 10 years, the success of projects like Silvertown Quays—outside the core, on government-owned land less bound by historic codes and neighborhood NIMBYs—is essential.

Partnering with the Government

But “developing in London is not for the faint-hearted,” even in partnership with the government, according to James Alexander of KUD International, the company codeveloping Silvertown Quays. Borrowing a page from its successful playbook in the United States, in which it has partnered with local governments to build aquariums and stadiums, KUD is working with the Docklands Redevelopment Agency to transform the now largely empty 60-acre Quays site. At the center will be the Terry Farrell-designed Biota!, Europe’s largest aquarium, along with 5,000 units of housing, 420,000 square meters of commercial space, and 73,000 square meters of retail and leisure facilities.

Mixed-use development is new to KUD, better known as a horizontal developer that leverages land values with large-scale infrastructure. But KUD’s techniques are new to London: sharing equity with the redevelopment agency and offering a guaranteed delivery price for infrastructure and the aquarium. Even in partnership with the agency, according to Alexander, getting to a final deal has taken four years—tracing deeds, completing archeological surveys, dealing with watchdog groups, and hopping other regulatory hurdles, not to mention negotiating against Livingston’s demand for 50-percent social housing (talked down to 30 percent).

KUD’s Alexander was candid about the firm’s worries. It will be betting $250 million up front on reclaiming the land and building the aquarium with no profit projected for seven years. The affordable housing goals remain aggressive, particularly with no guarantee that government grants, estimated at $20,000 per unit in the development agreement, will come through. Project delivery also will converge with the Olympics, which is guaranteed to trigger construction inflation and capacity issues. And, with many developers following the current boom and the government’s housing goals, Alexander adds, “an equal challenge will be to maintain value over time as the market inevitably drops off.”

Volatile Housing Markets

Indeed, with more than 90 percent of new housing permits in London’s pipeline designated for flats, a recent study, “New London,” by Knight Frank estate agency predicted a softening market for flats, signs of which are already appearing. More critical, the study suggested, is an already failing market for flats in other, less robust English housing markets that have followed the London model.

Citing a range of studies showing the dramatic tilt nationwide to brownfield/flat development over greenfield/single-family houses, historian Peter Hall also expressed concern in a recent paper presented at a Lincoln Institute conference that government and private developers are failing to meet a critical market for workforce housing, particularly single-family houses for young families. Several Loeb Fellows worried about the continued focus on large-scale, Bilbao-style attractors like Biota!. “The Tate’s BID model seemed potentially ground-breaking,” Lisa Richmond reflected, “while the aquarium (at Silvertown Quays) felt like a disaster in the making.”

Ambitious Plans for Olympic Village

On the 23rd floor of Barclay’s building overlooking the sleek Canary Wharf development and the future Olympic Village beyond, Tim Daniels of the London Olympic Delivery Authority offered the Loeb Fellows an overview of what will be London’s most ambitious attempt at regeneration. The Olympic Village dates to the Thatcher government’s launch of the Thames Gateway corridor, but it is finally sprouting under Livingston’s mix of go-go capitalism with a larger social agenda.

Livingston cannily separated the usual single Olympic authority into two separate agencies—one for building facilities, the other for marketing. Consequently, London is keeping one eye on the long game of what Daniels calls the “regeneration dividend.” In the short term, a new velodrome, stadium, tennis center, and the much-anticipated aquatics center by architect Zaha Hadid, along with a major new Euroline transit hub ushering in visitors from all over Europe, will anchor what will be the first village to fully integrate athletes’ housing with sports facilities. The goal, Daniels says, is to have more than 50 percent of the participants within walking distance. But long after the Olympic Games close, those facilities will anchor a mixed-use neighborhood in which the bedrooms originally built for 23,000 athletes and support staff will become 4,300 units of family housing.

Numerous speed bumps lie ahead, however, ranging from the tough deals still being negotiated for land assembly with owners looking to cash in, to finding new homes for “travelers”—gypsies who under British law have the right to squat on unused land. More than 6 kilometers of rivers and canals need to be dredged and remodeled, and 40 bridges either refurbished or built anew. Since the village site is cut off from any existing neighborhood by a major freeway and rail line, at least two major 50-meter “land bridges” are being proposed to make the awkward link to nearby Stratford.

But challenges aside, “it’s a great way to look at the Olympics,” noted Jair Lynch, a developer and former Olympic medalist who now sits on the U.S. Olympic Committee. “The whole thing can be taken over by the marketing people, but by splitting the authority, they can keep a strong focus beyond the event.” He and other Loeb Fellows concluded that the key for the village, along with all of London’s increasingly larger, bolder efforts at regeneration, will be keeping—and, in many cases, creating—a sense of local connection. As Lynch put it, “How do you create a real sense of neighborhood at those scales?”

Closing Observations

At the end of our study tour, most Loeb Fellows felt that Donald Hyslop of the Tate Modern offered the clearest, most hopeful, and most far-reaching aspirations for London’s bold, new brand of large-scale urban neighborhood building. With architects Herzog & de Meuron adding on to their celebrated first phase with an eye-catching, high-rise annex, the Tate will move out the electrical switching station and reclaim the huge, decommissioned fuel tanks beneath the building for a new 400-seat theater, more restaurants and shops, and more spaces for flexible programming.

Hyslop says the goal will be to develop a “life-long learning center” spawning a “16-hour-a-day” corridor along the 15-minute walk between the Tate and the rapidly regenerating Elephant & Castle neighborhood. Rather than being merely a catalyst for development, the Tate hopes to be an active agent in creating a neighborhood—a transformer, if you will, rechanneling financial and social wealth throughout the community.

Randy Gragg is the architecture and urban design critic for The Oregonian in Portland.

Loeb Fellows, 2005–2006

Teresa Brice-Hearnes, Program Director, LISC Phoenix (Local Initiatives Support Corporation), Phoenix, Arizona

Barbara Deutsch, Urban Greening and Green Roof Consultant, Washington, DC

Randy Gragg, Architecture and Urban Design Critic, The Oregonian, Portland, Oregon

Jair Lynch, CEO, Jair Lynch Companies, Washington, DC

Etty Padmodipoetro, Urban Design and Transportation Planning Consultant, Boston, Massachusetts

John Peterson, Architect, Peterson Architects, San Francisco, California

Lisa Richmond, Community Cultural Planning Consultant, Seattle, Washington

Luis Siqueiros, International Planning Consultant, Mexico City, Mexico

Kennedy Smith, Principal, The Community Land Use and Economics Group, LLC, Arlington, Virginia

Jody Tableporter, Chief Executive, Peterborough Urban Regeneration Company, Peterborough, United Kingdom

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 7 del CD-ROM Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

En las ciudades de América Latina, y especialmente en las más grandes, la ubicación de las viviendas es crítica para los grupos más vulnerables. En Buenos Aires, la población de las villas miseria en el área del centro se duplicó en el último período intercenso (1991-2001), si bien la población total declinó aproximadamente el 8 por ciento. En Rio de Janeiro, durante la misma década, los asentamientos informales de mayor crecimiento fueron los que se percibían como mejor ubicados, generalmente cerca de la costa en los barrios de clase media y alta, si bien éstos eran ya los barrios más hacinados y congestionados.

También se observa esta tendencia en Chile, no obstante el problema de los asentamientos informales es mucho menor que en el resto de América Latina. Sólo alrededor de 28.600 familias (el 1 por ciento de la población total de Chile) viven en 533 asentamientos precarios identificados (los cuales son denominados campamentos). Los catastros sucesivos demuestran que al mismo tiempo que los campamentos más antiguos se van reordenando, se continúan creando campamentos nuevos. Más de la mitad de los campamentos existentes fueron establecidos entre 1991 y 2007 (Fundación un Techo para Chile, 2007).

Hay varias explicaciones para esta persistencia de campamentos, aun en Chile, donde la política de vivienda se considera más desarrollada que en otros países, y donde ya queda poca tierra urbana disponible para ser invadida. Algunas familias que viven en campamentos pueden representar un grupo residual en transición entre su llegada a la ciudad y su reubicación en viviendas de interés social u otro tipo de vivienda formal. Otros pueden tener preferencia por tener su propia casa en un campamento en vez de tener que compartir cuartos con otra familia o parientes en una vivienda más formal.

Vivir en un campamento también puede ser comparable a anotarse en una lista de espera para poder acceder a un programa de vivienda de interés social, ya que el programa del gobierno que se concentra en este tipo de familias (Chile Barrio) tiene por finalidad atender a sus necesidades y facilitar su acceso a la vivienda de interés social. Como algunas de las familias que viven en campamentos aún no cumplen con las condiciones necesarias para participar en el programa de viviendas de interés social, siguen allí hasta poder encontrar otras opciones.

Por otro lado, la continua existencia de campamentos no se puede atribuir a altos niveles de pobreza o a una política débil de regularización de asentamientos. Por el contrario, en los últimos 20 años la pobreza en Chile se redujo a la mitad, y ahora se estima que alcanza al 13,7 por ciento de la población (CASEN, 2006). Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno implementó una política de vivienda que entrega bonos a las familias para comprar una casa. Este programa ha sido respaldado por sucesivas administraciones de gobierno y ha beneficiado hasta ahora a dos millones de familias, a un promedio de 100.000 familias por año, o casi el 3 por ciento de los 3,6 millones de hogares urbanos de Chile en 2002.

Independientemente de su éxito en términos de cobertura, los programas de vivienda han generado una concentración de viviendas de interés social en la periferia de Santiago y otras ciudades principales. Históricamente, los proyectos de viviendas de interés social han creado grandes zonas socialmente homogéneas que han producido la segregación de familias de bajos ingresos, con consecuencias negativas. Algunas de estas zonas ahora sufren de serios problemas sociales, como un alto nivel de desempleo y deserción escolar, como también sentimientos generalizados de falta de esperanza y inversión de los valores sociales entre sus residentes (Sabatini, Cáceres y Cerda, 2004).

También hay mayor inestabilidad e inseguridad laboral en la economía chilena en la actualidad que en el pasado, y una transformación radical del sistema político ha desestabilizado las relaciones cotidianas entre las clases populares y los líderes de los partidos políticos. A medida que estas formas tradicionales de cohesión social se van debilitando, ciertos factores, como la ubicación de una casa en la ciudad, se hacen más relevantes, ya que una buena ubicación puede brindar acceso a una mejor “geografía de oportunidades”, o sea a lugares que se perciben como de mayor y mejor acceso a servicios públicos y privados, como escuelas, mercados, parques y redes de transporte, como también acceso a mejores trabajos y proximidad a redes sociales y familiares.

En este contexto, examinaremos algunos de los factores que influyen en el continuo desarrollo y persistencia de los campamentos, a pesar de la disponibilidad de programas gubernamentales masivos de vivienda, como también un sistema legal que protege los derechos de propiedad.

Una encuesta de preferencias de localización de vivienda

Usando datos de la Región Metropolitana de Santiago, diseñamos tres conjuntos de muestras con un total de 1.588 unidades familiares: familias que viven en campamentos (812); familias que viven en viviendas de interés social y que se mudaron de campamentos que fueron erradicados (510); y familias que viven en viviendas de interés social pero que no se mudaron de un campamento (266). Las tres muestras fueron tomadas, respectivamente, de un inventario de moradores de campamentos preparado en 2007; y el registro del programa Chile Barrio, que identifica a familias que vivían en campamentos y que adquirieron viviendas de interés social entre 1999 y 2005; y familias del mismo proyecto de viviendas de interés social que no provenían de un campamento. Las encuestas en los campamentos fueron efectuadas de puerta en puerta en agosto de 2008, y en los barrios de proyectos de vivienda de interés social en diciembre de 2008.

Los resultados de la encuesta muestran que al vivir en campamentos, las familias logran optimizar las preferencias de localización de su vivienda con una mayor probabilidad de éxito, entendiendo dichas preferencias fundamentalmente como la proximidad a una buena geografía de oportunidades. Casi el 70 por ciento de las familias que antes vivían en campamentos y ahora viven en viviendas de interés social se quedaron en el mismo distrito, comparado con el 51,7 por ciento de las familias que viven en viviendas de interés social y que no vinieron de campamentos (ver Cuadro 1). Por lo tanto, sin alterar radicalmente la ubicación de su vivienda, las familias que antes vivían en campamentos pudieron acceder a subsidios de vivienda que les permitieron mejorar su estándar de vida y obtener un título legal.

Ver Cuadro 1 en anexo: Origen de las muestras de hogares en la Región Metropolitana (RM) de Santiago (porcentajes)

Las familias que viven en campamentos también perciben que tienen mayor prioridad que otras familias similares para acceder a viviendas de interés social, y una mayor probabilidad de acceder a viviendas de interés social en su localización preferida. Alrededor del 63 por ciento de las familias que viven actualmente en campamentos reportaron tener ventaja en el acceso a viviendas de interés social en comparación con otras familias. Esta percepción coincide con la realidad, ya que entre 1996 y 2007 la cantidad de campamentos en Chile declinó de 972 (105.888 familias) a 533 (alrededor de 28.600 familias) y el déficit de viviendas asociado con campamentos se redujo en un 75 por ciento.

Para examinar el precio del suelo como factor en la selección de vivienda, utilizamos la tasación fiscal en zonas de características similares (ZCS) y, como referencia, el valor máximo obtenido por cada distrito. En este análisis, el 71,4 por ciento de las familias que se mudaron de un campamento a una vivienda de interés social se transfirieron a una localización mejor o equivalente (ver Cuadro 2).

Ver Cuadro 2 en anexo: Valor actual del suelo comparado con el valor en el distrito de origen

La encuesta también muestra que la mayoría de las familias de campamentos (60,6 por ciento) llegó entre 2000 y 2008, un período de gran expansión en la oferta de viviendas para familias de menores ingresos, indicando una preferencia por vivir en un campamento bien ubicado antes que en una vivienda de interés social en otro lado (ver Cuadro 3).

Ver Cuadro 3 en anexo: Año de llegada de la muestra de familias que viven en campamentos

Los resultados de la encuesta se deben interpretar teniendo en cuenta los siguientes factores contextuales.

• El grupo de familias que viven en los campamentos es pequeño comparado con la población que potencialmente se puede beneficiar de programas de subsidio de vivienda. Las familias que antes vivían en campamentos eran sólo el 2,2 por ciento de todas las familias que vivían en viviendas de interés social en 2001 (INVI, 2001).
• El proceso de segregación de las familias más pobres a la periferia urbana es una tendencia que se ha mantenido a lo largo de los últimos 30 años. En la década de 1980 se instituyó una política de erradicación masiva de campamentos, y las familias fueron reubicadas desde los distritos del centro a la periferia. En la década de 1990, a medida que la democracia echó raíces en el país, la nueva administración adoptó una política de construcción de viviendas de interés social en gran escala para prevenir la formación de nuevos campamentos. No obstante, muchas de estas viviendas de interés social se están construyendo en zonas aún más periféricas, causando una segregación residencial a escala regional.
• Como resultado de estas políticas, grandes sectores de la región metropolitana de Santiago se caracterizan por su homogeneidad social. Por ejemplo, el distrito periférico de La Pintana creció 2,5 veces entre 1985 y 1994 (de 80.000 a 190.000 habitantes) debido a la reubicación de familias de menores ingresos que antes vivían en distritos actualmente habitados por familias de ingresos medios y altos en el Gran Santiago (Las Condes, Providencia, Ñuñoa y La Reina, entre otros).
• A pesar de la tendencia predominante, y en contraposición a lo que ocurrió en décadas anteriores, las familias que ahora viven en campamentos parecen tener una ventaja sobre las familias que no vinieron de campamentos para obtener un subsidio de vivienda en su localización preferida.

Interacciones entre pobreza y los valores del suelo

La mitad de las familias que viven en campamentos (51 por ciento) no son pobres, de acuerdo a la Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica (CASEN). En nuestra muestra, la mayoría de las familias que vivían en campamentos tienen un mayor porcentaje de jefes de familia masculinos, menor tamaño familiar, y un ingreso per cápita casi el doble de la mayoría de las familias de bajos ingresos de la Región Metropolitana. Este resultado contradice la creencia convencional de que las familias más pobres viven en los campamentos. Lo que parece estar ocurriendo es la expresión de una estrategia por parte de familias de menores ingresos para superar su vulnerabilidad y aprovechar al máximo las oportunidades para mejorar su situación, usando para ello la ubicación de su vivienda como un recurso en el proceso de movilidad social.

La incidencia de pobreza en los campamentos varía en función del precio promedio del suelo en el distrito donde se encuentra el barrio. Menos de la mitad de las familias que viven en campamentos ubicados en distritos de valor bajo y alto del suelo son pobres, mientras que aquéllas que viven en distritos de valor medio del suelo tienen niveles de pobreza mucho mayores (ver Cuadro 4). Las familias que viven en distritos de valores bajos y altos del suelo también tienen una mayor proporción de trabajadores en los sectores de servicios privados y domésticos, y menos empleados por cuenta propia.

Ver Cuadro 4 en anexo: Pobreza y empleo en las familias que viven en campamentos, por valor del suelo en el distrito

Los residentes perciben que la localización objetiva de los campamentos es mejor que el de las viviendas de interés social, porque es más probable que los campamentos se encuentren en los distritos de mayor valor del suelo, en comparación con las viviendas de interés social: 27 por ciento, comparado con 7,9 por ciento (ver Cuadro 5). Al mismo tiempo, las familias que viven en campamentos tienen una percepción mucho mejor de su proximidad a los servicios y puestos de empleo, y encuentran que su distrito es socialmente más diverso que el de las familias que viven en viviendas de interés social (ver Cuadro 6).

Ver Cuadro 5 en anexo: Distribución de familias por valor del suelo en sus distritos respectivos (porcentajes)

Ver Cuadro 6 en anexo: Percepciones de localización de la vivienda

Si se usan los valores del suelo como indicador de acceso a servicios, queda claro cuán significativa es la localización para las familias. Los campamentos ubicados en distritos donde los valores del suelo son altos exhiben ventajas significativas sobre aquellos en distritos de precio del suelo bajo, sobre todo con respecto a la ubicación del trabajo del jefe de familia y su cónyuge (ver Cuadro 7).

Ver Cuadro 7 en anexo: Percepciones de localización por valor del suelo en el distrito entre las familias que viven en campamentos (porcentaje)

Preferencias declaradas de localización

Las familias que viven en campamentos valoran su localización. Al preguntar: “Si tuviera la oportunidad de mudarse a otra casa, ¿qué elegiría?”, el 28,8 por ciento declaró que preferiría quedarse en el mismo lugar y el 57,6 por ciento se mudaría a otra ubicación dentro del mismo distrito. La tercera opción, mudarse a otro distrito, fue seleccionada sólo por el 13,6 por ciento de las familias.

Con respecto a sus expectativas para el futuro, la mayoría de las familias que viven en campamentos declaran que esperan vivir en una vivienda de interés social dentro de cinco años. El sesenta y siete por ciento cree que vivirá en una vivienda de interés social dentro del mismo distrito y el 25 por ciento de ese grupo cree que vivirá en una vivienda de interés social construida en el mismo lugar donde se encuentra el campamento donde vive ahora.

El resultado más interesante es que el 51,8 por ciento de las familias que viven en campamentos dicen que prefieren quedarse en el barrio (bajo las mismas condiciones) que mudarse a una vivienda de interés social lejos de su distrito actual, Esta preferencia también es expresada por el 58.7 por ciento de las unidades familiares que declararon estar dispuestas a ahorrar más de los aproximadamente 400 dólares estadounidenses que el estado exige actualmente como pago para participar en el programa; un pago más alto aumentaría aún más la probabilidad de quedarse en la misma localización.

Conclusión

Este estudio ofrece una nueva perspectiva sobre los patrones y preferencias de localización de las familias que viven en asentamientos precarios. Subyacente en la decisión familiar de vivir en un campamento está el interés de aumentar la probabilidad de obtener una vivienda de interés social en un período más corto y en el distrito de su preferencia. No parece haber ningún conflicto entre obtener una mejor localización y obtener un subsidio residencial de una vivienda formal. Por el contrario, el vivir en un campamento constituye una estrategia racional para alcanzar ambos objetivos.

Las familias que han seguido esta estrategia tienen un perfil un tanto distinto a la típica familia pobre de Santiago. La mayoría tiene un jefe de familia masculino y un nivel de ingresos que, si bien es bajo, se encuentra significativamente por encima de la línea de pobreza tal como se define en Chile. La localización del campamento parece cumplir un rol importante en favorecer la proximidad al trabajo tanto para el jefe de familia como para su cónyuge.

Los programas de vivienda de interés social en Chile se han guiado fuertemente por la noción del déficit de viviendas, donde las familias pasan a ser un número de una lista para obtener un subsidio de manera independiente, sin considerar aspectos tales como el mantenimiento de las redes sociales o las preferencias de localización. Esta política, basada en subsidiar la demanda y dar por sentado el valor del suelo, llevó a una segregación a gran escala en la periferia, donde los precios del suelo tienden a ser menores.

Este estudio demuestra que las familias optarán por una mejor localización, frecuentemente en la ciudad central, aunque ello signifique vivir en un campamentos o un lote más pequeño, demostrando los límites de la vivienda de interés social basada en los precios más bajos del suelo en la periferia. El programa Chile Barrio, creado en 1996, ha reemplazado el énfasis en el déficit de viviendas por un enfoque territorial que hace del campamento la unidad de intervención, y este nuevo enfoque parece haber mejorado las opciones de vivienda. La lección de política pública aprendida para programas de vivienda futuros es la necesidad de concentrarse en la calidad de la localización y en la inclusión social.

Referencias

CASEN. 2006. Ministerio de Planificación. www.mideplan.cl

Fundación un Techo para Chile. 2007. Informe catastro de campamentos. www.untechoparachile.cl/cis

Instituto de la Vivienda (INVI). 2001. Diagnóstico de medición de satisfacción de beneficiarios de vivienda básica. Santiago: Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo.

Sabatini, F., G. Cáceres, y J. Cerda. 2001. Segregación residencial en las principales ciudades chilenas: Tendencias de las tres últimas décadas y posibles cursos de acción”. EURE 27 (82) Diciembre.

Sobre los autores

Isabel Brain es socióloga y coordinadora del Programa de Apoyo a las Políticas Urbanas y de Suelo (ProUrbana) de la Universidad Católica de Chile Sus investigaciones se concentran en el desarrollo urbano, viviendas económicas, segregación residencial, mercados de suelos y asentamientos informales.

Pablo Celhay es economista e investigador de la Universidad Alberto Hurtado de Santiago, Chile. Recibió una maestría en políticas públicas de la Universidad de Chicago. En la actualidad está cursando la carrera de maestría en políticas públicas en la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile.

José Joaquín Prieto es director del Observatorio Social de la Universidad Alberto Hurtado de Santiago, Chile. Sus investigaciones se concentran en políticas sociales y metodología de las investigaciones aplicadas.

Francisco Sabatini es sociólogo y profesor de planeamiento urbano en el Instituto de Estudios Urbanos y Territoriales de la Universidad Católica de Chile. Se especializa en segregación social, conflictos medioambientales y participación ciudadana.

China ha experimentado un crecimiento económico rápido desde 1978, cuando adoptó una reforma económica y políticas de apertura hacia el mundo. Se ha convertido en la segunda mayor economía del mundo en términos de PIB, y su recaudación tributaria ha experimentado un crecimiento anual promedio de alrededor del 20 por ciento desde la reforma fiscal de 1994.

No obstante, muchos gobiernos subnacionales de China han experimentado problemas fiscales y han incurrido en grandes deudas locales en los últimos años debido a numerosas competencias del gobierno central no financiadas y la gran brecha fiscal entre las necesidades de gasto y la capacidad para generar ingresos. Por ejemplo, en 2008, los gobiernos subnacionales de China han sido responsables por el 79 por ciento de los gastos totales del gobierno, pero sólo del 47 por ciento de los ingresos gubernamentales totales (Man 2011).

A diferencia de muchos países desarrollados, los gobiernos locales de China (provinciales, de prefectura, de condado y municipales) no tienen ninguna autoridad legal para imponer tributos o pedir préstamos, y el impuesto sobre la propiedad desempeña un papel muy limitado en la estructura de financiamiento público a nivel local. En consecuencia, muchos gobiernos locales recurren a fuentes de ingresos extrapresupuestarios, imponen aranceles para el derecho a arrendar el suelo, otras tasas y recargos, y obtienen préstamos bancarios de forma indirecta para financiar las inversiones de infraestructura y desarrollo económico local.

Durante el período de 1991 a 2008, los aranceles para el arriendo del suelo (también llamados aranceles de transferencia del suelo) aumentaron del 5,7 por ciento de los ingresos totales del presupuesto local al 43,5 por ciento. Esta dependencia excesiva de aranceles para el arriendo del suelo ha sido criticada como un factor importante en el crecimiento del precio de las viviendas y el aumento de casos de corrupción y disputas sobre suelos en China.

Problemas con el sistema tributario actual

El sistema actual de impuestos sobre el suelo y la propiedad en China genera una cantidad limitada de ingresos, aun cuando se gravan cinco tipos de impuestos sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria en las diversas etapas de producción (ver tabla 1). Los gobiernos locales cobran el Impuesto a la Ocupación de Suelos Agrícolas y el Impuesto al Valor Agregado al Suelo (IVAS) en el momento de adquirir y transferir el suelo. En el momento de la toma de posesión, se cobran el Impuesto al Uso Urbano del Suelo y el Impuesto sobre la Propiedad Inmobiliaria, y finalmente se cobra el Impuesto a la Escritura cuando se transfiere el título de la propiedad.

Este sistema tributario tiene muchos problemas y debe ser reformado estructuralmente. En primer lugar, los diversos impuestos sobre el suelo y la propiedad constituyen solamente un 15,7 por ciento de los ingresos tributarios a nivel local. Es una fuente de ingresos inestable e inadecuada para los gobiernos locales de China. Los funcionarios de los gobiernos locales han dependido de otras fuentes de ingresos, como el arriendo de suelos del estado a emprendedores inmobiliarios a cambio de un arancel fijo importante, para financiar proyectos de capital y desarrollo de infraestructura. En 2010, los gobiernos locales de China recaudaron 2,7 billones de RMB en concepto de aranceles de arriendo de suelos, además de 8,3 billones de RMB en impuestos y otros ingresos presupuestarios. La relación entre los aranceles de arriendo y los ingresos tributarios totales fue del 32,5 por ciento, comparada con el 4,5 por ciento en 1999.

En segundo lugar, la estructura actual de impuestos sobre la propiedad en China aplica una mayor carga tributaria en la etapa de transacción que durante la posesión. Por ejemplo, la recaudación del impuesto anual sobre el uso urbano del suelo y el impuesto sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria durante la etapa de posesión ascendió a sólo el 6,44 por ciento de los ingresos tributarios locales en 2008, mientras que alrededor del 9,25 por ciento de los ingresos tributarios locales se recaudó en las etapas del desarrollo del suelo y transacción de la propiedad.

En tercer lugar, las propiedades residenciales ocupadas por sus dueños no están incluidas actualmente en la base tributaria del impuesto sobre la propiedad inmobiliaria, lo que restringe la capacidad del gobierno para recuperar la plusvalía del mercado de vivienda en pleno auge debido a la privatización de viviendas de interés social, el crecimiento de los ingresos de la población y la inversión masiva en infraestructura urbana. Para 2010, la tasa de propiedad de viviendas alcanzó el 84,3 por ciento de la bolsa de viviendas urbanas del mercado formal, y los valores de las mismas han experimentado aumentos sustanciales en los últimos cinco años en muchas de las grandes ciudades (Man, Zheng y Ren, 2011). Pero la exclusión de las propiedades residenciales del impuesto sobre la propiedad inmueble creó desniveles de riqueza y una demanda excesiva de viviendas con fines de inversión y especulación, lo que aumentó la cantidad de viviendas vacantes en muchas ciudades costeras.

Finalmente, a diferencia del sistema de impuestos sobre la propiedad en muchos países desarrollados, en China no se grava el impuesto de acuerdo al avalúo de la propiedad. En lugar de ello, su valor es el 1,2 por ciento del precio original, menos un 10 al 30 por ciento por depreciación, o un 15 por ciento de los ingresos reales por arriendo de la propiedad. Los funcionarios gubernamentales tienen poca experiencia en la estimación del valor de mercado de las propiedades existentes, una destreza fundamental para poder establecer un sistema moderno de impuesto sobre la propiedad.

Recientes avances en la reforma del impuesto sobre la propiedad

El gobierno central de China ha estado explorando la posibilidad de reformar su sistema actual de tributos sobre el suelo y la propiedad desde 2003, cuando propuso oficialmente por primera vez el establecimiento de un sistema moderno de impuestos sobre la propiedad. En 2006 se seleccionaron seis ciudades para realizar proyectos pilotos, y un año después se amplió esta cantidad a 10 ciudades.

En 2010, la Administración Estatal de Impuestos (AEI), que está a cargo de este proyecto piloto, ordenó a cada provincia que seleccionara por lo menos una ciudad para realizar ensayos de avalúo de propiedades, con el objeto de verificar el precio de venta declarado por los propietarios para el impuesto a la escritura. Estos ensayos han tenido un importante papel en la preparación técnica e informática de avalúos masivos futuros del valor de la propiedad. El 28 de enero de 2011, las ciudades de Shanghái y Chongqing recibieron permiso para recaudar impuestos sobre la propiedad de segundas residencias y residencias de lujo de reciente adquisición, respectivamente.

Logros importantes

La reforma del sistema de impuestos sobre la propiedad en China intenta establecer un sistema para gravar las propiedades existentes (incluyendo tanto el suelo como las estructuras edificadas) anualmente de acuerdo a su avalúo, con el objeto de generar una fuente significativa de ingresos para los gobiernos locales. Este sistema utilizará varios métodos de avalúo, tales como la comparación con los valores de mercado, su costo y los ingresos generados, y se aplicará a propiedades comerciales e industriales, así como también a propiedades residenciales, incluyendo aquellas ocupadas por sus dueños.

Algunas ciudades piloto, como Hangzhou, Dandong y Chongqing, han estudiado e implementado distintas versiones de Avalúo Masivo Asistido por Computadora (CAMA, por sus siglas en inglés). El AEI ha estado capacitando a funcionarios de las agencias tributarias locales de cada provincia en el desarrollo de un sistema CAMA y sus aplicaciones. También ha intentado establecer normas tecnológicas para cada método de avalúo.

En 2005, el AEI diseñó un ensayo de regulación de avalúo de propiedades inmobiliarias, con 12 capítulos y 40 cláusulas que estipulan los métodos de recolección de datos, las normas y el sistema CAMA. Todas las ciudades piloto han concluido su simulación de avalúo y han calculado las cargas y los ingresos tributarios utilizando distintos escenarios de tasa de impuestos. En 2011 se seleccionó a, por lo menos, una ciudad de cada provincia para realizar un avalúo de propiedades recién adquiridas para recaudar el impuesto a la escritura.

El avance más importante tuvo lugar a comienzos de 2011, cuando Shanghái comenzó a recaudar impuestos sobre las segundas residencias recién adquiridas por residentes y sobre las primeras residencias de no residentes de acuerdo a su valor de transacción, previa exclusión de la base tributaria de 60 metros cuadrados por persona. La ciudad de Chongqing está apuntando a la residencia unifamiliar existente y a los apartamentos de lujo recién adquiridos por residentes o segundas residencias adquiridas por no residentes. El programa excluye 180 metros cuadrados para residencias unifamiliares y 100 metros cuadrados para apartamentos en Chongqing.

Se ha impuesto el tributo sobre la propiedad a alrededor de 8.000 parcelas en total en estas dos ciudades, si bien este experimento de un año de duración recaudó sólo una pequeña cantidad para el financiamiento de viviendas de bajos ingresos. Aunque la base tributaria, la tasa tributaria y la recaudación han sido muy pequeñas en estas dos ciudades, estos esfuerzos representan un gran paso adelante para la reforma del impuesto sobre la propiedad en China.

Desafíos futuros

La reforma del impuesto sobre la propiedad en China todavía enfrenta enormes desafíos, aun cuando los ciudadanos y los medios de comunicación ya la comprenden mejor. En primer lugar, ha encontrado resistencia desde varios grupos de interés influyentes. Los mayores adversarios de un impuesto sobre la propiedad son los funcionarios gubernamentales locales, además de los inversores y especuladores inmobiliarios. Muchos gobiernos locales creen que la adopción de este impuesto reducirá el valor de las viviendas y, en consecuencia, reducirá la demanda de suelo, lo que disminuirá sustancialmente los aranceles por arriendo de suelo en manos estatales. Además, los funcionarios de los gobiernos locales son evaluados según el papel que cumplan en la estimulación del crecimiento de la economía local, y los proyectos de inversión en infraestructura se usan frecuentemente como un estímulo para el desarrollo de la economía local. Los funcionarios quieren acceso ilimitado a los aranceles de arriendo del suelo, porque se pueden recaudar y gastar con muy poco control y pueden generar una gran cantidad de ingresos durante el período de ejercicio de un funcionario.

Un segundo desafío es el progreso lento de los preparativos legales y de avalúo para el sistema de impuesto sobre la propiedad. Se tienen que promulgar leyes y reglamentaciones sobre el impuesto, incluyendo leyes y normas de avalúo. Habrá que capacitar y certificar a hasta 100.000 valuadores en las normas correspondientes. En tercer lugar, todavía no existe un consenso sobre cómo definir la base tributaria, sus exclusiones y exenciones; la asignación de responsabilidades de administración, fijación de tasas y avalúo; y la distribución de los ingresos tributarios. Y, por último, la falta general de familiaridad con el impuesto sobre la propiedad crea continuos malentendidos e interpretaciones erróneas acerca del impuesto.

Al mismo tiempo, cada vez más residentes urbanos comprenden que un impuesto sobre el avalúo de la propiedad comercial y residencial recaudado anualmente puede generar una fuente sustentable de ingresos para los gobiernos locales y reducir su dependencia de aranceles y cargos de transferencia de propiedad que contribuyen a incrementar el precio de las viviendas. A raíz de la política del gobierno central de restringir la compra de viviendas y de ajustar la oferta monetaria, los aranceles de arriendo del suelo han comenzado a disminuir en muchas ciudades en 2011.

Según un informe reciente del Instituto de Índices de China (2012), los aranceles por transferencia de suelos en 130 ciudades han disminuido un 11 por ciento en comparación con 2010. En Shanghái y Beijing han caído un 16 y 35,7 por ciento, respectivamente. Esta reducción significativa puede también ofrecer oportunidades a los gobiernos locales para encontrar maneras más sustentables de equilibrar la promoción del crecimiento económico con el suministro de bienes y servicios públicos. A largo plazo, el establecimiento de un sistema de impuestos sobre la propiedad para sustituir gradualmente los aranceles a la transferencia del suelo ofrece una manera eficiente, equitativa y sustentable de financiar los desarrollos locales y los egresos gubernamentales.

El impuesto sobre la propiedad se ha percibido como una manera efectiva de reducir los precios de la vivienda, amortiguar la especulación y reducir las tasas de viviendas vacantes. Muchos investigadores creen que los gobiernos locales han tratado de limitar la oferta de suelo para aumentar los precios y maximizar los ingresos, produciendo un rápido aumento de los precios de la vivienda y la falta de viviendas económicas en las zonas urbanas de China. La imposición de tributos sobre la propiedad residencial puede aumentar el costo de oportunidad de dejar las propiedades vacías o sin usar, y reducir los incentivos para el comportamiento especulativo. El impuesto se percibe también como una manera efectiva de reducir la brecha de ingresos y riqueza entre los residentes urbanos y desalentar la inversión especulativa en el sector inmobiliario.

Conclusiones

La reforma del impuesto sobre la propiedad de China está progresando en el área de investigación y experimentos de aplicación, y ha comenzado a ser mejor comprendido y aceptado por los ciudadanos y los gobiernos locales. Pero el establecimiento exitoso de un impuesto sobre la propiedad como una fuente importante de ingresos para el financiamiento público local requiere no sólo de técnicas de avalúo y de diseño tributario sino también de determinación política y de una reforma administrativa. Esta reforma podría generar un cambio fundamental en las relaciones intergubernamentales y el papel del gobierno en la estructura política y económica de China.

El Instituto Lincoln comenzó a respaldar las investigaciones relacionadas con la tributación de la propiedad conjuntamente con el gobierno chino en 2004, con la colaboración del Centro de Desarrollo e Investigaciones del Consejo Estatal, el Ministerio de Finanzas y la Administración Estatal de Impuestos (AEI). En 2007 se estableció en Beijing el Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Política de Suelos de la Universidad de Peking y el Instituto Lincoln, en parte para ayudar a organizar conferencias internacionales y programas de capacitación para funcionarios de las agencias tributarias de las ciudades piloto. El Centro continúa apoyando a expertos nacionales e internacionales para realizar actividades de investigación y proyectos de demostración en el área de impuestos sobre la propiedad y temas relacionados.

Sobre el autor

Joyce Yanyun Man es senior fellow y directora del Programa para China del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, y es directora y profesora del Centro de Desarrollo Urbano y Política de Suelos de la Universidad de Peking y el Instituto Lincoln.

Referencias

China Index Institute. 2012. http://www.chinanews.com/estate/2012/01-04/3580986.shtml

Man, Joyce Yanyun. 2011. Local public finance in China: An overview. In China’s local public finance in transition, eds. Joyce Yanyun Man and Yu-Hung Hong. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Man, Joyce Yanyun, Siqi Zheng, and Rongrong Ren. 2011. Housing policy and housing markets: Trends, patterns and affordability. In China’s housing reform and outcomes, ed. Joyce Yanyun Man. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

National Bureau of Statistics. 2009. China statistical yearbook. Beijing: China Statistics Press.

In the wake of the housing market collapse and the Great Recession—which caused a substantial increase in residential foreclosures and often precipitous declines in home prices that likely led to additional foreclosures—many observers speculated that local governments would consequently suffer significant property tax revenue losses. While anecdotal evidence suggests that foreclosures, especially when spatially concentrated, lowered housing prices and property tax revenue, the existing body of research provides no empirical evidence to support this conclusion (box 1). Drawing on proprietary foreclosure data from RealtyTrac—which provides annual foreclosures by zip code for the period 2006 through 2011 (a period that both precedes and follows the Great Recession)—this report is the first to examine the impacts of foreclosures on local government property tax values and revenues. After presenting information on the correlation between foreclosures and housing prices nationwide, we shift focus to Georgia in order to explore how foreclosures affected property values and property tax revenue across school districts throughout the state. Our empirical analysis indicates that, indeed, foreclosures likely diminished property values and property tax revenues. While still preliminary, these findings suggest that foreclosures had a range of effects on the fiscal systems of local governments.

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Box 1: Existing Research into the Impacts of Economic Factors on Property Tax Revenues

While there is existing research examining the various impacts of economic factors on property tax revenues, these studies use data that reflect only a previous recession (e.g., the 2001 recession) or that cover only the very start of the housing crisis in the Great Recession. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2010), for example, focus directly on the effects of house prices on local government revenues, using detailed panel data on Florida home prices during the 2000s. They conclude that changes in the real price of Florida single-family housing had an asymmetric effect on government revenues. Price increases do not raise real per capita revenues, but price decreases tend to dampen them. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt also find that asymmetric responses are due largely to caps on assessment increases, positive or negative lags between changes in market prices and assessed values, and decreased millage rates in response to increased home prices. Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2011) document the overall trends in property tax revenues in the United States from 1998 through 2009—when local governments, on average, were largely able to avoid the significant and negative budgetary impacts sustained by state and federal governments, at least through 2009, although there was substantial regional variation in these effects. Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2009) also examine the relation between education expenditures and property tax revenues for the 1990 to 2006 period. In related work, Alm and Sjoquist (2009) examine the impact of other economic factors on Georgia school district finances such as state responses to local school district conditions. Finally, Jaconetty (2011) examined the legal issues surrounding foreclosures, and the MacArthur Foundation has funded a project on foreclosures in Cook County, Illinois.

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Potential Links between Housing Prices, Foreclosures, and Property Values

Local governments in the United States rely on various own-source revenues, including local income, property, and general sales taxes and specific excise taxes, fees, and user charges. Of these, the dominant source is by far the property tax. In 2011, local property taxes accounted for roughly three-fourths of total local government tax revenues and for nearly one-half of total local own-source revenues (including fees and charges).

Some local taxes, such as income and sales taxes, have bases that vary closely with the levels of economic activity, and the Great Recession seriously depressed revenues from such taxes. The basis of the property tax is assessed value, which does not automatically change in response to economic conditions; in the absence of a formal and deliberate change in assessment, a decrease in the market value does not necessarily translate into a decrease in assessed value. Assessment caps, lags in reassessments, and the ability to make deliberate changes in millage or property tax rates combine so that economic fluctuations that influence housing values may not affect the property tax base or property tax revenues in any immediate or obvious way. Over time, however, assessed values tend to reflect market values, and property tax revenues also come under pressure.

A weakened housing market—with lower housing values and more foreclosures—may reduce local government tax revenues from several sources (Anderson, 2010; Boyd, 2010; Lutz, Molloy, and Shan, 2010), including real estate transfer taxes, sales taxes on home construction materials, and income taxes from workers in the housing construction and home furnishings industries. Because property tax revenues are such a large share of local tax revenue, however, changes in property tax revenues are often larger than the changes from these other housing-related taxes.

Foreclosure Activities Nationwide During and After the Great Recession

Figure 1 (p. 24) presents the total nationwide numbers of foreclosures at the 5-digit zip code level as a share of the number of owner-occupied homes in 2010. This figure demonstrates the clear geographic concentration of foreclosures. Arizona, California, and Florida were especially hard hit by the collapse of the housing bubble. However, other areas also experienced significant foreclosure activity.

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) produces a housing price index for each metropolitan statistical area (MSA). We matched the RealtyTrac foreclosure data to the FHFA housing price index for 352 metropolitan statistical areas. Figure 2 (p. 24) presents a simple scatterplot that relates total foreclosures over the years 2006 to 2011 as a share of the number of owner-occupied housing units in 2010, to the change in the housing price index over the period 2007 to 2012 for all 352 metropolitan areas. The simple correlation coefficient between foreclosures per owner-occupied housing units and the change in housing price index is -0.556; if we consider only those MSAs with non-zero foreclosures over the period, the correlation coefficient is -0.739. This simple analysis suggests that foreclosures have a significant negative relation with housing values. The next step is to explore the effect of foreclosures on the property tax base and on property tax revenues. In the next section, we examine this issue for the state of Georgia.

More Detailed Analysis: Foreclosures, Property Values, and Property Tax Revenues in Georgia

By examining the effect of foreclosures on property values and property tax revenues in a single state, we eliminated the need to control for the many ways in which institutional factors may differ across states. Georgia is a suitable focal point because in many ways it is roughly an “average” state. For example, local governments in Georgia rely on property taxes only slightly less than the national average; in 2008, property tax revenue as a share of total taxes for local governments was 65.1 percent in Georgia compared to 72.3 percent of the U.S. (Bourdeaux and Jun 2011).

We measure foreclosure activity with the Realty-Trac data, aggregating zip code observations into the corresponding counties. The Georgia Department of Revenue supplied the annual property tax base (referred to as “net digest” in Georgia) and property tax rates. Property tax and total local source revenues for school districts came from the Georgia Department of Education. The tax base is as of January 1 of the respective year. The property tax rate is set in the spring with tax bills being paid in the fall, the revenue from which would be reported in the following fiscal year. School districts are on a July 1 to June 30 fiscal year, so the 2009 tax base and millage rates, for example, would be reflected in revenues for fiscal year 2010. We also use various demographic and economic data (income, employment, and population) measured at the county level to help explain changes in the base. Because these variables are at a county level, for the analysis that follows, we added the property tax base and revenue variables for city school districts to those for the county school systems in each city’s county to obtain countywide totals for 159 counties. For counties that include all or part of a city school system, the tax rate is the average of the county and city school tax rates, weighted by the respective property tax base.

Only county governments conduct property tax assessment in Georgia, but the state evaluates all property tax bases annually, comparing actual sales of improved parcels during the year to assessed values, and determining if the assessment level is appropriate relative to fair market value, which is legally set at 40 percent. The resulting “sales ratio studies” report an adjusted 100 percent property tax base figure for each school district in the state, along with the calculated ratio. We use these adjusted property tax bases, covering the periods 2000 through 2011, to measure the market value of residential property.

Georgia has very few institutional property tax limitations. School district boards can generally set their property tax rates without voter approval, which is required only if the property tax rate for a county school district exceeds 20 mills. Currently, the cap is binding on only five school systems. Also, there is no general assessment limitation, although one county has an assessment freeze on homesteaded property. In 2009, the State of Georgia imposed a temporary freeze on assessments across the state, potentially affecting property tax revenue only in school year/fiscal year 2010; however, with net and adjusted property tax bases declining on a per capita basis for most counties in 2009 through 2011, it is unlikely that the freeze has constrained assessments.

Foreclosures

Table 1 provides the statewide mean and median number of foreclosures by zip code for 2006 through 2011. Total foreclosures almost doubled between 2006 and 2010, before declining in 2011. The mean number of foreclosures is much larger than the median, implying that the distribution is highly skewed.

Table 2 shows the distribution of Georgia zip codes by the number of years that the zip code had non-zero foreclosures. Over 65 percent of the zip codes had foreclosures in each of the six years, while only 7 percent had no foreclosures in all six years. This distribution suggests that very little of the state was immune to the foreclosure crisis.

Figure 3 (p. 25) shows the distribution of foreclosures across the state over the period 2006 through 2011. Because zip codes differ in size and housing density, we also map the number of foreclosures per owner-occupied housing units for 2010 in figure 4 (p. 25). Note that zip codes marked in white either have no foreclosures or are missing foreclosure data. As one would expect, urban and suburban counties (particularly in the Atlanta metropolitan area) have the most foreclosures. However, there are large numbers of foreclosures in many of the less urban zip codes as well.

Figure 5 shows the annual distribution of foreclosures per hundred housing units in each of Georgia’s 159 counties. Note that the bar in the box represents the median value, the box captures the observations in the second and third quartile, the “whiskers” equal 1.5 times the difference between the twenty-fifth and seventy-fifth percentiles, and the dots are extreme values. The median number of foreclosures by county increased from 0.17 per 100 housing units in 2006 to 1.18 per 100 units in 2010—more than a sixfold increase in the median. There is a high positive correlation between foreclosure activity in 2006 and 2011 across the counties. This correlation is 0.78 when measured relative to housing units and 0.74 when measured on a per capita basis, indicating that counties with above (below) average foreclosure activity before the housing crisis remained above (below) average at its peak.

Property Values

As for changes in property values, figures 6 and 7 show the distributions of annual changes, respectively, in the per capita net property tax base and in the per capita adjusted 100 percent property tax base across the 159 counties from 2001 through 2011. Studies suggest that foreclosures may have spillover effects on the market values of other properties in the jurisdiction (Frame, 2010). We attempt to estimate the effect of foreclosures on market values as measured by the adjusted 100 percent property tax base.

Our results are preliminary, in that the analysis included only Georgia data. Even so, they suggest significant negative effects of foreclosures on property values, controlling for year-to-year percent changes in income, employment, and population. The coefficient estimates on the foreclosures variable suggest that a marginal increase of one foreclosure per 100 homes (or approximately the increase in median foreclosures from 2006 to 2011) is associated with a roughly 3 percent decline in the adjusted 100 percent property tax base over each of the two following years. Similarly, an increase of one foreclosure per 1,000 population is associated with nearly a 1 percent decline in the adjusted 100 percent property tax base after one year, and a slightly lower percent decline in the following year.

Property Tax Revenues

We also explore the effect of foreclosures on property tax revenues. Figure 8 (p. 27) depicts the distribution of nominal changes by county in total maintenance and operations property tax revenues since 2001, showing considerable variation across the school systems in the annual changes in property tax revenues. Even in the latest three years of declining property values, at least half the counties annually realized positive nominal growth in property tax revenue. To understand the effect of foreclosure activity on local government property revenues, we estimate regressions that relate foreclosures to property tax levies and to actual property tax revenues.

We find that a rise in foreclosures is associated with a reduction in the levy, after controlling for changes in the property tax base as well as fluctuations in income, employment, and population. An increase of one foreclosure per 100 housing units is associated with about a 1.5 percent subsequent decline in the levy, all else held constant. We also find that foreclosures have a negative impact on revenues, all else constant. Like our earlier estimates, these results are for Georgia only, but they indicate a significant negative relationship between foreclosures and local government property tax levies and revenues. It may be that higher foreclosure activity makes local officials hesitant to raise property tax rates to offset the effect of foreclosures on the tax base.

Conclusions

How have foreclosures driven by the Great Recession affected property values and property tax revenues of local governments? Our results suggest that foreclosures have had a significant negative impact on property values, and, through this channel, a similar effect on property tax revenues, at least in the state of Georgia. Our results also suggest additional effects on levies and revenues after controlling for changes in the tax base. Further work is required to see whether these results extend to other states.

About the Authors

James Alm is a professor and chair of the department of economics at Tulane University.

Robert D. Buschman is a senior research associate with the Fiscal Research Center in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University.

David L. Sjoquist is a professor and holder of the Dan E. Sweat Chair in Educational and Community Policy in the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies.

Resources

Alm, James and David L. Sjoquist. 2009. The Response of Local School Systems in Georgia to Fiscal and Economic Conditions. Journal of Education Finance 35(1): 60–84.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, and David L. Sjoquist. 2009. Economic Conditions and State and Local Education Revenue. Public Budgeting & Finance 29(3): 28–51.

Alm, James, Robert D. Buschman, and David L. Sjoquist. 2011. Rethinking Local Government Reliance on the Property Tax. Regional Science and Urban Economics 41(4): 320–331.

Anderson, John E. 2010. Shocks to the Property Tax Base and Implications for Local Public Finance. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

Bourdeaux, Carolyn and Sungman Jun. 2011. Comparing Georgia’s Revenue Portfolio to Regional and National Peers. Report No. 222. Atlanta, GA: Fiscal Research Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

Boyd, Donald J. 2010. Recession, Recovery, and State and Local Finances. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

Doerner, William M. and Keith R. Ihlanfeldt. 2010. House Prices and Local Government Revenues. Paper presented at the Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Conference, “Effects of the Housing Crisis on State and Local Governments,” Washington, D.C. (May).

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Jaconetty, Thomas A. 2011. How Do Foreclosures Affect Real Property Tax Valuation? And What Can We Do About It?” Working paper presented at National Conference of State Tax Judges, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA (September).

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El impacto de las regulaciones del uso del suelo en América Latina

Cynthia Goytia es profesora en los programas de posgrado en economía urbana y políticas públicas de la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (UTDT) en Buenos Aires, Argentina. Es directora de los dos programas de maestría en economía urbana de la UTDT y del Centro de Investigación de Política Urbana y Vivienda (CIPUV) de la misma universidad. Además, ha impartido conferencias en la Universidad de Cambridge y en la London School of Economics.

Desde el año 2009, el Instituto Lincoln ha apoyado la tarea de investigación de Cynthia sobre el impacto de las regulaciones del uso residencial del suelo en la informalidad, la expansión urbana y los valores del suelo en las ciudades de América Latina. En su calidad de asesora profesional, ha trabajado con varios ministerios del gobierno argentino y de otros países latinoamericanos, así como con distintas organizaciones internacionales, tales como el Banco Mundial, el Instituto Mundial de la UNU de Investigaciones de Economía del Desarrollo, y el Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina, entre otros.

Cynthia tiene una maestría en economía urbana y un doctorado en planificación regional y urbana por la London School of Economics and Political Science.

LAND LINES: La regulación del uso del suelo a nivel municipal es un tema difícil de tratar. Aunque la zonificación y otras intervenciones pueden llegar a ser una solución sólida para disfunciones del mercado, también tienen efectos negativos imprevistos. ¿Cómo decidió usted llevar a cabo este tipo de investigación?

CYNTHIA GOYTIA: Comencé a interesarme en el análisis económico de las intervenciones sobre el uso del suelo cuando empecé a reconocer que los mercados del suelo tienen que ver con algo más que el suelo y la ubicación. En los últimos 30 años, aproximadamente, la regulación del uso del suelo y la zonificación se han vuelto mucho más importantes que la tributación del suelo para determinar la calidad de vida de la gente en las ciudades. A lo largo del tiempo, he notado que las intervenciones en el uso del suelo diseñadas para lograr fines sociales positivos a veces han generado consecuencias negativas indeseadas que los planificadores y gestores de políticas no fueron capaces de prever. Por ejemplo, las normas gubernamentales afectan el acceso a una amplia gama de bienes públicos y, como consecuencia, pueden dar como resultado una mayor segregación residencial y un mayor desarrollo informal.

Todo esto me animó a investigar los efectos de las intervenciones del gobierno en el mercado del suelo. También me di cuenta de que parte de la falta de información sobre los efectos regulatorios en América Latina era el resultado de la falta de datos comparables y sistemáticos sobre el uso del suelo. Así, en el año 2005 comencé un exhaustivo programa de investigación sobre este tema, que comenzó como un proyecto de cooperación con el gobierno nacional de Argentina, y que luego obtuvo el sólido apoyo del Instituto Lincoln.

LL: ¿Hasta qué punto son relevantes para América Latina los resultados de estudios recientes según los cuales el exceso de regulación del uso del suelo en países desarrollados incrementa los precios de la vivienda?

CG: Nuestra investigación empírica ofrece pruebas de que, al aumentar los precios en el mercado formal del suelo (y, por ende, reducir la oferta de viviendas sociales para hogares de bajos recursos), algunos aspectos de la regulación del uso del suelo podrían fomentar un mayor desarrollo de la informalidad. Por ejemplo, la Ley del Uso del Suelo promulgada en la Provincia de Buenos Aires hace 38 años definió nuevos requisitos relativos al tamaño mínimo de los lotes y obligaba a los desarrolladores a financiar la infraestructura para nuevas subdivisiones. Estos requisitos empujaron a los hogares de bajos ingresos del mercado legal del suelo hacia el sector informal, debido al aumento de los precios.

Aunque los objetivos generales de esta ley no eran malos, tuvieron consecuencias imprevistas sobre el acceso a la vivienda. Como resultado, el mercado del suelo se vio marcadamente sesgado hacia el segmento de altos ingresos, mientras que el submercado de bajos ingresos (hogares que, anteriormente, habían podido construir sus propias viviendas en lotes residenciales) prácticamente desapareció cuando se promulgaron y entraron en vigor las nuevas normas sobre el uso del suelo. No es de sorprender que estos tipos de limitaciones dieran como resultado la ocupación ilegal de terrenos en casi dos tercios de las jurisdicciones municipales que forman parte de las áreas metropolitanas de Argentina, incluida el área metropolitana de Buenos Aires.

LL: Muchos analistas sostienen que los códigos de edificación que tienden a la exclusión y del uso del suelo son los responsables, en gran medida, de la existencia de la informalidad desmedida en la región. ¿Cómo respondería usted a esta crítica?

CG: En mi última investigación sostengo que la regulación del uso del suelo no sólo se utiliza para corregir las disfunciones del mercado sino que también puede ser una manera de lograr, además, objetivos de exclusión. Nuestros resultados indican que los municipios con grandes proporciones tanto de hogares educados como de poblaciones de menores recursos tienden a imponer una zonificación residencial más restrictiva con el fin de maximizar los beneficios que los propietarios formales reciben de sus gobiernos municipales.

Existen algunas correlaciones interesantes entre el uso de medidas de exclusión en algunas jurisdicciones y las condiciones en las áreas vecinas. Por ejemplo, los municipios de Buenos Aires que poseen políticas estrictas de provisión de infraestructura se encuentran rodeados de municipios con una gran proporción de hogares que carecen de los servicios básicos. De hecho, la escasez de infraestructura es una característica principal de la idea de exclusión urbana. Así, el gobierno municipal tal vez intente regular de forma indirecta el desarrollo informal al no asfaltar los caminos o no proporcionar conexiones a los servicios de agua corriente y alcantarillado. La decisión de proveer pocos servicios a los asentamientos informales tal vez sea una herramienta estratégica para desalentar la migración hacia áreas que están experimentando la presión del crecimiento de la población, las cuales ya poseen un alto nivel de población y de ingresos y no están dispuestas a compartir su base tributaria con migrantes de bajos ingresos.

LL: Entre los diferentes factores que llevan a la informalidad en América Latina, ¿en qué lugar colocaría usted la regulación del uso del suelo?

CG: Nuestra investigación proporciona pruebas de que existe una relación entre la regulación del uso del suelo y la elección de la vivienda por parte de los hogares urbanos en Argentina. Los municipios que han emitido más medidas regulatorias del suelo también poseen sectores informales de mayores proporciones, lo que sugiere que el entorno regulatorio limita en gran manera el desarrollo de los mercados formales del suelo y de la vivienda para hogares de bajos recursos. Por ejemplo, el requisito de tamaño mínimo de lotes establece niveles de consumo de suelo que los hogares de menores ingresos no pueden permitirse. Además, estas regulaciones determinan la cantidad de viviendas que pueden construirse en los lotes, estableciendo alturas máximas, coeficientes de utilización del suelo o asignación de espacios abiertos, lo que provoca un sesgo en la oferta de viviendas hacia el mercado de altos ingresos. Los costos de aprobación de proyectos relativamente altos (tanto en términos de tiempo como de dinero) también tienen un impacto negativo, ya que elevan el costo final de la vivienda y/o desalientan a los desarrolladores a la hora de construir viviendas para hogares de bajos recursos. A la vez; no obstante, las políticas de inclusión (tales como la recuperación de plusvalías o las contribuciones por mejoras, las tarifas de impacto y la conservación de suelo vacante destinado al desarrollo de viviendas sociales) reducen la probabilidad de que los hogares recurran a los mercados informales del suelo.

Uno de los conceptos más importantes que debemos comprender es que la informalidad no es simplemente un problema de pobreza, sino una distorsión del mercado del suelo que afecta a hogares de todos los niveles de ingreso. Por lo tanto, la regulación del uso del suelo debería contribuir al diseño de políticas que logren solucionar las causas fundamentales de la informalidad y mantengan bajos los precios de los terrenos con servicios.

LL: La relación entre la eficiencia y la equidad parece ser el centro de los debates sobre la regulación del uso del suelo. Esta relación se da según diferentes normas, dependiendo de si hablamos de áreas urbanas de altos ingresos o de bajos ingresos, tal como lo demuestran claramente las zonas especiales de interés social (ZEIS) de Brasil, es decir, áreas de bajos ingresos que el estado preserva con el fin de construir viviendas sociales.

CG: Efectivamente. Las normas tales como las regulaciones de zonificación urbana para fines generales son bastante diferentes de las normas en pro de los pobres que se establecen en las ZEIS. La zonificación para fines generales tiene como objetivo mejorar la eficiencia del uso del suelo urbano, especialmente en el mercado formal de la vivienda. La planificación adecuada facilita la inversión oportuna en infraestructura y el desarrollo urbano a gran escala. En general, el uso eficiente del suelo contribuye a una mejor productividad urbana. No obstante, muchas veces la eficiencia no garantiza en sí misma el acceso a la vivienda por parte de los grupos de menores recursos.

Por el momento no contamos con una evaluación rigurosa de los efectos de las ZEIS; sin embargo, es importante considerar dos aspectos cuando pensamos en las normas menos rígidas establecidas para la vivienda destinada a hogares de menores recursos. En primer lugar, el razonamiento para permitir que existan diferentes regulaciones para distintos segmentos del mercado de la vivienda radica en que esta división mejora el bienestar general. En segundo lugar, la solución pragmática de regularizar las áreas informales genera el cuestionamiento hacia los municipios sobre la razón por la cual no permiten mayores densidades desde un principio, siempre que exista la infraestructura apropiada. En teoría, permitir el desarrollo de mayor densidad en áreas formales aumentaría la oferta general de suelo edificable, lo que, a su vez, reduciría los precios y aumentaría la disponibilidad de viviendas sociales.

LL: ¿Existe algún buen ejemplo de regulaciones del uso del suelo políticamente factibles y con inclusión social?

CG: En la mayoría de los países en vías de desarrollo, el desafío radica en diseñar políticas que traten las causas fundamentales de la informalidad y promuevan la inclusión social. Las jurisdicciones que han adoptado e implementado efectivamente medidas de inclusión pueden hoy en día proporcionar opciones de viviendas más asequibles en el mercado formal. No obstante, existen al menos dos tipos de enfoques distintos que adelantan la agenda de la regulación del uso del suelo en nuestras ciudades por caminos diferentes y con distintas implicaciones.

El primer tipo de enfoque tiene que ver con relajar las restricciones del uso del suelo que afectan de manera desproporcionada la oferta de viviendas para hogares de bajos recursos. Somos conscientes de que los costos del suelo más altos debido al “consumo forzoso” dificultan cada vez más la posibilidad de que los hogares de bajos ingresos accedan a la vivienda. Revisar este tipo de normas (tales como permitir unidades de condominio en áreas de baja densidad, que es donde vive la mayoría de los hogares de bajos recursos; aumentar los coeficientes de utilización del suelo; y reducir los tamaños mínimos de los lotes para las subdivisiones en las que la infraestructura se está introduciendo progresivamente) ayuda a mejorar la accesibilidad a la vivienda en el mercado formal. Estas medidas también permiten que el desarrollo de viviendas para hogares de bajos recursos sea más rentable, lo que, a su vez, aumenta los incentivos para ofrecer unidades en este segmento del mercado. Hoy en día existen algunos ejemplos de desarrolladores formales que están construyendo subdivisiones para hogares de bajos ingresos, así como también unidades habitacionales asequibles en algunos municipios donde tanto la población como la demanda de viviendas sociales han crecido mucho, tal es el caso de La Matanza, en el área metropolitana de Buenos Aires.

El segundo tipo de innovación en cuanto al uso del suelo tiene que ver con realizar cambios en los marcos regulatorios. Las jurisdicciones gubernamentales en todos los niveles actualmente están emitiendo diferentes políticas que cumplen una función más activa en el desarrollo y el financiamiento del suelo y la infraestructura: estas políticas guían el crecimiento urbano y los desarrollos en terrenos baldíos, a la vez que permiten recuperar las plusvalías derivadas de las inversiones públicas a gran escala. Uno de los ejemplos más claros de estas políticas es el caso de la ciudad de Rosario, Argentina. El gobierno otorga derechos de construcción (principalmente en áreas de altos ingresos) siempre y cuando el beneficio se utilice para financiar las inversiones públicas que sean necesarias para edificar en densidades altas y para proporcionar terrenos con servicios para viviendas sociales o asentamientos informales.

Ya he subrayado la importancia del gasto en infraestructura. Durante la última década, las aglomeraciones metropolitanas en Argentina se expandían a razón de un 3,5 por ciento anual en promedio, mientras que la población crecía a razón de un 1,2 por ciento anual. Este ritmo de desarrollo hace que el financiamiento de la infraestructura sea un tema prioritario. Algunos gobiernos municipales han respondido a esta situación implementando contribuciones por mejoras. Trenque Lauquen es un ejemplo de esto. El municipio ha utilizado estas contribuciones no sólo para financiar las inversiones en infraestructura sino también para gestionar el crecimiento urbano y tener terrenos disponibles para diferentes usos, incluido el de la provisión de viviendas para hogares de bajos ingresos. El éxito de esta medida, aunque con un alcance limitado, demuestra que las contribuciones para mejoras son un instrumento factible y flexible que puede ayudar a extender los servicios urbanos. Además, evita que los responsables de las subdivisiones informales del suelo exploten el vacío que queda entre los precios de terrenos formales con servicios y sin servicios.

LL: Según lo que sabemos y lo que desconocemos acerca de la regulación del uso del suelo en América Latina, ¿cuáles son, a su criterio, los temas de investigación que el Instituto Lincoln debería priorizar?

CG: HEl Instituto Lincoln de Políticas de Suelo ha estado realizando una magnífica labor en la generación de conocimientos acerca de la regulación del uso del suelo en América Latina a través del apoyo a las investigaciones, los seminarios y otras actividades, además de fomentar valiosas interacciones entre un amplio público de planificadores urbanos y gestores de políticas en la región. Ahora debemos continuar trabajando sobre estos conocimientos a fin de promover políticas que mejoren el acceso al suelo y a la vivienda e identificar las fuentes que generan distorsiones en la oferta de viviendas y que tienen como resultado un bajo nivel de cumplimiento y una informalidad generalizada.

Esto significa mejorar nuestra comprensión del impacto que tienen las innovaciones en materia de regulación que se están produciendo en la región. Aunque tenemos algunos casos de estudio sobre los efectos de estas nuevas herramientas, debemos llevar a cabo una revisión integral sobre la manera en que las ciudades, los municipios, los estados y los organismos nacionales definen sus marcos regulatorios. La creación de una base de datos integral que contenga esta información en relación con las principales aglomeraciones urbanas en la región permitiría realizar comparaciones a lo largo del tiempo y entre municipios.

Con este fin, el CIPUV ha llevado a cabo una encuesta nacional a funcionarios de planificación acerca de las regulaciones del uso del suelo en las áreas metropolitanas de Argentina. El conjunto de indicadores utilizados en el Índice de Políticas de Suelo del CIPUV (CILP) proporciona información detallada sobre parámetros tales como la existencia de planes de uso del suelo, las autoridades responsables de los cambios de zonificación y de los procesos de aprobación de proyectos residenciales, la existencia de restricciones de edificación, los costos relacionados con la aprobación de proyectos y la implementación de instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías.

A medida que ha transcurrido el tiempo, nuestra investigación ha comenzado a reformular las actitudes de los planificadores en cuanto a los marcos regulatorios. Hemos iniciado el diálogo con los planificadores y con los funcionarios públicos para comprender mejor la función que cumplen los mercados de suelo en las ciudades, así como también el impacto que tienen las regulaciones. Además, nuestros índices estandarizados han permitido realizar la comparación entre diferentes regulaciones en distintos municipios, así como llevar a cabo un análisis a nivel metropolitano y estatal. Como resultado, algunas jurisdicciones municipales y provinciales en Argentina recientemente han actualizado (o se encuentran en el proceso de actualizar) sus planes y leyes sobre el uso del suelo, algunas de las cuales datan de casi medio siglo.

LL: ¿Sería factible desarrollar una versión internacional del Índice de Políticas de Suelo del CIPUV?

CG: Sí. Desarrollar esta iniciativa tendría dos efectos muy importantes. En primer lugar, permitiría comparar distintas áreas metropolitanas en toda América Latina y mejorar la visibilidad del éxito que algunas ciudades han logrado al aumentar el acceso al suelo. En segundo lugar, brindaría un terreno fértil para que los gestores de políticas e investigadores aprendieran cuáles son las iniciativas que tuvieron mejores reultados. Esta iniciativa no sólo es factible sino también un desafío primordial que debe tratarse en los próximos años.