¿De qué manera se verán afectadas las finanzas del gobierno municipal por la enorme y creciente carga de pagar los costos de pensión contraídos previamente? En particular, ¿de qué manera estos costos de pensión heredados cambiarán la percepción de los residentes respecto al impuesto municipal sobre la propiedad y su intención de pagarlo? como primer paso de un programa de investigación del lincoln institute of land policy mucho más amplio sobre estas cuestiones, cabe preguntarse: ¿Qué sabemos –e igualmente importante, qué no sabemos– acerca de la magnitud de las deudas por pensiones sin fondos del gobierno municipal en los estados unidos? (ver Gordon, rose y Fischer 2012).

Es un principio fundamental de las finanzas públicas que los servicios del presente deberían pagarse con ingresos del presente, y que el financiamiento de deudas debería reservarse para proyectos de capital que brinden servicios a los futuros contribuyentes. este principio se viola cuando las deudas por pensiones relacionadas con los servicios de los trabajadores en el presente no son financiadas con compras de activos financieros en el presente y, en su lugar, deben pagarlas los futuros contribuyentes.

Desafortunadamente, no siempre se observan los principios de la prudencia en las finanzas públicas, y los gobiernos municipales en los estados unidos han acumulado una importante cantidad de deudas por pensiones sin fondos en los últimos años. esta situación genera un quiebre en la importante relación entre los contribuyentes y los servicios que reciben: la correspondencia desigual entre el valor total de los servicios públicos y los recursos tomados del sector privado. existe un importante debate sobre la solidez de dicha correspondencia y cuánta es la similitud de la relación de precios entre el valor pagado y el valor recibido para los contribuyentes particulares; casi no quedan dudas de que utilizar los ingresos corrientes para pagar servicios prestados en el pasado debilita esta relación.

Una conciencia pública creciente

La cuestión de las pensiones para empleados del gobierno estatal y municipal aparece en los titulares casi a diario (recuadro 1). Hasta hace sólo unos pocos años, estas pensiones eran competencia casi exclusiva de unos pocos funcionarios elegidos, juntas designadas, asesores en inversiones, actuarios y agencias calificadoras de crédito. ¿Qué cambió? La respuesta más inmediata es la gran recesión, que condicionó no solamente los ingresos fiscales del estado sino también el valor de los activos de los planes de pensión. En particular, la tenencia de capital proveniente de fondos de pensión estatales y municipales perdió casi la mitad de su valor, ya que cayó del pico de US$2,3 billones alcanzado en septiembre de 2007 a sólo US$1,2 billones en marzo de 2009 (Junta de Gobernadores del Sistema de la Reserva Federal 2012).

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Recuadro 1: ¿En dónde se encuentran en peligro las pensione municipales?

A fin de comprender cuáles son los lugares donde las pensiones municipales estaban experimentando dificultades en particular, Gordon, Rose y Fischer (2012) utilizaron un software de monitoreo de medios de comunicación para realizar una investigación de todas las agencias de noticias nacionales de los EE.UU. durante los tres primeros meses de 2012. La búsqueda se centró en artículos que incluían la palabra “pensión” junto con otros términos que identificaban a los gobiernos municipales, como “municipalidad”, “ciudad” o “condado”, y descripciones de problemas de financiamiento, como, por ejemplo, “pasivo”, “déficit”, “sin fondos”, “recorte”, “mora”, “reforma” y “problema”. Los resultados de la búsqueda produjeron más de 2.000 artículos separados de diferentes lugares en todo el país.

Según este análisis, varios tipos de lugares están experimentando problemas con la cuestión de las pensiones. Un grupo lo forman las jurisdicciones que han estado perdiendo gente y empleos con el transcurso de los años. Uno de los ejemplos más notorios es Detroit, Michigan, en donde la cantidad de jubilados es el doble de los trabajadores activos. En esta categoría también entra la ciudad de Prichard, Alabama, que perdió más del 45 por ciento de su población desde 1970 y, el año 2010 tenía menos de 23.000 residentes. En septiembre de 2009, este municipio sencillamente dejó de enviar los cheques de pensión a sus exempleados y, un mes más tarde, se declaró en quiebra. Para dichas comunidades, los conflictos relacionados con las pensiones también pueden ser un síntoma de mayores problemas fiscales o de disfunciones políticas.

Otro grupo de jurisdicciones pasó del auge inmobiliario a el posterior derrumbe del mercado de la vivienda. Algunos ejemplos son las ciudades de rápido crecimiento en California, como Stockton, que este año se declaró en quiebra, siendo la ciudad más grande que se haya declarado en quiebra en la historia. Mucho más desconcertante es la situación de jurisdicciones relativamente acaudaladas, como los condados de Suffolk o Nassau, en Nueva York, que parecen no ser capaces de aplicar recortes estrictos en los gastos o aumentar los impuestos debido a la paralización política. En lugar de ello, muchas de estas jurisdicciones han recurrido al préstamo para cumplir con sus obligaciones de pago de pensiones.

Solamente dos de las recientes bancarrotas municipales (Vallejo, California, y Central Falls, Rhode Island) fueron resultado de presiones de las pensiones públicas y la compensación de empleados junto con una reducción de la recaudación. Otras jurisdicciones, como Harrisburg, Pensilvania, y el condado de Jefferson, Alabama, están en apuros debido a malas decisiones en las inversiones. Además, algunas ciudades importantes, como Atlanta, San Francisco y Nueva York, han tomado medidas para limitar el crecimiento de las pensiones, con frecuencia gracias a la cooperación de los sindicatos de empleados públicos municipales. Central Falls logró obtener concesiones de oficiales de policía y bomberos en activo, así como de jubilados, pero aun esta medida resultó insuficiente para detener la caída hacia la quiebra.

Aunque el mercado de valores se ha recuperado en gran medida y las tenencias de capital derivadas de planes estatales y municipales se han incrementado nuevamente a más de US$2 billones, las pensiones públicas siguen estando bajo estrecha vigilancia. Las agencias calificadoras de crédito están tomando cada vez más en cuenta las deudas por pensiones sin fondos a la hora de llevar a cabo sus evaluaciones de riesgo crediticio de los gobiernos estatal y municipal. Además, los analistas están haciendo oír cada vez más sus críticas sobre los métodos que comúnmente se utilizan para evaluar los niveles de financiamiento de las pensiones.

El gobierno federal también está prestando atención a este tema. El congreso, alarmado por la posibilidad de que los gobiernos entren en mora, celebró una serie de audiencias sobre las finanzas de los gobiernos estatal y municipal a principios de 2011. Hace poco, los miembros republicanos del comité conjunto económico (JEC, por sus siglas en inglés) emitieron informes en los que se vislumbraba el espectro de una crisis similar a la de la eurozona debido a las deudas por pensiones estatales sin fondos (JEC 2011; JEC 2012).

A la luz de estas críticas y de los motivos de preocupación en torno a los crecientes costos derivados de las pensiones, 43 estados promulgaron reformas importantes en sus sistemas de pensión entre 2009 y 2011 (Snell 2012). Las modificaciones más comunes fueron las siguientes: aumento de los requisitos en la aportación por parte de los empleados (30 estados), aumento de la edad y años de servicio para la elegibilidad (32), ajuste de fórmulas para calcular los beneficios (17), y reducción en los aumentos del costo de la vida (21). En algunos estados, las modificaciones se aplicaron solamente a los nuevos empleados, aunque en otros estados, estos cambios afectaron a los trabajadores activos y a los ya jubilados. Estas medidas han generado una gran controversia y han dado como resultado el inicio de juicios en colorado, Minnesota, Nueva Jersey y Dakota del Sur.

La mayor parte de esta creciente atención hacia las pensiones de empleados del gobierno se ha concentrado en los planes del gobierno estatal, mientras que las pensiones de empleados públicos municipales relativamente no han sido sometidas a análisis. Aunque los planes municipales representan un porcentaje modesto del total de afiliados a las pensiones públicas (10 por ciento) y del total de activos de pensiones públicas (18 por ciento), su quiebra puede ser devastadora. Los residentes y las empresas con posibilidades de mudarse podrían abandonar aquellas comunidades en las que se aplican impuestos altos para reconstruir los activos derivados de pensiones en lugar de brindar servicios básicos. Una base imponible reducida podría empeorar aún más el fondo, con menos posibilidades de pagar los beneficios prometidos. El resultado podría ser el surgimiento de más ciudades como Prichard, Alabama.

Una mirada conjunta a los planes de pensión estatales y municipales

Las pensiones estatales y municipales son una parte importante del sistema de jubilación de la nación. La figura 1 muestra la distribución del total de us$15,3 billones en activos para la jubilación a finales de 2011 por tipo de plan. Los fondos de jubilación de empleados públicos estatales y municipales poseían, en conjunto, us$2,8 billones en activos, o casi un quinto del total.

Todos los estados tienen al menos un plan de pensión para empleados públicos y, en algunos estados, varios planes. Existen más de 220 planes estatales (algunos de los cuales son planes gestionados por el estado que ofrecen cobertura a trabajadores del gobierno municipal) y cerca de 3.200 planes municipales (tabla 1). En total, estos planes dan cobertura a 14,7 millones de trabajadores, 8,2 millones de beneficiarios actuales y 4,8 millones de personas elegibles para obtener beneficios en el futuro pero que aún no los reciben.

Las pensiones estatales y municipales son importantes, además, porque el 27,5 por ciento de los empleados de gobierno no está integrado en el seguro social (Nuschler, Shelton y Topoleski 2011). Estos empleados públicos sin cobertura se encuentran concentrados en unos pocos estados. La figura 2 ofrece una clasificación de los 16 estados que presentan las mayores concentraciones de trabajadores gubernamentales sin cobertura del seguro social. Casi todos los empleados de gobierno, tanto estatal como municipal, de Ohio y Massachusetts y más de la mitad de los empleados públicos estatales y municipales de Nevada, Louisiana, Colorado, California y Texas no están cubiertos por el seguro social.

Otra característica fundamental de las pensiones estatales y municipales reside en que, en su mayoría, consisten en planes de beneficios definidos (DB, por sus siglas en inglés). Los beneficios se calculan utilizando una fórmula que, por lo general, sigue este patrón:

(Salario promedio de los 3 últimos años) x
(Años de servicio) x
(2 por ciento por cada año de servicio) =
Beneficios

La mayoría de las pensiones de gobierno estatal y municipal también incluyen un ajuste según el costo de la vida. Una minoría de trabajadores del sector público se encuentra inscrita en planes de aportes definidos (DC, por sus siglas en inglés), según los cuales se coloca un monto específico en un fondo de jubilación por cada año de trabajo. Si se las compara con los planes dc, las pensiones dB protegen a los empleados de los riesgos derivados de inversiones, inflación y longevidad. Hasta el año 2009, cerca del 80 por ciento de los trabajadores estatales y municipales se encontraba inscrito en planes DB, y sólo poco más del 20 por ciento de los empleados estatales y municipales estaba en planes DC. Los trabajadores del sector privado presentaban la composición opuesta: el 20 por ciento estaba inscrito en planes DB y el 80 por ciento, en planes DC (Oficina de Estadísticas Laborales de los EE.UU. 2011).

Los planes DB predominaban en el sector privado, pero han ido desapareciendo, en parte debido a que la Ley de Seguridad de Ingresos de Jubilación para Empleados de 1974 (ERISA, por sus siglas en inglés) impuso normas mínimas de financiamiento y estableció el requisito de realizar aportaciones para seguros y otras cargas administrativas en relación con estos planes.

La menor cantidad de requisitos de financiamiento y de presentación de reportes que se aplican a las pensiones públicas permite a los gobiernos trasladar los costos de los trabajadores al futuro. Esta es una forma implícita de pedir préstamos, ya que se pueden evadir las normas presupuestarias calculadas y evitar la aprobación del electorado que generalmente se requiere para emitir bonos.

Requisitos de financiamiento y de presentación de reportes para las pensiones estatales y municipales

Históricamente, la mayoría de las pensiones estatales y municipales se financiaron con recaudaciones generales a plazo. La práctica actual de prefinanciar los planes de pensión estatales y municipales comenzó en las décadas de 1970 y 1980. Aunque los planes del sector público no se encontraban sujetos a la ERISA, esta ley sí requería emitir informes sobre sus prácticas. El informe de 1978 indicaba un “alto nivel de ceguera sobre el costo de las pensiones (…) debido a la falta de valuaciones actuariales, la utilización de suposiciones actuariales irreales y la ausencia general de normas actuariales” (Munnell y otros 2008, 2).

Esta señal de alarma llevó a varios planes a incrementar voluntariamente los niveles de financiamiento y prestar más atención a las normas actuariales y contables. En 1984 se creó la Junta de Normas Contables del Gobierno (GASB, por sus siglas en inglés), que emitió las primeras normas para planes de pensión en 1986 y realizó una profunda revisión de sus normas de valuación actuarial en 1994. El cumplimiento de dichas normas es de carácter voluntario, pero tiene el reconocimiento de las agencias calificadoras de crédito, los auditores y otros profesionales encargados de recopilar datos. A diferencia de las normas de la ERISA, que requieren métodos de valuación específicos para todos los planes privados, la GASB establece criterios que permiten cierta flexibilidad en la utilización de métodos específicos por parte de los planes públicos. En consecuencia, existen serios motivos de preocupación en lo referente a la transparencia y la comparabilidad de los datos sobre los que informan los propios planes de pensión estatales y municipales en relación con sus deudas.

Aportaciones de los empleadores

El cálculo del Pasivo Actuarial Devengado (AAL, por sus siglas en inglés) de un plan requiere la siguiente información: edad e historial salarial de los afiliados; proyecciones de incremento salarial, edades de jubilación, ganancias por activos e inflación; tablas de probabilidad de longevidad; y una tasa de descuento para convertir valores futuros estimados en valores en curso. El Pasivo Actuarial Devengado Sin Fondos (UAAL, por sus siglas en inglés) es equivalente al AAL menos los activos del plan.

El “costo normal” de un plan de pensión es el aumento del AAL debido al año de servicio en curso de los empleados existentes. La ERISA requiere que el costo normal se salde con las aportaciones de los empleados y empleadores. La GASB especifica una “Aportación Anual Obligatoria” (ARC, por sus siglas en inglés) de costo normal más una amortización a 30 años del UAAL. El problema reside en que, contrariamente a lo que su nombre indica, en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones no es obligatorio el pago del ARC.

Elección de la tasa de descuento

La cuestión que recientemente ha recibido más atención es la elección de la tasa de descuento. Las normas actualmente aplicables de la GASB permiten el descuento de las deudas futuras en base al rendimiento por inversiones proyectado, lo que dio un promedio del 8 por ciento anual antes de la recesión. No obstante, la mayoría de los economistas y especialistas en teoría financiera estarían de acuerdo con Brown y Wilcox (2009, 538) cuando afirman que “la tasa de descuento utilizada para valuar las futuras deudas derivadas de las pensiones debería reflejar el grado de riesgo de dichas deudas”, no de los activos. Las garantías constitucionales y legales consideran a las pensiones gubernamentales de bajo riesgo, mientras que el rendimiento histórico por inversiones incluye una prima de riesgo.

Los gobiernos estatales y municipales no pueden evitar los riesgos a largo plazo, como son una prolongada caída en la productividad o una caída de la bolsa durante una década. Por lo tanto, la tasa histórica de rendimiento a largo plazo en una cartera con gran composición patrimonial (antes de aplicar ajustes por riesgos) resulta una tasa de descuento demasiado alta. Las tasas de descuento más altas pueden hacer que las pensiones parezcan tener mayores fondos que los que verdaderamente poseen. Esto reduce los requisitos de aportaciones e impone obligaciones sin garantía a los futuros contribuyentes si no se logran las altas tasas de rentabilidad. Lo que resulta aún peor es que los administradores de los planes tienen de esta manera un incentivo para buscar carteras de alto riesgo con el fin de obtener una mayor tasa de descuento y un menor ARC.

Existen sólidos argumentos a favor de que la tasa de descuento del 8 por ciento que utitilizan muchos de los planes de pensión pública es demasiado alta, aunque existe un consenso menor en lo que respecta a cuánto debería reducirse dicha tasa para ser apropiada. En lugar de analizar estos puntos de vista, obtuvimos una estimación del impacto que podría tener una tasa más baja. Munnell y otros (2012) calculan los posibles cambios que se producirían en las deudas reportadas si en todos los planes se utilizara una tasa de descuento del 5 por ciento, en lugar del 8 por ciento. Dichos autores estiman que las deudas estatales y municipales aumentarían de US$3,6 billones a US$5,4 billones, y que las proporciones de financiamiento totales (activos/AAL) disminuirían de 75 por ciento a sólo 50 por ciento. Este es un cambio enorme, ya que representa el doble de las deudas sin fondos (UAAL = AAL – activos).

Últimas modificaciones en las normas de la GASB

La GASB (2012) emitió nuevas normas contables que entrarán en vigencia en 2013 y 2014. Según la modificación principal, los gobiernos estatales y municipales deberán aplicar diferentes tasas de descuento sobre las partes de las deudas que tienen fondos y las que no los tienen. Se seguirá aplicando una tasa basada en los ingresos en la parte del pasivo que posea financiamiento, mientras que se utilizará una tasa más baja y sin riesgos respecto del UAAL. El impacto de este cambio sobre el pasivo reportado depende de cuántos fondos tenga un plan: los planes totalmente financiados no sufrirán modificación alguna, los planes con fondos suficientes experimentarán unos pocos cambios, y los planes con escasos fondos estarán sujetos a grandes aumentos en las deudas reportadas y reducciones en el financiamiento. Según las nuevas normas, los estados contables del gobierno deberán incluir el UAAL, lo que incrementará la visibilidad del pasivo sin fondos para el electorado.

¿Qué sabemos sobre las pensiones municipales?

A pesar de los crecientes motivos de preocupación respecto a la salud fiscal de los planes de pensión municipales, no se tiene un conocimiento sistemático de los mismos. La mejor información disponible proviene de la Encuesta Anual de Sistemas de Jubilación para Empleados Públicos Estatales y Municipales, llevada a cabo por la Oficina del Censo de los EE.UU. (2012). Cada cinco años se ofrece información detallada sobre cada organismo de gobierno. Cada año se da información de datos a nivel de planes para una muestra que incluye casi la mitad de los 3.200 planes municipales, y estos datos se utilizan para generar estimaciones de totales para cada estado por tipo de gobierno. Las tablas 1 y 2 muestran ejemplos de los tipos de información que presenta la encuesta.

Las principales virtudes de la encuesta sobre jubilaciones de empleados de la Oficina del Censo son la calidad de los datos y el hecho de que son exhaustivos. Una desventaja importante es la falta de relevancia temporal, ya que los últimos datos municipales disponibles son los correspondientes al ejercicio de 2010. Otro problema reside en que hace muy poco que la Oficina comenzó a informar acerca de las deudas de los planes, y sólo incluye estos datos respecto de los planes estatales. Al igual que otras fuentes de datos sobre pensiones, la Oficina del Censo no recaba información sobre los planes DC u otros beneficios posteriores al empleo (OPEB, por sus siglas en inglés).

No obstante, la encuesta sobre jubilación de empleados arroja cierta luz sobre las pensiones municipales. Por ejemplo, la cantidad de planes municipales por estado varía significativamente: 7 estados no poseen planes municipales, 20 estados tienen menos de 10, Florida e Illinois tienen más de 300 cada uno, y Pensilvania posee más de 1.400. La cantidad de afiliados activos por beneficiario es una medida rudimentaria para saber de qué manera los aportes de los empleados sirven para financiar el plan. La tabla 1 muestra que el promedio nacional en los planes municipales es de 1,4 trabajadores por jubilado, aunque la variación entre estados es considerable. Esta proporción de respaldo es menor que 1 en 12 estados; de entre 1 y 2 en 31 estados; y de más de 2 en 7 estados (Utah posee la proporción más alta: 6,8).

Ninguno de estos datos nos dice cuán suficientemente financiadas se encuentran las pensiones municipales. Para obtener esta información, debemos recurrir a encuestas independientes. La mayoría de estas encuestas ofrecen una buena cobertura sobre los planes estatales, aunque, por lo general, incluyen sólo información sobre algunos de los planes municipales más grandes, como, por ejemplo, la encuesta anual de planes de afiliados de la Asociación Nacional de Administradores de Jubilación Estatal (NASRA, por sus siglas en inglés). Unas pocas investigaciones nacionales se han centrado en las deudas por pensiones municipales, en lugar de estatales. Por ejemplo, Novy-Marx y Rauh (2011) analizan las finanzas de las pensiones municipales utilizando datos de los Informes Financieros Anuales Consolidados (CAFR, por sus siglas en inglés) respecto de los planes de ciudades y condados que poseen más de US$1.000 millones en activos a partir de 2006.

El Centro de Investigaciones sobre Jubilación (CRR, por sus siglas en inglés) de la universidad Boston College mantiene una Base de Datos de Planes Públicos (PPD) para los mayores planes estatales y municipales, con datos provenientes de informes actuariales individuales sobre los planes y CAFR del gobierno municipal. Mediante el uso de la PPD más otros tipos de información sobre planes municipales adicionales, el CRR recientemente emitió un informe con datos para 2010 en base a una muestra de 97 planes en 40 estados (Munnell y otros 2011). Esta es una muestra modesta en relación con el total de 3.200 planes municipales; no obstante, debido a que se concentra en los planes grandes, cubre el 59 por ciento de los activos de pensiones municipales y el 55 por ciento de los afiliados.

Un resultado importante de esta investigación es la amplia dispersión que existe en la relación promedio de financiamiento del 77 por ciento en 2010 (figura 3). De los 95 planes grandes de la muestra del CRR con información utilizable, sólo 16 poseían activos para cubrir más del 90 por ciento del pasivo. En el extremo opuesto, hay 9 planes con un financiamiento menor al 50 por ciento (Munnell y otros 2011). Además, este estudio muestra al ARC como un porcentaje de la nómina gubernamental municipal. El promedio general para 2010 es del 22 por ciento, y en este caso también existe una amplia dispersión (figura 4). De los 91 planes grandes en la muestra del CRR con información utilizable, más de la mitad (49) tienen un ACR por debajo del 20 por ciento de la nómina, aunque 16 planes poseen participaciones en el rango menos manejable de entre 30 por ciento y 80 por ciento. Cinco planes poseen un pasivo por pensiones de tal magnitud que, de pagarse por completo, costaría más que el 100 por ciento de la nómina.

Debe tenerse en cuenta que los gobiernos municipales en la mayoría de los estados no están obligados a pagar la cantidad total de ARC . No poseemos datos a nivel municipal; sin embargo, según un informe a nivel estatal, existe una amplia variación en el porcentaje de los ARC efectivamente pagados en todos los planes, todos los años y en todos los estados (Equipo de Trabajo para la Crisis Presupuestaria Estatal 2012). Munnell y otros (2011) calculan los pagos de pensión efectivamente realizados como un porcentaje de los presupuestos municipales, y en este caso también obtienen como resultado una variación considerable: el 14 por ciento de los gobiernos de la muestra destinan más del 12 por ciento de sus presupuestos al pago de las pensiones.

Conclusiones

Las pensiones del gobierno municipal se encuentran, en promedio, significativamente escasas de fondos. La razón fundamental reside en que, ante la falta de una obligación legal, muchos gobiernos no han reservado los suficientes fondos cada año para cubrir las deudas por pensión adicionales contraídas en ese año, y mucho menos para amortizar el pasivo sin fondos de años anteriores. En efecto, estos gobiernos piden préstamos para pagar los servicios de los trabajadores en el presente y trasladar la carga a futuros contribuyentes.

Tenemos muchos menos datos acerca de los 3.200 planes administrados a nivel municipal que los que tenemos sobre los 220 planes estatales. La mejor información respecto de los planes municipales proviene de investigadores que analizan los informes financieros detallados de los planes y los gobiernos municipales. Forzosamente, estos estudios se concentran en los planes más grandes. Lo que sí sabemos es que existe una amplia variación entre los diferentes planes respecto de ciertas medidas clave: el porcentaje del pasivo que se encuentra cubierto por los activos; la aportación completa que debería cubrir tanto los costos de pensión del año en curso como la amortización del pasivo sin fondos (ARC ) relativo a la nómina o a la recaudación anual; el porcentaje del ARC que se paga efectivamente; y el porcentaje del presupuesto en curso que se destina a los costos de pensión. Una importante cantidad de gobiernos municipales está en dificultades por una o más de estas medidas.

Lo que empeora aun más la situación es que lo que sabemos acerca del pasivo proviene de los datos reportados por los propios municipios y la tasa de descuento que estos gobiernos eligen. En casi todos los casos, la tasa de descuento es inadecuadamente alta, y la utilización de una tasa de descuento menor podría aumentar el pasivo sin fondos a más del doble. El resultado es un grave problema con respecto a las deudas por pensiones municipales que amenaza las finanzas del gobierno municipal, aunque no conocemos su magnitud ni el nivel de desigualdad de su distribución.

Sobre los autores

Richard F. Dye es visiting fellow del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Asimismo es profesor en el Instituto de Gobierno y Relaciones Públicas de la Universidad de Illinois en Chicago, y profesor emérito de Economía en el Lake Forest College.

Tracy Gordonfellow en Estudios Económicos en el Instituto Brookings, Washington, DC. Su campo de investigación se centra en las finanzas públicas estatales y municipales, la economía política y la economía urbana.

Referencias

Brown, Jeffrey R. y David W. Wilcox. 2009. Discounting state and local pension liabilities. American Economic Review 99(2): 538–542.

Comité Económico Conjunto (Joint Economic Committee o JEC). 2011. States of bankruptcy, part I: The coming state pensions crisis. Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, 8 de diciembre.

Comité Económico Conjunto (Joint Economic Committee o JEC). 2012. States of bankruptcy, part II: Eurozone, USA?. Republican Staff Commentary, Washington, DC, 15 de mayo.

Equipo de Trabajo para la Crisis Presupuestaria Estatal. 2012. Informe del Equipo de Trabajo para la Crisis Presupuestaria Estatal. http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-Force-Full.pdf.

Gordon, Tracy M., Heather M. Rose e Ilana Fischer. 2012. The state of local government pensions: A preliminary inquiry. Documento de trabajo. Cambridge MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

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More than any other single variable, the change in land values across time and over space provides important insights into the shifting spatial structure of a city. Whereas a typical property sale reflects the combined value of the land and buildings, the land value alone represents the actual current worth of a location and suggests expectations about the future. Even if a parcel bears the burden of an outmoded construction, the price of the land reflects the present discounted value of the stream of returns that could be earned from the highest and best use of the parcel. Rapidly rising land prices in an area of a city are a clear indication that people expect the neighborhood to be in high demand for some time to come, signaling investment opportunities to developers. Changes in land values may also serve to alert city officials that an area may require zoning changes and investments in infrastructure.

Land value is also an important component in the cost approach to property assessment, which is one of the three commonly used assessment methods (including the sales comparison and income approaches). The cost approach has three major components: (1) the cost of building the existing structure if it were new at the time of assessment; (2) the depreciation of the building to its current condition; and (3) the price of the land parcel. Adding (1) to (3) and subtracting (2) generally produces a good estimate of overall property value. In standard property transactions, however, land values are not easily separated from the value of structures. Sales of vacant land, which more clearly indicate a site’s value, are relatively rare in large, built-up urban areas; as a result, relatively few studies of vacant land sales exist (see Ahlfeldt and Wendland 2011; Atack and Margo 1998; Colwell and Munneke 1997; Cunningham 2006). Teardowns can sometimes be used to measure land values, because land represents the entire value of a property when the existing building is demolished immediately following a sale (McMillen 2006; Dye and McMillen 2007). However, teardowns tend to be concentrated in certain high-value neighborhoods, and the data on demolitions can be hard to obtain.

Among U.S. cities, Chicago is uniquely fortunate to have a data source, Olcott’s Land Values Blue Book of Chicago, which reported estimates of land values for every city block and for blocks in many Cook County suburbs for most of the 20th century. Olcott’s provided a critical input to the cost assessment procedure: After determining the building cost and depreciation, the overall value of a property can be assessed by multiplying the parcel size by the land value provided in the Blue Book series. This article is based on a sampling of data from the Olcott volumes (box 1). It includes a series of maps that provide a clear picture of the spatial evolution of Chicago during the 20th century, similar in spirit to the classic book, One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago (Hoyt 1933).

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Box 1: Data Sources for Chicago Land Values

Olcott’s Land Values Blue Book of Chicago covers the City and much of suburban Cook County with a series of 300 maps, each printed on one page of a book. The city itself comprises 160 individual maps with an impressive level of detail. Most block faces have a value representing the price per square foot for a standard 125-foot-deep lot. Land use is also indicated. Large lots and most industrial land have prices quoted by the acre or occasionally by the square foot for an unspecified lot depth. The data represent land values for 1/8- x 1/8-mile square grids, which closely follow Chicago’s street layout and thus resemble city blocks. Each year’s data set includes 43,324 observations for the entire city.

The Lincoln Institute of Land Policy has provided funding to digitize the data contained in Olcott’s Blue Book for a series of years spanning much of the twentieth century: 1913, 1926, 1932, 1939, 1949, 1961, 1965, 1971, 1981, and 1990. A more thorough description of the procedure used is presented in Ahlfeldt et al. (2011). Digitizing the maps involves bringing them into a GIS environment. Average land values are calculated for 1/8- x 1/8-mile squares overlaid on the maps. The full data set has more than 600,000 data points across the 10 individual years.

Olcott’s stopped publication in the early 1990s, and the last year of digitized data is 1990. To supplement Olcott’s records for recent years, the authors obtained data on all vacant land sales in the city from 1980 to 2011. More than 16,000 sales were successfully geocoded, and they display the dramatic increase in land prices during the period prior to the collapse of the housing market at the end of 2006. These combined data sets provide a unique opportunity to analyze the changing spatial structure of an entire city over an extended time.

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Spatial Variation in Land Values

Despite its flat terrain, Chicago has never been a truly monocentric city. Lake Michigan has long been an attractive amenity for its scenic value, its moderating effect on the climate, and the series of parks lining its shore. The Chicago River also has had a significant influence on the location of both businesses and households. Development to the north of the Central Business District (CBD) was delayed because the bridges over the main branch of the river had to open so often for river traffic that commuting to the Loop business area was unpredictable and time consuming. The north and south branches of the river attracted both industrial firms and low-priced residential developments for laborers while repelling high-priced homes designed for CBD workers. The locations of major streets, highways, and train lines also had significant effects on development patterns. Thus, there is ample reason to expect that the rate of change in land values varies across the city.

The maps in figure 1 show this spatial variation in land values in Chicago over time. In 1913, land values were highest in a large area around the CBD, and they were also quite high along the lakefront and along some of the major avenues and boulevards leading out of the downtown area. In 1939, this pattern was generally similar, along with the rise of the north side relative to the south side of the city: Land values were very high all along the northern lakefront and extending well inland on the north side. The area at the edge of the city due west of the CBD (the Austin neighborhood) also had relatively high land values in 1939.

By 1965, the pattern of land values had changed markedly. Very high land values were confined to a relatively small area in the CBD. The high-value area of the west-side Austin neighborhood was much smaller in 1965 than in 1939, and nearly all the formerly high-value areas had shrunk in size.

By 1990, however, the situation changed dramatically. The area with very high values extended much farther north and inland than previously. Areas on the south side had relatively high land values in 1990, particularly around the South Loop (near the CBD) and Hyde Park (along Lake Michigan south of the CBD).

After 1990, the pattern of continued redevelopment of the city is based on an analysis of actual sales of vacant land. The expansion of the high-value area to the north and west of the CBD is remarkable, and the near south side also enjoyed a resurgence during this time.

Figure 2 addresses how the recent recession affected the growth of land values in Chicago by expressing land values as a function of distance from the CBD. The plots show the change in average (log) land values over time for tracts with centroids falling within 2-, 5-, and 10-mile rings around the CBD. In 1913, average land values were far lower 10 miles from the CBD than in the closer rings. By the 1960s, there was little difference between land values across these distances. Since then, average values grew much more in the 2-mile ring than in more distant locations. During the Great Recession, land values declined rapidly in the 2-mile ring, less rapidly in the 5-mile ring, and not at all in the 10-mile ring. Thus, the areas that had the highest rates of appreciation during the period of extended growth also had the highest rates of decline during the recession.

Figure 3 provides a different perspective on the spatial variation in land values over time. The three panels show smoothed land value surfaces for 1913, 1990, and 2005. The 1913 and 1990 surfaces are estimated using Olcott’s data, while the 2005 estimates are based on sales of vacant land. In all three years, land values are far higher in the CBD than elsewhere. In 1913, there are a large number of local peaks in land values at the intersections of major streets. These areas were relatively small commercial districts that served local residents in a time before car ownership was commonplace. In 1990, the land value peak in the CBD is accompanied by a much lower plateau just to the north along the lakefront. In 2005, the plateau has grown to a large area that extends well into the north side and inland along the lakefront. The region of high land values has also extended south along the lakefront, with a local rise much farther south in Hyde Park.

Persistence of Spatial Patterns

Historical land values are interesting not only because they reveal how an urban area has changed over time, but also because the past continues to exert substantial influence on the present. Cities are not rebuilt from scratch in every period. Buildings last a long time before they are demolished, and sites that were attractive in the past tend to remain desirable for a long time. One of the unique features of the Olcott’s data set is that it allows us to compare land values from 100 years ago to current land values and land uses.

Figure 4 shows the average date of construction for the 1/8- x 1/8-mile squares. The recent recentralization of Chicago is evident in the donut shape of building ages around the CBD. The newest buildings are close to the CBD, while the oldest buildings are in the next ring. Buildings in the most distant region were most likely built between 1940 and 1970.

Figure 5 summarizes this relationship by comparing the mean construction date to distance from the CBD. The oldest buildings are in a ring just over 5 miles from the CBD.

A good measure of structural density is the ratio of building area to lot size. Economic theory predicts that structural densities will be high where land values are high. Structures last for a long time. How well do past values predict current structural density? Figure 6 compares the structural density of buildings in the 2003 Cook County assessment rolls to land values in 1913 and 1990. This data set includes the building area of every small (six units or fewer) residential structure in Chicago.

The height of the bars indicates the structural densities: Tall bars have relatively high ratios of building areas to lot sizes. The color of the bars indicates land values: Red bars have relatively high and values. Thus, we should expect to see a large number of tall red bars and low green bars. In general, the two panels do indicate a positive correlation between structural density and land values. The correlation is particularly evident on the north side and along the lakefront. The correlation with 1990 is less clear on the south and west sides. Several elevations in the density surface are not matched by correspondingly high land values. One explanation for these results, which are in line with the reorientation of high-priced areas toward the north side, is that the relatively high densities in these areas are artifacts of a past when those blocks were relatively more valuable and when there were incentives to use the land intensively. The 1913 panel of figure 6 suggests that land values are actually more closely correlated with building densities for 2003 than are the 1990 values. The root of this apparently anomalous result is that building density reflects the economic conditions at the time of construction, and most of the buildings in that part of the city date from long ago. The past continues to exert a major influence on the present.

Conclusion

Olcott’s data provide a clear picture of the changes in Chicago’s spatial structure during most of the 20th century. Never a truly monocentric city, Chicago began the century with very high land values in the CBD, along the lakefront, and along major avenues and boulevards leading out of the downtown area. Values were also high in neighborhood retail areas at the intersections of major streets. By 1939, the north side of Chicago had already begun to display its economic dominance. The city then suffered an extended period of decline, with the CBD holding the only major cluster of high land values in the 1960s. Since then, the city has undergone a remarkable resurgence. High land values now extend over nearly the entire north side, and land values have also rebounded in parts of the south side. Our analysis also shows the strong role that history continues to play in the current spatial structure of the city. A result of this persistence is that land values from a century ago are better than current land values at predicting the density of the current housing stock.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy for generous funding and support, and are grateful to the Centre for Metropolitan Studies at the TU-Berlin for hosting a team of researchers during the project work. Kristoffer Moeller and Sevrin Weights are acknowledged for their great contribution to designing and coordinating the compilation of the data set. Philip Boos, Aline Delatte, Nuria-Maria Hoyer Sepulvedra, Devika Kakkar, Rene Kreichauf, Maike Rackwitz, Lea Siebert, Stefan Tornack, and Tzvetelina Tzvetkova provided excellent research assistance.

About the Authors

Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt is associate professor at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences (LSE) in the Department of Geography and Environment and Spatial Economics Research Centre (SERC).

Daniel P. McMillen is professor in the department of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Resources

Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M., Kristoffer Moeller, Sevrin Waights, and Nicolai Wendland. 2011. “One Hundred Years of Land Value: Data Documentation.” Centre for Metropolitan Studies, TU Berlin.

Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M., and Nicolai Wendland. 2011. “Fifty Years of Urban Accessibility: The Impact of the Urban Railway Network on the Land Gradient in Berlin 1890–1936.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 41: 77–88.

Atack, J., and R. A. Margo. 1998. “Location, Location, Location! The Price Gradient for Vacant Urban Land: New York, 1835 to 1900.” Journal of Real Estate Finance & Economics 16(2) 151–172.

Colwell, Peter F., and Henry J. Munneke. 1997. “The Structure of Urban Land Prices.” Journal of Urban Economics 41: 321–336.

Cunningham, Christopher R. 2006. “House Price Uncertainty, Timing of Development, and Vacant Land Prices: Evidence for Real Options in Seattle.” Journal of Urban Economics 59: 1–31.

Dye, Richard F., and Daniel P. McMillen. 2007. “Teardowns and Land Values in the Chicago Metropolitan Area.” Journal of Urban Economics 61: 45–64.

Hoyt, Homer. 1933. One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McMillen, Daniel P. 2006. “Teardowns: Costs, Benefits, and Public Policy.” Land Lines, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy 18(3): 2–7.

Thomas J. Nechyba is professor of economics at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, where he also serves as director of undergraduate studies for the Department of Economics. In addition, he is a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and he serves as associate editor for the American Economic Review and the Journal of Public Economic Theory. His research and teaching focus on the field of public economics, in particular primary and secondary education, federalism and the function of local governments, and public policy issues relating to disadvantaged families.

Professor Nechyba has lectured and taught in courses at the Lincoln Institute for several years, and he recently completed a working paper based on Institute-supported research, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” This conversation with Joan Youngman, senior fellow and chairman of the Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, explores his interest in land taxation and his research findings.

Joan Youngman: How is a land tax different from a conventional property tax?

Thomas Nechyba: It’s really a question of tax efficiency. Any tax has two effects, which economists call the income and substitution effects. The income effect of a tax is the change in the choices made by the taxpayer because payment of the tax has reduced the taxpayer’s real income. The substitution effect arises because the very existence of the tax changes the relative prices of the taxed goods, and therefore gives an incentive to taxpayers to substitute non-taxed goods for taxed goods. The income effect does not give rise to any efficiency problems; it simply implies that some resources are transferred from taxpayers to the government, and we hope the government will do something useful with the money. But, the change in behavior from the substitution effect causes an economic distortion that does not benefit anyone. That is, when the higher price of a taxed good causes me to substitute to a different non-taxed good purely because of the distorted prices, then I am worse off and the government gets no revenue. This is the source of the loss of economic efficiency from taxation, because people are worse off than they were previously, and by a larger amount than the tax collections themselves. This phenomenon is sometimes called a deadweight loss.

Once I asked my students to react to the following statement on an exam: “People hate taxes because of income effects, but economists hate taxes because of substitution effects.” One student wrote that it was undeniably true because it showed that economists aren’t people! Well, I think at least some economists are also people. However, it is true that people dislike taxes primarily because they don’t like paying money to the government. Economists especially dislike those taxes that cause greater deadweight losses, i.e., taxes that have greater substitution effects.

A land tax is a very unusual tax. It does not carry this deadweight loss because it does not give rise to a substitution effect. No one can make a decision to produce more land or less land, and the fact that land is taxed will not distort economic decisions. If we think of the price of land as the discounted present value of future land rents, a tax that reduces expected future rents will cause the price of land to drop. But the total cost of the land, which is the purchase price plus the tax, remains unchanged. Those who are considering the purchase of land therefore face the same cost before and after the tax: before the tax, they simply pay a single price up front; after the tax, they pay a lower price up front but they know they will also have to pay all the future taxes. There is no substitution effect, only an income effect for those who currently own land, because now they can sell it for less than before. Property taxes that tax both land and buildings, on the other hand, do give rise to substitution effects because they distort the cost of making improvements to the property.

A revenue-neutral shift to land value taxation would reduce other, distortionary taxes. A shift to a more efficient tax can improve economic welfare without a loss in tax collections. This much is well known. What is not well known is the magnitude of this benefit and of the cost to landowners in terms of lower land prices. Conventional wisdom predicts that a shift to an efficient land tax would increase income and output but reduce land prices. This kind of general statement isn’t much help to policy makers. If one is suggesting major changes in a tax system, policy makers need to know whether the benefits and the costs are going to be large or small. My recent Lincoln Institute working paper, “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform,” constructs a model of state economies in the U.S. to help us think about the effects of such changes.

JY: How did you become interested in developing an economic model for land taxation?

TN: A few years ago, Dick Netzer, professor of economics and public administration at New York University, suggested that I look at the implications for the U.S. economy of replacing capital taxes with land value taxes. Most economists know of the Henry George Theorem and recognize that land taxation is efficient, but they associate his ideas with nineteenth-century economic thought. We assume that all the changes in the economy since then, and changes in the economic role of land, have left these ideas inapplicable to contemporary tax systems. So I was quite surprised that my model indicated that substituting a land value tax for capital taxes on a national level would not only be efficient, as expected, but would actually raise the value of many types of land. However, property taxes are state and local taxes, and the U.S. constitution places special impediments to a national property tax, so a land tax would not be possible on a national level. Further, since each state economy is different, the results of substituting land value taxes for other taxes will also vary from state to state.

JY: How can a tax on land increase land prices?

TN: In and of itself, a tax on land does not increase land prices; it actually reduces land prices, because it reduces the discounted present value of land rents. My research does not consider a land value tax in isolation, but as part of a revenue-neutral tax reform that replaces other, distortionary taxes with a land value tax. Lower taxes on capital will increase capital usage, and more intensive use of capital will raise land prices. For example, if constructing a building becomes more profitable because the tax on the building is lowered or eliminated, an investor may be willing to pay a higher price for its components, including the land.

JY: How did you go about estimating the magnitude of these effects?

TN: I developed a general equilibrium model of an economy that uses land, man-made capital and labor in production. A general equilibrium model is one that examines how changes in one kind of market affect all other markets. This model is then applied to different states, as well as to one hypothetical “average” state, to see how various tax reforms that substitute land value taxes for taxes on capital or labor would affect prices and production. The division of capital into land and man-made capital is a departure from standard analysis, which generally looks at capital as a single category.

One critical element is the elasticity of substitution among these factors; that is, the ease with which one can be substituted for another. Technically, it is the percentage change in one factor that results from a 1 percent change in the other. This is the key to efficiency gains from reducing the tax on man-made capital and on labor and increasing the tax on land. A lower tax on man-made capital will increase the use of that capital, which in turn will produce greater output and more hiring of labor. The easier it is to substitute man-made capital and labor for land, the greater the benefit from a switch to land value taxation.

JY: Where do the elasticity numbers come from?

TN: I use a range of estimates drawn from the economic literature. For example, most studies of the substitution between capital and land give elasticity estimates between 0.36 and 1.13. My paper uses the relatively conservative estimates of 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25 as high, medium and low values, and looks at the result under each assumption. This number is then adjusted to reflect the amount of land in the state devoted to farming, on the assumption that farmland is less easily substituted for capital in the production process. I also ask similar questions with regard to substitution between land and labor.

The elasticities of the actual supplies of man-made capital and labor are also crucial. If taxes on them are reduced, how much extra capital and labor will be available as a result of the increased after-tax return? Often in studies of this sort we make what is called a “small open economy assumption.” We assume that the economy we are looking at is small in relation to the rest of the world, and that capital and labor flow freely into and out of the jurisdiction. In that case, the elasticity of supply is infinite. The opposite extreme would be an economy with the equivalent of closed borders, where no capital could enter or leave. In that case the elasticity of supply would be zero. In looking at U.S. states, the small open economy assumption is not completely accurate, and zero elasticity is not accurate either. The right number is somewhere in between. Neither capital nor labor is as mobile internationally as within the U.S., and labor in particular is less mobile across state boundaries than within a state or a small region. The small open economy assumption may be appropriate in some circumstances for smaller states, but we have to introduce more complex assumptions in other cases.

JY: How does your model compute taxes on land and labor and man-made capital? This isn’t a standard classification of taxes.

TN: This is complicated, because it involves payroll taxes, federal and state corporate taxes, federal and state income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and so on. So the model looks at all these taxes and makes assumptions about who is paying them to estimate an overall tax rate on labor from all sources—federal, state and local. Similarly, the model estimates an overall tax rate on land and on man-made capital. This allows us to move from an illustrative example in which taxes on labor and capital are replaced by land value taxes to considering changes in real-world taxes, which of course are never based solely on labor or capital.

JY: How do you represent the shift in taxes from labor and man-made capital to land?

TN: This is a hypothetical policy experiment in the model. Suppose, for example, you wanted to eliminate all sales taxes in a revenue-neutral way, making up the lost collections through a land value tax. Sales taxes are the average state’s largest revenue source, so this shift would be quite ambitious. The model shows what would happen under various elasticities of substitution and elasticities of supply, as described above. The tables in the paper show what land tax would be necessary to maintain revenue, and the changes in capital investment and land prices that would result.

JY: How do you move from the hypothetical average state to the 50 individual states?

TN: You have to begin by asking what factors might cause states to have different experiences with land value taxation. We consider each state’s taxes, because the benefits of shifting to a more efficient system will vary according to how much current taxes distort economic choices. Some states have no income taxes. Some states tax property heavily, while others tax sales heavily. The other critical component concerns the state’s sources of income—how they are divided among land, labor and man-made capital. The Bureau of Economic Analysis reports income from various sources by state, but does not account separately for income from land. For that information we draw on the Census of Agriculture data on the amount and market value of farmland to estimate an income figure.

JY: What kinds of results did you obtain?

TN: Since taxation of land is always economically efficient, and since taxation of other factors is always economically inefficient, a shift to land taxes always increases capital, income and labor use. For the “typical” state it seems that most of the simulated tax reforms are feasible, particularly those that reduce taxes on capital. A 20 percent cut in the sales tax, for instance, requires a nearly 24 percent increase in the tax on land, while a similar cut in property taxes requires virtually no change (0.2 percent) in the tax on land. Even a complete elimination of the state and local property tax calls for only a 23 percent increase in the tax on land, while an elimination of the sales tax would require a whopping 131 percent increase. Landowners would be deeply and adversely impacted by reforms that cut the sales tax (losing up to two-thirds of their wealth under a complete elimination of the sales tax), while they would barely feel the impact of most reforms focused on the property tax. They would experience at most a 7 percent decline in their wealth under the complete elimination of the property tax, and an actual increase in their wealth for less dramatic property tax reforms.

But these results differ substantially by state. For instance, the percentage change in the tax on land required to maintain constant state and local government revenues as taxes on capital are eliminated ranges from -1.91 percent to over 104 percent. Similarly, the impact on land prices varies greatly, with prices barely declining (or even increasing) in some states while falling by as much as 85 percent in others. While the elimination of all state and local taxes on capital is therefore technically feasible in all states, it is clearly politically more feasible in some states than in others. Overall, of course, replacing distortionary taxes with nondistortionary taxes on land always brings growth in the employment of capital and labor and increases output—but the size of these impacts also varies greatly. Given that the main political hurdle to land taxation is the expected adverse impact on landowners, these results seem to indicate that, as in the case of the “typical” state, such reforms should emphasize the simultaneous reduction in taxes such as the corporate income tax or the property tax.

JY: What do you take as the central lessons of this work?

TN: Several broad lessons emerge from the analysis of a typical state. First, elasticity assumptions are crucial to the exercise of predicting the likely impact of tax reforms. Second, under elasticity assumptions that are both plausible and relatively conservative, this model predicts that some types of tax reforms are more likely to succeed than others. In particular, tax reforms that reduce taxation of capital in favor of land taxation will have more positive general welfare implications while minimizing the losses to landowners. So policy makers might consider reforming corporate income and property taxes rather than sales and personal income taxes. Third, since elasticities tend to be lower in the short run, it is likely that some of the positive gains of tax reforms that reduce distortionary taxes in favor of land taxes will emerge only with time.

The most striking lesson from simulating tax reforms for the 50 different states is how greatly results can vary depending on underlying economic conditions and current tax policies in those states. Thus, far from arriving at “the answer” regarding the impact of land tax reforms, this study suggests that such answers are likely to differ greatly depending on the context in which the reforms are undertaken. Reforms that raise the tax on land are likely to be more effective the larger the size of the reform, the higher the initial distortionary taxes in the state, and the lower the current level of state income. And, reforms are more likely to be politically feasible (in the sense of not causing great declines in land values) when they involve reductions in taxes on capital.

The idea that land value taxation is unrealistic or would drive land prices into negative numbers is based on a static view of the economy, where no one responds to tax changes by substituting one factor for another. Once you accept that behavior will change in response to taxes, that static view no longer applies. Under these fairly conservative assumptions, tax reforms that use land taxes to eliminate entire classes of distortionary taxes are economically feasible in virtually all states. This work shows that, far from being quaint or outmoded, the idea of taxing land value is quite relevant to the contemporary policy debate.

Working Paper Information: Thomas Nechyba. 2001. “Prospects for Land Rent Taxes in State and Local Tax Reform.” 70 pages. The complete paper is posted on the Lincoln Institute website at www.lincolninst.edu and may be downloaded for free.

If cynics know the price of everything but the value of nothing, then they may have something in common with contemporary American planners. Constrained by the courts, the planning fraternity sometimes appears to have spent the last decade rationalizing nexuses and quantifying costs without really addressing the social and environmental values that should underpin the planning process. Under assault from those criticizing government, as well as from the property rights movement, the profession seems to have retreated into the land of that dismal science, economics. This allegation has been made in a number of ways over the past few years by critics as diverse as New Urbanist architects and, in England, the Royal Family. Is it really justified?

This article is written from an English perspective and is based on research into the types of planning tools used in the United States to minimize the adverse effects and costs of development or to maximize public benefits. The intention is to adapt the best American practices for future use in the United Kingdom.

A broad analysis of the types of policy processes presently being used highlights an amazing breadth and depth of local policy innovation. The accompanying table outlines the range of policies found, broken down either by the way they have been justified or the process that has been used. This “family” grouping may help in suggesting other types of policies that can be used to achieve similar goals. It may also provide a useful reminder that the policies are always supposed to achieve aims, and that those aims should always be in a constant state of review.

The policies span a wide range. Some are not traditionally thought of as land use or planning policies. Indeed, in many cases the policies are not promoted with any explicit intention of achieving specific land use goals. They are, however, all capable of directly affecting land use patterns and, properly used, can all realize benefits to the community.

Purpose Policies

Harm, quality of life and control policies are all well-accepted planning tools. They work to prevent development in inappropriate areas–on wetlands or in congested districts, for example–or to require development in certain places. For the most part these policies do not offer any new lessons to UK planners. However, their scope is widening. New harms are being defined, such as air quality, lack of public transit accessibility and effects on the water table.

In addition, new, more limited types of land interests, such as easements and deed restrictions, are being used as controls, and new actors are becoming involved. For example, in South Florida the Water Management District is now a major purchaser of land and development rights, working in loose alliance with planning authorities. School boards, forest preserve districts and private utility companies have also become more interventionist.

Nevertheless, the main areas of experimentation are in other family groups. Cost policies are being used more proactively and are being expanded in scope. Fees are being used to either encourage or discourage development in particular locations. In San Diego impact fees in outlying zones have been set at economically prohibitive levels to deter development. In Dade County, Florida, road impact fees are banded and fees increase towards the urban fringe. In Montgomery County, Maryland, certain fees are waived when affordable housing is provided.

Cost policies can also be used to raise revenue to meet off-site costs for nontraditional “infrastructure.” In Boston and San Francisco linkages have been identified between the construction of new offices and the need for housing, justifying the extraction of money sums. In principle the range of these fees could be expanded. The City of San Diego already charges developers for new libraries, fire stations and other community facilities, and includes some future maintenance costs. In rapidly growing areas, the public costs of new health infrastructure, hospitals and clinics might also be considered.

Some municipalities have considered the possibility of charging “disassociation fees” that recognize the cost to the community of development away from central cities. “Historic investment” or “recoupment” fees could account for the cost of past provision of infrastructure. In the case of schools or hospitals, a charge could also be made to reflect the cost of wasted desk and bed capacity in the area from which migration has occurred. Alternatively, fees could be charged for the “softer” social costs of increasing the distance that citizens need to travel to reach open space or to reflect the additional stress that occurs from lengthy journeys through strip development.

Process Policies

Market policies have been described as creating “a currency in the public domain that [can] then be traded.” Unsurprisingly, new markets have developed swiftly, responding to local conditions. These policies generally require zoning that sets limits on development at lower levels than the market would otherwise build. A release from that limitation can then be “sold” or transferred for use either on or off site. Seattle, New York state, Maryland and New Jersey lead the way with policies of this type, creating the necessary currency in the form of bonus floor areas and transferable rights. They also provide “market” infrastructure such as credit banks in some cases. In Florida the private sector has set up profitable “mitigation banks” that reclaim damaged land to create mitigation credits for future use by developers whose projects would threaten wetlands. Private sector sales of “utility credits” also occur.

Fiscal policies are all too often seen as intended simply to raise revenue. Yet they can also guide land uses and capture public benefits from increases in the development value of private land. In some Business Improvement Districts, such as those in Miami Beach and Chicago, increased tax assessment streams have been bonded and the proceeds spent on capital works achieving planning aims. In San Diego’s special assessment areas the cost of new social infrastructure, such as parks and libraries, is borne in this way.

In some areas it is possible to secure contributions towards public works that lead to private benefits, for example when major new transport links or services are provided. In downtown Miami, businesses that benefit from a transit system pay a property assessment that meets the county’s share of the original infrastructure cost.

The final two categories of policies are important for different reasons. Adequate transitionary policies are essential. Politically and legally it is difficult to introduce new policies unless careful attention is paid to minimizing or mitigating the immediate costs. Providing for a lengthy period of introduction, or providing compensating credits, as in Montgomery County, may offer some comfort. In some areas “reversionary” permits have been proposed, where development rights revert back to an earlier or less valuable use if they remain unimplemented for a period of time. The miscellaneous policies provide clear means for enforcement. All too often well-intentioned policies are not rigorously applied. Agreements may allow easier control and greater certainty.

Conclusion

It is clear that a large number of policy tools are available to and used by American planners. The opening criticism questioned their fixation with economics. While economic issues are and always should be part of the planning process, the scope of planning policies itself shows that planning is about more than economics. However, it has also become apparent that planners tend to use only a limited range of instruments, even when alternative approaches might better achieve their policy goals.

For a variety of legal and institutional reasons, municipalities understandably concentrate on those policies that they have already used and that have worked. Notwithstanding that, to an English planner the American system as a whole offers a mouthwatering array of policy feasts. It is a shame that so many planners operating within the system only nibble at the corners of a table that is groaning with the weight of possible delights.

Stephen Ashworth is a visiting fellow at the Lincoln Institute and a Harkness Fellow in a program sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund of New York. In the United Kingdom he is a partner in the firm of Denton Hall, Lawyers. This article is drawn from his research on “Harnessing Land and Development Values for Public Benefit.”