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Five years ago, New Orleans resident Mandy Pumilia was concerned about the number of apparently blighted structures in her neighborhood, known as Bywater, where she is currently vice president of the neighborhood association. Despite post-Katrina recovery efforts, it was hard to identify and track truly troubled properties, and she didn’t have access to city data that could have helped. Instead, she built her own Google spreadsheet and filled it in with the results of her own research and legwork. “It was an arduous process,” she recalls. And despite her tech savvy and determination, it was a solution with limits: it wasn’t easy to share the information beyond people she knew directly, and keeping up with property-specific city hearings was a chore.
Since then, a web app called BlightStatus (blightstatus.nola.gov) has become a valuable new tool for her neighborhood recovery efforts. Created in 2012 by Code for America, a nonprofit specializing in open-source projects that benefit local government, BlightStatus makes it simpler for citizens like Pumilia to access property details, more deeply engaging them in managing blight and other planning challenges. The effort caught the attention of other cities and led to a spinoff startup called Civic Insight, which is now deploying its technology in Dallas, Atlanta, Palo Alto, Sacramento, and other places.
In New Orleans, BlightStatus aggregates information on inspections, code complaints, hearings, judgments, foreclosures, and more. This data is generally siloed or hard to access, but the app gathers and updates most of it daily. Users can search by address or use an interactive map to search at the neighborhood or citywide level. Particularly useful: a “watch list” feature that lets someone like Pumilia keep tabs on specific properties, and sends timely alerts about hearings and other developments. “And it makes it easier for me to empower other residents,” she adds, “so I’m not the only keeper of information.”
When other cities noticed New Orleans’ embrace of the app and expressed interest in a similar tool, Code for America adapted the technology to work elsewhere. “We seemed to hit a nerve,” says Eddie Tejeda, one of the BlightStatus creators. Specifics varied from place to place, but grappling with official property data was clearly a widespread frustration. Lots of people want information about buildings and property, Tejeda continues, but what’s available is often “really hard to work with”; digging through it requires knowledge and experience.
With an investment from the Knight Foundation, the group formed Civic Insight in 2013, using their New Orleans work as a template that could be scaled for other cities large and small, with varied needs and data sets. (Setup and annual subscription-like fees vary by population: roughly $1,000 to $10,000 for the base rate plus 20 to 70 cents per capita.) Among its newer clients, Dallas is proving a particularly important case study. A sprawling metropolis with wildly diverse neighborhoods, from pricey and thriving to severely economically challenged, it’s helping demonstrate that this approach to open-data technology isn’t just for triage in a place like post-Katrina New Orleans.
The connection came via Habitat for Humanity. The nonprofit’s New Orleans chapter has been an enthusiastic user of BlightStatus. Members passed the word to colleagues in Dallas, where the city has been grappling with strategies for using data to define, track, and address blight and related issues, such as identifying problem landlords. Launched in late 2014 with data similar to the information collected in New Orleans, the Dallas version will incorporate additional crime and tax-related statistics that locals want to access more readily, says Theresa O’Donnell, the city’s chief planning officer, who spoke about the app at the Lincoln Institute’s Big City Planning Directors conference in Cambridge in October 2014. “As we get these programs up and started,” she says, “we can rely more on citizens to let us know if [our blight efforts] are working or not.”
Atlanta and Sacramento are rolling out their own programs to make use of the app this year, and other Civic Insight efforts are forthcoming in Fort Worth, Texas, and elsewhere. Client goals aren’t limited to blight issues, notes Tejeda, now Civic Insight’s CEO: in Palo Alto, where zoning, development, and construction are hot topics, architects and homeowners use the app to keep up with permitting processes. That flexibility is by intent. “It’s relatively quick for us to map [raw data] to our application,” he explains. “The role we play is being the translator between what the city has, and what the public needs.” (The app is also built to accommodate new data sets—and it’s no surprise that active citizens like Pumilia, in New Orleans, have lots of suggestions that Civic Insight is working to accommodate.)
Comprehensive data sets and other digital tools have helped to guide planners and other city officials for years, but what Civic Insight is up to is the next logical step. “There’s this great opportunity to harness this data—sort of hidden data, for many cities—and bring it to life” in ways that are useful to citizens and planners alike, points out Lincoln Institute fellow Peter Pollock, the former head of planning in Boulder, Colorado.
Such accessibility matters because policy makers must “coproduce the good city” with residents, Pollock continues. “Planners are in the business of harnessing community energy around a vision for the future,” he says. That means zoning and permitting—but also maintenance and compliance. “It’s not just building the city; it’s care and feeding of the city over time.”
Still, the Civic Insight proposition may seem confusing at first: How does a city benefit by hoping citizens will pore over information that it already owns? But that’s the point. Opening up data to people who really know the neighborhoods where they live and work amounts to a kind of crowd-sourcing strategy for planning-level city maintenance.
Just ask Pumilia. This is the essence of what she was trying to do in New Orleans with her DIY spreadsheet and a whole lot of grit a few years ago. Now she can monitor her neighborhood more easily and direct others to BlightStatus so they too can quickly round up the information they need and prod the city about troublesome properties.
Dipping into the data as we speak, she calls up the history of one local address: “So there are one, two, three, four, five cases against this property,” she says. In short, she has just whipped up a ready-made dossier of neglect—one that helped persuade officials to start a process that should lead to the auction of that property.
Sometimes, Pumilia says with a laugh, “It requires citizen action to inspire people to do their jobs.”
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Uno de los más formidables retos para los líderes políticos y sociales de este siglo radica en poder crear condiciones económicas e institucionales que conduzcan a una gestión ambiental urbana eficaz, y que al mismo tiempo estén comprometidas a consolidar la democracia, promover la justicia social y erradicar la pobreza urbana. Este desafío de promoción de la inclusión socioespacial resulta todavía más significativo en los países en vías de desarrollo y con economías en transición, dada la complejidad de los problemas resultantes de la urbanización intensiva, la degradación ambiental, las crecientes desigualdades socioeconómicas y la segregación espacial. Merece especial atención el debate sobre las condiciones jurídico-políticas del desarrollo y la gestión ambiental urbana.
La discusión sobre ley e ilegalidad en el contexto del desarrollo urbano ha cobrado impulso en años recientes, especialmente desde que el Programa Hábitat1 de la ONU destacó la importancia fundamental del Derecho Urbanístico. En los talleres de trabajo facilitados por el Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano (IRGLUS) de los últimos ocho años, los investigadores han señalado la necesidad de realizar un análisis crítico del papel de las instituciones y de las estipulaciones jurídicas en el proceso de urbanización. Según lo sugiere la Campaña Mundial de Gobernabilidad Urbana del Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (CNUAH)2, la promoción de la reforma jurídica ha sido considerada por organizaciones nacionales e internacionales como una de las condiciones principales para cambiar la naturaleza excluyente del desarrollo urbano en países en desarrollo y en transición, y para confrontar eficazmente el problema cada vez mayor de la ilegalidad urbana.
Las prácticas ilegales han proliferado de formas variadas, especialmente en el contexto cada vez más extenso de la economía informal. Un número creciente de personas han tenido que ponerse al margen de la ley para poder tener acceso a tierra y viviendas urbanas, y se ven forzadas a vivir sin seguridad de tenencia en condiciones muy precarias, generalmente en zonas periféricas. Este proceso tiene muchas repercusiones serias —sociales, políticas, económicas y ambientales— y requiere confrontación por parte del gobierno y de la sociedad. Generalmente se reconoce que la ilegalidad urbana debe entenderse no sólo en términos de la dinámica entre sistemas políticos y de mercados del suelo, sino también en función de la naturaleza del orden jurídico en vigor, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la definición de los derechos de propiedad inmobiliaria urbana. La promoción de la reforma urbana depende principalmente de una reforma comprensiva del orden jurídico, que modifique los reglamentos de los derechos de propiedad del suelo y el proceso general de desarrollo, legislación y gestión del suelo urbano. Se ha concedido especial importancia a las políticas de regularización de la tenencia, dirigidas a promover la integración socioespacial del pobre urbano, tales como las propuestas por Campaña Mundial de Tenencia Segura del CNUAH.
Comparación entre enfoques conservadores e innovadores
Este complejo debate jurídico-político tiene serias repercusiones socioeconómicas en el mundo entero, y debe considerarse bajo tres enfoques político-ideológicos, conservadores pero influyentes, del derecho y la reglamentación jurídica.
En primer lugar, la función de la ley en el desarrollo urbano no puede cifrarse a los términos simplistas propuestos por quienes sugieren —a pesar de los resultados históricos— que el capitalismo de por sí permite distribuir ampliamente la riqueza, y quienes defienden un estilo “no intervencionista” a la regulación estatal para controlar el desarrollo urbano. Considerando que la globalización es sin duda irreversible y en cierto modo independiente de la acción gubernamental, no hay justificación histórica para la ideología neoliberal que supone que al maximizarse el crecimiento y la riqueza, el mercado libre también optimiza la distribución de ese incremento (Hobsbawn 2000).
Varios indicadores de la creciente pobreza social, especialmente los que guardan estrecha relación con las condiciones precarias del acceso al suelo y a la vivienda en áreas urbanas, demuestran que, incluso si el mundo se ha enriquecido como resultado del crecimiento económico y financiero mundial, la distribución social y regional de esta nueva riqueza dista de ser óptima. Aún más, el desarrollo industrial exitoso de muchos países (por ejemplo Estados Unidos, Alemania o incluso Brasil y México) se logró adoptando medidas de regulación y rechazando la aceptación incondicional de la lógica del mercado libre. Quizás más que nunca es de importancia capital redefinir la acción estatal y la regulación económica en países en desarrollo y en transición, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la promoción del desarrollo urbano, la reforma del suelo, el control del uso del suelo y la gestión de la ciudad. No se puede pasar por alto el papel central de la ley en este proceso.
En segundo lugar, el efecto de la globalización económica y financiera sobre el desarrollo de los mercados del suelo ha presionado a los países en desarrollo y en transición para que reformen sus leyes nacionales del suelo y homogenicen sus sistemas jurídicos a fin de facilitar la gestión internacional de los mercados del suelo. Este énfasis en una reforma globalizada orientada al mercado de la tenencia de la tierra y del derecho, con la resultante “americanización de las leyes comerciales y la expansión de bufetes anglo-estadounidenses mundiales”, se basa en un enfoque del suelo “puramente como un activo económico que debería estar a la disposición de cualquiera que pueda aprovecharlo para lograr los más altos y mejores beneficios económicos”. Este punto de vista está encaminado a facilitar las inversiones extranjeras en el suelo, más que a reconocer “el papel social del suelo en la sociedad” y que dicho suelo es “parte del patrimonio social del Estado” (McAuslan 2000).
Un tercer y cada vez más influyente punto de vista se ha basado mayoritariamente, y a veces imprecisamente, en las ideas del economista Hernando de Soto. Él defiende la noción de que se puede resolver el problema de la pobreza global si se incorpora la creciente economía extralegal informal a la economía formal, particularmente en áreas urbanas. En su opinión, los pequeños negocios informales y viviendas marginales de los pobres son esencialmente activos económicos (“capital muerto”), que deberían ser revitalizados por el sistema jurídico oficial y convertidos en un capital líquido que permita a sus dueños el acceso al crédito formal y la posibilidad de invertir en sus viviendas y negocios, y de esa manera fortalecer la economía como un todo. Ahora bien, en vez de cuestionar la naturaleza del sistema jurídico que generó la ilegalidad urbana en primer lugar, varios países han propuesto la total —y frecuentemente incondicional— legalización de los negocios informales y el reconocimiento incondicional de títulos de propiedad absoluta para los habitantes urbanos de algunos asentamientos informales como método “radical” para transformar las economías urbanas.
Contrario a estos enfoques conservadores, varios estudios recientes han señalado que, en ausencia de planes urbanos bien estructurados, coherentes y progresistas, el enfoque del (neo)liberalismo jurídico no hará más que agravar el ya serio problema de la exclusión socioespacial. Tanto legisladores como organismos públicos deben tomar conciencia de las muchas y a veces malignas repercusiones de sus propuestas, especialmente las relativas a la legalización de los asentamientos informales. El tan esperado reconocimiento de la responsabilidad del Estado por suministrar derechos de vivienda social no puede reducirse al reconocimiento de los derechos de propiedad. La legalización de actividades informales, particularmente a través del reconocimiento de los títulos individuales de propiedad, no garantiza automáticamente la integración socioespacial.
Y si no se formulan dentro del ámbito de políticas socioeconómicas comprensivas y no se asimilan a una estrategia ampliada de gestión urbana, las políticas de legalización de la tenencia podrían tener efectos indeseados (Alfonsin 2001), entre ellos: nuevas cargas financieras no intencionales a los pobres urbanos, poco efecto en la reducción de la pobreza urbana, y, lo más importante, el refuerzo directo de los poderes económicos y políticos que han sido los causantes tradicionales de la exclusión socioespacial. Las nuevas políticas deben integrar cuatro factores principales:
La búsqueda de soluciones jurídico-políticas novedosas de tenencia para los pobres urbanos debe integrar la promoción de la tenencia individual con el reconocimiento de los derechos sociales de vivienda, incorporar esa dimensión siempre olvidada del papel de la mujer e intentar reducir los impactos de tales soluciones en el mercado del suelo, para que los beneficios de las inversiones públicas estén a disposición de los pobres urbanos y no de los promotores inmobiliarios privados. Perseguir esos objetivos es de fundamental importancia dentro del contexto de la promoción de una estrategia de reforma urbana más amplia y de carácter inclusivo (Payne). Varias ciudades, como Porto Alegre, Ciudad de México y Caracas, han tratado de materializar planes urbanos progresistas con la reforma de sus sistemas jurídicos tradicionales. Entre las medidas significantes que se han tomado para democratizar el acceso al suelo y a la propiedad, figuran normas y regulaciones de naturaleza menos elitista, zonificación residencial especial para los pobres urbanos y cambios en los mecanismos fiscales de captura de plusvalías del suelo, para tornarlos menos regresivos.
Para ampliar el debate
Dentro del contexto de estos acalorados debates sobre Derecho Urbanístico, el Instituto Lincoln prestó su apoyo a tres conferencias internacionales recientes:
Ley y gobernabilidad urbana
En vista del énfasis relativamente nuevo en establecer vínculos entre los estudios urbanos y los estudios jurídicos, es necesario que la dimensión jurídica del proceso de desarrollo urbano se convierta en el centro de la investigación de una forma más explícita. Para ello se requiere un abordaje más coherente al lenguaje, de manera que conceptos claves, como los derechos de propiedad, puedan discutirse adecuadamente tanto en términos políticos como jurídicos. La mayoría de los artículos presentados en esta conferencia de IRGLUS se centraron en la regularización del suelo. La regularización se ha convertido en la respuesta política más frecuente al problema general de los asentamientos ilegales, pero el término es usado de muchas maneras y con diferentes significados por diferentes organismos e investigadores. Para implementar la dimensión física de las políticas de regularización se impone actualizar infraestructuras e introducir servicios, como también destacar puntos de sensibilidad cultural. Por ejemplo, para que las políticas de regularización aporten seguridad de tenencia, se deberá prestar más atención al impacto del proceso sobre la mujer.
Los participantes también señalaron los efectos de las políticas de regularización en los mercados de suelo formales e informales. Algunos perciben la regularización como un “mercadeo” de los procesos operativos de los antiguos asentamientos ilegales. Un punto de preocupación fue la posibilidad de “elitización” (gentrification) la cual en este caso no se refiere a restaurar y cambiar el uso de las edificaciones, sino más bien al proceso mediante el cual grupos de medianos ingresos “invaden” asentamientos recientemente regularizados para fines residenciales u otros, hasta desalojar a los inquilinos originales. No hay duda de que al definir las políticas de regularización, es importante considerar una amplia gama de aspectos económicos y políticos. En particular, hay que incluir a los habitantes de los asentamientos ilegales en la vida económica y política de la ciudad, para así evitar mayor segregación socioeconómica y sus peligros asociados.
Dar respuestas adecuadas a los problemas complejos de los asentamientos ilegales es difícil, aparte de que las soluciones particulares no siempre funcionan en todos los casos. A la hora de la verdad, el éxito de un programa de regularización depende de acciones gubernamentales y de costosos programas y reformas jurídicas. Sin embargo, hay una brecha significativa entre las preguntas planteadas y la práctica real. Debido a la urgencia de adelantarse a los procesos de los asentamientos ilegales, los organismos públicos se están concentrando en la cura, y no en la prevención.
¿Cómo pueden los gobiernos municipales detener el proceso de los asentamientos ilegales? Aportando soluciones más eficaces de suelo y vivienda. Los participantes de la conferencia defendieron la legitimidad de los programas de tenencia, pragmáticamente en algunos casos, como un derecho fundamental en otros. Dado el enfoque de direccionamiento “desde arriba” que suele aplicarse a este asunto, se debe ampliar el círculo de participantes con capacidad decisoria para que incluya la voz de los pobres urbanos.
Conferencia del CNUAH/CEPAL
América Latina fue la única región que elaboró un plan de acción para el programa Hábitat II, señal de que, a pesar de las diferencias fundamentales de tipo lingüístico, histórico y cultural de la región, existe un plan común que debería facilitar la colaboración. La estructura urbana de la región está pasando por cambios profundos como resultado de varios procesos combinados, entre ellos:
Todos estos problemas han empeorado debido a la expansión de la globalización económica, las políticas de liberalización inapropiadas y los esquemas de privatización carentes de regulación. Pese a su rápida integración al creciente mercado global, América Latina ha experimentado una explosión de pobreza social en la última década. Las proyecciones del Banco Mundial sugieren que, de no confrontarse este problema, 55 millones de latinoamericanos podrían estar viviendo con menos de US$1 al día en la próxima década.
La Declaración de Santiago producto de esta conferencia estableció la meta de un plan ambiental urbano para poner en marcha diálogos político-institucionales y gestiones conjuntas. El objetivo es crear las condiciones necesarias para salvar los obstáculos de gobernabilidad política que siguen oponiéndose a los esfuerzos de las dos décadas pasadas para promover reformas económicas y democratización en la región. A fin de desarrollar una estructura urbana más competitiva y eficiente, tal plan de acción regional debe:
Como parte de una estrategia de reforma urbana más amplia, debe prestarse atención urgente a la necesidad de suministrar condiciones habitacionales mejores y más accesibles para los pobres urbanos. Dada la reciente disminución de las inversiones públicas habitacionales en la mayor parte de América Latina, es crítico comenzar ya a proporcionar nuevas unidades habitacionales, mejorar las existentes y regularizar los asentamientos informales.
Igualmente, la Declaración de Santiago adelantó una variedad de propuestas, entre ellas nuevos marcos normativos para políticas urbanas y habitacionales; políticas de organización territorial y mecanismos de control del uso del suelo; y políticas públicas para integración social e igualdad de los géneros. Sin embargo, no confrontó el hecho de que muchos de los problemas sociales, urbanos y ambientales de la región son consecuencia de los sistemas jurídicos nacionales de carácter conservador, elitista y mayormente obsoleto que siguen vigentes en muchos países. Cualquier propuesta para un nuevo equilibrio entre estados, mercados y ciudadanos para apoyar el proceso de reforma urbana, requiere no sólo cambios económicos y político-institucionales, sino también una completa reforma jurídica, especialmente la gestión jurídico-política de los derechos de propiedad.
Conferencia de Derecho Urbanístico de Brasil
La constitución brasileña de 1988 introdujo un capítulo pionero sobre política urbana al consolidar la noción de la “función social de la propiedad y de la ciudad” como el principal marco conceptual para el Derecho Urbanístico brasileño. Si bien es cierto que las constituciones brasileñas desde 1934 establecían nominalmente que el reconocimiento del derecho individual de propiedad estaba condicionado a la realización de una “función social”, hasta 1988 no se había definido claramente este principio ni se había podido ejecutar con los mecanismos de observancia en vigor. La Constitución de 1988 reconoce el derecho individual de propiedad en áreas urbanas únicamente si el uso y desarrollo del suelo y de la propiedad satisfacen las estipulaciones con sesgo social y ambiental del Derecho Urbanístico, especialmente de los planes maestros formulados en los ámbitos municipales. Como resultado, se ha decretado un sinnúmero de leyes municipales urbanas y ambientales para apoyar una amplia variedad de políticas y estrategias de gestión urbana progresista.
Algunas de las experiencias internacionales más innovadoras de gestión urbana están teniendo lugar en Brasil, como el proceso del presupuesto participativo adoptado en varias ciudades (Goldsmith y Vainer, 2001). La inminente aprobación de la Ley Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (el llamado “Estatuto de la ciudad”) debe contribuir a consolidar el nuevo paradigma constitucional de planificación y gestión urbana, especialmente por el hecho de reglamentar instrumentos de observanción constitucional tales como edificación obligatoria, transferencia del derecho de construir, expropiación mediante tributación progresista y derechos de prescripción adquisitiva.
Proceder a ese cambio en el paradigma jurídico es de importancia fundamental. La tradición incipiente de estudios jurídicos urbanísticos en Brasil tiende a ser esencialmente legalista, pero refuerza las nociones tradicionales del derecho individual de propiedad especificadas en el Código Civil de 1916. Este Código obsoleto considera el suelo y los derechos de propiedad casi exclusivamente en función de las posibilidades económicas ofrecidas a los propietarios individuales, sin dejar mucho campo para una intervención estatal con sesgo social, dirigida a conciliar los diferentes intereses existentes sobre el uso del suelo y de la propiedad. Tan importante es decretar nuevas leyes como lo es consolidar el marco conceptual propuesto por la Constitución de 1988, y de esa manera sustituir las estipulaciones individualistas del Código Civil, las cuales todavía sientan las bases para una interpretación judicial conservadora sobre el desarrollo del suelo. Gran parte de la resistencia ideológica a las políticas urbanas progresistas que sostienen grandes grupos conservadores de la sociedad brasileña tiene su origen en el Código, que no considera el papel de la ley y la ilegalidad en el proceso de desarrollo urbano y de gestión urbana.
Los artículos presentados en esta conferencia exploran las posibilidades jurídicas, políticas e institucionales creadas por el nuevo marco constitucional para ejecutar acciones estatales y sociales en el proceso de desarrollo urbano y control de uso del suelo. Los participantes recalcaron que la discusión de leyes, instituciones jurídicas y decisiones judiciales debe estar respaldada por un entendimiento de la naturaleza del proceso legislativo, las condiciones de cumplimiento de la ley, y la dinámica del proceso de producción social de ilegalidad urbana.
Los participantes también advirtieron que si el tratamiento jurídico del derecho de propiedad se saca del ámbito restrictivo del Derecho Civil, de forma que pueda ser interpretado a partir de los criterios más progresistas del redefinido Derecho Urbanístico público redefinido, entonces las posibilidades ofrecidas por el Derecho Administrativo brasileño tampoco son satisfactorias. Las estipulaciones existentes y en vigor, limitadas y formalistas, carecen de suficiente flexibilidad y competencia para manejar y garantizar la seguridad jurídica y las relaciones político-institucionales que están transformándose rápidamente en varios niveles: dentro del entorno estatal, entre niveles gubernamentales, entre Estado y sociedad, y dentro de ésta. Las nuevas estrategias de gestión urbana se basan en ideas tales como plusvalías, asociaciones público-privadas, operaciones “urbanas” e “interligadas”, privatización y terciarización de la prestación de servicios públicos y presupuesto participativo; el problema es que dichas estrategias carecen de un soporte pleno del sistema jurídico. Además, la nueva base constitucional del Derecho Urbanístico brasileño todavía requiere consolidarse como el primer marco jurídico para la gestión urbana.
Conclusión
Todavía quedan sin contestar muchas preguntas importantes sobre ley e ilegalidad urbana, y antes de que puedan contestarse adecuadamente, se necesitarán muchos más trabajos, investigaciones y debates. Sin embargo, formular las preguntas correctas es a veces tan importante como dar las respuestas acertadas. Por esa razón, el debate de la dimensión jurídica del proceso de desarrollo urbano y de gestión urbana continuará explorando las interrogantes para América Latina y el resto del mundo.
Notas
1) Programa Hábitat: Plan de acción global adoptado por la comunidad internacional en la Conferencia Hábitat II en Estambul, Turquía, en junio de 1996
2) CNUAH: Centro de las Naciones Unidas para los Asentamientos Humanos (Hábitat). Consulte los sitios www.unchs.org/govern y www.unchs.org/tenure para obtener información sobre la Campaña Mundial de Gobernabilidad Urbana y la Campaña Mundial de Tenencia Segura del CNUAH.
Referencias
Alfonsin, Betania de Moraes. 2001. “Politicas de regularizacao fundiaria: justificacao, impactos e sustentabilidade”, in Fernándes, Edésio (org) Direito Urbanistico e Politica Urbana no Brasil. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey.
de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.
1989. The Other Path. London: I.B.Tauris & Co.
Fernandes, Edésio. 1999. “Redefinición de los derechos de propiedad en la era de la liberalización y la privatización”, Land Lines (noviembre) 11(6):4-5.
Goldsmith, William W., and Carlos B. Vainer. 2001. “Participatory budgeting and power politics in Porto Alegre”. Land Lines (January) 13(1):7-9.
Hobsbawn, Eric. 2000. The New Century. London: Abacus.
McAuslan, Patrick. 2000. “From Greenland’s icy mountains, from India’s coral strand: the globalisation of land markets and its impact on national land law”. Trabajo presentado en la Conferencia de Derecho Urbanístico de Brasil.
Payne, Geoffrey. “Innovative approaches to tenure for the urban poor”. United Kingdom Department for International Development.
Sobre el autor
Edésio Fernandes, abogado brasileño, es profesor de la Unidad de Planificación para el Desarrollo del University College de Londres. También se desempeña como coordinador de IRGLUS (Grupo Internacional de Investigación sobre Legislación y Espacio Urbano). Fernándes desea expresar su agradecimiento a los participantes del taller de trabajo del IRGLUS en Cairo quienes compartieron sus notas, especialmente Ann Varley, Gareth A. Jones y Peter Marcuse.
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While the issue of managing suburban growth has long been on the Lincoln Institute’s agenda, “sprawl” is now receiving a great deal of attention from citizens, policy analysts and policymakers, as well as the popular press. However, crafting policies to respond to suburban growth is extremely difficult for a variety of reasons.
First, we lack a public consensus about what sprawl is. Even paraphrasing former US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, “. . . but I know it when I see it” does not work in this case. For example, one often hears from anti-sprawl activists that they do not want their community to be “another Los Angeles.” However, Los Angeles is more densely populated today than it was 30 years ago.
Dowell Myers and Alicia Kitsuse report that “the Los Angeles urbanized area (the region excluding mountains and deserts) has the highest gross population densities among the 20 largest metropolitan regions, higher even than New York.”1 Exploring deeper, one finds that “Los Angeles” is code for a variety of social problems that are concentrated in our nation’s cities, such as urban crime, teenage pregnancy, poverty, persistent unemployment, and a variety of other concerns, not the least of which is the organization of uses in metropolitan space.
A second challenge to crafting policies to respond to suburban growth is the threat to anticipated economic gain by some of those who own undeveloped land on the fringes of metropolitan areas. For example, one can imagine the great interest these landowners would have in negotiations to redraw urban growth boundaries. The line on the map can have significant monetary implications for a parcel depending on which side of the line it lands.
A third challenge is the variety of existing policies and laws that have encouraged suburban growth over the past 50 years. In a recent Institute-supported study, Patricia Burgess and Thomas Bier make a strong case that governmental fragmentation on two fronts contributes to a policy environment that supports sprawl.2 Fragmentation between levels of government makes regional planning approaches difficult, while fragmentation across functional agencies impedes comprehensive solutions. In another study, Joseph Gyourko and Richard Voith have argued that the combination of the federal mortgage interest deductions and local-level exclusionary zoning have encouraged low-density residential development in jurisdictions surrounding central cities.3
Finally, there is little agreement about desired future development patterns. Thus, if the forces that create sprawl are based on a combination of federal, state and local policies, if our existing landscape reflects both public and private actions, and if the desired future is unclear, how does one even begin to address the issue? The Lincoln Institute’s mission is to contribute to and improve the quality of debate about land policies. Toward that end, our work on sprawl is multi-dimensional, focusing on educational programs for policy officials at the federal, state and local levels.
Programs for Federal and State Officials
Land use issues have increased in importance on the federal policy agenda, and the Institute has begun working with Region 1 of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), based in Boston, to develop a training course for senior administrators. Many staff at EPA are not schooled in land use planning, but their work in traditional EPA areas such as water or air quality requires that they pay attention to land use issues.
Harvey Jacobs, professor of urban and regional planning at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, developed and taught a course to two groups of EPA administrators in the fall of 1998. Response to the two-day program, which included the historical and institutional context of land use planning, was so positive that the EPA asked the Institute to offer this program annually as part of EPA’s required orientation for new administrators.
At the state level, the Institute has recently supported programs to facilitate information exchanges among legislators and planning directors. Patricia Salkin of the Government Law Center at the Albany Law School has researched lessons to be learned from states that attempted state-level legislation on growth management, but failed. Among her findings was the lack of in-depth knowledge among state legislators and executive-level policymakers about the causes and consequences of suburban sprawl. In order for any kind of growth management legislation to be passed successfully, sponsorship is needed by the appropriate legislator. Depending on the state, this might be the chair of the Local Affairs Committee or a different committee leader.
In an attempt to respond to this need for better understanding about sprawl on the part of legislators and their staffs, the Lincoln Institute and the Albany Law School cosponsored a briefing session in February 1999, in Albany. It coincided with the legislative session and, fortuitously, was held on the day of a press conference announcing that the bipartisan “Smart Growth Economic Competitiveness Act of 1999” had been filed in both houses of the New York legislature. The bill includes three key provisions:
(1) It charges the Governor to create an inter-agency council to review existing policies related to growth and development.
(2) It creates a task force to study the issue and come up with recommendations.
(3) It asks the Governor to provide grants for regional compact efforts.
National experts on sprawl, state legislators and commissioners, and Mayor William A. Johnson of Rochester and members of his staff exchanged up-to-date information on related state-level efforts, as well as possible resources for their continued work on this issue. The briefing session gave prominence to the issue of growth management at an important juncture in the state’s history. Perhaps most useful to the legislators and other senior-level policymakers was the neutral forum that the briefing provided for frank discussion of the complexities of “smart growth.” While the event was designed with legislators in mind, it is clear that participants from the executive branch who attended the briefing session also benefited.
In another attempt to target our educational programs to key decision makers, the Lincoln Institute, the Regional Plan Association (RPA) and the New Jersey State Planning Commission cosponsored a leadership retreat for state planning directors from ten of the eleven Northeast states. The directors, or in states without a state planning director a representative from the executive branch, met in Princeton in March for a day characterized by peer-to-peer training.
States with nascent state-level efforts were able to learn from those with more institutionalized programs. While Delaware is as different from New York as Connecticut is from Maine, their state officials were able to benefit enormously from stepping outside their individual political, geographic and economic contexts and considering alternative solutions to similar problems. While each state must construct strategies appropriate to its own needs, all states face many common concerns.
The gathering also provided an opportunity to contribute to a larger, region-wide planning effort. Among the initiatives presented by Robert Yaro, executive director of RPA, was Amtrak’s introduction of high-speed rail service between Boston and Washington, DC, which may leverage substantial economic growth for cities along the corridor. Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington will clearly benefit from rapid, comfortable transportation between terminals. However, it may be in smaller cities such as Providence, Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport, Stamford, Newark, Trenton and Wilmington where high-speed rail could have a far greater impact. Frequent service to these cities, where airline connections are limited, could bring new investment as well as increased access to other employment centers for their residents.
RPA is drafting a proposal to provide the analysis and preliminary recommendations needed to evaluate the benefits of the Amtrak service. The state planning officers at the Princeton meeting felt that the initiative would be of great interest to their governors and agreed to take the RPA proposal back to their states in an effort to broaden the coalition in support of Amtrak’s high-speed rail service in the Northeast Corridor.
Programs for Local Officials and Community-Based Organizations
At the local level, strategies to address suburban sprawl also need to focus on development and redevelopment in the cities, and the Institute is expanding its course offerings to groups long interested in urban policy. Last November, the Institute cosponsored “Breaking Barriers, Building Partnerships: Urban Vacant Land Redevelopment” with the Massachusetts Association of Community Development Corporations. Meeting in Boston, staff from community development corporations and private and non-profit lenders explored strategies for bringing underutilized land back into use. A similar group gathered in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in May for a workshop cosponsored by the North Carolina Community Development Initiative and the Kenan Institute for Private Enterprise. The hands-on training was designed to give participants experience in generating alternative financing strategies for urban redevelopment
In another effort in the Southeast, the Lincoln Institute provided support to Spelman College as part of an effort to contribute to the redevelopment of its neighborhood in Atlanta. In June, Spelman and its partners from the Atlantic University Center held a community summit as part of a larger initiative to identify both neighborhood needs and university-community strategies to address those needs.
Our experiences in these programs confirm the complex factors influencing current development patterns: the variety of social, economic, technological and political forces; complex and sometimes conflicting policies at the local, state and federal levels; and the actions of those in the public, private and non-profit sectors. Through this work we have come to understand the need for basic information about the broader issue of land markets. In particular we are interested in how and why land markets operate as they do and the implications of land market activity on various public and private stakeholders. Future curriculum development efforts in this area will concentrate on materials to help policymakers and citizens gain a better appreciation of these markets. In doing so, we will have a fuller understanding of the sprawl issue: what causes sprawl, where interventions will be effective, and the characteristics of successful interventions.
Rosalind Greenstein is a senior fellow and director of the program in land markets at the Lincoln Institute.
Notes
1. Myers, Dowell, and Alicia Kitsuse, “The Debate over Future Density of Development: An Interpretive Review.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1999: 22.
2. Burgess, Patricia, and Thomas Bier, “Public Policy and ‘Rural Sprawl’: Lessons from Northeast Ohio.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1998.
3. Gyourko, Joseph, and Richard Voith, “The Tax Treatment of Housing and Its Effects on Bounded and Unbounded Communities.” Lincoln Institute Working Paper, 1999.
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Scholars and practitioners involved with the regularization of low-income settlements in Latin America shared their experiences in a forum sponsored by the Lincoln Institute last March and hosted by the City of Medellín and its regularization office, PRIMED (Integrated Program for the Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellín). Participants included representatives from PRIMED, Medellín city officials, and observers from multilateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, AID and GTZ (Germany).
Twelve major presentations reported on the most significant case studies from eight countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Perú and Venezuela. The forum proved to be a landmark meeting whose findings, summarized below, are expected to have important implications for Latin American policymakers.
Comparative Perspectives on Regularization
Several different approaches to regularization are illustrated in the country case studies. The two primary approaches are juridical regularization, i.e., legal land entitlement procedures to convert from de facto to de jure property ownership, as in Perú, Ecuador and Mexico; and physical regularization (urbanization), including the extension of infrastructure into irregular settlements, as in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and other countries. A third approach, which has been emphasized only recently, puts priority on the social and civic integration of low-income settlements and their populations into the urban fabric by a combination of measures.
While most countries have elements of all three forms of regularization, they usually focus on one direction or another. In Mexico all three approaches are used simultaneously. In most other countries the emphasis depends on the relative strengths of the actors, organizations and politics on the one hand, and on the way the regularization problem is conceived (“constructed”) by federal and local authorities on the other.
Juridical Regularization: Land Title Programs
The regularization of land titles has become accepted practice by governments, international agencies and NGOs alike. (see Figure 1.) In fact, the question “Why Regularize?” that was raised at the beginning of the forum seemed to catch everyone by surprise. Yet, posing this question goes to the heart of the matter about who defines the problems regarding land tenure and who establishes policies in favor of regularization. Most of the legal titling programs examined in the case studies were lengthy and expensive, and, by the time they came on-line, did little to significantly affect the level of security or to systematically provide services in the settlements.
Figure 1 Common Arguments in Favor of Land Regularization
As far as the poor are concerned, however, several of the arguments in favor of regularization would appear to be spurious. Established households generally have de facto security and rarely prioritize the need for full legal title, the latter being a need more associated with middle-classes value systems. Moreover, once settlements are well-established, home improvements and consolidation occur at a rate that is closely tied to available resources, not to title security. As for the introduction of services, most providers follow their own internal rules for timing and procedures; rarely is legal title an important criterion.
Furthermore, low-income households do not like falling into debt and are uneasy about entering formal credit systems, even though NGOs and governments are moving towards micro-credit support. In short, where low-income groups want regularization of tenure it appears to be because the state wants them to want it and then constructs demand accordingly.
One may conceive of tenure regularization as both an end in itself and a means to an end. Regularization as an “end” emerged clearly in the Lima case, where access to land and land titling programs substitute for a systematic housing policy. The most recent round of land titling (since 1996) even includes a retitling of previously regularized lots as an arena of political patronage serving the central government at the expense of the city’s political leaders. (1) A similar situation prevailed in Mexico with the multiplex regularization agencies created during the 1970s. In both countries the commitment to tenurial regularization is clearly indicated by active programs, usually providing a large number of titles each year at low cost.
Elsewhere, regularization may also be an “end,” but it is of secondary importance. In Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador and Ecuador, for example, titling is at best only a minor part of the physical regularization package. Even so, the absence of legal tenure and the need for regularization may be used to good political effect by regulating the flow and order of infrastructure provision.
Regularization of titles as a means to an end is promoted widely by international agencies as part of the World Bank’s New Urban Management Program. Mexico is a good example of the process whereby land titling is a prerequisite to urban land management, planning and public administration. Regularization incorporates the population into the system of land registry, tax base, planning controls, construction permissions, consumption charges, and recovery of services and infrastructure. Regularization becomes the means to urban sustainability and management, and this more than any other reason explains its widespread espousal and adoption today.
One notable feature in several case studies was the apparent reluctance to regularize on private lands unless the initiative had the support of the original landowner. As a result, the settlements most likely to be regularized are those occupying public land or land whose ownership is unchallenged. With the exception of Mexico, governments are reluctant to expropriate in the social interest. Several countries have a system of land occupancy rights that permits transfer of ownership after a certain number of years of proven and appropriate use. In Brazil this usucapión system has been extended recently to allow for title transfer on privately owned urban lots of less than 250m2 that have been occupied continuously for five years.
Issues in juridical regularization programs:
Physical Regularization: Urbanization and Infrastructure Provision
The second principal arena of regularization reported by many of the case studies at the forum focused on the physical regularization process in different forms of irregular settlements. In Medellín, for example, approximately 12 percent of the total population is estimated to live in fast-growing barrios, which are often built on steep slopes like their hillside counterparts in Rio or Caracas. There are undoubted problems and dangers in these areas, but most of the participants who visited the PRIMED settlements were more encouraged by their level and rate of consolidation than the local officials appeared to be. (The discussion did not address upgrades and interventions in inner-city tenements-conventillos, vecindades, cortiços.)
It is impossible to do justice to the many innovative programs that were described at the forum, but one major success story is the Favela/Bairro program in Rio de Janeiro. This project is predicated on close collaboration with local residents to open up favela streets to vehicular access in combination with service installation. However, it is important to recognize that its success has only been possible at considerable cost: the total expenditure between 1994 and 1997 has been US$300 million, in large part provided by the IDB. This raises important questions about the replicability of such programs.
Issues in physical regularization programs:
>
Regularization as a Means of Social Integration
It became apparent in the deliberations that an increasingly explicit goal of regularization is to achieve social integration by bringing low-income populations into the societal mainstream and into the urban fabric. This is most frequently observed in reference to the “rescue” of low-income populations and other marginal groups and their incorporation into the urban citizenry. This was one of the important goals in Brazil’s favela/bairro program, which, in part at least, aimed to break up the drug and delinquent youth gangs and to rescue the local population from their influence.
A potential problem with this approach is that concepts of “good citizen” and the societal mainstream are social constructions that are often highly value-laden and may derive from within a particular class and dominant power group. Regularization to achieve integration into the wider set of social opportunities such as public education and health care is one thing; regularization for social convergence and conformity is another. However, this theme remains incipient in the literature, and the whole notion of citizenship with its bundles of rights and responsibilities is part of an agenda still largely unconsidered.
Conclusion
This international forum emphasized the need to be aware of the different underlying rationales for juridical and physical regularization in individual countries, and to be aware that they are closely tied to the political and planning process. In order for regularization to work well there has to be genuine political commitment such that all departments and officials who intervene do so with greater integration, cooperation and empowerment. Policymakers should also think imaginatively about alternative, “parallel” ownership systems and opportunities for genuine public participation in decisionmaking at all stages in the regularization process.
Important, too, are financial commitment and sustainability. Unless regularization is tied to medium- and long-term cost recovery through taxes, user charges and deferred assessments, programs will continue to depend on major external funding and subsidies, which will severely limit the extent and scale of their application.
An exciting last session of the forum allowed participants to reflect on future directions for research and policy analysis on land market regularization. Five major areas emerged. First, we recognized the need to identify the various actors and interest groups involved in promoting irregular or illegal land development in the first place, and to make explicit the differences between land invasions, owner subdivisions, company subdivisions and other actions. The point here is that irregularity is produced by various actors and interests groups as a for-profit business, and is not just a result of dysfunctional urbanization.
Second, we discussed moving away from dualist thinking and breaking with the idea of conceptualizing the land market in terms of the formal and informal city, the parallel city, or normal and subnormal barrios, all of which implicitly assume that the poor are locked into a separate land market. In fact, there is a single land market that is segmented, not separated, along a continuum in terms of access and affordability.
Third, we need to confront the issue of financial replicability and the ways in which finance might be leveraged through cross-subsidies, plusvalia, valorization charges, tax-and-spend, progressive consumption charges, and other mechanisms. Fourth, we need to be less gender-blind. It is important to think more imaginatively about regularization priorities with respect to gender and to explore innovative titling schemes that address the need for women’s settlement and housing rights.
Finally, we need to be much more precise in our terminology, and, more importantly, to recognize that there is a “social construction” embedded within language. The terms adopted in any society are revealing about how that society views and diagnoses housing and related social issues. Terminology may lead to punitive or patronizing policy solutions; it may even “criminalize” local populations. Most of the differences and variations in the case studies stem from the way each society constructs its understanding of the housing problem and how it presents that vision to its people-through its terminology, through its laws, procedures and policies, and through the bureaucratic and administrative organization of the state itself.
1. Julio Calderon, “Regularization of Urban Land in Peru,” Land Lines, May 1998.
Peter M. Ward is professor of sociology and of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. Among his many books is Methodology for Land and Housing Market Analysis, coedited with Gareth Jones and published by the Lincoln Institute in 1994.
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A group of Latin American scholars, practitioners and government officials who monitor urban market information systems and publish statistical reports on market behavior met in Chile in April to share their experiences and explore plans for future cooperation. Representatives came from Mexico City; San Salvador, El Salvador; Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre, Brazil; Montevideo, Uruguay; Santiago, Chile; Quito, Ecuador; and Bogota, Colombia. Specialists from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) also participated.
Most of the cities’ initiatives originated from small ventures to obtain information for project evaluation, research requirements or market analysis, and later expanded into larger-scale systems to monitor different types of markets and broader geographic regions.
Newly constructed housing and office and commercial buildings are the most frequently studied markets; price, location and product type are the basic variables being computed. Other variables are used in specific cases to obtain more precise information about each product being supplied to the market or each transaction. In all cases, statistics are gathered from the formal market, even though an estimate from Bogota indicates that this market represents only about one third of all transactions.
Newspapers, magazines or specialized publications are the major sources of market data, but building permits or visits to construction sites also provide useful information. In San Salvador, the main source is data from the banking system on credit loans for the acquisition of real estate property.
The geographical area and the time period for which statistics are computed vary from case to case. Yet, all systems face the same dilemma of losing statistical validity when reducing the size of the unit of analysis or shortening the time period. On the other hand, broadening the geographic area means a loss of homogeneity of well-defined neighborhoods, and broadening the time frame limits fine tuning of the phenomena.
General statistics and market trends are disseminated through newspapers and specialized publications, while more detailed statistics are sold through periodical bulletins and reports. Published listings of new construction provide an open and useful mechanism for correcting information, because when a case is not listed the supplier is the first one to make it known.
At present, only Brazil and Mexico are operating their information systems on a profit basis. In other countries, income from the sale of market data covers only operating expenses, but dissemination of the data provides opportunities for professional consultants to use it for related profitable activities. Thus, this information aids the private sector by making markets more transparent and helping entrepreneurs evaluate urban projects and define geographic and economic trends. For the public sector, the market data assists in the public valuation of properties and in planning purposes.
Many challenges remain to improve the coverage of urban market transactions, the quality of the information, the analysis of the data, and the debate this information can stimulate regarding urban land policy. From an academic perspective, the challenge is to improve the understanding of the phenomena being observed. From a professional perspective, it is to use the available information for better project analysis and to adjust valuation maps to establish more accurate records for property tax purposes.
Since many Latin American cities lack any type of urban market monitoring systems, the special challenge facing the participants in this ongoing project is to find ways to share their experiences to improve the efficiency of market operations and urban planning throughout the region.
Pablo Trivelli is regional coordinator of the Urban Management Program, United Nations Development Program, Santiago, Chile. The seminar was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute with the GTZ-MINVU project, the Urban Studies Institute of the Catholic University of Chile, and Chile’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.
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Brownfields are industrial and commercial properties with known or suspected soil contamination problems. The environmental and financial challenges of dealing with these sites represent serious barriers to potential urban revitalization.
As the antonym for greenfields, or undeveloped land in suburban and rural communities, brownfields have made their way to the top of many urban priority lists. The National Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Economic Development Administration, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development are among the groups that have made recent brownfield policy statements.
Development Perspectives
Many central cities have nearly exhausted their supply of “clean” land for development, contributing to their loss of residents, jobs and a stable tax base. Inner-city businesses often relocate to surrounding suburbs because land is not available in the city to support their future expansion. Thus, urban brownfields give an inadvertent boost to the economic development strategies of outlying areas. This increased development pressure, in turn, can pose complex suburban and rural growth management issues.
While most known or suspected brownfields are in central cities, the problem is also evident in older inner-ring suburbs, some rural areas and military base communities. Brownfields, in short, play an important role in shaping regional development patterns by influencing the location of residential and business activities. Central cities must tackle the brownfields problem to provide new land for development and reverse their declining economic competitiveness.
Environmental Perspectives
Varying opinions exist on the extent of the brownfields problem, and more importantly what the public and private sectors should do about assessing environmental hazards on these sites. This situation will change, but not before environmental regulators clarify the relevant policies. Brownfields are not Superfund sites by regulatory definitions. The environmental and health risks of Superfund sites are significantly greater than those of brownfields. Nevertheless, brownfields can pose serious environmental threats where “real” environmental and health risks are documented through risk assessment. In many instances, however, brownfields may be less threatening than earlier thought.
Depending upon future site use, environmental and health threats can vary considerably, which raises the “how clean is clean” issue. Regulators, property owners, developers, lenders, insurers and local government officials are engaged in an open debate over future brownfields clean-up standards. Many experts, myself included, advocate standards based upon the future use of the property, as opposed to a “one standard applies to all uses” approach. Earlier regulatory practices required sites to be fully cleaned for potential residential use, which requires the highest level of clean-up. These practices are being challenged because they are so costly and because they discourage recycling of industrial land.
State Policy Innovations
Nineteen states have created voluntary brownfields clean-up programs as alternatives to regulatory enforcement. Programs such as those in Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota and New Jersey allow property owners, municipalities and other parties greater flexibility in meeting clean-up standards.
State voluntary programs are positive for several reasons. First, because they are voluntary they allow property owners and developers to initiate the process without traditional enforcement pressures. This leads to more response from private markets, and to more creative and cost-effective clean-up and redevelopment. Secondly, these programs encourage problem solving at the local level, where land use, zoning and planning regulations can contribute to solutions.
Thirdly, the state programs address key liability concerns by offering a level of “comfort” to banks, property owners, and others involved in clean-up and redevelopment. Many argue these programs must go even further. A final benefit is that state government is often willing to provide financial incentives, which experience shows are often necessary to get companies and developers to clean and reuse these properties.
State programs are expected to continue to gain momentum over time, but most administrators believe they need extra help from the EPA to make their programs more successful. They are urging federal authorities to strengthen assurances against future liability claims by stronger “comfort letters” to property owners, lenders and developers. Currently the federal government cannot provide a 100 percent delegation of authority to the states for brownfield regulation, without future federal legislative changes. Better intergovernmental coordination and greater information exchange about standards and remediation technology would help the situation. The states would welcome federal financial support for their programs, even though many will rely on private user fees to finance program administration.
Future Knowledge and Investment Needs
Most cities discover that the unknowns outweigh the facts about older industrial and commercial properties. This lack of knowledge limits city leaders’ ability to shape cost-effective strategies to cope with these problems. Knowledge is an essential ingredient in effective strategy development—ask any corporation employing knowledge strategies to best their competition. Communities with brownfields must inventory these sites and investigate the risks and opportunities associated with these properties.
Properly used, the information from these investigations can help separate real from perceived problems related to site conditions and future development potential. Knowledge can help manage the risks and reduce the uncertainty. In short, we need to end the hysteria about brownfields, which may motivate political action but also may reduce public and private confidence that cities can be revitalized and made whole once again.
Many people are searching for “deep pockets” to finance brownfield remediation. This search frightens all levels of government as budget-cutting pressures continue to grow across the public sector. Corporations and private property owners, on the other hand, reject the notion that they should either pay clean-up costs that may be unnecessary or pay for pollution problems created by previous owners or third parties.
Overall national costs to the public and private sectors of cleaning up brownfields are unknown because there is no agreed-upon definition of brownfields, and because clean-up standards continue to change. Both problems greatly affect cost estimates. City officials are unable to assess the cost of property clean-up within their jurisdictions for the same basic reasons. Future use of risk assessment techniques, coupled with the use of more cost-effective remediation technology, will help to lower these costs.
In the absence of deep pockets, communities must identify creative approaches to funding site clean-up and redevelopment. Through citywide planning, policymakers must establish useful priorities to guide their investments based upon future development trends and land use patterns. Serious environmental threats should be eliminated on any site, regardless of its development potential. In most other cases, the development potential should be a primary factor in considering next steps.
The public sector should engage corporations that own contaminated sites, banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and real estate investment funds to determine what is required to attract private capital to fund clean-up and redevelopment. Private property owners, corporations and developers should seek state and local economic development groups as potential investment partners in returning these sites to productive use.
Donald T. Iannone directs the Economic Development Program and the Great Lakes Environmental Finance Center in The Urban Center at Cleveland State University. Much of his work focuses on financing the redevelopment of brownfield sites.
Additional information in printed newsletter.
1. Photo caption: The Publicker site, a former distillery on the Delaware River in Philadelphia, was cleaned up with EPA funds and will be redeveloped as a shipping terminal.
Photo credit information: – Richard McMullin, photographer, Office of the City Representative, Philadelphia
2. Map of U.S.: EPA Brownfields Demonstration Cities
Large Cities:
Cleveland/Cuyahoga County, Ohio
Baltimore, Maryland
Detroit, Michigan
Indianapolis, Indiana
New Orleans, Louisiana
St. Louis, Missouri
Mid-Size Cities:
Birmingham, Alabama
Bridgeport, Connecticut
Knoxville, Tennessee
Louisville, Kentucky
Richmond, Virginia
Rochester, New York
Sacramento, California
Trenton, New Jersey
Smaller Cities/Clusters:
Cape Charles/Northampton County, Virginia
Laredo, Texas
Oregon Mill Sites (7 small towns), Oregon
West Central Municipal Conference, Cook County, Illinois
Caption: Eighteen cities or regions have already received grants of up to $200,000 through the EPA’s Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative. An additional 32 cities will receive funds by the end of 1995. The common objectives of these projects are to assess contamination at abandoned sites; involve community residents in decision making; leverage other public and private funds for clean-up and redevelopment; resolve liability issues; and serve as role models for other communities.
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From the earliest days of the Republic, civic boosters have prodded American governments to develop large-scale physical facilities—mega-projects, we label them—ranging from canals and railroads in the nineteenth century to rail transit systems and convention centers today. Until the mid-twentieth century, such projects tended to involve modest public expenditures by contemporary standards and they rarely caused significant disruption of the existing urban fabric.
This pattern altered abruptly in the 1950s and early 1960s. Central city economies had, with rare exceptions, stagnated through the Great Depression and World War II, and they continued to do so in the early postwar years. Local business and political leaders concluded that if central cities—particularly those developed prior to the auto age—were ever to thrive again, they would require major surgery. Specifically, they needed to clear slums to provide large downtown sites for redeveloped office districts; to facilitate high-speed automotive movement between suburban and central city locations; and to provide larger airfields with attractive terminals for the nascent commercial aviation industry.
Recognizing that they could not finance these expensive projects with locally generated funds, urban leaders campaigned aggressively for federal assistance, and they were successful in obtaining considerable amounts of funding. We attribute their success mainly to the following factors: (1) public confidence in government was unusually high in the postwar period; (2) business leaders generally accepted the need for government activism to sustain prosperity; and (3) although cities lacked the political clout to secure expensive programs on their own, they were able to participate in much broader coalitions—most notably, those focused on housing (which expanded to include urban renewal) and highways. Urban aviation advocates were less successful, but as aviation traffic boomed they were able to fund new airports and expand old ones by relying primarily on revenues from landing fees and terminal leases.
During the late 1950s and the 1960s these efforts combined to produce an unprecedented wave of urban public investment. While often successful on their own terms, these projects tended to be highly disruptive as well, destroying in particular vast amounts of low-income housing and urban parkland. Project advocates maintained that the public should accept such impacts to advance the greater good. Robert Moses, New York’s famed master builder, never tired of citing a French proverb: “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs” (Caro 1974).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, neighborhood activists allied with those involved in the emerging environmental movement against the full panoply of mega-project programs that had come into being during the 1950s. They succeeded not just in blocking large numbers of planned expressways, renewal schemes and airport projects, but also in securing the adoption of numerous statutes, regulations and judicial doctrines, thus strengthening the hands of critics in urban development controversies. For a time it seemed to most observers that the era of mega-project investment in cities was over.
“Do No Harm” Planning
The forces committed to mega-projects have proven highly resilient and adaptive, however. While the character of such investment has changed dramatically since the 1970s, its volume has remained high. Nevertheless, mega-project advocates have had to work within new constraints; they have had to learn the art of making omelets without leaving a residue of broken eggs. We label this art, as exercised in the domain of urban land use, “do no harm” planning. Its essential components are the selection, siting and design of projects to minimize disruptive side effects, and the aggressive mitigation of any harmful impacts that cannot be avoided entirely. Most obviously, governments have ceased clearing slums and building expressways through developed neighborhoods, and only one major new passenger airport—in Denver—has been constructed since the early 1970s.
Public investment in facilities such as rail transit systems, festival retail markets, sports stadiums and arenas, and convention centers has surged. Within the transportation sector, moreover, investment priorities have shifted toward the reconstruction of existing highways, new construction on suburban fringes and airport terminals rather than runway improvements. The great advantage of such projects is that they are relatively easy to site either at some distance from existing development or in older commercial districts that have few preservationist defenders.
Where cities and states have gone forward with major highway and airport projects, they have taken extraordinary steps to minimize social and environmental impacts. The new Denver airport, for example, is on a previously rural 53-square-mile site 25 miles east of downtown. Its location and scale were determined primarily by two considerations: land assembly without the disruption of existing residential enclaves; and future airport operation without significant noise impacts overflowing the airport boundary. Boston’s $14.6 billion Central Artery/Tunnel project, known colloquially as “The Big Dig,” appears very different, in that it is located in the heart of downtown, but it is virtually identical in its do no harm planning orientation. It is almost entirely underground as it passes close to built-up areas (replacing a previous elevated roadway); it has been threaded into the urban fabric without the taking of a single home; and it will add significantly to the city’s parkland.
Common Themes
In addition to do no harm planning, our review of mega-projects built over the past two decades identified the following themes as particularly salient.
Business Support
While insufficient by itself, strong business support has generally been an indispensable condition for mega-project development. Within the business community, leadership has almost invariably come from enterprises with deep local roots, particularly in real estate ownership, development and finance. The strongest supporters of Denver’s new airport, for example, were those who owned property with commercial development potential near the new site; downtown businesses concerned that the city’s existing airport was too small to allow for the region’s continued development; and the banks and financial service firms that had lent money to many of the city’s property owners and developers. Similarly, the most active and effective support group for Boston’s Big Dig has been the Artery Business Committee, a coalition of those who own major buildings adjacent to the artery’s corridor and several major employers with historic roots in downtown Boston.
Public Entrepreneurs
In addition to well-mobilized constituencies, aggressive, deft government officials have been indispensable to the success of recent mega-project proposals. Indeed, it was frequently they who originated project ideas and first sparked the formation of supportive coalitions. Even when others initiated, they commonly took the lead in crafting strategies, tactics and plans; in lobbying for state and federal aid; in securing other types of needed legislation and regulatory approvals; and in dealing with project critics.
Though business groups initiated some projects, they seemed more frequently to “invest” in proposals originated by public entrepreneurs. The business constituents were by no means easy marks, of course. Like venture capitalists in the private sector, they considered a great many ideas brought to them by public entrepreneurs (and others), but invested only in those few that looked particularly good for their enterprises, were to be carried out mainly or entirely at public expense, and had a reasonable chance of securing the myriad approvals required.
Illustratively, Boston’s Big Dig was conceived by Fred Salvucci, a transportation engineer who had become active in battles against planned highway and airport projects during the 1960s and then served as transportation secretary for twelve years under Governor Michael Dukakis. During the first Dukakis administration (1975–1979) the main constituencies for a new harbor tunnel (business) and for depressing the central artery (neighborhood and environmental groups) were at loggerheads. While temporarily out of office from 1979 to 1983, however, Salvucci concluded that the politically feasible strategy might be to marry these projects, while also relocating the tunnel to an alignment far from a neighborhood that it had historically threatened. This strategy in fact resolved the local controversy, and prepared the way for a successful campaign for massive federal aid, led again by Salvucci with critical business support.
Denver Mayor Federico Peña broke a similar type of logjam that had persisted for years over whether to expand Denver’s existing Stapleton Airport or build a new facility on a large site outside the city’s borders. Concluding that the obstacles, both political and environmental, to expanding Stapleton were insuperable, but that city ownership and operation of any new airport remained a critical objective, he negotiated successfully with adjacent Adams County for a massive land annexation. To achieve this objective, he accepted conditions protecting county residents from significant airport noise and guaranteeing Adams County most of the tax benefits that would flow from economic development around the new airport. With local agreements in hand he, like Salvucci, then led a successful campaign for special federal assistance.
Mitigation
Do no harm plans avoid substantial neighborhood and environmental disruption but it is impossible to build a mega-project with no negative side effects. The commitment of do no harm planning is to ameliorate such impacts as much as possible, and to offset them with compensatory benefits when full direct mitigation cannot be achieved. The boundary between mitigating harm and providing net benefits to protesting groups is often indistinct, however, so the norm of mitigation provides leverage as well for skilled activists whose demands are at times tangential to the mega-projects whose budgets they seek to tap. Mega-project champions in turn reflected on the fate of such projects as New York City’s proposed Westway, which failed because of what seemed at first a minor legal challenge. They were deathly afraid of litigation and were frequently willing to make very expensive concessions in return for agreements by critics not to sue.
During permitting for the Big Dig, for example, Boston’s Conservation Law Foundation (CLF), a group whose signature strategy was litigation for environmental purposes, threatened to sue unless the state committed to accompany the highway project with a multi-billion dollar set of rail transit investments, mainly for expansion. CLF’s rationale was that the transit projects would prevent the new road from filling up with traffic, which in turn would generate more air pollution. Modeling done for the project (as well as data from other regions) showed that the Big Dig would not in fact have significant air pollution effects, and that investing in rail transit extensions would be a particularly inefficient way to offset pollution effects if they did occur. Nonetheless, both Democratic and Republican state administrations acquiesced to CLF’s demands because they did not want to risk litigation, which at the very least threatened project delays and might also have imperiled the breadth of local consensus in support of the Big Dig.
Bottom-up Federalism
A naïve observer of American politics might assume that the federal government distributes grants to achieve national goals. In fact, however, the grantor-grantee relationship is usually much more complicated than that. Recipient jurisdictions are typically active participants in the coalitions that bring new programs into being and provide them with critical support each budget season. The programs of aid for mega-project investment that we examined were all distinguished more by their openness to local initiative than their sharp definition of national purpose. If grantee jurisdictions had a great deal of influence collectively on program structure, moreover, they had even more when it came to projects, and they were able to exercise it individually.
Every project we studied was initiated by subnational officials and interest groups, and it was they who took the lead at every stage in the decision process. While limited in their discretion by federal program rules, they were alert as well to opportunities for securing waivers, statutory amendments and add-on funds, with the assistance of their congressional delegations. Stated another way, when federal aims are diffuse and weakly defended, principal-agent theory (as applied to the intergovernmental system) needs to be read bottom-up rather than top-down.
High and Rising Costs
Do no harm designs and related mitigation agreements have tended to produce projects that are vastly more expensive than their historic predecessors. According to Brian Taylor (1995), the average cost per centerline mile of urban freeways rose by more than 600 percent in real terms from the 1960s to the 1980s, and costs were even more extreme in some of the mega-projects we examined. Whereas Taylor found that urban freeways cost on average about $54 million per centerline mile (in 2002 dollars) in the 1980s, for example, the Big Dig cost $1.9 billion per centerline mile. Judith Grant Long (2002) reports in a similar vein that the average cost of new stadiums and arenas more than quadrupled in real terms from the 1950s to the 1990s, and we have calculated that light rail development costs increased by nearly two-fifths from the 1980s to the 1990s.
Both older and more recent projects have been marked by a consistent pattern of substantial cost increases between authorization and completion. The projected cost of Boston’s Big Dig, for example, has roughly tripled in real terms since its approval by Congress as an interstate highway project in 1987. The cost of Denver International Airport more than doubled from the late 1980s, when it received voter approval and its federal funding commitments, to its completion six years later.
While a full study of this issue was beyond the scope of our work, we judge that the consistent pattern of underestimation has two primary causes. First, project advocates have very strong incentives to estimate optimistically as they seek political commitments of support. Second, mega-projects are often so complex—both technically and in terms of the mitigation agreements that will often prove necessary to keep them on track—that early cost estimates are typically little more than guesses within very broad ranges.
Locally Painless Project Funding
The hallmark of successful mega-project financing is that projects should appear costless, or nearly so, to the great majority of local voters. The easiest way to achieve this result is to rely on funding from higher-level governments. Where such aid is unavailable or insufficient, the challenge is to identify other sources of revenue to which local voters are generally insensitive—which means, above all, avoiding local property and income taxes and spreading the burden beyond host city residents.
This challenge became increasingly salient after 1970 with rising antitax sentiment, the end of federal renewal aid, and the surge in capital spending for such facilities as stadiums, arenas and convention centers, for which federal aid was only rarely available. In the growing domain of mass transit, moreover, federal matching ratios have tended to decline since 1980.
The revenue strategies adopted to deal with these challenges have been varied and ingenious. New terminals and runways at major airports have been funded largely by increased landing fees, lease payments, and (since the early 1990s) ticket surcharges authorized by the federal government but imposed locally. Stadiums, arenas and convention centers are commonly funded by taxes that fall mainly on nonresidents, such as taxes on hotel rooms, car rentals and restaurant bills. Where broad-based taxes have been unavoidable, the preferred method has been incremental add-ons to sales taxes, which typically require voter approval. Voters have often said no, but sales tax increases provide large amounts of revenue when they are adopted—and when they are not, project advocates routinely come back with revised plans. In Los Angeles and Seattle, for example, transit advocates responded to referendum defeats by scaling back their rail plans and allocating some of the projected revenue to bus service and local road improvements.
Looking to the Future
Almost two decades ago, when New York City’s ambitious Westway project died even though its backers had helped pioneer the do no harm planning and design paradigm, then-Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wondered whether it had become so difficult to build public projects that “Central Park could not conceivably be built today” (Finder 1985). Recent history suggests, however, that the mega-project impulse remains strong. The pertinent question is not whether the U.S. political system can still generate mega-projects but whether the projects that go forward are typically worth their costs to taxpayers.
In general, economists are skeptical about the cost-effectiveness of the most prominent mega-projects, from the Big Dig to the scores of rail transit systems, professional sports facilities and convention centers, built over the past 25 years. Project advocates invariably retort that the economists miss intangible project benefits such as fostering community pride and (in the case of transit, particularly) strengthening the likelihood of smart growth practices in new development. The national coalitions in support of highway and airport improvements, which economists tend to rate more favorably than other types of projects, have argued vociferously that current environmental rules and opportunities for critics to litigate are too onerous and should be relaxed.
There is no easy resolution of these issues because they involve tradeoffs between important, deeply held values. However, our review of a half-century of public works projects in urban areas has left us with three clear impressions. First, states and localities should be required to bear half or more of the cost of projects they undertake, because great windfalls of earmarked money from higher levels of government tend to overwhelm serious local deliberation. Second, strong environmental regulation helps ensure that local pro-growth coalitions do not leave fouled environments or devastated neighborhoods in their wake. Finally, while referenda are in general a flawed instrument of policy making, the evidence seems to suggest that the requirement of voter approval for major local projects tends to have a salutary effect on the bargaining between business groups that stand to benefit financially from the proposed investments and the more general interests of local taxpayers and residents.
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Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff are the coauthors of Mega-Projects: The Changing Politics of Urban Public Investment. Altshuler is the Stanton Professor of Urban Policy at the Kennedy School of Government and the Graduate School of Design (GSD) at Harvard University, and director of the Kennedy School’s Taubman Center for State and Local Government. Luberoff is the Taubman Center’s associate director and an adjunct lecturer at GSD.
References
Caro, Robert A. 1974. The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Finder, Alan. 1985. Westway: A road that was paved with mixed intentions, losing confidence and opportunities. New York Times, September 22, sec. 4, 6.
Long, Judith Grant. 2002. Full count: The real cost of pubic funding for major league sports facilities and why some cities pay more to play. Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University.
Taylor, Brian. 1995. Public perceptions, fiscal realities, and freeway planning: The California case.
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Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.
Durante varios años, el Instituto Lincoln ha patrocinado programas de investigación y capacitación en colaboración con funcionarios de Porto Alegre, Brasil. El experimento de política del suelo descrito en este artículo representa un avance de alto potencial pedagógico porque recalca la importancia de los factores de procedimiento (gestión, negociación, transparencia, legitimidad pública) en la provisión de tierras urbanizadas para los pobres, por encima del enfoque tradicional en las necesidades de financiamiento y otros recursos.
En el mundo de hoy, aproximadamente mil millones de personas viven en tugurios de barrios marginales con infraestructura precaria y sin seguridad de tenencia, y se espera que la situación empeore en el futuro (UN-HABITAT 2003). Desde las perspectivas del orden urbano y del ambiente, las ocupaciones ilegales del suelo suelen causar daños irreversibles e imponer altos costos de urbanización para los gobiernos municipales y para la sociedad como un todo.
La irregularidad es un fenómeno multidimensional que involucra cuestiones de tenencia (derechos de ocupación legal, registro de títulos, etc.); cumplimiento de normas y regulaciones urbanas (tamaños de lotes, tolerancias para espacios públicos, disposición de calles, etc.); cantidad y calidad de servicios suministrados; tipo de área donde se produce el asentamiento (áreas con riesgos ecológicos, laderas, zonas industriales abandonadas contaminadas, etc.); y por encima de todo, el proceso de ocupación en sí, que suele ser diametralmente opuesto al de la urbanización formal. En el mundo “formal”, la ocupación representa la última fase de una secuencia legal y reglamentada que empieza con la titulación y continúa con el planeamiento y la dotación de servicios.
Si bien las áreas irregulares suelen disponer de infraestructura básica, lo cierto es que la instalan los parceladores o las autoridades municipales después de la ocupación y frecuentemente como medida de emergencia. Por ejemplo, algunas veces existen redes troncales de agua y sistemas de alcantarillado cerca de las áreas donde se están formando los asentamientos irregulares, y el parcelador o incluso los ocupantes se limitan a improvisar conexiones clandestinas a las tuberías principales. Esta clase de intervención, si bien no es desastrosa en asentamientos pequeños, conlleva la extensión de los servicios a áreas no aptas para la ocupación humana. En otros casos, compañías de servicios públicos o privados extienden sus servicios a nuevos asentamientos sin tener en cuenta su condición legal y a menudo sin consultar con las autoridades municipales.
Procesos de ocupación típicos
Hoy en día, la manera más común de crear asentamientos irregulares consiste en ocupar parcelas mediante una compleja sucesión de transacciones comerciales en las que participan el propietario, el promotor inmobiliario o parcelador (fraccionador de terrenos) y, frecuentemente, los futuros ocupantes. Los propietarios buscan maneras de sacarle rentabilidad a la tierra; los parceladores hacen caso omiso a los códigos municipales y producen subdivisiones de bajo costo y alta rentabilidad; y los ocupantes pobres adquieren estos terrenos ilegales simplemente porque no tienen otra opción y quizás ni siquiera conocimiento de la legalidad de la situación. Por lo general, estas personas carecen de fuentes regulares de ingresos y de ahorros que les permitan aspirar a créditos o satisfacer las estrictas normas de construcción y otras condiciones exigidas para la adquisición y ocupación formal.
Los ocupantes compran el “derecho de ocupación” a través de un contrato de adquisición de la parcela (sin importar el estatus legal del terreno) y proceden a organizar la disposición de las calles y a construir viviendas sencillas. Cuando se realiza una inspección oficial, ya es demasiado tarde: las casas ya se construyeron y la comunidad está organizada para resistirse a cualquier intento de cambio. Las autoridades públicas no tienen capacidad para ir al ritmo de este ciclo de complicidad y terminan limitando su función a una mínima inspección, lo que no sólo esconde un modelo de gestión tolerante de la informalidad sino que pone en evidencia la carencia de otras opciones habitacionales para ese segmento de la población.
Muchas ciudades están aplicando medidas curativas de alto costo para introducir mejoras urbanas y programas de regularización de títulos, pero su eficacia ha sido limitada hasta la fecha (Smolka 2003). Lo más grave y paradójico es que las expectativas creadas por estos programas tienden a aumentar el número de personas que recurren a la irregularidad. Para decirlo en pocas palabras: el proceso típico de acceso a tierra urbanizada por parte de los pobres urbanos es injusto e ineficaz, y a la larga termina en un círculo vicioso de irregularidad porque contribuye a la pobreza en vez de mitigarla. El problema no es tanto definir el tipo, el proveedor y la escala de los servicios suministrados sino más bien cómo, cuándo y dónde funciona el proceso de dotación de dichos servicios.
El caso de Porto Alegre, Brasil
Porto Alegre, capital del estado más meridional de Brasil, es centro de un área metropolitana formada por 31 municipalidades. Con una población de 1.360.590 habitantes (año 2000), esta ciudad ha ganado reconocimiento mundial gracias a sus programas de reducción de la pobreza e inclusión social y sus muy aclamados procesos de gestión participativa que han mejorado la calidad de vida de sus habitantes (Getúlio Vargas Foundation 2004; Jones Lang Lasalle 2003; UNDP 2003; UN/UMP 2003). Cabe mencionar el alto alcance de los servicios de infraestructura, ejemplificado en el hecho de que el 84 por ciento de las viviendas de la ciudad están conectadas al sistema de alcantarillado; el 99,5 por ciento recibe suministro de agua tratada; el 98 por ciento recibe electricidad; y el 100 por ciento de los sectores goza de servicios de recolección selectiva de desechos (municipalidad de Porto Alegre, 2003).
A pesar de estas cifras impresionantes, el 25,5 por ciento de la población vive en los 727 asentamientos irregulares de la ciudad (Green, 2004) y el crecimiento anual estimado de la población de estas áreas marginales es del 4 por ciento, en comparación con sólo 1,35 por ciento para la ciudad en conjunto. Esta situación plantea la interrogante de cómo explicar el aumento paradójico de irregularidad ante la provisión generalizada de servicios básicos en un periodo de gestión participativa exitosa y popular.
A pesar de que el proceso decisorio de inversiones públicas en Porto Alegre ha mejorado desde 1989 (fecha de la introducción del sistema de presupuesto participativo descentralizado), también es cierto que el proceso sigue aquejado de fallas tales como ineficacia del sistema económico, técnicas poco apropiadas, caos medioambiental, injusticia fiscal (porque el dinero que debería beneficiar al público termina en los bolsillos de los parceladores) e insostenibilidad política. Muchas de las zonas están plagadas de problemas serios como calles deficientes sin drenaje ni pavimentación, inestabilidad geológica, susceptibilidad a inundaciones y falta de titulación legal, lo cual se traduce, por ejemplo, en la carencia de domicilio postal para poder recibir correspondencia. Así y todo, el caso de Porto Alegre es muy interesante porque constituye una vívida demostración de que el problema de confrontar la irregularidad no se refiere tanto a la provisión de servicios sino a cambiar el proceso de prestación de los mismos. Se trata de una cuestión de procedimientos, un cambio en las reglas del juego.
Un innovador instrumento de política urbana
El Urbanizador Social fue desarrollado en Porto Alegre como un instrumento, y más generalmente un programa, para superar el proceso insostenible de provisión de servicios urbanos pese a una larga historia de legislación reglamentaria (fig. 1). Promulgada en julio de 2003, poco después de la aprobación del innovador decreto brasileño Estatuto de la Ciudad, la Ley del Urbanizador Social fue el fruto de intenso diálogo entre sindicatos de la industria de la construcción, pequeños parceladores, cooperativas de vivienda, agentes financieros y la municipalidad.
Un “urbanizador social” es un promotor inmobiliario inscrito en el municipio, que tiene interés en construir viviendas de interés social en áreas identificadas por el gobierno y conviene en hacerlo bajo ciertos términos negociados tales como ofrecer parcelas urbanizadas a precios accesibles. Se trata de una asociación público-privada a través de la cual la municipalidad se compromete a aumentar la flexibilidad de ciertas normas y reglamentos urbanos, agilizar el proceso de obtención de licencias, reducir los requisitos jurídicos y reconocer la urbanización progresiva en etapas. También se prevé la transferencia de los derechos de urbanización como estímulo para los urbanizadores privados. Otros incentivos pueden presentarse en forma de acceso a líneas de crédito específicas o ciertas inversiones públicas directas en infraestructura urbana, de manera que los costos no terminen saliendo de los bolsillos del comprador final. Entre los posibles “urbanizadores sociales” figuran promotores inmobiliarios debidamente certificados, contratistas que ya están trabajando en el mercado informal, propietarios y cooperativas autogestionadas.
El programa Urbanizador Social de Porto Alegre incorpora lecciones aprendidas de problemas reales como también oportunidades de acción pública aún sin explotar, y se inspira en varias ideas específicas. Primero que todo, reconoce que los parceladores que suministran tierras urbanizadas al sector de bajos ingresos —si bien a través de actividades ilegales, irregulares, informales y clandestinas— poseen una experiencia y familiaridad con dicho sector que definitivamente no tienen las autoridades públicas. Por eso, en vez de condenar a estos agentes, posiblemente sea más beneficioso para el interés público darles incentivos apropiados (como también sanciones) para que puedan desempeñarse dentro del marco legal. Además, aunque es ampliamente sabido que los parceladores suelen ganar más dinero si se mantienen al margen de la ley (porque tienen menos costos generales, no pagan tarifas de permisos, etc.) menos conocido es el hecho de que, si se les diera la opción, muchos de ellos preferirían trabajar legalmente, incluso si ello redujera sus ganancias.
En segundo lugar, las plusvalías generadas por las transacciones del suelo podrían convertirse en una fuente de ingresos para el proyecto. En la práctica, este valor agregado debería ser distribuido directamente por el propietario —como una contribución de tierra que exceda lo exigido por la ley para los fraccionamientos de terrenos para el sector de bajos recursos—, e indirectamente por el parcelador en forma de menores precios del suelo para los compradores de bajos ingresos. En la mayoría de los casos de urbanización irregular, el público no percibe los beneficios de estos aumentos en el valor del suelo.
En tercer lugar, al dar transparencia a los términos de las negociaciones directas, y en consecuencia propiciar acuerdos que benefician a todas las partes interesadas (propietarios, promotores, autoridades públicas, compradores), el proceso del Urbanizador Social crea vías que facilitan el cumplimiento de las normas establecidas para el proyecto. Otro componente del proceso de negociación está relacionado con el programa de inversión acordado y su efecto en eliminar la especulación.
En cuarto lugar, para que este nuevo modo de urbanización pueda tener éxito, es necesario que pueda ofrecer un suministro adecuado de tierra urbanizada que satisfaga las necesidades sociales bajo condiciones de mercado competitivas (es decir, más costeables que las condiciones de los parceladores que normalmente serían informales). Un ingrediente básico del programa es que establece nuevas reglas para la urbanización social en general. Para los agentes privados debe estar muy claro que el proceso del Urbanizador Social es la única vía de participación del gobierno en el desarrollo de asentamientos costeables y aprobados.
El Urbanizador Social como un tercer camino
Desde el punto de vista del interés público, la meta principal de esta nueva estrategia es establecer, antes de la ocupación de los terrenos, la base o al menos un programa urbanizador que permita reducir o controlar los costos de la urbanización (fig. 2).
Por lo general, los gobiernos de las ciudades del tercer mundo responden a la incapacidad del sector pobre para tener acceso al mercado formal mediante dos modelos o paradigmas. Bajo el modelo del subsidio, el público interviene para facilitar tierra urbanizada bien sea directamente a través de asentamientos públicos desarrollados como respuesta a situaciones de emergencia, o indirectamente mediante préstamos a tasas inferiores del mercado para los promotores inmobiliarios que se desenvuelven en ese sector del mercado. En el otro extremo, el llamado “modelo de tolerancia del 100 por ciento” reconoce que el gobierno no tiene la capacidad de suministrar toda la tierra urbanizada requerida, y en consecuencia tolera arreglos irregulares e informales que pueden a la larga mejorarse mediante varias clases de programas de regularización.
Ninguna de estas dos maneras de enfrentar el problema afectan las condiciones del mercado y ambas contribuyen al círculo vicioso de la informalidad. En el primero de los casos, los subsidios se transforman en mayores precios del suelo, mientras que en el segundo caso los parceladores imponen una recargo basado en las expectativas de una regularización futura: mientras mayor es la expectativa, mayor es el recargo.
El Urbanizador Social representa una tercera vía que reconoce tanto el papel y la experiencia de los parceladores informales que trabajan en el segmento de bajos recursos, como la función indispensable de los agentes públicos, quienes prestan su apoyo a la población pobre para que participe en un mercado que, de otra manera, sería inaccesible. En otras palabras, este programa representa un esfuerzo para “formalizar lo informal” e “informalizar lo formal”, facilitando y proporcionando incentivos para que los promotores inmobiliarios puedan desenvolverse con más flexibilidad en ese sector poco rentable que es el mercado de bajos ingresos. Es un instrumento diseñado para estimular tanto a los empresarios que operan en el mercado inmobiliario clandestino como aquéllos que lo hacen en el segmento mercantil formal de mayores recursos, a fin de que urbanicen la tierra bajo las normas regulares existentes.
En el mundo entero se ha establecido una gran variedad de asociaciones público-privadas. Aunque es posible que el Urbanizador Social pueda ser visto como otro más de estos arreglos, consideramos importante establecerlo claramente y darle amplia difusión a fin de incrementar las posibilidades de este tipo de asociaciones.
La promulgación de la Ley del Urbanizador Social constituye un intento de cambiar la manera tradicional de responder a las necesidades de vivienda del sector de bajos recursos, porque da una señal clara a los agentes privados que gestionan en el mercado del suelo y protege al público de las acciones arbitrarias de los desarrollos privados. El Urbanizador Social ha demostrado ser una herramienta indispensable para la gestión pública. Sin embargo, dado que rompe con las prácticas de “siempre”, su puesta en práctica enfrenta todavía una multiplicidad de desafíos:
1. Desde un punto de vista institucional, debe superar el modelo tradicional de desarrollo urbano del municipio, que se ha limitado a los aspectos de regulación e inspección. Esta tradición puede interferir en las funciones de la autoridad pública como gerente, líder de los procesos de urbanización y regulador de relaciones que normalmente quedan a la merced de las reglas del mercado.
2. Desde el punto de vista de la administración municipal, la meta es coordinar sus muchas agencias, sucursales y entidades para estimular actividades que gocen de viabilidad económica y atractivo para los promotores inmobiliarios. El problema es que dicha meta pareciera estar reñida con los objetivos típicos del sector público.
3. Para poder atraer a grandes empresas inmobiliarias que forjen mejores asociaciones con las autoridades públicas, es fundamental que el instrumento ofrezca grandes atractivos dado que estas empresas ya tienen suficientes oportunidades lucrativas en el mercado de altos recursos.
4. Asimismo, el programa deberá poder aumentar la viabilidad de asociaciones con pequeñas empresas inmobiliarias, quienes por lo general carecen de la infraestructura interna y de los recursos financieros para poder desenvolverse en este tipo de mercado.
5. Finalmente, el Urbanizador Social debe procurar su estabilidad y función como elemento estructural de política urbana de acuerdo con el principio de acceso democrático a la tierra. Como nota interesante, tras 16 años con el mismo grupo político progresista en poder, Porto Alegre está actualmente pasando por una serie de cambios políticos acompañados de incertidumbre. A la larga, el Urbanizador Social no podrá crear resultados importantes si los gobiernos municipales no incorporan sus principios de manera estratégica a largo plazo.
Actualmente Porto Alegre tiene cinco proyectos pilotos de Urbanizador Social en diferentes etapas de desarrollo. Para que puedan funcionar como verdaderos experimentos, en ellos participan diferentes clases de promotores inmobiliarios tales como empresas urbanizadoras pequeñas, urbanizadoras ya establecidas en el mercado y cooperativas de viviendas. Una de estas áreas piloto ha demostrado la posibilidad de producir 125 m2 de tierras completamente urbanizadas a precios que van desde US$25 a US$28 por m2, en contraste con los precios del mercado formal, de US$42 a US$57 por m2 , por la misma cantidad de tierra. Los precios más bajos citados demuestran la buena disposición que tienen los promotores inmobiliarios a ceder en sus contratos con las autoridades municipales para ofrecer sus servicios dentro del marco del Urbanizador Social.
La municipalidad también intentó adquirir financiamiento para actividades de urbanización social a través de la entidad Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), organización federal responsable por el financiamiento del desarrollo urbano y de la vivienda. La agencia está creando una nueva línea de financiamiento dentro de su programa de asociaciones, mediante el cual se otorga crédito a un comprador para la compra de una parcela. Hasta ahora, esta opción financiera había estado disponible únicamente para la adquisición de unidades habitacionales antes de su construcción. La idea de una línea de crédito para financiar el desarrollo de tierra urbanizada es una novedad. Otro aspecto digno de mencionarse son las intenciones de la administración municipal para anular los requisitos de análisis de riesgo para los promotores inmobiliarios; esto representa un ingrediente fundamental para abrir el campo a los pequeños promotores inmobiliarios.
Los elementos innovadores del instrumento del Urbanizador Social, en comparación con los métodos públicos tradicionales de enfrentar la irregularidad urbana, han captado la atención de muchas organizaciones y otras municipalidades. En el ámbito federal, el Urbanizador Social se considera totalmente integrado con los principios del Estatuto de la Ciudad, por lo que ha ganado el apoyo del Ministerio de las Ciudades de Brasil. Actualmente el Congreso nacional brasileño está debatiendo sobre otra ley federal que trata de la subdivisión de la tierra urbana, y el Urbanizador Social es parte de la discusión. Si se aprueba, esta legislación sobre subdivisiones será un paso importante para cambiar el deficiente proceso tradicional de suministro de acceso a la tierra para la población urbana pobre de otras ciudades brasileñas.
Bibliografía
Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 2004. Revista Você S/A.Editora Abril. August 10. São Paulo, Brasil
Green, Eliane D’Arrigo, ed. 2004. Irregularidade fundiária em Porto Alegre por região de planejamento (Irregularidad del suelo en Porto Alegre por regiones de planificación) Municipalidad de Porto Alegre, Secretaría de Planificación Municipal. www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br/spm/
Jones Lang Lasalle. 2003. World Winning Cities II. http://www.joneslanglasalle.com/research/index.asp
Municipalidad of Porto Alegre. 2003. Informaçöes a cidade: Títulos e Conquistas (Información sobre la ciudad: Títulos y logros). www.portoalegre.rs.gov.br
Smolka, Martim O. 2003. Informalidad, Pobreza Urbana y Precios de la Tierra. Land Lines 15(1): 4–7.
UN-HABITAT. 2003. The Challenge Of Slums: Global Report On Human Settlements. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT. http://hq.unhabitat.org/register/item.asp?ID=1156
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. Human Development Report 2003. New York: Oxford University Press. http://www.undp.org/
United Nations Urban Gestión Program (UN/UMP). 2003. Report de la Urban Management Program of UN-HABITAT 2003. Nairobi, Kenya: UN-HABITAT. http://hq.unhabitat.org/programmes/ump/públicoations.asp
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The annual rate of urbanization in China has increased rapidly from 17.9 percent in 1978 to 39.1 percent in 2002, accompanied by rural-to-urban migration on a massive scale. More than 70 million rural migrants were working and living in urban areas at the end of 2000.
This influx of population has created a unique urban form—villages within cities, also referred to as “urbanizing villages” or ChengZhongCun in Chinese. For example, in the city of Shenzhen, with an official population of around 9 million in 2000, approximately 2.15 million inhabitants lived in 241 urbanizing villages with a land area of almost 44 square kilometers. In the city of Guangzhou, with a population of more than 8 million, there were 277 urbanizing villages with approximately one million inhabitants in 2000.
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Faculty Profile of Paulo Sandroni
