Topic: Planificación urbana y regional

Implementing Waterfront Redevelopment in Amsterdam and Havana

Frank Uffen, Abril 1, 2004

Over the last 50 years cities have been the scene of major transformations that have allowed them to evolve from being centers primarily for economic activities to a combination of more specialized productive, commercial and service functions. The results are mixed, but in those cities considered most successful, beauty and humanism have managed to coexist with economic efficiency and effectiveness, significantly increasing the creation of wealth and the well-being of the community at large. In this context, developments known as “large urban projects” seek to rescue dilapidated areas such as historic centers, former industrial and military zones, vacant railroads and airports, and decaying housing settlements and transform them into vibrant residential areas able to generate tax revenues, employment, and public and social benefits to enhance quality of life.

The redevelopment of waterfronts creates tremendous opportunities to reintegrate historic city centers with their adjacent waterways and to facilitate growth that would otherwise move to the outskirts of the city. Many concerns have to be addressed, however. What type and scale of development are desirable and possible? How can meaningful relationships be established between the old and the new? What are the impacts on the environment and the existing infrastructure? What public policies and investments are needed? What are the roles of the public and private sectors? How do we organize the planning process, including building political and community support?

Amsterdam and Havana are cases where waterfronts provide challenges and opportunities to address this complex balancing act. Both are UNESCO World Heritage Cities dealing with the pressures of profit-driven real estate development and the desire to protect both their historic centers and the interests of their contemporary populations.

In December 2003 the Lincoln Institute, with Havana’s Group for the Development of the Capital (GDIC), the Office of the Historian and the Port Authority of the Ministry of Transportation, cosponsored a seminar in Havana at which waterfront experts from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, New York and Panama shared their experiences with Cuban planners and public officials. This article elaborates on the Amsterdam presentation, in particular how management, experiments, planning and land policies enabled an impressive transformation of that city’s former industrial waterfronts, and offers lessons that may be applicable for Havana.

Planning and Development Policies in the Netherlands

The Netherlands has a well-known tradition of strong national planning and development, precipitated by the housing shortage since World War II. The notion of limited space drives the country’s development policies and its commitment to preserving green and agricultural areas between cities. Housing, infrastructure, retail and office development, environmental protection, agriculture, water management and open space are major concerns at both the national and local levels. With two-thirds of their country below sea level, the Dutch have always pursued new ways of relating to water. National planning policies thus concentrate on facilitating growth in designated areas, controlling urban sprawl and reorganizing inner cities without neglecting major infrastructure and the management and control of green spaces and water bodies.

The Dutch rediscovered the importance of their cities in the 1980s after the rapid growth of suburbs and new towns caused increasing congestion and a lack of livable spaces. The idea of a “compact city” was adopted in the nation’s Fourth Memorandum of Urban Planning (1988), advocating concentration on the urban nexus in order to “redevelop currently abandoned areas.” Typical sites include Rotterdam’s Kop van Zuid and Amsterdam’s Eastern Docklands. The compact city concept was broadened in the 1990s with the notion of the “complete city,” marrying concepts of multiple and intensive land use with the concentration of functions and activities in a melting pot of lifestyles.

The reorganization of transit areas and transport routes is another planning priority that aims to combine different transport functions and discourage the use of cars. Examples include the Airport City plan for the Amsterdam Schiphol Airport and the area around the future high-speed train station Zuidas-WTC. The Zuidas master plan creates enough space over the railway and highway for the construction of 7 million square feet of offices, 1,500 dwellings, retail space, hotels, museums and a new park.

Despite the national government’s plans and ambitions, financial resources determine its role in development projects. The significant decrease in national housing and development subsidies since 1990 has highlighted the strategic importance of the local government in the (re)development process. However, the Amsterdam case also shows that management capacity, reliable development partners and creative financial and development tools are instrumental for redevelopment.

Amsterdam’s Land and Housing Policies

Amsterdam is the cultural and financial capital of the Netherlands and the largest city in the Randstad-Holland or Deltametropolis region of 6 million people. The city has close to 750,000 inhabitants, 375,000 housing units and 417,000 jobs, and has one of the world’s largest conserved historic city centers.

Amsterdam’s land policies are strategic tools in the city’s redevelopment strategies. In 1896 the city democratically decided on a land-lease system to acquire land and lease it to future users. Important arguments for leasing were that increases in land value should benefit the entire community and the city should determine the use of scarce land to prevent speculation and undesirable development.

The land-lease system works as follows. The city’s land corporation acquires land and leases it to private developers for periods of 49 or 99 years. Leaseholders pay an annually adjusted amount for use of the land, determined by location, square feet of development, type of use (office, retail, affordable or market rate housing, open space, etc.), new or existing buildings, and parking (on the street or inside). The city determines the price of land through a residual land value method that links the market value of the property, the land and the construction costs. The value of land equals the sales value of the property minus the construction costs determined by the location (costs are considerably higher in the historic neighborhoods). In 2002 leases totaled 59 million euros.

Acquisition of privately owned land—as in the Eastern Docklands area—is financed through loans to the city’s land corporation, whose interest payments account for 80 percent of its expenses. Excess revenues are used to support the city’s development and rehabilitation efforts, particularly for commercially unprofitable projects such as parks and open space. This system also serves political objectives such as the provision and geographic distribution of affordable housing. In a high-density city like Amsterdam, land is scarce and its use is subject to much real estate pressure. As the landowner the city maintains a strategic role in determining the use, quality and amount of land available for development.

Amsterdam relies on its relationships with the city’s civic and nonprofit development groups for support and implementation of its plans, and the role of housing associations is critical. These associations were created as a result of the housing law of 1901, which allowed for union-related associations and religious organizations to establish nonprofit housing associations. With national subsidies and strong support from local governments, they have built thousands of units, especially in the neighborhoods damaged during the war. In some of these areas over 75 percent of the units is owned by housing associations.

The deregulation of the Dutch housing market in the early 1990s strongly affected the housing associations’ position as both owners and developers. They lost most of the national housing subsidies, but in exchange the government granted them more financial and institutional freedom to manage their assets. As a result, the nonprofit sector had to become more professionalized, and many of the housing associations merged to create economies of scale. Today, Amsterdam counts 13 housing associations that manage over 200,000 units, ranging from 1,400 to 37,500 units each. Many associations successfully positioned themselves as trustworthy and financially stable developers. Moreover, they became strategic partners for commercial developers looking for experts on affordable housing and partners for creating goodwill for their projects with the city and community groups. More and more, they develop mixed-income projects in collaboration with private developers using creative financial packages. In 2000, for example, half of the units built by housing associations were market rate. The resulting profits financed the other half as affordable and moderate-income units.

In an unexpected side effect of the housing reform, these associations have become leaders in setting high standards for urban design and planning. With their commitment to the city and to community development they have been willing to take risks with low-cost but provocative designs, and many of their projects have become international examples for innovative affordable housing concepts.

Waterfront Redevelopment in Amsterdam

Amsterdam is a city founded on water and around a dam that separated the Amstel River from the IJ River. In the seventeenth century, Amsterdam was the world’s most prominent commercial and maritime center. The canals and waterways built in that era still marvel the millions of tourists who visit the city every year. The relationship between the city and its waterfront has not always been organic; mistakes have been made, such as the 1898 decision to build Amsterdam’s central railway station in the middle of the port area. The station effectively ruined the visual relationship and physical connections between the IJ, the port and the dam, destroying the ancient heart of the capital.

In the past 40 years, most port functions have moved closer to the sea to handle container ships, while the large financial institutions moved to the south axis of the city due to a lack of space and poor accessibility. The inner city of Amsterdam, which is adjacent to the old port areas, remains the region’s largest center for retail, culture and entertainment and is well suited for pedestrians, bicyclists and public transportation. Although the port continues to play an important economic role for Amsterdam, the city essentially turned its back to the harbor for many years.

Major areas of Amsterdam are now being converted and rehabilitated, while entirely new areas are being built on artificial islands. The city’s southern and northern waterfront system of old piers and wet docks is becoming an attractive residential and mixed-use district with retail and cultural centers, new transit, parks and waterfront promenades, most of which mix contemporary design with the historic maritime character. The construction of IJburg, an overspill area in the IJsselmeer Lake, is designed to accommodate 45,000 new inhabitants.

Discussion about the redevelopment of the Eastern Docklands and the rest of the southern IJ waterfront began in the early 1980s. Following years of negotiations between the municipality, developers and well-organized community groups, the plan, currently in the final phases of construction, proposed a series of high-density, moderate-rise communities on the water, thus remaking a historic and cultural bond with the water. Housing is the major component of all development on the IJ bank, and 40 percent of it is affordable. In many cases the city’s professional nonprofit housing associations have led the development and encouraged private investment.

The formal planning process for the IJ-waterfront started with a design competition in 1984. Initially the city government endorsed the IJ Boulevard master plan by Rem Koolhaas for the entire 10 km southern waterfront. The redevelopment program incorporated a range of uses, but focused on office development and supporting amenities to stop the exodus of corporations and to finance the proposed infrastructure program. The plan was to be implemented by the Amsterdam Waterfront Finance Company (AWF), a public-private partnership of the city and one master developer/investor with unprecedented authority. Subsequent controversy over the size and cost of the plan, the collapse of the office market in the late 1980s, and growing discontent with the plan among the city’s prominent civic and community groups led to the dismantling of the partnership in 1994.

The city then changed its approach and passed a strategic memorandum titled “Anchors of the IJ” in 1995. This plan proposed to build on the existing island structure with a phased development starting at the outer edges and working toward the Central Station area. This pragmatic and organic approach concentrated the city’s efforts and resources on master plans for smaller and more manageable areas. The development program shifted toward housing with public buildings and squares (the anchors) at strategic locations within a framework of larger infrastructure investments. The national government committed to building a new tunnel in the early phases of the planning process and a light-rail system at a later phase. Urban design and development programs were determined by site potential and strong community input and were modified over time based on experience, new ideas and changing market conditions. Since the city owns the land and thus controls how much land is available for development, it encouraged private developers to team up with nonprofit housing groups to bid for portions of the waterfront. The Amsterdam case underscores the fact that strategy, planning tools, leadership and partners are interdependent and instrumental for redevelopment that benefits the community at large.

Implications for Havana

The uniqueness of Havana’s waterfront makes it a formidable site for innovative and comprehensive redevelopment and for avoiding the mistakes that have spoiled the charm of many other cities around the world. Havana is Cuba’s capital city, home to more than 2 million of the country’s 11 million citizens. Prior to the 1959 revolution Cuba was the leading business and tourist destination in the Caribbean, but its subsequent political isolation and lack of economic development have resulted in a mostly unspoiled historic city now in desperate need of repair. Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the subsequent loss of a market for 65 percent of Cuban exports, Havana has focused on attracting investment through real estate ventures. Most joint ventures (350 were active in 2001, worth $2.6 billion) are with Canadian and European companies in the booming hospitality industry. Tourism and related activities again generate much-needed foreign currency, especially in Havana where historic downtown hotels have been upgraded and new office buildings are being built in nearby elegant neighborhoods to the west.

The government recognizes the historic and economic value of Old Havana’s architectural heritage and strongly supports renovation and rehabilitation of its historic buildings and squares. The progress and benefits are impressive, considering the limited public resources and the state of the city’s infrastructure and buildings. The Office of the Historian, the development authority for Old Havana, has stimulated revenues that generated $50 million for social and historic preservation programs in 1999 alone (Nunez, Brown and Smolka 2000).

Havana’s waterfront is considered a key asset for future growth and therefore a key area of concern. The waterfront includes the famous Malecon Boulevard as well as the lesser-known inner-harbor districts on the east side of Old Havana. Along the shores of this bay, historic warehouses and small communities are mixed with decaying infrastructure, port facilities, heavy industry and shipyards. Many different city and state agencies are involved in planning for this vast area, yet no clear development directive has been defined and most players lack the authority to take that role. In response, some agencies have developed plans for individual properties, but implementation is unlikely because there is no funding in place and the oil refineries across the bay produce heavy fumes, which discourage some tourist-oriented activities.

Since land in Havana is publicly owned, capturing the increase of land values could create a strategic and sustainable source for financing much-needed public investments in affordable housing, public space and infrastructure. The local government can lead the redevelopment process; however, support and collaboration with regional and national public partners will be important for larger investments. Flexibility in program and a focus on process instead of blueprint planning is essential to accommodate changing market conditions and emerging opportunities. The latter is especially evident as development depends significantly on private investments.

With its historic beauty, proximity to the United States and lack of development for more than 40 years, Havana draws the attention of developers from throughout the world. It has the potential to become a model livable city that has preserved most of its heritage and is not spoiled by the automobile. It is in the interest of all of us, but especially the Cuban people, to ensure that attention to both high-quality redevelopment and the public interest determines the transformation of Havana’s waterfront.

Frank Uffen is managing director of New Amsterdam Development Consultants in New York. Other Dutch participants in the seminar who contributed to this article are Riek Bakker (partner, BVR Consultancy for Urban Development, Landscape and Infrastructure, Rotterdam), Ad Hereijgers (partner, DE LIJN Office for Urban Development, Amsterdam), Willem van Leuven (project manager, Amsterdam Project Management Bureau) and Rutger Sypkens (project developer, Ballast Nedam Construction, Amsterdam).

Reference

Nunez, Ricardo, H. James Brown, and Martim Smolka. 2000. Using land value to promote development in Cuba. Land Lines 12(2):1–4.

America’s Megapolitan Areas

Robert E. Lang and Dawn Dhavale, Julio 1, 2005

Megapolitan areas are integrated networks of metro- and micropolitan areas. The name “megapolitan” plays off Jean Gottmann’s 1961 “megalopolis” label by using the same prefix. We find that the United States has ten such areas, six in the eastern part of the U.S. and four in the West (see Figure 1).

Megapolitan areas extend into 35 states, including every state east of the Mississippi River except Vermont. As of 2003, megapolitan areas contained less than one-fifth of all land area in the lower 48 states, but captured more than two-thirds of total U.S. population, or almost 200 million people. The 15 most populous U.S. metropolitan areas are also found in these megapolitan areas.

Gottmann’s megalopolis idea influenced academics but had no impact on the way the U.S. Census Bureau defines space. Today the idea of a functional trans-metropolitan geography is one that warrants renewed attention (see Carbonell and Yaro 2005). Regional economies clearly extend beyond an individual metropolitan area, and the megapolitan concept suggests a new geography to show how these economies are linked.

The Census seeks simple but definitive methods for describing and organizing space. Metropolitan areas were officially designated in 1949 to show functional economic relationships. Commuting, which at that time mostly joined suburban residents to jobs in the cities, was an easily measured and universal proxy for this linkage. Thus the center and periphery existed as a single integrated unit linked by employment dependency.

A direct functional relationship such as commuting does not exist at the megapolitan scale, however. The area is simply too large to make daily trips possible between distant sections. But commuting is just one—albeit key—way to show regional cohesion. Other integrating forces are goods movement, business linkages, cultural commonality and physical environment. A megapolitan area could represent a sales district for a branch office, or, in the case of the Northeast or Florida, a zone of fully integrated toll roads where an E-Z Pass or SunPass collection system works across multiple metropolitan areas.

A megapolitan area as defined here has the following characteristics:

  • Combines at least two existing metropolitan areas, but may include dozens of them
  • Totals more than 10 million projected residents by 2040
  • Derives from contiguous metropolitan and micropolitan areas
  • Constitutes an organic cultural region with a distinct history and identity
  • Occupies a roughly similar physical environment
  • Links large centers through major transportation infrastructure
  • Forms a functional urban network via goods and service flows
  • Creates a usable geography that is suitable for large-scale regional planning
  • Lies within the U.S.
  • Consists of counties as the most basic unit

Figure 1 highlights the key interstate highways linking major metros within megapolitan areas. Interstate 95 plays a critical role in megapolitan mobility from Maine to Florida. Because of the large population centers in the Northeast and Peninsula megas, the number of people living within 50 miles of this interstate exceeds all others in the nation. The West’s bookend to I-95 is I-5, which runs through three separate megapolitan areas. In 2000 more than 64 million people lived within 50 miles of I-95, and more than 37 million lived within the same distance of I-5. Most of this population is found in the two megapolitan areas along I-95 and the three straddling I-5. Interstate 10 also links three megas: Southland, Valley of the Sun and Gulf Coast. Other places where key interstates help define megapolitan growth are the I-35 Corridor from Kansas City, Missouri, to San Antonio, Texas; and I-85 in the Piedmont linking Atlanta, Georgia to Raleigh, North Carolina (Lang and Dhavale 2005).

Big Places, Big Numbers

Figure 2 shows the 2003 population and current growth rates in the ten megapolitan areas. As a group, megapolitans outpaced the national growth rate for the first three years of the decade—3.89 percent versus 3.33 percent, gaining 7.5 million new residents over the period. Only two megapolitan areas, Northeast and Midwest, trailed the nation as a whole in growth, but these are also by far the most the populous megas, with more than 50 and 40 million residents by 2003 respectively. Together, at 90.5 million people, they surpass the population of Germany, the largest European Union nation with 82.5 million residents. Unlike Germany, however, the Northeast and Midwest are still growing. They form the old industrial heart of the nation and still represent the largest trans-metropolitan development in the U.S.

The fastest growing megapolitan areas are in the Sunbelt, and several of them experienced gains above 5 percent for the period 2000 to 2003. The fast-growth megas, ranked by their development pace, are Valley of the Sun, Peninsula, I-35 Corridor, Southland and Piedmont. Two megapolitans now fall below the 10 million resident mark, but based on an extrapolation of current growth rates, Cascadia will pass this population size in 2025, while the booming Valley of the Sun will reach the mark by 2029.

Megapolitan areas also vary by physical size (see Figure 3). The Midwest is the largest with 119,822 square miles, an area slightly smaller than the state of New Mexico. The Piedmont is almost as expansive with 91,093 square miles. The more populous Northeast by contrast comprises just 70,062 square miles. By this calculation, the Northeast would appear to be the densest megapolitan area. However, the square mileage figure for Southland compared to its population density is significantly distorted by the inclusion of Riverside and San Bernardino counties in California, which are two of the largest counties in land area in the U.S.

Megapolitans will account for most new population and job growth from 2005 to 2040, and they will likely capture a large share of money spent on construction (Nelson 2004). These areas are projected to add 83 million people and 64 million jobs by 2040, and they will require an additional 32 million new housing units, including both new construction and replacement units. By 2030 half of the built environment will have been constructed in the previous 30 years, and by 2040 the figure could reach nearly two-thirds. The money needed to build the residential and commercial structures to house this growth is staggering. It will take an estimated $10 trillion to fund megapolitan residential construction and an additional $23 trillion for nonresidential structures.

Megapolitan Form and Function

Megapolitan areas vary in spatial form, ranging from a clear corridor or linear form to vast urban galaxies, and many megas exhibit both spatial patterns. Figure 4 showing the I-35 Corridor highlights all megapolitan counties in light shading and urbanized areas in the darker zones, lined up like beads along a string. The dark black lines are the interstate highways, and the light ones are the county boundaries. The biggest single node in the corridor is Dallas, and the only major metropolitan area that lies away from I-35 is Tulsa. The galactic form of the Piedmont area (Figure 5) illustrates interstate highway corridors lacing the region with a web of cities dominated by metropolitan Atlanta.

Figure 6 provides a summary of selected megapolitan features. The “signature industry” label refers to the businesses that are popularly associated with each area. These may not be the largest industry in the region, but they are key sectors that play to each megapolitan’s current competitive advantages. Thus, high tech is to NorCal what finance is to the Northeast or aerospace is to Cascadia—the sector in which the megapolitan dominates either U.S. or world markets.

A county-level analysis of political trends, based on the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, shows that five megas lean Republican and five Democratic. The most Democratic area is NorCal, while the I-35 Corridor is the most Republican. Midwest and Peninsula are the most swing megapolitans, with the former tilted to the Democrats and the latter to the Republicans. In 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry won the megapolitan area popular vote by 51.6 percent to 48.4 for President George W. Bush—almost the exact reverse of the nation as a whole. Kerry received 46.4 million megapolitan votes, while Bush won 43.5 million. The 90 million total megapolitan ballots accounted for three-quarters of all votes cast, while the fourth quarter of the votes went heavily for Bush. The president’s margin of victory in nonmegapolitan America was 60/40, which approximates his 2004 vote share in rural America (Lang, Dhavale and Haworth 2004).

Mega Policy Implications

Any new geographic category can reshape public policy. Given that megapolitan areas as proposed here redefine the space where two out of three Americans reside, their impact could prove significant. There are countless ways that megas may alter the policy landscape, but this discussion focuses on two issues: urban sprawl and transportation planning.

Megapolitan Sprawl. The emergence of megapolitan areas comes not only from rapid population growth over the past several decades; it also reflects how the nation is developing. Since 1950 the most significant urban pattern has been decentralization. Even by the time Gottmann first observed the megalopolis extending north and south from New York City, the emergence of the “spread city” was apparent (Regional Plan Association 1960). Suburbs from Boston to Washington were racing toward one another, making the Northeast a single extended megapolitan space.

The different ways megapolitan areas develop also provide insight into how urban decentralization varies around the nation to produce distinct regional built forms. This knowledge can improve the way regions respond to the consequences of sprawl. As measured by built density, sprawl differs in character among regions from “dense sprawl” in places such as Los Angeles, where even the edge of the region may have subdivisions with small lots, to the edges of southern metropolitan areas that feature low-density development and constitute a quasi-rural environment (Lang 2002).

The percent of metropolitan residents living in “urbanized areas” (defined by the Census Bureau as having densities at or exceeding 1,000 residents per square mile) also shows variation in regional development patterns. A metropolitan area with a substantial number of residents below this threshold indicates a low-density urban fringe. Among the megapolitans, Southland is the most urbanized, with virtually all (98.17 percent) of the region’s residents living in these areas. By contrast, just over two-thirds of Piedmont citizens live in urbanized places. The edge of megapolitan development in Southland is sharp and well-defined, as indicated by the very small share of people living in the nonurbanized fringe, whereas the Piedmont edge is amorphous, given that one in three people live outside its urbanized areas.

Nationally, nearly 25.8 million megapolitan residents live in low-density, nonurbanized areas, mostly east of the Mississippi. Even the intensely built Northeast—the place that inspired Gottmann—has more than 5.2 million residents living in places with less than 1,000 people per square mile. Piedmont has just over 6 million in these same places, while the Midwest mega has almost 6.7 million.

This analysis indicates that there is a Southland versus Piedmont style of megapolitan sprawl, which could affect regionwide strategies for addressing future growth. For example, given that Southland is already densely built, altering its pattern of sprawl could mean better mixing of land uses to facilitate pedestrian or transit-oriented development. The same strategy would not work in Piedmont where densities are low.

Super MPOs and Transportation Planning. There are clearly cases where the megapolitan scale is the most logical one at which to address problems. Consider the recent debate over the fate of Amtrak, America’s National Railroad Passenger Corporation. The Bush administration wants to eliminate all Amtrak funding in the 2006 federal budget. Defending this action, U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta (2005) wrote in the New York Times, “The problem is not that Americans don’t use trains; it is that Amtrak has failed to keep up with the times, stubbornly sticking to routes and services, even as they lose money and attract few users.”

Amtrak is a national rail system with a profitable line connecting big northeastern cities, which offsets losses on service to remote rural locals. Megapolitan areas have two qualities—concentrated populations and corridor form—that make them excellent geographic units around which Amtrak could be reorganized. These megapolitans constitute an American Europe—a space so intensely settled that high-capacity infrastructure investment between centers makes sense.

If officially designated by the U.S. Census Bureau, megapolitan areas would be the country’s largest geographic unit. Their rise could spark a discussion of what types of planning needs to be done on this scale. In Europe, megapolitan-like spatial planning now guides new infrastructure investment such as high-speed trains between networked cities. The U.S. should do the same. The interstate highways that run through megapolitan areas, such as I-95 from Boston to Washington, DC; I-35 from San Antonio to Kansas City; and I-85 from Raleigh to Atlanta, would benefit greatly from unified planning. A new Census Bureau megapolitan definition would legitimize large-scale transportation planning and trigger similar efforts in such areas as economic development and environmental impact.

Federal transportation aid could be tied to megapolitan planning much the way it has recently been linked to metropolitan areas. The Intermodal Surface Transit Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) required regions to form metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) in order to receive federal money for transportation projects. In a similar vein, new super MPOs could result from future legislation that directs megapolitan areas to plan on a vast scale.

At the moment there is no guiding vision of how to invest the nation’s transportation funds. We are only keepers of past visions, most notably the Interstate Highway System, which for better or worse at least demonstrated a national will for investment. The interstates also completed a nationwide project, begun in the nineteenth century with canals and railways, to provide equal access and capacity across a continental nation. The investment paid off, as witnessed by the emergence of Sunbelt boomtowns such as Phoenix, but the next stage of American spatial evolution is at hand. The U.S. has moved beyond the simple filling in of its land and is now witnessing intensive megapolitan growth. Infrastructure investment must move beyond basic links across the entire country to focus on significantly improving capacity within megapolitan areas.

Robert E. Lang is director of the Metropolitan Institute and associate professor of Urban Affairs and Planning at Virginia Tech (www.mi.vt.edu). His research on megapolitan areas is supported in part by the Lincoln Institute through a 2005 Planning and Development Research Fellowship. Dawn Dhavale is a doctoral candidate in Urban Affairs and Planning and research associate at the Metropolitan Institute.

References

Carbonell, Armando, and Robert D. Yaro. 2005. American spatial development and the new megalopolis. Land Lines 17(2): 1–4.

Gottmann, Jean. 1961. Megalopolis: The urbanized northeastern seaboard of the United States. New York: Twentieth-Century Fund.

Lang, Robert E. 2002. Open spaces, bounded places: Does the American West’s arid landscape yield dense metropolitan growth? Housing Policy Debate 13(4): 755–778.

Lang, Robert E., and Dawn Dhavale. 2005. Beyond megalopolis: Exploring America’s new “megapolitan” geography. Census Report 05:01. Alexandria, VA: Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech (June). www.mi.vt.edu

Lang, Robert E., Dawn Dhavale, and Kristin Haworth. 2004. Micro Politics: The 2004 presidential vote in small-town America. Census Report 04:03. Alexandria, VA: Metropolitan Institute at Virginia Tech (November).

Mineta, Norman Y. 2005. Starving Amtrak to save it. New York Times, February 23: A19.

Nelson, Arthur C. 2004. Toward a new metropolis: The opportunity to rebuild America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program Survey Series (December).

Regional Plan Association. 1960. Plan for greater New York. New York: Regional Plan Association.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2005. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF 1) 100-Percent Data. http://factfinder.census.gov/.

Land Policies Across Geography and Time

Lessons from Latin America
Martim O. Smolka and Laura Mullahy, Enero 1, 2007

One of the characteristics that makes working on land policy in Latin America so fascinating is the ever-present contrast between the characteristics that are common throughout the region and the anomalies that make each country’s relationship with land unique.

An Infrastructure and Economic Recovery Plan for the United States

Petra Todorovich, Enero 1, 2009

Despite the challenges of overhauling existing policies and implementing a bold agenda for infrastructure investment, the decisive election of a new President on a platform of change presents a real opportunity and sense of momentum for action in Washington.

Herramientas de planificación de escenarios para comunidades sustenables

Jim Holway, Octubre 1, 2011

Las comunidades locales sustentables necesitarán mecanismos para visualizar y planificar el futuro y para que los residentes participen en el proceso. La planificación de escenarios es una manera crecientemente efectiva de respaldar estos esfuerzos, y Suelos y Comunidades del Oeste (Western Lands and Communities, o WLC), la sociedad conjunta del Lincoln Institute of Land Policy y el Sonoran Institute, está trabajando para desarrollar las herramientas necesarias.

Planificación de escenarios para afrontar la incertidumbre

Las decisiones y los esfuerzos de planificación sobre el uso del suelo son elementos de fundamental importancia para visualizar el futuro en 20 a 50 años y poder guiar opciones políticas e inversiones públicas que sean sustentables a nivel económico, social y medioambiental. A medida que la incertidumbre aumenta y los recursos disponibles disminuyen, es cada vez más importante considerar la gama completa de condiciones emergentes y preservar nuestra capacidad para responder a esos cambios, adoptar políticas y realizar inversiones que se puedan adaptar a una variedad de futuros potenciales.

Las áreas clave de incertidumbre incluyen los cambios demográficos y de población, las tendencias económicas, la variabilidad y el cambio climático, los costos y disponibilidad de recursos, los mercados de suelos, las preferencias de vivienda, la construcción de viviendas asequibles y la salud fiscal de los gobiernos locales. Junto con la creciente incertidumbre y la reducción de recursos, o quizás debido a ello, las autoridades deben enfrentarse con perspectivas conflictivas sobre el futuro deseado y sobre el papel del gobierno en el suministro de servicios e infraestructura, así como en la regulación y planeamiento.

Esta polarización creciente significa que es necesario contar con más participación cívica y una sociedad más informada para respaldar políticas estables e inversiones adecuadas en el futuro de la comunidad. La planificación de escenarios ofrece un mecanismo para afrontar estas necesidades así como los problemas de incertidumbre y conflicto potenciales. Afortunadamente, a medida que el alcance y la complejidad de la planificación y la demanda de una mayor participación han aumentado, los avances en la capacidad de potencia informática y el acceso público a la tecnología permiten desarrollar herramientas nuevas y más poderosas.

El Instituto Lincoln tiene un largo historial de respaldo al desarrollo de herramientas de planificación y la publicación de sus resultados (Hopkins y Zapata 2007; Campoli y MacLean 2007; Brail 2008; Kwartler y Longo 2008; Condon, Cavens, y Miller 2009). Este artículo describe las lecciones aprendidas con el uso de herramientas de planificación de escenarios en varios proyectos realizados por WLC, así como los mecanismos para ampliar su uso.

Superstition Vistas

Superstition Vistas es un territorio vacante de 275 millas cuadradas (700 Km2) propiedad de un fideicomiso de suelos estatal en el borde urbanizado del área metropolitana de Phoenix (figura 1). Los suelos de fideicomisos estatales, como este sitio en Arizona, son la clave de los patrones de crecimiento futuro, porque el estado es dueño del 60 por ciento del suelo disponible para desarrollo inmobiliario. Colorado y Nuevo México, en un grado un tanto menor, cuentan con oportunidades similares con sus suelos de fideicomisos estatales (Culp, Laurenzi y Tuell 2006). El pensamiento creativo sobre el futuro de Superstition Vistas comenzó a tomar impulso en 2003, y el Instituto Lincoln, por medio de su sociedad conjunta WLC, estuvo entre los primeros en proponer estos esfuerzos (Propst, 2008).

Los objetivos iniciales del WLC para la planificación de escenarios en Superstition Vistas incluyeron el desarrollo de capacidades, el desarrollo de herramientas y la identificación de oportunidades para catalizar el proceso de planificación. Específicamente, propusimos:

  • analizar el suelo de manera audaz, holística y comprensiva;
  • aumentar la capacidad del Departamento de Suelos del Estado de Arizona para elaborar planes en gran escala y dar el ejemplo a otras dependencias estatales de suelos que tienen que enfrentar las oportunidades de crecimiento urbano;
  • diseñar un modelo de desarrollo sustentable;
  • impulsar el desarrollo de herramientas de planificación de escenarios e ilustrar su uso;

WLC, junto con otras alianzas regionales, jurisdicciones vecinas, la empresa regional de electricidad y agua, dos proveedores hospitalarios privados y una compañía minera local, formaron el Comité Directivo de Superstition V istas para impulsar los esfuerzos de planificación, obtener financiamiento y contratar a un equipo de consultores. Los consultores, que trabajaron con el comité por un período de tres años, realizaron múltiples actividades de consulta pública e investigación en valores, recopilaron datos sobre Superstition V istas, desarrollaron y refinaron una serie de escenarios alternativos del uso del suelo para construir una comunidad de 1 millón de residentes, evaluaron el impacto de los distintos escenarios y produjeron un escenario compuesto para el sitio.

El Departamento de Suelos Estatales de Arizona (el propietario) adaptó el trabajo de los consultores para preparar un borrador conceptual del plan para Superstition Vistas en mayo de 2011 y presentó una propuesta de enmienda al plan comprensivo ante el condado de Pinal. El condado está considerando ahora la enmienda propuesta y se espera que su Junta de Supervisores tome una decisión a fines de 2011.

Lecciones de sustentabilidad

El análisis de escenarios, utilizando las mejoras promovidos por WLC, identificó los factores más importantes que iban a incidir en los patrones de desarrollo y los conflictos potenciales en los resultados deseados (figura 2). La inclusión de costos individuales de edificación e infraestructura para los escenarios alternativos facilitó el examen de sensibilidad, al variar estos factores claves y la efectividad de costo de cuatro niveles crecientes de eficiencia energética e hídrica en cada tipo de edificio.

Los escenarios también examinaron el impacto de la forma urbana sobre las millas de vehículos viajadas (vehicle miles traveled, o VMT). El modelo de escenarios produce indicadores de uso del suelo, uso de energía y agua, VM T, emisiones de carbono y costos de construcción. Este análisis reveló las oportunidades a corto plazo de mejoras en la sustentabilidad. El equipo de consultores, en colaboración con el Comité Directivo, identificó una serie de lecciones que ilustran el valor de las herramientas de planificación de escenarios, y que se pueden aplicar a otros proyectos para diseñar áreas urbanas más sustentables y eficientes (Equipo de Consultores de Superstition Vistas, 2011).

1. Crear centros de uso mixto para reducir el tiempo de viaje, el uso de energía y la huella de carbono.

Una de las maneras más efectivas de reducir los tiempos de viaje, el uso de energía y la huella de carbono resultante son los centros de usos mixtos a lo largo de las rutas de transporte público y cerca de las residencias y los barrios. Las casas más pequeñas, las formas más compactas de desarrollo urbano y los sistemas de transporte multimodal generan beneficios similares (figura 3). No obstante, el modelo de escenarios para Superstition V istas demostró que los centros de uso mixto serían sustancialmente más importantes que un aumento de densidad para mejorar las opciones de transporte, el uso de energía y la huella de carbono.

2. Promover desde el principio las inversiones y puestos de empleo de alta calidad para catalizar el éxito económico.

Una economía local robusta y un equilibrio diverso de puestos de empleo, vivienda y tiendas cercanas son críticos para crear una comunidad sustentable, sobre todo cuando se ofrecen empleos de alta calidad al comienzo del desarrollo inmobiliario. Una inversión pública inicial significativa y la formación de alianzas público privadaspueden suplir la infraestructura crítica y tener un enorme impacto sobre la forma del desarrollo y sobre el valor de los suelos del fideicomiso estatal. El fideicomiso de suelos estatal también podría brindar una oportunidad única para inversions de capital a largo plazo, ya que las autoridades que administran el fideicomiso de suelos podrían proporcionar acceso a los recursos para las inversions iniciales de capital y permitir que se recuperen dichas inversiones cuando más adelante el suelo se venda o arriende a un valor superior.

3. Proporcionar infraestructura de transporte multimodal y conexiones regionales para facilitar un crecimiento eficiente.

Otro paso crítico es establecer cómo introducir gradualmente las mejoras de transporte a medida que la región vaya creciendo y el mercado pueda sostener un aumento en los servicios. Los componentes de introducción gradual pueden comenzar por autobuses y pasar después a un sistema de tránsito rápido de autobuses (Bus Rapid Transit, o BRT), concediendo derechos de paso para corredores eventuales de trenes suburbanos o trenes livianos. Para establecer la cohesión de toda la zona y permitir la evolución hacia infraestructuras de transporte de mayor envergadura financiera a medida que va madurando la comunidad, es necesario identificar y construir corredores de transporte multimodal e infraestructura antes de iniciar las ventas para emprendimientos residenciales y comerciales.

4. Diseñar edificios eficientes que ahorren agua y recursos energéticos y reduzcan la huella de carbono de la comunidad.

La incorporación de costos de construcción y datos de rentabilidad de la inversión en la planificación de recursos permite hacer cálculos de factibilidad financiera y costo-beneficio. El equipo de consultores construyó un modelo de cuatro niveles de uso de agua y energía (modelo de base, bueno, mejor y óptimo) para cada escenario y tipo de edificación. Los resultados demostraron que las inversiones en eficiencia energética darían más resultados en edificios residenciales que en aquellos comerciales e industriales. Otra conclusión es que la generación de energía renovable centralizada en los edificios podría ser una mejor inversión que las medidas extremas de conservación de energía.

5. Ofrecer opciones de vivienda que cumplan con las necesidades de una población diversa.

La construcción de una comunidad viable significa suplir las necesidades de todos los residentes potenciales con una amplia variedad de tipos de emprendimientos y precios al alcance de los trabajadores locales, permitiendo ajustes para condiciones futuras del mercado.

6. Incorporar flexibilidad para responder a los cambios de circunstancias.

Uno de los desafíos para los planes maestros en gran escala que se irán poniendo en práctica en múltiples fases a lo largo de 50 años o más es cómo elaborarlos para que el desarrollo propiamente dicho pueda evolucionar y revitalizarse con el tiempo. Los planes de implementación tienen que incluir mecanismos que limiten futuros problemas de resistencia a que se construya en parcelas vacías y se reurbanice cerca de donde uno vive (“no en mi patio trasero”).

Lecciones de procedimiento

El proceso de previsualización para Superstition Vistas consistió en planificar una ciudad o región de comunidades completamente nuevas en un área vacante propiedad de un solo dueño público y sin población existente. Dada la reciente recesión económica, así como la capacidad limitada de la agencia estatal para ofrecer suelos al mercado, es probable que el desarrollo de esta zona se postergue por varios años. A pesar de estas condiciones particulares, las lecciones de procedimientos aprendidas en este proyecto hasta ahora son relevantes para otros esfuerzos a largo plazo y de gran escala, y para la expansión de la planificación de escenarios para la toma de decisiones comunitarias en general.

El acuerdo sobre los procedimientos y procesos de planificación se ha convertido en un elemento cada vez más importante a medida que se prolonga el período de planificación y desarrollo, y la cantidad de partes interesadas aumenta. Es probable que en cualquier proyecto a largo plazo con múltiples partes involucradas se produzcan cambios significativos en los participantes, las perspectivas y los factores externos, como el reciente colapso de la economía inmobiliaria. Estos desafíos se tienen que tener en cuenta e incorporarse en las tareas del proyecto.

1. Diseñar para el cambio.

Los proyectos a largo plazo tienen que poder adaptarse a los cambios en las partes interesadas, dirigentes e incluso a las perspectivas políticas en el curso de la planificación e implementación. Los proyectos se beneficiarían enormemente si anticiparan estos cambios, acordaran mecanismos para transferir conocimiento a los nuevos participantes, y establecieran ciertos criterios y decisiones que las nuevas partes interesadas deberían cumplir. Para ello deben comprender cómo manejar condiciones políticas o de mercado cambiantes, e incorporar flexibilidad en estos factores al construir escenarios alternativos.

2. Considerar cómo se va a gobernar.

Este es un tema para la planificación y los esfuerzos de implementación, y también para la elaboración de una estructura de toma de decisiones en una comunidad nueva. Al construir una ciudad nueva, es importante considerar cómo crear un sistema de gobierno capaz de implementar una visión coherente y comprensiva para una comunidad que aún no existe.

3. Incorporar nuevos diseños comunitarios en planes comprensivos locales y regionales.

También es crítico considerar cómo un proyecto de la escala de Superstition Vistas, con hasta 1 millón de residentes y un plan de construcción de 50 años o más, se puede integrar en el marco de un plan comprensivo de condado prototípico. Los escenarios y las visiones tienen que reflejar las ideas y planes a que las jurisdicciones locales están políticamente dispuestas y puedan incorporar desde el punto de vista administrativo en su proceso de planificación.

4. Desarrollo en fases.

Las comunidades tienen que establecer mecanismos para permitir la adopción de una visión de construcción a largo plazo y después incorporar una serie de planes flexibles y adaptables por fases para implementar esta visión en forma paulatina.

5. Planificar para condiciones cambiantes del mercado.

Las condiciones del mercado, las preferencias de vivienda y las oportunidades de empleo evolucionarán, y los proyectos a gran escala con visiones creativas y atractivas pueden hasta crear su propia demanda. Nadie sabe a ciencia cierta qué nos ofrecerán los mercados futuros, de manera que es fundamental considerar mercados alternativos y diseños comunitarios adaptables. Las proyecciones de combinaciones residenciales y las estimaciones de absorción inmobiliaria tienen que ser flexibles y no deben partir de la base de las preferencias y tendencias actuales solamente.

6. Conectar con valores comunes.

También es importante demostrar cómo las propuestas de desarrollo se conectan con visiones y valores comunes compartidos y estables a lo largo del tiempo. Para Superstition Vistas, ciertos valores como la oportunidad de llevar adelante un estilo de vida saludable y brindar opciones para residentes de todo el espectro socioeconómico, son ampliamente compartidos. Los planificadores también tienen que reconocer los valores más polémicos o que pueden ser transitorios y probablemente cambiarán.

Desafíos y oportunidades

La experiencia de WLC en la planificación de Superstition Vistas ha sido exitosa en varios niveles. La comunidad se unió a través del Comité Directivo para desarrollar una visión de consenso que representaba una cooperación multijurisdiccional alrededor de la idea de un crecimiento sustentable e “inteligente”. Las comunidades vecinas, a pedido del comisionado estatal de suelos, demoraron cualquier intento de anexo. Además, el Departamento de Suelos del Estado de Arizona elaboró un plan para una escala geográfica, horizonte temporal y nivel de integración mucho más ambicioso que cualquier intento previo. No obstante, la enmienda al plan comprensivo propuesta para Superstition Vistas es, en el mejor de los casos, un primer paso hacia una visión para una comunidad de hasta 1 millón de personas.

El Departamento de Suelos del Estado de Arizona no ha podido, por lo menos hasta ahora, presionar demasiado para crear maneras nuevas y más creativas de conceptualizar emprendimientos a gran escala que puedan mejorar el valor económico de los suelos de fideicomisos estatales y la forma urbana regional. El reciente colapso de los mercados de suelos y de vivienda en todo el país también ha afectado este proyecto y las percepciones locales del potencial de crecimiento en el futuro. Como el esfuerzo general para conceptualizar e implementar planes de desarrollo para Superstition Vistas está sólo comenzando, no se espera que el desarrollo concreto comience hasta por lo menos dentro una década más. Habrá múltiples oportunidades para continuar con estos esfuerzos de planificación y construir previsiones más audaces y comprensivas a medida que la economía inmobiliaria se vaya recuperando y el desarrollo de suelos vuelva a ser más atractivo.

La planificación de escenarios y las visualizaciones efectivas cobran más importancia y son más difíciles de lograr cuando se intenta construir una visión más ambiciosa y a más largo plazo. Las visualizaciones que pueden ilustrar de manera convincente los centros de actividad y los barrios de mayor densidad y uso mixto, pueden ayudar a obtener aceptación del público. También se necesitan mecanismos efectivos para comunicar a los participantes actuales que el proceso de planificación pasa por imaginarse características comunitarias y preferencias de vivienda y estilos de vida para sus nietos o bisnietos, dentro de muchos años.

Como se apuntó previamente, las inversiones iniciales en transporte, desarrollo económico, educación y servicios públicos pueden afectar significativamente a una comunidad y hacer de catalizador para la creación de puestos de empleo de alto nivel y obtener una alta tasa de retorno. Para alcanzar este potencial, hacen falta mecanismos que faciliten estas inversiones, ya sea en suelos privados o suelos de fideicomisos estatales. La continuación del trabajo sobre el valor de contribución de la conservación de suelos, inversiones en infraestructura, planificación y servicios de ecosistemas, así como la integración de esta información en la planificación de escenarios, resultaría de gran ayuda en la tarea de resolver la incertidumbre e impulsar la sustentabilidad comunitaria.

Otros proyectos y lecciones aprendidas

WLC realizó tres proyectos adicionales de demostración para ilustrar y mejorar las herramientas de planificación de escenarios y aplicarlas en distintas situaciones.

Condado de Gallatin, Montana

El personal del Sonoran Institute colaboró con la Universidad Estatal de Montana para organizar un taller con las partes interesadas locales, en el que cuatro equipos distintos produjeron escenarios para concentrar el crecimiento proyectado en la región actualmente desarrollada del “triángulo” de Bozeman, Belgrade y Four Corners. Este esfuerzo integró exitosamente la herramienta de planificación de escenarios Envision Tomorrow con las proyecciones de unidades de vivienda del Modelo de Crecimiento del Sonoran Institute, y demostró el valor de las herramientas de modelación de retorno a la inversión como elemento de verificación del uso propuesto del suelo y los tipos de construcción. El proyecto también demostró el valor de la planificación de escenarios a los expertos locales.

Las lecciones aprendidas incluyeron las siguientes: (1) para muchos participantes, los mapas impresos son más intuitivos que la tecnología de pantalla táctil que utilizamos; (2) se debería usar información adicional sobre las características del suelo, como la productividad de la tierra y los valores del hábitat, para preparar los escenarios de crecimiento; y (3) hacen falta técnicas más efectivas para visualizar la densidad y el diseño de los distintos tipos de uso del suelo, así como para incorporar las realidades políticas y del mercado que las herra mientas de planificación de escenarios generalmente no captan.

Los productos de este proyecto en Montana incluirán la creación de una biblioteca de tipos de construcción apropiados para la región para usar con los modelos de retorno de inversión y escenarios, y un informe que examina los costos y los beneficios, incluyendo el impacto en la sustentabilidad, de un crecimiento futuro en el área del triángulo del valle de Gallatin. Con el respaldo de WLC, la Universidad Estatal de Montana ha podido incorporar el uso de herramientas de planificación de escenarios en sus programas de estudiantes graduados.

Condado de Garfield, Colorado

La oficina de Áreas Legadas del Oeste de Colorado del Sonoran Institute, con el respaldo del Instituto Lincoln, la Agencia de Protección Ambiental de los Estados Unidos y otros contribuyentes locales, utilizó la herramienta Envision Tomorrow como una nueva manera de impulsar la implementación de planes adoptados previamente para contrucción en parcelas vacías y reurbanización de uso mixto en áreas de crecimiento previsto. Este proyecto se concentró en la educación de las partes interesadas sobre los mecanismos necesarios para implementar recientes planes comprensivos adoptados para el desarrollo centrado en ciudades, más que en la generación de escenarios para un plan comprensivo.

Uno de los tres esfuerzos que se llevaron a cabo por separado examinó la factibilidad política y de mercado de la revitalización del centro de Rifle, Colorado. El proyecto de la ciudad de Rifle utilizó exitosamente una herramienta de retorno de la inversión para identificar factores financieros y de regulación que podrían afectar los esfuerzos de revitalización, y congregó a las partes claves necesarias para su implementación: propietarios, emprendedores, corredores inmobiliarios, comisionados de planificación, funcionarios locales, representantes estatales del transporte y personal local.

Una de las lecciones aprendidas en este proyecto fue la importancia de evaluar las visiones audaces a la luz de la realidad del mercado. Por ejemplo, los esfuerzos de la anterior planificación de Rifle se concentraron en edificios de uso mixto de seis a ocho pisos, pero en el mercado actual, incluso los proyectos de tres a cuatro pisos no se consideran factibles (figura 4c). Ahora se presta mayor atención a proyectos de uso mixto de dos pisos y casas adosadas. Las visualizaciones de una parcela subutilizada en el centro de la ciudad ilustran el tipo de opción de un solo piso que puede llegar a ser más factible para el desarrollo comercial inicial (figura 4b). También se identificó como un límite a la inversión las restricciones de estacionamiento de vehículos y un requisito mínimo elevado de cobertura de lotes. Además de identificar cambios en el código de edificación de Rifle, estos resultados generaron un debate sobre el papel de las alianzas público privadas para catalizar el emprendimiento inmobiliario del centro.

Cuenca de Morongo, California

Esta área de gran cantidad de espacio abierto y hábitat silvestre, situada entre el Parque Nacional Joshua Tree y el Centro de Combate Aéreo Terrestre de la Infantería de Marina en el sur de California, puede verse afectada por la expansión regional de población. Este proyecto del Grupo de Espacios Abiertos de la Cuenca de Morongo es un esfuerzo innovador para vincular los resultados actuales de priorización de conservación con una herramienta SIG para analizar y predecir de qué manera los patrones de uso del suelo afectan el hábitat silvestre y la capacidad de planificación de escenarios de Envision Tomorrow.

Estamos evaluando los impactos ambientales de los patrones actuales y de las alternativas potenciales de desarrollo y las opciones de planificación geográfica y del uso del suelo. Las herramientas que se están desarrollando con este empeño serán útiles para todos los fideicomisos de suelos del país que estén interesados en aliarse con otros socios para tratar temas de planificación local y regional e incorporar en sus proyectos objetivos mayores de conservación del paisaje y el hábitat silvestre.

Herramientas de planificación de código abierto

WLC ha concentrado recientemente sus esfuerzos en el desarrollo de herramientas de planificación de código abierto como un mecanismo para aumentar el uso de planificación de escenarios. Los factores claves que entorpecen su uso incluyen: (1) el costo y la complejidad de las herramientas propiamente dichas; (2) el costo y disponibilidad de datos; (3) la falta de normalización, que dificulta la integración de herramientas y datos; y (4) herramientas privadas que pueden ser difíciles de adaptar a las condiciones locales y pueden impedir la innovación.

Los partidarios de las herramientas de modelación de código abierto creen que los códigos normalizados permitirán una mayor transparencia e interoperabilidad entre modelos, lo que daría como resultado una capacidad más rápida de innovación y un mayor nivel de utilización. Como resultado de nuestro trabajo con Envision Tomorrow en el proyecto de Superstition Vistas, WLC y otros miembros de un grupo de herramientas de planificación de código abierto siguen tratando de impulsar las herramientas de planificación de escenarios y la promesa de las herramientas de código abierto para promover comunidades sustentables en muchos más lugares.

Sobre El Autor

Jim Holway dirige Western Lands and Communities, la sociedad conjunta del Instituto Lincoln con el Sonoran Institute, con sede en Phoenix, Arizona. Previamente fue subdirector del Departamento de Recursos Hídricos de Arizona y profesor de práctica en la Universidad Estatal de Arizona.

Referencias

Propst, Luther. 2008. A model for sustainable development in Arizona’s Sun Corridor. Land Lines 20(3).

Superstition Vistas Consulting Team. 2011. Superstition Vistas: Final report and strategic actions. www.superstition-vistas.org

Publicaciones Del Instituto Lincoln

Brail, Richard K. 2008. Planning support systems for cities and regions.

Campoli, Julie, and Alex S. MacLean. 2007. Visualizing density.

Condon, Patrick M., Duncan Cavens, and Nicole Miller. 2009. Urban planning tools for climate change mitigation.

Culp, Peter W., Andy Laurenzi, and Cynthia C. Tuell. 2006. State trust lands in the West: Fiduciary duty in a changing landscape.

Hopkins, Lewis D., and Marisa A. Zapata. 2007. Engaging the future: Forecasts, scenarios, plans, and projects.

Kwartler, Michael, and Gianni Longo. 2008. Visioning and visualization: People, pixels, and plans.

Informe del presidente

La política medioambiental y el desarrollo urbano en China
Gregory K. Ingram, Abril 1, 2013

Desde la primera reforma económica ocurrida en 1978 hasta la liberalización de inversiones extranjeras y el desarrollo del sector privado que se dio entre mediados de la década de 1980 hasta la actualidad, las principales reformas económicas de China han tenido como prioridad lograr una alta tasa de crecimiento económico. Estas políticas funcionaron tan bien que el PIB per cápita en dólares constantes en China aumentó cerca de un 10 por ciento anual de 1980 a 2010. Este rendimiento en el crecimiento no tiene precedentes en un país de grandes dimensiones, pero ha sido acompañado por incontables costos, tales como la transformación estructural de la economía, el ajuste social y las migraciones y la degradación medioambiental. En un nuevo libro del Instituto Lincoln titulado China’s Environmental Policy and Urban Development (La política medioambiental y el desarrollo urbano en China), editado por Joyce Yanyun Man, se trata el último de estos temas. Según este libro, de acuerdo con las estimaciones realizadas por agencias gubernamentales, los costos medioambientales sin documentar asociados a la producción económica fueron del 9,7 por ciento del PIB en 1999 al 3 por ciento en 2004.

El crecimiento económico en países de bajos ingresos por lo general viene acompañado de costos medioambientales. Este trueque se ve plasmado en la “curva medioambiental de Kuznets”, según la cual la calidad medioambiental se deteriora con el crecimiento económico en los niveles de bajos ingresos y luego mejora con el crecimiento económico en los niveles de ingresos más altos. Según lo indicado en este libro, las estimaciones de la curva medioambiental de Kuznets para las ciudades chinas entre 1997 y 2007 muestran que, durante dicho período, los índices de contaminación industrial en China se redujeron a medida que aumentaron los ingresos, lo que indica que las ciudades con ingresos más altos experimentaron mejoras en estos índices de calidad medioambiental conforme aumentaron sus ingresos.

Varios de los autores de los capítulos de este libro afirman que las políticas medioambientales de China y su rendimiento se encuentran en una etapa de transición. Los indicadores medioambientales están mejorando en respuesta a las nuevas políticas y reglamentaciones, mientras que el crecimiento económico continúa. Al mismo tiempo, China también ha sufrido reveses en este sentido. Por ejemplo, ciertos eventos de gravedad extrema, como la combinación de un clima extremadamente frío con inversiones atmosféricas que se dio este invierno en Beijing, produjeron niveles muy altos de concentraciones de partículas en dicha ciudad.

La lógica detrás de la curva medioambiental de Kuznets implica diferentes elementos, tanto de demanda como de oferta. En cuanto a la demanda, las poblaciones con ingresos más altos demuestran apreciar cada vez más los servicios que tienen que ver con el medio ambiente, por lo que defienden las mejoras medioambientales. Con respecto a la oferta, las inversiones en nuevas capacidades hacen uso de equipos modernos con procesos que respetan el medio ambiente y tecnologías de control más accesibles económicamente. Las últimas mejoras medioambientales en China también derivan del fortalecimiento de los entes de regulación ambiental. En 1982, la función que tenía la Agencia de Protección Medioambiental era principalmente de asesoramiento. No obstante, en 1988 se transformó en una agencia nacional; en 1998 se convirtió en un ente más independiente, la Agencia Estatal de Protección Medioambiental; y posteriormente, en 2008, se elevó la jerarquía del ente para convertirse en el Ministerio de Protección Ambiental.

La creciente influencia de las agencias de protección medioambiental centrales se vio acompañada por un cambio en el estilo de las reglamentaciones. El antiguo énfasis que se daba a las normas de orden y control (tales como las normas sobre emisiones) se reemplazó en forma parcial por instrumentos basados en incentivos económicos (tales como los impuestos sobre insumos y el nuevo impuesto sobre emisiones de carbono). Según las investigaciones realizadas, a la fecha la aplicación de las normas de orden y control ha arrojado mejores resultados.

Mientras que las agencias centrales establecieron normas nacionales, la responsabilidad de monitorear y velar por el cumplimiento de dichas normas se descentralizó en gran medida hacia las agencias medioambientales municipales o metropolitanas. El rendimiento de los gerentes municipales se revisa todos los años según criterios que hacen hincapié en el crecimiento económico. Otras mejoras en los resultados medioambientales pueden darse solamente cuando dichos criterios dan un mayor peso a las mejoras medioambientales. Por ejemplo, como consecuencia de haber incluido la reducción de las emisiones de sulfuro como criterio de rendimiento anual, se produjo un rápido aumento en el control de las emisiones de dióxido de sulfuro de las centrales de energía.

Aun cuando a China le resta mucho por hacer para reducir la contaminación del aire urbano, limpiar los ríos y lagos y mejorar la eficiencia en el uso de la energía, estos objetivos están cobrando mucha más importancia para los ciudadanos. La creciente disponibilidad de datos relacionados con los indicadores medioambientales está promoviendo un diálogo nacional respecto de la calidad medioambiental. El nuevo libro de la profesora Man representa un aporte a este diálogo, ya que informa sobre el progreso realizado, identifica los desafíos inmediatos y evalúa las nuevas políticas y enfoques normativos para las mejoras medioambientales.

Winning Strategies for Climate Resilience

Helen Lochhead Considers Rebuild by Design
Julio 1, 2014

In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, with more frequent extreme weather events and rising sea levels, the vulnerability of coastal cities and towns has become a matter of urgency. But out of disasters can come opportunities for innovation. Post-Sandy, a range of new initiatives, tools, policies, governance frameworks, and incentives are being tested, including competitions such as Rebuild by Design (RBD). Spearheaded by the Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the contest used design as a key tool for creating integrated strategies to build resilience, sustainability, and livability.

After HUD announced the winners in June, Land Lines discussed RBD with Helen Lochhead, an architect, urban and landscape designer, and 2014 Lincoln/Loeb Fellow at the Graduate School of Design at Harvard University and the Lincoln Institute. Previously, she was the Executive Director of Place Development at Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority. She is also an adjunct professor at the University of Sydney.

Land Lines: How did Hurricane Sandy differ from other storms in the United States?

Helen Lochhead: Sandy caused unprecedented damage and underscored the vulnerability of coastal cities and towns to more frequent extreme weather events. Given the financial costs, topping $65 billion, and the excessive human toll, with 117 people dead and more than 200,000 displaced from their homes, it was clear from the outset of the recovery process that rebuilding what existed before was not a viable option.

All levels of government—federal, state, and city—clearly articulated the imperative to build greater resilience in the Sandy-affected areas of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. To ensure the tri-state region fares better next time around, it was acknowledged that we had to build differently. Because every $1 spent on mitigation and preparation can save $4 down the road on post-disaster rebuilding, government agencies are testing a range of new initiatives, including competitions that promote resilience through innovative planning and design, such as Rebuild by Design.

Land Lines: How did Rebuild by Design differ from other recovery efforts and design competitions?

Helen Lochhead: The RBD competition acknowledged design as a key tool for dealing with extreme weather events, with potential to reframe questions and develop new paradigms that challenge the status quo. Designers are collaborators, visualizers, and synthesizers. RBD provided them the opportunity to unpack issues and put together scenarios in new and different ways.

RBD’s approach was also regional. Hurricane Sandy defied political boundaries, so the competition aimed to address structural and environmental vulnerabilities that the storm exposed across all affected areas. It also promised to strengthen our understanding of regional interdependencies, fostering coordination and resilience both at the local level and across the United States.

The procurement strategy was different as well. The standard model for federal design competitions is to define an existing problem, develop a brief, and solicit solutions from the best experts in the field. But a problem of such unprecedented scale and complexity as Sandy cannot easily be defined until it’s understood in all its dimensions. This takes time. Such unchartered territory suggested the need for an open-ended question and an interdisciplinary, cross-jurisdictional approach.

First, a diverse pool of talent was engaged by a unique consortium of project partners—President Obama’s Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force and HUD in collaboration with New York University’s Institute for Public Knowledge (IPK), the Municipal Art Society (MAS), Regional Plan Association (RPA), and the Van Alen Institute (VAI), with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation and other major foundations. Rather than limiting the field, the project partners sought integrated teams of interdisciplinary, collaborative thinkers, to facilitate a broad range of ideas and approaches as well as more holistic strategies.

Second, the competition process itself was different. Eight months total, it was short, sharp, and focused. The process involved research and design to interrogate the issues and maximize the breadth and range of ideas through open innovation paradigms. The process was research-led, open-source, and collaborative, to better refine the nature and scope of the complex regional challenges and develop comprehensive design solutions.

Third, RBD set aside HUD Community Development Block Grants (CDBG-DR) funding—$920 million specifically—to help implement winning projects and proposals. Typically, grantees are required to develop action plans only after receiving these funds. But RBD informally changed this procedure by fostering innovative proposals before awarding money. Thus, federal dollars became a catalyst for innovation as well as a mechanism to facilitate implementation. Teams were encouraged to secure their own funding for additional design development as well, fueling the extension of their outreach and their project’s scope.

Finally, RBD interacted with communities, not-for-profits, government agencies, and local, state, and federal leaders at every stage to build new coalitions of support and capacity in tandem with each design proposal.

Land Lines: How effective was Rebuild by Design as a vehicle for driving innovation and delivering resilience across the region? And what are the key possibilities and challenges of such a design-led process?

Helen Lochhead: We will not know for some time if RBD will ultimately deliver innovations that better prepare and adapt the region to a changing climate or whether the projects can be successfully implemented and leveraged to build resilience in other vulnerable communities. However, it is possible to identify where the competition has demonstrated innovation and potential impact over and above more standard processes.

The sheer number of participants, range of disciplines, and integrated team structures facilitated a multiplicity of ideas and approaches but also more holistic strategies. From a field of 148 submissions, RBD selected 10 multidisciplinary design teams to research and develop a range of proposals. These finalists included more than 200 experts primarily from planning, design, engineering, and ecology.

The multifaceted research phase, which began in August 2013, also differentiated the competition process from the start. Teams immersed themselves in design-based research, targeted discussions, and field trips to Sandy-affected areas to help understand the enormity of the challenge. The Institute for Public Knowledge led this stage as a way to address a broad range of issues and involve local community input and fieldwork. The IPK research identified vulnerabilities and risk, for which the design teams could then propose better, more resilient alternatives. This framework enabled the project teams not only to identify, understand, and respond to core problems, but to define opportunities and create scenarios. The process also facilitated the sharing of research and ideas across teams.

The designers undertook extensive precedent studies, examined global best practice, and met with community members to elicit input on what might be most effective in local contexts. They identified new and emerging approaches to coastal protection, finance, policy, and land-use planning, as well as communication models that demonstrated promise in other contexts and could be adapted in the Sandy-affected region. Visual tools were key to the exploration. Teams tested scenarios using GIS mapping tools to collate, synthesize, and communicate complex data. Three-dimensional visualizations helped to convey various options and engage stakeholders.

The power of design-led propositions cannot be underestimated as a means to translate intangible problems into tangible solutions that stakeholders can relate to and discuss in meaningful ways.

Land Lines: You mentioned that RBD built new coalitions of support. How was the outreach different?

Helen Lochhead: Ten ideas were selected for design development in October, commencing the final stage of the competition. Teams worked closely with MAS, RPA, and VAI to transform their design ideas into viable projects that would inspire cooperation from politicians, communities, and agencies across the region and thus facilitate implementation and funding. Because of the regional approach of these far-reaching projects, the role of the partner organizations was pivotal here in bringing together local networks of often vastly different interests.

Coalition building was essential to ensuring that the approach was inclusive as well as comprehensive. Even more important was the grassroots support for implementation, to create the necessary momentum to deliver projects in the long run, as inevitably some will roll out over time as funds become available.

Land Lines: What were some key themes in the proposals?

Helen Lochhead: The overarching logic in the proposals is that the greatest benefit and value is created when investment addresses not just flood or storm risk, but also the combined effects of extreme weather events, environmental degradation, social vulnerability, and vital network susceptibility. By restoring ecosystems and creating recreational and economic opportunities, the projects will enhance sustainability and resilience.

What prevailed were layered approaches that incorporate more ecological green/blue infrastructure as well as gray infrastructure systems, along with proposals for new, more regionally based governance models, online tools, and educational initiatives that build capacity within communities. Many demonstrated place-based solutions that also had wider application. All highlighted interdependencies, fostering coordination and inclusion.

Land Lines: Among the winning projects, announced by HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan on June 2, what are some of the key innovations?

Helen Lochhead: SCAPE/Landscape Architecture’s “Living Breakwaters” could have far-reaching application if the engineered protective oyster reefs are successful. Although the proposal faces some challenges—in-water permitting and potential broader environmental impacts that need to be worked through—it has the potential to be piloted and tested on a much smaller scale, with the buy-in of local communities and champions such as the New York Harbor School, to iron out teething problems early on. If feasible, it has the added benefit of self-sustaining biological systems that keep replenishing themselves. The ingenuity of this scheme is the use of a pilot project to challenge the policy and regulatory framework with a radical rethink of the possibilities. Regulatory hurdles are often a significant barrier to innovation, so a small-scale trial is a low-risk investment. If it fails, there is little downside; if it succeeds, it will have circumvented major policy hurdles, paving the way for other new approaches to more ecologically based storm protection.

MIT CAU + ZUS + URBANISTEN’s “New Meadowlands: Productive City + Regional Park” proposal for the New Jersey Meadowlands affords another equally innovative approach to implementation. It’s a striking example of green infrastructure in the form of thick, multifunctional, landscaped berms along the water’s edge that act as a flood barrier but also allow occupation. The proposal features a productive regional park, with berms and wetlands ringing the waterway, that buffers vital property and infrastructure from floods, rebuilds biodiversity, and hosts recreational and social programs as well as a mix of development to take advantage of the new parklands.

The project also proposes a compelling opportunity for a regionally based governance model to help implement the vision. The New Jersey Meadowlands Commission—with existing land use zoning in 14 municipalities—is a case study in intermunicipal collaboration with latent powers that position it well for a coalition-building effort over this regional landscape. With some re-engineering, it could potentially become an ecological and economic development agency. There are many regulatory hurdles embedded in this proposal that a strong governance body such as this one could potentially streamline. The regional scale of many of the proposals means that they cross jurisdictional boundaries, which complicates implementation. By identifying the untapped potential of this existing governance framework, this team has shifted a major roadblock.

The BIG Team’s “BIG U” is a compartmentalized, multipurpose barrier designed to protect vulnerable precincts in lower Manhattan from floods and storm surge. The team focused on the Lower East Side. The project integrates green space and social programs and, in the longer term, proposes much-needed transit. While it aims to redress the lack of recreational open space in the neighborhood, it inadequately addresses systemic shortcomings, such as the shortage and quality of low-income housing in the area, access to services, and the potential gentrification this project could accelerate.

In Nassau County, Long Island, the Interboro Team’s “Living with the Bay” sought to enhance the region’s quality of everyday life in nonemergency times while addressing flood risk. Taken as a whole, the initiatives present a collection of relatively low-risk propositions that can be readily implemented and that sow seeds for a more strategic and resilient future. Over the long term, improvements would include denser housing close to mass transit and a new community land trust.

PennDesign/OLIN’s “Hunts Point Lifelines” proposal for the Bronx focused on social and economic resilience. While the team considered environmental vulnerabilities, its chief concern was the critical role that the Hunts Point Food Market plays in the local community and the regional food chain. The team worked with the community and industrial property owners to develop site-specific designs for integrated storm protection as well as green infrastructure that offers high-quality social space using components that can be manufactured locally and built cooperatively. The project demonstrated the potential of hybrid port protection and ecology throughout the estuary.

OMA’s comprehensive strategy for Hoboken—“Resist, Delay, Store, Discharge”—represents a catalogue of interventions that incorporates extensive green/blue infrastructure as well as a protective barrier for critical transport infrastructure. While it shares many similarities with the Hoboken Sustainable Communities project, its strength is the comprehensive approach achieved through a series of key initiatives that brought Hoboken and Jersey City to the table with more than 40 stakeholders who will be essential to implementation.

Land Lines: What were the most winning aspects of projects that didn’t win?

Helen Lochhead: Open-source frameworks enabled online engagement that informed both the process and the public, so teams could tap into a much broader range of users than just those who traditionally attend community meetings. For example, Sasaki’s “CrowdGauge for Rebuild” first asked users in Asbury Park, New Jersey, to rank a set of priorities. Then it demonstrated how a series of actions and policies might affect those priorities. Finally, it gave users a limited number of coins, asking them to put that money toward the actions they supported most.

Various teams demonstrated a kit-of-parts approach, drawing on economic development initiatives, how-to toolkits, and urban improvement projects in various combinations to achieve resiliency objectives. HR&A Cooper Robertson’s proposal for Red Hook, Brooklyn, is an example of this method. With all the layers in place, a number of these strategies could be scaled up and result in systemic transformation and benefits. Such granular approaches facilitate phased implementation and with funding are immediately actionable, impactful, and scalable.

Sasaki/Rutgers/Arup’s “Resilience + the Beach” shifted the focus inland from the Jersey Shore to higher, drier headlands, by redefining the coastal zone as the six-mile deep ecosystem between the beach and the New Jersey Pine Barrens. By revealing the scenic attributes and recreational potential of the hinterland’s waterways and forests, the strategy encourages development to migrate from the barrier island edge to stable inland areas to grow a more layered tourism economy. The site for this project is Asbury Park, but the approach has broader regional application by capitalizing on the geographical attributes characteristic of the New Jersey coast—the Pine Barrens, inland bays, and barrier islands—to create new attractions. The strategy includes a range of actions including new green/blue infrastructure, open space and development, and a community toolkit to educate landowners on local risk and options for resilience.

Another prototype for regional coastal cities, WB’s “Resilient Bridgeport” consists of a resilience framework and specific design proposals for the Long Island Sound region. A set of integrated coastal, urban, and riparian design strategies and planning principles provide multiple lines of defense to protect Bridgeport against flooding and storm surge while stimulating environmental restoration, economic development, and neighborhood revitalization focused around social housing.

Land Lines: In sum, what have been the key successes of the competition so far?

Helen Lochhead: The urgency of the problem and the fast pace of the competition provided a level of intensity, drive, and momentum that yielded results in a short time frame. Many of the design solutions were characterized by a quantum and richness of ideas, depth of resolution, and cleverness of approach. The focus was not just on recovery and risk reduction, such as flood and storm mitigation, but on long-term resilience and sustainability. All propositions deliver multiple social, economic, and environmental benefits—improvements related to amenities, ecology, education, capacity building, long-term savings, and community health and well-being—and so tend to be higher-performing, holistic solutions.

The impact to date has already been catalytic. If nothing else, RBD has generated momentum and delivered major benefits to the region by starting the conversation on resilience by design. Granted, the real measure of success is in the implementation, but a robust, innovative process is required to provoke cultural change in practice. RBD has set that example.

Land Lines: What will be the key challenges of implementation?

Helen Lochhead: Finding the sweet spot between the visionary and the pragmatic.

The carrot for the winners was the possibility of building these projects with disaster recovery grants from HUD and other sources of public- and private-sector funding. As such, a key part of the final phase was an implementation strategy that demonstrated feasibility, support of local grantees, phasing, and short-term deliverables that can be delivered with CDBG-DR funding as well as ongoing revenue streams for later stages.

The real opportunity for HUD now is to leverage this process and its exemplary projects to benefit other regions at risk on a national scale.

Fideicomisos de suelo comunitario que crecen desde la base

Los organizadores comunitarios se convierten en emprendedores inmobiliarios
Miriam Axel-Lute and Dana Hawkins-Simons, Julio 1, 2015

A medida que crece el interés por vivir en las ciudades, el costo de las propiedades residenciales en muchos mercados de moda se ha ido por las nubes. Según el Centro Conjunto para Estudios de la Vivienda (Joint Center for Housing Studies o JCHS, 2015), en 2014 la tasa de viviendas vacantes en el mercado de alquiler alcanzó su mínimo en dos décadas; el precio de alquiler aumentó en 91 de 93 áreas metropolitanas estudiadas, y el índice de precios al consumidor para los contratos de alquiler se incrementó el doble de la tasa de inflación, hasta un 10 por ciento o más en Denver, San José, Honolulu y San Francisco.

A pesar de una interrupción debida a la crisis hipotecaria, los precios de las viviendas a la venta también han seguido aumentando, a menudo más allá del alcance de los compradores potenciales (Olick 2014); en Washington D.C., la mediana del valor de la vivienda casi se triplicó entre 2000 y 2013 (Oh et al. 2015). Cuando los activistas para el derecho a la vivienda comienzan a buscar herramientas efectivas para evitar el desplazamiento de las familias de bajos ingresos fuera de los barrios en proceso de aburguesamiento y crear comunidades inclusivas, muchos recurren a los fideicomisos de suelo comunitario (recuadro 1) como manera de ayudar a construir un inventario de viviendas permanentemente asequibles.

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Recuadro 1: El modelo de fideicomiso de suelo comunitario

Bajo el modelo de fideicomiso de suelo comunitario (CLT, por su sigla en inglés), una organización controlada por la comunidad retiene la propiedad de una parcela de suelo, y vende o alquila viviendas en dicho suelo a familias de bajos ingresos. En contrapartida a precios inferiores a los del mercado, los compradores aceptan restricciones de reventa, de modo que las viviendas sigan siendo económicas para los compradores subsiguientes, permitiendo al mismo tiempo a los dueños acumular algo de patrimonio neto. El fideicomiso de suelo comunitario también prepara a los compradores para adquirir la propiedad, les ofrece apoyo en sus problemas de financiamiento, y gestiona las reventas y las viviendas de alquiler.

De esta manera, el fideicomiso permite a más familias ser propietarias de una casa y apoya a los residentes que quieren comprometerse con sus barrios a largo plazo. En las áreas que se están aburguesando, ofrecen una manera efectiva para que las familias de bajos ingresos mantengan una participación en el barrio, porque aceptan un subsidio único inicial (que puede provenir de diversas fuentes, frecuentemente incluyendo programas públicos como el Programa de Sociedades de Inversión HOME o los Subsidios en Bloque para Desarrollo Comunitario) que queda ligado al edificio, manteniendo el bajo precio de las unidades a lo largo del tiempo sin necesidad de aportaciones adicionales de dinero público. En los mercados de vivienda débiles, también son beneficiosos (Shelterforce 2012), al proporcionar educación en materia financiera para reducir la cantidad de ejecuciones hipotecarias, mejorar el mantenimiento del barrio y mantener una tasa de ocupación estable. En 2009, en el auge de la crisis de ejecuciones hipotecarias, la probabilidad de que los préstamos de la Asociación de Banqueros Hipotecarios (MBA, por su sigla en inglés) se encontraran en el proceso de ejecución hipotecaria era 8,2 veces mayor que para los préstamos de fideicomisos de suelos comunitarios (CLT), a pesar de que los préstamos de los CLT se habían efectuado de manera uniforme a hogares de bajos ingresos (Thaden, Rosenberg 2010) mientras que los préstamos MBA incluían todos los segmentos de ingresos. De las poquísimas casas de un CLT que completaron el proceso de ejecución hipotecaria, la cartera del CLT no perdió ninguna.

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De forma similar a las corporaciones de desarrollo comunitario (community development corporations o CDC), muchos CLT surgieron de organizaciones vecinales de base. La organización comunitaria tradicional (a diferencia del concepto más amplio de “sensibilización comunitaria”) crea una base empoderada de residentes para determinar por si mismos lo que necesitan y se movilizan para lograrlo; como frente común, estos individuos están en mejores condiciones para contrarrestar a los opositores corporativos o gubernamentales y otras formas de poder institucional. La colaboración estratégica y la fortaleza numérica son esenciales para la formación exitosa de un CLT. Pero las destrezas requeridas para organizarse políticamente alrededor de problemas locales son muy distintas a las requeridas para administrar propiedades inmobiliarias. Si bien hacen falta ambas destrezas para implementar y sustentar un CLT, la adquisición de estas competencias centrales bajo un mismo techo puede obstaculizar la capacidad de una organización vecinal para dedicarse a su misión fundamental o alcanzarla.

¿Cómo han pilotado las organizaciones comunitarias que crearon un CLT el desafío de adquirir dos juegos de destrezas aparentemente incompatibles? Examinamos aquí la experiencia de cinco CLT consolidados de distintas regiones del país para ver cómo superaron este desafío y fueron modificando su enfoque a consecuencia de ello. Desde Boston a Los Ángeles, los organizadores comunitarios enfrentaron una amplia gama de problemas, desde barrios con altas tasas de suelo vacante y casi sin mercados de vivienda, a áreas de gran movimiento donde la preocupación principal era el desplazamiento de familias de bajos ingresos. Sin embargo, estas cinco organizaciones tuvieron razones notablemente similares para iniciar un fideicomiso de suelo comunitario: cada uno de los directores de estos CLT señaló que la comunidad quería controlar el suelo para impedir no sólo que los residentes perdieran una casa sino también que no pudieran comprar una por falta de recursos. Incluso los CLT que comenzaron en mercados de vivienda débiles estaban ubicados cerca del centro o cerca de distritos universitarios u otras áreas populares, y reconocieron la posibilidad de desplazamientos a medida que las condiciones de sus barrios mejoraran. Todos señalaron que era esencial contar con una visión comunitaria clara para que un CLT tenga éxito, aunque algunos grupos asumen la responsabilidad directa de crear e implementar dicha visión, mientras que otros se dedican a realizar trabajos por una vivienda en nombre de una organización matriz encargada de orientar la visión más amplia. Las formas de organizar y desarrollar las viviendas también variaron, pero todos estuvieron de acuerdo en que estas dos actividades pueden ser difíciles de combinar.

Dudley Neighbors Inc., Boston, Massachusetts

La organización más antigua en nuestro estudio, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI) o Iniciativa del Barrio de Dudley Street, se formó en un mal momento para el mercado en la década de 1980 para combatir el desecho ilegal de residuos en grandes extensiones de suelos que quedaron vacantes a consecuencia de una ola de incendios intencionados. La ciudad estaba proponiendo un plan de ordenamiento territorial para la zona sin tener en cuenta la opinión de los residentes, y los miembros de la comunidad respondieron creando DSNI para reclamar el derecho de la comunidad a participar de las decisiones sobre el uso del suelo en su zona. Conquistaron este derecho y, por medio de DSNI, decidieron que un CLT era la mejor herramienta para ayudar a implementar la visión de la comunidad. “Muchas veces, los grupos quieren formar un CLT creyendo que resolverá mágicamente los problemas de un barrio”, dice Harry Smith, director del CLT de DSNI, Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI) u Organizaciön de Vecinos de Dudley. “Pero primero decimos: ‘¿Han plasmado una visión de cómo se debería desarrollar su comunidad, y pueden explicar cómo encaja un CLT en dicha visión?’”

DNI, fundado en 1984, es una organización independiente, pero mantiene estrechos vínculos con su organización matriz. Los dos grupos comparten personal, y DSNI nombra a la mayoría de los integrantes de la Junta Directiva del CLT. El CLT es responsable solamente de proporcionar viviendas asequibles y del control comunitario del suelo, y deja a DSNI la tarea prioritaria de organización y planificación comunitaria. Ni DSNI ni DNI llevan a cabo el desarrollo inmobiliario directamente, sino que se asocian con emprendedores locales de viviendas sociales para ello.

Debido a su larga historia y relaciones ya establecidas, DSNI se dedica menos a actividades de lucha política que en sus días iniciales. Pero no renuncia a ello, de ser necesario. De hecho, Smith señala que mantener un CLT puede ser una fortaleza política única. Cuando DSNI se organiza para determinar el destino de una parcela particular de terreno, “el hecho de tener un fideicomiso de suelo nos da un nivel de impacto adicional”, dice.

Fideicomiso de suelo comunitario Sawmill, Albuquerque, Nuevo México

El CLT Sawmill, ubicado en Albuquerque, Nuevo México, se inició en 1996 cuando, después de una década de realizar actividades de organización comunitaria, los residentes de bajos ingresos se unieron para luchar contra una fábrica vecina que contaminaba el aire y amenazaba su salud. Querían ejercer control sobre el uso futuro del espacio. Después de que los líderes asistieron a una conferencia para aprender más sobre los fideicomisos de suelo comunitario, mantuvieron una serie de reuniones sobre este tema. Aunque algunos residentes mostraron preocupación por no poseer el suelo en el modelo del CLT, un veterano de la comunidad les recordó que de todas maneras no eran dueños de su propiedad ahora, ya fuera porque estaban de alquiler o porque no tenían los recursos para controlar lo que ocurría en su propio suelo. El exdirector ejecutivo Wade Patterson dice: “El hecho de que el objetivo específico estuviera orientado a controlar los costos de la vivienda calmó las inquietudes sobre el aburguesamiento de la comunidad y el desplazamiento de los residentes. El hecho de conseguir viviendas, y no otra fábrica, fue algo indiscutible”.

El CLT Sawmill fue creado como una organización independiente dedicada al desarrollo inmobiliario, a la administración y a la gestión de propiedades. Es uno de los mayores CLT del país, con 17 hectáreas, e incluye viviendas en propiedad, en alquiler y para personas de la tercera edad. Recientemente ganó una licitación de la ciudad de Albuquerque para revitalizar un viejo motel en un nuevo barrio de la ciudad, y el CLT está tratando de resolver cómo introducirse en esa comunidad de manera respetuosa.

Las asociaciones de vecinos de Albuquerque que se encuentran en el área de influencia de Sawmill, incluyendo el Consejo Asesor de Sawmill, que lanzó el CLT, se enfocan en la “construcción de la comunidad” por medio de eventos culturales, según Patterson. El CLT respalda la organización vecinal ofreciendo espacio para reunirse en uno de sus edificios, además de otros tipos de apoyo. “Nuestro objetivo no es liderar sino ofrecer apoyo manteniéndonos detrás”, dice Patterson.

Fideicomiso de suelo comunitario de San Francisco, California

El fideicomiso de suelo comunitario de San Francisco (SFCLT) fue creado en 2003, en un momento en que el mercado inmobiliario de la ciudad era uno de los más activos del país, y los residentes de bajos ingresos estaban preocupados por los altísimos alquileres y desalojos ilegales para convertir las propiedades en condominios. Los organizadores vecinales estaban buscando un modelo que pudiera prevenir los desalojos y dar a los residentes de menores ingresos un mayor control sobre su situación de vivienda.

El CLT es una entidad independiente, pero mantiene una relación estrecha con los organizadores vecinales que lo fundaron. Cuando sus grupos asociados se organizan para impedir desalojos o conversiones a condominios de un edificio en riesgo de ello (generalmente edificios de departamentos pequeños), SFCLT hace de comprador para preservar el edificio y después lo convierte en una cooperativa en suelo propiedad del CLT. SFCLT cuenta con personal que tiene experiencia inmobiliaria, pero no construye edificios nuevos; todas las obras de rehabilitación se contratan por fuera. Gestiona los aspectos financieros de la adquisición y la conversión, la administración del suelo y la capacitación y respaldo para ayudar a los residentes a formar una junta directiva y administrar el gobierno de la cooperativa. “Los grupos vecinales interesados en temas de vivienda nos remiten a todos los residentes necesitados; nosotros somos la única organización en temas de vivienda que puede ayudar a estabilizar un edificio de departamentos de varias unidades comprándolo”, dice la directora Tracy Parent. SFCLT organiza a sus miembros para apoyar los temas más amplios promovidos por sus socios de la coalición, pero no “inicia las actividades organizativas” sobre estos temas, según Parent.

T.R.U.S.T. South LA, Los Ángeles, California

Cuando se formó T.R.U.S.T. South LA en 2005, los barrios objetivos estaban llenos de lotes vacantes y viviendas deterioradas, mientras que las áreas circundantes estaban amenazadas por la presión del desarrollo inmobiliario. Si bien los fundadores —Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Strategic Actions of a Just Economy y Abode Communities— pensaron inicialmente en crear un CLT principalmente como una herramienta de vivienda, han asumido un papel más amplio en la implementación de una visión comunitaria. “Originalmente, nos constituimos como un grupo de adquisición de suelos. Después, nuestros miembros quisieron organizarse”, dice la directora ejecutiva Sandra McNeill. El CLT se ha organizado, por ejemplo, contra el propietario malintencionado que estaba tratando de desalojar a los residentes de un edificio que había dejado deteriorar a propósito para aprovecharse del vencimiento de las restricciones en el monto del alquiler de las viviendas de Sección 8. También se ha organizado para recaudar fondos para llevar a cabo mejoras en el transporte y en los espacios verdes en su barrio, y ha participado en coaliciones para el apoyo de políticas municipales más amplias, como, por ejemplo, el aumento de financiamiento para viviendas sociales.

El grupo se describe ahora como “una iniciativa comunitaria para estabilizar los barrios situados al sur del centro de Los Ángeles”. T.R.U.S.T. South LA es una organización independiente que se considera parte del equipo de desarrollo de proyectos de vivienda, y se asocia con otros para comprar, financiar y construir o rehabilitar viviendas.

Aun cuando T.R.U.S.T. South LA realiza muchas tareas de organización, casi todo su trabajo de política se realiza en colaboración con otros grupos, incluyendo sus socios fundadores. A los emprendedores que se dedican a viviendas sociales, en general no les gusta correr riesgos”, dice McNeill. “Pueden involucrarse en actividades políticas para garantizar que se proporcione financiamiento para viviendas sociales, pero no más que eso”.

Fideicomiso de suelo Community Justice, Filadelfia, Pensilvania

El Fideicomiso de Suelo Community Justice (Justicia Comunitaria) de Filadelfia se constituyó en el noreste de Filadelfia en 2010, cuando el mercado inmobiliario estaba atravesando fuertes altibajos. Aunque el barrio estaba plagado de propiedades vacantes y abandonadas, estaba rodeado por todos lados de florecientes mercados inmobiliarios, y parecía probable que estos crecientes precios y presiones inmobiliarias se propagaran. El Proyecto de Revitalización Comunitaria de Mujeres (Women’s Community Revitalization Project o WCRP), junto con una coalición de organizaciones cívicas locales, realizaron docenas de reuniones públicas para ayudar a los miembros de la comunidad a comprender qué significaba la formación de un fideicomiso de suelo comunitario y explorar sus inquietudes sobre las restricciones a la reventa. Los asistentes votaron a favor de formar un CLT.

El CLT Community Justice se constituyó como un programa del WCRP, que cuenta con conocimientos propios de desarrollo inmobiliario y organización comunitaria, incluido un departamento completo dedicado a estas actividades.

Pero la directora ejecutiva del WCRP, Nora Lichtash, advierte: “A veces pierdes algunas relaciones, cuando realizas actividades de organización comunitaria… A ciertas personas no le gusta que les presionen para que haga lo correcto”. En efecto, el WCRP aparentemente presionó tanto a una concejala local sobre ciertos temas que ella se negó a dar al CLT el suelo vacante que este fideicomiso esperaba conseguir para su primer proyecto inmobiliario. Al final, sin embargo, la concejala ayudó al grupo a establecer un banco de suelo para toda la ciudad (Feldstein 2013–14), que promueve algunos de los mismos principios que el fideicomiso de suelo.

A pesar de tensiones potenciales como estas, Lichtash cree que las funciones del CLT y de la organización comunitaria están muy interrelacionadas. Es importante recordar que la organización comunitaria y la construcción de viviendas sociales van unidas”, dice. Las personas que aportan fondos creen que hay que hacer una cosa o la otra, pero no es bueno separar el CLT de las actividades de organización comunitaria. Uno está construyendo capacidad para los trabajos presentes pero también para los trabajos futuros. Cuando uno se organiza, se hace respetar, porque tiene el poder del pueblo”.

Desarrollar o no desarrollar: Una decisión importante

El desarrollo de viviendas sociales es un asunto complicado y caro que ninguna organización comunitaria debería tomarse a la ligera si está pensando en iniciar un fideicomiso de suelo comunitario. “Si te dedicas al desarrollo inmobiliario, tendrás menos tiempo para las actividades de organización comunitaria, que son acumulativas. Para formar una organización vecinal realmente representativa, hace falta mucho tiempo y una gran dosis de sacrificio. Si tomas el camino más fácil, corres el riesgo de poner en peligro gran parte del poder que has construido a través de los años”.

La experiencia de Boston, por ejemplo, comienza con una moraleja. DSNI intervino cuando el emprendedor original del primer proyecto del CLT se echó atrás. Fue “traumático” para el personal y la junta, dice Smith. Nos tomó muchísimo tiempo y It distracted DSNI from its core functions.” distrajo a DSNI de sus funciones principales”.

La idea de controlar los recursos de desarrollo y tener acceso a las cuotas del emprendedor inmobiliario puede seducir a los grupos de base, dice Lichtash, de WCRP. Pero se debe proceder con extremo cuidado. Convertirse en un emprendedor inmobiliario puede enturbiar las aguas”, dice. En estos negocios millonarios, tienes que poner atención en todos los detalles. Y eso te aleja del trabajo educativo”.

El trabajo inmobiliario es muy duro y especulativo”, continúa Lichtash. Crees que estás consiguiendo una cosa y en realidad consigues otra. Yo le digo a la gente que las primeras asociaciones deben durar bastante tiempo. Es difícil mantener contentos tanto a los inquilinos como a las fuentes de financiamiento”.

Patterson del CLT Sawmill está de acuerdo con esta opinión, y agrega que es particularmente difícil “cumplir con todas las fechas de vencimiento y la presentación de informes sobre las necesidades de financiamiento [del desarrollo inmobiliario]. Siempre me sorprendo de la sobrecarga de tareas administrativas que esto requiere”. También aconseja que si no cuadran los números, “lo importante es saber que puedes retirarte de un proyecto si fuera necesario”.

McNeill de T.R.U.S.T. South LA dice: “Sin duda, el desarrollo inmobiliario tiene su propio lenguaje. Es complejo. Las organizaciones sin fines de lucro que se dedican a esto tienen grandes presupuestos y en general también una cantidad considerable de personal. Tengo mucho respeto por las destrezas que hacen falta para sacar adelante estos negocios. Se requieren unas destrezas muy distintas de lo que hacemos nosotros”.

Otra consideración es que no es fácil actualmente participar en una industria como la de las viviendas sociales. En el entorno de financiamiento actual, muchos de los subsidios que los CLT han utilizado tradicionalmente para desarrollar y administrar sus unidades se han reducido mucho, y es difícil encontrar hipotecas para los compradores potenciales de viviendas. Dice McNeill: “La industria de la vivienda ha sufrido enormes cambios. La realidad es que no hay una oportunidad en la actualidad para que una nueva organización se dedique a este negocio. No cabe duda de que este no es el momento”.

Incluso la administración continua de un CLT requiere un tipo de relación con los residentes distinta de la que tendría un organizador comunitario. El cobro de las cuotas del emprendedor y de los alquileres puede afectar la relación con los residentes y la dinámica de poder”, dice Smith de DNI. Uno es responsable tanto ante los inquilinos como ante los propietarios de tu comunidad, así que se producen tensiones”, según Lichtash de WCRP. Como comenta Parent de SFCLT: “Los organizadores comunitarios con frecuencia pintan los problemas como claras opciones morales”, pero cuando administras una propiedad, “hay matices”.

Con la mirada en la meta

Una vez que un grupo comunitario ha determinado que un CLT es la herramienta apropiada para mantener viviendas asequibles para los residentes locales, deberían hacerse las siguientes preguntas: ¿Quién ejercerá el liderazgo para implementar la visión más amplia? ¿Existe ya una organización que esté comprometida y sea capaz de hacerlo, o hay que crear una? ¿Hay grupos comunitarios que ya tengan experiencia en desarrollo inmobiliario y acceso a financiamiento, y que puedan asociarse con un CLT o incluso integrarlo en sus actividades? ¿Cómo puede el nuevo CLT asociarse y apoyar el trabajo de la organización comunitaria, en vez de distraer su labor?

Muchos CLT nuevos están siguiendo el camino de grupos como DSNI y T.R.U.S.T. South LA, estableciendo organizaciones separadas para gestionar las funciones de administración y la propiedad de suelo, y utilizando después la capacidad de emprendedores de viviendas sociales ya existentes por medio de alianzas. Si bien es cierto que cada localidad es distinta, este método parece ser un buen punto de partida para estos grupos, sobre todo si quieren conservar su energía para realizar la importante tarea que originalmente se propusieron: luchar por formar comunidades dinámicas y equitativas.

Miriam Axel-Lute es editora de Shelterforce, una revista dedicada al campo de desarrollo comunitario. Ha escrito extensamente sobre temas de organización comunitaria y fideicomisos de suelo comunitario.

Dana Hawkins-Simons es una galardonada periodista que ha publicado innovadoras investigaciones en U.S. News & World Report. También fue directora de Iniciativa de Oportunidades de Vivienda en el Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda.

Referencias

Beckwith, Dave, con Cristina Lopez. 1997. “Community Organizing: People Power from the Grassroots.” http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers97/beckwith.htm

Feldstein, Jill. 2013/14. “Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust.” Shelterforce. Otoño/Invierno 2013/14. www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning_a_land_bank_we_can_trust2/

Horwitz, Staci. 2011. “It’s All About Choice.” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/article/2313/its_all_about_choice/

Joint Center for Housing Studies. 2015. State of the Nation’s Housing 2015. Harvard University. www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing

Oh, Seunghoon, Josh Silver, Annelise Osterberg, y Jaclyn Tules. 2015. Does Nonprofit Housing Development Preserve Neighborhood Diversity? An Investigation into the Interaction Between Affordable Housing Development and Neighborhood Change. Manna, Inc. www.mannadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Final_Neighborhood_Impact_Analysis_7_1.pdf

Olick, Diana. 2014. “Housing Still Too Expensive Despite Positive Signs.” CNBC.com, 10 de julio. www.cnbc.com/2014/07/10/housing-still-too-expensive-despite-positive-signs.html

Shelterforce. 2012. “What’s the Point of Shared-Equity Homeownership in Weak Market Areas?” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/images/uploads/theanswer171-2.pdf

Schutz, Aaron y Marie G. Sandy. 2011. “What Isn’t Community Organizing.” En Collective Action for Social Change: An Introduction to Community Organizing, London: Palgrave McMillan. pp. 31–44.

Thaden, Emily y Greg Rosenberg. 2010. “Outperforming the Market: Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in Community Land Trusts.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1846_1154_LLA10102%20Foreclosure%20Rates.pdf

Land Policy, Land Markets and Urban Spatial Segregation

Allegra Calder and Rosalind Greenstein, Noviembre 1, 2001

Is urban spatial segregation a consequence of the normal functioning of urban land markets, reflecting cumulative individual choices? Or, is it a result of the malfunctioning of urban land markets that privatize social benefits and socialize private costs? Is it the result of class bias, or racial bias, or both? Does public housing policy create ghettos? Or, do real estate agents and lending officers substitute personal bias for objective data, thereby creating and reinforcing stereotypes about fellow citizens and neighborhoods? Can changes in land policy lead to changes in intra-metropolitan settlement patterns? Or, do such changes come about only from deep social changes having to do with values such as tolerance, opportunity and human rights?

Thirty-seven practitioners and academics from thirteen countries struggled with these and other related questions at the Lincoln Institute’s “International Seminar on Segregation in the City” in Cambridge last July. The seminar organizers, Francisco Sabatini of the Catholic University of Chile and Martim Smolka and Rosalind Greenstein of the Lincoln Institute, cast a wide net to explore the theoretical, historical and practical dimensions of segregation. Participants came from countries as diverse as Brazil, Israel, Kenya, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland and the U.S., and they brought to the discussion their training as lawyers, sociologists, economists, urban planners, regional scientists and geographers. As they attempted to come to terms with the meaning of segregation, the various forces that create and reinforce it, and possible policy responses, it became apparent that there are no simple answers and that many viewpoints contribute to the ongoing debate. This brief report on the seminar offers a taste of the far-reaching discussion.

The papers presented by all participants in this seminar are posted on the Lincoln Institute website.

What is Segregation and Why Is It Important?

Frederick Boal’s (School of Geography, Queen’s University, Belfast) work is informed by both the rich sociological literature on segregation and his own experience of living in the midst of the troubles between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Boal suggested that segregation was best understood as part of a spectrum that ranged from the extreme approach of ethnic cleansing to the more idealistic one of assimilation (see Figure 1). As with so many policy issues, segregation will not be solved by viewing it as a dichotomy but rather as a continuum of degrees or levels of separateness, each with different spatial manifestations.

For Peter Marcuse (Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation and Planning, Columbia University, New York) segregation implies a lack of choice and/or the presence of coercion. When racial or ethnic groups choose to live together, he calls that clustering in enclaves. However, when groups are forced apart, either explicitly or through more subtle mechanisms, he calls that segregation in ghettoes. It is the lack of choice that distinguishes these patterns and invites a public policy response.

The meaning and importance of segregation varies with the historical context. For William Harris (Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Jackson State University, Mississippi), who writes about spatial segregation in the U.S. South, segregation can be neither understood nor addressed without fully appreciating the role that race has played and continues to play in American history and public policy. Flavio Villaça (School of Architecture and Urbanism, University of São Paulo, Brazil) understands segregation within a class framework, where income level and social status, not race, are the key factors influencing residential patterns. In Brazil and many other countries with long histories of authoritarian regimes, urban services are generally provided by the state. In these countries, urban residential patterns determine access to water and sewer facilities (and therefore health) as well as transportation, utility infrastructure and other urban services.

In many cases, Villaça and others assert, land market activity and urban codes and regulations have been used, both overtly and furtively, to create elite, well-serviced neighborhoods that segregate the upper classes from the rest of society, which is largely ignored. This view has parallels in the U.S., where access to high-quality schools and other valued amenities is largely determined by residential patterns that are closely associated with segregation by income level, ethnic background and other demographic characteristics. Seminar participants also cited the correlation between disadvantaged communities and the location of environmental hazards. People segregated into low-income ghettoes or neighborhoods comprised primarily of people of color confront the downsides of modern urban living, such as hazardous waste sites and other locally unwanted land uses.

Ariel Espino (Department of Anthropology, Rice University, Texas) presented an analysis of how distance is used to reinforce social, political and economic inequality in housing. When social and economic differences are clear and understood, ruling elites tolerate physical proximity. For example, servants can live close to their employers, even in the same house, because economic relations and behavioral norms dictate separation by class.

Why Does Segregation Persist?

Prevalent throughout the seminar was an assumption that all residents of the city (i.e., citizens) ought to have access to urban services, at least to a minimum level of services. However, Peter Marcuse challenged the participants to think beyond a minimum level and to consider access to urban amenities in the context of rights. He questioned whether wealth or family heritage or skin color or ethnic identity ought to determine one’s access to public goods—not only education, health and shelter, but also other amenities directly related to physical location. In language reminiscent of Henry George’s views on common property in the late-nineteenth century, Marcuse asked whether it was fair or right, for example, for the rich to enjoy the best ocean views or river frontage or other endowments of nature while the poor are often relegated to the least attractive areas.

Robert Wassmer (Department of Public Policy and Administration, California State University) described the economic processes involved in residential location, as they are understood by public choice economists. In this view, house buyers do not choose to buy only a house and a lot; they consider a diverse set of amenities that vary from place to place. Some buyers may choose an amenity bundle that includes more public transit and less lakefront, while others may choose greater access to highways and higher-quality public education. However, not all citizens have equal opportunities to make such choices. Several seminar participants added that this debate is part of a larger conversation about access and choice in society, since nearly all choices are constrained to some extent, and many constraints vary systematically across social groups.

Other participants drew attention to the ways that government policy (e.g., tax codes, housing legislation) and private institutions (e.g., real estate agents, lending institutions) interact to influence the behavior of land markets, and thus the effects of land policies on public and private actions. Greg Squires (Department of Sociology, George Washington University) reported on a study of the house-hunting process in Washington, DC. His research findings emphasize the role of real estate agents in steering buyers and renters into same-race neighborhoods. As a consequence, blacks simply do not enjoy the same opportunities as whites and are far less likely to obtain their first choice of housing, thus challenging the public choice model. Squires also found that housing choice is determined by social or economic status. For example, priorities for neighborhood amenities among black house-hunters tended to differ from those of whites, in part because they had fewer private resources (such as an automobile) and were more dependent on a house location that provided centralized services such as public transportation.

John Metzger (Urban and Regional Planning Program, Michigan State University) examined the role of the private market in perpetuating segregation. He presented research on the demographic cluster profiles that companies like Claritas and CACI Marketing Systems use to characterize neighborhoods. These profiles are sold to a range of industries, including real estate and finance, as well as to public entities. The real estate industry uses the profiles to inform retailing, planning and investment decisions, and, Metzger argues, to encourage racial steering and the persistence of segregation. Mortgage lenders use profiles to measure consumer demand. Urban planners—both private consultants and those in the public sector—use profiles to determine future land uses for long-range planning and to guide planning and investment for central business districts. Real estate developers use profiles to define their markets and demonstrate pent-up demand for their products. The profiles themselves are often based on racial and ethnic stereotypes and in turn reinforce the separation of racial and ethnic groups within regional real estate markets.

Xavier de Souza Briggs (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) brought the idea of “social capital” to the discussion. As the term is being used today by sociologists and social theorists, social capital embodies the social networks and social trust within communities that can be harnessed to achieve individual and group goals. Briggs argued that social capital is both a cause and an effect of segregation in the U.S., but it can be leveraged to create positive change. Others challenged the extent to which social capital theory and research helps to address urban spatial segregation. These participants argued that it tended to frame the policy question as “How do we improve poor people?” rather than addressing the structural and institutional mechanisms that contribute to residential segregation and income inequality. Yet, the sociologists’ view is that social capital is the very element that communities need to exert some element of control over their immediate environments, rather than to be simply the recipients of the intended and unintended consequences of the political economy.

Social Justice and Land Policy

Seminar participants from around the world shared examples of spatial segregation enforced as a political strategy through the power of the state.

  • The British colonial government in Kenya employed planning laws and exclusionary zoning to separate native Africans from the British, and those residential patterns established almost a century ago are reflected in Nairobi today.
  • The military government at the time of the British mandate in Palestine forced the Arab Palestinians to reside in only one sector of the city of Lod, facilitating the transformation of this once Arab city in what is now Israel.
  • The military regime of Augusto Pinochet evicted thousands of working-class Chileans from certain sectors of their cities to make way for small, elite middle- and upper-class settlements.
  • The Apartheid regime of South Africa created separate residential sectors based on race and systematically kept groups isolated in virtually all aspects of society.

The connections between these extreme forms of spatial segregation and the land policies and market forces at work in most cities today are complex and challenging to articulate. One link is in the ways that land policies and the institutions that support land markets continue to be used to legitimize discriminatory practices.

By envisioning cities where citizens have real freedom to choose their residential locations, the planners in the seminar focused on government policies and programs to facilitate integration, such as the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity Program. However, Stephen Ross (Department of Economics, University of Connecticut) questioned the assumed benefits of resettlement or integration policies by asking, “What if you dispersed high-income people across the city? What would change? Does this idea help us to think more carefully about why space matters?”

Another query from Xavier Briggs challenged participants to think about where the most meaningful social interactions actually occur. Specifically, what needs to happen, and in what circumstances, to move from the extreme of ethnic cleansing on Boal’s urban ethnic spectrum toward assimilation? Briggs suggested that institutions such as schools and workplaces might be better suited to foster more diversity in social interactions than are residential neighborhoods.

Ultimately, the urban planners wanted the tools of their trade to be used for shaping a city that offered justice for all. Haim Yacobi (Department of Geography, Ben-Gurion University, Israel), while referring to the status of the Arab citizens in the mixed city of Lod, touched the foundations of western democratic ideals when he asked, “If a citizen does not have full access to the city, if a citizen is not a full participant in the life of the city, is he or she living in a true city?”

Allegra Calder is a research assistant at the Lincoln Institute and Rosalind Greenstein is a senior fellow and cochairman of the Institute’s Department of Planning and Development.

The Landscape of Ideas on Property Rights

Antonio Azuela, Noviembre 1, 1998

My experience in attending the “Who Owns America? II” conference in Madison, Wisconsin, last June was like contemplating a landscape of ideas about land and people. From my perspective, this landscape had four salient features:

  • the expansion of property rights;
  • the challenge of the private/public dichotomy;
  • the growing complexity of the physical world, which constitutes the ‘object’ of property rights;
  • and the narrative approach as a methodological tool for better understanding property as a social relationship.

The most noticeable feature in U.S. legal thinking about land is the great importance of property rights. Latin American legal tradition, following French jurist Leon Duguit’s doctrine of the social function of property, tends to see property rights as something to be limited by government and law in order to meet social needs. So, it was a cultural shock for me to discover the popularity of Charles Reich’s theory about property, where egalitarian ideas are advanced by means of asserting individual property rights.

At the conference, one could see many different ways in which the notion of property rights was expanded to accommodate new social demands. Eric Freyfogle’s contention that property should have an honored place in society is one example. Of course, an idea does not have to be accepted unanimously in American legal thinking for it to be an important aspect of today’s landscape of ideas about property.

The second feature refers to the distinction between public and private-a distinction that is so essential to modern societies that it is usually taken for granted. We are used to recognizing the coexistence of two separate forms of social control over the same piece of land: that of private landowners and that of public government organizations. However, one has to remember that this separation is not eternal or universal; it is a historical product.

Urban studies have long shown that land use regulations constantly affect the relationships between public and private control. Planning powers and development rights have been shrinking and expanding since the inception of modern urban management, and that process is now seen as normal. A more profound challenge to the separation of public and private categories was raised at the conference by indigenous peoples’ claims to their territories in the United States.

Those claims refer to a third, not yet fully codified, form of social control over land. In general, indigenous peoples do not aim at controlling local governments, i.e. governing a territory through conventional means. They also reject being treated simply as private corporations who own land. They talk about rights of a different nature, with old and new elements, and they do so by challenging a series of treaties between the people and the state. A treaty is the typical form of legal relationship between a nation-state and an external force. Apparently, past treaties were supposed to ‘settle’ the territorial question. But those treaties are now being questioned both in terms of the public/private dichotomy and because the formation of a nation-state was not completed.

We must also recognize that classical legal thinking does not have the tools to give meaning to these developments, because it is the very foundation of that thinking that is being shaken. Clearly, these concerns are also being raised in Canada and Mexico, although under different forms and with different outcomes. Scholars and practitioners in legal theory, and particularly constitutional theory, in all three countries of North America can learn a lot from each other in this process.

We should not be surprised to see new forms of territorial control when there have been so many changes in the land itself. Thousands of books have been written about the transformation of the land, mainly from what we now call an environmental perspective. Land as the ‘object’ of property relations has become extremely complex, and this complexity is the third feature I see in this landscape of ideas. Territories have become very difficult to understand, and perhaps the most relevant development is the blurring of the urban/rural distinction. We do not have cities in the traditional sense of the word; what we have is a set of urbanization processes.

The heralds of cyberspace tell us that as distances are shortened through new technologies, space and distance have become irrelevant. The truth is that technological change, combined with demographic and social change, has only made land more complex. This is clear when we see, as in the papers presented at the conference, the great number of disciplines that describe, analyze and even sing about land. There is not a single discipline that can embrace land into one form of discourse.

Maybe the most interesting new way of looking at land is the narrative approach, the fourth feature in our landscape. Listening to stories about land throws more light on property relationships than many other empirical methods because it allows us to recognize the subjective aspects without getting too far from empirical social sciences. Compared to the rigidity of legal and economic approaches, personal accounts give us the fluidity of property as a social relationship, the changes that occur in that relationship as a result of many interactions, and the different meanings that a piece of land or a neighborhood can have for its dwellers, new settlers, visitors or others.

Recognizing the richness and vividness of people’s stories and contrasting this richness against the rigidity of legal categories does not require neglecting those categories. Indeed, this more subjective approach can be another way of taking the law seriously. There is hardly any social discourse about land, even in its most vernacular form, which does not have a normative connotation. When someone says ‘this land is (was or should be) mine,’ he or she is making a legal claim. Legal categories are important outside the professional circles of lawyers, judges and realtors precisely because they are part of people’s stories; moreover, their function is to give meaning to people’s experiences.

When legal categories are not able to embrace a people’s normative representations about land, the law has lost its meaning. If traditional legal thinking defines property as a bundle of rights, the narrative approach can teach us to see property rights as bundles of representations that can be used to help people give meaning to their relationship to the land. Maybe this is the main lesson I have learned from “Who Owns America?”: to use many lenses to look at the landscape and to explore comparative ideas about individual and community ownership, informal settlements and legal systems throughout North America.

Antonio Azuela is the Attorney General for Environmental Protection in the federal government of Mexico. A graduate of Universidad Iberoamericana (Mexico City) and the School of Law, University of Warwick (England), he has been the legal advisor to several state governments and federal government agencies on planning law. Mr. Azuela is author of La Ciudad la Propiedad. Privada y el Derecho-The City: Private Property and the Law (El Colegio de Mexico, 1989) and numerous other publications on urban and environmental law from a sociological perspective.

Editor’s Note: The “Who Owns America? II” conference in June 1998 was cosponsored by the Lincoln Institute and the North American Program of the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

The University of Wisconsin Press has recently published Who Owns America? Social Conflict over Property Rights, edited by Harvey M. Jacobs, and based on the first conference in 1995. Contact: www.wisc.edu/wisconsinpress