The introduction of land titling programs to the informal land market seemed to offer a magic solution to the problem of poverty in third world countries. Various governments breathed a sigh of relief, as the struggle to reduce poverty would no longer require the complex and stressful income redistribution measures that always cause conflicts between social groups and classes. According to this magic formula, all that was required was for informal urban dwellers (about 50 percent of the population in the major cities) to formally register their properties and thus gain access to title deeds, so they could obtain mortgage loans from private banks. Their titles and newfound access to loans would enable them to increase their real estate capital, improve their homes and develop small businesses (de Soto 1986; 2001).

To put this hypothesis to the test, and at the request of Perú’s National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas e Informática–INEI), I conducted a study of the official real estate registration policy under which more than one million title deeds were conferred in Perú between 1996 and 2000. This policy was implemented by the Commission for the Official Registration of Informal Property (COFOPRI) and the Real Estate Registry of Urban Settlements (RPU). As stated in Perú’s Law Decree 803 of March 1996, the purpose of this policy was to establish a formal relationship between the distribution of land titles, access to formal credit mechanisms and better standards of living. Based on information provided by National Household Surveys (ENAHO) for 1998 and 1999, conducted by INEI, my study analyzed data on housing that either was acquired through invasions or other illegal means and did not have property titles or had obtained titles from COFOPRI through the regularization process. The data base consisted of 913,335 units in 1998 and 1,033,480 in 1999, out of a total of 3,572,091 urban housing units for both years. The financing obtained for housing expansion and other domestic expenses was used as an indicator to determine the access to credit, whereas the structure of the dwelling and the supply of basic services were used to determine standards of living.

Those who advocate the regularization of property in Perú argue that property titles should be granted on a large scale by recognizing informal occupation (that is, legalizing land ownership), awarding registered land title deeds, and thus establishing the links needed to gain access to formal credit mechanisms. Official registration is the legal procedure whereby actual rights to a property result in legal ownership. A particular characteristic of this procedure is the firm resolve to establish connections between the legalization of land and property and the access to mortgages through the private banks. As described by the Path to Property Association, an organization dedicated to promoting these policies worldwide, the basic philosophy behind the formal registration process is that prosperity in countries with market economies is largely achieved because those societies have adequate property systems that enable their markets to operate through exchangeable ownership rights in a wide-ranging market.

To grant landowners indisputable proof of ownership and protect them from fraud and uncertainty ownership rights must be standardized, and universally accessible exchange instruments must be registered in a central government system by legal norms and regulation. Consequently, through the official registration of property, the “energy” of the informal sector can be channeled toward organized and prosperous market economies. From this perspective, informality is merely the inability of governments to make their laws coincide with the real circumstances under which people work and live. Nevertheless, this viewpoint fails to reduce a complex phenomenon to its legal dimension and neglects its economic aspects.

Land Titling Policy and Outcomes

To speed up the distribution of land titles and to avoid troublesome formalities, COFOPRI took over this responsibility from the municipalities. The World Bank supported this policy, granting COFOPRI a US$38 million loan in December 1998. Between 1996 and 2000, 1,134,000 duly registered land title deeds were awarded: 645,165 of them in Lima, 112,631 in Arequipa and 74,180 in Trujillo (the first, second and third largest cities in Perú, respectively). In terms of the distribution and registration of land titles, the success of the formal registration policy is undeniable. However, the fact that municipalities were removed from the process is questionable, since their legal role in the urban system was undermined.

A close connection between the official registration of property and the standard of living was observed in Lima after the policy was implemented. Between 1998 and 1999, regularized (formerly illegal or informal) housing in the capital city showed improved construction of walls, floors and roofing; however, the nonregularized housing units also had improved construction of walls and floors. In the rest of the country, informal housing in urban areas predominates over regularized housing.

While regularized housing units outside Lima increased from 17,929 to 48,869 between 1998 and 1999, the number of units still without property titles increased from 371,005 to 392,436, indicating the persistence of invasion mechanisms. The gaps between different types of improvements on regularized and informal houses outside Lima increased between 1998 and 1999 for most categories (see Table 1).

Looking at the relationship between official land titles and access to credit, the study found that of the 70,725 houses in Lima awarded land title deeds by COFOPRI in 1998, about 23,965 (34 percent) of those homeowners gained access to varied types of financing, such as loans from banks, lending agencies or family members, to improve or renovate their homes. In 1999, the owners of about 23,804 (18.3 percent) out of a total of 129,588 titled houses obtained such financing. Although there is no official information on how many homeowners applied for credit and were denied, this result proves that officially registered households that gain access to loans are a minority and, in fact, the number has decreased. This situation is explained by complex factors including the economic recession, the default rate of 10 percent on private bank loans, fear of giving loans to lower-income sectors, and fear among these residents of mortgaging their houses and land.

Similarly, the number of bank loans to already titled landowners in Lima decreased from 12,750 in 1998 to 8,993 in 1999. In contrast, the use of own resources to finance housing improvements rose from 12,282 in 1998 to 14,811 in 1999. Not only is a larger majority spending their own funds on housing, but they are facing more difficulties in gaining access to credit institutions, despite the formal registration of their properties. A study by COFOPRI-DESCO (Riofrío 2001) identified several characteristics of those who are willing to take mortgages:

• Stable nuclear families;
• Both husband and wife are wage-earners;
• Entrepreneurial mentality and willingness to take risks;
• Have self-owned businesses (microbusinesses, taxis, etc.); and
• Have information on the use of the Urban Land Registry.

Of the 12,750 households officially registered and regularized in Lima in 1998 that also received bank loans for renovations and improvements, 52.6 percent obtained their loans from the Banco de Materiales and 47.4 percent from the National Construction Company (ENACE). In 1999, 8,993 officially registered and regularized households received loans for renovations and improvements, 7,593, or 84.43 percent from the Banco de Materiales and 15.57 percent from the ENACE. Since these are both public entities that grant subsidized loans (at the same annual interest rate of 7 percent), there is no connection between the official registration of property through regularization programs and access to loans from private banks.

With respect to seeking financing for other kinds of household expenses, only 11,323 (8.7 percent) out of a total of 129,588 households registered in Lima in 1999 resorted to any kind of financial assistance. Since no public entity provides loans for these expenses, most households receive money from friends and relatives (47 percent) or other sources such as lending agencies (25 percent). Only 28 percent of these 11,323 registered households gained access to loans from private banks for household needs.

In other urban areas, the situation of officially registered households is different from Lima’s experience. In 1998, the use of the households’ own funds for housing improvements predominated over bank loans (78.7 percent compared with 21.2 percent), whereas in 1999 bank loans predominated over own funds (51.3 percent compared with 42.9 percent). In 1998, all of the loans were public loans granted by Banco de Materiales, and 93 percent were from that source in 1999. With respect to loans for other household expenses, 6,163 (13 percent) of the total of 47,302 households officially registered during 1999 received some financing. Of this small group, 45 percent received financial assistance from lending agencies and other sources, 34 percent from friends and relatives, and 21 percent from their employers or work centers. None of them obtained funds from private banks.

Conclusions

The study yielded the following conclusions with regard to the relationship between official registration of titles and access to credit:

• In general, and despite the increase in the number of properties regularized between 1998 and 1999, access to loans decreased during that period, coinciding with the economic recession and related problems affecting private banks.
• The use of personal resources predominates over bank loans as a source of funds for the expansion of both regularized and informal housing. Loans for other household expenses are obtained mainly from relatives and friends, followed by private banks and informal lending systems. Lower-income families primarily use their own funds or those of social networks for improvements to both regularized and informal housing; resources from formal public or private institutions are secondary.
• Surprisingly, informal households gain more access to loans from private banks than do regularized households. For example, in 1999, 100 percent of loans for improvements to housing units regularized by COFOPRI in Lima were public loans, thus none received private loans, whereas 28 percent of nonregularized housing units did obtain private loans. This suggests that the eligibility criteria used by private banks is based on job stability and fixed monthly income, rather than on land tenancy. The information obtained from ENAHO shows that in 1998, 25 percent of families living in informal dwellings earned about US$747.50 per month. This is the equivalent of “6 to 7 minimum monthly wages,” a frequently used measure for salaries for lower-income sectors in Latin American countries. In contrast, only 12 percent of families living in officially registered properties regularized by COFOPRI earned a comparable salary. This paradoxical situation, whereby title holders do not have access to private banks, while those without titles have higher incomes and better access to loans, may be explained by the fact that COFOPRI, seeking to grant a large number of titles quickly and to create political impact, concentrated its efforts in newer, fragmented neighborhoods where it was easier to identify the landowners. In contrast, COFOPRI tended to ignore older and more close-knit neighborhoods where it was harder to identify the owners due to the presence of multiple generations living under the same roof.
• In the case of both regularized and informal properties, the main sources of loans were public entities that grant subsidized loans (i.e., Banco de Materiales).

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Thus, there is no direct relationship between the number of title deeds handed over to informal dwellers and their subsequent access to loans from private banks. This conclusion was confirmed when the transition government that succeeded former President Fujimori (1990-2000) revealed in 2001 that only 12,388 mortgages had been recorded in the RPU throughout the country, which is equivalent to only 5 percent of potential beneficiaries. Although registration facilities may be useful, they are certainly not sufficient to increase access to credit. Effective policies require an in-depth study of a number of different factors, including:

• The policies on which private bank loans are based. Discriminatory policies (redlining, etc.) are prevalent in Latin America, as in the U.S.
• The popular credit culture, particularly as regards poor people’s fear of losing their property (which is virtually their only asset), as well as the lack of understanding of concepts of property titles, credit and even banks. It’s important to study the patterns of cultural inertia that are put to the test by this type of policies and consider the opportunities for education that could facilitate these processes.
• The reluctance of people to register their properties and use the registries. The intention of this article, and the research behind it, is not to minimize the importance of policies aimed at facilitating access to credit by the poor by means of regularization programs. On the contrary, such policies are important and should be stimulated, although we would not suggest urban poverty can be resolved exclusively through this means. For the system to improve, it is essential to have a better understanding of the credit system and the popular credit culture, as well as to develop financial assistance programs that address the current resistance to the use of mortgages by both the poor and the banking sector.

Julio Calderón Cockburn is a sociologist and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Perú. He has written many books and articles published in the Americas and Europe, and he currently works as an independent consultant and university professor. He is a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute, which supported the study reported here and other research and teaching projects in the past. Several of his written works are available on the Lincoln Institute website in the Latin America section under LAC Papers (www.lincolninst.edu).

References

Calderón Cockburn, Julio A. 2001. Comparative analysis of the benefited and non-benefited population by the national formalization plan. In Has the well-being of the population improved?: A balance of the main social policies and programs. Lima: National Institute of Statistics and Data Processing (INEI): 65-92. de Soto, Hernando. 1986. The Other Path. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.

_____. 2002. The Mystery of Capital. London: Bantam Press.

Fernandes, Edesio. 2002. The influence of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital. Land Lines 14 (1): 5–8.

Riofrío, G., J. Calderón y M. Zolezzi. 2001. Estudio sobre cultura registral. Lima: COFOPRI-DESCO. Agosto.

Researchers from the Lincoln Institute are working with the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC) in Havana to better understand how land and increments in land value can be utilized to facilitate the physical rehabilitation and economic development of Cuba.

During the Soviet era, Cuba’s economic environment was characterized by a top-down model in which state agencies were the principal economic and development actors. Planning was autocratic and inflexible; trade depended primarily on the socialist bloc countries; financial capacity was centralized in the national budget; and there was no tax system. Legal, financial and economic reforms implemented since 1990 have helped to create an institutional environment more conducive to economic efficiency and to allow Cuba’s participation in the global market (see Figure 1).

However, the Cuban economy still faces tremendous difficulties that have seriously affected the country’s capacity to maintain living standards, the quality of social and public services, and economic development programs in general. For example, Cuba’s GDP in 1995 was only one-half its 1989 level and its import capacity has fallen from roughly 8 billion to 2 billion US$ annually.

Figure 1: Summary of Key Reforms

1990 Opening of the economy to foreign investors

1991 Reinstatement of Cuban international trade

1992 Introduction of modifications to the 1976 Constitution

Introduction of new forms of non-state property Elimination of the state monopoly on international trade Expansion of foreign-owned private market enterprises 1993 Transfer of formerly state-owned rural land to workers

1994 Restructuring of the central state administration Opening of agricultural markets based on supply and demand mechanisms

1995 Reestablishment of indicative planning and introduction of financial indicators Beginning of state business restructuring Regularization of the circulation of hard currency in the banking system Enactment of new laws on foreign investments Gradual introduction of components of a tax system Enactment of the law restructuring the banking system

1997 Enactment of the law on free trade zones

The Cuban government has tried to promote tourism as its primary means to generate much-needed hard currency quickly. As a Caribbean island, Cuba offers substantial tourist attractions, ranging from magnificent beaches to the architectural heritage of Old Havana, which has been recognized on UNESCO’s World Heritage List, as well as other natural, historical and cultural sites around the country. However, stimulation of the tourist industry requires international partners to undertake the development of hotels, shops, restaurants and airport expansion. The fact that the state owns most of the land available for development is a critical element in Cuba’s strategy to attract foreign developers and tourists.

The government’s plan to build its tourist industry has shown some success. In 1967 there were about 2,000 tourists to the island annually, whereas in 1998 over 1.4 million visitors traveled to Cuba. During the last five years alone, foreign investors have increased their operations in Cuba in several economic sectors, particularly in tourism. As a result 2,000 new hotel rooms have been added in Havana, with a total capacity now surpassing 10,700 rooms. Nationwide there are 31,600 hotel rooms, and the target is to increase capacity to 40,000 over the next two years. About 80 percent of recent construction activity in Cuba is related, directly or indirectly, to the tourist sector. Some estimates indicate that state-owned land and buildings already committed to these new projects represent around 500 million US$. Significantly, this development has been achieved without the existence of a formal land market.

Land-based Policies to Stimulate Development

Land has been used in various ways to help stimulate development and to generate public revenues. First, the Cuban government has used land as its capital contribution in joint ventures with international developers. For example, VanCuba Holdings, S.A., a Canadian company, is a 50-percent partner with the Cuban government in a project to build 11 hotels. Cuba contributed the land as its 50-percent share and the Canadian company is expected to invest 400 million US$. Many such joint venture arrangements, particularly real estate and tourism projects, have been made with development companies from Canada, Spain, Italy and Israel.

Since land is Cuba’s principal contribution to these international ventures, a key issue is to assure that the financial value of the land represents 50 percent of the project’s social capital. In cases where the monetary value of the contributed land is less than 50 percent, the foreign partner has often been instrumental in helping its Cuban counterpart apply for credit from international banks or financial institutions to make up the difference. More recently, the credit to assure 50-percent Cuban participation is obtained at low interest rates directly from the Central Bank of Cuba rather than from international entities.

A second mechanism to stimulate development is the increased use of land leasing agreements for commercial and office projects. Leasing is preferred since the direct sale of state-owned land is possible only in very special situations. The leasing terms are negotiated on the basis of the specific land value, and if accepted by all parties are established for 25 years. The lease may be reviewed and extended for an additional 25 years if the parties involved in the renegotiations agree upon the new criteria. In Havana, several projects with foreign investors are currently operating under such an agreement, and the estimated area under development in the city surpasses 100 hectares.

Third, the Cuban government has entered into direct rental agreements for state-owned land in free trade zones, which in some cases generate significant revenues. About 120 foreign private and public-private enterprises have been established already in two trade zones in Havana.

Both the leasing and direct rental agreements for state-owned land provide important new funds to the national budget. These resources are then used to improve the standard of living in local communities by providing social services (education and health), developing economic projects, upgrading and enlarging major infrastructure and other amenities, and generating jobs. Some examples of city and community benefits that have been supported largely by these revenues are the new Havana International Airport, the creation and improvement of a digital telephone system, and the metropolitan park projects in the Almendares River area.

A different but very interesting set of instruments to mobilize land value increments resulting from public investment has been developed by the Office of the Historian, the public agency responsible for promoting, financing and developing the revitalization program in Old Havana. This Office has begun to collect both indirect and direct taxes totaling 35 percent of revenues from private enterprises not related to the Office, such as hotels, commercial businesses and restaurants that have benefited from the Office’s efforts to rehabilitate the historic district. These external revenues, as well as revenues generated by projects initiated by the Office itself, are used in a kind of revolving fund to support further investments in the built environment. They also fund a variety of social programs, including housing, nursing homes, and educational and cultural activities in Old Havana. The Office’s total revenues surpassed 40 million US$ in 1998 and 50 million US$ in 1999. The government is also negotiating other kinds of revenue-generating programs to capture land value increments to support the rehabilitation of the Paseo del Prado and the Rampa areas of Havana, as well as the Boca de la Chorrera redevelopment project at the mouth of the Almendares River.

Difficulties with Implementation

Cuba’s implementation of these various tools for capturing land value increments has not occurred without problems. In the case of the indirect and direct taxes on revenues introduced in Old Havana, several businesses have claimed that their revenue sources are not a result of the efforts by the Office of the Historian to improve the district, and therefore should be exempt from the tax. For example, the headquarters of the Cuban Fuel Distribution Company (CUPET) is located in a valuable area in the heart of the historic center but does not pay the tax. The company argues that its revenue sources (i.e., its facilities and distribution networks) are located outside the center and therefore do not benefit from the rehabilitation process.

The 25-year leasing agreements illustrate a different problem arising from the implicit dilemma between short-run vs. long-run goals, because the agreements do not include a periodic updating of lease payments. On one hand, if the payments are set on the basis of existing use and value, the public authorities may lose significant financial resources that could accrue from the impacts of these investments and other changes in land value over the 25-year lease. However, if the authorities attempt to capture the anticipated higher value immediately, they will have more difficulty making such expensive deals with wary investors.

The lack of an adequate legal system for real estate development and mortgage lending in Cuba is a major obstacle to implementation of all these instruments. Proposed new real estate laws have been drafted but legislation expected to be introduced last year has not yet been adopted. This uncertain and unpredictable legal situation can prevent the formation of serious business partnerships, which normally require long-term vision, stability and transparency. Furthermore, this lack of legal protection may scare away the highest quality developers who would be most able to carry out sophisticated larger projects. As a result, the Cuban government has had fewer strong proposals to evaluate and has been accepting smaller projects with less established international developers.

These smaller projects are sometimes problematic for several reasons. First, they are often located in the most desirable parts of Havana, although such developments are not necessarily appropriate for those neighborhoods. Second, they must rely on existing infrastructure since they are not large enough to provide that additional investment. Third, the aesthetic quality and even the basic service standards of these new hotels or apartments are sometimes questionable. Since these buildings affect the overall image of the city, they may even have a negative impact and contribute to the devaluation of their neighborhood.

A related problem is the uncertainty that developers experience in having to deal with new institutions and policy tools that are being negotiated within the Cuban government at the same time they are being implemented in the field. While these policies are under review, the government has introduced a moratorium on new development in certain areas of Havana and has slowed the real estate negotiation process in general. Without stability and trust in the relevant government agencies and policies, private investors for commercial or residential projects are discouraged by the risks inherent in making long-term development decisions. This has an obvious effect on the costs of development and the expected internal rates of return.

Finally, there are the difficulties of assessing land values in the absence of formal markets, let alone transparent land transactions. Government agencies involved in development have two choices. One is to use administrative prices in determining the value of leases or contributions, even though the basis for these prices may not reflect the actual value of land attributes. Alternatively, the agencies must negotiate the price with foreign developers based on the dynamics of the particular site. Both options are limited by the lack of ongoing independent land market transactions on which to evaluate actual prices.

Land Policy Dilemmas

Although Cuba has made substantial progress, it faces many challenges and dilemmas in using land efficiently to stimulate development and generate revenues. For example, the smaller, more expedient projects may result in faster development and revenue flows, but they are not able to create a broader vision for future land uses, and they frequently cause damage to the historic fabric and natural environment. The larger, better-financed projects can create such a vision and enhance the environment, but are much more difficult to negotiate and take longer to build.

Furthermore, the larger projects may require a substantial investment in basic infrastructure because of the poor quality of existing conditions. The government has not had the resources to make these investments, thus threatening the economic sustainability of new urban interventions. Small projects cannot support such investment burdens. While the large projects may be able to finance infrastructure investment, they run the risk of becoming exclusive enclaves separated from the surrounding community when they provide infrastructure only as part of their own project. The question, then, is how to finance the infrastructure in a non-exclusionary manner to encourage other small-scale development. Three alternatives are being pursued simultaneously, but are subject to continuing debate:

• small, individualized interventions using leases to occupy infill areas in the city that are already well-endowed with infrastructure;
• enclaves of large resorts and gated communities that can support infrastructure through exactions and development fees, with other controls built into the negotiation to prevent exclusionary access; or
• broader value capture policies to use real estate as an asset to generate revenues in a way that preserves the historical heritage and community solidarity, and prevents social segregation, sprawl and other negative implications.

Another aspect of the debate among Cuban planning and development experts concerns the pros and cons of introducing open land markets with a strong tax system vs. maintaining the existing public management of state-owned land. Those who advocate for introducing open land markets feel it is a necessary step to encourage development so that Cuba can benefit from linkages with the global economy and different types of foreign investments. These experts also argue that Cuba must continue to develop mechanisms for capturing publicly created land value.

Those who argue for continuing the current system point to Cuba’s success in reducing spatial segregation, promoting balance in social and urban services, preserving historic and other patrimony values in the city, and reserving enough land for future development projects. These advocates point to the recent Latin American experience with free markets, which has resulted in increased segregation between rich and poor areas, a lack of social services in poorer areas, increases in urban violence, speculation, and growing environmental problems.

In summary, some of the priority issues on Cuba’s land development agenda are the establishment of a legal system with clear parameters and the introduction of more rigorous and transparent mechanisms for valuing land and buildings. In addition, diversification of the types of Cuba-based partners available to participate in international development projects will help establish criteria for a longer-term planning perspective that will encourage large-scale infrastructure projects and support the continuing provision of benefits to the community. These concerns are not so different from land policy challenges in other developing countries. The continued study of land value as an instrument for development in Cuba offers important lessons for researchers and public officials throughout Latin America.

Ricardo Núñez is researcher at the Group for the Integrated Development of the Capital (GDIC) in Havana, Cuba. H. James Brown is president and CEO of the Lincoln Institute, and Martim Smolka is senior fellow and director of the Institute’s Latin American and Caribbean Program. Laura Mullahy, research assistant for the Latin American and Caribbean Program, also contributed to this article.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 2 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Académicos y profesionales involucrados en la regularización de asentamientos en sectores de bajos ingresos en Latinoamérica compartieron sus experiencias en un foro patrocinado por el Instituto Lincoln en marzo de 1998. La ciudad de Medellín, Colombia y su oficina de regularización, PRIMED (Programa Integrado para el Mejoramiento de Barrios Deficientes en Medellín) sirvieron de anfitriones. Entre los participantes se incluyeron representantes de PRIMED, empleados oficiales de la ciudad de Medellín y observadores de instituciones multilaterales, tales como el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), el Banco Mundial, USAID y la Fundación GTZ de Alemania.

Doce ponencias principales informaron sobre los casos de estudio más significativos de ocho países: Brasil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, México, Perú y Venezuela. El foro resultó ser una reunión excepcional cuyas conclusiones, resumidas más adelante, probablemente tendrán importantes repercusiones en las políticas de Latinoamérica.

Perspectivas Comparativas de Regularización

Diversos puntos de vista sobre regularización aparecen ilustrados por los trabajos de cada país. Los dos enfoques principales son la regularización jurídica (por ejemplo: procedimientos de legalización de títulos de la tierra a fin de convertir la propiedad “de hecho” en propiedad jurídica, en Perú, Ecuador y México) y la regularización física (urbanización), incluyendo la expansión de servicios de infraestructura en asentamientos irregulares (Colombia, Venezuela, Brasil y otros países). Un tercer enfoque, en el cual se ha hecho énfasis sólo recientemente, establece como prioridad la integración social y cívica de los asentamientos de población de bajos ingresos dentro de la estructura urbana a través de una serie de medidas.

Aunque en la mayor parte de los países se presentan elementos de estos tres tipos de regularización, generalmente cada país se orienta más en una dirección que en otra. En México, los tres enfoques se utilizan simultáneamente. En la mayoría de los otros países, el énfasis depende de la fuerza relativa de los actores, las organizaciones y las políticas por una parte, y de la forma en que el problema de regularización es concebido (“construido”) por las autoridades federales y locales, por otra.

La Regularización Jurídica: Programas de Adjudicación de Títulos de Propiedad

La regularización de títulos de propiedad se ha convertido en práctica similarmente aceptada por gobiernos, agencias internacionales y organizaciones no gubernamentales. De hecho, la pregunta “¿por qué regularizar?” que se planteó al comienzo del foro pareció tomar a todos de sorpresa. Sin embargo, esta pregunta nos dirige al fondo de la cuestión sobre quienes definen los problemas relacionados con la tenencia de la tierra y quiénes establecen las políticas a favor de su regularización. La mayoría de los programas de títulos examinados en los casos de estudio resultaron largos y costosos; además, una vez puestos en práctica, sirvieron de poco para afectar significativamente el nivel de seguridad o para suministrar servicios en forma sistemática a los asentamientos.

Figura 1

Argumentos Comunes a Favor de la Regularización de la Tierra

• Provee seguridad contra el desalojo.
• Provee incentivos de estímulo a la inversión en mejoras y consolidación de la vivienda.
• Facilita y provee la introducción de servicios tales como electricidad y agua.
• Genera acceso al crédito utilizando la vivienda como garantía.
• Incorpora los residentes al sector de ciudadanos propietarios y al proceso democrático.
• Integra los asentamientos y la propiedad a la base jurídica y fiscal de la ciudad.

En lo que concierne a los sectores pobres de la población, sin embargo, varios de los argumentos a favor de la regularización aparentan ser falsos. Los hogares establecidos generalmente tienen seguridad de hecho y pocas veces consideran la necesidad de un título legal completo como una prioridad, sino más bien como una necesidad asociada con el sistema de valores de la clase media. Es más, una vez que los asentamientos están bien establecidos, las mejoras y la consolidación de la vivienda ocurren en una proporción estrechamente asociada con la disponibilidad de recursos, no con la seguridad del título de propiedad. En relación con la introducción de servicios, la mayoría de los proveedores siguen sus propias reglas internas para definir el tiempo y los procedimientos; pocas veces el título legal es un criterio importante.

Por lo demás, a las familias de bajos ingresos no les gusta endeudarse y no les resulta fácil el incorporarse a los sistemas formales de crédito, aun cuando las organizaciones no gubernamentales y los gobiernos tienden a inclinarse hacia la asistencia por medio de microcréditos. En suma, da la impresión de que cuando los grupos de bajos ingresos desean la regularización de la propiedad es porque el Estado quiere que lo deseen y, consecuentemente, contribuye a construir la demanda correspondiente.

Se podría concebir la regularización de la propiedad como un fin en sí misma tanto como un medio hacia un fin. La regularización como “fin” aparece claramente ilustrada en el caso de Lima, donde el acceso a la tierra y a los programas de adjudicación de títulos de propiedad sustituyen a una política sistemática de vivienda. El ciclo más reciente de adjudicación de títulos (desde 1996) incluye también la retitularización de terrenos anteriormente regularizados, como un campo de patrocinio político destinado a beneficiar al gobierno central a cuentas de los líderes políticos ciudadanos. Una situación similar prevalecía en México con las agencias de regularización múltiplex creadas durante los años ’70. En ambos países la dedicación a la regularización de la tenencia de la tierra aparece claramente señalada por programas activos, que generalmente procesan un alto número de títulos cada año a bajo costo.

En otras partes, la regularización puede ser también un “fin”, pero de importancia secundaria. En Colombia, Brasil, El Salvador y Ecuador, por ejemplo, la adjudicación de títulos constituye solamente una pequeña parte del conjunto de la regularización física. Aún así, la ausencia de propiedad legal y la necesidad de regularización pueden ser utilizadas hacia buenos fines políticos al regular el suministro y el orden de la provisión de infraestructura.

La regularización de títulos como medio hacia un fin se encuentra ampliamente fomentada por las agencias internacionales como parte del Nuevo Programa de Gerencia Urbana del Banco Mundial. México constituye un buen ejemplo del proceso, en donde la adjudicación de títulos de propiedad de la tierra es un requisito previo para la gestión de la tierra urbana, la planificación y la administración pública. La regularización incorpora a la población dentro del sistema del registro de tierras, la base de recaudación de impuestos, los controles de planificación, los permisos de construcción, las tasas de consumo, y la recuperación del costo de servicios e infraestructura. La regularización se convierte en un medio para el sustento y manejo urbanos; esta, más que ninguna otra razón, explica su amplia adopción y aceptación actual.

Un factor notable en varios de los casos estudiados fue la aparente renuencia a regularizar tierras privadas a no ser que la iniciativa tuviera el apoyo del dueño original. Como resultado, los asentamientos con mayores posibilidades de ser regularizados son aquéllos ubicados en tierras públicas o tierras cuya propiedad nunca ha sido cuestionada. Con la excepción de México, los gobiernos se han mostrado renuentes a expropiar tierras con fines de interés social. Varios países tienen un sistema de derechos de ocupación de la tierra que permiten la transferencia de la propiedad después de un cierto número de años de uso comprobado y apropiado. En Brasil, este sistema de usucapión ha sido ampliado recientemente a fin de permitir la transferencia de títulos de terrenos urbanos de propiedad privada menores de 250 m2 que hayan sido ocupados continuamente durante cinco años.

Factores de los programas de regularización jurídica:

• Alcance de la demanda residencial y prioridad del título de propiedad: La alta prioridad para la adjudicación de títulos aparece solamente cuando hay una alta inseguridad asociada con la tenencia ilegal de terrenos (Costa Rica), o donde el Estado promueve la asociación de la inseguridad con la falta de título (México).
• Procedimientos y administración de los programas de adjudicación de títulos: Los ejemplos varían de prácticas de bajo costo, eficientes y rápidas (Perú y México) a procesos ineficientes e interminables. La mayoría de los casos analizados cayeron dentro de la última categoría (Brasil y Colombia especialmente), en gran parte porque el campo de la regularización no es una alta prioridad.
• La naturaleza y el funcionamiento de las oficinas del catastro y el registro de la propiedad: Casi todos los casos estudiados señalaron grandes defectos en el registro de tierras y las instituciones de avalúo de la tierra. Incluso donde existen arreglos institucionales satisfactorios, las relaciones y la comunicación entre las dos oficinas resultaron ser invariablemente pobres.
• La forma y el “peso” de los títulos de propiedad de la tierra: El poder y la importancia de los títulos varían desde títulos “duros”, tales como títulos registrados y títulos completos de propiedad que sólo podrían ser impugnados a través de procedimientos legales de expropiación o embargo; hasta títulos “blandos”, los cuales representan poco más que certificados de posesión, registros de ocupación o contratos de compra. Entre ambos extremos, y paralelos a la dimensión legal, se encuentran los títulos establecidos por la costumbre y los derechos de propiedad sociales, tales como derechos de uso, derechos comunes, usos y costumbres, etc. Estos últimos sólo tienen fuerza en la medida en que son apoyados por el Estado.

La Regularización Física: Urbanización y Provisión de Infraestructura

El segundo campo principal de regularización registrado en muchos de los casos de estudio del foro estuvo enfocado en el proceso de regularización física de distintas formas de asentamientos irregulares. En Medellín, por ejemplo, se estima que aproximadamente el 12% de la población total vive en barrios de crecimiento rápido construidos frecuentemente sobre laderas empinadas, igual que en barrios similares en las laderas de Río o Caracas. Existen indudables problemas y peligros en estas áreas; sin embargo, la mayoría de los participantes en el foro que visitaron los asentamientos de PRIMED se mostraron más entusiasmados por su nivel y grado de consolidación que los propios oficiales locales. (La discusión no se extendió a las intervenciones y mejoras en alojamientos pobres del centro de la ciudad: conventillos, vecindades, cortiVos).

Es imposible describir adecuadamente todos los programas innovadores presentados en el foro, pero uno de los casos de mayor éxito es el programa Favela/Bairro, del municipio de Río de Janeiro. Este proyecto se basó en la estrecha colaboración con los residentes locales para abrir las calles de sus favelas al acceso vehicular y la instalación de servicios. No obstante, es importante reconocer que el éxito del proyecto ha tenido costos considerables: el gasto total entre 1994 y 1997 fue de 300 millones de dólares, suministrados en gran parte por el BID. Esto plantea serias interrogantes acerca de la capacidad de réplica de este tipo de programas.

Factores de los programas de regularización física:

• Instrumentos legales: En muchos casos no se requieren instrumentos legales para llevar a cabo proyectos de regularización urbana e intervención pública. Es más, la expropiación por motivos de interés público no resulta atractiva para la mayoría de las autoridades locales. La creación de zonas especiales de interés social (ZEIS y PREZEIS en Brasil) es un mecanismo de ayuda a los barrios que introduce una mayor flexibilidad de intervención fuera de las normas y códigos locales. Muchos otros instrumentos legales han resultado ser más bien débiles, especialmente aquellos con amplio grado de discreción en su aplicación (la Ley Novena de Colombia, por ejemplo).
• Los costos de regularización y el desplazamiento de la población: La intervención física origina costos adicionales asociados con la instalación y el consumo de servicios, y puede también acarrear contribuciones más altas de impuestos. Para poder cubrir estos costos, las familias se ven obligadas a ahorrar en otros gastos (por ejemplo, demorando el ritmo de consolidación de la vivienda), o a buscar formas de obtener rentas, tales como alquilar o compartir terrenos o viviendas. Inevitablemente, algunos decidirán o se verán obligados a vender e irse. Poco se sabe sobre los niveles de desplazamiento, pero por lo general los propietarios de bajos ingresos permanecen en el mismo asentamiento; la estabilidad de la población, y no su movilidad, suele ser la norma.
• Los mecanismos financieros para la regularización: Varios de los más notables y exitosos proyectos dependieron del financiamiento externo, y muchos proyectos aparentan acarrear subsidios explícitos e implícitos. Para que los proyectos puedan ser replicados se requieren métodos de financiamiento más ágiles, tales como recursos fiscales (impuestos a la tierra y las propiedades, como en México) o tarifas a los usuarios (como en Medellín, por ejemplo). Otro mecanismo captura los impuestos sobre las ganancias de capital a partir de mejoras a la propiedad (plusvalías y tasas de valorización, como en Colombia) pero generalmente no se aplica a las viviendas de bajos ingresos.
• Responsabilidades administrativas y gubernamentales de la regularización: Casi sin excepción, la tendencia general ha estado dirigida hacia la descentralización, con una disminución del poder a nivel del gobierno central y un fortalecimiento al nivel municipal. El papel de los estados, departamentos o provincias se ha debilitado en alto grado. Esta tendencia implica que una responsabilidad creciente de regularización recae sobre las autoridades urbanas, y a su vez plantea otros problemas importantes: la capacidad institucional, el aprendizaje y la diseminación de las mejores prácticas, el desarrollo de la capacidad y la responsabilidad fiscales, la continuidad de los programas a través de distintas administraciones, la coordinación e implementación de programas en jurisdicciones metropolitanas (donde las ciudades se administran por más de una municipalidad), y el papel de las organizaciones no gubernamentales que no han sido electas.
• La participación popular (del público) en la regularización: Aunque la participación popular en los proyectos de desarrollo de barrios es ampliamente aceptada y deseada, con frecuencia no existe o es meramente nominal (Ecuador). En otros países, ha manifestado ser un proceso genuino y muy intenso (Costa Rica y Brasil). La participación popular involucra a los residentes de manera instrumental en la implementación de proyectos y ofrece oportunidades para reconocer los llamados sistemas plurales (paralelos) de justicia (Venezuela), las leyes consuetudinarias, los usos y costumbres (México), etc.
• La regularización y los derechos del ciudadano: El creciente reconocimiento de los derechos del ciudadano se hizo aparente en muchos de los casos estudiados. Dichos derechos incluyen el derecho a la vivienda (en México, aunque no se cumple), el derecho al acceso a la vivienda (Perú y El Salvador), y el derecho a beneficios de infraestructura y urbanización. Asimismo, es importante reconocer que los derechos del ciudadano también traen consigo “deberes del ciudadano”, particularmente en lo que se refiere al pago de impuestos y al consumo.

La Regularización como Medio de Integración Social

Durante las deliberaciones del foro se hizo aparente que un objetivo cada vez más explícito de la regularización es el de alcanzar la integración social a través de la incorporación de la población de bajos ingresos a la mayoría social y a la estructura urbana. Esto se manifiesta con mayor frecuencia en referencia al “rescate” de la población de bajos ingresos y de otros grupos marginales y su incorporación a la ciudadanía urbana. Este ha sido uno de los objetivos primordiales del programa favela/bairro en Brasil, el cual, al menos en parte, estuvo orientado a romper los círculos de delincuentes juveniles y tráfico de drogas, y a rescatar a la población local de su influencia.

Un problema potencial de este enfoque reside en que los conceptos de “buen ciudadano” y “mayoría social” son construcciones sociales que frecuentemente están cargadas de valores y que pueden derivarse a partir de una cierta clase social o un grupo dominante del poder. La regularización con motivos de alcanzar la integración dentro de un amplio marco de oportunidades sociales tales como la educación pública y los servicios de salud es una cosa; la regularización a fin de lograr la convergencia social y la conformidad es otra. Sin embargo, la investigación y la literatura sobre este campo continúan siendo incipientes, y la noción completa de ciudadanía con sus correspondientes derechos y responsabilidades forma parte de una agenda todavía poco considerada.

Conclusión

Este foro internacional hizo énfasis en la necesidad de estar conscientes de las distintas razones subyacentes a la regularización física y jurídica en cada país, y de tomar en cuenta que estas razones se encuentran estrechamente relacionadas con los procesos políticos y de planificación. Para que la regularización funcione bien, debe haber un compromiso político genuino tal que todos los departamentos y oficiales que intervengan lo hagan con la mayor integración, cooperación y autorización. También se necesita pensar creativamente sobre sistemas alternativos, sistemas “paralelos” de propiedad, y sobre oportunidades para la real participación del público en la toma de decisiones en todas las etapas del proceso de regularización.

El compromiso y el sustento financieros también son temas importantes. A menos que la regularización vaya acompañada por la recuperación del costo a largo y mediano plazo a través de impuestos, tasas al usuario y avalúos diferidos, los programas continuarán dependiendo mayormente del financiamiento externo y de subsidios, lo cual limita severamente la extensión y la escala de su aplicación.

La interesante última sesión del foro permitió a los participantes reflexionar sobre las futuras direcciones de investigación y análisis de políticas de regularización del mercado de la tierra. Cinco áreas importantes emergieron de esta discusión. Primero, se reconoció la necesidad de identificar a los diversos actores y grupos de intereses involucrados en la promoción del desarrollo de tierras irregulares o ilegales, para empezar, y de hacer explícitas las diferencias entre invasiones de tierras, subdivisiones de propietarios, subdivisiones de empresas y otras acciones semejantes. Se planteó que la irregularidad es generada por varios actores y grupos de intereses con fines de lucro, y no únicamente el resultado de un proceso disfuncional de urbanización.

Segundo, se discutió la necesidad de alejarse del pensamiento dualista y romper con la definición del concepto del mercado de la tierra en términos de la ciudad formal e informal, la ciudad paralela, o los barrios normales y deficientes, todos los cuales implican que los sectores pobres se encuentran atrapados en un mercado separado. En realidad, hay un mercado único de la tierra que está segmentado, no separado, a lo largo de una continuidad en términos de acceso y capacidad de adquisición.

Tercero, se necesita afrontar el problema de la capacidad de réplica financiera de experiencias exitosas y las formas posibles de obtener financiamiento a través de subsidios internos, plusvalías, tasas de valorización, gastos de impuestos, tasas progresivas de consumo, y otros mecanismos. Cuarto, necesitamos hacernos menos los ciegos ante las diferencias de género. Es importante que pensemos con más imaginación al definir las prioridades de regularización para cada género, y que exploremos esquemas innovadores de programas de títulos que respondan a la necesidad de satisfacer los derechos específicos a la vivienda y al domicilio de la mujer.

Finalmente, necesitamos ser mucho más precisos en nuestra terminología y, más importante aún, reconocer que hay una “construcción social” imbuida en el lenguaje. Los términos adoptados por cada sociedad revelan la forma en que esa sociedad ve y diagnostica la vivienda y los problemas sociales relacionados con ella. La terminología puede conducir a soluciones políticas punitivas o condescendientes, e incluso “criminalizar” a sectores locales de la población. Gran parte de las diferencias y variaciones entre los distintos casos de estudio se derivan de la forma en que cada sociedad construye su percepción del problema de la vivienda y la manera en que esta visión es transmitida a la gente: a través de la terminología, a través de las leyes, los procedimientos y las políticas, y a través de la organización administrativa y burocrática del Estado mismo.

Peter M. Ward es profesor de sociología y asuntos públicos de la Universidad de Texas en Austin, y miembro asociado de la facultad del Instituto Lincoln. Entre sus numerosos libros se incluye una “Metodología para el análisis del mercado de la tierra y la vivienda”, editada conjuntamente con Gareth Jones y publicada por el Instituto Lincoln en 1994.

Growing recognition of the economic and social importance of land, housing and real property markets is focusing attention on the need for good policies and good data to monitor the performance of these markets and their effects on the international economy.

Much of the impetus for addressing these issues came with the United Nations General Assembly’s unanimous endorsement in 1988 of the document Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. This report described the social and economic role of housing and called on governments to undertake enabling policies to create well-functioning land and housing markets.

Within a few years, the World Bank published its own housing policy paper, Housing: Enabling Markets to Work, which set out a stylized set of “do’s and don’ts” for housing policymakers to use in making choices about policies, regulations and institutions that influence the performance of the housing sector. Each of these documents makes it clear that the stakes of getting housing policies right are considerable, especially those policies having to do with urban land.

The Importance of the Housing Sector

Housing, together with the land under it, is the single most important asset of households in most of the world’s cities. Housing investment and the flow of housing services account for a total contribution to GNP of between 7 and 18 percent in most countries. However, these figures fail to convey fully how the performance of the housing sector is intertwined with that of the broader economy through real, financial and fiscal circuits.

Since housing comprises 15 to 35 percent of consumer spending in most countries, inflation in housing prices is a significant element of overall consumer price inflation. Housing loans comprise some 15 to 20 percent of the consolidated assets of the banking systems of the most industrialized countries, making the integrity of these loans crucial to the overall soundness of the financial sector.

Housing subsidies, particularly in formerly planned economies, have contributed to budgetary deficits which have aggravated inflationary pressures, and poorly planned housing policies have often led to limited residential and labor mobility. Even in the United Kingdom, research indicates that inappropriate housing policies have increased structural unemployment rates, increased consumer prices and interest rates, adversely affected the balance of payments, and led to a significant decline in rates of household savings. Real estate booms and busts have also become a prominent feature of urban and national economies, notably in the United States and Japan.

Given the importance of the housing sector and the high cost of policy failures, it is surprising that many countries underestimate the objectives and instruments of housing policy. As a result, housing problems are often aggravated by ill-conceived or poorly executed public policies, and the performance of the sector falls beneath its potential.

Policies Affecting Housing

The provision of infrastructure, the regulation of land and housing development, the organization of the construction and materials industry, and the involvement of the public sector in housing production all have direct bearing on the production of housing and its responsiveness to shifts in demand. But other policies are also important—for example, those that relate to the physical and legal security of renters and owners, and the ability to use housing as collateral for long-term financing.

These policies influence the desirability of, and demand for, real estate and housing as an asset and, therefore, the amount of housing that investors want to build. In turn, these policies affect the quantity and affordability of housing available to meet the needs of final consumers of housing services. Investment decisions also influence the cost, availability, quality and production of informal housing, which accommodates much of the urban population in many developing countries.

Recent data on 53 countries collected by the Housing Indicators Program, a joint program of the United Nations’ Centre for Human Settlements and the World Bank, supports the importance of policy differences in shaping housing sector outcomes. Two key types of indicators are physical measures, such as crowding or structural durability, and measures related to price, such as house values, rents and the ratio of house value to income (also called the house-price-to-income ratio), which often reflects the relative efficiency of housing markets.

Comparisons of such indicators suggest, for example, that in Thailand, where land and housing regulation is simple and efficient, housing supply is more than 30 times as responsive to shifts in demand than in either Korea or Malaysia, where regulation is complicated and cumbersome. This is reflected in striking differences in housing prices, quality and affordability among the three countries.

Enabling and Non-enabling Policies

“Enabling” countries are considered more market friendly because their housing policies support housing demand through appropriate housing finance, property rights and subsidies. Such countries facilitate housing supply by providing infrastructure, pertinent regulation and a competitive housing development industry. Figure 1 shows how a number of important housing outcomes vary with both the level of economic development (as measured by per capita income) and the policy environment for four groups of countries.

Housing prices at lower income levels among non-enablers are often the equivalent of two annual incomes higher than they are among enablers. Home ownership rates among enablers are generally 15 to 25 percentage points higher. Crowding, as measured by floor area per person, is significantly less among enablers. Residential mobility (percentage of population moving annually) is higher among enablers—a factor that facilitates upgrading housing conditions and enhancing job mobility.

A comparison of U.S. cities shows that house prices in non-enabling cities with stricter regulatory policies have risen in relative terms some 30 to 60 percent over a 15-year period (see Figure 2). This trend suggests important consequences for quality of life and competitiveness among cities with different degrees of market flexibility. Relative shifts in housing costs are in some cases equivalent to doubling potential residents’ combined federal and state income tax, creating powerful disincentives for moving and for the functioning of labor markets.

These and similar findings suggest that systematic policy mistakes have been made, that their costs have been high, and that it is time for a general change in thinking about the aims and instruments of land and housing policy.

Stephen K. Mayo, a visiting fellow of the Lincoln Institute, is developing research and education programs on land prices, land markets and the broader economy. On November 7-8, 1997, the first in a series of conferences on this topic will be held at the Institute to examine land prices and land information systems.

FYI

References

Angel, Shlomo, Stephen K. Mayo, and William Stephens. “The Housing Indicators Program: A Report on Progress and Plans for the Future,” Netherlands Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 1993.

Malpezzi, Stephen, “House Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas,” Journal of Housing Research 7,2, 1996.

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements. Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000. United Nations, New York, 1988.

World Bank. Housing: Enabling Markets to Work. World Bank Housing Policy Paper. Washington, DC, 1993.

Figure 1 Housing Outcomes for Four Groups of Countries

Source: Based on data from 53 countries collected by the joint World Bank/UN Centre for Human Settlements Housing Indicators Program (HIP). The Enabling Index was developed using HIP data on policies, regulations and institutional arrangements.

Figure 2 Average Housing Price Changes for U.S. Cities

Source: Based on hedonic price indices for rental and owner-occupied housing (weighted by the proportion of renters and owners in each market) for U.S. Standard Metropolitan Areas. The classification of U.S. cities as enablers or non-enablers is based on an index of regulatory stringency originally developed and applied by Stephen Malpezzi.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Las políticas públicas y acciones urbanísticas relacionadas con la vivienda de interés social en Colombia, como en otros países latinoamericanos, se han concentrado en los programas de regularización y mejoras, que en muchos casos están vinculados a la necesidad de fondos para infraestructura. Estos programas también se consideran como el único instrumento paliativo para abordar un problema que parece no tener solución –el desarrollo urbano ilegal (pirata)–, aunque han resultado ser bastante limitados y hasta contraproducentes. En este trabajo presentamos una política alternativa: la aplicación de principios e instrumentos para la gestión del suelo y la participación en plusvalías (participación pública en los incrementos del valor del suelo derivados de las acciones administrativas). Esta política fue establecida en la constitución colombiana y en la Ley 388 de 1997, que estipula que los ingresos provenientes de los incrementos del valor del suelo deben usarse en inversiones sociales.

Operación Urbanística Nuevo Usme es uno de los proyectos estratégicos promovidos por el alcalde de Bogotá Antanas Mockus para resolver el problema de los desarrollos urbanos ilegales. Ubicada en el sureste de la ciudad, la localidad de Usme es una de las áreas más vulnerables a las presiones de la urbanización ilegal; poderosos urbanizadores piratas han dispuesto más de la mitad de las 1.000 hectáreas ya designadas para uso urbano. El mecanismo predominante para este tipo de desarrollo informal, además de las invasiones y los asentamientos humanos ilegales, ha sido la venta de lotes por parte de urbanizadores que compran grandes extensiones de tierra a precio rural y las venden sin redes de servicios públicos ni infraestructura y sin aprobación de la administración pública. Entre las consecuencias negativas de este tipo de desarrollo encontramos precios del suelo relativamente altos y patrones desiguales de ocupación territorial.

Se espera que Usme se extienda e incorpore otras 600 hectáreas de cerros y terrenos ecológicamente frágiles –considerados en gran parte suelo rural–, según el plan maestro de la ciudad (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial o POT) que fue aprobado en junio de 2000. El gobierno de Bogotá ya ha invertido en sistemas de acueducto y alcantarillado para el área y está ejecutando otros proyectos, entre ellos la ampliación del sistema de transporte público TransMilenio y la construcción de 6.200 viviendas para el sector de bajos ingresos. Además, por iniciativa de organizaciones de ciudadanos, dos grandes áreas –el Parque entre Nubes y el Agroparque Los Soches– han sido designadas en el POT como hitos urbanos locales de gran significado y simbolismo. La primera es un parque grande que marca la transición entre el territorio urbano y el rural, amenazado constantemente por el desarrollo ilegal y la explotación. La segunda, un tipo de zona de amortiguación agrícola, fue creada por una organización campesina que aceptó a sabiendas una reducción en el precio del suelo al cambiar la clasificación del mismo de suburbano a rural, a fin de preservar su carácter agrario. Actualmente esta organización aplica medios alternativos novedosos de gestión de suelo mediante proyectos de conservación ecológica para beneficiar a la ciudad en su conjunto y obstaculizar la amenaza del crecimiento urbano ilegal.

¿Cómo puede la diversidad de elementos, desde la vivienda social hasta el transporte público y la conservación de tierras agrícolas, crear una oportunidad para condiciones de vida sostenible para los habitantes más pobres de la ciudad? ¿Cómo reconciliamos los objetivos de la política urbana y la justicia social? ¿Cómo puede la ciudad impedir que los urbanizadores piratas se aprovechen inmerecidamente de la nueva área de desarrollo de Usme? Este es el desafío que enfrentan el gobierno municipal, las organizaciones de vivienda popular y los residentes del sur de la ciudad.

Mecanismos alternativos para la recuperación de plusvalías

Uno de los temas de debate con respecto a la Ley 388 es el precedente de recuperación de plusvalías en áreas destinadas para viviendas sociales. Las organizaciones de vivienda han buscado exonerar esos suelos de la participación en plusvalías, debido a una frecuente interpretación errónea de la naturaleza del instrumento, según la cual el valor recuperado se transfiere al precio final de la vivienda (véase Smolka y Furtado, página 12). Desde un enfoque diferente, el proyecto Usme está estructurado a partir de varios mecanismos alternativos para la recuperación de plusvalías que van más allá de la función restringida y malinterpretada de un impuesto.

El primer mecanismo consiste simplemente en anunciar el proyecto Usme, puesto que la Ley 388 establece que en caso de adquisición pública de suelo, el valor comercial del mismo (para fines de indemnización) no puede incluir el monto correspondiente a las plusvalías derivadas del proyecto. Esta disposición congela el precio del suelo en su nivel anterior al anuncio del proyecto, por lo que es un instrumento oportuno para reducir el costo del suelo que de otra manera tendría que pagar la administración local para sus propios proyectos de desarrollo urbano.

El segundo mecanismo es el Plan Parcial, un plan para parcelas de desarrollo local que se basa en el principio de reparto equitativo de cargas y beneficios y que la legislación colombiana ha adoptado de la legislación de España. Esta modalidad de reparcelación (o reajuste equitativo del suelo) abarca la distribución de los costos de infraestructura, así como los derechos de desarrollo, y permite que la administración pública obtenga una porción del suelo urbanizado como retribución por su inversión en las obras de desarrollo. Mediante este mecanismo el Municipio de Bogotá obtiene suelo de forma gratuita o por un costo bajo que luego puede destinar para infraestructura o servicios públicos, o para viviendas de interés social.

Un tercer mecanismo es la recuperación de plusvalías, tal como la establece la Ley 388, para la cual se requiere que la Alcaldía Mayor apruebe un acuerdo específico. Si se aprueba el plan de recuperación, el municipio puede recobrar entre el 30% y el 50% del incremento del precio del suelo derivado del cambio en su clasificación de rural a urbano, la autorización para usos más rentables o el incremento de los derechos de desarrollo. Las plusvalías podrían pagarse con suelo, como un porcentaje de participación en el proyecto, en infraestructura o en dinero efectivo. Una vez más, el efecto que se busca es reducir el precio del suelo obtenido por la administración local por el cumplimiento de sus objetivos sociales.

Una alternativa más innovadora consiste en que la administración local o el municipio asigna los derechos de desarrollo del suelo directamente a beneficiarios de pocos ingresos del programa de viviendas. Este ingenioso mecanismo, basado en la separación de los derechos de construcción de los derechos de propiedad, en efecto traslada el equilibrio de fuerzas desde los urbanizadores hacia las familias de pocos ingresos que se residencian en el área y por consecuencia comparten el incremento del valor del suelo generado por el desarrollo. Estos nuevos residentes ahora tienen los derechos sobre la tierra que de otra manera habrían tenido que comprar a urbanizadores piratas que ya no tienen un mercado cautivo para la venta de lotes irregulares a precios altos en anticipación de futuros programas de mejoras.

Al adoptar una actitud activa en la regulación de la ocupación del área mediante la distribución de tales derechos de construcción, el municipio se encuentra en una posición más ventajosa para negociar directamente con los urbanizadores piratas y para emular de alguna manera sus acciones mediante la dotación de suelo urbanizado (“terrenos y servicios”) a precios asequibles. Con este enfoque jurídico el municipio garantiza la dotación de carreteras, redes de servicios públicos, zonas verdes y espacios públicos y recreativos que por lo general los urbanizadores piratas no ofrecen o que los propietarios de tierras rurales no pueden mantener. En síntesis, el procedimiento asigna los derechos de construcción a los habitantes de pocos ingresos que con el tiempo construirán viviendas gracias a sus propios esfuerzos. Al reducir los derechos de construcción del propietario original a través del Plan Parcial, también se reduce el precio del suelo.

Ampliación de la participación en plusvalías

La política de plusvalías que busca recuperar los incrementos del valor del suelo para beneficio público ha sido aceptada en áreas de ingresos altos, donde las rentas públicas se utilizan para subsidiar inversiones sociales en otras localidades. Sin embargo, los urbanizadores piratas suelen encontrar maneras de expropiar estas inversiones en áreas de ingresos bajos mediante las actividades ilegales y clandestinas prevalecientes utilizadas para el acceso y ocupación del suelo. El proyecto Usme representa un intento por trasladar el poder de negociación de la población con respecto a los urbanizadores piratas mediante el diseño de procesos de urbanización alternativos.

La Alcaldía Mayor ya ha hecho un compromiso de facto para aplicar los instrumentos de recuperación de plusvalías, aunque éstos siguen siendo objeto de explicaciones y discusiones dentro del debate general sobre la política de participación en plusvalías. Como ya hemos visto, el principio práctico en que se basa esta política es la separación de los derechos de propiedad de los derechos de construcción. No obstante, esta política afronta una enorme resistencia debido a la tradición jurídica civil de que los derechos unitarios y absolutos están asociados con la tenencia privada de la tierra.

La novedad del programa radica en su potencial para abordar directamente los retos de la urbanización de bajos ingresos. Las expectativas han hecho aumentar el precio de las tierras parceladas ilegalmente en Usme y han propiciado que los urbanizadores piratas “produzcan suelo comercial” mediante la destrucción de comunidades campesinas, la degradación de áreas de importancia ecológica y la ocupación de zonas de riesgo. La tolerancia de tales prácticas llegó a un extremo tal que los precios elevados prevalecientes en las transacciones de estos mercados inmobiliarios –ilegales, en su mayoría– han sido utilizados por la administración local como precio de referencia para determinar la indemnización justa por la adquisición de tierras.

A falta de mecanismos públicos para intervenir en el mercado del suelo, tales como la participación en plusvalías, los propietarios –particularmente los urbanizadores piratas– no sólo han recuperado todos los incrementos del precio derivado del desarrollo urbano, sino que además han tomado bajo control el proceso. La urbanización ilegal resultante es costosa para los ocupantes individuales de dichos asentamientos y para la sociedad como un todo, ya que eleva el costo de los futuros programas de mejoras entre tres y cinco veces, en comparación con el costo de urbanizar suelo no ocupado.

Mediante los mecanismos alternativos mencionados anteriormente, se espera que otras conversiones del uso del suelo, como en el caso de la urbanización de Usme, se hagan más en un entorno político-económico alternativo, en el cual el municipio participe como un regulador activo y socialmente responsable del proceso. Estos proyectos forjarán nexos estrechos entre las políticas de regulación del suelo y las reglas que se aplican para la compra o subasta pública de tierras, para la distribución de los costos de dotación de infraestructura y servicios públicos y para el ejercicio de los derechos de desarrollo. La devolución a la comunidad de las plusvalías derivadas de estos cambios en las regulaciones del desarrollo urbano y las inversiones públicas constituye la manera más eficaz de construir relaciones más democráticas basadas en el ejercicio de una demanda renovada de reforma urbana y el derecho de acceso al suelo.

María Mercedes Maldonado Copello es profesora e investigadora del Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales (CIDER) de la Universidad de Los Andes en Bogotá, Colombia. Martim O. Smolka es miembro principal y director del Programa para América Latina y el Caribe del Instituto Lincoln.

Carlos Morales-Schechinger joined IHS, the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, in 2008. This international institute attracts students from all over the world, mostly from developing countries. Some IHS programs are sponsored jointly with the Lincoln Institute.

Previously Morales was a part-time lecturer at UNAM, the National Autonomous University of Mexico. He has been collaborating on a regular basis in seminars and courses organized by the Lincoln Institute throughout Latin America for the past 12 years. He lectures primarily on land value capture instruments, land and property taxation, and land-based preventive policies as alternatives to informal settlements.

He has held various government posts, including director of land policies and instruments in Mexico’s ministry for urban development, where he designed and implemented an ambitious program on land banking; and as director of cadastral policy for Mexico City’s government, where he managed an extensive fiscal reform of property taxes. He also held posts in both public and private banks in Mexico, dealing with property valuation, mortgages, property administration, and loans for large urban developments and for local governments.

He holds a bachelor’s degree in architecture from UNAM, a diploma in local government finance from the University of Birmingham, UK, and a Master of Philosophy in urban studies from the University of Edinburgh, UK.

Land Lines: How did you become involved with the Lincoln Institute?

Carlos Morales: My first introduction was in the early 1980s when I attended an Institute-sponsored international conference in Cambridge that related to my work for the government on urban land policy. The ideas I learned about were put to direct use two years later when I worked on a reform to increase the supply of serviced land in medium-sized cities and to subsidize sites and services for low-income households in Mexico. In the early 1990s, when I was working for the government of Mexico City on an ambitious property tax reform, I attended another Institute conference on property taxation.

From 2000 onward, I participated in many education activities organized by Martim Smolka through the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Around 2004 the Institute started a joint venture with IHS and I was one of the visiting lecturers hired by the Institute to teach in those programs. I was later invited to join the IHS staff full-time as the manager of this joint venture.

Land Lines: How do you compare the effectiveness of institutions such as IHS and the Lincoln Institute?

Carlos Morales: I believe they are complementary. The Institute is a leader in research and education on land policies, with an international focus on Latin America and China. IHS is recognized for its education and capacity building on urban management and development for a worldwide audience, focusing on developing and transition countries. IHS courses are open to students from all regions, but most come from countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Through its joint venture with IHS, the Lincoln Institute is able to reach out to those from many more countries in an efficient way.

Land Lines: Conveying fundamental knowledge about land policy and urban management to practitioners is not an easy task. What have you found is the most effective approach?

Carlos Morales: Using a combination of two things is important: the profile of the lecturer and the appropriate pedagogy. Lecturers should have experience both as practitioners and as academics to be able to answer questions that are relevant to practitioners, especially when the answers imply moving away from their comfort zone and facing some kind of change.

The ultimate purpose of social science is precisely to change reality, not only to understand it. Consultancy brings academics close to practice, but it does not confront them with the moral commitment of implementing policy or the ethical responsibility for making policy work on the ground. Experience in direct practice is crucial. The Institute’s programs in Latin America employ lecturers with this profile, and they have proven effective in addressing issues such as the impacts of taxation and regulations on land markets and in choosing instruments for capturing incremental land value, both of which are hot topics in the region.

Regarding pedagogy, practitioners tend to be skeptical about theory. They regard it as impractical, and they want to test it to be convinced. Using examples of policies implemented in other cities is very useful. Some students from developing countries do not accept cases from more developed countries, arguing that their governance structure is too different. Others prefer cases from diverse situations because in spite of contextual differences they aspire to better development opportunities for their own countries. A lecturer should have an arsenal of many different cases to examine when questions rise.

Doing simulation games is also a very effective technique. Games involving role playing where participants compete against each other are the most useful for understanding land markets and helping solve problems. Role playing is revealing even when participants fail to solve problems since it prompts them to question what happened. I have seen how participants who experience failure in a game begin to cooperate and design clever regulations on their own. Another strategy is to assign participants roles contrary to their beliefs or experience. For example, government officials playing the role of pirate land developers learn about the substantial amounts of money the poor must spend just to access land.

Playing the devil’s advocate works well when discussing controversial concepts, as if the participants are in a land court. This is not a new technique except when played with a couple of twists. An example is determining the criteria for compensating eminent domain. In this game one team argues in favor of current use values and the other future use values. Background literature and practical information are provided for arguments on both sides. Practitioners from many places can relate to examples of regulatory takings, whether as expropriations in China, land restitutions in Eastern Europe, or the sale of building rights in Brazil.

Since participants have to defend a position with which they do not agree, they have to study and work harder. In many cases they end up changing their minds, or at least identifying new arguments to use later in debating their opponents in real life. At the end of a land court game the group acting as jury secretly votes twice, first on the team’s performance as advocates and second on the conceptual arguments. When a team gets more votes than the position they defended, it is clear that more research on the issue is needed. What I like best is that the game does not impose a position on the participants, but it raises the level of debate.

Land Lines: What are the main types of resistance to concepts and ideas on land policy?

Carlos Morales: Perhaps the concept most frequently resisted is how taxes and regulations are capitalized into the price of land. Resistance can come from an ideological standpoint (either left or right, both have arguments), self-interest (landowners do not readily accept sacrificing profit), or ignorance of how the capitalization concept works. As an educator I have a role to play in addressing the last challenge.

Even if theory is explained to practitioners, they remain skeptical if their experience contradicts the theory. Misunderstanding can come from referring to a tax on a commodity that is not as scarce as land, but it can also come from experience with land markets themselves. This happens when two policies with opposite effects are introduced together, for example, increasing densities and increasing taxes. The combined effect of these measures makes it difficult to understand the impact of each one. A simulation game can help isolate each impact. Practitioners need to experiment with each policy measure to better understand them both. I have noticed that they may nod with skepticism when you lecture them, but they give you a “eureka” smile when they reach understanding by playing a game.

Land Lines: How do you overcome resistance to topics such as value capture?

Carlos Morales: A charge linked to the increase in densities is a way of capturing the incremental value of land and a source of funds to finance infrastructure, as São Paulo is doing when it charges for extra building rights. The discussion about how this policy impacts market price is controversial. Landowners oppose it because it reduces their price expectations, but developers favor it because it reduces land prices and the payments are returned in the form of public works. A similar situation happened in Bogotá when a tax on the increment in the value of land was introduced.

Both cases are useful references to explain land value capture in developing countries, yet more city cases need to be documented and disseminated, and some practitioners want examples from developed countries. This is not easy, because land value capture is a buzzword in Latin American circles, but not in most developed countries. This is not because value capture is not used in the United States or other places, but rather because it is assumed as part of the operation of the land market. It is the role of lecturers to point this out and open opportunities for sharing experiences among practitioners from both developed and developing countries.

Land Lines: Please comment on the difficulties of conveying taxation concepts to planners.

Carlos Morales: Planners learn about property taxes if they are high enough to have an impact on decisions by landowners, developers, and land users, as in the United States. In developing countries these taxes generally are so low that they do not impact market decisions, so planners are not interested. When I play games that illustrate land markets to architects—who are often also planners—and they realize that the city is not going the way they expect, their most frequent reaction is to suggest more taxes and more efficient land markets. Seldom do they propose a traditional land use plan.

Land Lines: What in your opinion are the central concepts or ideas that could make the difference in the international debate on urban land markets?

Carlos Morales: Pointing out that land value capture is a significant source for financing infrastructure and preventing slums can bring more stakeholders into a serious discussion. Ideas related to security of tenure, land registration, and titling in order to increase access to loans have been dominating policy, but results have not been as positive as predicted. Slums continue to develop and service provision is still lagging behind.

Policies that have to do with land taxation and property obligations—not just property rights—have more potential to improve the functioning of urban land markets. UN-Habitat and the World Bank adopted the earlier notions of security of tenure as a solution, but are now beginning to show interest in land-based urban development instruments. Land value capture policies will have an effect tomorrow, but with a political cost today because giving titles is cheap and appeals to short-term politicians. This is the challenge that should be faced in the international debate to ensure more effective and long-term land market reform.

As interest in urban living grows, the cost of residential real estate in many hot markets is skyrocketing. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS 2015), in 2014 rental vacancy rates hit their lowest point in two decades; rents rose in 91 out of 93 metropolitan areas studied; and the consumer price index for contract rents climbed at double the rate of inflation—and 10 percent or more at the top end, in Denver, San Jose, Honolulu, and San Francisco. Despite some interruption from the mortgage crisis, asking prices for homes for sale have continued to rise as well, often beyond the reach of potential home buyers (Olick 2014); in Washington, DC, the median home value nearly tripled from 2000 to 2013 (Oh et al. 2015). As housing activists look for effective tools to prevent displacement of lower-income families from gentrifying neighborhoods and create inclusive communities, many are turning to community land trusts (box 1) as a way to help build the nation’s stock of permanently affordable housing.

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Box 1: The CLT Model

Under the CLT model, a community-controlled organization retains ownership of a plot of land and sells or rents the housing on that land to lower-income households. In exchange for below-market prices, purchasers agree to resale restrictions that keep the homes affordable to subsequent buyers while also allowing owners to build some equity. The CLT also prepares home buyers to purchase property, supports them through financial challenges, and manages resales and rental units.

CLTs thus bring sustainable home ownership within the reach of more families, supporting residents who want to commit to their neighborhoods for the long term. In gentrifying areas, they provide an effective way for lower-income families to retain a stake in the neighborhood because they take a single initial subsidy (which could come from a variety of sources, often public programs such as the HOME Investment Partnerships Program or Community Development Block Grants) and attach it to the building, keeping the units affordable over time without new influxes of public money. In weak housing markets, they are beneficial as well (Shelterforce 2012), providing the financial stewardship that ensures fewer foreclosures, better upkeep, and stable occupancy. In 2009, at the height of the foreclosure crisis, Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) loans were 8.2 times more likely to be in the foreclosure process than CLT loans, despite the fact that CLT loans were uniformly made to low-income households (Thaden, Rosenberg 2010), and MBA loans included all income brackets. Of the very few CLT homes that did complete foreclosure, none were lost from the CLT’s portfolio.

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Much like community development corporations (CDCs), many CLTs grew from grassroots neighborhood organizations. Traditional community organizing (distinct from broader “resident outreach”) creates a base of residents who are empowered to determine for themselves what they need and mobilize to get it; as a united front, these individuals are better able to counter-balance corporate or governmental opponents and other forms of institutional power. Strategic collaboration and strength in numbers are essential to the successful formation of a CLT. But the skills required to organize politically around local concerns are very different from the skills required to manage real estate. While both sets of skills are required to implement and sustain a CLT, growing these core competencies under the same roof might hamper the neighborhood-based organization’s ability to pursue or achieve its core founding mission.

How have community organizations that created CLTs navigated the challenge of building two seemingly incompatible skill sets? We examined the experience of five established CLTs in locations across the country to see how they addressed this challenge and how their focus evolved as a result. From Boston to Los Angeles, community organizers faced a range of conditions, from high-vacancy neighborhoods with almost no housing market to booming areas where displacement was the top concern. Yet all five organizations had remarkably similar reasons for starting a community land trust: each CLT director spoke of wanting community control of land to prevent residents from either losing a home or being unable to afford one. Even those CLTs that began in weak housing markets were located near downtowns, university districts, or other popular areas, and recognized the potential for displacement as conditions in the neighborhoods improved. All agreed that a clear community vision is essential to the success of a CLT, but some groups take direct responsibility for creating and implementing that vision, while others are devoted to housing work on behalf of a parent organization charged with shepherding the larger vision. Approaches to organizing and housing development varied as well, but all agreed that these two activities can be a difficult mix.

Dudley Neighbors Inc., Boston, MA

The oldest organization in our study, Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), formed in a cold market in the 1980s to fight illegal dumping on broad swaths of vacant land left behind by a wave of arson. The city was proposing a master plan for the area without seeking input from residents, and community members responded by organizing DSNI to assert the community’s right to direct decisions about land use within its boundaries. They won that right and through DSNI decided that a CLT was the best tool to help the organization implement the community’s vision. “A lot of times, groups want to jump into creating a CLT thinking it will magically solve a neighborhood’s problems,” says Harry Smith, director of DSNI’s CLT, Dudley Neighbors Inc. (DNI). “But first we say: ‘Have you written down a vision of development in your community, and can you say how a CLT fits into that?’”

Founded in 1984, DNI is an independent organization, but it maintains close ties to its parent organization. The two groups share staff, and DSNI appoints a majority of the CLT’s board. The CLT is responsible only for providing affordable housing and community control of land, freeing DSNI to make organizing and community planning its main priority. Neither DSNI nor DNI carry out development directly, but instead partner with local affordable housing developers.

Because of its long history and established relationships, DSNI engages in less confrontational organizing than it did in its earliest days. But it doesn’t shy away from it if necessary. In fact, Smith reports that maintaining a CLT can be a unique political strength. When DSNI organizes around the fate of a particular parcel of land, “Having a land trust gives us an extra level of impact,” he says.

Sawmill Community Land Trust, Albuquerque, NM

Located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sawmill CLT was born in 1996 when, after a decade of community organizing, low-income residents banded together to fight a nearby factory that polluted their air and threatened their health. They wanted to assert control over future use of the space. After leaders attended a conference to learn more about CLTs, they held a series of community meetings on the topic. Though some residents aired concerns about the lack of land ownership in the CLT model, a community elder reminded them that they didn’t truly have ownership of their property in any case, either because they were renting or were ill-equipped to control what happened on their land. Former executive director Wade Patterson says, “The fact that the work was specifically geared toward controlling housing costs assuaged concerns about gentrification and displacement. The fact that we got a house instead of another factory was something we couldn’t argue with.”

Sawmill CLT was created as a standalone organization dedicated to housing development, stewardship, and property management. It’s one of the largest CLTs in the country, with 34 acres, which includes rental, ownership, and senior housing. Recently, it won an RFP issued by the city of Albuquerque to revitalize an old motel in a new neighborhood in the city, and the CLT is figuring out how to enter the community respectfully from outside.

Albuquerque’s Sawmill-area neighborhood associations, including the Sawmill Advisory Council, which launched the CLT, focus on “community building” through cultural events, says Patterson. The CLT supports neighborhood organizing by offering meeting space in one of its buildings and other support. Patterson says, “Our goal isn’t to lead but to be behind them.”

San Francisco Community Land Trust, San Francisco, CA

SFCLT was launched in 2003, at a time when the city was already one of the hottest real estate markets in the country, and low-income residents were concerned about soaring rents and illegal evictions for condo conversions. Housing organizers were seeking a model that could prevent evictions and give lower-income residents more control over their living situations.

The CLT is a standalone entity, but it maintains a close relationship with the housing organizers who founded it. When its partner groups organize to prevent evictions or condo conversions in an at-risk building (generally small apartment buildings), SFCLT steps in as a preservation purchaser and converts them to co-ops on CLT-owned land. SFCLT has in-house real estate expertise, but does not develop new buildings, and it contracts out any needed rehabilitation. It handles the financial aspects of the acquisition and the conversion, the stewardship of the land, and the training and support that helped residents form a co-op board and carry out co-op governance. “Housing groups refer everyone to us; we’re the only housing organization that can help stabilize a multi-unit apartment building by buying it,” says director Tracy Parent. SFCLT organizes its member base to support the broader issues that its coalition partners push for, but it doesn’t “initiate organizing” on issues, according to Parent.

T.R.U.S.T. South LA, Los Angeles, CA

When T.R.U.S.T. South LA was formed in 2005, its target neighborhoods were filled with vacant lots and deteriorated housing, while surrounding areas were under increasing development pressures. While the founders—Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Strategic Actions of a Just Economy, and Abode Communities—originally envisioned the CLT as primarily a housing tool, it has taken on a broader role in implementing a community vision. “Originally, we formed as a land acquisition group. Then our members wanted to organize,” says executive director Sandra McNeill. The CLT has, for example, organized against a slumlord who was trying to evict residents from a building he had strategically let deteriorate in order to cash in on expiring section 8 affordability restrictions. It has also organized to raise funding for transportation and green space improvements in its neighborhood and participated in coalitions to support broader citywide policies such as increased funding for affordable housing.

The group now describes itself as “a community-based initiative to stabilize the neighborhoods south of downtown Los Angeles.” T.R.U.S.T. South LA is a standalone organization that considers itself part of the development team on housing projects, partnering with others to purchase, finance, and construct or rehabilitate housing.

Although T.R.U.S.T. South LA does a lot of organizing, nearly all of its policy work is conducted in collaboration with other groups, including its founding partners. “Affordable housing developers generally aren’t risk takers,” says McNeill. “They may be involved in political work to ensure that funding streams are in place for affordable housing, but that’s as far as most of them go.”

Community Justice Land Trust, Philadelphia, PA

Community Justice Land Trust in Philadelphia formed in Northeast Philadelphia in 2010 amid combined cold and hot market challenges. Although the neighborhood suffered from a large number of vacant and abandoned properties, it was surrounded on all sides by booming markets, and those rising prices and development pressures seemed likely to spread. The Women’s Community Revitalization Project (WCRP), along with a coalition of local civic organizations, held dozens of public meetings to help the community members understand what forming a CLT would mean and to explore their concerns about resale restrictions. Attendees voted in favor.

Community Justice CLT is set up as a program of WCRP, which has its own in-house development and organizing expertise, including an entire department devoted to organizing.

But as WCRP’s executive director Nora Lichtash warns, “Sometimes you lose relationships when you’re organizing. . . . Sometimes people don’t like to be pushed to do the right thing.” Indeed, WCRP apparently pressured its local council person enough on certain issues that she declined to give the CLT vacant land it had hoped to secure for its first development. In the end, however, the council person helped the group establish a citywide land bank (Feldstein 2013–14), which furthers some of the same goals as the land trust.

Despite potential tensions like these, Lichtash believes that organizing and CLT functions should stay closely related. “It’s important to remember that organizing and building affordable housing fit together,” she says. “Your funders think you should be doing one or the other, but it’s not good for CLTs to be separated from organizing. You’re building your capacity for present and future work. When you organize, you’re respected because you have people power.”

To Develop or Not to Develop: A Big Decision

Affordable housing development is a complicated and expensive business that no community organization should take lightly if it is thinking about starting a CLT. As DNI’s Smith says, “If you do development work, it will take time away from organizing, which is cumulative. It takes time and a lot of sacrifice to form a truly representative, neighborhood-based organization. If you cut corners, you risk jeopardizing a lot of the power you’ve built up over the years.”

The Boston experience, for example, begins with a cautionary tale. DSNI stepped in when the original developer for the CLT’s first project backed out of the deal. It was “traumatic” for staff and board, says Smith. “It took so much time. It distracted DSNI from its core functions.”

The idea of controlling development resources and accessing developer fees can be seductive to grassroots groups, says WCRP’s Lichtash. But they should proceed with extreme care. “Becoming a developer can muddy the waters,” she says. “You have to focus on every detail in million-dollar deals. It takes you away from educational work.”

“Real estate work is very hard, speculative,” Lichtash continues. “You think you’re getting one thing and instead you get another. I tell people to partner for a long time first. It’s hard to keep both tenants and funding sources happy.”

Patterson of Sawmill agrees and adds that it’s particularly difficult “to meet all the deadlines and reporting requirements on funding [for development]. I’m always shocked by the amount of administrative overhead that’s required.” He also advises that if you can’t make the numbers work, “it’s important to know you can pull out of a project if needed.”

T.R.U.S.T. South LA’s McNeill says, “Development definitely has its own language. It’s complex stuff. Nonprofits that do it have large budgets and tend to have sizable staffs. I respect the skill it takes to pull off these deals. It’s a very different skillset from what we do.”

Another consideration is that affordable housing development is not an easy industry to break into these days. In the current funding environment, many of the subsidies that CLTs have traditionally used to develop and steward their units are being slashed, and mortgages for potential CLT home buyers are harder to find. McNeill says, “We’ve gone through enormous shifts in the housing industry. The reality is that there isn’t an opening now for new organizations to get into the development business. It’s definitely not the time.”

Even the ongoing stewardship of a CLT requires a different kind of relationship with residents than an organizer would have. “Developer fees and rent collection could impact the relationship with residents and the power dynamic,” says Smith of DNI. “You’re responsible to leaseholders and non-leaseholders in your community, so there are tensions,” according to Lichtash of WCRP. And as SFCLT’s Parent comments, “Organizers often paint issues as clear moral choices,” but when you are involved as a property manager, “there are nuances.”

Eyes on the Prize

Once a community group has determined that a CLT is an appropriate tool for keeping housing affordable to local residents, the next questions should be: How will the roles be divided up? Who is taking the lead on implementing the broader vision? Is there an organization already in place that’s committed and able to take that on, or does one need to be created? Are there groups serving the community that already have development expertise and access to funding that could partner with a CLT or even fold one into their work? How can the new CLT partner with and support the community’s organizing work rather than distract from it?

Many newer CLTs are following the lead of groups like DSNI and T.R.U.S.T. South LA by setting up a separate organization to manage the stewardship and land ownership functions, and then drawing on the capacity of existing affordable housing developers through partnerships. While every locality is different, this approach seems like a wise place for groups to start, especially if they want to preserve their energy for the important work they started with: fighting for vibrant, equitable communities.

Miriam Axel-Lute is the editor of Shelterforce, a magazine devoted to the field of community development. She has written extensively on both organizing and community land trusts.

Dana Hawkins-Simons is an award-winning journalist who has published groundbreaking investigations in U.S. News & World Report. She is also the former director of the Opportunity Housing Initiative at the National Housing Institute.

References

Beckwith, Dave, with Cristina Lopez. 1997. “Community Organizing: People Power from the Grassroots.” http://comm-org.wisc.edu/papers97/beckwith.htm

Feldstein, Jill. 2013/14. “Winning a Land Bank We Can Trust.” Shelterforce. Fall/Winter 2013/14. www.shelterforce.org/article/3910/winning_a_land_bank_we_can_trust2/

Horwitz, Staci. 2011. “It’s All About Choice.” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/article/2313/its_all_about_choice/

Joint Center for Housing Studies. 2015. State of the Nation’s Housing 2015. Harvard University. www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing

Oh, Seunghoon, Josh Silver, Annelise Osterberg, and Jaclyn Tules. 2015. Does Nonprofit Housing Development Preserve Neighborhood Diversity? An Investigation into the Interaction Between Affordable Housing Development and Neighborhood Change. Manna, Inc. www.mannadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Final_Neighborhood_Impact_Analysis_7_1.pdf

Olick, Diana. 2014. “Housing Still Too Expensive Despite Positive Signs.” CNBC.com, July 10. www.cnbc.com/2014/07/10/housing-still-too-expensive-despite-positive-signs.html

Shelterforce. 2012. “What’s the Point of Shared-Equity Homeownership in Weak Market Areas?” Shelterforce. www.shelterforce.org/images/uploads/theanswer171-2.pdf

Schutz, Aaron and Marie G. Sandy. 2011. “What Isn’t Community Organizing.” In Collective Action for Social Change: An Introduction to Community Organizing, London: Palgrave McMillan. pp. 31–44.

Thaden, Emily and Greg Rosenberg. 2010. “Outperforming the Market: Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in Community Land Trusts.” Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1846_1154_LLA10102%20Foreclosure%20Rates.pdf

We are inaugurating our fourteenth volume year of Land Lines with a new look and feel—more color, more articles, more news about our faculty, and more announcements about our courses, publications and special projects.

In the past five years our educational programs have expanded to reach policy makers and practitioners in federal, state and local government throughout the United States and in many countries of Latin America, Europe, Africa and Asia. Our faculty has developed a broad range of introductory and advanced professional development courses that explore both the theory and practice of land and tax policy.

The Institute’s Department of Valuation and Taxation, chaired by Joan Youngman, has three major goals: improving public and scholarly debate on the taxation of land value; addressing the economic impact, feasibility, political acceptability, and appropriate use of value-based taxes; and contributing to a better understanding of the valuation process for tax purposes. The local property tax, as the primary value-based tax in the United States, is a major focus of the Institute’s work, but we analyze a variety of revenue instruments, particularly with regard to their treatment of land value increments attributable to public investment.

The Department of Planning and Development, cochaired by Rosalind Greenstein and Armando Carbonell, links interests in the theory and practice of planning with an understanding of how land markets operate. Our concerns focus on urban and regional planning and design, land conservation, urban redevelopment, and the behavior of land markets. We are particularly interested in the integration of urban and environmental systems; the planning process and its outcomes; the interplay of public and private roles in decisions involving land policy and land use; the effect of land markets and the institutions that support them on the city and its residents; and the role of land and real estate in the larger economy and in poverty alleviation.

Building on our experiences in Latin America since 1993, Martim Smolka directs the Institute’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean in developing activities oriented toward both scholars and practitioners, including legislative and executive policy officials and upper-level technical staff. Programs focus on five priority topics: value capture policies and implementation of instruments to mobilize land value increments; property taxation systems that can meet the needs of rapid urbanization; regulatory environments supporting large-scale urban intervention; security of tenure, regularization and urban upgrading programs; and urban land market forces, including spatial and social segregation, speculation, vacant land and related issues.

Each issue of Land Lines will continue to feature articles by faculty who share the ideas discussed and lessons learned in Institute-sponsored courses. In addition, we will announce upcoming courses, lectures and other programs that are open to a general audience, and we will keep you informed about new publications, web-based programs and other resources that address our work in land and tax policy.

Una versión más actualizada de este artículo está disponible como parte del capítulo 4 del libro Perspectivas urbanas: Temas críticos en políticas de suelo de América Latina.

Los instrumentos de captura de plusvalía, aunque difíciles de aplicar, son ampliamente reconocidos como mecanismos beneficiosos de planificación fiscal. En América Latina, Colombia se ha destacado por su larga y particular tradición de institucionalización de la captura de plusvalías mediante la contribución de valorización (una especie de tasación especial) y la contribución de desarrollo municipal (Ley 9 de 1989), la cual antecedió al actual instrumento de participación en plusvalías.

Desde 1921, año de introducción de la primera de estas leyes, Colombia ha desarrollado una cultura fiscal en la cual los ciudadanos están conscientes de los instrumentos de captura de plusvalía, y los aceptan como un mecanismo legítimo de recaudación de ingresos. Como ejemplo, en 1968 (en su época de mayor uso), la contribución de valorización representó el 16 por ciento de los ingresos municipales en Bogotá y aproximadamente el 45 por ciento en Medellín; a principio de la década de 1980 recaudó un 30 por ciento de los ingresos totales en Cali. No obstante, debido a que el suelo aún desempeña un papel importante como defensa contra la inflación en países como Colombia -donde los mercados de capital no están muy desarrollados-la puesta en práctica de tales instrumentos sigue enfrentando una fuerte resistencia política por parte de muchos y variados grupos de interés, desde propietarios y promotores poderosos hasta familias de bajos y medianos recursos para quienes la tierra es una importante fuente de ahorros.

Sobre la base de esta experiencia, la Ley 388 de 1997 que creó la participación en plusvalías decreta que todas las municipalidades deben diseñar y aprobar un plan maestro de diez años (el Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial o “POT”) y adoptar la plusvalía como una de las fuentes principales de ingresos del plan. Las entradas recaudadas por las plusvalías deberán utilizarse principalmente para la provisión de infraestructura y viviendas sociales a vecindades pobremente dotadas de servicios públicos, así como también para obras públicas de interés general. La ley establece tres condiciones administrativas para poder aplicar las plusvalías como parte del POT, a saber:

1. cambio de categoría de la tierra, especialmente cuando la tierra rural con bajo potencial de desarrollo es incluida dentro de los límites de crecimiento del plan maestro (y por consiguiente se designa como tierra para expansión urbana o como tierra suburbana);
2. autorización de derechos adicionales de desarrollo en un sector determinado; o
3. conversión del uso de un sector, especialmente de uso residencial a uso comercial.

La participación en plusvalías se basa en el derecho público y legítimo de participar en la captación de los aumentos del valor de la tierra generados por acciones administrativas tales como cambios en zonificación o densidad, que pueden generar ganancias sustanciales para el propietario de la tierra.Es importante notar que este instrumento no es un impuesto ni tampoco una contribución o tarifa, sino más bien un derecho de la comunidad a “participar” en los beneficios resultantes de las funciones gubernamentales orientadas a mejorar el desarrollo urbano. La Ley 388 y sus decretos acompañantes definen los parámetros generales para utilizar las plusvalías, pero se requiere que las municipalidades determinen sus procedimientos específicos. Sin embargo, a muchos alcaldes y funcionarios públicos les preocupan las ambigüedades de la ley, y les está costando el proceso de su aplicación, así como la del instrumento de plusvalías.

Con el objeto de abrir un espacio de debate sobre este problema entre funcionarios públicos y otros expertos, el Instituto Lincoln y el Departamento de Planeación de Bogotá organizaron un seminario en diciembre de 1999, antes de la fecha límite de aprobación del plan maestro legal (POT) (31 de diciembre). El seminario reunió a representantes de entidades y participantes activos en el proceso de ejecución, entre ellos directores de planificación de ciudades importantes, representantes de ministerios y organismos públicos nacionales, representantes de instituciones encargadas del avalúo inmobiliario, abogados y especialistas participantes en el diseño del instrumento. Un resultado inmediato del seminario fue la formación de un grupo de presión que logró cambiar la fecha límite al 30 de junio de 2000, alargando así el tiempo disponible para revisar las estipulaciones problemáticas del POT.

Aspectos claves de la implementación de la ley

Aplicación de plusvalías a diferentes situaciones.

La mayoría de los representantes municipales que asistieron al seminario coincidieron en que las plusvalías deben ser utilizadas únicamente en situaciones que redunden en ganancias claras y sustanciales, a fin de procurar una mayor aprobación por parte de los ciudadanos y de simplificar el proceso administrativo durante la primera fase de la ejecución. El consenso general es que los propietarios han aceptado la contribución de valorización y han estado dispuestos a pagar porque han entendido claramente que el aumento en el valor del suelo se debe a la inversión pública. En Bogotá, por ejemplo, la contribución de valorización ha sido una de las principales fuentes de financiamiento para la construcción de calles nuevas desde 1969.

En comparación, las plusvalías se aplican únicamente en situaciones en que el aumento en el valor de la tierra puede atribuirse específicamente a una decisión sobre el uso de tierra pública definida en el POT, tal como un cambio en la categoría de la tierra, su densidad o su uso. Una situación para la cual se evidencia el cambio en el precio de la tierra, es la extensión del perímetro urbano a fin de incluir suelo rural que podría desarrollarse en años subsiguientes. La mayoría de los representantes de municipalidades opinaron que este escenario es el más obvio para la aplicación de la ley, y que debe constituir el enfoque del instrumento durante su etapa inicial.

Exactitud de los avalúos del suelo.

La Ley 388 sugiere establecer la fecha de julio de 1997 (fecha de aprobación de la ley en el Congreso), como base de referencia para establecer las ganancias en el precio de la tierra. Sin embargo, aún no está claro cuándo ni por qué método los municipios podrán determinar el precio de la tierra en los años sucesivos. El problema es que el valor base inicial podría ya haberse alterado por los “rumores” que hayan corrido acerca de las designaciones de suelo en los planes maestros. En vista de ello se plantean varias interrogantes, por ejemplo: , ¿debería calcularse el valor antes de la circulación de rumores sobre los cambios urbanísticos, o justo antes de tomarse la decisión formal? ¿Cómo deberían las ciudades tratar los incrementos en el valor del suelo atribuidos a acciones ejecutadas entre esa fecha base y la aprobación del POT? ¿Cuánto tiempo dura la validez del avalúo? ¿Qué pasa después de cierto tiempo (por ejemplo, 15 ó 20 años)?

Estas preguntas adquieren aún más relevancia si consideramos que las normas del uso de la tierra establecidas recientemente en algunas ciudades ya han sido capitalizadas en precios de la tierra, y por ende han reducido sustancialmente los márgenes actuales para la aplicación de la participación en plusvalías.

Además, existen diferentes implicancias legales acerca de los valores relacionados que deben considerarse, es decir, el “uso real” versus el “mayor y mejor uso”. ¿En qué debe basarse el aumento del valor del suelo?: ¿en el uso potencial? ¿en el real? Y en lo que se refiere a la fórmula definida legalmente para hacer los avalúos, ¿debería aplicarse dicha fórmula al área potencialmente desarrollable, incluso si el constructor no está solicitando una autorización para desarrollar el sitio hasta su máxima densidad admisible? ¿Qué pasa si una propiedad avaluada en cierta fecha no se termina de construir? Aunque la ley define el concepto de zonas con características geoeconómicas similares, no está claro si el terrateniente puede solicitar legalmente que el avalúo se haga sobre la base de “propiedad a propiedad” o sobre la base de “zonas homogéneas”.

Otra fuente de preocupación la constituyen las estrictas fechas límites establecidas por la ley para calcular los precios comerciales antes del plan maestro y los nuevos precios de referencia después de la adopción del plan. Por ejemplo, la ley otorga a la alcaldía apenas cinco días después de la aprobación del nuevo POT para determinar los nuevos precios en las áreas afectadas, e impone además realizar todos los cálculos en el transcurso de los próximos 60 días. No está clara la estructura legal de adopción de procedimientos de costo simplificados que permitan efectuar los avalúos en áreas homogéneas de la ciudad, y no en lotes individuales.

Definición de categorías de suelo.

Las diferencias de las categorías de suelos para las leyes 9 de 1989 y 388 de 1997 conducen a interrogantes sobre su aplicabilidad. La Ley 9 incluyó una categoría de suelo suburbano que podía ser desarrollado en densidades moderadas en la periferia de las ciudades. Por ejemplo, toda la tierra desarrollable hacia el norte de Bogotá cae ahora en esa categoría suburbana, la cual permite densidades residenciales de 160 habitantes por hectárea. La zonificación propuesta por el nuevo plan maestro permite un aumento para llegar a densidades de entre 180 y 220 habitantes por hectárea. La Ley 388 establece la posibilidad de gravar la conversión del uso rural a urbano, pero no contempla la categoría suburbana, aun cuando el suelo suburbano ya posee poderosos derechos de desarrollo. Debido a estas dificultades, y para evitar problemas adicionales de implementación, muchas ciudades prefieren tratar el suelo “suburbano” como “urbano”.

Exenciones y casos especiales.

Aunque las viviendas para la población de bajos ingresos están exentas de las plusvalías, la ley impone de todas maneras calcular los aumentos en el valor del suelo. Esto constituiría un costo adicional innecesario, considerando que el 80 por ciento de todas las viviendas a construirse en Bogotá durante los próximos diez años estarán destinadas a la población de bajos recursos. ¿Qué efecto tiene este cálculo sobre la imparcialidad de este instrumento para el 20 por ciento restante de las viviendas? ¿Qué tan eficaz es la plusvalía como un instrumento de planificación que busca disminuir la especulación en la tierra designada para viviendas populares?

Otro asunto se refiere a la designación de zonas de conservación o áreas designadas para protección ambiental mediante la transferencia de derechos de desarrollo. Las protestas de agentes privados sobre las apropiaciones hechas en contra de sus derechos de propiedad plantean importantes interrogantes de compensación. Además, para el caso de áreas ya designadas para desarrollos de alta densidad pero que aún no están totalmente desarrolladas, hay también preguntas sobre las “expectativas” de los valores del suelo.

Obstáculos políticos y operativos.

Una fuente continua de confusión y malentendidos se refiere a la eficacia del cálculo del incremento en el valor del suelo. ¿Puede o debe implementarse este cálculo en los casos en que, debido a una recesión económica generalizada, los valores del suelo estén supuestamente en declive? Si el propietario pierde dinero al vender la tierra, o si no está desarrollando sus propiedades en absoluto, entonces sencillamente no habrá plusvalías disponibles para la administración local. Teóricamente bastaría con hacer una distinción entre los efectos generadores (acciones administrativas) y las tendencias en los mercados de tierras. Sin embargo, tal como está sucediendo actualmente en Colombia, en la práctica es fácil entender que los instrumentos de captura de plusvalías son más poderosos y políticamente aceptables durante los períodos de ascenso de los ciclos de precios del suelo que durante los períodos de descenso.

Las connotaciones políticas del tema se ponen de relieve si se consideran las sustanciales carteras de tierra normalmente apartadas por los promotores para fines de planificación estratégica e incluso de especulación. En efecto, muy a menudo los planificadores urbanos se ven obligados a ser más flexibles (si no magnánimos) y a aflojar los reglamentos urbanísticos a fin de motivar a los promotores durante las épocas de recesión. Claro está que esta presión por parte de los promotores podría sencillamente ser un intento de recuperar pérdidas incurridas por las decisiones equivocadas sobre inversiones en el pasado.

Algunas veces los promotores se quejan de que la municipalidad está fijando una tarifa de plusvalía demasiado alta en tiempos de economía deficiente, cuando la recesión puede desalentar las inversiones futuras en mejoras de construcción. Sin embargo, la experiencia habida con la contribución de valorización ofrece un contraargumento, sugeriendo que si la cantidad de plusvalías generadas por el cambio en el uso de la tierra se consideran sobrevaluadas, significa que el cambio carece de una buena razón costo/eficacia y por tanto no debería proponerse. Otra posibilidad es que quizás se cometió un error en los estudios o cálculos de viabilidad.

Por encima de estas dificultades prácticas, la ley impone ciertos requisitos de aplicación que afectan su operación, tales como la necesidad de notificar directamente al propietario que su propiedad está sujeta a obligaciones por plusvalías. ¿Debería esta responsabilidad correr por cuenta de la administración pública o del propietario? Existen también dificultades legales respecto a cuándo se deben cobrar las plusvalías al propietario (¿durante la liquidación de las propiedades? ¿cuando el propietario solicite la licencia de conversión del uso del suelo?). De la misma manera, si un área que se va a densificar (o sufrir cualquier cambio de zonificación) recibió una infraestructura adicional por la cual se le impuso la contribución de valorización, el propietario estaría sujeto a una doble tributación, algo que sin duda constituiría una fuente de malestar. Tal como lo establece la nueva ley, la contribución de valorización es independiente de las plusvalías, lo cual es importante debido a la opción existente de calcular y cobrar las ‘plusvalías por las obras públicas designadas por el Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial (POT).

Ajustes propuestos por funcionarios municipales

Los funcionarios públicos presentes en el seminario realizado de diciembre en Bogotá sugirieron unas cuantas maneras de simplificar la ejecución de la Ley 388, las cuales sacrifican la precisión en el cálculo de las plusvalías a cambio de conveniencia, transparencia y cumplimiento. Esta perspectiva se basa en que la voluntad política puede ser más importante que la “exactitud” técnica, al menos en las etapas tempranas y de transición de la puesta en marcha, a fin de mejorar las posibilidades de éxito a largo plazo. Un ejemplo útil y descriptivo fue el citado por los funcionarios de la ciudad de Cartagena (500 000 habitantes), la cual desde 1992 ha estado aplicando exitosamente la contribución de desarrollo municipal. Esta experiencia demuestra que los cambios de densidad de un nuevo lote deberían tener un efecto similar en la generación de las plusvalías, al de la tasa generada por el mismo tipo de cambio de densidad observada en un área distinta pero comparable de la ciudad.

Los participantes también propusieron restringir la aplicación de las plusvalías a las áreas más estratégicas y dinámicas de la ciudad, donde el potencial de ganancias sea más evidente que en áreas con poco aumento en el valor del suelo. Además, la valoración de las plusvalías debe basarse en zonas homogéneas, y no en lotes individuales. Es necesario también que el instrumento de plusvalías pase por varias fases de desarrollo escalonado conforme las municipalidades ganan conocimiento y destrezas en técnicas de valorización y avalúos. Así, el período establecido de nueve años para la validación de los avalúos de los incrementos en el valor del suelo debería ser sujeto a revisiones peródicas más frecuentes. Igualmente, la emisión de algunas reglas prácticas de transición (ausentes en la formulación original de la ley) facilitarán la introducción de un nuevo sistema fiscal.

Se hicieron otras sugerencias respecto a la adopción de planes maestros (POT). Las municipalidades deberían utilizar tales planes, en vez de algún otro mecanismo de valoración externo al POT, para identificar áreas en donde habrá un cambio en la utilización del suelo a fin de determinar si dicho cambio trae consigo un aumento en las plusvalías. Antes de adoptar el POT, las municipalidades deberán identificar tales áreas con el fin de poder tener a tiempo las técnicas de valoración y avalúos y para mitigar la sensación de incertidumbre. Algunos participantes incluso sugirieron utilizar el POT para definir el valor “anterior”, y así poder determinar el incremento neto en el valor del suelo.

En general, los participantes coincidieron en que tanto el concepto como la orientación del plan maestro y del instrumento de plusvalías son aceptables y deseables. Muchos de los problemas y asuntos discutidos en el seminario y en todo el país se refieren a la ejecución de cualquier esquema de captura de plusvalías, o simplemente de cualquier nueva legislación normativa o fiscal. En este caso el diseño de los procedimientos de ejecución puede mejorarse, dado que siempre será más fácil cambiar los aspectos operativos que la ley en sí. Sin embargo, y por encima de todas las dificultades formales remanentes, se ha demostrado claramente que la voluntad política, la experiencia técnica acumulada y el compromiso ético de los participantes son factores críticos para perfeccionar este instrumento de política del suelo y poner en práctica los principios muy encomiables que lo inspiran.

Carolina Barco de Botero es la Directora de Planeamiento de la ciudad de Bogotá, Gerente Consultora de Ciudades, Ltda. en Bogotá y forma parte del Consejo Directivo del Instituto Lincoln. Martim Smolka es Senior Fellow y Director del Programa para América Latina del Instituto Lincoln. Fernanda Furtado, Fellow del Instituto Lincoln, también participó en la elaboración de este artículo. Recientemente terminó su tesis de Ph.D. (en portugués) sobre la captura de plusvalías en América Latina, en la Facultad de Arquitectura y Urbanismo de la Universidad de São Paulo, Brasil. En uno de los capítulos de su tesis se describe la situación de Colombia.

Argumentos en favor y en contra de la participación en plusvalías

A favor

• reduce la corrupción en tanto que expone los beneficios que en el pasado solían negociarse “debajo de la mesa”;
• reduce la especulación;
• genera ingresos públicos que son designados para fines redistributivos;
• reduce las distorsiones en la distribución de los incrementos en el valor del suelo urbano;
• contribuye a un mejor entendimiento de la cultura fiscal, mejorando así la recaudación de otros avalúos e impuestos.

En contra

• introduce más burocracia en la ejecución de planes maestros y en el proceso de desarrollos de licencias del ambiente construido;
• legaliza la apropiación privada de los incrementos en el valor del suelo, puesto que el propietario se queda con aproximadamente un 50 a 70 por ciento de las plusvalías;
• genera altos costos administrativos relativos a las entradas que genera.

Scholars and practitioners involved with the regularization of low-income settlements in Latin America shared their experiences in a forum sponsored by the Lincoln Institute last March and hosted by the City of Medellín and its regularization office, PRIMED (Integrated Program for the Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellín). Participants included representatives from PRIMED, Medellín city officials, and observers from multilateral institutions including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, AID and GTZ (Germany).

Twelve major presentations reported on the most significant case studies from eight countries: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, Perú and Venezuela. The forum proved to be a landmark meeting whose findings, summarized below, are expected to have important implications for Latin American policymakers.

Comparative Perspectives on Regularization

Several different approaches to regularization are illustrated in the country case studies. The two primary approaches are juridical regularization, i.e., legal land entitlement procedures to convert from de facto to de jure property ownership, as in Perú, Ecuador and Mexico; and physical regularization (urbanization), including the extension of infrastructure into irregular settlements, as in Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and other countries. A third approach, which has been emphasized only recently, puts priority on the social and civic integration of low-income settlements and their populations into the urban fabric by a combination of measures.

While most countries have elements of all three forms of regularization, they usually focus on one direction or another. In Mexico all three approaches are used simultaneously. In most other countries the emphasis depends on the relative strengths of the actors, organizations and politics on the one hand, and on the way the regularization problem is conceived (“constructed”) by federal and local authorities on the other.

Juridical Regularization: Land Title Programs

The regularization of land titles has become accepted practice by governments, international agencies and NGOs alike. (see Figure 1.) In fact, the question “Why Regularize?” that was raised at the beginning of the forum seemed to catch everyone by surprise. Yet, posing this question goes to the heart of the matter about who defines the problems regarding land tenure and who establishes policies in favor of regularization. Most of the legal titling programs examined in the case studies were lengthy and expensive, and, by the time they came on-line, did little to significantly affect the level of security or to systematically provide services in the settlements.

Figure 1 Common Arguments in Favor of Land Regularization

• Provide security against evictions
• Provide incentives to stimulate investments in home improvements and consolidation
• Facilitate and provide for the introduction of services such as electricity and water
• Generate access to credit using the home as collateral
• Incorporate residents into the property-owning citizenry and the democratic process
• Integrate settlements and property into the tax and regulatory base of the city

As far as the poor are concerned, however, several of the arguments in favor of regularization would appear to be spurious. Established households generally have de facto security and rarely prioritize the need for full legal title, the latter being a need more associated with middle-classes value systems. Moreover, once settlements are well-established, home improvements and consolidation occur at a rate that is closely tied to available resources, not to title security. As for the introduction of services, most providers follow their own internal rules for timing and procedures; rarely is legal title an important criterion.

Furthermore, low-income households do not like falling into debt and are uneasy about entering formal credit systems, even though NGOs and governments are moving towards micro-credit support. In short, where low-income groups want regularization of tenure it appears to be because the state wants them to want it and then constructs demand accordingly.

One may conceive of tenure regularization as both an end in itself and a means to an end. Regularization as an “end” emerged clearly in the Lima case, where access to land and land titling programs substitute for a systematic housing policy. The most recent round of land titling (since 1996) even includes a retitling of previously regularized lots as an arena of political patronage serving the central government at the expense of the city’s political leaders. (1) A similar situation prevailed in Mexico with the multiplex regularization agencies created during the 1970s. In both countries the commitment to tenurial regularization is clearly indicated by active programs, usually providing a large number of titles each year at low cost.

Elsewhere, regularization may also be an “end,” but it is of secondary importance. In Colombia, Brazil, El Salvador and Ecuador, for example, titling is at best only a minor part of the physical regularization package. Even so, the absence of legal tenure and the need for regularization may be used to good political effect by regulating the flow and order of infrastructure provision.

Regularization of titles as a means to an end is promoted widely by international agencies as part of the World Bank’s New Urban Management Program. Mexico is a good example of the process whereby land titling is a prerequisite to urban land management, planning and public administration. Regularization incorporates the population into the system of land registry, tax base, planning controls, construction permissions, consumption charges, and recovery of services and infrastructure. Regularization becomes the means to urban sustainability and management, and this more than any other reason explains its widespread espousal and adoption today.

One notable feature in several case studies was the apparent reluctance to regularize on private lands unless the initiative had the support of the original landowner. As a result, the settlements most likely to be regularized are those occupying public land or land whose ownership is unchallenged. With the exception of Mexico, governments are reluctant to expropriate in the social interest. Several countries have a system of land occupancy rights that permits transfer of ownership after a certain number of years of proven and appropriate use. In Brazil this usucapión system has been extended recently to allow for title transfer on privately owned urban lots of less than 250m2 that have been occupied continuously for five years.

Issues in juridical regularization programs:

• Extent of resident demand and priority for full land title: A high priority for titling emerges only when there is high insecurity associated with illegal lot holding (Costa Rica), or where the state promotes the association of insecurity with lack of titling (Mexico).
• Procedures and administration in the titling programs: Examples range from very rapid, efficient and lost-cost practices (Peru and Mexico) to interminable and inefficient procedures. Most of the case studies fell at the latter end of the spectrum (Brazil and Colombia especially), in large part because this arena of regularization is not a high priority.
• The nature and functioning of property registry and cadastre offices: Almost all case studies pointed to major shortcomings in land registry and land valuation assessment institutions. Even where satisfactory institutional arrangements existed, relations and liaison between the two offices were invariably poor.
• The form and “weight” of land titles: The power and importance of titles ranged from “hard” titles, such as registered titles and full property titles that could only be challenged through eminent domain or expropriation procedures, to “soft” titles, which represented little more than certificates of possession, registration of occupancy or contracts of purchase. Somewhere in the middle, and parallel to this legal dimension, are the customary titles of social property rights, such as use rights, common rights, usos y costumbres, etc. The latter will hold force only to the extent that they are supported by the state.

Physical Regularization: Urbanization and Infrastructure Provision

The second principal arena of regularization reported by many of the case studies at the forum focused on the physical regularization process in different forms of irregular settlements. In Medellín, for example, approximately 12 percent of the total population is estimated to live in fast-growing barrios, which are often built on steep slopes like their hillside counterparts in Rio or Caracas. There are undoubted problems and dangers in these areas, but most of the participants who visited the PRIMED settlements were more encouraged by their level and rate of consolidation than the local officials appeared to be. (The discussion did not address upgrades and interventions in inner-city tenements-conventillos, vecindades, cortiços.)

It is impossible to do justice to the many innovative programs that were described at the forum, but one major success story is the Favela/Bairro program in Rio de Janeiro. This project is predicated on close collaboration with local residents to open up favela streets to vehicular access in combination with service installation. However, it is important to recognize that its success has only been possible at considerable cost: the total expenditure between 1994 and 1997 has been US$300 million, in large part provided by the IDB. This raises important questions about the replicability of such programs.

Issues in physical regularization programs:

• Legal instruments: In many cases legal instruments are not required to effect urban regularization projects and public intervention. Moreover, expropriation in the public interest is not attractive to most local authorities. The creation of special social interest zones (ZEIS and PREZEIS in Brazil) is one mechanism to help neighborhoods by providing greater flexibility of intervention outside of city codes and norms. Many other legal instruments were found to be rather weak, especially those with a large degree of discretion in their application (Ley novena in Colombia, for example).
• The costs of regularization and population displacement: Physical intervention brings additional costs associated with installation and consumption of services, and may also introduce higher tax contributions. In order to meet these costs, families may be obliged to find savings elsewhere (by slowing the rate of home consolidation, for example) or engage in rent-seeking behaviors such as renting or sharing lots or dwellings. Inevitably some will choose or be forced to sell and move out. Little is known about displacement levels, but generally low-income owner households remain settled; population stability, not mobility, is the norm.
• Financial mechanisms for regularization: Several of the most notable and successful projects rely on external funding, and many projects appear to carry explicit and implicit subsidies. In order for projects to be replicable, more agile financial methods are required, such as fiscal resources (land/property taxes, as in Mexico) or user charges (as in Medellín, for example). Another mechanism captures capital gains taxes on improvements (plusvalia and valorization charges, as in Colombia), but generally does not apply to low-income housing. (See page 5.)
• Administrative and governmental responsibilities for regularization: Almost without exception the trend has been towards decentralization with a lessening of power at the central government level and a strengthening at the municipal level. The role of the state/department/province level has weakened greatly. This trend means that an increasing responsibility for regularization falls on city authorities, and in turn raises other important issues: institutional capacity; learning and dissemination of best practices; the development of fiscal capacity and responsibility; program continuity across administrations; program coordination and implementation in metropolitan jurisdictions (where cities overlap more than one municipality); and the role of unelected NGOs.
• Popular (public) participation in regularization: While popular participation in neighborhood development projects is widely espoused and desired, it is often non-existent or purely nominal (Ecuador). Elsewhere, it was seen to be genuine and quite intensive (Costa Rica and Brazil). Popular participation involves residents instrumentally in project implementation and offers opportunities to take account of so-called plural (parallel) justice systems (Venezuela), customary laws, usos y costumbres (Mexico), etc.
• Regularization and citizens’ rights: The rising public awareness of citizens’ rights was apparent in many of the case studies. These include rights to housing (Mexico, but unfulfilled); rights of access to housing (Peru and El Salvador); and rights to infrastructure and urbanization benefits. It is also important to recognize that citizens’ rights also carry citizens’ obligations, particularly as taxpayers and consumers.

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Regularization as a Means of Social Integration

It became apparent in the deliberations that an increasingly explicit goal of regularization is to achieve social integration by bringing low-income populations into the societal mainstream and into the urban fabric. This is most frequently observed in reference to the “rescue” of low-income populations and other marginal groups and their incorporation into the urban citizenry. This was one of the important goals in Brazil’s favela/bairro program, which, in part at least, aimed to break up the drug and delinquent youth gangs and to rescue the local population from their influence.

A potential problem with this approach is that concepts of “good citizen” and the societal mainstream are social constructions that are often highly value-laden and may derive from within a particular class and dominant power group. Regularization to achieve integration into the wider set of social opportunities such as public education and health care is one thing; regularization for social convergence and conformity is another. However, this theme remains incipient in the literature, and the whole notion of citizenship with its bundles of rights and responsibilities is part of an agenda still largely unconsidered.

Conclusion

This international forum emphasized the need to be aware of the different underlying rationales for juridical and physical regularization in individual countries, and to be aware that they are closely tied to the political and planning process. In order for regularization to work well there has to be genuine political commitment such that all departments and officials who intervene do so with greater integration, cooperation and empowerment. Policymakers should also think imaginatively about alternative, “parallel” ownership systems and opportunities for genuine public participation in decisionmaking at all stages in the regularization process.

Important, too, are financial commitment and sustainability. Unless regularization is tied to medium- and long-term cost recovery through taxes, user charges and deferred assessments, programs will continue to depend on major external funding and subsidies, which will severely limit the extent and scale of their application.

An exciting last session of the forum allowed participants to reflect on future directions for research and policy analysis on land market regularization. Five major areas emerged. First, we recognized the need to identify the various actors and interest groups involved in promoting irregular or illegal land development in the first place, and to make explicit the differences between land invasions, owner subdivisions, company subdivisions and other actions. The point here is that irregularity is produced by various actors and interests groups as a for-profit business, and is not just a result of dysfunctional urbanization.

Second, we discussed moving away from dualist thinking and breaking with the idea of conceptualizing the land market in terms of the formal and informal city, the parallel city, or normal and subnormal barrios, all of which implicitly assume that the poor are locked into a separate land market. In fact, there is a single land market that is segmented, not separated, along a continuum in terms of access and affordability.

Third, we need to confront the issue of financial replicability and the ways in which finance might be leveraged through cross-subsidies, plusvalia, valorization charges, tax-and-spend, progressive consumption charges, and other mechanisms. Fourth, we need to be less gender-blind. It is important to think more imaginatively about regularization priorities with respect to gender and to explore innovative titling schemes that address the need for women’s settlement and housing rights.

Finally, we need to be much more precise in our terminology, and, more importantly, to recognize that there is a “social construction” embedded within language. The terms adopted in any society are revealing about how that society views and diagnoses housing and related social issues. Terminology may lead to punitive or patronizing policy solutions; it may even “criminalize” local populations. Most of the differences and variations in the case studies stem from the way each society constructs its understanding of the housing problem and how it presents that vision to its people-through its terminology, through its laws, procedures and policies, and through the bureaucratic and administrative organization of the state itself.

1. Julio Calderon, “Regularization of Urban Land in Peru,” Land Lines, May 1998.

Peter M. Ward is professor of sociology and of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin and a faculty associate of the Lincoln Institute. Among his many books is Methodology for Land and Housing Market Analysis, coedited with Gareth Jones and published by the Lincoln Institute in 1994.