



# European Spatial Research and Planning

Edited by ANDREAS FALUDI

# European Spatial Research and Planning



---



# European Spatial Research and Planning

Edited by  
Andreas Faludi

 LINCOLN INSTITUTE  
OF LAND POLICY  
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

© 2008 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

All rights reserved.

Texts and maps stemming from research projects under the ESPON programme presented in this book do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the ESPON Monitoring Committee.

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

European spatial research and planning / edited by Andreas Faludi.

p. cm.

Based on a seminar held at the University of Luxembourg on May 3–4, 2007.

Includes index.

ISBN 978-1-55844-177-4

1. Regional planning—European Union countries—Congresses. 2. European Union countries—Economic policy—Congresses. 3. Land use—European Union countries—Planning—Congresses. 4. Intergovernmental cooperation—Europe—Congresses. I. Faludi, Andreas.

II. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

HT395.E8E848 2008

338.94—dc22

2008004017

*Designed by Janis Owens, Books By Design, Inc.*

Composed in Minion by Books By Design, Inc., in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Printed and bound by Puritan Press Incorporated in Hollis, New Hampshire. The paper is Utopia II, an acid-free sheet.

MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

<i>List of Figures and Tables</i>	<i>vii</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	<i>ix</i>
<i>Foreword</i> Armando Carbonell	<i>xi</i>
<i>Preface</i>	<i>xiii</i>
<b>Introduction</b> Andreas Faludi	1
<b>1 Organization, Achievements, and the Future of ESPON</b> Cliff Hague and Verena Hachmann	21
<b>2 Territorial Impact Analysis of EU Policies</b> Kai Böhme and Thiemo W. Eser	43
<b>3 Polycentricity Under the Looking Glass</b> Janne Antikainen	67
<b>4 Planning for Decline: The Demographic Imperative</b> Diogo de Abreu	87
<b>5 The Shrinking Continent: Accessibility, Competitiveness, and Cohesion</b> Klaus Spiekermann and Michael Wegener	115
<b>6 Response to Natural Hazards and Climate Change in Europe</b> Philipp Schmidt-Thomé and Stefan Greiving	141
<b>7 Figuring Out the Shape of Europe: Spatial Scenarios</b> Jacques Robert and Moritz Lennert	169



---

<b>8</b>	<b>North-South Regionalism: A Challenge for Europe in a Changing World</b>	195
	Pierre Beckouche and Claude Grasland	
<b>9</b>	<b>The Europeanization of Planning</b>	225
	Kai Böhme and Bas Waterhout	
<b>10</b>	<b>The Making of the <i>Territorial Agenda of the European Union</i>: Policy, Polity, and Politics</b>	249
	Thiemo W. Eser and Peter Schmeitz	
	<i>Contributors</i>	271
	<i>Index</i>	273
	<i>About the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy</i>	287

## Figures

1.1	Lead Partners and Project Partners of the ESPON 2006 Program	27
2.1	Territorial Impact Assessment and the Policy (Evaluation) Cycle	63
3.1	Territorial Dimension and Polycentricity at Work	69
3.2	The Finnish Urban Network	75
3.3	Typology of Functional Urban Areas in Europe	82
4.1	Population Growth in Europe, 1990–2000	90
4.2A	Percentage of People over 65 in the Population	91
4.2B	Potential Support Ratio	91
4.3	Crude Death Rate in the EU27, 1960–2005	93
4.4A	TFR in Northern Europe, 1960–2000	94
4.4B	TFR in Western Europe, 1960–2000	94
4.4C	TFR in Southern Europe, 1960–2000	95
4.4D	TFR in Eastern Europe, 1960–2000	95
4.5	TFR in 1999 (NUTS 2)	96
4.6	Migratory Balance, 1996–1999	99
4.7A	Population Forecasts (all nine models)	102
4.7B	Population Forecasts (the eight central models)	102
4.8	Population Variation (%), 2000–2050 (Model A)	103
4.9	Trends of Aging by NUTS 2	104
4.10	Population Variation, 2000–2050 (Model B0)	105
4.11	PSR Variation for EU15, EU25, and EU29, 2000–2050	106
4.12	Migration Flows in Europe	107
4.13	Cumulative Migration Flows in Europe	107
4.14	Labor Force Replacement Ratio in 2000	109
4.15	European Regional Typology Based on Aging and Depopulation Trends	111
5.1	Time-Space Maps of Rail Travel Times, 1993–2020	116
5.2	Potential Accessibility by Road, 2006	120
5.3	Accessibility versus Economic Performance, 2001	123
5.4	Relative and Absolute GDP Effects, Scenario B5, 2031	126
5.5	Polycentricity in the Old Member States (EU15) and in New Member States and Accession Countries (NMAC), 1981–2031	130
5.6	Development of Polycentricity of Metropolitan European Growth Areas (MEGA) in Europe, 1981–2031	131
6.1	Aggregated Natural Hazards in Europe	143
6.2	From Risk Assessment to Risk Management	157
6.3	Efficiency of Measures Depending on Timing	158
6.4	Change in Efficiency of Adaptation Measures over Time	159
6.5	Forest Fire Hazard and INTERREG IIIB Projects Related to European Regions	161
6.6	SEAREG Decision Support Frame	163



7.1	Trend Scenario: Final Image, 2030	180
7.2	Cohesion-Oriented Scenario: Final Image, 2030	185
7.3	Competitiveness-Oriented Scenario: Final Image, 2030	188
7.4	Spatial Structure and Urban Hierarchy	190
8.1	Role of the Vision of Europe in the World for Internal and External Policies	196
8.2	Evolution of the EU Share of World Population and GDP (PPS), 1950–2020	199
8.3	Joint Evolution of the Share of the World Population and GDP (PPS) from 1950–1954 to 1996–2000	204
8.4	Origin of Migrants in ESPON According to Country of Birth	205
8.5	Major Air Connections Between Cities of the World in 2000: Global Network	209
8.6	Major Air Connections Between Cities of the World in 2000: European Gateway Cities	210
8.7	Global Influence of EU Plus Switzerland and Norway	215
9.1	Intensity of Cooperation on Polycentric Development Under INTERREG	237
9.2	Application of ESDP Policy Guidelines in Groups of European Countries	240
9.3	Processes and Influences Underlying the Europeanization of Planning	243

## Tables

1.1	The Relation Between ESPON Projects and the ESDP	24
1.2	Territorial Impacts of EU Sector Policies	31
1.3	Elements of Smart Public Administration	36
2.1	Main Features of Selected ESPON Studies	45
2.2	TIA Minimum Requirements	55
2.3	The Territorial Impact Model	56
5.1	Goal Conflicts of Polycentricity Policies	132
6.1	Reported Effects of Selected Larger Natural Hazards on European Countries, 1970–2005	145
6.2	Overview of the European Planning System	152
6.3	Hazards Addressed by Spatial Planning in Europe	153
6.4	Contribution of Spatial-Oriented Planning and Supporting Instruments to Risk Management Strategies	154
8.1	Percentage of EU27 in the World	198
8.2	The Place of Western and Eastern Europe in Foreign Direct Investment	201
8.3	Criteria Used for Delimitation of EU27 Plus Switzerland and Norway Influence Area in the World	214
8.4	Maximum and Minimum Values of ESPON29 Influence	216
9.1	Funding According to ESDP Priorities and INTERREG IIIB Cooperation Area	236
9.2	Fields Where the Ideas of the ESDP Application Were First Used	241
9.3	Toward a Typology of Europeanization in Planning	244

## ABBREVIATIONS

ASTRA	Developing Policies and Adaptation Strategies to Climate Change in the Baltic Sea Region
BBR	Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CDCR	Committee for the Development and Conversion of Regions
CEG	Centre for Geographical Studies of the University of Lisbon
CEMAT	Conférence Européenne des Ministres Responsables de l'Aménagement du Territoire
COCOF	Coordination Committee of the Funds
CSD	Committee on Spatial Development
CU	Coordination Unit
DG Regio	Directorate-General for Regional Policy
DG Relex	Directorate-General for External Relations
DSF	Decision Support Frame
ECP	European contact point
EIA	environmental impact assessment
EM-DAT	Emergency Disasters Database
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI	European and Neighborhood Partnership Instrument
ESDP	<i>European Spatial Development Perspective</i>
ESPON	European Spatial Planning Observation Network
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FUA	functional urban area
GVA	gross value added
IA	impact assessment
ICT	information and communication technology
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISO	International Standards Organization
ITPS	Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies
LFA	less favored area
MEGA	metropolitan European growth area
NIS	New Independent States of the former USSR
NMAC	new member states and accession countries
NSRF	National Strategic Reference Framework
OMC	open method of coordination
OP	operational programs
PSR	potential support ratio
RDR	Rural Development Regulation
SEA	strategic environmental assessment
SEAREG	Sea Level Change Affecting the Spatial Development of the Baltic Sea Region

---

SEEP	South-Eastern Europe Perspective
SMEs	small and medium enterprises
SPESP	Study Programme on European Spatial Planning
TA	<i>Territorial Agenda</i>
TCR	third cohesion report
TEN	Trans-European Networks
TEN-E	Trans-European Energy Networks
TEN-T	Trans-European Transport Networks
TEQUILA	Territorial Efficiency Quality Identity Layered Assessment multicriteria
TFR	total fertility rate
TIA	territorial impact assessment
TIM	Territorial Impact Model
TPG	transnational project group
TSP	<i>Territorial State and Perspective of the European Union</i>
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
WTO	World Trade Organization

With the publication of *European Spatial Research and Planning*, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy adds a third volume to its series of investigations of spatial planning, research, and policy in Europe, all under the magisterial editorship of Andreas Faludi. Each of these books examines the European experience with an expectation that it may hold lessons for land policy in the United States. This book taps into the treasure trove of research that is ESPON, the European Spatial Planning Observation Network, which has yielded a plethora of studies on the real and anticipated outcomes of European territorial policy. The ESPON corpus provides our authors with the means to examine developments at the intersection of research and policy: “evidence-informed” if not exactly “evidence-based” policy.

The three volumes chart what has turned out to be a rapidly evolving European discourse. The first volume of the series, published in 2002, *European Spatial Planning*, dealt with policies derived from the *European Spatial Development Perspective* (ESDP), which had been adopted in 1999. Then, the main idea for American planners was strategic development policy at the continental scale based on alternative spatial visions of core and periphery and a European envy of the United States with its multiple zones of integration with the global economy. By the second volume, *Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society* (2007), the European Union (EU) had moved on from the ESDP, picking up 10 additional member states along the way. Our book highlighted the aspiration for equity across the newly enlarged European space. At the time of the present volume, with the EU standing at 27 members, Europe is emerging from a period of reflection following rejection of the Constitution, with a new *Territorial Agenda* to guide policy, supported by the ESPON empirical base.

What is significantly new in this agenda? Viewed from the United States, there is the sense that planners are “attaching themselves to the competitiveness discourse,” as Andreas puts it, with an implication that efficiency will trump equity in this round of the policy debate. But in Europe, this is a discourse that is accompanied by, at the least, a sense of urgency, and, for some, of impending crisis, involving climate change, energy insecurity, and potential demographic collapse. The ESPON research underpinning this volume reveals that policy goals like “sustainable economic growth” and “territorial cohesion” have far-reaching consequences



across sectors and geography. For example, EU policies that favor higher GDP will likely increase greenhouse gas emissions, while a cohesion strategy, resulting in lower GDP, would favor meeting emissions targets. And while EU cohesion policies may have resulted in decreased inequality between countries, they have led to an increase in spatial inequality within countries, according to ex-post territorial impact assessments.

In the case of transportation policy, ex-ante scenario analysis has shed light on the relationship between infrastructure investment and regional development. The Trans-European Networks (TEN), projected out to 2020, were found to result in converging accessibility and GDP between core and periphery in relative terms, but with the gap increasing in absolute terms. Over this period, the scenarios point to an overall tendency to lower polycentricity in Europe, as transport policy advantages large urban centers, notwithstanding pricing strategies leading to more expensive transport that will tend to strengthen polycentricity. Perhaps of greatest interest to followers of the significant European investment in major infrastructure projects like high-speed rail is the finding that large increases in regional accessibility are expected to translate into only small increases in regional economic activity. This will no doubt bear further examination as American planners consider the role of transportation infrastructure within a national development framework as part of initiatives like America 2050.

Perhaps the most striking area of difference between Europe and the United States in the context of territorial policy has to do with demography. Europe is facing a population deficit by midcentury of the same order as the expected increase in U.S. population in that period. While it is true that the United States has by no means come to grips with its own immigration issues, it is perhaps still fair to observe that immigration policy will continue to contribute significantly to the tension between Europe's continental vision, and its place within a greater regional neighborhood, and the wider world.

*Armando Carbonell*

*Chairman*

*Department of Planning and Urban Form*

This is the third in a series of volumes published by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy that I have had the honor of editing. Previous volumes are *European Spatial Planning*, published in 2002, and *Territorial Cohesion and the European Model of Society*, published in 2007. As the art of European spatial planning develops, so do the aspects relevant for an international and in particular a North American audience. The topic of this volume relates to the concerted efforts to acknowledge and disseminate evidence gathered by the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON), hence the title *European Spatial Research and Planning*.

This book would not have been possible without the constant interest in these issues and support provided by Armando Carbonell, the chairman of the Department of Planning and Urban Form at the Lincoln Institute. He is a widely traveled and well-connected observer, not only of the North American and international planning communities, but also of the European scene. He conceived of the idea of bringing European spatial planning efforts closer to a North American audience. Together with Robert D. Yaro, president of the Regional Plan Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, Armando brought master's students from the University of Pennsylvania, where both were practice professors, to Europe to work on what was initially called the American Spatial Development Perspective. Later groups from the University of Pennsylvania were joined by students and their teachers from other schools to focus on specific metropolitan areas in the United States.

The Lincoln Institute, the Regional Plan Association, and others continue to work on this initiative, now dubbed America 2050, to consider the vast implications of U.S. population and economic growth between now and 2050. This comprehensive strategy seeks to match the historic planning efforts by U.S. presidents Thomas Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt in their respective centuries.

It is extremely gratifying to learn that European spatial planning should have such ripple effects. To the insider, the sometimes small efforts of the several dozen planners involved in the European enterprise seem less grandiose than they may seem from the outside. Also, since publication of the *European Spatial Development Perspective* in 1999, the European planning discourse has taken a new turn and is increasingly couched in terms of a policy to achieve "territorial cohesion."

What has been missing all along is a sound analytical base to this discussion. The makers of the *European Spatial Development Perspective* (ESDP) were keenly aware of this and hoped for a network of research centers to be set up—and financed—by European institutions. As always, there was much soul searching about whether this was an appropriate task for these institutions and about how existing national initiatives were to be integrated. In the end, the European Union consented to fund ESPON, originally to provide the basis for a substantial review of ESDP.

In the mid-2000s hundreds of researchers started producing volumes of research reports on many aspects of European spatial development and planning. This whetted the appetite of the key players to bring all this new evidence to bear on the evolving territorial cohesion policy of the European Union (EU) and to do so from the bottom up by means of an initiative of the member states. In 2004 the idea of an “evidence-based document” to inform the EU territorial cohesion policy was born.

The ins and outs of these efforts are discussed in the introduction to this volume and in several other chapters covering the process. The discussion extends to the intriguing issue of whether the idea of evidence-based planning was viable in the first instance. Undeniably, though, the evidence produced by ESPON, often invoking innovative approaches to research and analysis, was fascinating, and it gave rise to the idea of this volume.

As with the previous two volumes, the approach to this book began with inviting a select group of people from all over Europe to give papers on their experience with various aspects of ESPON’s work. A seminar took place on 3 and 4 May 2007 at the University of Luxembourg with the generous assistance of Christian Schulz (professor of European spatial planning) and his team there.

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a staunch supporter of many European initiatives, including those relating to European spatial planning and ESPON. Luxembourg now supports the effort, acting as the management authority and the paying authority and assisting with the financing of the ESPON Coordination Unit located there, an example of the synthesis between top-down and bottom-up initiatives in the EU.

Holding the seminar in Luxembourg had the added advantage of enabling Peter Mehlbye, the director of the Coordination Unit, to attend the seminar and to enlighten the participants about ongoing efforts to formulate a new ESPON program for the period 2007–2013. Clearly, in years to come there will be more to tell about European spatial planning. Meanwhile, I want to acknowledge Peter Mehlbye’s generous assistance in smoothing our way to obtain permission for using material from ESPON research in this book. The permission granted excludes the right of using the ESPON map design for new maps produced by projects outside the ESPON framework.

*Andreas Faludi  
Delft, The Netherlands  
September 2007*

# European Spatial Research and Planning





# Introduction

Andreas Faludi

At Leipzig on 25 May 2007 ministers responsible for spatial planning and development of the member states of the European Union adopted the *Territorial Agenda of the European Union: Towards a More Competitive and Sustainable Europe of Diverse Regions* (Territorial Agenda 2007). As the subtitle indicates, this document relates to the Lisbon Strategy, which aimed for the EU to become by 2010 “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council 2000). Inserting sustainability on a par with competitiveness in the subtitle makes clear that the ministers wish to take sustainable development seriously, as agreed at Gothenburg (CEC 2001b).

The Lisbon Strategy may have been deemed unrealistic since it was developed, but creating growth and jobs remains the goal of EU policy (CEC 2005). The *Territorial Agenda* argues that the diversity of Europe’s regions is conducive to that goal. Making use of their endogenous potential, also described as their territorial capital (OECD 2001), the regions can each contribute to attaining the goal.

This introduction is about European planners attaching themselves to the competitiveness discourse, while at the same time sustaining their commitment to a specifically European model of society, different from any American model (Judt 2005, 748; Faludi 2007). This introduction is also and in particular about how evidence, produced in a collaborative effort by a network of more than 600 researchers involved in the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON), is being brought to bear on European spatial planning. The EU can rarely operate with the same sense of purpose as the United States—a federation of more than 200 years’ standing—but the European example in planning may serve as a source of inspiration. After all, ESPON could easily be the most elaborate collaborative research effort feeding into planning policy ever undertaken.

The date of the Leipzig meeting was almost to the day 10 years after the meeting of the planning ministers at Noordwijk, who gave their blessing to the first official draft of the *European Spatial Development Perspective* (ESDP). None of the ministers assembled at Leipzig were in office 10 years ago. Indeed, almost half of the countries represented were not even EU members in 1997. On 1 May 2004, the EU admitted 10 new members, most of them from central and eastern Europe,

and Bulgaria and Romania joined on 1 January 2007. So the EU as presently constituted with its 27 members looks very different from when the ESDP was being prepared, and the planning challenges are different, too. As a venue, Leipzig also had symbolic significance (Böhme and Schön 2006). Adopted in 1994, the so-called Leipzig Principles had been the foundation of the ESDP.

The stakes are high. In 2008 a review of the EU budget will start, as agreed as part of the Financial Perspectives 2007–2013. That review will, among other things, critically examine the second-largest budget item, cohesion policy, the item most relevant to European planning efforts. With a view to that future, the *Territorial Agenda* is attempting to factor territorial cohesion into the equation of Europe's competitiveness. The aim is thus to make territorial cohesion policy a pillar of a revamped cohesion policy.

The *Territorial Agenda* is rooted in the ESDP (CEC 1999). A joint product of the member states—with substantial assistance from the Commission of the European Communities, better known as the European Commission, or simply the Commission—the ESDP was a major achievement of the 1990s (Faludi 2002; Faludi and Waterhout 2002). As a result of member state reluctance to grant it a role, the Commission withdrew its support and invoked the concept of territorial cohesion instead (Faludi 2006). As the Financial Perspectives 2007–2013 come into operation, and pending the resolution of the issue of an EU mandate for territorial cohesion policy, the Commission pursues a tentative territorial cohesion policy by invoking spatial or territorial criteria in evaluating “National Strategic Reference Frameworks” (NSRFs) and “Operational Programmes” (OPs) prepared in pursuance of the *Community Strategic Guidelines* (Council of the European Union 2006). Under the umbrella of the new third objective of cohesion policy, European territorial cooperation, successful ESDP follow-ups like the Community Initiative INTERREG and ESPON will continue, but now as part of mainstream cohesion policy.

In this introduction, the focus is on ESPON, a remarkable learning exercise that pursues relevant themes and, since a belated start in mid-2002, brings together researchers from across Europe. As the ESPON 2006 program has it: “The organizational structure of the ESPON . . . raises expectations for intensive networking between the research institutes for all the various study subjects which will serve the objective of supporting the establishment of a scientific community in the different fields addressed by the ESPON” (ESPON 2003, 10–11). The plethora of results—tens of thousands of pages of text with hundreds of maps, all available on the Web site ([www.espon.eu](http://www.espon.eu))—has induced member states to resume their planning initiative and produce the evidence-based document *The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union: Towards a Stronger European Territorial Cohesion in the Light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Ambitions* (2007).

The first section of this introduction gives an overview of developments since the ESDP that have led to more recent initiatives. The second section focuses on the role of evidence and experts in producing the two new documents. The introduction ends with a preview of chapters 1–10.

## European Planning Since the Turn of the Century

According to the ESDP, the three spheres of European planning are (1) polycentric development and urban-rural partnership; (2) access to infrastructure and knowledge; and (3) prudent management of the natural and cultural resources. However, at the European level, there is no more talk, as in the ESDP, of European spatial development policy, let alone of spatial planning—except for the mention of spatial planning in the title of ESPON, as a kind of relic of the past. The reason for eschewing the use of these terms is that in 2000 the Commission ended its support for the ESDP process. As a consequence, the Committee on Spatial Development, which did the groundwork for the ESDP, was disbanded. Listed in the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe as an objective and as a competence shared between the Union and the member states on a par with economic and social cohesion, the new concept of territorial cohesion would have given the EU, and the Commission, a key role in developing any relevant policies. However, French and Dutch voters who objected to the constitution rendered its ratification unrealistic. In June 2007, the European Council of Heads of State and Government decided to abandon the constitution in favor of a treaty amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, a decision which was finalized at their meeting in late October, to be followed by the signing of the document in December 2007. The prospects of it coming into force—in 2009 or later, depending on the ratification process—are good. At any rate, the new treaty refers once again to “economic, social and territorial cohesion” as an objective of the Union and as a “shared competence between the Union and the Member States” (Presidency of the IGC 2007).

Meanwhile, in pursuance of the Lisbon Strategy, EU policy priorities generally have shifted from “soft” concerns, with which planning is associated, toward the pursuit of competitiveness, to be achieved through promoting innovation (Giddens 2007; see chapter 3). Territorial cohesion policy of whatever denomination must be seen to increase competitiveness.

The origin of cohesion policy lies in the mid-1970s, when the then European Community started giving financial support to member states pursuing their own regional policies. Under Jacques Delors, Commission president in 1985–1995, the rudimentary policy of the 1970s was revamped to serve the twin objectives of economic and social cohesion in the Single European Act of 1986. Within national and regional envelopes that are the outcomes of protracted intergovernmental bargaining, regional and local authorities, as well as other stakeholders, apply for funding, to be used in addition to their own resources on projects designed to pursue a set number of priorities. The approach is thus programmatic, but at the same time relies on input from below. This has led to a remarkable form of multilevel governance, giving the Commission access to regional and local stakeholders and vice versa (Hooghe and Marks 2001).

Presently, the lion’s share of the funds goes to regions in central and eastern Europe, but regions with “geographical handicaps” (for instance, peripheral and

even ultra-peripheral regions, mountain regions, and islands) are also eligible as a matter of course. The policy is to compensate them for disadvantages suffered in competing in the single market.

This policy came under fire in the Sapir Report (Sapir et al. 2004) on EU economic governance, which argued that cohesion policy failed to promote competitiveness and was bureaucratic, to boot. Subsequently, some net contributors to the EU budget posed the challenge of replacing cohesion policy with financial transfers to the new member states—in fact a return to the policies of the 1970s. The argument was to cut bureaucracy by removing the Commission as the key player in regional policy.

Another issue of more immediate importance in the debate over the Financial Perspectives 2007–2013 was the overall spending ceiling, calculated as a percentage of the GDP of the EU. This overshadowed the discussion on the reform of the budget. In the end, the amounts allocated were reduced to a level lower than what the Commission had deemed necessary. At the same time, cohesion policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the equally contentious U.K. budget rebate were allowed to continue, but with a commitment to reviewing the budget framework, including all the controversial issues, starting in 2008. The aim is to arrive at a new setup in time for the next Financial Perspectives for the period after 2013.

The Commission heard the challenge to its cohesion policy loud and clear and redirected it to support the Lisbon Strategy. In fact, cohesion policy is one of the few instruments of the Commission used for this purpose. Otherwise, the Lisbon Strategy depends on the willingness and ability of member states to work toward targets for reforming labor markets, increasing female participation, investing in R&D, and so forth. Member states are only committed to formulating National Reform Programmes and reporting on their implementation using agreed indicators. The Commission produces summary accounts of their achievements, the idea being that the worst performers will want to improve their efforts.

For cohesion policy, a similar cycle is in place. The Commission proposed new *Community Strategic Guidelines* for cohesion policy for the approval of the Council of the European Union (commonly known as the Council of Ministers). Member states formulated NSRFs followed by OPs. At the time of this writing—October 2007—the Commission was still discussing whether some of them conformed to the guidelines and to the relevant council regulation (Official Journal of the European Union 2006). There will be an important midterm review in 2010.

The *Community Strategic Guidelines* describe the territorial dimension of cohesion policy:

One of the features of cohesion policy—in contrast to sectoral policies—lies in its capacity to adapt to the particular needs and characteristics of specific geographical challenges and opportunities. Under cohesion policy, geography matters. Accordingly, when developing their programmes and concentrating resources on key priorities, member states and regions

should pay particular attention to these specific geographical circumstances. (Council of the European Union 2006, 40)

The responsible Directorate-General for Regional Policy has issued a guidance document for the mandatory *ex-ante* evaluation of the NSRFs and OPs (Directorate-General 2006). Its annex 4 describes how specific needs and characteristics of territories should be taken into account, reflecting an appreciation of the particular problems and opportunities that result from their geographic situations. The annex also proposes indicators to be used in doing that, thereby referring to the work of ESPON. (For more on the territorial impact assessment and the indicators used, see chapter 2.) The guidance document even suggests that NSRFs and OPs should include sections on territorial cohesion. However, evaluating the NSRFs, Polverari et al. (2006, 78) conclude that territorial aspects have not played as strategic a role as might have been expected. Similar to a study by Bachtler, Ferry, Méndez, and McMaster (2007) of the OPs, their work shows that with the exception of France, only a few new member states (for instance, Hungary and Poland) invoke the concept of territorial cohesion. It is worth noting, however, that the Commission's guidance document came out in August 2006, when the preparation of the NSRFs was already well under way. At the Leipzig meeting, the representative of the responsible Directorate-General for Regional Policy gave a somewhat more upbeat assessment of the "urban and territorial dimension" of the documents available at the time (Directorate-General 2007).

Meanwhile, the work by researchers throughout Europe in the framework of ESPON has borne fruit in more ways than just providing indicators for evaluating programs. In 2004 the Dutch presidency of the European Union—in coordination with other member states sympathetic to the idea of territorial cohesion policy, like France and Luxembourg (Faludi and Waterhout 2005)—invited the ministers of the member states responsible for territorial cohesion to an informal meeting at Rotterdam, the first such meeting since the ESDP process had come to an end. There ministers decided to produce an evidence-based document drawing on the work that was becoming available from ESPON. The ESDP had sorely lacked a solid analytical base (Böhme and Schön 2006, 61; Faludi and Waterhout 2002, 166–172), a fact that led to the belated formation of ESPON in 2002—three years after the ESDP was completed. That is not how it is being framed, but producing an evidence-based document is a repeat, albeit in adapted form and with better data on which to base recommendations, of the ESDP process. The idea is to use available evidence to make a convincing case for taking into account the spatial or territorial dimension of various policies.

At Luxembourg six months after the Rotterdam meeting, the ministers reassembled and accepted a scoping document to prepare what would eventually become a document entitled *The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union*. Later on, it was decided to also produce the much shorter political document called the *Territorial Agenda*, which formed the object of the ministerial meeting at Leipzig. The experts considered the emergent *Territorial State and Perspectives* too

complex to be put before the ministers. In particular, the ESDP process had shown that maps were controversial in any policy document of this kind, so the *Territorial Agenda* does not contain any. With many maps culled from the work of ESPON, the *Territorial State and Perspectives* was presented at Leipzig merely as a background document. Clearly, on the way from collecting the evidence to formulating policy, many decision points have been passed. Evidence-based planning is not a straightforward matter of drawing conclusions based on the facts.

The remainder of this section discusses the *Territorial Agenda* as a strategic document with proposals for contributing to the EU agenda of promoting jobs and growth. The document also insists that account be taken of the needs and characteristics of specific geographical challenges and opportunities. In short, its message—like that of the *Community Strategic Guidelines*—is that geography matters.

An eight-page document, the *Territorial Agenda* comes in four parts. The first part clearly states its main focus as contributing to the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies; it defines territorial cohesion as a permanent and cooperative process involving various actors and stakeholders. The second part begins by identifying six major challenges: (1) climate change (discussed in chapter 6 of this volume); (2) rising energy prices and the accelerating integration of regions in global economic competition; (3) the impact of the enlargement of the European Union; (4) the overexploitation of ecological and cultural resources; (5) the loss of biodiversity, “particularly through increasing development sprawl while remote areas are facing depopulation”; and (6) the effects of demographic change and migration on the labor market, the supply of public services, and the housing market (discussed in chapter 4 of this volume).

With a glance at the European social model, a topic of continuing debate (Giddens, Diamond, and Liddle 2006; Giddens 2007), the second part of the agenda states that territorial cohesion is a prerequisite of sustainable economic growth and job creation. Emphasis is on making use of regionally diversified territorial potential and on the increasing territorial influence of Community policies.

After recounting the three spheres of European planning according to the ESDP mentioned previously, the third part of the *Territorial Agenda* outlines new priorities for developing the EU territory: (1) strengthening polycentric development and innovation through networking of city regions and cities; (2) developing new forms of territorial governance between rural and urban areas; (3) promoting regional clusters of competition and innovation, specifically across borders; (4) supporting and extending Trans-European Networks (TEN); (5) promoting trans-European risk management (the chief concern of the authors of chapter 6); and (6) strengthening ecological structures and cultural resources for a new approach to development.

What is new on the list of priorities is risk management, including the impacts of climate change, a topic that has come up in the wake of floods and droughts over the past years and is receiving increasing emphasis, due in part to media attention, the film *An Inconvenient Truth* having been discussed in preparatory expert meetings. It is only fair to add though that, whereas they are at the top of

the list of challenges, climate change and energy figure less prominently in the list of priorities than one might expect.

However, there is much to do about competitiveness under the priorities. Coming before Lisbon, the ESDP had already related a polycentric urban system to Europe's competitiveness, culminating in the ESDP's proposal to encourage the development of more global economic integration zones outside the "pentagon" of London-Paris-Milan-Munich-Hamburg. The ESDP had invoked the example of the United States possessing such zones on the East Coast, the West Coast, in the Midwest, and in the South, thus giving it a competitive advantage. Promoting polycentric territorial development with a view to making better use of available resources in European regions is also the main plank of the *Territorial Agenda*, but without invoking the concept of global economic integration zones.

The fourth part of the *Territorial Agenda* urges European institutions to pay more regard to the territorial dimension of policies. There is also a demand for more in-depth analyses in the ESPON 2013 program of the effects of EU policies on territorial cohesion and for operational indicators. This emphasis on territorial monitoring is based on the analysis of the territorial impacts of EU policies and what could be done about managing them in chapter 3 of the *Territorial State and Perspectives*, which admits that the ministers for spatial planning and development themselves cannot do more than delivering a sound evidence base and putting the territorial dimension of EU policies on the EU agenda. For effective management of the territorial impact of EU policies they

appear to be dependent on the commitment of the formal EU institutions, especially the European Commission, as the initiator of EU Policies. In other words, leadership in managing the territorial impact of EU policies appears only possible if the European Commission and the EU Ministers for Spatial Development cooperate closely as a driving force for other stakeholders. (*Territorial State* 2007, 56)

The *Territorial State and Perspectives* document refers to the white paper on European governance (CEC 2001a), which compliments the ESDP for taking steps toward more policy coherence. It then points out that the Commission "has made initial attempts to address the politically sensitive issue of a coherent approach to the territorial impact of EU policies," but that it "remains a rather premature and fragile matter on the EU agenda" (*Territorial State* 2007, 56). In plain English: Territorial impact assessment is controversial, since member states fear yet another procedure, like strategic environmental assessment (SEA)—considered cumbersome by some—being imposed on them. This is why an earlier proposal to introduce territorial impact assessment did not make it into the final document.

A separate set of recommendations in the *Territorial Agenda* concerns cooperation between the Commission and the member states. It talks about the need for in-depth dialogue and the opportunities that should be provided by what are called the "existing committees." Previous drafts of the *Territorial Agenda* requested that the Commission establish an internal territorial cohesion contact

point; hard pressed to fulfill ever more tasks, the Commission apparently retorted at a preparatory meeting in November 2006 that it was unable to do that. The final *Territorial Agenda* as approved by the ministers contains merely the commitment by the ministers themselves to set up a network of territorial cohesion contact points. The earlier draft invited the Commission also to publish what is called a communication on territorial cohesion, an idea the Commission itself had launched at Luxembourg but shelved in the wake of the negative referenda. Apparently, a high-ranking Commission official had cold-shouldered the idea in the absence of ratification of the Constitution. However, the Leipzig *Presidency Conclusions* go at least as far as requesting the Commission to publish a report on territorial cohesion by 2008 (German Presidency 2007, 5). Searching for relevant input, the Commission has circulated a questionnaire asking member states to give their views.

The *Territorial Agenda* asks the member states themselves to integrate the priorities it sets out, as well as the territorial aspects of the *Community Strategic Guidelines*, in national, regional, and local development policies, but without attending to the general lack of capacity for doing so documented by Schout and Jordan (2007).

The longest list of follow-up actions relates to what the ministers themselves will do. Easily the most important one is the request, reiterated in the conclusions of the German presidency (2007), for the Slovene presidency of early 2008 to take the *Territorial Agenda* into account in preparing the 2008 spring European Council traditionally devoted to discussing the progress of the Lisbon Strategy. Otherwise, too, the ministers have firm ideas as to where they are going. For instance, they intend to facilitate debate on a long list of EU dossiers from a territorial point of view. The Portuguese presidency is organizing an Informal Meeting of Ministers on Territorial Cohesion and Regional Development—the designations of such meetings have the habit of changing—in late 2007 to discuss the first “Action Programme” under the *Territorial Agenda*.

After Slovenia, France will hold the EU presidency. A supporter of territorial cohesion policy, France is certain to advance its cause but still has to announce whether it will hold a ministerial meeting. In 2000, the French showed a preference for expert meetings and seminars. Be that as it may, the *Territorial Agenda* will come up for review under the Hungarian presidency in the first half of 2011.

What transpires is, first, that the ministers have come to accept that the EU—and thus the Commission—needs to have a territorial cohesion policy, irrespective of whether the constitution in its present or an amended form will be ratified. (As indicated previously, the prospects are now that the new treaty replacing the constitution, which makes reference to territorial cohesion, will hopefully be ratified. If it is ratified, the question of an official EU mandate for territorial cohesion policy will be resolved.)

Second, discussion of the *Territorial Agenda* at the European Council in the spring of 2008 would be the first occurrence of territorial issues receiving attention from that prestigious body. This is hopeful. As the only one of the new member states to adopt the common currency so far, Slovenia commands much good will,



and even before becoming an EU member, Slovenia had taken planning initiatives in the framework of the Council of Europe.

Optimism needs to be qualified, though. It is the ministers responsible for spatial planning and development and their expert advisers who have come to a somewhat more positive view of EU territorial cohesion policy. There are two reasons for their conversion:

1. Experts have gone through an intensive learning experience, forming a supranational community described as a “roving band of planners” in the process (Faludi 1997). After the ESDP came a multitude of projects under the Community Initiative INTERREG. Those collaborative, hands-on exercises were cofinanced by the EU, with, according to Müller et al. (2005, 1), more than 10,000 people involved. That must have had a diffuse effect in terms of the Europeanization of state, regional, and urban planning asked for in the ESDP (CEC 1999, 45).
2. Ministers responsible for spatial planning are not in a strong position to coordinate, as is their calling, national sectors and their policies, backed as these sectors are by relevant directorates-general of the European Commission. Thus, environmental policy makers draw strength from relevant EU policies; transport planners have the Trans-European Networks to refer to; and, although with the *Territorial Agenda* planners are doing their best to relate to it, economic policy makers are closer to the EU growth and jobs agenda. So it would be attractive for planners if they, too, could draw on EU territorial cohesion policy for legitimizing their role and aspirations.

As a final comment, the story of the *Territorial Agenda*, like that of the ESDP, is one of experts engaging in bureaucratic politics and taking along their ministers to defend their case. With the possible exception of some French circles (Faludi 2006; Bovar and Peyrony 2006), there is no overwhelming political concern, nor—with the notable exceptions of the Association of European Regions, the Committee of the Regions (an official advisory committee of the EU), and the Council of Maritime and Peripheral Regions in Europe—is there a lobby for territorial cohesion. The object of the *Territorial Agenda* is to give more prominence to territorial cohesion. It should be judged by whether it succeeds in doing so.

## Producing the Evidence

As indicated previously, the catalyst for producing the *Territorial Agenda* was the new evidence provided by ESPON.

Information about ESPON, its organization, and its achievements is available from a midterm evaluation required for all such programs (MVA Consultancy 2003), a less usual update of same (MVA Consultancy 2005), and a subsequent commissioned study concerned with the lessons to be drawn from ESPON and the strategy to be followed in the future (Rambøll Management 2006). There are also

a number of so-called synthesis reports, the final one under the telling title “Territory Matters for Competitiveness and Cohesion: Facets of Regional Diversity and Potentials in Europe” (ESPON 2006b), reflecting among other things on the process of producing the evidence provided by ESPON. There is also a scientific report compiled by a group of key experts (ESPON 2006a). All this has fed into the ESPON 2013 program (ESPON 2007), still under review by the European Commission at the time of this writing.

Academic papers on the organization of ESPON are slower in coming. Most of those available are by researchers who are, or have been, involved in the process. The pioneer among academic observers of European spatial planning, Richard H. Williams (1999) has drawn attention to the novel approach introduced in the Study Programme on European Spatial Planning (SPESP). He participated in that experimental forerunner of the ESPON, also discussed by Bengs (2002). Other recent papers are Van Gestel and Faludi (2005), Hague (2006), Böhme and Schön (2006), and Prezioso (2007). Bengs (2006) continues to follow the ESPON critically. The authors of chapter 1 in this volume update and synthesize all this information.

Originally, ESPON was intended to provide the analytical base for amplifying the ESDP agenda, “putting some flesh on the generic skeleton of ideas that is the ESDP” (Bengs 2002, 13). The ESDP itself did not have such a base, at least not one that was consistent across the member states. Indeed, for a long time, the makers of the ESDP were hoping for the ESPON to be set up in time for first results to feed into the final document. That was an idle hope because the Commission argued that the lack of a specific EU mandate in that area—always stressed by the member states when it came to keeping the EU and the Commission at bay—made it impossible to allocate a budget line for such a research network. The Commission did finance the experimental SPESP, however. Williams (1999, 7) surmised that the point of the exercise was to demonstrate that “networked research does not work, thus making the case for creating an institution analogous to the European Environment Agency.” Conceivably, there has been a dispute over this within the Commission. Bengs (2006, 6) reports on an incident during the SPESP program when a high-ranking Commission representative disputed not only the guidance given six months earlier by his colleague, but also the whole point of networked research—the value of which was later to be confirmed by the official evaluation of the SPESP.

The choice between a network and an independent EU agency was an issue from the beginning. Böhme and Schön (2006, 67) speculate about whether, once territorial cohesion has become a shared competence, a European agency would after all be more suitable than a network. Be that as it may, presently the only fixed structure is the ESPON Coordination Unit located in Luxembourg under arrangements by which the government of the Grand Duchy foots the bill.

To return to the situation at the beginning of the decade, the positive evaluation of the SPESP left no option but to pursue the network approach, now included in the objectives of ESPON. So after more protracted discussions, ESPON got off the ground in mid-2002 under the umbrella of INTERREG. ESPON 2006, as it began to be called, covered the territory, first, of the 15 and, as

of May 2004, the 25 EU member states. In addition, the territories of two new members that were to join on 1 January 2007, plus those of the nonmembers Norway and Switzerland, were included, so that the ESPON 2006 proudly spoke of the EU29. The usual rules for EU funding applied, although they had been adopted for quite different types of activities. This is a point to which we will return.

ESPON 2013, the follow-up to ESPON 2006, will operate as a European observation network for territorial development and cohesion as soon as the relevant regulations have been approved. It covers an even larger space: the current EU27; the three official candidates, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey; and the nonmembers of the EU and paying members of ESPON, Norway and Switzerland, augmented by Iceland as a new partner. Neighboring countries will be encouraged to join. Tiny Liechtenstein may also join. ESPON 2013 will soon be once again pursuing relevant themes, bringing together hundreds of researchers doing innovative work.

Under complicated arrangements, 85 percent of the funds for the actual research will come from the EU, and the rest will come from the participating states. The EU funds will be provided under the “territorial cooperation” objective of cohesion policy.

Like European spatial planning, ESPON is expert driven. As indicated, its origins reach back to the early days of the ESDP process when it became plain that the analytical base for a European planning document of any description was weak to nonexistent. The idea was for a European network of major research institutes to generate the necessary data, but despite persistent efforts, spearheaded by Luxembourg beginning in 1997, the financing of such a network turned out to be a thorny issue for the reason given above: The member states refused to recognize an EU competence in the matter. The way out was to label the SPESP an experimental and innovative action. Eventually, ESPON was brought under Article 53 of the INTERREG regulations and, significantly, its name changed to European Spatial Planning *Observation* Network—rather than *Observatory* Network, thus indicating that ESPON is intended not as a network of existing research institutes but rather as a more free-floating arrangement.

The stated purpose of ESPON was to lay the foundation for an ESDP II, although that was quickly forgotten as ESDP II became an unrealistic prospect; ESPON 2006, however, did research relating to the ESDP agenda, of course. The ESPON program had seven objectives:

1. Adding a European focus to national research
2. Amplifying the ESDP for transnational and national spaces
3. Developing instruments and creating institutions for the application of the ESDP
4. Exploring the spatial dimension of EU and national-sector policies
5. Improving coordination of those policies
6. Bridging the gap between policy makers, administrators, and academic analysts

## 7. Networking within the relevant European academic community

Projects fell into four categories. There were, first, thematic studies relating to main ESDP themes, from polycentric development to natural and cultural heritage. Second, there were impact studies of EU-sector policies, from transport (discussed in this book by Klaus Spiekermann and Michael Wegener in chapter 5) to pre-accession aid and programs to promote development in countries with no immediate prospect of joining (discussed in a global context by Pierre Beckouche and Claude Grasland in chapter 8). Of these, the study of the territorial impact of the Common Agricultural Policy—discussed among other sector policies for its impact on territorial cohesion in chapter 2—proved particularly controversial. It showed that the CAP favored the core regions, thus counteracting the attempt of cohesion policy to make up for the disadvantages suffered by the least favored regions, mostly in the periphery (Shucksmith, Thomson, and Roberts 2005). Bengs (2006, 8) suggests that there were even attempts to suppress the findings of this study. Third, there were coordinating, so-called cross-thematic studies. Defining coordination as a research task allowed more funds to be allocated to this important task than the meager overhead expenditure allowed under the relevant regulations (Van Gestel and Faludi 2005, 87; Böhme and Schön 2006, 64). Developing integrated tools for European spatial development and formulating spatial scenarios (the latter discussed by Jacques Robert and Moritz Lennert in chapter 7) also came under this category, but Hague (2006, 28) argues that the coordinative tasks assigned to the projects concerned were to the detriment of theoretical depth. Finally, studies and scientific support projects, including an innovative data navigator designed to facilitate access to information available throughout Europe, formed a mixed category.

The geographic scope was described previously as that of a putative EU29. In terms of geographic detail, the studies generally went as far as what is called the NUTS 3 level (regions), but not to the next-lower level of what are called Local Administrative Units (formerly NUTS 4). The reason was the lack of data across Europe for more fine-grained studies. This reduced the value of the results to smaller member states and their regions. There was also much concern, articulated by Bengs (2002) and others, about the appropriateness of definitions derived from the urbanized core of Europe for analyzing the situation in the thinly populated periphery. It is not uncommon for issues and definitions identified from a European perspective to give a distorted picture of situations as seen through the eyes of those directly affected. (In chapter 6, Schmidt-Thomé and Greiving show this also to be the case for the identification of some hazards.)

As indicated, ESPON 2006 was subject to restrictions under regulations pertaining to this type of program. In addition to the ceiling on overhead expenditures, the contract model spelled trouble, in particular for the lead partners of the Transnational Project Groups doing the work. In addition, the overall budget was small. Control and management were in the hands of a Managing Authority, a Paying Authority, and a Monitoring Committee. Supported by the Coordination Unit, the latter, which included representatives of the member states and the

Commission, was firmly in charge of content. In addition to this complex structure, there were European Contact Points in each of the countries participating. These were supposed to generate interest for the public tenders, assist with obtaining the necessary data, and disseminate results; with their resource endowments varying, however, they did not always work as intended.

Commissioning research involved public tenders, but the number of tenders decreased over time. Large research institutes, many from universities, mostly from northwest Europe, for whom the research was of intrinsic interest, were over-represented. So cumbersome were the procedures that some of the Transnational Project Groups were forced to subsidize the studies they were involved in (Rambøll Management 2006, 18). Those participating complained also about interventions and additional demands from responsible authorities (Rambøll Management 2006, 15; Van Gestel and Faludi 2005, 82; Hague 2006, 26; Bengs 2006, 6). Comments in a study by Rambøll Management (2006) also suggest that the Monitoring Committee was politicized to a point that, rather than deliberating on common strategies, national representatives took partisan views. Undoubtedly, that led to distortions in the process of producing the objective evidence on which future territorial cohesion policy should be based.

The main finding of the Rambøll study was that ESPON 2006 had created more added value for the scientific community than for practitioners and policy makers. Since the study took a user and demand perspective, it is of little surprise that its recommendation was to strengthen the potential value of ESPON for these practitioners and policy makers. The study also recommended giving the program more focus and aiming for simple solutions to topical problems. This is bound to increase the ever present “structural tension between the commissioners of research and the research community” (Hague 2006, 25; see also Bengs 2006, 7; Faludi and Waterhout 2006, 10–11; ESPON 2006a, 12).

The Rambøll study is unusual. As indicated, the study came on top of the routine midterm evaluation and its less routine update, which suggests that the Commission wanted to get the next version of ESPON right. In early 2006 two successive drafts of the new *ESPON 2013 Programme: European Observation Network on Territorial Development and Cohesion* were put out for consultation.

When it is operational, ESPON 2013 will carry out activities under the following priorities:

1. Applied research on territorial development, competitiveness, and cohesion: evidence on territorial trends, perspectives, and policy impacts
2. Targeted analysis based on user demand: European perspective on development of different types of territories
3. Scientific platforms and tools: territorial indicators and data, analytical tools, and scientific support
4. Capitalization, ownership, and participation: capacity building, dialogue, and networking

5. Technical assistance, analytical support, and communication (ESPON 2007, 30–31)

This is the outcome of a SWOT analysis of ESPON 2006 performed by the Monitoring Committee in consultation with its counterpart at the European Commission. The foregone conclusion was that an efficient and modern regional policy “has to be based on necessary evidence and knowledge to ensure a solid policy implementation” (ESPON 2007, 23). ESPON 2013 accepts the recommendations of the Rambøll study to focus on the needs of practitioners and policy makers, but the “demand from policy development voiced as noted by members of the ESPON Monitoring Committee will be the key selection criteria for the thematic orientations” (ESPON 2007, 34).

Although ESPON 2013 promises more attractive research contracts, thus remedying some of the practical problems in ESPON 2006, critics worried about the interface between research and policy making will not be satisfied to hear that, if anything, the short-term, user-, and policy-driven emphasis will increase. Presumably, this will be at the expense of opportunities for long-term, fundamental, and inevitably critical pursuits.

The issue between researchers and policy makers is a long-standing one, and in ESPON, too, researchers hoping to be able to work systematically on an objective evidence base for policy were disappointed. Rather, the Commission wanted “just-in-time” results to suit its agenda (Hague 2006, 26), and the results needed to be what one Commission representative famously described as “punchy” (Van Gestel and Faludi 2005, 85). The tension is too fundamental ever to be resolved, but in ESPON arrangements veer in the direction of favoring the commissioners of research.

This relates to more fundamental issues in evidence-based policy, discussed by Faludi and Waterhout (2006). Attempts to base policy on evidence reach from Roman censuses, through Patrick Geddes’s “survey before plan,” to recent examples of national observatories or research institutes covered in a special issue of a journal for which their paper is the introduction. Faludi and Waterhout discuss the different institutional dynamics involved. While research normally follows a set approach from formulating hypotheses to designing research, collecting empirical evidence, and drawing conclusions, a process that has a long gestation period, policy making tends to be less predictable and more dynamic. Policy is often influenced by events of the day and, in particular, media attention to those events. It is difficult to forge a direct relationship between a research program and the delivery of a specific policy, leading Davoudi (2006) to conclude that, rather than talking about policy as evidence based, the more modest but realistic aim should be for policy to be “evidence informed.” This suggests a less direct, but still positive, relation between the two.

Indeed, Faludi and Waterhout (2006, 9) conclude that there can be “no question of evidence forming a self-evident, objective basis for action. Rather, on methodological grounds, what is accepted as decisive evidence is a matter of choice, and as such is value-laden and political. The search for evidence, i.e. the

formulation of research programs and proposals, is also a political choice.” In chapter 5, too, the authors, based on their experience in ESPON, subtly but critically discuss this issue. Undeniably, though, the planners involved in the *Territorial Agenda* process have taken great strides toward underpinning their recommendations with European-wide evidence. In that sense, the *Territorial Agenda* is clearly evidence informed, and that is all its makers should have expected of it.

## Preview

The chapters that follow bear witness to the fact that the *Territorial Agenda* is evidence informed.

Unlike the present author, all the other authors whose work appears in this volume have been directly involved in the work of ESPON. The first chapter is about the program as such. Cliff Hague and Verena Hachmann discuss its organization, achievements, and future in more detail than the cursory discussion above could supply. In chapter 2 Kai Böhme and Thiemo Eser focus on a substantive issue, arguably one of the most important in the *Territorial Agenda*: territorial impact assessment in the context of various other assessment procedures, including the impact assessment to which EU legislation is being submitted. They also discuss results of various impact studies conducted in the framework of ESPON.

Janne Antikainen, in chapter 3, examines polycentricity, in regard to the Lisbon Strategy and to the pursuit of competitiveness in Europe. He uses Finland, which is regarded as a model of competitiveness and innovation, as a case study. He differentiates between polycentricity as it pertains to urban systems and as a strategic policy concept for promoting knowledge and innovation.

In chapter 4 Diogo de Abreu discusses the issue, accepted to be perennial in Europe, of planning for demographic decline, which is likely to condition spatial and social policies. Replenishing the diminishing labor force to meet the needs of an aging population presents itself as a possible solution. The chapter discusses the levels of immigration that this would require, as well as a variety of demographic indicators associated with different scenarios.

The next three chapters emphasize sustainability. Klaus Spiekermann and Michael Wegener focus on accessibility, competitiveness, and cohesion in chapter 5. The European territory is being transformed by the accelerated speed of movement. Accessibility at the global and European scales is seen as a core determinant of competitiveness, but it has implications for two other major EU goals: balanced development and sustainability. Increasing mobility is one of the reasons for failure to meet the Kyoto greenhouse gas emission targets, and for the growing vulnerability to energy price shocks. Philipp Schmidt-Thomé and Stefan Greiving discuss the implications for spatial development of natural hazards and climate change in chapter 6. They point out that risk patterns are site specific. The most appropriate strategy is to reduce vulnerability, and spatial planning can play an important role. In chapter 7 Jacques Robert and Moritz Lennert report on the “Spatial Scenarios” project, one of the integrative studies under ESPON 2006. The

scenarios explore the spatial consequences of political choices considered fundamental in today's policy context in Europe, but the main message is that issues considered fundamental now may not have the greatest impact in the future. Climate change—also discussed by Schmidt-Thomé and Greiving—accelerating globalization, the aging population, and a new energy paradigm must urgently be taken into account.

In chapter 8 Pierre Beckouche and Claude Grasland focus on another challenge arising from Europe's position in the wider world. China, India, Japan, and the United States are considered competitors of Europe. One way of facing the competition would be to strengthen Europe's links with its neighbors. The European Neighbourhood Policy should enhance the local dimension of projects, thereby promoting decentralized cooperation, weakly developed both in Russia and in the Mediterranean countries.

Kai Böhme and Bas Waterhout focus on the Europeanization of planning in chapter 9. Europeanization is the result, not only of the ESDP and its successor, the *Territorial Agenda*, but also and in particular of other policies that, almost unintentionally, influence territorial development in Europe. Thus, research into Europeanization needs to include those policies.

The final chapter is by Thiemo Eser and Peter Schmeitz. The authors, both centrally involved in the *Territorial Agenda*, present thematic, institutional, and political-strategic perspectives and develop story lines from each of them. This approach reveals strengths and weaknesses in the *Territorial Agenda* and the *Territorial State and Perspectives* document on which it is based, as well as the hidden agenda behind them.

Between them, the ten chapters provide a comprehensive view of how the search for evidence to support the ESDP agenda—now the *Territorial Agenda of the European Union*—has proceeded, what the evidence has been in some key areas, what the implications are, and what other conclusions could have been drawn. The authors also demonstrate that a learning exercise like ESPON can contribute to shaping a political agenda, which—as mentioned at the beginning of this introduction—could perhaps serve as a source of inspiration for fellow planners across the Atlantic.

## References

- Bachtler, J., M. Ferry, C. Méndez, and I. McMaster. 2007. The 2007–2013 Operational Programmes: A preliminary assessment. *IQ-NET Thematic Papers* (European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow) 19(2).
- Bengs, C., ed. 2002. *Facing ESPON* (Nordregio Report 2002:1). Stockholm: Nordregio.
- . 2006. ESPON in context. *European Journal of Spatial Development* (October). <http://www.nordregio.se/EJSD/debate061023.pdf>.
- Böhme, K., and P. Schön. 2006. From Leipzig to Leipzig: Territorial research delivers evidence for the new Territorial Agenda of the European Union. In *Evidence-based planning*, A. Faludi, ed. Special issue, *disP* 165, 42(2): 61–70.
- Bovar, O., and J. Peyrony. 2006. Le cas français de l'Observatoire des territoires: L'évidence par la prospective ou par l'observation? In *Evidence-based planning*, A. Faludi, ed. Special issue, *disP* 165, 42(2): 25–33.



- CEC (Commission of the European Communities). 1999. *European Spatial Development Perspective: Towards balanced and sustainable development of the territory of the EU*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- . 2001a. *European governance: A white paper*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- . 2001b. *A sustainable Europe for a better world: A European Union strategy for sustainable development*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- . 2005. *Working together for growth and jobs: A new start for the Lisbon Strategy*. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- Council of the European Union. 2006. *Council decision on community strategic guidelines on cohesion*. Interinstitutional file 2006/0131, 18 August. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st11/st11807.en06.pdf>.
- Davoudi, S. 2006. Evidence-based planning: Rhetoric and reality. In *Evidence-based planning*, A. Faludi, ed. Special issue, *disP* 165, 42(2): 14–24.
- Directorate-General. 2006. *The new programming period, 2007–2013: Indicative guidelines on evaluation methods—Ex ante evaluation* (Working paper no. 1). Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docoffic/2007/working/wd1\\_exante\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/2007/working/wd1_exante_en.pdf).
- . 2007. *The territorial and urban dimension in the national strategic reference frameworks and operational programmes 2007–2013: A first assessment*. Directorate-General for Regional Policy, European Commission. [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/themes/urban/leipzig\\_report.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/themes/urban/leipzig_report.pdf).
- ESPON. 2003. *The ESPON 2006 Programme: Programme on the spatial development of an enlarging European Union*. Luxembourg: ESPON Coordination Unit. [http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/199/file\\_291/espon\\_pc\\_final.pdf](http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/199/file_291/espon_pc_final.pdf).
- . 2006a. *Applied territorial research: Building a scientific platform for competitiveness and cohesion* (ESPON Scientific Report II, Autumn 2006). Luxembourg: ESPON Coordination Unit.
- . 2006b. *Territory matters for competitiveness and cohesion: Facets of regional diversity and potentials in Europe* (ESPON Synthesis Report III, Autumn 2006). Luxembourg: ESPON Coordination Unit.
- . 2007. *ESPON 2013 Programme: European observation network on territorial development and cohesion* (Operational Programme, version 3, resubmitted 16 July). Luxembourg: ESPON Coordination Unit. [http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/1145/file\\_2261/espon\\_2013\\_op-version\\_3-16-7-2007-ec.pdf](http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/1145/file_2261/espon_2013_op-version_3-16-7-2007-ec.pdf).
- European Council. 2000. *Presidency conclusions—Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March*. [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm).
- Faludi, A. 1997. A roving band of planners. In *Shaping Europe: The European Spatial Development Perspective*, A. Faludi and W. Zonneveld, eds. Special issue, *Built Environment* 23(4): 281–287.
- , ed. 2002. *European spatial planning*. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- . 2006. From European spatial development to territorial cohesion policy. *Regional Studies* 40(6): 667–678.
- , ed. 2007. *Territorial cohesion and the European model of society*, Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
- Faludi, A., and B. Waterhout. 2002. *The making of the European Spatial Development Perspective: No masterplan*. RTPI Library Series. London: Routledge.
- . 2005. The usual suspects: The Rotterdam informal ministerial meeting on territorial cohesion. *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 96(3): 338–342.

- . 2006. Introducing evidence-based planning. In *Evidence-based planning*, A. Faludi, ed. Special issue, *disP* 165, 42(2): 3–13.
- German Presidency. 2007. *Conclusions of the German EU Council presidency on the informal ministerial meeting on urban development and territorial cohesion*. [http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original\\_1005297/Conclusions-of-the-German-EU-Council-presidency-on-the-Informal-Ministerial-Meeting-accessible.pdf](http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original_1005297/Conclusions-of-the-German-EU-Council-presidency-on-the-Informal-Ministerial-Meeting-accessible.pdf).
- Gestel, T. van, and A. Faludi. 2005. Towards a European territorial cohesion assessment network: A bright future for ESPON? In *Territorial cohesion: An unidentified political objective*, A. Faludi, ed. Special issue, *Town Planning Review* 76(1): 81–92.
- Giddens, A. 2006. *Europe in the global age*. London: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A., P. Diamond, and R. Liddle, eds. 2006. *Global Europe, social Europe*. London: Polity Press.
- Hague, C. 2006. ESPON and territorial research and practice in Europe. In *European territorial research in progress: Conference proceedings of the first ESPON scientific conference*, 23–35. Luxembourg: ESPON Coordination Unit.
- Hooghe, L., and G. Marks. 2001. *Multilevel governance and European integration*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Judt, T. 2005. *Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945*. London: Random House.
- Müller, A., with F. Dosch, W. Görmar, V. Hachmann, and N. Schäfer. 2005. *Bericht 2005 Transnationale Zusammenarbeit/TransCoop 05 Report*. Bonn: Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung.
- MVA Consultancy. 2003. *Mid-term evaluation of the ESPON 2006 programme: Final report*. [http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/125/file\\_392/fr\\_mid-term\\_eval-full.pdf](http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/125/file_392/fr_mid-term_eval-full.pdf).
- . 2005. *ESPON Mid-term evaluation update: Final report*. [http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/125/file\\_354/mte\\_final-report\\_26-9-2005.pdf](http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/125/file_354/mte_final-report_26-9-2005.pdf).
- OECD. 2001. *Territorial Outlook*. Paris: OECD.
- Official Journal of the European Union. 2006. *Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999*. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:210:0025:01:EN:HTML>.
- Polverari, L., I. McMaster, F. Gross, J. Bachtler, M. Ferry, and D. Yuill. 2006. Strategic planning for Structural Funds in 2007–2013: A review of strategies and programmes. *IQ-NET Thematic Papers* (European Policies Research Centre, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow) 18(2).
- Presidency of the IGC. 2007. *Draft treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community*. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/cg00001re01en.pdf>.
- Prezioso, M. 2007. Why the ESPON programme is concerned more with “policy implications” than with “good science.” *European Journal of Spatial Development* (March). <http://www.nordregio.se/EJSD/debate070312.pdf>.
- Rambøll Management. 2006. *Study on “territorial cohesion, lessons learned from the ESPON programme projects and strategy for the future”: Final report*. [http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/1186/file\\_2380/final\\_report\\_espon\\_study.pdf](http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/programme/1186/file_2380/final_report_espon_study.pdf).
- Sapir, A., P. Aghion, G. Bertola, M. Hellwig, J. Pisany-Ferry, D. Rosita, J. Viñals, and H. Wallace, with M. Butti, M. Nava, and P. M. Smith. 2004. *An agenda for a growing Europe: The Sapir Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schout, J. A., and A. J. Jordan. 2007. From cohesion to territorial policy integration (TPI): Exploring the governance challenges in the European Union. *European Planning Studies* 15(6): 835–851.

- Shucksmith, M., K. Thomson, and K. Roberts, eds. 2005. *CAP and the regions: The territorial impact of the Common Agricultural Policy*. Wallingford, Oxfordshire, England: CABI.
- Territorial Agenda. 2007. *Territorial Agenda of the European Union: Towards a more competitive and sustainable Europe of diverse regions*. [http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original\\_1005295/Territorial-Agenda-of-the-European-Union-Agreed-on-25-May-2007-barrier-free.pdf](http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original_1005295/Territorial-Agenda-of-the-European-Union-Agreed-on-25-May-2007-barrier-free.pdf).
- Territorial State. 2007. *The Territorial State and Perspectives of the European Union: Towards a stronger European territorial cohesion in the light of the Lisbon and Gothenburg ambitions*. [http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original\\_1005296/The-Territorial-State-and-Perspectives-of-the-European-Union.pdf](http://www.bmvbs.de/Anlage/original_1005296/The-Territorial-State-and-Perspectives-of-the-European-Union.pdf).
- Williams, R. H. 1999. Constructing the European Spatial Development Perspective: Consensus without a competence. *Regional Studies* 33:793–797.