

**Should Beijing Control the Influx of Migrants?
A Labor Market Analysis Using the 2010 Census**

Chengdong Yi, Youqing Huang, and Chuan Zhang

© 2014 Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

**Lincoln Institute of Land Policy
Working Paper**

The findings and conclusions of this Working Paper reflect the views of the author(s) and have not been subject to a detailed review by the staff of the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.

Contact the Lincoln Institute with questions or requests for permission to reprint this paper. help@lincolninst.edu

Lincoln Institute Product Code: WP14CY2

Abstract

Beijing has experienced an influx of migrants in the last decade. According to the latest 2010 census, migrants without local household registration accounted for more than one third of 19.6 million population in Beijing. This triggered again the heated debate on the proper population size of Beijing and whether the influx of migrants should be controlled. A review of migration policy in Beijing shows that the Beijing Municipal Government has remained the position of “controlling” and “managing” migration although the tactics have been more diversified and subtle in recent years. Yet, the empirical analysis using the latest 2010 census data shows that migrants have contributed to the economic development, have had a more complementary than competitive relation with local residents, and have not caused the increase of unemployment rate in Beijing. In other words, the influx of migrants has had positive impact on the labor market, thus the policy of controlling the influx of migrants in Beijing is baseless at least from the perspective of the labor market. A more lenient migrant policy is recommended.

About the Author(s)

Chengdong Yi

Department of Urban and Real Estate Management

Central University of Finance and Economics

Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy

Beijing, P. R. China

chdyi@cufe.edu.cn

Youqin Huang

Department of Geography and Planning

Center for Social and Demographic Analysis

State University of New York

Albany, New York, 12222

yhuang@albany.edu

Chun Zhang

Peking University-Lincoln Institute Center for Urban Development and Land Policy

Beijing, P. R. China, 100871

zhangch@plc.pku.edu.cn

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Literature Review	3
The Evolution of Migrant and Labor Management Policy.....	5
Empirical Analysis.....	11
Demographic Characteristics	11
Employment Characteristics	13
Characteristics of Non-working Population.....	16
Conclusion and Discussion	18
References	21

Should Beijing Control the Influx of Migrants? A Labor Market Analysis Using the 2010 Census

Introduction

China has experienced an accelerated urbanization in the recent decades. The rate of urbanization increased from 35% in 2000 to 49.69% in 2010 (NSB, 2011). The rapid urbanization and economic growth have further attracted industries and population to large cities. For example, in Beijing, “resident population” (changzhu renkou) was 13.8 million in 2000 (BSB, 2001), of which 11.1 million was “registered population” (huji renkou, or local residents), and 2.7 millions were “resident migrants” (changzhu wailai renkou, or migrants). The latter accounted for 19.4% of the total resident population. In the following ten years, resident population in Beijing increased 5.8 million, reaching 19.6 million in 2010 (Table 1), which is much larger than the population target of 18 million for 2020 in Beijing’s comprehensive plan (BMG, 2005). In other words, since 2000, there has been a net increase of 580,000 population each year in Beijing, comparable to a large or medium city in the West. More than three quarters (76%) of the population increase were resident migrants (4.4 million in total), who accounted for 35.9% of total resident population in Beijing in 2010 (BSB, 2011). The influx of migrants and rapid population growth in Beijing have further stressed the already under pressured environment and resources.

Table 1: Population in Beijing over Time

	2000	2010	Change
Resident Population (million)	13.819	19.612	5.793
Registered population (million)	11.135	12.567	1.432
Resident migrants (million)	2.684	7.045	4.361
Share of migrants in resident population (%)	19.4	35.9	

Source: compiled from 2000 and 2010 census.

There has been a heated debate among the government, academia, and the general public regarding whether the population size in Beijing has become too large and population control especially controlling the influx of migrants is needed. One camp argues that the rapid population growth and the overly large population size in Beijing will cause many problems in resources, environment, employment, infrastructure and social services. For example, using availability of water resource, Yang (2007) estimated that the optimal population size for Beijing is 22 million, thus population control is needed. Scholars have been studying effective and appropriate methods to control population size. For example, Duan (2009) recommended the Beijing Municipal Government (BMG) to control population through housing (yi fang guan ren)—the government clearly sets the housing standard (per capita living space and facilities), improves migrants’ living condition and increases living cost, thus indirectly controls population size. The other camp thinks that there is no real answer to the optimal size of a city. City as a place for labor agglomeration, its size should be

determined by the market (Lu et al, 2011). In other words, individuals and companies will make the best decision regarding whether they want to go to the city (Ding et al., 2005). According to Western experience, population in Beijing should be around 25-35 million (Ding et al., 2005), which is far more than the population in 2010. Thus, there is no need to control population growth in Beijing. In contrast, population growth in Beijing can significantly promote social and economic development, thus it is undesirable to control population in Beijing (Jiang, 2011).

For decades, China had remained as a urban-rural divided dual society with the household registration (Hukou) system and related dual employment, housing and social welfare system. Migration especially rural-to-urban was strictly controlled. Since the economic reform launched in the late 1970s, the government has allowed migration and labor movement, and it has become easier for migrants to settle and register in small cities and towns (Chan, 2009). Yet, the majority of migration in China has been informal migration without the change of household registration, while formal migration from rural to urban, and from small to large cities with registration change has been strictly controlled. Despite the central government's push for further reforms in the hukou system in small and medium cities, a differentiated migrant policy remains and "reasonable control" for migrants to obtain local registration in large cities is still encouraged (State Council, 2012). Compared to local residents, migrants without local registration have inferior social and economic opportunities and status, and they are so-called "unrooted noncitizens" (Solinger, 1999) or "underclass" (Smith, 2000), who have to fight for their citizen rights in cities (Cheng, 2005). Yet, with the development of an increasingly mature market economy, government policies on labor market are also changing. For example, in 2008, the "Employment Promotion Law" stipulates that rural migrants enjoy the same labor rights as urban labors and no discriminatory constraints can be imposed on rural migrants working in cities.

As the national capital and one of the main magnets for migrants, Beijing has always exercised strict control of migration. With recent reforms and changes in migration and labor policy, should Beijing continue to control the influx of migrants? Using the latest 2010 census data, this chapter aims to answer this question from the perspective of labor market. Specifically, this chapter aims to address the following questions:

1. What are the characteristics of resident migrants? What are the implications for the labor market?
2. Is the labor market in Beijing still a dual market? What kind of relationships do resident migrants have with registered population? Do migrants compete with and replace local residents, or do they only supplement local labors?
3. What is the impact of migrants on the labor market? Has the influx of migrants caused higher unemployment rate in Beijing?

A divided labor market can cause inefficient resource allocation, hamper economic growth, and even aggravate social inequality, which can cause social and political instability. Thus this research has important policy implication. In the following section, we will first review

literature on the impact of migrants on local labor market. Then we will review migration and labor management policy over time in China and Beijing, followed by an empirical analysis of migrants in Beijing, using the 2010 census data. The chapter ends with concluding remarks and policy implications.

Literature Review

Many studies show that the labor market in urban China is a dual labor market (Knight & Song, 1999; Meng & Zhang, 2001; Appleton et.al. 2004). With a dual labor market, local residents mostly work in formal sectors that offer high pay, job security, and good work environment but require skills, while migrants are more likely to work in informal sectors that offer low pay, job insecurity, and poor environment and do not require much skill (Wang, 2005). This is so-called migrants' "complementary effect" with local residents on the labor market. In the 1990s, migrants in large cities such as Shanghai and Wuhan have mainly had complementary effect to the local population (Wang and Shen, 2001; Shen ,2002; Shen ,2003;Yang, 2004). In Beijing, there are many central government agencies and large state owned enterprises and public organizations. In these formal sectors, local residents receive preferential policy in employment, and migrants who are employed usually receive local registration and thus become local residents. Migrants without local registration are rarely employed in these government agencies and state owned sectors; instead they have to work in informal sectors. Thus, the economic structure in Beijing has resulted in a dual labor market where the complementary effect dominates.

Meanwhile, there are studies show that while the labor market in Chinese cities is still divided, it is moving toward a more competitive labor market (Dong & Bowls, 2001; Appleton & Song, 2004). With reforms in the state owned sector, non-state sector has become the predominant segment of the urban economy. According to the Beijing Economic Census in 2008, 90% of work units were non-state and non-collective owned. While the government may require state owned enterprises and public organizations to give priority to local residents in employment, it has no control over non-state sectors, where local residents and migrants compete for jobs. In addition, if non-state work units hire local residents, they have to provide them complete social security system, the so-called "five insurances and one fund" (wu xian yi jin)¹, while they can be rather flexible toward migrants to reduce labor cost. Thus non-state work units are more willing to hire migrants. Even the state sector hires some migrants to reduce cost. In 2008, 68.9% of all employed people in Beijing were in the non-state and non-collective sector. Thus migrants have "substitution effects" for the local residents on the labor market.

¹ "Five insurances" include pension insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance, occupational accident insurance and child birth insurance, and "one fund" refers to housing provident fund. With the exception of occupational accident insurance and child birth insurance which are paid solely by work units, the rest are paid by both work units and employees with pre-determined percentages of employee's wage.

Given the persistence of the hukou system on the one hand, and the increasingly mature labor market and privatization and marketization of the urban economy on the other hand, we hypothesize that in general there are both substitution and complementary effect between migrants and local residents on the labor market. With the dominance of central government agencies and large state owned enterprises and public organizations in Beijing, the “complementary effect” may be stronger than “substitution effect”, while in cities such as Shenzhen, the opposite may be true.

Research on immigrants in the West shows that unemployment rate among immigrants is usually higher than natives due to their lower human capital endowment, language problems and cultural differences (e.g. Sari et al., 2011). Yet, research on domestic migrants in China shows that unemployment rate is actually lower among migrants as they often find jobs through social network even before migration, and there are relatively small language and cultural differences between them and local residents (Li, 1996; Zhao, 1998). Furthermore, resident migrants are a self-selective group. On the one hand, compared to local residents, migrants are willing to take any job to survive in the city. On the other hand, migrants who do not have jobs may have left the city for their hometowns due to the lack of social security coverage for them in the city. Thus, we also hypothesize that unemployment rate is lower among migrants than local residents in Beijing.

From the economic perspective, a city reaches the optimal population size when the marginal cost equals the marginal revenue (Alonso, 1971). The marginal cost refers to the negative consequences brought by one additional resident in the city, such as traffic jams, resource shortages, deteriorated environment, over-stressed public services, and residential crowding, and the marginal revenue refers to the agglomeration effect and the economy of scale brought by each additional resident in the city. Yet, in reality, it is very difficult to calculate the optimal population size (Ding et al., 2005). Thus, when population grows and the labor force expands, yet unemployment remains reasonable and does not increase rapidly, it is usually considered that the city has not reached its optimal population size and thus population control is not needed. We hypothesize that unemployment rate in Beijing has not increased significantly despite the influx of migrants, thus population control is not needed.

The Evolution of Migrant and Labor Management Policy

Since 1958 when “Regulation on Household Registration in China” was issued, the socialist China has created a unique system of household registration (Hukou), which has worked together with the food rationing system, the employment system, and the social welfare system for various purposes such as public security, social control and management, and collecting vital statistics (Cheng and Selden, 1994). It demonstrated the Chinese government’s emphasis on strict migration control. Since the economic reform was launched in the late 1970s, China has been experiencing a profound institutional transition toward a market economy. As a result, the Hukou system and labor management system have since changed significantly, including gradually allowing labor migration, relaxing policies on

changing from agricultural to non-agricultural hukou (nong zhuan fei) and getting rid of its quota, and allowing qualified peasants to register in small cities and towns (Chan, 2006). Yet, despite these reforms, the hukou system remains in effect, and it is increasingly becoming the obstacle for China to develop further (Chan, 2009). In most large and medium cities, migrants have to meet a set of very strict criteria in order to gain local registration. Not surprisingly, there is still a large volume of the so-called resident migrants, who have been living/working in cities for years yet still considered outsiders with no access to most welfare benefits.

China has come a long way developing its policy framework for migrants. In general, there are four periods in China's migration policy, which is characterized from strict migration control to limited opening up and relaxation, to improving management, and now to focusing on serving migrants and promoting equal treatment for migrants (Table 2). Before 1984, China had mostly adopted strict migration control policies that were consistent with the original hukou system. With invisible walls between cities and the countryside (Chan, 1994), rural-to-urban migration was fully controlled by the government and spontaneous migration was rare. Virtually all migration was accompanied with the change of household registration, which was required to access daily essentials in cities. The year of 1984 was a turning point when China started to reform the hukou system and started the period of limited opening up and relaxation. That year State Council issued a "Notice about Rural Migrants Registering in Towns", which stated that the bureau of public security should issue local non-agricultural registration to peasants (and their families) who have stable residence and have long term employment in industries, commerce and services in towns. Yet, town governments were not responsible for their food, housing and employment. In 1985 the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) required migrants who live in cities for more than three months to apply for "Temporary Residence Certificate" (zan zhu zheng), which essentially acknowledged and allowed migration. The issue of Identification Card (shen fen zheng) to all adults in the same year further facilitated migration as there is no hukou information on the Identification Card which is required for employment and many other purposes such as hotel check-in, and flight/train ticket purchase. In 1992, MPS allowed certain cities to issue so-called "blue stamped hukou" (lan yin hukou, also called green card) to qualified migrants who enjoy similar rights as local residents. Yet, this trend of opening up and relaxing migration policy is not without retrenchments. For example, in 1990, the State Council was concerned about the employment pressure in cities as a result of the increasing rural-to-urban migration. It issued a document to promote the model of "leaving agriculture without leaving the countryside" (li tu bu li xiang), required local governments to establish a system of temporary work permit and employment registration, thus to effectively control and strictly manage rural-to-urban migrants.

Table 2: Major Migration Policies by the Central Government

Table 2 Major Migration Policies by the Central Government			
Theme	Year	Policy Document Title	Main policies
Controlling migration	pre-1984		
Limited Opening up and relaxation	1984	SC: Notice about Rural Migrants Registering in Towns	Peasants with stable job and residence in towns can register in towns
	1985	MPS: Temporary Regulation about Temporary Residence Population in Cities and Towns	Migrants living in cities for more than three months need to apply for temporary residence card
	1985	Regulations on Chinese Residents' Identification Card	Started to issue Identification Card to all adult citizens
	1990	SC: Notice about Taking Care of Labor Employment	Promoting "leaving agriculture without leaving the countryside; reasonably control rural-to-urban migration and reduce employment pressure in cities and towns
	1992	MPS: Notice about Implementing Localized Urban Registration System	Allow Blue Stamp Hukou to be issued to qualified rural migrants
Improving management and policy for migrants	1993	CCP Central Committee: Decision about Several Issues related to Establishing a Socialist Market Economy	Promoting and guiding rural surplus labor to be transferred to non-agriculture sector and orderly migration between regions
	1995	Suggestion about Strengthening the Management of Migrant Population	Issued the principle of "guidance, macro-control, strengthening management, promoting benefits and getting rid of
	1997	SC: An Experimental Scheme for Reforming the Hukou System in Small Cities and Towns	In small cities and towns, qualified rural migrants (with stable jobs and housing) can gain urban registration
	2000	SC: Suggestions about Promoting the Healthy Development of Small Cities and Towns	In county government seats, rural migrants with stable job and housing can gain urban registration
Promoting serving migrants, Improving management, and providing equal treatment	2001	The Tenth Five- Year Plan	Reforming the hukou system, establishing a system for orderly rural-to-urban migration
	2003	SC: Method for Helping and Managing Homeless People in Cities	The management changed from "forcible detention and deportation" to "willingly accepting help".
	2006	Several Suggestions from State Council about Solving the Problem of Rural Migrants	Promoting equal treatment to migrants, strengthening management, improving service
	2007	Suggestion about Further Strengthening Service and Management for Migrants	Issued the principle of "equal treatment, improving service, reasonable guidance, improving management"
	2011	The Twelfth Five- Year Plan	Promoting service and management for migrants
	2012	Notice about Actively Promoting the Reform of the Hukou System	Differentiated policies for different cities

Realizing the indispensable importance of migrants to the urban and national economy, the Chinese government has changed its position on migrants and has been improving migrant management and policy system since 1993. Terms such as “encouraging and guiding migration”, “strengthening migration management”, “promoting reasonable and orderly

migration” characterized many of government policies on migration/migrants in mid-1990s. Since 1997, profound reforms in the hukou system have been carried out in small cities and towns, which has made it much easier for qualified rural migrants to gain non-agricultural registration in small cities and towns. Since 2001, migration policies have focused on “promoting orderly migration”, “improving management and services for migrants” and more recently “equal treatment for migrants”. In particular, in “Suggestion for Further Strengthening Service and Management for Migrants” in 2007, State Council established the principle of “equal treatment, improving service, reasonable guidance, improving management”. For the first time, the term of “service” (fu wu) is placed before “management” (guan li), which demonstrates the government’s shift in its attitude and policy towards migrants from controlling migration to respecting migrants’ rights, and from refusing migrants’ entitlement in cities to serving them with equal treatment. The latest development in hukou reform is “differentiated policies” (fen lei zheng ce) between cities (State Council, 2012), which allows different types/sizes of cities to adopt different policies for changing agricultural to non-agricultural hukou. While it is easier to register in county-level cities, registration in municipalities needs to be “reasonably controlled”. With this increasingly localized policy framework, it is foreseeable that only a small fraction of elite migrants may gain local registration in large cities such as Beijing.

As the national capital, Beijing obviously possesses many unique opportunities and resources, which attracts people all over China. To control the size of in-migrants, Beijing has always adopted a strict hukou system. Every year, there is a strictly controlled quota for migrants and college graduates to gain Beijing hukou. Each year Beijing gives out about 140,000 of Beijing hukou, of which 80,000 are assigned by the central government, and only 60,000 are controlled by Beijing Municipal Government (BMG) (xinhuanet.com, 2011). According to the Vice Director of Beijing Bureau of Human Resources and Social Welfare, Zhang Zude, the quota will decrease over time (Huang, 2011). Given the large number of migrants in Beijing and the small number of hukou quota, it is very difficult to obtain Beijing hukou and obviously only a tiny fraction of migrants can do so. The BMG has adopted various approaches to control migrants, such as “registration management” (hu ji guan li), “employment management” (jiu ye guan li) and “housing management” (ju zhu guan li), which have not been very effective in controlling the size of migrants in Beijing (Song et al., 2008).

Registration management or “managing migrants through certificate (yi zheng guan ren) aims to control the size of in-migrants through various certificates and registration. Since 1985 when the BMG issued “Regulation about Hukou Management for Migrants” (No. 166), temporary residence registration (zan zhu deng ji) and “temporary residence certificate” (zan zhu zheng) have remained as the main method of registration management, although the focus has shifted from preventing criminals from entering Beijing to controlling the size of in-migrants in 1995 (BMG, 1995). To promote the development of private and individual economy, BMG has allowed a certain number of qualified migrants to apply for Beijing hukou since 2001 (BMG, 2001, No. 73); yet this policy was suspended soon after. For talents and skilled workers in need, Beijing started to issue “work and residence certificate”

(gongzuo juzhu zheng), which allows migrants to enjoy same rights as local residents regarding children's education, housing purchase, social security, and occupational promotion. Yet, there has been no formal policy for these certificate holders to convert their "work and residence certificate" to Beijing hukou (Beijing Times, 2009). Even in 2012, Beijing local hukou remains an undisclosed entry criterion for employment in most state owned enterprises and public organizations.

Employment management or "managing migrants through employment" (yi ye guan ren) was the main method of migrant management in Beijing. In 1989 BMG issued "Method for Employment Management for Migrants", which clearly stated that migrants could only be hired in industries and occupations that local urban and rural labors could not fulfill thus to strictly control the volume of migrants. In the following years, the governing principle for migrant management in Beijing has been "controlling the size, managing strictly, strengthening services, providing legal protection" (guimo kongzhi, yange guanli, jiaqiang fuwu, yifa bao hu) (BMG, 1995). As a result, an array of certificates is used to collect migrant information and control the growth of migrants. For example, all migrant labor need to apply "temporary residence certificate" and "migrant employment certificate" (wailai renyuan jiuye zheng); migrant women who are in reproductive age need to apply for "marriage and childbirth certificate" (hun yu zheng); and work units and individuals who lease housing to migrants needs to apply for rental permits. There is strong employment discrimination against migrants in Beijing through a system of controlling overall volume of migrants, screening migrants before hiring, limiting allowed industries and occupations for migrants, replacing migrants with local unemployed labor, and collecting fees and setting up various entry criteria (Song 2006). With migrant policy changes at the central level, these discriminatory policies and management methods in Beijing are no longer appropriate, and many of them have been recently cancelled or suspended. Yet, "controlling migrants through employment" remains a priority, but with more subtle tactics. Vice Mayor Cheng Hong argued in 2011 that employment is the "root" for controlling migrants, and she suggested raising screening standards for 17 industries such as small convenience stores and small restaurants, and stop issuing "Business Permit" to people doing business in illegal construction and areas deemed to be demolished (Huang et al., 2011). It is clear these industries and locales are most favored by migrants, thus these tactics will have the effect of driving out migrants.

Housing management or "managing migrants with housing" (yi fang guan ren) emerged recently as the main method of migrant management in Beijing. Since 1985 when BMG formalized migrant management (No. 166), individuals and work units who provide housing to migrants have to a certain degree been responsible for reporting migrants to the public security bureau. In 1995, BMG clearly specified the need to control the stock of rental housing, and that migrants living in rental housing should not exceed a certain proportion of registered population in "Regulations on Migrants' Rental Housing Management in Beijing". In 2007, Beijing specifically established a Migrant and Rental Housing Management Committee, further combining migrant management with rental housing management and strengthening the importance of "housing management". With

skyrocketing housing prices, many migrants have been living either in dilapidated urban villages at the urban fringe or basement of the so-called People's Air Defense Project (ren fang gong cheng) in cities, both of which offer relatively affordable rents². While the demolition of urban villages has destroyed many affordable housing for migrants, since 2011, BMG has been clearing up underground/basement rental and forcing tenants out in the name of safety. In the government work report in 2011, BMG aimed to strengthen and formalize the management of rental behavior (Xinhua net, 2011). The Beijing Committees of Housing and Urban Rural Development (BCHURD) forbade the rental of illegal construction and any other housing that is not allowed for leasing. In 2012, BCHURD clearly specified that there should be no more than 2 persons in one room and per capita living space should not be less than 5 m² in rental housing. While these actions and regulations seem to grow out of concerns for migrants' housing condition, they in reality aim to destroy affordable housing for migrants, while government subsidized housing still excludes migrants (Huang, 2012). Thus by increasing housing cost for migrants, BMG aims to control the volume of migrants in Beijing.

Despite the policy and mentality change from controlling to managing and now to serving migrants at the central level, BMG still focuses on controlling and managing migrants. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, BMG (2010) considered the task of "strictly controlling the chaotic and overly rapid population growth" as the "priority among priorities" (zhong zhong zhi zhong) in the next five years. It clearly stated the need to control population size, optimize population structure, strictly implement entry policy, and control the quota for Beijing hukou (BMG, 2010). Meanwhile it claims that priority should be given to professionals and skilled migrants who are needed for Beijing's development. A system of "residence certificate" (ju zhu zheng) is recommended to monitor and control migrants in real time and dynamically (Huang et al, 2011), which can be strengthened through the organic combination of registration management, employment management, and housing management. Correspondingly, BMG has adopted many tactics to drive out or reduce migrants, such as clearing up basement rental, controlling group rental (qun zu), both of which are very popular among migrants, establishing migrant management office in residential complexes, and re-organizing employment positions.

Beijing is promoting the so-called "Shunyi Model", which is considered a successful policy experiment using registration management, housing management and employment management in combination. Shunyi is one of the districts in Beijing, where the district government has been re-organizing its low-end industries. For example, it invested 50 million yuan to establish eight centralized recycling stations, which has resulted in a significant decline of migrant workers engaged in recycling industry from more than 3000 to 832 people (Cheng, 2011)³. It also gives enterprises specific local employment quota if they occupy the land in the district (zhan di dai jiu ye), and rewards those who hire local labors.

² In Chinese cities, People's Air Defense Project requires basements built under most residential buildings to protect people and materials in case of a sudden enemy attack.

³ Recycling industry is one of those "dirty, dangerous, demanding" sectors that is dominated by migrants. In particular, migrants from certain provinces such as Henan province dominate this industry and they often congregate in so-called "Henan village" in suburban Beijing (Ma and Xiang, 1998).

Now in Shunyi district, more than half of employment in secondary and tertiary industries is occupied by local labors (Cheng, 2011).

Despite long-standing and persistent strict control of migration, Beijing is experiencing a policy evolution similar to the policy change at the central level in recent years. Song and Hou (2007) argued that the “idea” (li nian) of migrant management in Beijing is changing from focusing on management to considering both management and service, respecting migrants’ will of staying in Beijing, and incorporating them into the public service and social management system; the management system is becoming increasingly simplified, and the management style is increasingly formalized. In 2011, at a meeting of model migrants in Beijing, the Party Secretary (Liu Qi) emphasized the need to treat migrant workers in Beijing as “new citizens” (xin shi min) of Beijing, and provide them decent work and living environment, while the Mayor (Guo Jinglong) decided to explore and establish the system of allocating Beijing hukou to qualified migrant workers (Sun, 2012). In the population work plan in 2012, “population control” (renkou tiaokong), which appeared in work plans in previous years, was replaced by “population service and management” (renkou fuwu guanli), and BMG aimed to fully serve and manage *de facto* population in Beijing. Treating migrants as “new citizens”, BMG is going to issue “residence certificate” to all migrants, who can enjoy related public services and social security (Wei, 2012). These latest developments demonstrate the shift from controlling and managing migrants to serving migrants in Beijing, which is certainly very encouraging, although the actual implementation and results are yet to be seen.

In summary, the hukou system in Beijing has experienced significant changes. The principal management framework for resident migrants has changed from “temporary residence certificate” to “residence certificate”, which allows migrants to enjoy more public services. The employment system is increasingly open to migrants; yet the conventionally known criteria of hukou, industry, occupation and education are disappearing, while undisclosed criteria operate together with the policy of employment management and housing management. But it is still extremely difficult to obtain Beijing hukou, Beijing hukou quota is still strictly controlled, and the system of allocating public resources through hukou is still in place. For example, subsidized housing in Beijing still targets only residents with local Beijing hukou⁴. While the government demands equal treatment for migrant children in public schools, it is still extremely difficult for migrant children to enroll in public schools in Beijing due to unreasonably high fees and the college entrance exam system⁵. In terms of social security, the enrollment rate among migrants for pension insurance, medical insurance, unemployment insurance is extremely low, while for local residents the coverage is 100 percent (Yin et al., 2010). BMG has promised to cover all migrants with social

⁴ Public rental housing, which is supposed to be accessible to qualified migrants, is still at the stage of experiment.

⁵ Under the current education system, compulsory education is the responsibility of the government where one’s hukou is registered, thus it is very difficult for migrants’ children to go to public schools in Beijing, and usually a large lump-sum fee (jie du fei) is needed in order to enroll in public schools in Beijing. Although in 2004, “jie du fei” was cancelled in Beijing (Li, 2004), various other fees such as endorsement fees and entry criteria are enacted, which is often beyond migrants’ affordability. In addition, even if migrant children can enroll in public schools in Beijing, they still cannot attend high-school and college entrance exam in Beijing, which may discourage them from attending public schools in Beijing.

security and provide them more public services; yet the system is still in the process of being formulated (Wei, 2012). Thus while “serving migrants” has become a catch word in politics, Beijing remains divided, and the threshold for migrants to become legal citizens remain high.

Empirical Analysis

To empirically answer the question whether there is a need for Beijing to control the influx of migrants, we will use the latest 2010 census data to analyze the impact of migrants on the labor market. We focus on “resident population” (chang zhu ren kou), which includes those 1) who live in current street/town/village and are registered at where they live, or with hukou undecided, 2) who live in current street/town/village, but have left their hukou registration location for more than 6 months, and 3) who are registered at current street/town/village, but have left for less than 6 months or are living abroad. “Resident population” includes “registered population” (or local population, local residents) who has Beijing hukou and “resident migrants” (or migrants) who have non-Beijing hukou but have left their hukou registration place for more than half a year. Comparisons between registered population and resident migrants will be conducted.

Demographic Characteristics

Compared to local residents, resident migrants are much younger and more likely to be active labor force (Table 3). Almost 90% of migrants, compared to only 73% of local population, are working age population. Less than 7% of resident migrants (compared to 9.5% of local residents) are 14 years old and younger, and 3.3% of migrants are 60+ years old (compared to 17.6% of local residents). The dependency ratio among migrants is 0.11, less than one third of that among resident population (0.37)⁶. As a result, the overall dependency ratio is 0.27. In other words, the influx of migrants has significantly decreased the dependency ratio in Beijing, which is beneficial to economic development. In particular, more migrants are in younger working age groups than local residents. About 44% of migrants are 15-29 years old (compared to 23.5% of local residents), and another 40% of migrants are 30-49 years old (compared to 32.1% of local residents). This shows that migrants not only expand the labor force pool, but also are younger labors who slow down the aging process in Beijing. There are also more males, and singles (34% vs. 22%) among migrants than local residents and migrants are much more likely than local population to live in collective households (33.5% vs. 6.9%). Yet, migrants have lower education attainment than local residents. More than 56% of migrants have junior high or lower education (compared to 38% of local population), and only 23% have vocational or college+ education (compared to 37% of local population). More than two thirds of migrants have agricultural hukou, in contrast to only 21% of local population, which shows

⁶ In most state and formal sectors, 60 is the official retirement age. In some cases, 55 is the official retirement age for women. Thus dependency ratio is calculated with people who are not working (≤ 14 , or 60+) divided by working age population (15–59).

most migrants in Beijing come from rural areas elsewhere. These migrant characteristics are consistent with the general profile of migrants in China.

Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of Resident Population in Beijing

Table 3 Demographic Characteristics of Resident Population in Beijing			
%	Resident Population	Resident Migrants	Registered Population
Age group	100	100	100
0-14	8.7	6.9	9.5
15-29	31	44.4	23.5
30-49	34.8	39.7	32.1
50-59	13	5.6	17.2
60+	12.5	3.3	17.6
Gender	100	100	100
Male	51.6	54.3	50.1
Female	48.4	45.7	49.9
Marital Status	100	100	100
Single	26.2	34.4	22.1
Married	68.1	63.8	70.3
Divorced/widowed	5.7	1.8	7.6
Household Type	100	100	100
Family household	83.6	66.5	93.1
Collective household	16.4	33.5	6.9
Education	100	100	100
Elementary school and lower	12.3	10.2	13.5
Juniro High	32.7	45.9	25.2
Senior High	22.1	19.5	23.6
Vocational school	12.6	11	13.6
College and higher	20.2	13.3	24.1
Hukou Type	100	100	100
Agricultural	38	67.7	21.3
Non-agricultural	61.4	32.3	77.7
Duration for person-hukou separation		100	100
0.5-1 year		14.2	7.6
1-3 years		36.4	26.5
3-5 years		19.7	22.6
5+ years		29.8	43.4
Reasons for person-hukou separation			
Engage in industry & business		73.9	12.0
Demolishment and residential		0.7	30.2
Joining family members		8.0	13.9
Study and training		4.7	8.2
Marriage		2.9	7.7
Living with relatives/friends		4.6	7.3
Job change		3.6	6.5
Temporary hukou registration		0.2	3.5

Source: compiled using Beijing 2010 census summary tables.

It is clear that resident migrants are increasingly becoming long-term residents in Beijing. The person-hukou separation (ren hu fen li) duration among migrants is rather long. For

example, about 30% of migrants have left their hukou registration place for 5 or more years, 20% for 3-5 years, and another 35% for 1-3 years. The phenomenon of person-hukou separation is also quite common among local residents who live in a different local from their registration within Beijing. Interestingly, the duration of person-hukou separation is longer among locals, with 43% of them having left their hukou registration place for 5+ years. Yet their reasons for person-hukou separation are rather different. For migrants, the predominant reason is economic, namely to engage in industry and business (wu gong jing shang) (73.9%), distantly followed by joining family members (8.0%). Reasons for local residents are more diverse, with demolishment and residential move as the most important reason (30.2%), followed by joining family members (13.9%) and engaging in enterprises and business (12%).

Employment Characteristics

Since employment information is collected only for those who are 15+ years old, the following analyses focus on this cohort only. Table 4 shows the employment structure and wage by industry. Compared to local residents, migrants are much more likely to engage in wholesale and retail (29.3% vs. 11.8%), manufacture (17.7% vs. 13.8%), hotel and restaurant (9.4% vs. 3.0%) and construction (9.2% vs. 4.7%). Local residents are relatively more evenly spread out among industries, with manufacture (13.8%), wholesale and retail (11.8%), public management and social organization (10.1%), agriculture (8.8%) and transport, warehouse and postal service (8.4%) as the top five industries. While there are some overlaps regarding most important industries to migrants and local residents (e.g. manufacture, wholesale and retail), it's clear that they tend to concentrate in different industries.

Table 4: Employment Structure and Wage between Migrants and Local Population

Table 4 Employment Structure and Wage between Migrants and Local Population						
	Resident Population (%)	Resident migrants (%)	Registered Population (%)	% of migrants among	Average wage (yuan)	Wage deviation (yuan)
Industry	100	100	100	45.9	65,683	-
Resident service and other services	3.0	5.0	1.4	74.9	27,806	-37,877
Hotel and restaurant	5.9	9.4	3.0	72.6	32,813	-32,870
Wholesale and retail	19.9	29.5	11.8	68.0	61,680	-4,003
Construction	6.7	9.2	4.7	62.5	47,292	-18,391
Manufacture	15.6	17.7	13.8	52.1	47,175	-18,508
Telecommunication, computer service and software industry	4.1	4.2	3.9	47.8	103,898	38,215
Rental and commerce service	5.0	5.0	5.0	45.6	60,327	-5,356
Real Estate	3.6	3.4	3.7	44.2	50,670	-15,013
Culture, sports, and recreation	2.8	2.5	3.1	40.3	79,718	14,035
Mining	0.3	0.3	0.4	34.3	68,538	2,855
Transport, warehousing, and postal service	6.3	3.8	8.4	27.6	51,443	-14,240
Health, social security and social welfare	2.6	1.4	3.6	24.2	72,652	6,969
Scientific and technological research, geological surveying	3.1	1.6	4.4	23.9	92,098	26,415
Education	4.7	2.4	6.6	23.9	68,543	2,860
Finance, banking and insurance	2.8	1.4	3.9	23.2	200,349	134,666
Irrigation, environment, and public infrastructure management	1.3	0.6	1.8	22.7	42,328	-23,355
International Organization	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.3	-	-
Electricity, gas and water production and supply	1.0	0.3	1.5	16.5	86,108	20,425
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishing	5.5	1.5	8.8	12.3	30,158	-35,525
Public management and social organizations	5.8	0.8	10.1	6.1	60,303	-5,380
Occupation	100	100	100	45.9		
Commerce and Service workers	33.8	48.1	21.7	65.2		
Production, transportation/shipping workers	21.5	24.8	18.8	52.8		
Cadres in government, party, enterprises and public organizations	3	2.3	3.5	35.6		
Clerks and staff	15.5	10.2	19.9	30.3		
Professionals	20.4	13.1	26.6	29.4		
Agricultural workers	5.8	1.5	9.4	12.0		
Source: Compiled using Beijing 2010 census summary tables of employment and Beijing 2011 statistics yearbook summary tables of wages.						
Note: Wage deviation equals difference between the average wage of each industry and average wage of all industries weighted by employment in each industry.						

Table 4 is ranked based on the proportion of migrants among employees in each industry. Overall, more than 45% of workforce was migrants, which demonstrates the indispensable importance of migrants to Beijing's economy. However, the proportion varies significantly between industries. In resident services/other services and hotel and restaurant, migrants account for 74.9% and 72.6%, respectively, of all workforces in these two industries, the highest of all industries. Migrants account for 68% of employees in wholesale and retail, 62.5% in construction, 52.1% in manufacture and less than 50% in all other industries. In comparison, migrants account for less than 20% of workforce in electricity/gas/water production and supply, agriculture/forestry/animal husbandry/fishing, and public management and social organization. In other words, local residents dominate in these industries.

Table 4 also shows wage varies significantly between industries. Finance/banking/insurance has the highest wage (200,349 yuan/year), while resident services (27,806 yuan/year), hotel/restaurant (32,813 yuan/year), and agriculture (30,158 yuan/year) have the lowest wage. Not surprisingly, migrants account for only 23% of work force in finance/banking/insurance, while they dominate two of the three industries with the lowest wage—resident service and hotel/restaurant. In other words, migrants tend to concentrate in low-wage industries.

A different way to look at this is wage deviation for each industry. Following Wang (2004), wage deviation equals difference between the average wage of each industry and average wage of all industries weighted by employment in each industry. In 2010, the weighted average wage for all industries was 65,683 yuan. According to Table 4, resident service/other services, agriculture/forestry/animal husbandry/fishing, hotel and restaurant, irrigation environment and public infrastructure management, manufacture, and construction have the lowest and negative wage deviation. In other words, industrial average wage in these six industries is lower than the overall average wage. About 43% of migrant workers work in the six lowest paid industries (compared to 33% of local residents). Industries with the highest wage deviation include finance/banking/insurance, telecommunication/computer service/software industry, scientific and technological research/geological surveying, electricity/gas/water production and supply, culture/sports/recreation. About 10% of migrant workers work in the five highest paid industries (compared to 17% of local residents). In other word, migrants are concentrated in low-wage industries than local residents, while the latter are more concentrated in high-wage industries.

Occupation wise, migrants are more likely to be commerce/service workers (48.1% vs. 21.7%), production/transportation/shipping workers (24.8% vs. 18.8%) than local residents, while they are much less likely to be professionals (13.1% vs. 26.6%), clerks and staff (10.2% vs. 19.9%), cadres (2.3% vs. 3.5%) and agricultural workers (1.5% vs. 9.4%). Not surprisingly, migrants account for almost two thirds of commerce/service workers, and more than half of production/transportation/shipping workers, while only about 30% of professionals and clerks/staff. This also confirms that hukou status influence significantly migrants' probabilities of being employed in certain occupations (Chen, 2011).

Adopting the method by Ellis and Wright (1999), Dissimilarity Index between migrants and local residents in industry and occupation is calculated⁷, which is 36.5 and 32.3, respectively. This shows there is a certain degree of industrial and occupational segregation between local population and migrants in Beijing, and industrial segregation is slightly higher than occupational segregation. While the degree of industrial and occupational segregation is not very high, it is clear that the labor market in Beijing is divided and somewhat segregated, which is probably not beneficial to efficient resource allocation and occupational mobility.

Characteristics of Non-working Population

Among working-age population (15+ years), many are not working, and reasons are different between migrants and local residents. The main reason for migrants not working is doing housework at their own homes (36.8% vs. 13.5% for locals). While retirement/on leave is the dominant reason for local residents (48.6% vs. 22.5% for migrants). Interestingly, study as the reason for not working is similar between migrants and local residents (about 21%). Migrants are also more likely to lose jobs due to personal reasons (7.1% vs. 3.7% for local residents), while local residents are more likely to lose job due to the loss of work capability (5.9% vs. 1.5% for migrants).

⁷ $DI = \sum |X_i - Y_i| / 2$, of which X_i and Y_i are the proportion of local population and migrants in industry (or occupation) i , respectively. DI ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 indicating no difference and 100 indicating the opposite distribution between the two sub-populations.

Table 5: Reasons for Working Age People Who are not Working

Reasons (%)	Resident population	Resident migrants	Registered population
Study in schools	20.8	21.4	20.7
House work	17.1	36.8	13.5
Retired or on leave	44.6	22.5	48.6
Lost work capability	5.2	1.5	5.9
No job after graduation	1.5	2.1	1.3
Lost work due to problems in work units	1.8	0.7	2.0
Lost work due to personal reasons	4.3	7.1	3.7
Responsibility land is expropriated	0.2	0.1	0.3
Others	4.5	7.9	3.9
Total	100	100	100
Estimated unemployment rate	4.9	2.2	7.1

Source: compiled using Beijing 2010 census summary tables.

Non-working population includes those who have exited the labor market and those who want to work but cannot find jobs—unemployed. Unemployment rate is calculated as the percentage of unemployed people out of the sum of working and unemployed people. Unemployed people are resident population who are 15+ years old and meet the following three criteria: 1) there is no job information for occupation; 2) reason for not working is listed as any one of the following: no job after graduation, lost job due to problems of work units, lost job due to personal reasons, and responsibility land was expropriated. Using the 2010 census data, the estimated overall unemployment rate in Beijing was 4.9% in 2010, which is lower than the unemployment rate of 5.5% in 2000⁸. In addition, unemployment rate among migrants (2.2%) was only one third of that among local residents (7.1%). This is consistent with previous research. For example, Wang (2004) analyzed 2000 census data and Du (2011) analyzed 2005 population survey data in Beijing, and both find that unemployment rate is lower among migrants than local residents. Local residents enjoy better social security and housing subsidies, which may encourages them to choose not to work, thus leads to high unemployment rate. In contrast, only a small proportion of migrants are covered by unemployment insurance, and many unemployed migrants may have returned to their

⁸ Unemployment rate in 2000 was estimated based on the 2000 census micro level data. The definition of unemployment rate in 2000 is somewhat different from the conventional definition in the West (Zhang, 2003). Unemployed people are resident population who are 15+ years old and meet the following three criteria: 1) there is no job information for occupation; 2) reason for not working is listed as any one of the following: no job after graduation and seeking job, lost job and seeking job.

hometowns. This shows that despite its large volume, migrants have not been a financial burden for the Beijing government.

The above definition of unemployment rate is somewhat different from the conventional definition in the West. Following the Western definition, we define unemployed people as those resident population who are 15+ years old and meet the following three criteria: 1) did not work for money for more than one hour last week; 2) have looked for jobs in the previous three months; 3) if there is an appropriate job, can start to work within two weeks. Using this definition, we calculate the urban/town unemployment rate was 3.9% and the total unemployment rate was 4.2% in Beijing⁹, which is much lower than that in large metropolitan areas of many market economies¹⁰.

During the first decade of the 21st century, population in Beijing increased 5.79 million (of which 4.36 million were migrants). Yet, the unemployment rate in 2010 remained relatively low, and was in fact lower than that in 2000. This shows that population growth did not seem to bring much pressure on employment and the influx of migrants in Beijing has not had negative impact on unemployment. In contrast, the economy in Beijing has experienced rapid growth, with per capita GDP increased from 24,127 yuan to 75,943 yuan during the same period (BBS, 2011)¹¹. Thus population growth in Beijing has had positive impact on the economy.

Conclusion and Discussion

Strictly controlling population growth in large cities has been a long-held urban policy in China. With the influx of migrants in large cities in recent decades, controlling the influx of migrants and thus controlling population growth have remained a top-most concern for many cities. The concern is even more acute in Beijing, because on the one hand Beijing is especially attractive to migrants due to its capital status and thus unique opportunities and privileges, and on the other hand, the physical environment of Beijing (e.g. the lack of water) makes urban sustainability a much more urgent issue than elsewhere. Not surprisingly, despite the profound policy changes in smaller cities and at the central level, Beijing has more or less maintained its policy of “controlling” and “managing” migration, although with more diversified approaches such as registration management, employment management and more recently housing management. It is still extremely difficult for migrants to obtain Beijing hukou despite their long-term stay and undeniable socio-economic contribution in Beijing. Yet, as we have presented in this chapter that this policy position is not supported by the fact at least from the labor market perspective.

⁹ Urban unemployment rate = urban/town unemployed population / (urban/town unemployed population + urban/town non-agricultural employed population) * 100; total unemployment rate = total unemployed population / (total unemployed population + total employed population) * 100

¹⁰ For example, During Oct. 2009–Sep. 2010, the unemployment rate was 8.9% in London, UK (Office for National Statistics, 2011). Unemployment Rates for 49 Large Metropolitan Areas in USA ranged from 6.5% to 14.3% (BLS, 2012).

¹¹ After controlling inflation, the latter is about 2.14 times of the former.

Using the latest 2010 census data, we analyzed labor market characteristics of migrants in comparison to local residents. Migrants in Beijing are generally younger, more likely to be male and single, and with relatively lower education attainment. It is clear that migrants have enlarged the labor force pool, added “the demographic dividend”, decreased the dependency ratio, and slowed down the aging process in Beijing. More than half of migrants have been living in Beijing for more than three years, and they moved to Beijing mainly for economic reasons. Migrants have been long-term economic contributors in Beijing, yet they have not enjoyed the same rights as local residents.

Examining both industry and occupation, it is clear that the relationship between migrants and local residents is mainly complementary, and competition between the two is more secondary. While there are some overlaps between migrants and local residents regarding the most important industries (e.g. wholesale and retail, manufacture), migrants concentrate in low-wage industries that few local residents work in such as construction, rental and commercial service, resident service and other services. Similarly, migrants are more likely to be commerce and service workers, and production, transportation/shipping workers, while local residents are more likely to be cadres, professionals, and clerks and staff¹². In addition, migrants have much lower unemployment rate than local residents, which shows that they have not really become the financial burden for Beijing. With the rapid growth in population and per capita GDP, the overall unemployment rate in Beijing remains relatively low, and was actually lower than that in 2000. Thus from the perspective of labor market impact, the influx of migrants in Beijing has promoted economic growth, which does not really support ongoing policies on strict migration control. BMG has recently labeled resident migrants “new citizens”, and is planning to set up the system of residence certificate to convert qualified migrants into local residents, and to allow them enjoy same rights as local residents. This is an encouraging step toward eventual recognition of migrants as equal citizens as local residents.

It is still debatable what is the optimal population size in Beijing. On the one hand, population growth in Beijing has brought younger labor force and stimulated economic growth; on the other hand, population growth has also resulted in a set of problems such as traffic congestion and higher pressure on the environment, which may well be the consequences of economic agglomeration and are common in other global cities. It has been argued that more research is needed to evaluate the long-term impact of population growth on urban economic and social development. Economists argue that the optimal urban population should be decided by the market (Lu et al, 2011), and high living cost in large cities will promote the optimal population allocation between cities. Yet in China, prices for many goods (such as electricity, gas and water) and public services (e.g. public transportation) are distorted and much lower than market prices. Thus marketization and reforms are needed in these sectors before market can influence population distribution. In

¹² Due to the lack of micro-level data, this chapter cannot directly examine the impact of individual and institutional factors on labor market outcomes of both local residents and migrants, which deserves another paper when the data is available.

addition, government intervention is very strong in China, especially in cities such as Beijing. As the national capital, Beijing enjoys privileges in resource allocation, and it possesses unique opportunities and attractions to the population¹³. Thus there is a need to regulate government behaviors as well. While the debate on the optimal population size and migration control is unlikely to end in the near future, it is clear that migrants are increasingly important to Beijing's economy, and they have not brought many negative consequences at least on the labor market. Thus from the labor market perspective, controlling migration in Beijing seems to be baseless. Furthermore, eliminating discrimination against migrants will promote the development of labor market and greatly improve economic efficiency and social justice (World Bank, 2012). Thus relaxing migration control has broader socio-economic benefits.

Given the contradiction between existing migrant policy and the reality in the labor market, we recommend BMG to adopt a more lenient migrant policy. With migrants achieving same status as local residents as the ultimate goal, we recommend the BMG to adopt a point system as an interim policy to convert qualified migrants to local residents, who can enjoy same rights as local residents. Based on the system of resident certificate, this point system should also consider factors such as housing, occupation, education and skill, duration of social insurance payment, tax record, and credit history. The government should study and evaluate the point system, and design and implement increasingly relaxed policies for migrants to obtain Beijing hukou. Meanwhile, BMG should withdraw from many aspects of resource allocation such as controlling housing prices and setting overly low prices for public services to reduce man-made advantages in Beijing, and allow the market to regulate migration. In addition, Beijing needs to reposition itself in the regional development, promotes the development of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei metropolitan region, and thus reduces the population pressure on resource and the environment in Beijing.

¹³ For example, it is much easier for students with Beijing hukou to be admitted into good universities, and it is much easier for people with Beijing hukou to be hired by central and Beijing municipal government agencies and State-owned companies.

References

- Alonso, William, The Economics of Urban Size, *Papers in Regional Science*, Volume 26, Issue 1, pages 67–83, January 1971.
- Appleton S., J. Knight ,L., Song and Q. Xia, Contrasting Paradigms: Segmentation and Competitiveness in the formation of the Chinese Labor Market, *Journal of Chinese Economics and Business Studies*, 2004,2,3.
- BCHURD, 2012. Notice about Issues related to per capita Living Space Standard for Rental Housing in Beijing (in Chinese).北京市住房和城乡建设委员会, 关于公布我市出租房屋人均居住面积标准有关问题的通知 (征求意见稿), 2012
- Beijing Bureau of Public Security, 1985. Detailed Regulations about Implementing “Regulations about Hukou Management of Temporary Resident Population from Beijing Municipal Government” (in Chinese). (北京市公安局, ”实施《北京市人民政府关于暂住人口户口管理的规定》的细则”, 1985年11月26日颁布.)
- Beijing Committee of Construction, 1995. Regulations for Migrants’ Rental Housing Management in Beijing(in Chinese). (北京市建设委员会, 《北京市外地来京人员租赁房屋管理规定》, 1995 年颁布实施, 2004 年废止)
- Beijing Committee of Housing and Urban Rural Development (BCHURD), 2011. Stipulations about Rental Housing Management in Beijing(in Chinese). 北京市住房和城乡建设委员会, 北京市房屋租赁管理若干规定, 2011
- Beijing Municipal Government (BMG), 2001, No. 73. An Experiment Method for Migrant Entrepreneurs Investing in Beijing to Obtain Beijing Registration(in Chinese). (北京市人民政府, 《关于外地来京投资开办私营企业人员办理北京市常住户口试行办法》(京政办发[2001]73 号) , 2001 年 10 月 1 日)
- Beijing Municipal Government, 2005. The Comprehensive Plan for Beijing (2004–2020) (in Chinese). 北京市人民政府, 北京城市总体规划 (2004-2020 年), 2005
- Beijing Municipal Government, 2010. Suggestions for Formulating the 12th Five Year Plan for Economic and Social development in Beijing(in Chinese). 中共北京市委十届八次全会, 《中共北京市委关于制定北京市国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议》, 2010年11月30日
- Beijing Statistics Bureau (BSB), 2011. Report of Main Statistics from the 6th Population Census in Beijing (in Chinese). (北京统计局, 北京市第六次人口普查主要数据公报, 2011).
- Beijing Statistics Bureau, 2010. *Beijing Economic Census Yearbook, 2008*(in Chinese). Beijing: China Statistics Press. 北京第二次全国经济普查领导小组办公室,北京统计局,国家统计局北京调查总队,北京经济普查年鉴2008, 中国统计出版社,2010
- BMG, 1985. No. 166. Regulations about Migrants’ Hukou Management from Beijing Municipal Government, implemented in 1986, suspended in 1995(in Chinese). (北京市人民政府, 京政发〔1985〕166 号文件《北京市人民政府关于暂住人口户口管理的规定》(1985 年颁布,1986 年实施,1995 年废止))

- BMG, 1995. Regulations about Migrants Hukou Management in Beijing (in Chinese) .(北京市人民政府第11号令, 《外地来京人员户籍管理规定》, 1995年6月13日.)
- BMG, 1997. Regulations about Migrants Hukou Management in Beijing (Revised in 1997) (in Chinese).
- BMG, 1995. Management Regulations for People Doing Business in Beijing (in Chinese).(北京市政府, 《北京市外地来京务工经商人员管理条例》, 1995 年 4 月 14 日颁布).
- BMG, 1997. Management Regulations for People Doing Business in Beijing(Revised in 1997) (in Chinese) .
- BSB, 2001. Report of Main Statistics from the 5th Population Census in Beijing (in Chinese) .(北京统计局, 北京市第五次人口普查主要数据公报, 2001)
- BSB, 2011. *Beijing Statistical Yearbook*. Beijing: China Statistics Publisher (in Chinese) .(北京统计局, 北京统计年鉴, 中国统计出版社, 2011)
- CCP Central Committee and State Council, 2006. Suggestions for Promoting Healthy Development of Small Cities and Towns(in Chinese). 中共中央、国务院, 《关于促进小城镇健康发展的若干意见》, 2000 年 6 月,
- CCP Central Committee, 1993. Decision about Several Issues related to Establishing Socialist Market Economic System(in Chinese).中共中央, 《关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定》, 1993 年 11 月
- Central Committee of Comprehensive Management, 1995. Suggestions for Strengthening Migrant Management(in Chinese). 中央综治委, 《关于加强流动人口管理工作的意见》, 1995 年 9 月
- Central Committee of Comprehensive Management, 2007. Suggestions for Further Strengthening Service and Management for Migrants(in Chinese).中央综治委, 《关于进一步加强流动人口服务和管理工作的意见》, 2007 年
- Chan, Kam Wing, 1994. *Cities with Invisible Walls: Reinterpreting Urbanization in Post-1949 China*, Oxford University Press, USA
- Chan, Kam Wing, 1994. Hukou Reform and Rural-Urban migration in China, in *Labor Migration in Transitional China*(in Chinese), ed. By Cai, Fang. Beijing: Social Science Literature Press. Pp. 38–59. 陈金永, 中国户籍制度改革和城乡人口迁移, 蔡昉等主编, 中国转轨时期劳动力流动, 社会科学文献出版社, 2006, 38–59。
- Chan, Kam Wing, 2009. The Chinese Hukou System at 50, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 50(2): 197–221
- Chen Yu , Occupational Attainment of Migrants and Local Workers: Findings from a Survey in Shanghai's Manufacturing Sector. *Urban Studies*; 01/01/2011, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p3–21, 19p.

- Chen, Wenya , 2011. Heated Discussion about Population Diffusion in Beijing, Will Housing Determine the Index of Happiness(in Chinese)? *Economy Observation*, Jan. 27. 陈文雅, 北京热议人口疏散,房子决定幸福指数? 经济观察报, 2011, 1月27
日http://www.eeo.com.cn/industry/real_estate/2011/01/26/192433.shtml
- Cheng, Tianjun and Seldon, Mark, 1994. The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System. *The China Quarterly*, 139: 644–668.
- Cheng, Yingfang, 2005. Institutional Arrangement and Identity Assimilation for Migrant Workers, *Sociological Research*(in Chinese), Issue. 3. 陈映芳, 2005,“农民工制度安排与身份认同”,《社会学研究》, 第三期。
- Ding, Chengri, Song Yan, Gerrit Knaap、Huang Yan,2005. *Urban Planning and Spatial Structure*(in Chinese), Beijing: China Architecture Industry Press. (丁成日, 宋彦, Gerrit Knaap、黄艳, 城市规划与空间结构, 中国建筑工业出版社, 2005)
- Dong X., & P. Bowls, Segmentation and Discrimination in China's Emerging Industrial Labor Market, *Chinese Economic Review*, 2001,13(2–3),170–196.
- Du, Xin, 2011. The Impact of Hukou Characteristics on Urban Labor Market—A Case Study of Beijing. *Economy Commentary*(in Chinese), 5: 98–106. 杜鑫, 户籍特征对城市劳动力市场状态的影响—以北京市为例, 经济评论, 2011, 5: 98–106
- Duan, Chengrong and Zhu, Fuyan, 2009. “Control Population through Housing”: the Basics of Migrant Management, *Urban Issues*(in Chinese), 4: 76–79. 段成荣, 朱富言,“以房管人”:流动人口管理的基础, 城市问题, 2009, 4: 76–79。
- Ellis, Mark and Wright, Richard, “The Industrial Division of Labor among Immigrants and Internal Migrants to the Los Angeles Economy,” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1999), pp. 26–54.
- Huang, Hai, 2011. Beijing is Controlling the Beijing Hukou Quota Again after Controlling Cars, *Xinhua Daily News*(in Chinese). Jan. 20th. (黄海, 限车后,北京再限进京指标? 2011年01月20日, 新华每日电讯), http://news.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2011-01/20/c_13698541.htm
- Huang, Youqin, 2012. Low-income Housing in China: Policies and Practices, *The China Quarterly*, 212.
- Jiang, Xiangqun and Qin Yanyan, 2011. Understand the Issue of Population Size in Beijing from the Perspective of Scientific and Reasonable Functional Positioning. *Beijing Social Sciences*(in Chinese), 2: 53–58. 姜向群,秦艳艳, 以科学、合理的功能定位认识北京市的人口规模问题, 北京社会科学, 2011, 2: 53–58.
- Knight J., & L. Song, The rural urban divide, Economic Disparities and Interactions in China, *Oxford Economic Papers*,1999,51,284–299.
- Li, Jiangtao, 2004. Beijing Cancels School Enrollment Fee (Jie Du Fei) (in Chinese). 李江涛, 北京取消借读费, 2004年07月10日, <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-07-10/06223042695s.shtml>

- Li, Peilin, 1996. Migrant Workers' Social Network and Social Status, *Sociological Research*(in Chinese), Issue 4. 李培林, 1996, 《流动民工的社会网络和社会地位》, 《社会学研究》第4期。
- Lu, Ming, 2011. Scientifically Understand City Size and Distribution(in Chinese), <http://www.ibtimes.com.cn> 陆铭: 科学地认识城市规模与布局, <http://www.ibtimes.com.cn> 2011 年 04 月 01 日
- Ma LJ, Xiang B. Native Place, migration and the emergence of peasant enclaves in Beijing. *The China Quarterly*.155:546–581.
- Meng Xin ,Junsen Zhang, The Two-tier Labor Market in Urban China, *Journal of Comparative Economics*; Sep2001, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p485–505
- Ministry of Finance, State Council Development and Research Center, and World Bank, 2012. *China in 2030: Developing a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-income Society*(in Chinese). 财政部、国务院发展研究中心和世界银行, 2030 年的中国: 建设现代、和谐、有创造力的高收入社会, 2012
- Ministry of Public Security, 1992. An Urgent Notice about Decisively Stopping the Wrong Practice of Open Sale of Non-agricultural Hukou(in Chinese). 公安部, 关于坚决制止公开出卖非农业户口错误做法的紧急通知, 1992 年 5 月
- Ministry of Public Security, 1992. Notice about Implementing Localized Hukou System in Cities and Towns(in Chinese).公安部, 《关于实行当地有效城镇居民户制度的通知》1992 年 10 月
- Ministry of Public Security, 1997. Experiment Scheme for Hukou Management System Reform in Small Cities and Towns(in Chinese). 公安部, 《小城镇户籍管理制度改革试点方案》, 1997 年 6 月
- Ministry of Public Security, 1985. Temporary Regulations about Managing Temporary Migrants in Cities and Towns(in Chinese). 公安部, 《公安部关于城镇暂住人口管理的暂行规定》的通知, 1985年7月13日.
- National Statistics Bureau (NSB), 2011. Report of Main Statistics from the 6th Population Census(in Chinese) (国家统计局, 国务院人口普查办, 第六次人口普查主要数据公报, 2011)
- Office for National Statistics of UK, Local area labour markets: Statistical indicators, April 2011
- Sari, Pekkala and Kerr, William R., Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey, No.09-013 Working Paper, January 2011.pp.22.
- Shen Jianfa and Yefang Huang, The working and living space of the floating population in China, *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 44, No. 1, April 2003,51–62.
- Shen, Jianfa, A study of the temporary population in Chinese cities. *Habitat International*; Sep2002, Vol. 26 Issue 3, p363, 15p

- Smith, Christopher J., 2000. The Floating Population in China's Cities: A New Ethnic Underclass, In *China's Economic Growth: The Impact on Regions, Migration and the Environment*, edited by terry Cannon (2000), London: MacMillan Press. Pp. 91–114.
- Solinger, Dorothy J.(1999) *Contesting citizenship in urban China: Peasant migrants, the state, and the logic of the market*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Song, Hongyuan,Huang Huabo,Liu Guangming. 2006. Analysis of Policy Issues related to Labor Migration in the Countryside, in *Labor Movement in Transitional China* (in Chinese), ed. By Cai, Fang and Bai, Nansheng. Beijing: Social Science Press. Pp. 167–190. (宋洪远等, 黄华波,刘光明, 关于农村劳动力流动的政策问题分析, 见蔡昉, 白南生主编, 中国转轨时期的劳动力流动, 社会科学出版社, 2006, 167–190)
- Song, Jian and He, Lei. 2008. Dilemmas and Exploration of Migrant Management in Chinese Cities—Discussion based on Management Practice in Beijing. *Population Research* (in Chinese). 32(5): 41–57. 宋健, 何蕾, 中国城市流动人口管理的困境与探索—基于北京市管理实践的讨论, 人口研究, 2008, 32 (5): 41–57
- Song, Jian and Hou, Jiawei, 2007. Migrant Management: Evolution of Related Policies and Regulations in Beijing, *Market and Population Analysis*(in Chinese), 3: 14–22 宋健,侯佳伟.流动人口管理:北京市相关政策法规的演变.市场与人口分析.2007;3:14–22
- State Council, 1984. Notice from State Council about Rural Migrants Register in Towns(in Chinese). 国务院,《国务院关于农民进入集镇落户问题的通知》, 1984 年 10 月 13 日
- State Council, 1990. Notice about Doing a Good Job in Labor Employment(in Chinese). 国务院,《关于做好劳动就业工作的通知》, 1990 年 4 月.
- State Council, 2003. Management Method for Helping the Homeless and Beggars in Cities(in Chinese). 国务院,《城市生活无着的流浪乞讨人员救助管理办法》2003 年 6 月
- State Council, 2006. Suggestions from State Council about Solving Problems related to Rural Migrant Workers(in Chinese).国务院,《国务院关于解决农民工问题的若干意见》2006 年.
- State Council, 2011. Notice from State Council about Distributing the 12th Five-year Plan for Population and Development in China(in Chinese). No. 39. 国务院,国发〔2011〕39 号,国务院关于印发国家人口发展“十二五”规划的通知, 2012
- State Council, 2012. Notice about Actively and Smoothly Pushing Forward the Hukou Management Reform(in Chinese). 国务院办公厅,《关于积极稳妥推进户籍管理制度改革的通知》, 2012 年 02 月 23 日
- Sun, Qian, 2012. State Council Announced the Notice for Hukou Reform a Year Later, and for the First Time Obtaining Hukou in Prefectural Level Cities is Possible. *Beijing Times*(in Chinese), Feb. 24. 孙乾, 2012, 国办时隔一年公布户籍改革通知, 地级市落户首次放开, 京华时报, 2012 年 02 月 24 日, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3dd81de50102dwe9.html

- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployment Rates for Large Metropolitan Areas, April 20, 2012, <http://www.bls.gov/lau/malrgrank10.htm>
- Wang, Dewen, Wu, Yaowu and Cai, Fang, 2004. Migration, Unemployment and Urban Labor Market Divide—Why do Migrants Have Low Unemployment Rate? *World Economy Collection*(in Chinese), Issue 1. 王德文, 吴要武, 蔡昉, 迁移、失业与城市劳动力市场分割—为什么农村迁移者的失业率很低? 《世界经济文汇》2004年第1期。
- Wang, Guixin and Shen, Jianfa, 2001. A Study on the Complementary and Substitution Relationship between Local and Migrant Labor in Shanghai, *Population Research*(in Chinese), 1: 9–19. 王桂新, 沈建法, 上海外来劳动力与本地劳动力补缺替代关系研究, 人口研究, 2001, 1: 9–19
- Wang, Meiyang, 2005. Employment Opportunity and Wage Difference in the Urban Labor Market—A Study on Migrant Workers' Employment and Income, *China Social Science*(in Chinese), 5: 36–48. 王美艳, 城市劳动力市场上的就业机会与工资差异—外来劳动力就业与报酬研究, 中国社会科学, 2005, 5: 36–48
- Wang, Shuqin, 2009. Beijing Bureau of Human Resources Announced that it Has not Studied Policies related to Converting Employment and Residence Certificate into Beijing Hukou. *Beijing Times*(in Chinese), Feb. 24. 王树勤, 北京人事局: 未研究工作居住证转户口政策, 2009年02月24日, 京华时报, http://www.tianshannet.com.cn/news/content/2009-02/24/content_3858985.htm
- Wei, Minyan, 2012. Beijing is about to Implement the System of Residence Certificate, Gradually Breaking Off from the Simple Hukou Model, *New Beijing Times*(in Chinese), March 17. 魏铭言, 北京即将推广居住证制度, 逐步脱离简单户籍模式, 新京报, 2012年03月17日
- Xinhua Net, 2011. Beijing is Planning to Control Population through Multiple Approaches, and will Tighten up the Beijing Hukou Quota(in Chinese). 北京拟采取多种举措调控人口, 将收紧进京指标, 新华网 2011/02/15 http://www.szonline.net/Channel/201102/20110215/310562_4.html
- Yang, Kaizhong, 2007. Overpopulation and Solution in Beijing, in Population and Development—Edited Volume by *Beijing Population and Development Forum*(in Chinese), No. 3. Beijing: Tsinghua University Press. (杨开忠. 北京市人口超载形势和对策 [A]. 人口与发展——首都人口与发展论坛文辑: 第3辑 [C]. 北京: 清华大学出版社, 2007.)
- Yang, Yunyan, Urban Labour Market Segmentation: Some Observations Based on Wuhan Census Data, *The China Review*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 145–158.
- Yin, Zhifeng, Guo, Lin and Che, Shiyi, 2010. Migrants' Social Security Condition and Impact Factors—Analysis based on 2006 Micro-level Data in Beijing, *Beijing Science and Technology University Journal*(in Chinese), 26(2): 53–62. 尹志锋, 郭琳, 车士义, 流动人口的社会保障状况及影响因素分析—基于2006年北京市的微观数据, 北京科技大学学报(社会科学版), 2010, 26(2): 53–62

- Zhang, Chewei, 2003. An International Comparison of Unemployment Rate Definition and Urban Unemployment Rate in China, *World Economy*(in Chinese), 5: 47–58.张车伟, 失业率定义的国际比较及中国城镇失业率,世界经济,2003,5: 47–58.
- Zhao, Shukai, 1998. *Surveying Cities and Countryside—Observation and Research on Peasant Migration*(in Chinese). Beijing: China Agriculture Press. 赵树凯, 1998,《纵横城乡——农民流动的观察与研究》, 中国